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Nationalism and Latin American Music: Selected Case Studies and Theoretical Considerations

In discussing the criollo-based independence movements in the Americas during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Benedict Anderson notes that these cases are not easily explained by the usual means of national linguistic and cultural distinction.[1] He writes: "All, including the U.S.A., were creole states formed and led by people who shared a common language and common descent with those against whom they fought" (1991, 47). "Yet," he asserts, "they *were* national independence movements" (ibid., 49).

In this essay I argue that they were not initially *national* independence movements in the contemporary sense of (1) general inclusion of the state's population within the conception of nation or (2) popular sovereignty as the basis of state sovereignty and legitimacy vis-à-vis other states. In the early nineteenth century these ideas about *nations* and *nationalism* were not yet common, and the Latin American republics were formed according to different premises. In both Europe and Latin America, nineteenth-century notions of the nation were grounded in the discourse of Liberalism and criteria of sufficient territorial and population size, economic viability, and in Latin America at least some agreement regarding political principles. Eric Hobsbawm argues that a variety of nineteenth-century European nationalist movements were "evidently incompatible with definitions of nation as based on ethnicity, language, or common history, but, as we have seen, these were not decisive criteria of liberal nation-making" (1990, 33). Hobsbawm's observations hold true for the early Latin American republics as well.

A century later, during the early to middle decades of the twentieth century, more inclusive, culturally based conceptions of the *nation* became prominent in Latin America, sometimes in the context of populist movements. It was not until this point that efforts to link formerly disenfranchised populations to the state got underway. Consequently, the modular

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processes of post-colonial musical nationalism, especially the 'modernist reform' or folklorization of indigenous and African-American traditions also became common.

It seems significant that, in spite of the differing local conditions that led to populist projects in specific Latin American countries, they occur close together in time and produce very similar musical results–suggesting common underlying models, motivations, and causes. Let me offer the following points for further discussion. First, populist nationalist movements in Latin America were state-initiated programs that challenged the traditional ruling oligarchies by so-called 'modernizing' capitalist interests;[2] populism occurred within programs to increase domestic and trans-state capitalist activity beyond the established ruling groups. Second, this situation correlated with the increasingly inclusive notions of the nation marked by the expansion of the franchise, concessions such as labor and land reforms, and increased forging of cultural links with subaltern groups within the state's territory.

What we see in Latin America from the 1820s to the 1970s, and in nationalist discourse more generally, is an ever-increasing inclusivity and acceptance of different social groups within the nation conceived as a sociocultural unit with a corresponding increased emphasis on cultural nationalism and reformist transformations of subaltern cultural and musical practices. Contemporary 'multiculturalism' is the most recent example of this trajectory. Cultural and musical nationalism did not receive the same level of state emphasis in the early period because creating a unified population within the state's territory was not a primary criterion of the *nation*. This situation was to change in the first half of the twentieth century, the period when cosmopolitan nationalist discourse and practices were to develop a symbiotic relationship with individual state projects of capitalist expansion. Here, I offer some general comparisons of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Latin American nationalist movements to trace the development of increasing inclusivity and participation, resulting in the contemporary idea of nation. The comparisons also illustrate two basic types of musical nationalism that exist currently in many countries: (1) state-generated and elite-associated forms and (2) 'reformist-popular' or 'folkloric' styles–both historically layered in relation to elite and inclusive or populist nationalist periods in Latin America.

My primary aim in this paper is to map out broad tendencies and to offer some theoretical ideas for thinking about musical nationalism in Latin America; to this end I have selected examples that clearly illustrate the processes I am concerned with. A Bolivian case study is used to discuss the dynamics of early elite nationalism and national anthems. The well-known and rather classic cases of populist nationalism in Peru, Brazil, and Argentina illustrate the emergence of contemporary nationalist discourse

and increased state involvement with popular arts. These cases illustrate the relationships between populist nationalism and modernist capitalism as both a more encompassing discursive formation, and as a structure and mode of economic practice. In the final section of the paper, I compare the intersection of regionalism, nationalism, and capitalist-culture industries in Mexico and Peru to illustrate the different dynamics affecting musical nationalism in these two countries.

Certain scholars such as Partha Chatterjee and Michael Herzfeld have emphasized the need to study nationalism in relation to the particularity of specific cases, while others such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Anthony Smith have emphasized the general nature of nationalism as a phenomenon. My own position falls somewhere between. As a *cosmopolitan* ideology and political project (Turino 2000), nationalism and cultural nationalist programs exhibit a fair degree of redundancy, making general treatments possible and useful. At the same time, conditions within given states do require specific consideration as the Peru-Mexico comparison indicates. For the sake of brevity, I can only discuss relatively few cases in any detail, but it is my hope that the general ideas and tendencies suggested here will be of some use for the detailed analysis of musical nationalism in other Latin American and Caribbean contexts.

Nationalism as Discourse and Practice

Nation as a Historical Concept

In *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality,* Hobsbawm traces a series of major shifts in nationalist discourse. Nineteenth-century views of *nation* and *nationalism* were influenced both by Liberalism and Marxism and underpinned by general ideas of social evolution and human progress (1990, 41). Hobsbawm illustrates that throughout much of the nineteenth century in Europe, conceptions surrounding the viability of 'nations' involved a threshold of sufficient size and productivity as an economic unit, and longevity and strength as a political-military unit, rather than the contemporary idea of coterminous relations between a cultural unit and a state. Thus, 'nation-building' involved incorporating different groups to expand the nation-state territory, and not the processes of cultural homogenization of populations that we associate with 'nation-building' in the twentieth century (ibid., 25–38).

> The national [cultural] heterogeneity of nation-states was accepted, above all, because it seemed clear that small, and especially small and backward,

> nationalities had everything to gain by merging into greater nations, and making their contributions to humanity through these. (ibid., 34)

The contemporary idea of the *nation* as a culturally and linguistically unified group with the right to its own state emerged slowly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but received a major boost after World War I from the Wilsonian principle of making state borders coincide with the frontiers of nationality ('culture') and language.

> For the peace settlement after 1918 actually translated this principle into practice as far as was feasible, except for some politico-strategic decisions about the frontiers of Germany, and a few reluctant concessions to the expansionism of Italy and Poland. At all events, no equally systematic attempt has been made before or since, in Europe or anywhere else, to redraw the political map on national [that is, cultural] lines. (Hobsbawm 1990, 133)

Throughout his book, Hobsbawm makes a convincing case that the ideal of coterminous relations between *nations* (as homogeneous sociocultural units) and *states* has always been the exception, not the rule, in practice (e.g., ibid., 186). Nonetheless, it was the Wilsonian principle of articulating nations (as culture groups) with states and national self-determination "which is also in principle the Leninist one" (ibid., 40) that came to define nationalist discourse and shape nationalist movements in the twentieth century. Indeed, as applied to ex-colonies, the principle of 'national' self-determination was written into the United Nations Charter (Smith 1995, 15).

Hobsbawm traces the rising emphasis on popular political inclusion to a variety of causes beyond the Wilsonian principle from 1918 to 1950. Foremost among these were new competitors for people's loyalty such as cosmopolitan socialist movements, especially among working classes. Perhaps more important was the necessity of integrating and strengthening national economies in the period between the world wars:

> Inter-war Europe also happened to see the triumph of that other aspect of the 'bourgeois' nation which was discussed in an earlier chapter: *the nation as a 'national economy.'* Though most economists, businessmen and western governments dreamed of a return to the world economy of 1913, this proved to be impossible. (Hobsbawm 1990, 131; emphasis added)

By 1913 capitalist economies were already moving rapidly in the direction of large blocks of concentrated enterprise, supported, protected, and even to some extent guided by governments. In short, as the economic blizzard swept across the global economy, world capitalism retreated into the igloos of its nation-state economies and their associated empires (ibid., 132). These shifts in cosmopolitan nationalist discourse and practices in Europe during the first half of the twentieth century have direct bearing on Latin American nationalism.

Contemporary Problems of Terminology and Analysis

Hobsbawm's work is particularly valuable because it illustrates the recent and relative nature of contemporary nationalist conceptions. Especially in countries where nationalism has been particularly successful (e.g., the United States, England, France, Australia, Japan, and Mexico), the terms and premises of the post-Wilsonian discourse have merged with popular common sense. Since contemporary nationalist discourse projects coterminous relations between *nation* and *state,* these two words are commonly collapsed as synonyms. The popular conflation of *nation* and *state*–by politicians, scholars, the mainstream media, as well as in everyday speech–must be untangled if we are to come to a proper understanding of the shifting relations between states and the populations in their territories (endodiscursively equated with 'nations').

Equally important, national sentiment and eliding the proper conceptual relationship between nation and state are fundamental to mass moral-political habit and volunteerism. George W. Bush's recent assertion that Americans "speak with one voice" is a rhetorical device based on the elision of nation and state and the projection of a unified population. It has been dangerously effective in spite of the fact that under-reported mass demonstrations around the United States in opposition to *state* military action against Iraq (e.g., in October 2002, January 2003) show that 'we' do not speak with one voice. The elision of nation and state also leads to innocent populations being held responsible, and being killed, for the acts and policies of their governments, as on September 11 in New York and in Iraq. For both analytical clarity and political reasons, the concepts of *nation, state, nationalism,* and *national sentiment* should be distinguished conceptually and understood historically. That is, these concepts must be explored in relation to the contemporary commonsense version of reality that nationalist discourse has propagated.

State and Nation

The *state* comprises the government-centered institutions and social relations of formal control and welfare, backed by a claim to the legitimate use of force within a given territory; this, together with claims of territorial autonomy, define it as an entity. The distinction between a state and "civil society" is not hard and fast, for example, in one time and place religious institutions or universities may be part of the state apparatus, whereas in others they may belong more firmly to civil society. The important point, however, is that regardless of one's subjective feelings about belonging, the state enforces the rights, duties, and the very fact of belonging with legal sanctions–passports, taxes, military service, school attendance.

I reserve the word *nationalism* to refer to a political discourse and to political movements and arrangements using the premises of nationalist discourse. As discussed above, the main premises of the contemporary form of nationalism were in place by the mid-twentieth century: (1) the concept of a *nation* as a somehow unified sociocultural entity; (2) the right of every nation to govern itself, that is, a coterminous relation between nation and state; and (3) political legitimacy being based on, at least the guise of, popular sovereignty.

In this context, nation is an identity unit whose members define themselves as a nation in relation to having or aspiring to their own state by the logic of contemporary nationalist discourse. That is, as opposed to kin-based, territorial, occupational, physical, linguistic, or other bases of social identification, national identity depends on a conception–'nation'–that nationalist discourse itself has propagated. Whereas state membership is defined and enforced with legal sanctions, being part of a nation depends on a more informal set of subjective feelings. Anthony Smith (1971), among others, has referred to the feelings of belonging to a nation upon which nationhood depends as national sentiment.

Whereas nationalist discourse typically projects cultural homogeneity as the defining feature of 'nation', national sentiment is the more operationally significant force linking populations and states. National sentiment can and often does operate across cultural difference. Native Americans, African Americans, and Italian Americans can feel part of the nation, and be willing to fight and die for their country while remaining quite distinct culturally. National sentiment gives rise to concrete manifestations of belonging and pride and even feelings such as "my country [read: government] right or wrong." People also often find themselves in the personal crisis of shame and guilt because they at once feel that they belong to the nation while 'their' government carries out acts which they find fundamentally immoral, dangerous, or illogical. Pride and shame are two sides of the same national sentiment coin. Both indicate a strong identification with the state and the intimacy of belonging, as Michael Herzfeld has pointed out. Creating or sustaining broad-based national sentiment is a primary goal of nationalist movements and governments.

Cultural Nationalism

With the formation of new post-colonial states in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean around the mid-twentieth century, the basic premises of nationalism were often already common sense for local leaderships (Turino 2000, chap. 5) or were at least understood to be required for legitimacy, for example, in relation to the United Nations Charter. The resultant need to

create a 'nation' where in many places a suitable identity unit did not exist, and even the notion of nation did not exist, led to major efforts in the realm of cultural nationalism. *Cultural nationalism* is the semiotic work of using expressive practices and forms to fashion the concrete emblems that stand for and create the 'nation', that distinguish one nation from another, and most importantly, that serve as the basis for socializing citizens to inculcate national sentiment. In all nation-states and aspiring nation-states, cultural nationalism is an on-going process. Cultural nationalism is not a celebratory or entertainment-oriented frill attached to serious political work; it is one of the essential pillars upon which the entire nationalist edifice stands. Music, dance, visual arts, political speech, and a broad variety of other expressive cultural practices, in turn, are at the center of cultural nationalist projects.

Musical Nationalism

I consider *musical nationalism* to be a subset of cultural nationalism; I define it narrowly as any use of music for nationalist purposes. By this I mean that it is music used to create, sustain, or change an identity unit that conceives of itself as a nation in relation to having its own state, as well as for state or nationalist party purposes in relation to creating, sustaining, or transforming national sentiment. My definition emphasizes use and effects, rather than necessarily being connected to style or motivations among the original music makers–Ronald Reagan's lauding of Springsteen's song "Born in the U.S.A." is a famous, laughable, attempt at musical nationalism.[3]

While interesting variety exists, such as Mussolini's use of Palestrina or Zimbabwean guerrillas' use of Protestant hymns in the 1970s war, there is an astounding degree of redundancy in the processes and forms of musical nationalism in the contemporary world. The most obvious type of musical nationalism includes military music that is indexically linked to states through contextual use, and patriotic songs and national anthems that make the connection through their texts as well as indexically. Hence, I illustrate that this type represents an early historical stratum of state-sponsored musical nationalism.

Another common form of musical nationalism in the twentieth century involves the reformist fusion of local, non-cosmopolitan instruments, sounds, and genres within a largely cosmopolitan aesthetic, stylistic, and contextual frame. The national 'folk' orchestras of Bulgaria and Mali, the urban folkloric groups of Bolivia, the *indigenista estudiantinas* of Peru in the 1920s, the national orchestras of China, the Ballet Folklórico of Mexico, the electric guitar-*mbira* bands of Zimbabwe, the Trinidadian steelbands, among so many other examples, fit this pattern; the processes transforming indigenous forms are rather standard (e.g., compare Chopyak 1987; Noll

1991; Turino 1993, 2000; Buchanan 1995; Stuempfle 1995; Moore 1997; Scruggs 1999; Sheehy 1999; Tuohy 2001; Hagedorn 2001; Rios 2002).

The term *reformism* comes from nationalists' own language about their cultural nationalist programs–local cultural practices are 'reformed' in light of 'modern' techniques, aesthetics, and contexts. From Mao and Mugabe to Perón and Velasco, what is typically expressed is that a *new* national culture will be forged from the *best* of local culture combined with the *best* of 'modern' (cosmopolitan) culture. The localist elements are important for emblematic distinction and to foster identification within the country. The cosmopolitan features are important to create iconicity with other nation-states and as the basis of acceptance and popularity abroad. The cosmopolitan features are also chosen, almost as a matter of course, because the designers of state-cultural nationalism are typically cosmopolitan themselves (Turino 2000, chaps. 5, 6, 9). What is important for my purposes is that reformist or 'folklorization' processes of musical nationalism grew up with and served the more inclusive post-Wilsonian nationalist projects.

Until recently, the style trend most typically studied as musical nationalism by musicologists involved the inclusion of 'vernacular' references within elite art music compositions. In terms of process, this resembles 'folkloric' products in that localist and cosmopolitan elements are combined, but the situation is reversed from the reformist type discussed above. Rather than transforming indigenous or grassroots traditions according to cosmopolitan aesthetics and contexts, here cosmopolitan art music genres are seasoned with local elements (e.g., pentatonicism, or indigenous instruments, or popular melodies and rhythms; e.g., see Béhague 1971; Béhague 1979, chaps. 4, 5).

This type of composition may be connected to national sentiment for the composer and audiences, in which case it fits the framework that I am developing here. In other instances, cosmopolitan Latin American composers and audiences may respond to such 'vernacular' references simply as a style trend derived from European models, or for exotic appeal. This type of composition may well involve all three motivations and uses, and detailed ethnographies among producers and audiences would be useful for understanding the specific dynamics involved in relation to political nationalism.

Early Nineteenth-Century Independence Movements

Independence movements in Latin America were set in motion by a variety of factors. Beginning in the 1760s, the Bourbon Reforms were designed to strengthen the empire politically and fiscally, but in fact helped set the stage for the wars of independence through the alteration of criollo status vis-à-vis peninsulars and the mother country. The Reforms created regular criollo army units with criollo officers. A free trade reform of 1778, which

opened thirteen ports in Spain to all the major ports in Latin America, created new groups of wealthy criollos while threatening the positions of those who formerly benefited from monopolistic practices. One result of this shifting economic situation was that it became clear to many influential colonists that they needed to design their own economies. Most directly, independence movements resulted from Napoleon's seizure of the Spanish throne in 1808:

> In accordance with traditional Spanish political theory, and in some cases propelled by a concurrence found in the Enlightenment, . . . many of the colonies began to govern themselves in the name of the deposed king. When Ferdinand was restored to the throne and proclaimed the return of royal absolutism in 1814, many colonists decided to seek more formal and truer independence. (Kinsbruner 2000, 7)

Enlightenment ideas, especially Adam Smith's economics in conjunction with John Locke's individualist, property-oriented conception of state and society, helped form the basis of nineteenth-century Liberalism–one of the primary ideologies influencing the newly independent Latin American states. Leadership and the franchise in new Latin American states involved elite criollos. The politically active citizenry was usually determined constitutionally by property ownership and by literacy, and it was this small group who directed the course of things for the 'passive citizenry' and the 'common good'.

To contend that these were national independence movements in the sense understood today, Benedict Anderson emphasizes a statement made by San Martín in 1821: "in the future, aborigines [of Peru] shall not be called Indians or natives; they are children and citizens of Peru and they shall be known as Peruvians" (Anderson 1983, 50). San Martín's phrase "in the future" is the optimum one. Theoretically, any adult male could become politically active by gaining property and/or becoming literate, regardless of race.[4] But in actuality, these stipulations "eliminated nearly the entire adult male population from active citizenship," true also in the United States, Great Britain, and France, where very few adult males were allowed to vote in elections at that time (Kinsbruner 2000, 110). Kinsbruner writes:

> Nineteenth-century Liberals were clearly not democrats in the sense of Rousseau's general will, and in fact they wrote constitutions that, like the United States Constitution, carefully guarded against *democracy* in the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century meaning of the term. There were democrats or men with democratic leanings among them, like Carrera of Chile; but these men were quickly repressed and their ideas pushed aside for nearly a half century. (ibid., 2000, 112; original emphasis)

Nineteenth-century Liberal beliefs in progress and the potential of the individual led the Latin American founding fathers to look forward to a

time of fuller political participation, but it was slow in coming, especially among the lower social *castes*–indigenous peoples, African-Americans, and mixed groups. In fact, Liberal emphasis on individual property rights sometimes had disastrous effects; privatization of indigenous communal lands in Peru, for example, led to greater usurpation by large landowners (Romero 2001, 125), and reduced these societies' abilities to defend themselves. In Argentina and Chile, to name two infamous examples, San Martín's idealism did not hold sway, and indigenous peoples were systematically slaughtered as they were in North America. So much for national inclusion.

The seeds of popular sovereignty existed theoretically but not actually, and the notion of an inclusive nation, too, was only incipient. Rather than being based initially on 'nation' as distinctive cultural unit, the early Latin American republics organized around issues of economic interest, ideas about political organization, as well as more or less according to colonial political boundaries. Indeed, the franchised members of the republics were primarily elite criollos, and it was precisely the members of this group in the different republics that were not culturally distinct from each other or very much so from Spaniards. Nations and nationalism in the contemporary sense were not yet operative ideas in nineteenth-century republics.

The Beginnings of Musical Nationalism

Musical nationalism in the early republics was also incipient and grounded in cosmopolitan rather than distinctive local popular traditions as would take place a century later. Music used in conjunction with state ceremony was usually in the mold of European military band music or Italian opera. This repeated connection between music and *state* ceremony established gradually the indexical meanings for the first type of nationalist music, but note that this process began before the contemporary notion of nation had emerged.

As an idea, the social necessity of having a national anthem developed slowly and in fact preceded the nation-state formation, beginning with England in the mid-1700s and Spain and France later in the century.[5] Anthony Smith makes the argument that the French Revolution was a nationalist and not simply a bourgeois revolution based on the fact that its leaders politicized the ideas of *la nation, la patrie,* and *le citoyen;* chose a new French flag to replace the royal standard; and in the crisis of war after 1792, adopted a new anthem, the *Marseillaise* (1998, 126). Smith highlights the ideas and emblems that would come to be widely adopted to signal nationalist movements and "nationhood."

Many Latin American countries followed the incipient model and adopted national anthems early on–for example, Argentina in 1813, Chile in 1819, and Peru in 1821. The styles of these musical pieces were not

chosen to distinguish culturally one republic from another; indeed the active criollo citizenry were not culturally distinct. In his article on national anthems, Malcolm Boyd writes:

> the tendency for an anthem of one country to resemble those of its neighbors is nowhere more clearly shown than in the example of South and Central America. As a group they are strongly influenced by the style of nineteenth-century Italian opera, and at least three of them were composed by Italians. (1980, 46–47).

In the creation of musical emblems for the state at this point in time, there was no impetus to mark local stylistic distinctions because the idea of nation as a distinct *cultural* unit was not yet operative as a basis for political legitimacy. Rather than indexing cultural uniqueness, the official anthems were adopted to exhibit iconicity with other legitimate states in cosmopolitan terms; that is, the assertion of legitimacy and sovereignty for emerging states was based on *similarity* with existing states *not difference.*

As discussed by LaDona Martin-Frost, the case of Bolivia's national anthem is particularly instructive. She notes that "Bolivia's legitimacy as a sovereign state was disputed during the first decades of the Republic (1825–45) by the neighboring countries of Peru, and Argentina, and among Bolivians themselves" (1997, 15). The Bolivian national anthem was premiered in 1845 in a state celebration to commemorate a battle resulting in the first definitive boundary of the country between Bolivia and Peru. The Bolivian president commissioned Benedetto Vincenti, an Italian composer, to create the anthem.

The anthem was first performed by a military band in front of the governmental palace during the celebration; the second performance was of a five-part choral arrangement with orchestral accompaniment in the municipal theater the same evening. Martin-Frost suggests that the relatively late date (1845) of adopting a national anthem pertained to an insecurity about Bolivia's viability, and she finds it significant that the anthem was commissioned and premiered in an event carefully orchestrated to proclaim sovereignty definitively.[6]

In Bolivia, the use of an operatic anthem and the first contexts and media of performance are marked by cosmopolitan conformity rather than cultural distinction from other countries. Martin-Frost, like other historians of the early Latin American republics, however, suggests that the use of European-styled music and performance contexts and the importation of European composers and artists were a means of maintaining the cultural prestige of the criollo elites and a means of marking distinction from other social groups *within* the state, that is, Indians, African Americans, mestizos, and mulattos. The use of European forms resulted from and functioned to support the elite identity of the active citizenry, 'the nation', of the time (see also Iturriaga and Estenssoro 1985, 115–17), and to exclude

the subaltern groups from the nation. This type of exclusionary attitude persisted in many Latin American countries well into the twentieth century. My favorite example comes from Peru where, as late as 1946, a representative to the legislature suggested a law requiring people from the highlands (read 'Indians') to carry passports to enter the criollo-dominated capital of Lima (Turino 1993, 120).

Latin American Oligarchies and International Capital

By the second half of the nineteenth century, the wealth of the ruling oligarchies of many Latin American countries was heavily dependent on the control of cheap labor and resources at home and on foreign capital for infrastructure (e.g., railroads) in relation to an export-oriented economy. This structure supported a small elite well but not other sectors of Latin American populations. It led to the general perception of an alliance between the oligarchies and foreign capital. In many countries there were also unequal internal economic-political relations with one region dominating others.

The dismal economic conditions of peasants and the working class–the bulk of states' populations–did not allow for the growth of a domestic consumer economy to support local industrial and economic growth, thus restricting wealth to the oligarchy and maintaining a dependence on foreign, largely U.S. and British, capital and control. Economic dependence threatened the political independence of states in very real terms, as recent International Monetary Fund and World Bank economic structural adjustment programs and loan arrangements still illustrate.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, foreign economic control contradicted notions about nation-state sovereignty, moreover, oligarchic rule chafed with the growing conception of 'nation' as an inclusive, sovereign, cultural unit. Alliances between foreign capital and the oligarchies proved a frustrating obstacle to economic improvement and expansion of incipient Latin American middle classes. The bulk of the literature on nationalism clearly indicates that nationalist movements (in the contemporary-inclusive sense) are typically spearheaded by "middle groups"–between the established elites and the masses. Such is the case for Latin American populist movements that emerged to challenge and overturn the existing systems. There was a symbiotic relationship between the discourse of a more inclusive nationalism and processes of expanding capitalism to new sectors within given states. Both populist nationalists and aspiring capitalists needed the masses to confront the old oligarchies: for political support, as workers, and as consumers. As Hobsbawm observed regarding Europe during the interwar period, the aspect of *'nation' as 'national economy'* came to the fore.

Populist Nationalism

Nicola Miller has noted that "the key change from nineteenth- to twentieth-century nationalisms in [Latin America] was surely the shift from exclusion to inclusion of the masses" (1999, 39). This is particularly pronounced in countries that had populist movements, or at least currents.[7] Examples of Latin American populism, more or less developed, include Mexico, in the context of and following the 1910 revolution; in Peru with President Leguia (1919–30), and more markedly with President Velasco (1968–75); in Brazil with Getúlio Vargas in 1930–45; in Cuba during the early Machado government, beginning in 1924, and after Castro's revolution in 1959; in Argentina with the Radical Civic Union in 1916–30 and Perón (1946–55); in Bolivia beginning with the Movimiento Nacionial Revolucionario in 1952; and in Chile with Allende (1970–73). In places such as Peru, Argentina, and Cuba where there were marked populist moments earlier and later in the twentieth century, the latter movements were more concerted and systematic in their attempts to affect and integrate the economic, political, educational, media, and artistic fields in relation to the general population. I have selected three cases for discussion–Perón, Vargas, and Velasco–to illustrate the similar approach to populism, especially in relation to the performing arts, in three very different social and historical contexts. The tendencies suggested by here might serve as a basis for comparison with other nationalist movements during the second half of the twentieth century.

In these cases populist nationalism was the attempt to create broad-based nations in places where they did not exist, and to firm up the crucial nation-state linkage whereby governments could attempt to better direct the activities and attitudes of state populations. In contrast to the perennialist theory of nationalism that suggests that a historically evolved, culturally distinct 'nation' will seek its own sovereignty, from the bottom up, populist-nationalism in Latin America typically involved top-down, state-generated movements. Populism was the attempt on the part of new leaderships to circumvent the power of regional oligarchies by tying the masses to a strengthened centralized state through concessions–for example, state protection of labor and land reforms–made to the working class and the peasantry.

Unlike the previous situation, by the mid-twentieth century, the masses were perceived as a key alternative basis for political power that, to succeed, must be founded on economic strength and independence. This shift in perception correlated with capitalist development. Capitalism requires ever-expanding growth in production to stay competitive with other capitalist entities at both the level of individual enterprises and at the level of states. Expanding production requires expanding markets. By the mid-twentieth century, the masses were understood to be crucial to economic development and political independence of sovereign states as labor, but

equally important for state sovereignty, as consumers. Creating a consumer base requires more dispensable income among a greater number of people, and it requires culture change: teaching people to desire the products produced. Populist governments in Latin America became more involved with cultural activities, including music, than ever before because of a recognition of these systemic relations.

Nations and National Economies

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries individual regions within Brazil had tremendous economic autonomy. The republican constitution of 1891, for example, gave states the right to contract foreign debts without interference from the central government (Vianna 1999, 40). During this period the coffee-cultivating oligarchy of São Paulo and Minas Gerais impeded the power of the central state in the interest of their own economic independence.[8] At the head of a Liberal Alliance representing the urban middle class, reformist army officers, and non-coffee growing regions and interests, Getúlio Vargas came to power in 1930; he began working to centralize state control in opposition to the oligarchy and to develop broader segments of the economy. As part of the project to strengthen the centralized state, Jordan Young, among others, noted that Vargas

> saw the political implications and power to be gained by working with labor, [his government] enacted social legislation to aid the working class. Labor courts were set up, and some serious attention began to be directed to the problems of lower-income groups in Brazil. (1967, 88)

Such concessions to "the masses" are a central pillar of populist movements.

In Peru Juan Velasco and his Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (RGAF) staged a successful coup in 1968 in response to peasant and guerrilla movements in the highlands, rising militancy among urban labor, and corruption in the civilian government during the 1960s. In reaction to the various crises facing the state, the RGAF proclaimed an anti-imperialist, antioligarchic nationalist ideology and realized that popular participation would be necessary if the revolution was to succeed in creating economic development. Velasco stated that he conceived of the "Peruvian problematic as a totality. This implies an integral and integrated vision of the social, economic, and cultural manifestations" (1972, 65).

Velasco courted the working class but was more successful with the masses of indigenous peasants because of his bold agrarian reform of 1969 (see Turino 1991, 1993). In addition to redistributing hacienda lands to peasants, the reform included the formation of 'rationally organized' or 'modern' agrarian cooperatives that were to generate surplus produce for the cities and cash for the members. In a speech selling the reform, Velasco

made it clear that it was a definitive move against the still powerful landed oligarchy: "it is the poor," he emphasized, "who suffer from underdevelopment and the oligarchy and its allies in other countries that benefit from it. Thus, this revolution makes a frontal assault against the oligarchy and its accomplices within and outside of Peru" (1971, vol. 1, 143). Linking the traditional elite with foreign capital, and emphasizing 'national' economic sovereignty he went on to say: "the land will never again return into the hands of large land owners, and our oil will never return into the hands of international companies," (ibid.; he nationalized the International Petroleum Company in 1969). In the same speech he explicitly tied land reform to increased production but also to an increased consumer base. The latter was of paramount importance in a country where much of the peasantry still operated largely in a separate subsistence economy:

> The agrarian reform is not only in the interests of the peasant. The cities will also be beneficiaries of the great changes that the agrarian reform will make in the near future. The men of industry will have a much larger market to sell their manufactured products to. No longer will they only sell to three or four wealthy landowners, but rather to the hundreds and thousands of owners of the land. No longer will only privileged children have shoes, rather all of the children of Peru will have them. What I am saying is that the consumers of industrial goods will grow by the thousands and hundreds of thousands all over the country. This enormous growth of the consumer market will make it possible and necessary to hugely augment production of all of the industries and commercial activities of the towns and cities of our country. (ibid., 146)

Juan Perón dramatically came to power because of popular support. Having already strategically established a strong alliance with the working class from his post in the labor ministry, on 17 October 1945 Juan Perón was brought out of detention and handed the presidency by a huge mass rally. Joseph Page writes:

> Argentina would never be the same after the seventeenth of October. The working class had for the first time marched its way onto the political scene and achieved an enduring degree of self-awareness. . . . Juan Perón emerged as both cause and effect of October 17. His labor policies gave workers something to lose if they did not mobilize in his defense. (1983, 134)

Similar to Velasco, Perón made pronouncements that economic independence from foreign capital was dependent on the systematic growth of domestic industry and consumers. Joseph Page wrote that in the first two years of his initial term, Perón "consolidated working-class support. He saw to it that workers received a greater share of the national income and *increased their levels of consumption*" (ibid., 181; emphasis added). In an act signed by the president entitled "Declaration of Economic Independence," Perón referred to the projected growth of economic production and consumption as "patriotic energy" (Perón 1990, 50).

These cases indicate the symbiotic relationship between the operations of capitalism and the spread of contemporary inclusive conceptions of the nation by the mid-twentieth century. The masses came to be perceived as the basis for both a new form of political power and economic independence, two factors structurally interdependent. Through state concessions and the discourse of nationalism, new groups were linked to the state as active and necessary citizens, that is, as part of the nation. It is also striking that women received the vote under Vargas and Perón, further extending the active citizenry.

While Perón, Vargas, and Velasco all used the term revolution and slogans of social participation to distinguish themselves from the old regimes, their governments often developed so as to be thought of as totalitarian. For example, the failure of the Velasco "experiment" is usually viewed as the result of the glaring contradictions between his ideology of popular participation and the government's on-going use of coercion to maintain control (Turino 1993, 140). Under Velasco, Vargas, and Perón, the state entered into and attempted to control ever-greater segments of civil society and political process. The three increasingly perceived the systemic political, economic, and cultural aspects necessary for linking nation and state, and for creating greater numbers of workers and consumers. This recognition required new methods of governance that involved the state with the cultural realm, including music, more than ever before in Latin America.

Populism and Cultural Nationalism

Peru

Velasco instituted a major educational reform to bring rural indigenous children into the 'national' society. As Gellner (1983) and others have noted, mass education systems are fundamental to nationalist movements because they provide a relatively common basis of socialization for previously culturally diverse groups.[9] Mestizo educators were sent into indigenous communities throughout highland Peru, and rural illiteracy declined substantially between 1972 and 1981 (CNP 1984, 102). There was also a direct political motivation behind universalizing education. Velasco stated that the educational reform "will create a new consciousness among all Peruvians of the basic problems of our country; and that will contribute to *forging a new type of man within a new social morality*" (1972, 63; emphasis added). A woman studying at the time in Cusco told me that students were made to memorize the government's widely diffused *Inca Plan,* the official statement of the revolution's ideology and objectives (Turino 1991, 274).

Velasco made official the indigenous language Quechua. He passed a law requiring all radio stations to dedicate seven hours and thirty minutes of air time to 'folkloric' Peruvian music. The government also sponsored major festivals and contests for regional performing arts. Initially contests were held at the district, province, and department levels, the winners of each moving up to the next competition. The departmental winners received an expense- paid trip to Lima to perform in an immense music and dance festival that was called Inkari. The bringing together of music and dance groups from all over the country was a demonstration of official respect and support for the popular arts and of linkages with the different regions. A friend, Jaime Montaño, commented that the enthusiasm and pomp surrounding the Inkari Festival had a positive impact on the later support of highland migrant musical performance in Lima (Turino 1993, 142).

As is well known, contests and 'folkore' festivals are a common part of cultural nationalist programs in many parts of the world. By providing incentives such as monetary rewards and prizes, contests attract people who might not normally perform on stages, or in formal presentations, or as codified ensembles. Contests are thus a key device for bringing ad hoc participatory traditions into formal presentational contexts–often initiating the profound conceptual shift of "music-dance as play or ceremonial interaction" to "music-dance as art product." Incentives also encourage performers to shape their presentations according to what they perceive the judges will want. When elite judges are involved, as is so often the case, contests are a particularly successful way to shape indigenous and regional styles to conform to dominant aesthetics–usually the same aesthetics held by nationalist functionaries. Thus, contests are a key mechanism in the process of cultural reformism–the transformation of localist traditions according to dominant, typically 'modern' cosmopolitan, aesthetics and contexts.

'Folklore' festivals and contests began in Peru during the initial populist regime and indigenista involvements of President Leguia in the 1920s. Typically, the contests have been judged by mestizo and criollo "experts"; even I was once asked to be a judge, along with other local dignitaries, in a provincial contest in southern Cusco. As is typically the case, there was no sense that local elders or practitioners of the tradition should serve as judges.

In a contest performance I witnessed in Puno during the 1980s, I saw a formalized indigenous ensemble imitate, in great detail, a mestizo-indigenista stylization of these peasants' own participatory courting dance, the *kh'ajelo.* What was striking here was that the indigenistas' stylization included a parody of silly, drunken, emasculated indigenous men being led off by their domineering women at the end of the dance; the indigenous contest performers reproduced these unflattering stereotypes of themselves.

It remains to be said that the *kh'ajelo* continued to be danced in its normal participatory way by young people in usual semi-private courting contexts at the same time that an increasingly standardized presentational

version was being diffused throughout the country in 'folkloric' stage shows and contests. Nonetheless, the young peasants knew what was expected of them, at least in presentational 'folkloric' events–indicating the penetration of the mestizo-indigenista version. In her comparative study of Cuban *santería* in ritual and folkloric contexts, Katherine Hagedorn suggests that the two types of situations are not mutually exclusive and that religious meanings and ritual performance style can be carried over into presentational performance (2001). Her conclusions seem well founded and offer an important caution that 'folkloric' presentations are not necessarily totally distinct from, or an inauthentic version of, the pre-existing styles and contexts of performance. The *kh'ajelo* discussed here, however, does not fit with her observations.

The mestizo-indigenista version emerged as a minstrel show-like parody, all the more troubling when imitated by indigenous people themselves (an imitation of an imitation). I would argue generally that the indigenista stylizations of indigenous dances represent a very distinct semiotic trajectory in relation to their indigenous models. If the codified "official" version is repeated often enough in public performance and is taught in schools (often innocently by mestizo school teachers who might not know the original dance) it can come to compete with, and over time even replace, the indigenous performance style (see Turino 2000, chap. 9 for a comparable African case). States cannot control cultural attitudes and directions, but they can significantly guide them through repeated subsidies and official programs.

Velasco's agrarian and educational reforms and his cultural nationalist programs did help initiate some level of national involvement among indigenous peasants that I worked with or at least a recognition of the state's gestures toward them (Turino 1991, 273–77). But in the end, the Velasco "revolution" was too short and too fraught with contradictions to succeed in creating a unified 'national' vision and identity. I will return to this topic later in the paper.

Brazil

Hermano Vianna suggests that

> because of its social and regional heterogeneity and its lack of a unifying ideology, [Vargas's] Liberal Alliance needed national organizing principles to under gird its political strategies. Never had the spirit of national unity been so important to a Brazilian regime. (1999, 40–41)

As in Peru, the Vargas government became deeply involved in cultural affairs. According to Daryle Williams, between 1934 and 1939 under Vargas and his minister of education Gustavo Capanema, the Brazilian state developed a "systematic institutional approach to cultural management"

(2001, 60). Using typical reformist language, Capanema claimed that "his primary responsibility was the *improvement* of Brazilian culture" (ibid., 62). Williams estimates that federal expenditure toward education and culture combined grew by 262 percent between 1932 and 1943 (ibid., 68). Defending the government's cultural initiatives, the 1938 *Revista do Serviço Público* noted:

> A false and empty liberalism once denounced any State initiative [in the realm of culture] as an invasion into territory which should be exclusively reserved for free intellectual initiative. . . . Only an imbecile would now be capable of defending this position, which is unsuitable in today's world. *Those nations that do not demonstrate active consciousness of their unique characteristics* will find it difficult to survive this tempestuous era in which we live. *No aspect of national life can be left at the margins of state action, as the State is the sole entity capable of imprinting upon each citizen a truly nationalist mark.*
>
> Cultural development merits the highest level of attention from those in power, as it is the linchpin to real and lasting national progress. (ibid., 69; emphasis added).

This statement blatantly justifies the state's need of, and role in, cultural nationalism for the sake of national distinction, 'modernity' and 'progress'. By the time that later nationalist movements occurred in, say, the Caribbean or Africa, such assertions were hardly necessary; the importance of state- or party-directed cultural nationalism was common sense. However, commonplace contemporary notions about state-nation linkages evolved slowly, and apparently this still needed to be asserted during the 1930s in Brazil.

As in Peru, radio became a primary medium in Brazil for education and linking various populations to the state. While the first radio broadcasts only began in 1922,

> the radio did not acquire a mass audience until after the revolution of 1930. Getúlio Vargas, brought to power by that revolution, demonstrated a keen sense of how radio could contribute to his project of national unification. Later in his long rule, he proclaimed that even small towns should have public radio loudspeakers to keep the inhabitants informed of national issues, especially in the absence of nationally distributed newspapers (Vianna 1999, 77).

The radio was an important alternative to "print capitalism" in this particular national project (cf. Anderson 1991).

Capanema explicitly rejected European totalitarian models of media control; thus, state-sponsored radio programs had to compete with private sector programming with the exception of the prime-time *Hora do Brasil,* which was supposed to be aired on all channels. This program contained doctrinaire authoritarian speeches as well as reports on the economy and cultural events. According to Williams, the musical content included "doggedly nationalistic compositions [and] broadcasts

of symphonic and popular music of Brazilian and foreign composers" (2001, 87). Williams later notes:

> Despite the wide market penetration, . . . evidence strongly indicates that the *Hora do Brasil* was largely a failure. Broadcasters in Sao Paulo initially refused to retransmit the program, silencing the airwaves during the time allotted for compulsory broadcasts. Radio listeners turned off their radios. Vargas himself was informed by a rather honest civil servant that the *Hora do Brasil* should, in fact, be named 'The Hour that talks to itself'. (ibid., 87)

The state made explicit attempts to harness samba and other popular genres for 'educational' purposes. Members of the Department of Press and Propaganda (DIP) enlisted well-known musicians and lyricists to compose songs that praised Vargas and the government (Williams 2001, 86; Dunn 2001, 27). Some of the results were collected and published by Jairo Severiano in *Getúlio Vargas e a música popular* (1983). "Glorias do Brasil" (by Ze Pretinho e Antonio Gilberto dos Santos) of 1938, for example, is a patently nationalist song:

> Brazil, oh dear land, envied by the New World" / / Getúlio Vargas appeared, the great Brazilian leader, who among your children, as a hero, was the first [we] still keep in our memory" // "Getúlio Vargas who came to show that Brazil belonged to Brazilians. (1983, 29)[10]

The DIP also encouraged composers to use popular songs to uplift people from marginalized or low-life culture *(malandragem)* and to set a good, productive example. In "E Negocio Casar!" (It's a good deal to get married), a samba by Ataulfo Alves and Felisberto Martins, recorded in 1941, the protagonist is a happy worker who has been reformed by Vargas' New State:

> Look at that! My life has had a big change.
> I am no longer that guy who came home too late,
> [You should] do what I did [change your life, get married].
> Because life is for a worker.
> I have a sweet home
> I am happy with my love.
> The Estado Novo
> Came to guide us.
> In Brazil there is no shortage
> But you have to work.
> There is coffee, oil, and gold,
> No one can doubt.
> And if you are a father of four children
> The president offers a prize.
> It is a good deal to get married.

While all the arts were enlisted, music had a special role to play in populist movements. Unlike nationalist literature that appealed to

class-based reading publics, popular music was already widely practiced and appealed to the lower classes. As missionaries in Latin America had discovered centuries before, the relatively short, repetitive nature of songs made them an excellent medium for conveying educational messages. These aspects, coupled with the fact that recorded songs (as opposed to films) were relatively cheap to produce and that music was easily transmitted by radio, the mass medium par excellence, drew state attention to the music field. Christopher Dunn notes that "The Estado Novo government had realized that Brazilian popular music was not only a useful vehicle for encouraging patriotism within the country, but also a potentially effective means for projecting a positive national image abroad" (2001, 27). He later discusses Carmen Miranda and the diffusion of samba to other countries. The use of a style as a national musical emblem at home is often bolstered, and sometimes even determined, by the style's popularity abroad–as identity units, 'nations' operate in an international arena.

As a patron for composers in need of financial support, the DIP made some impact on the samba world, and yet commercial radio continued to play many sambas that did not conform to government orthodoxies (see Williams 2001, 86). Music and the radio thus remained media for alternative popular expression, as long as the songs were not openly subversive. As with the Peruvian *kh'ajelo*, Brazilian-state cultural intervention left room for alternative positions. This was due, in part, to Capanema's refusal to go the totalitarian route, to the dismay of some colleagues in the Department of Propaganda. Here we are reminded that states are not monolithic, but rather involve individuals often with conflicting views and agendas.

In consort with the use of popular music on recordings and radio, the Vargas state became involved with carnival performance. During the early 1930s the mayor of Rio, a Vargas appointee, offered "legitimacy and modest subsidies" in return for carnival groups' ('samba schools') adherence to certain regulations, including the formal organization of the groups with the requirement of official names and officers (Raphael 1990). What is striking is that this mechanism for formalizing ad hoc grassroots performance groups became common to nationalist movements elsewhere. After 1980 in Zimbabwe, for example, the Mugabe government similarly used economic incentives and governmental decrees to urge rural village dancers to organize performance troupes with a formal group name, officers, and a codified repertory so that they could be used for presentational performances (Turino 2000, chap. 9). In both Brazil and Zimbabwe, this move towards bureaucratization and 'modernist reform' made the groups more easily available for state direction and programming.

In Rio each samba school was required to obtain a parade permit to take part in carnival, and Raphael notes "More important in the long run, however, was the ruling that each school must center its carnival parade around an event or figure of Brazilian history" (1990, 77). Vianna wrote

that less than two years after Vargas became head of state, the samba school Deixa Falar dramatized the revolution that brought him to power in a parade sponsored by the *Jornal do Brasil* (1999, 90).

> In 1937, the authoritarian national government of Vargas's New State decreed that the samba schools must dramatize historical, didactic or patriotic themes. The sambistas of Rio accepted the regulations, and the model of Rio carnival was then extended to the rest of Brazil, from Porto Alegre, in the far south, to Manaus, in the heart of the Amazon basin (Vianna 1999, 90).

Raphael noted that these regulations "reflected very well the trademarks of the Vargas regime: nationalism, corporatism, and populism" (1990, 77). The use of historical themes involved an educational function, but it was also a way to associate the samba schools with 'the nation' and, indeed, to construct the nation. Nationalists typically emphasize history–time depth for 'the nation' to create the idea of a long and rooted heritage (e.g., see Anderson 1991). Through performance of historical figures and events, the schools fortified the notion of a common Brazilian past and their involvement with that history, thus creating new indexical ties between marginalized people and the very abstraction–'nation'–that they helped bring into existence through performance. Raphael commented that such policies "represented the first government attempt to reach out to Rio's Black population, and the latter responded enthusiastically" (ibid., 77).

Vargas later reached out to other regional popular artists and styles such as northeasterner Luis Gonzaga and *baião.* As with Velasco's Inkari festival in Peru, the obvious implication is that the Vargas state celebrated popular musics that indexed given populations in the effort to link those populations to the state and include them within the image of the nation. Vianna, however, offers a more complex view. For him, samba and related popular genres were not simply an index for blackness, but rather emerged from a history of interracial and cross-class interactions:

> the *favela* dwellers and sambistas of Rio de Janeiro played a leading, but not an exclusive role. Among those involved were blacks and whites (and, of course, mestiços), as well as a few gypsies–also a Frenchman here or there. *Cariocas* and *bahianos,* intellectuals and politicians, erudite poets, classical composers, folklorists, millionaires, even a U.S. ambassador–all had something to do with the crystallization of the genre and its elevation to the rank of national symbol. Second, the crystallization of the genre and its symbolic elevation were concurrent–not consecutive–processes. There never existed a well-defined, "authentic" samba genre prior to its elaboration as a national music. (1999, 112)

Samba may have helped codify images of the nation, but Vianna's position is that nationalist as well as cosmopolitan intervention was central to codifying samba. Just as cultural nationalist projects often involve formalizing formerly ad hoc performance groups, they also involve formalizing performance genres

and stylistic canons: "No sooner had *samba de morro* been invented than it became the very emblem of a pure and ancient Brazilian essence, uncontaminated by outside influences," (ibid., 113).

Vianna's account contains two interesting hints regarding the way nationalist emblems and canons are chosen. First, in contrast to Raphael who associates samba strictly with Afro-Brazilians, Vianna argues that samba was useful as a nationalist emblem precisely because it was a rather vaguely defined performance complex that was already the product of cultural mixing and complex social negotiations. It thus already contained "national traits that the largest number of 'patriots' would accept as exemplifying an essential Brazilian identity" (ibid., 113). If one thinks of the two or three popular music complexes from the United States that serve as nationalist emblems in a similar way–country and western, jazz, and rock 'n' roll–they too are all the product of long histories of interracial, interregional, and, to some extent, interclass interchanges within an urban milieu. Although, as with samba, the subsequent myths of these styles have tended to 'purify' their social origins, it is the very complexity of their roots that makes them intuitively recognizable as emblems of Americaness.

Vianna's second hint about Rio samba's rise as nationalist emblem involves the centrality of Rio itself. During the 1930s, the radio programs with the largest national audiences were all broadcast from Rio. By 1929, six record companies were releasing local recordings for the Brazilian market.

> All of these studios were located in Rio, and all of them needed musicians. What could be more propitious for the city's popular music? In the 1930s, recording and broadcast technology came together with the political will to create a unified national culture, and this confluence occurred precisely in Rio de Janeiro (still, at this time, the national capital). Carioca samba, a set of local styles peculiar to Rio, was about to be crystallized and projected nationally as Brazilian samba (ibid., 78).

Here we see the close collaboration of capitalist enterprises and cultural nationalism. Similarly, state intervention initiated the processes that turned Rio's carnival into big business, and once again performance contests became a key device of formal control.[11]

Vianna's observation about the centrality of Rio parallels my explanation as to why the Zezuru *mbira* emerged as a national emblem in Zimbabwe, and why certain dance drumming traditions came to form the national canon (Turino 1998; 2000). The Zezuru people lived in the region around the capital of Harare where live radio broadcasts and recording were centered. It was musicians from this group who found it easiest to respond to invitations to play on and record for the radio. The other groups most available for radio broadcasts and for participation in Harare-centered nationalist rallies during the early 1960s were rural-migrant associations, situated in townships around the capital. These migrant groups specialized in one or

two dance-drumming traditions unique to their home regions in Zimbabwe. It was precisely this collection of dances performed in the townships that was codified as the national canon by the government-sponsored National Dance Company and in schools after 1980. In both Brazil and Zimbabwe, convenient access to media producers and nationalist functionaries proved important for the selection of certain nationalist emblems over others. In some ways, a similar picture emerges for mariachi music in Mexico, as discussed below.

Argentina

In 1946 Perón announced, "The state has to concern itself with the culture of the people, because nations that lack a culture of their own are highly vulnerable to becoming semi-colonial countries" (quoted in Miller 1999, 61). Like other populists, Perón took a systematic view of state-civil society relations and made building a 'national culture' his fifth and final objective (after creating social, economic, and political bases and reforming the judicial system). Like the others discussed, his government was concerned with mass media, especially radio; in 1949 it was mandated that at least 50 percent of music broadcast was to be Argentinean. Perón's working class base, and his on-going struggle with the Buenos Aires elite led him to spurn intellectuals associated with this group who did not offer him explicit support. As a famous example, Perón "promoted" Jorge Luis Borges from his job in a Buenos Aires library to poultry inspector in the local street market–Borges retired from public employ (Miller 1999).

It is estimated that about 85 percent of Argentines are of European decent, and between 1890 and 1910 in Buenos Aires three out of four adults were immigrants (Moreno 1987, 94). By the late nineteenth century intellectuals and writers had selected the image of the gaucho, as the emblem of distinction for the nation. Soon after, 'folklore' and 'folk music' grew in importance as nationalist emblems, often including gaucho indices.

Moreno Cha chronicled the institutional support for and the growing urban popularity of 'folkloric' music in Argentina in two waves–with and directly after the country's two populist regimes in the 1920s and from the 1950s to the 1960s (Moreno 1987, 1998). She correlated this with heightened industrialization, especially in the early period, and consequent rural to urban migration. She also described the transformations of rural repertories, original stylistic elements, and performance contexts in ways that closely fit processes of reformism in many places–for example, favoring staged contexts and reducing the style features that conflicted with cosmopolitan aesthetics (1987).[12] As a parallel development, 'folkloric' music was professionalized and codified as a type, represented by such recording stars as Los Chalchaleros and Los Fronterizos by the 1950s.

Moreno discussed the folkloric festivals that have been held in Argentina since the late 1950s. As in Peru and in Brazilian carnival, these events included performance contests. She noted that the music heard at major festivals

> is not traditional, however, but revivalistic, composed in traditional styles by famous musicians who sometimes perform it themselves. A good performance in a competition like the Festival de Folklore de Cosquín can launch a performer's career at the national or international level, especially when followed by recordings and live appearances. (1998, 262)

Because of particularly strong ties to Europe, Argentinean approaches to 'folk music' as a basis for *nationalist sentiment* drew directly from European and cosmopolitan nationalist sources even more directly than in other Latin American countries. Indeed as early as 1906, Ricardo Rojas published a series of articles in a leading newspaper introducing Herder's concepts of the folk *(volk)* and the collective spirit of the people *(volksgeist)* to argue that "the true strength of a people would henceforth depend upon its sense of nationality rather than the wealth of its territory" (Miller 1999, 166). Given this cosmopolitan grounding, it is not surprising that Argentinean musicians were among the first and most important to insert South American 'folkloric' music into the cosmopolitan sphere, originally in Paris, as Fernando Rios recently documented (2002).

In discussing Juan Perón's populism, Nicola Miller wrote:

> 'National culture' was described in his Second Five-year Plan as including not only traditional songs, legends, music, dances and crafts, but also 'the spiritual inheritance bequeathed to us by classical cultures, especially those of Greek and Latin origin . . . with the addition of all those manifestations of modern world culture which do not contradict the guiding principles of those [classical] forms' (ibid., 60).

Miller emphasized that Perón took a broad cosmopolitan view of 'national culture' rather than strictly adhering to "the paraphernalia of folkloric gauchos and tango with which [he] is customarily associated in populist mythology" (ibid., 60). Such combinations of the locally distinct and the cosmopolitan typically characterize cultural and musical nationalism in precisely this way; Vianna's interpretation of the emergence of samba illustrates the point as well. Cultural nationalists typically express that a new national culture will be forged from the best of local 'traditional' culture combined with the best of foreign and 'modern', that is, cosmopolitan, culture. The localist elements (e.g., gauchos, 'folk' music) in the reformist mix are for emblematic distinction and also function as signs of unity or inclusion; the cosmopolitan features (e.g., national anthems and 'folk' music) create iconicity with other nation-states, and are also due to the fact that the designers of state-cultural nationalism are cosmopolitans

themselves (Turino 2000). This reformist type of musical nationalism did not exist in the early Latin American republics, it grew up with contemporary, more inclusive notions of the nation, and in Latin America most markedly with populist movements.

Capitalism, Nationalism, and Musical Regionalism[13]

In many Latin American countries regional identities are particularly strong, and in some places remain more vital than national identities. Nowhere is regionalism more pronounced than in the musical field. In Mexico and Peru, for example, regional ensemble and musical styles are pronounced, and they played a role in both nationalist projects and in capitalist culture industries. A brief comparison of regionalism in Peru and Mexico again indicates related effects in the workings of capitalism and nationalism.

There are many examples of regional and 'ethnic' groups redefining themselves as 'nations' by nationalism's own logic, and thus entertaining the idea of a separatist movement (e.g., Fenwick 1981, 214). Strong regionalism and ethnic autonomy are thus threats to existing and incipient nation-states. Cultural nationalist programs typically seek to celebrate ethnic and regional distinctiveness ('folkways' contrasted with cosmopolitan forms and practices) to define the uniqueness of a given nation. But they must also carefully balance this with incorporating such distinctions into the very definition of the nation so as to diffuse cultural difference as a resource for separatism. The process of incorporation frequently involves the reform of regional styles such that they become acceptable to people outside the original region, a kind of "mainstreaming" or homogenization; we have already discussed contests, festivals, and schools as common mechanisms for accomplishing this.

Capitalist enterprises operate with the profit motive being primary; companies will sell to the largest markets possible. Country-wide markets are better than regional ones, just as trans-state markets are better still. While companies seek to expand sales through flooding the market with a given product, advertising, and so on, they also gravitate to existing markets. Especially for culture industries (recordings, clothing, films, art, and food), markets are strongly tied to existing identity units (generational, subcultural, regional, gender-specific, class, etc.). In many Latin American countries ready-made national identities were not firm enough to define markets for things like music during the first part of the twentieth century. Rather, regional styles indexing regional identities were often more pronounced and offered the best ready-made markets once rural migrants in the cities began to have money for luxury items. In parallel to nationalist projects, however, it was in the best interest of recording and film companies if regional styles could ultimately attract a broader 'national'

market, and this involved the same type of mainstreaming of stylistic distinctions as occurs through cultural nationalism. The suggestion here, then, is that capitalism and nationalism once again operate in consort and can have similar effects on regionalism, but for different reasons–profit versus strengthening the state. The situations in Mexico and Peru, however, illustrate different dynamics because of the relative stage of capitalist and nationalist development in the two countries.

Regionalism in Mexico

The variety of regional *son* styles and ensembles in Mexico is well known. A few of the best-known regional styles include the violin-led Huasteca style; the harp-*requinto*-led Jarocho style to the south in Veracruz; the marimba groups further south; the string-band styles of Michoacán and Jalisco to the west; and the conjunto-accordion style from the north; as well as a number of indigenous traditions in different parts of the country. Daniel Sheehy summarized the decline of economic and cultural regionalism in early twentieth-century Mexico. Regarding the period following the 1910 Mexican Revolution, he wrote,

> Government educational programs promoted a broad knowledge of regional cultural expressions and created a select canon of songs and dances from different regions to be taught in all the nation's schools. A massive program of road-building reached communities that had been isolated for centuries. (1999, 43–44)

The selection of various regional artistic styles to create a 'national' canon is typical of nationalist movements in many places, and is key to the process of incorporating regional distinctiveness into a unified icon of the nation.

Styles once strongly tied to given regional identities become indexically related to each other and to the 'nation' by repeatedly juxtaposing them in performances in schools, festivals, and presentations by state-sponsored folkloric groups and through verbal nationalist discourse. The specific mechanism involved is the shifting of indexical associations with a given style from region to nation, as well as fortifying the indexical linkages of regions to each other as the nation.

Indices come to stand for what they represent through co-occurrence between sign and object in peoples' actual experience. Redundantly changing the context of a given sign (e.g., a particular *son* style) changes the meaning of the index. Indices, however, also typically carry earlier layers of associative meaning. Thus, the juxtaposition of different regional indices within a discursive frame that emphasizes 'nation', as in, say, a 'national folk festival', produces a more complex iconic sign of the nation as "the sum of these tangible (indexical) parts." Canon creation is key

because the same items will repeatedly be found together and thus come to be strongly associated with each other and with the symbolic frame 'nation'. The semiotic formula looks something like this, with the plus signs representing new indexical associations among the terms: index of region A + index of region B + index of region C + index of region D + nationalist discursive frame (symbols, words about 'nation', 'Mexico') = 'nation' (icon). By repeatedly juxtaposing pre-existing regional indices within the same contexts, the image (icon) of the 'nation' emerges as the combination of these attractive sights and sounds: "this mosaic of regions and beautiful traditions *is* our country." Thus, an abstraction, 'nation', is given flesh and blood, a perceivable form. The creation of national canons is crucial to cementing new indexical associations between the composite indices and between the indices and nationalist symbols through repetition. The canon ensures that the same items will be included again and again.

Through this process, Jarocho music comes to be redefined as Jarocho music and Mexican, or 'national', music simultaneously. With time, if the style is largely maintained in schools, 'national folkloric' performances, and the trans-local mass media, the regional association may fade almost entirely and the transformation from regional to national index will be almost complete (the original 'folk'/regional resonance remains important for grounding and 'authenticity'). There are numerous examples of this very process during the twentieth century; samba and the gaucho as national emblems follow this trajectory, as does the mariachi ensemble of Mexico.

In addition to nationalism, the mass media and capitalist-culture industries were the other prominent forces that reduced regionalism in Mexico. Sheehy continued:

> The rapid growth of the electronic media beginning in Mexico around 1930 invaded all but the most remote populations through radio, recordings, films, and television. *A few regional musics gained a foothold in the media, but always at the cost of transforming themselves into professionalized commodities required to have broad appeal beyond their traditional regional audience* (1999, 43–44; emphasis added).

Sheehy summarized the history of the mariachi from a localized, non-professional, often ad hoc, regional ensemble from western Mexico to its current status as the internationally best-known ensemble type of the country; both nationalism and culture industries were involved. In 1907 an eight-piece mariachi and four dancers from Guadalajara, Jalisco, performed on stage at the president's residence for the secretary of state of the United States. "This portended both the use of the mariachi as an 'official' emblem of West Mexican and national culture and the major migration of musicians to Mexico City that would soon follow" (Sheehy 1999, 46). The same year, the mariachi Cuarteto Coculense made the first known

recordings of this style. In 1920 the mariachi Coculense was invited to perform for an elite group in Mexico City and

> became the first mariachi to appear in a stage show in a legitimate theater in Mexico City [the famous Teatro Iris]; the first to appear in a 'sound' film [*Santa,* 1931] and, above all, the first to make 'electric' recordings, initiating the era of the dominance of the mariachi style in radio, film, and especially on records, which has endured over fifty years. (Sonnichsen 1993, 3; quoted in Sheehy 1993, 46)

In parallel fashion to the singing-cowboy Westerns produced in the United States around the same time (Malone 1969, 154–55), the music and image of mariachis became widely diffused throughout Mexico via popular films. Also paralleling the transformation of regional "hillybilly" string band styles into the largely unified, commercialized country and western genre in the United States, mariachis became associated with a professionally penned and commercially recorded type of country music known as *música ranchera.*

By the 1950s mariachi ensembles had become highly professionalized, standardized groups with a number of violins, two or more trumpets, guitars, *vihuela,* and *guitarrón.* The string style became lush and highly orchestrated as were the trumpet parts, and the vocal style incorporated wide, dramatic vibrato. The rougher edges of rural performance were reformed to appeal broadly to cosmopolitan aesthetics (e.g., in violin and vocal timbres). Moreover, mariachis came to incorporate signature *sones* from different parts of Mexico (e.g., "La Bamba" from Veracruz, "La Malagueña" in Huasteca style), making their repertoires 'national' in scope and appealing to people from all over Mexico.

In the case of the mariachi, capitalist culture industries (film, recording companies, and radio) and musicians' own professional aspirations led to the stylistic reform of a regional tradition to make it widely appealing, and thus sellable, to the widest possible audience. The culture industries both helped create the appeal for this style as well as benefited from its growing popularity. The result of creating a locally unique, yet cosmopolitan, 'national' ensemble type that is widely recognized as an emblem for Mexico fits precisely with typical cultural nationalist goals. But here the impetus was largely commercial and not generated by state institutions directly, although one hand washes the other.

Regionalism in Peru

Music in Peru is equally or even more regionally segmented than in Mexico. From one department to another, and even one province to another within a given department, a totally different inventory of instruments, ensemble

types, and repertories can be found. Unlike Mexico and Brazil, however, in Peru, neither the government nor the culture industries have yet to transform a regional style into a national one. In the early decades of the twentieth century, criollos in Lima projected the urban-popular *vals criollo* as the national music, but it did not take among the majority population of highlanders and highland migrants in cities. Following European custom, elite composers created 'nationalist' compositions incorporating indigenous and mestizo elements and themes, but these too usually had a very limited audience and impact (see Béhague 1979, 165–76).[14] Perhaps the closest thing Peru has to a pan-regional popular style is *chicha*, or *cumbia andina,* an electric urban-popular genre emerging in the 1970s and 1980s, but the dynamics of *chicha* are quite distinct from the trajectory described for mariachi.

After World War II, intensive migration from the highlands to Lima created a new consumer base among rural migrants for commercially produced records and shows of highland music (Turino 1998; Romero 1999, 411–18). Unlike mariachi in Mexico, however, a single regional style did not emerge to take on pan-regional popularity in Peru. Rather radio programming and recording continued to cater to regional identities and affiliations through the 1980s. Radio stations targeting highland migrants divided their air time into thirty-minute, one-, and two-hour slots dedicated to the music of a given region (especially *waynos,* or *huaynos*).[15] Recording companies and stage shows likewise used a variety of performers who emphasized their regional heritage because this is what there was, and this is what sold. Migrants tended to buy the recordings of artists from their own regions, and highland regional identities were strongly maintained through the proliferation of migrant regional associations (Turino 1993).

Regional heritage was clearly indexed through ensemble type (e.g., the sax, clarinet, harp, and violin *orquestas* of Junín; the mandolin-led groups of Ancash; the guitar, violin and/or harp music of Ayacucho; the *bandurria* groups of southern Cusco; the panpipe groups of Puno, etc.), as well as stylized regional costumes and repertories. Commercial *wayno* performers operating out of Lima and other major cities, especially the most successful ones, are somewhat distinguishable stylistically from most rural performers in their use of wide vibrato, somewhat more transparent ensemble textures, and a standardization of song form. Yet relative to the stylistic transformations of the mariachi, these groups remained much closer to the rural regional styles they hailed from, as did the aesthetics of their audiences. Regional highland Peruvian styles were never transformed to the extent that they would be attractive to cosmopolitan audiences, rather they remained grounded in highly localized aesthetics. Given this maintenance of regionalism, neither politicians nor marketers could use or favor the style of one region without alienating the people from other regions. Thus, when political leaders wanted to use highland music to index

'nation' or to indicate populist ties, they would have to include a variety of groups and styles in the same event.

Beginning in the 1960s and reaching its apex of popularity in the 1980s, *chicha* or *cumbia andina* emerged as a new kind of youth music among the children of Andean migrants in Lima and other cities (Turino 1990; Romero 1999, 416–18). *Chicha* combined *wayno* melodic traits with the rhythm of the Colombian *cumbia* performed on electric guitars, bass, keyboards, and percussion, often *timbales*. It was the first style emerging from and catering to the migrant market that functioned pan-regionally. *Chicha* stars like Los Shapis, were consciously pan-region in their effort to expand the market. They performed a *chicha* medley of the best-known *waynos* from different highland departments, and they initially marketed themselves as "Los Shapis del Perú," and later, more widely still, "de América."

In the mid-1980s, *chicha* was used to advertise banks and other goods and services to highland migrants. In a typical populist move, President Alan García had *chicha* bands play on the steps of the governmental palace. As an interesting development, *chicha* was sometimes used for the parties following mass weddings held in the *pueblos jóvenes* where many highland migrants lived.[16] In lieu of other possibilities, *chicha* was used to appeal to migrants in pan-regional contexts. Even though *chicha* had some adult fans, it was most strongly tied to the youth market and so did not emerge as an emblem that could be used to project nationhood or to sell to all highlanders; Romero noted that still in the 1990s, the other highland styles shared the migrant market (1999, 417).

Mariachis evolved aesthetically so that their music could nostalgically represent *lo mexicano* across broad regional and class sectors of the Mexican population, as well as abroad. In contrast, *chicha* remained a music of the lower classes that never adapted to cosmopolitan tastes. Elite Peruvians considered it *huachafo* (kitsch), and with its nasal vocal style, heavy-reverb studio sound, and short, static melodic phrasing, the style did not appeal to audiences abroad, for example worldbeat fans.[17] I suggest that the styles that work successfully as national emblems must also be attractive in general to cosmopolitans in trans-state contexts, and as stated earlier, popularity abroad is often key to the selection of national musical emblems at home–for example, jazz for the United States, *mbira* for Zimbabwe, calypso and steelband for Trinidad, *merenge* for the Dominican Republic, *gamelan* for Indonesia, the tango for Argentina.[18]

At the turn of the twentieth century, Mexico and Peru were similar in that both were characterized by distinct, relatively isolated regional cultural formations, and both had large indigenous and mestizo populations. As in Brazil, regionalism in both countries was underpinned by regional economies controlled by local elites. By the mid-twentieth century, however, Mexico had reached a much higher degree of national integration and capitalist development than Peru. The Mexican government initiated a state

school system much earlier and a road system that surpasses anything Peru has yet to achieve except in the most developed parts of the country (e.g., on the coast and around cities). In consort, the culture industries blossomed earlier and became larger in Mexico than in Peru; for example, Peru still does not have a developed film industry, whereas Mexican films and certain musical styles (e.g., mariachi, ranchera) have been diffused throughout the Americas.

The combination of more persistent cultural-nationalist projects and a more developed mass media infrastructure has helped generate a more successful, that is, broader, complex of national sentiment in Mexico which functions bilaterally to support state leadership and open wider national (and ultimately trans-state) markets for cultural products. In Peru, capitalist culture industries still have to cater to regional markets more substantially, hindering both nation-building and market-building. Many of the processes that began in Mexico following the revolution (e.g., a state school system) did not get underway until the Velasco regime in Peru. Nation-building requires time and constant effort and negotiation.

As is well known, individual identities are multiply-constituted and allow for distinct nodes of identification and representation depending on the context of social interaction, such as gender, class, occupation, religion, region of residence, and national identity. Strong national sentiment does not negate regional sentiment or community identity. In fact, as illustrated by Velasco's Inkari festival and folkloric canons of regional styles, cultural nationalist projects often draw on regional indices and sentiment to construct images of the nation and to imbue them with feeling. In successful nationalist movements, however, regional styles become redefined as part of 'national mosaic' or '*our* folklore'; the strength of the index shifts from region to nation, although usually carrying the former associations as a necessary component. All of this takes time.

Often, nationalist projects are not successful. In the early 1980s after independence in Zimbabwe, the Mugabe government worked hard at establishing national sentiment through many of the same means described in this paper. By the early 1990s the project had largely fallen apart because of economic woes and alienation from the state among the majority population (Turino 2000). Peter Wade notes that Colombians often say that Colombia "lacks a true national identity or a proper spirit of nationalism [national sentiment]" (2000, 31). The same could be said of the inhabitants of many regions in Peru. Community identity remained primary among older indigenous peasants in Conima that I knew in the 1980s (1993). The Conimeño and Puneño migrants in Lima with whom I worked emphasized regionalism, as did the mestizo musicians of Cusco with whom I studied. Raul Romero argues that regionalism rather than a unified national vision is most operative among inhabitants of the Mantaro Valley of Junin–an area that is certainly more closely tied to Lima than many

highland regions (2001, 32–33). He explains the strength of regionalism in Peru as the result of the "absence of a 'national project', that is, the lack of concern of the elites in representing other social classes, regions, and cultures besides their own" before the 1970s (2001, 33). Like other Latin Americans, many Peruvians seem to be emotionally involved with their 'national' football team, indicating some level of national identification. But Peruvian nationalism lacks time depth and continuity and consequently it remains weak; national sentiment does not run very deep or affect broad patterns of social practice because of sustained popular animosity against the state. Without a widely diffused, deeply implanted, sense of national sentiment, I would argue, Peru is not a nation-state; the on-going history of guerrilla warfare in the country underlines the fact. There are many similar situations throughout the world.[19]

The Peru example also suggests that even though capitalist enterprises and nationalist projects often work in consort to use and diffuse regionalism and to build *masses* of consumers and citizens respectively, capitalist enterprises will ultimately cater to available markets due to the profit motive regardless of state-generated nationalist goals. This point is underlined by the independence of Brazilian recording and radio enterprises that allowed for popular expression outside the box of Vargas's nationalist orthodoxies– because such expression attracted consumers and thus provided profits. Dialectically the result of weak nationalism in Peru, culture industries continued to support regionalism to the detriment of national identity because of available markets and affiliations. Like other cases presented in this paper, this example suggests that capitalism is often the more independent force and nationalism the dependent variable– especially if one accepts the thesis that capitalist expansion beyond the traditional elites was key to generating inclusive nationalism in the first place.

Conclusions

Between the 1850s and the 1950s, the concept of nation was expanded from a relatively small group of literate landowners to include the general populations within Latin American republics. To overcome the old oligarchies and foreign intervention, as both demanded and justified by post-Wilsonian nationalist discourse, populists sought to develop and expand domestic industry and popular political support. Expanding domestic industry required more workers, of course, but equally critical, economic independence required ever growing masses of domestic consumers. Perón and Velasco were explicit about this. Production and consumption became framed as patriotic duties.

Unlike the creation and control over workers, which had been achieved by a variety of coercive methods throughout the colonial and early republican

periods, creating a mass of consumers meant bringing people up to a certain economic level. It also meant teaching people to want the new things and life ways that were produced through education and media as well as getting them together with the products through better transportation systems–all aspects discursively defined as 'modern progress.' Unlike simply corralling workers, creating consumers and citizens meant inviting people to participate more fully in the society, and to join culturally, a real issue in places like Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. Within populist discourse, national participation and belonging as citizens became synonymous with capitalist participation and belonging as workers and consumers; 'nations' and 'national economies' were tightly linked as Hobsbawm has suggested.

In Latin America, state intervention in the cultural/artistic realm was most pronounced during populist periods. During the elite-nationalist period in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, cosmopolitan style–European military music, Italian-opera-inspired anthems, and art music with vernacular references–were the main forms of musical nationalism. This music functioned to create iconicity with other established, legitimate states and to maintain elite distinction from the masses, underlining the restricted concept of 'nation' at that time. These types remain as an older strata of musical nationalism still operating in contemporary Latin American states alongside the newer reformist or 'folkloric' types of nationalist music.

The evidence presented suggests that populist leaders approached state-civil society relations in a particularly systematic way, including the realms of artistic practice. Music had a special role to play during populist movements, and in inclusive cultural-nationalist projects in general because (1) of its strong indexical connections to, and established popularity among, specific regional and subaltern social groups; (2) as a short repetitive form, it provided an effective 'teaching' tool without depending on literacy; (3) songs were relatively cheap to mass produce; (4) music fit well with radio, the most important 'popular' medium for much of the twentieth century, especially in countries with less capitalized culture industries and low literacy rates. Reformism involving the incorporation and adaptation of subaltern musics to fit cosmopolitan ideas, aesthetics, contexts, and practices became the prominent form of musical nationalism; this second historical strata of musical nationalism accompanied the more inclusive conceptions of the nation.

Why have the contemporary ideologies and practices of nationalism, modernity, and capitalism typically spread as a unit throughout the post-colonial world? The techniques, goals, and rationales of *inclusive nationalism* and *expanding modernist capitalism* are structurally related because success in both depends on ever increasing numbers of active, willing, participants. In Latin America, Africa, and much of the post-colonial world, however, success remains uneven, and is often thwarted by the same structures of unequal capitalist development that helped inspire the response of inclusive nationalism in the first place.

Notes

1. Here *criollo* refers to native-born Americans of European decent.
2. When I use single quotes, this indicates a term as it is used within its own home discourse, that is, 'modern' as constructed by the discourse of modernity. I call these *endodiscursive* terms, words that dialectically construct and are constructed by a particular discursive formation.
3. Because of the title, and because his staff obviously did not listen to the words, Reagan cited this popular Bruce Springsteen song as a rallying cry for American pride and spirit when, in fact, it was a dark tale of the disillusionment of a working-class Vietnam vet.
4. Other seeds of contemporary democratic thinking, like need for freedom of the press and freedom of speech, were also present, although limited within Latin American Liberal discourse of the mid-nineteenth century. For example, Mariano Moreno of Buenos Aires argued that "the masses of the people will exist in shameful barbarism if they are not given complete liberty to speak on any matter *as long as it is not in opposition to the holy truths of our august religion and the decisions of the government* which are always worthy of our greatest respect." (quoted in Kinsbruner 2000, 112; emphasis added).
5. In the United States, the "Star Spangled Banner" was sung in 1814, but not officially adopted until 1931.
6. As another example of an anthem accompanying political consolidation, Peter Wade wrote "It was not until 1886 [that] Rafael Núñez imposed a strongly centralist constitution–and also incidentally composed the words for Colombia's first national anthem. This centralization [was] characterized by intensive peasant colonization of virgin lands and increased integration of the peasantry into national and international markets via a commercial bourgeoisie. It was at this time that the first Academia Nacional de Música was founded (1882), and from about 1887, a national anthem began to be standardized, based on the words by Rafael Núñez and set to music by Oreste Sindici (1837–1904), an Italian immigrant" (2000, 31).
7. Not all Latin American countries had populist moments. In Peter Wade's account (2000, 30–39), for example, it would appear as if Colombia has not had a well-defined populist moment. He also suggests that while racial difference (indigenous people and Blacks) has been incorporated into official representations of the nation, it was largely a means to assert the superiority of "whites" and mestizos. In this context, Wade notes that Colombians often say that Colombia "lacks a true national identity or a proper spirit of nationalism" (31).
8. Hermano Vianna writes that they also "impeded the formation of parties that might represent national currents of political opinion. They

were merely playing it safe, though, because national currents of public opinion hardly existed yet" (1999, 40).

9. Basic to Gellner's theory of nationalism, mass education was designed to teach people to learn how to learn so that they could be flexible and could readily retrain themselves for the rapidly shifting job requirements of a 'modern' industrial economy.
10. Text translations are by Adriana Fernandes.
11. Raphael, Fernandes and other observers have suggested that the parades were judged by elites, and that ensembles shaped their performances to appeal to the judges much as I described for folkloric contests in Peru (Raphael 1990, 78; A. Fernandes, personal communication, 2003).
12. Moreno makes it clear that 'folkloric' music was also performed in informal gatherings in urban environments and was not, by any means, restricted to stage contexts, but it is true that stage and mass media venues receive the most attention and garner the most prestige for performers who succeed in those contexts.
13. A much reduced version of this paper was read at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Ethnomusicology in October, 2002. This section on regionalism was added, inspired by questions and comments from Daniel Sheehy, which I gratefully acknowledge.
14. One clear exception to this generalization is D. Alomía Robles's indigenista zarzuela, *El Cóndor Pasa,* which attracted large audiences in repeated performances in Lima in the early twentieth century.
15. The *wayno* genre designation in Peru is like *son* in Mexico. The term points to a song type but one that is regionally distinct in terms of the ensembles that perform it as well as tempo and rhythmic differences, text forms, and a variety of other traits, including dance style.
16. Mass weddings were held to cut costs for the poorer "young town" or squatter-settlement dwellers at that time.
17. It is striking that given the array of highland musical styles, the only musical type unique to Peru that was enlisted into the worldbeat sphere was a revivalist form of coastal Afro-Peruvian music, for example, Susana Baca "discovered" by David Byrne. Here I am discounting the urban-folkloric *kena-siku-charango*-guitar-*bombo* combos that have become internationally popular because this tradition more strongly hails from Bolivia and Argentina, and in the form of *nueva canción,* from Chile.
18. This makes obvious sense since the emblems for nation-states must be recognizable, and attractive, in the trans-state context as well as domestically. In addition, in some post-colonial countries, popularity among cosmopolitans abroad raises the prestige of "home-grown" items within the country due to an overestimation of foreign sophistication and taste.
19. Even if cultural homogeneity rather than national sentiment is used to define *nation,* the case remains the same. Hobsbawm, for example,

remarks that "probably not much more than a dozen states out of some 180 can plausibly claim that their citizens coincide in any real sense with a single ethnic or linguistic group" (1990, 186).

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