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Back to Whom?

Neoclassicism as Ideology

Scott Messing, *Neoclassicism in Music: From the Genesis of the Concept through the Schoenberg/Stravinsky Polemic,* Studies in Musicology, no. 101 (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1988; xvii, 215 pp.)

Stephen Hinton, *The Idea of Gebrauchsmusik: A Study of Musical Aesthetics in the Weimar Republic (1919–1933) with Particular Reference to the Works of Paul Hindemith,* Outstanding Dissertations in Music from British Universities (New York: Garland, 1989; iii, 246 pp.)

Wolfgang Osthoff and Reinhard Wiesend, eds., *Colloquium Klassizität, Klassizismus, Klassik in der Musik 1920–1950 (Würzburg 1985),* Würzburger Musikhistorische Beiträge, vol. 10 (Tutzing: Hans Schneider Verlag, 1988; 180 pp.)

In their commentary to the Paul Sacher Stiftung facsimile of Stravinsky's *Symphonies d'instruments à vent* (composed in 1920), André Baltensperger and Felix Meyer classify the *Symphonies* as "one of the last works of the composer's 'Russian' period," to be sharply distinguished from "the new 'neoclassical' orientation" around the corner, recognizable by its "complex network of allusions to historical models in art music."[1] Retrospectivism and stylistic allusion—in particular, pastiche or parody of eighteenth-century styles and forms—are indeed the features by which twentieth-century neoclassicism in music is generally identified, but a mere moment's reflection will show their inadequacy to the concept. There are plenty of familiar works that invoke or evoke the eighteenth century (*Der Rosenkavalier,* for one, or *Ariadne auf Naxos*) without their being assimilated to the "neoclassical" model. Strauss's stylistic retrospectivism is usually viewed as a symptom of a more general nostalgia (and nostalgic eighteenth-century pastiche had a considerable nineteenth-century history), whereas the composers usually named as the "neoclassic" ringleaders, chiefly the middle-aged Stravinsky and the young Hindemith, were not stylistically retrospective. (In what way, then, *were* they retrospective?) Unlike the post-*Elektra* Strauss, they did not forfeit their reputations as modernists. Indeed, its proponents have often touted neo-

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classicism as the first truly "modern" twentieth-century style, in that its end run around romanticism signaled a true break with the past rather than maximalization of familiar aims and means.

The origins of neoclassicism are usually located in the disruptions of World War I. Writers hostile to it have often attempted to write it off as a warbred hysteria, of which the chief outward manifestation, to quote its fiercest antagonist, was "retrogression into the traditional."[2] Many music historians and theorists have ratified this notion, viewing neoclassicism as a sort of salvage operation—a "perestroika," as we have learned to say—by which the doomed "tonal system" was given a superficial preservative restructuring. On this view, neoclassicism was not an authentic modern style but a "right deviation" in defiance of history.

So what was it, hardboiled modernism or futile nostalgia? Can we define it, or can we only know it when we see it? What was its relationship to its own contemporary world, on the one hand, and to the world of the past, on the other? What did it mean to its contemporaries, and what should it mean to us? Should we call it a musical style at all? A concept? A practice? Some recent studies have promoted a fresh approach to these questions by attempting to reconstruct the historical contexts and circumstances out of which the neoclassicizing impulse emerged. The importance of this work lies not only in its contribution to the factual elucidation of the subject but also in its potential for dismantling many of the false premises on which the historiography of twentieth-century music has long been resting. Now that the evils wrought by historical determinism and utopianism have been cathartically acknowledged and disavowed in many areas of life and social thought, the time is right for such a project. Once we begin looking at the neoclassical repertory without teleological or dialectical prejudices, the first thing we learn is that it was an intransigent thing, neither a refuge in the past nor a maintenance of a nervous status quo. Like its collateral descendant, the "historical performance" movement, it was a tendentious journey back to where we had never been.

. . .

An art that wishes to be plain, brisk, non-descriptive, and even non-expressive.
—CHARLES KOECHLIN, "Le 'Retour à Bach'"

My Octuor is not an "emotive" work but a musical composition based on objective elements which are sufficient in themselves.
—IGOR STRAVINSKY, "Some Ideas about My Octuor"

Scott Messing is a good digger. In *Neoclassicism in Music,* he successfully unearths the cultural politics out of which *nouveau classicisme* (in German, *Klassizität*) began to emerge—not as nostalgia, and long before the Great War. He reminds us at the very outset that as a musical style category "neoclassicism"

is virtually coeval with "classicism" (*classique, Klassik*): hence the futility of trying to gauge the difference between the neo and the real thing; the latter is already a neoclassical construction. He analyzes the cluster of terms habitually mustered to describe the "classic" and the "neoclassic" alike—"clarity, simplicity, objectivity, purity, refinement, constructive logic, concision, sobriety, and so on" (as he lists them on p. xiv)—and shows how they collectively construct national and ethical identities, as well as artistic ones. He demonstrates the connections between (neo)classicism and youth culture, (neo)classicism and cultural elitism, (neo)classicism and authoritarianism, (neo)classicism and the politics of exclusion. He knows how (neo)classicism relates to "decadence." He is aware of the difference between a conservative and a reactionary, and that the latter is a kind of radical. He has investigated the relationship between musicological archaeology and nationalism. And, albeit implicitly, he has a great deal to say about what is now known (after Harold Bloom) as the "anxiety of influence."[3]

His book, in short, is a breakthrough in culturally informed music historiography. That in five years it has not managed to attract interest commensurate with its deserts has to do not only with the author's modest, unassertive diction, and not only with the fact that his offering is a revised dissertation published in a low-prestige series. The unjustified neglect is also, I think, the result of some long-standing academic biases.

Although he has a short and somewhat perfunctory "German" chapter, treating Mann's and Busoni's ideas about *Klassizität* (*neue* for the former and *junge* for the latter), Messing looks at things mainly from the French perspective, training a Gallic lens on Stravinsky (with the late-appearing Schoenberg as the "other" for a change). The author's motivating idea is that "an examination of the critical response to Stravinsky's works as well as the composer's own prose during the period 1914–23 (when the meaning of the term neoclassicism was transformed) can determine the link between his musical style and the aesthetic which attempted to define that style" (88).

In other words, the book intends a discourse that has long been stigmatized and exorcised within the academy as "extramusical." The locus classicus of that dismissal, where neoclassicism is concerned, is Milton Babbitt's edict, in the Stravinsky memorial issue of *Perspectives of New Music,* that "catch words" such as "back to Bach" and "neoclassicism" were only "to be talked about by those who could not and should not talk about the music."[4]

As always with Babbitt, for "talk" read "talk shop"; the reason for dismissing the language of public converse is simply and wholly its lack of "pertinence to professional activity or professional discourse."[5] To equate music, for purposes of discussion, with the techniques of manufacturing music, to regard the manufacturing of music as the only legitimate professional concern of musicians, and to sanction only such locutions as may describe or analogically

represent that manufacture is of course merely to practice another politics of exclusion, the "poietic fallacy," as I prefer to call it.[6] It implies a wholly production-oriented model, a model that ought to be as outmoded for cultural history as it has (lately) become in economics. In cultural practice, the production orientation represents the unconscious residue of a romanticism many of its espousers (the "neoclassicists" themselves, for example) have outwardly rejected; and it is the fatal flaw of most twentieth-century theorizing on the arts, including a great deal of ostensibly Marxist theorizing.[7]

"Professional discourse," in any case, is no more transparent a discourse than any other. It does not uncover reality, it merely represents the "interests," on many levels, of "the *[sic]* contemporary composer" (as the young Charles Rosen put it in a jeremiad of long ago), who may or may not be contemporary to the music discoursed about—indeed, who may not exist at all except as a catchphrase.[8] Professional discourse can be, and often is, an instrument of idealization after the fact. As a discourse of entrenched power it is conservative. It is seldom where the cultural action is.

Public discourse, on the other hand, can possess real illocutionary force. It can make things happen. The force and its effects are "historical facts" (as Dahlhaus would say), accounting to a considerable degree for the meaning encoded in artistic products. The whole value of today's revisionary history is the opportunity it offers (read: the obligation it imposes) to problematize the stand-pat assumptions of "professional discourse." One of the ways it does this is by recapturing and restoring what Stephen Hinton, in *The Idea of Gebrauchsmusik,* calls the "openness" in which "past events . . . occurred." This is necessary, he says, because "otherwise the very essence of the historical act (as opposed to the scientific fact)—freedom—would be extinguished" (81). Even if one rejects the reason as yet another romantic prejudice (and even if one views as an abuse Hinton's immediate objective, which is to expunge the taint of "ideology" from the "content of art"), one has to approve the deidealizing objective.

There is no better illustration of the influence of public discourse, and its embodiment in actual music, than the story of the "neoclassical" Stravinsky. What Messing calls "the critical response to Stravinsky's works" and "the aesthetic which attempted to define [his] style" in fact (and to an extent even Messing may not realize) virtually shaped that style.

In France, the actual cognate to the English *neoclassicism* (*néoclassicisme;* cf. the German *Klassizismus*) was at first a pejorative, implying an unimaginative epigonism; French critics at the turn of the century loved to deride Mendelssohn and Brahms, indeed the whole "nineteenth-century German lineage [of symphonists]," as "neoclassic chloroform" (Messing, 12). The concept of "good" classicism—the dialectical adversary of decadence and a force for renewal—was born in phobic reaction to another German, of course, Oedipal antagonist to three generations of French musicians.[9]

The first great flurry of French roots-seeking in the "classical" past came about in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War under the aegis of the Société Nationale de Musique. This organization, and the chamber music it presented, could be the subject of a fascinating Bloomian study, since under the motto Ars Gallica the Société Nationale fostered the greatest rash of Teutonizing *néoclassicisme* in the history of French music. But its 1871 inaugural concert also unveiled the first of many compositions that would appear over the next three decades "dans le style ancien." Much of this repertoire (like the inaugural piece, by Alexis Castillon) consisted of mediocre parlor music, although major composers also contributed to it, among them Saint-Saëns and D'Indy. Even at its fluffiest, though, it was high-minded nationalistic fluff, and its retrospectivism was the result of a Wagner-inspired attempt to circumvent Wagner and everything that had led up to him. Nor ought we forget that some of the earliest swerves toward bona fide "modern music," beginning with Satie's *Trois sarabandes* (1887) and continuing with Debussy's piano suites (*Suite bergamasque,* 1890; *Suite: Pour le piano,* 1894–1901), took place within this ostensibly retrospective domain.

The first musician to whom the word *néoclassique* was applied without irony was, predictably enough, Stravinsky. This happened in 1923, the year of the *Octuor,* but quite a few months before that work actually appeared.[10] The Stravinsky work to which the N-word was first attached, as it happened, was none other than the *Symphonies d'Instruments à vent*—by now, as we have seen, more often viewed in contrast to neoclassicism than as an example of it—and the man who attached it was another Russian émigré, Boris de Schloezer. From the beginning, moreover (and just as predictably), the term characterized Stravinsky in opposition to Schoenberg, whose art "is in its essence Tristanesque, romantic (the same as that of Scriabin)."[11] Nothing could be more critical to our understanding of neoclassicism as term and concept than to recognize these circumstances: the application was made, and the opposition drawn, not with respect to any eighteenth-century stylization but in connection with what is now looked upon as Stravinsky's valedictory to his "Russian period." As a criterion for neoclassicism, retrospection was neither necessary nor sufficient.

What made the *Symphonies* "neoclassical" for Schloezer, thence for many others, was the assumption that it was

> only a system of sounds, which follow one another and group themselves according to purely musical affinities; the thought of the artist places itself only in the musical plan without ever setting foot in the domain of psychology. Emotions, feelings, desires, aspirations—this is the terrain from which he has pushed his work. The art of Stravinsky is nevertheless strongly expressive; he moves us profoundly and his perception is never formularized; but there is one specific emotion, a musical emotion. This art does not pursue feeling or emotion; but it attains grace infallibly by its force and by its perfection. (Quoted in Messing, 130).

These words, quite irrelevant to the poetic conception of the *Symphonies* (a *tombeau* for Debussy that faithfully mimics an Orthodox funeral service),[12] not only characterize reception but also prefigure with uncanny accuracy the most famous Stravinskian pronunciamento of them all—that "over-publicized bit about expression (or non-expression)" from the *Chroniques de ma vie* that the composer would so try to live down in his late years, when he became desperate to forge retroactive links to his "Tristanesque" rival.[13] His initial appropriation of Schloezer's viewpoint shows that Stravinsky invested in (and abetted) it ex post facto.

And despite the fact that this was the judgment of another transplanted Russian, it epitomized that cluster of values—purity, sobriety, objectivity, grace, impersonal precision, and so on—by which the French defined themselves in opposition to the decadently "psychological" Germans, whose art they nervously dismissed with what Messing rightly calls "fashionable anathemas" (59).[14] The great oriental primitive, insofar as he was now suddenly taken to be "the most anti-Wagnerian of musicians," had willy-nilly become the paragon of Frenchness. Until old age—until he made belated peace with "the German stem"[15]—Stravinsky paraded himself as "Wagner's Antichrist."[16]

But it did not happen quite that suddenly. The documents Messing presents depict the culmination of the process by which Stravinsky was co-opted to a long-standing French esthetic program. The initial stages are also worth a look because, contrary to conventional opinion, they relate to the period preceding the war and had as their object *Petrushka* and especially *The Rite of Spring,* works that can now seem even more antithetical than the *Symphonies* to Stravinsky's later stance. The French managed to find in them what they were looking for, though, and this constituted the "intuition" about his music that so impressed Stravinsky at the time, and that he made a point of recalling in a memoir of Jacques Rivière close to five decades later.[17]

Rivière (1886–1925) was the precocious editor of *La Nouvelle Revue française,* the aggressively nationalistic literary forum founded in 1909, the year of Diaghilev's first "saison russe," by a group of seven writers that included André Gide. They adopted, as motto for their program of cultural renewal, something very old indeed: the title of Joachim du Bellay's "pléiade" manifesto of 1549, *Défense et illustration de la langue française.* The inaugural editorial had glossed the slogan as follows:

> *La langue* is not just language, it is culture. . . . *Défense* . . . can mean no more than a psychological reaction, the response or rejoinder of a living organism to all influences, good or bad. . . . The strongest periods are those that react the most vigorously, just as they are the most avid to assimilate. . . . Finally, *illustrer* aspires less here to the sense of rendering illustrious than to that of rendering plain. Genius alone can create glory and he appears only when he appears. But it is for each of us to define him, support him, surround him with an environment of admiration and understanding.[18]

That genius would be Stravinsky, and the explication, bolstering support, and intelligent admiration he received from the *NRF* as by-product of its literary politicking seduced and profoundly influenced him in turn.[19] In his reviews of Stravinsky's ballets, Rivière promoted the composer from the status of mere musician to that of exemplary artist for France. When everyone else was exclaiming at the orgiastic dissonance of *The Rite,* its *âme slave,* its sublime terror, Rivière called it "the first masterpiece we may stack up against those of impressionism," and for the following magnificently expressed reasons:

> The great novelty of *Le Sacre du printemps* is its renunciation of "sauce." *Here is a work that is absolutely pure. . . .* Nothing is blurred, nothing is mitigated by shadows; no veils and no poetic sweeteners; *not a trace of atmosphere.* The work is whole and tough, *its parts remain quite raw;* they are served up without digestive aids; *everything is crisp, intact, clear and crude. . . .* Never have we heard *a music so magnificently limited.* If [Stravinsky] has chosen those instruments that do not sigh, *that say no more than they say,* whose timbres are *without expression* and are *like isolated words,* it is because he wants to *enunciate everything directly, explicitly, and concretely. His voice becomes the object's proxy,* consuming it, replacing it; *instead of evoking it, he utters it. . . .* Thus Stravinsky, with unmatched flair and accomplishment, is bringing about in music the same revolution that is taking place more humbly and tortuously in literature: *he has passed from the sung to the said, from invocation to statement, from poetry to reportage.* (My italics, signaling passages that again herald not just "neoclassicism," but Stravinsky's own esthetic manifestos of the 1920s and 1930s.)[20]

Thus Rivière in 1913. One is tempted to suggest that by misreading Stravinsky so early as a classicist and a positivist, Rivière actually turned him into one. For one is influenced not only by anxiety but also by praise, the more so when the praise is at once so intelligent and so hyperbolic. It is not so hard to understand why, just emerging from a milieu in which he was ranked far below Glazunov (and even behind Maximilian Steinberg, his teacher's son-in-law), Stravinsky should have been susceptible to the blandishments of those who placed him higher than Debussy. He did what was necessary to keep that praise coming.

The retrospective turn was taken, on the way from the *Symphonies* to the *Octuor,* by way of *Mavra* and *Les Cinq doigts,* the latter an insignificant opus but a big milestone. *Pulcinella* had little or nothing to do with it (nor, as Messing points out on p. 112, was it received by the French as "classique"). Strapped for funds, the uprooted Stravinsky was not about to turn down the first paying job Diaghilev had been able to offer him in five years (and only after Falla refused it), but it was not his idea and had little relation to his interests at the time. His defacements of "Pergolesi" were an accommodation between the eighteenth-century *objet trouvé* and the anhemitonic pseudo-folkish harmonizations with which he had been experimenting in *Les Noces,* the project that the *Pulcinella* commission interrupted: the very end of the

"Pergolesi" ballet, with its ersatz dominant chord (a stack of thirds containing every note of the C-major scale except the leading tone), can furnish quick confirmation.

It was the rediscovery of the leading tone, and the reintroduction into his music of the dominant function (very perspicaciously noted, in an early review of *Mavra,* by Poulenc),[21] that proclaimed the self-attachment of Stravinsky's umbilical cord to Western "classical" tradition. To observe the exact moment of its fastening, see the third little piece (Allegretto) in *Les Cinq doigts,* fabulously ironical because it is in fact an unadvertised arrangement of the famous Russian folk tune *Kamárinskaya,* known to all concertgoers from arch-"nationalist" Glinka's *Fantaisie pittoresque* of 1848.

So it was a distanced, ironized past—betokening a stance of highly self-conscious contemporaneity—that Stravinsky evoked, and he accomplished it by the use of an ironized dominant function. Ironized, but not marginalized or denatured: the accompaniment to the "Russian Maiden's Song" in *Mavra,* for example, which became a popular encore item and therefore something of an emblem, consists of nothing but tonics and fully resolving, functional dominants. The harmony and the bass line, however, are misaligned by the use of multileveled ostinati that go in and out of phase. The ear is never allowed to take the V–I cadence for granted. The misalignments continually force renewed attention, achieving precisely the effect that the Russian formalists called *ostraneniye,* "making-strange."

Stravinsky was impelled to a retrospective classicism by what he called the "loss of Russia." In this, by the way, he established belated contact with the original wellsprings of the movement that had fathered the Ballets Russes long before Stravinsky was aboard: *Mir iskusstva* (The World of Art), the self-avowedly classicizing reassertion of aristocratic taste in the face of materialist and utilitarian esthetics that led Diaghilev and Benois in the closing years of the nineteenth century to their rediscovery of the ballet, a classical art that had been preserved in aspic by the Russian autocracy and that now could serve as medium for an artistic and spiritual regeneration. Stravinsky's ironized cultivation of the phonology and morphology of eighteenth-century music was literally a reactionary move,[22] a furious rejection of the horrible new order—Bolsheviks overrunning his native country, proletariats rampant everywhere—that he called "modernism." He went around telling interviewers that "modernists"—the expressionistic "revolutionary" Schoenberg, naturally, above all—"have ruined modern music,"[23] just as modernists of a different stripe had befouled the modern world.

His Chaikovsky ballet, *Le Baiser de la fée,* although externally commissioned, was a relatively unironized pastiche, motivated by disgust with Prokofieff's *Le Pas d' acier,* a flimsy, cacophonous exploitation of Soviet thematics, the "radical chic" of its day. For Stravinsky (especially since Diaghilev's epochal *Sleeping Beauty* of 1921), Chaikovsky, of all nineteenth-century composers the

most given to idiosyncratic "eighteenth-century" confections, was above all the paragon of the lost "Imperial" style. Thus, if Stravinsky's music of the 1920s and 1930s was no longer "revolutionary," it was anything but conservative. In the precise meaning of the word, his was a counterrevolutionary art.

With the *Octuor,* Stravinsky joined the *retour à Bach,* and, with his Concerto and Sonate, over the next couple of years he commandeered it. French Bachianism meant purity: the renunciation of all national character in favor of a musical Esperanto with a lexicon heavily laced with self-conscious allusions to the perceived fountainhead of "universal" musical values.[24] French Bachianism was a defense of art against psychopathology: hence all that insistence on objectivity, as in the epigraph above. Above all, French Bachianism was an affirmation of cultural elitism: the craftsman, working at an exalted level of mastery, levitates above the comprehension of the mob. Thus Nadia Boulanger on the *Octuor:*

> Stravinsky appears in the light of the constructivist, of geometry; all of his thought is translated into precise, simple, and classic lines; and the sovereign certainty of his writing, always renewed, here takes on in its dryness and precision an authority without artifice.
>
> No transpositions, all is pure music. . . . The score of the Octet is among those which furnish the satisfaction of the spirit and the eyes which recognize the passions of counterpoint, for those who love to reread the old masters of the Renaissance and Johann Sebastian Bach.[25]

So far from an investment in "the German stem," the *retour à Bach* was an attempt to hijack the Father, to wrest the old contrapuntist from his errant countrymen (who with their abnormal "psychology" had betrayed his purity, his health-giving austerity, his dynamism, his detached and transcendent craft) and restore him to a properly elite station. "I go back to Bach," said Stravinsky in one of those down-with-modernism interviews (Messing, 142), "not Bach as we know him today, but Bach as he really is. You know now they play Bach with a Wagner orchestra and make him sound very pleasant, so people will like him. That isn't the real Bach." It was the original authenticity pitch.

. . .

> *Strict polyphonic form . . . requires "performance"; it cannot be "enjoyed"; one has to be part of it.*
>
> —ERICH DOFLEIN, "Gegenwart, Gebrauch, Kitsch und Stil" (1929)

> *After these observations the aim of this book ought to be clear: it is* activity.
>
> —PAUL HINDEMITH, *Elementary Training for Musicians*

> *This can't go on.*
>
> —THEODOR W. ADORNO, *Impromptus*

Clarity, sanity, objectivity, elitism . . . Messing stops just short of the dark side, but he hints at it several times, as when he quotes a letter from

Stravinsky to Ansermet, full of praise for the music of "a young gentile German, full of talent, named Paul Hindemith."[26] Chalk up another intransigent binarism, even unlovelier than the rest, to join France/Germany, youthful/decadent, classic/romantic, objective/subjective, authority/identification, reactionary/modernist, Stravinsky/Schoenberg.[27] Had Stravinsky known more about his fair-haired boy, though, he might have been less pleased to greet him.

Messing has speculated that the work Hindemith sent Stravinsky was the Kammermusik No. 1, first performed to a triumphant reception at the Donaueschingen festival just two weeks before Stravinsky wrote to Ansermet. If so, Stravinsky would have been flattered, since the Kammermusik's first movement is "undoubtedly the finest *Petrushka*-derivative of the twentieth century."[28] But making it one of the prime exhibits in *The Idea of Gebrauchsmusik* (where, in a manner recalling Messing's presentation of Stravinsky, it assumes the role of antithesis to Schoenberg's *Kammersymphonie,* op. 9), Hinton points up the crucial differences between the cultural meaning of Hindemith's socially motivated Weimar antiromanticism and Stravinsky's socially detached Parisian elitism. The one challenged the "paradigm of autonomy," the other exalted it. The one was transcendental kitsch, the other transcendental chic.

The concept to which Hinton has devoted his study—together with its companion term, *neue Sachlichkeit*[29]—arose out of what Harold Bloom would call a misprision and what Hinton calls a "fruitful misinterpretation" (24). The fascinating early chapters of Hinton's book, in which these notions are traced to their sources, are his best and most essential contribution to understanding the "right deviation" from the evolutionary straight-and-narrow, which in Germany seemed at first to be more a thing of the left.

Contrary to Hindemith's own claim, in *A Composer's World,* that he had coined the term *Gebrauchsmusik* (which by 1951 he was predictably eager to disavow),[30] the term arose in academic circles. The originator seems to have been Paul Nettl, who used it in a study of seventeenth-century dance music to distinguish dances danced to from dances listened to (*Vortragsmusik*). Heinrich Besseler, whose 1923 dissertation also concerned the origins of the dance suite, not only appropriated the term but also (in a widely disseminated lecture, "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens") abstracted it as an esthetic category and sought to ground it in Heidegger's concept of *Faktizität,* the "facticity" of Being (*Dasein*), and in the opposition of *Ding* (thing) and *Zeug* (apparatus). "The less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become," wrote Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* (Hinton, 13). Besseler, whose research in medieval music had relativized his values, had lost faith in the supremacy of absolute music and its attendant modes of listening. He dreamed of recapturing Heidegger's "primordial" immediacy of experience and the

social relevance the music he studied had possessed as an art still undivorced from life-as-lived. Hence music as *Zeug:* music-for-use, as opposed to music as *Ding* (*eigenständige,* or autonomous, *Musik*). "Gebrauchsmusik represents for the individual something of equal rank to his other activities, something with which he has dealings in the way that one has dealings with things of everyday use, without having to overcome any distance beforehand, that is, *without having to adopt an aesthetic attitude.*"[31]

It is noteworthy that this antiesthetic esthetic of actuality and participation, opposed to the romantic ideal of transcendent genius and the tradition of passive concert-contemplation, should have emerged out of an antiquarian milieu. Hinton attributes it to a typically academic generalization: "Besseler's descriptive intentions become normative"; "his academic concern with adequately describing the anthropological and aesthetic context of early music turns into support for a renewal of musical life" (16). It was another end run around the nineteenth century, one born not of national aspirations but of social ones, and inspiring a different sort of musical pseudoretrospectivism. Heidegger apparently intended nothing of the kind. His own esthetics (not explicitly formulated until later) remained firmly tied to the autonomy principles; for him, the music-Thing would always be something to stare at and to sacralize. But Besseler's misreading of his philosophy professor was overdetermined, responsive not only to the perceived implications of Heidegger's thought, but to many other stimuli from what we now call "Weimar culture."

If World War I looms as a great divide even in the historiography of the victor nations, how much more a cataclysm did it seem to the losers, for whom it brought immediate political upheaval and economic chaos, the palpable legacy of "decadence." *Gebrauchsmusik* and *neue Sachlichkeit* were not just a reaction to the romantic esthetic of the Sublime, but a reaction to all the forces that were seen to have precipitated the war, forces that notably included nationalism. Having experienced ruin, German artists—the ostensible heirs of the "mainstream"—were more suspicious than anyone else of the lie of transcendence, any promise of immortality, permanence, lasting value. Hence the cult of the perishable, the ephemeral, the transient (whence Hindemith's pride in having authored—in the *Lehrstück* of 1929—a piece whose component parts could be rearranged or omitted at pleasure). Hence, too, the notion of an art that was not merely to be used, but to be used up. Obsolescence—happily planned obsolescence, the considered rejection of "masterpiece culture"—was the corollary (the price) of true contemporaneity. The last movement of Hindemith's Kammermusik No. 1 (Stravinsky may not have thumbed that far) was titled "Finale: 1921" and quoted a foxtrot popularized that year by the Wilm Wilm band. The next year's model, the *Suite '1922'* for piano, sported a "Shimmy" and a

"Boston." The composer's own title-page cartoon shows a chance moment on a bustling thoroughfare.[32]

Antimetaphysics of another sort was embodied in the music Hindemith wrote for himself to perform (epitomized in another product of 1922, the scandalous Sonata for Solo Viola, op. 25, no. 1), an unadulterated *Spielmusik* in which the activity of performance was tantamount to the content of the music. "I composed the first and fifth movements in a buffet car between Frankfurt and Cologne and then went straight on to the platform and played the sonata," Hindemith wrote in his catalog of works (Hinton, 181). Matter-of-factness as high artistic cause is reflected in Hindemith's zealous attempt to insulate his music from "tiresome rubato-playing and 'expression'-art" by the use of sloganeering performance directions (e.g., the famous "Tonschönheit ist Nebensache"). "Hindemith's achievement," Hinton writes, "was to reintroduce that spontaneity [that had characterized eighteenth-century performance practice] into the composition of sonatas and concerted chamber music against the background of a tradition of romantic autonomy" (186).

The peak of *neue Sachlichkeit* was reached with the *Zeitoper,* epitomized in Hindemith's *Neues vom Tage* (1929), a work whose comic point lay in the incongruity between its canonical (i.e., permanent) genre and its topical (i.e., perishable) content. While sardonic and debunking, and while obviously related to dada and surrealism, this was still not an unserious art. It was after hearing Hindemith's now-lost "Filmmusik" *Felix der Kater im Zirkus* honked out by a mechanical organ at Baden-Baden in 1927 that Aaron Copland was moved to write, "In Hindemith Germany has its first great composer since 1900."[33] By 1932, the last Weimar year, Hindemith's antimetaphysics had taken a self-consciously civic, high-principled turn, epitomized by the *Plöner Musiktag* that earned Stravinsky's outright and undying contempt.[34] This was "Musik als Zeug" with a vengeance, and by paying both spiritual and stylistic homage to the musicologically resurrected *Gebrauchsmusik* (or actual *Dienstmusik*) of the past—*Morgenmusik, Tafelmusik, Kantate,* and *Abendkonzert,* in that order—it managed to be ephemeral *sub specie aeternitatis.*

Casting himself in the role of latter-day *Stadtpfeifer,* Hindemith gave the retrospective turn a new twist: (neo)classicism—"Blockflötenkultur," Krenek would later sniff in disaffection—as ethical imperative. Hindemith had admonished a professional audience in 1927:

> A composer should only write nowadays when he knows for what need he is writing. . . . The poor connection in music which exists nowadays between producer and consumer is generally to be regretted. . . . The days of always composing for one-self are perhaps over for ever. (Hinton, 198; cf. Stravinsky: "The trick, of course, is . . . to compose what one wants to compose and to get it commissioned afterward.")[35]

Adorno called this the esthetic of "Gemeinschaftsmusik," antithetical to that of the Vienna school's "neue Musik."[36] It reached an apotheosis at the Baden-Baden festival the same year, for which Hindemith selected the pieces, programming them under four eminently public-spirited categories: *Tonfilme, Musik für Liebhaber, Originalmusik für Rundfunk, Lehrstück.*

Weimarisch notions like these—great artist as good citizen; high art reduced to social transaction; music making as activity, not speculation; classicism as antiestheticism—posed the greatest threat of all to latter-day romantics of the transcendental strain. Modernists of a more ancient esthetic looked nervously to their pedestals. Denunciation was double-barreled. On the one hand, "neue Sachlichkeit" was commercial treason: *Kunstler* fraternizing with *Bürgerthum.* On the other hand, it was political treason, rendering what was God's unto Caesar (or worse, unto the bureaucratic state). Either way, it was no "disinterested" thing. And this is what Schoenberg meant when he accused Hindemith (along with Krenek) of "a lack of conscience" and "a disturbing lack of responsibility."[37] The artist's primary obligation was not to other people but to art. A social conscience was no conscience at all; indeed, lack of a proper contempt for the world and its inhabitants was contemptible. Hindemith's greatest sin, to Schoenberg, was his "nonchalance."[38] (We might prefer to see it now, from the opposite perspective, as noblesse oblige.) And here Schoenberg found himself willy-nilly in agreement with Stravinsky, who had quickly come to suspect the gentile German's promiscuous productivity.[39]

. . .

> *The claim that the idea of aesthetic autonomy merely deceives us about the social reality in which nothing exists that does not perform a function, is too crude on the one hand, and too platitudinous on the other, to permit meaningful discussion.*
>
> —CARL DAHLHAUS, "The Musical Work as a Subject of Sociology"

So there was a Bach of the right and a Bach of the left. There was the transcendent impersonal artisan whose name came improbably to signify the height of fashion (a fashion that would prove more durable than anyone at first suspected), and there was the old *Gemeinschaftsmusiker,* turning out well-made, socially useful goods to order. Two aspects of a single "classic" creative personality were radically dichotomized to serve contemporary needs, justifying a pair of seemingly antithetical esthetic programs that were nevertheless united in their opposition to the tainted esthetic of "psychology, emotions, feelings, desires, aspirations," and the individualistic subjectivity it glorified. In this shared hostility, both back-to-Bach strains were authentic children of their shattered time; for however else the authoritarian ideologies of the new Europe may have differed, and however they may have clashed rhetorically, they were united in backlash against the arrogant individual whose hubris had brought disaster.

As early as 1913, the year of Jacques Rivière's co-optation of Stravinsky, the critic Henri Clouard asserted that the "classical Renaissance" in French letters was code for regressive political action (Messing, 8). The *NRF,* with its double-barreled elitism combining artistic avant-gardism and reactionary politics was the prototype for many similar ventures, including *Montjoie!* Ricciotto Canudo's riotous protofascist rag (to which Stravinsky was a regular contributor), which reflected the cultural politics of the *NRF* (or of Diaghilev's old *World of Art,* for that matter) as if in a funhouse mirror. By the end of the 1920s, Stravinsky had consciously cast himself as the Mussolini of music—"the dictator of the reaction against the anarchy into which modernism degenerated," in the words of his disciple Arthur Lourié, an early Soviet defector—who wanted to do for modern music what the Duce promised to do for modern Europe.[40] He introduced his famous Charles Eliot Norton Lectures, delivered on the eve of World War II, with an invitation to regard his words as "dogmatic" and "objective" confidences, delivered "under the stern auspices of order and discipline," virtues that are finally associated in the Fourth Lesson with their "best example" in music, a Bach fugue: "A pure form in which the music means nothing outside of itself. Doesn't the fugue imply the composer's submission to the rules? And is it not within those strictures that he finds the full flowering of his freedom as a creator?"[41]

The classic and the romantic are opposed in Stravinsky's exposition under the politically charged rubrics of submission and insubordination. The artist must "submit to the law," to ordained values that transcended individuals, because "Apollo demands it."[42] He had said as much, and said it more eloquently a decade earlier in that great homily known as *Apollon musagète,* the "white ballet" of 1928 that begins (like the *Octuor*) with a polemical cadential trill. *Apollon* wordlessly adumbrated the whole central core of the *Poetics of Music* with its heavy tirade against the Dionysiac hubris of the *Gesammt Kunstwerk.* Apollo versus Dionysus was first of all music vs. drama, thence stasis vs. flux, beauty vs. frenzy, purity vs. mixture, repose vs. desire, containment vs. expression—all easily decoded as classicism vs. romanticism. (As Stravinsky's old mentor and collaborator Alexandre Benois had written, the art of the nineteenth century had been "one great slap in the face of Apollo.")[43] Or rather, that *was* the code for an antiegalitarian message more decorously insinuated by the example of artistic excellence than proclaimed. In *Oedipus rex*—for Stravinsky no family romance but a fable of insubordination and submission—the composer symbolized and ratified the offended universal order by bringing back in glory every stiff traditional convention of the eighteenth-century musical stage, precisely what the Dionysiac Wagnerians in their hubris had tried to abolish in their frenzy for individualistic expression.

Recalling late in life the first staged production of *Oedipus* (Kroll Opera, Berlin, February 1928), Stravinsky focused on the audience, which included both Hindemith ("hingerissen," as Stravinsky recollected) and Schoenberg

("abgekühlt").[44] With a nervous eye on Schoenberg's reputation with the contemporary young, the aged Stravinsky allowed that the German master "must have heard in [*Oedipus*] nothing but empty *ostinato* patterns and primitive harmonies." Indeed, a jotting of Schoenberg's, made the next day but not published until four years after Stravinsky's death, bluntly confirms Stravinsky's apprehensions: "This work is nothing." Period. But with remarkable candor Schoenberg admitted to himself the very same anxiety vis-à-vis Stravinsky that Stravinsky would later feel about Schoenberg: anxiety at his rival's reputation with the contemporary young—which is to say, with Hindemith and Krenek's generation. "I know," Schoenberg wrote, "that the works which in every way arouse one's dislike are precisely those the next generation will in every way like. And the better the jokes one makes about them, the more seriously one will later have to take them."[45]

To disapprove of Stravinsky was by then a Schoenbergian reflex, what with all those "antimodernist" press interviews in which Schoenberg saw himself the butt of Stravinsky's sallies (sallies he had already tried to answer in kind in *Drei Satiren*). And, indeed, who else could Stravinsky have had in mind but the extreme maximalizer of romantic individualism in music, the composer who brought the art of psychopathology to its final shriek in *Erwartung* (which Stravinsky knew only by reputation), and in that virtually clinical study in morbid subjectivity known as *Pierrot lunaire* (which Stravinsky heard in Berlin in 1912 as the composer's guest). To "Bachians" of all persuasions Schoenberg seemed the natural antagonist. To Stravinsky, in particular, Schoenbergian atonality was precisely the degenerate "anarchy" against which he wanted to dictate the Bachian reaction. It must have seemed to a deracinated Russian aristocrat the exact analogue to the "Bolshevik" straits in which the world of his birthright had foundered.

Given the two composers' mutual suspicion, the more is the irony that by the mid-1920s Schoenberg, too, had journeyed back to Bach, joining in the authoritarian reaction against anarchy and psychopathology (a reaction of which, as far as he was concerned, *he* was of course by rights the dictator). The early twelve-tone pieces, through which Schoenberg attempted to introduce a rigorous therapeutic order into atonal music, were cast in the form of Baroque dances—minuets, gavottes, and gigues—as a prelude to the larger sectional forms of the "classical" tradition such as Schoenberg and his pupils had formerly sought to supersede. As "pure" utopian craftsmanship, intricately made but "ohne Zweck," Schoenberg's Bachianism had far more in common with Stravinsky's snooty art than it had with the socially motivated *Gemeinschaftsmusik* of his fellow Germans, toward which his attitude would always remain ironical. Yet because it was largely confined, unlike Stravinsky's, to abstract instrumental genres, Schoenberg's neoclassicism (and Webern's) quickly metamorphosed into technical research and tours de

force, foreshadowing the fetishized "professional discourse" espoused by those who later donned the mantle of their authority.

All of this was done, as Stravinsky would say, "under the stern auspices of order and discipline," which is to say, *sub specie patris*. It is no coincidence that Webern's most stringently constrained and dehumanized work, the String Quartet, op. 28, is the one based on a series derived from the B-A-C-H cipher, already impressively invoked in Schoenberg's Orchestral Variations.[46] *Et patriae:* the immediate concern may have been the preservation of a precious heritage at a time of perceived crisis, but it was a heritage dogmatically viewed as supreme, and its supremacy was part and parcel of what had to be preserved.[47] The neoclassicism of Schoenberg and Webern was thus tinged from the outset with chauvinism; their Bach was a third Bach, a national as well as a universal figurehead, asserting one nation's claim to ascendance and forestalling "Latin and Slav hopes of hegemony."[48] "It was mainly through J. S. Bach," Schoenberg alleged, "that German music came to decide the way things developed, as it has for 200 years." And it was precisely Bach's elaboration of the technique of absolute music—"contrapuntal art, i.e., the art of producing every audible figure from one single one"—that vouchsafed German domination.[49]

So, pace Dahlhaus, not even "esthetic autonomy" is unpolitical. It, too, performs a function. Being utopian, it defines itself by what it excludes. Without making essentialist claims about predisposition, one certainly can and should take note of the ease with which utopian formalists have on occasion been seduced by other manifestations of exclusionary politics. Webern's enthusiastic embrace of Hitler has become known by excruciating degrees, likewise the rabidity with which Schenker approved of brownshirt activities from afar in the years before the *Anschluss*.[50]

But so could those who hankered after community fall easy prey to National Socialism's metaphysical organicism.[51] *Gemeinschaft* metamorphosed by easy degrees into *Volksgemeinschaft,* until Krenek could assert the existence of "an unbroken line" leading "from the activist *Wandervogel* (Boy Scout), by way of Hindemith's concerto grosso style, to the Hitler youth, of whom it is told that they give vent to their indomitable spirit of independence by secretly performing Hindemith's *Spielmusik.*" With regard to the great Spielmann himself (by then, like Krenek, banned in his homeland as a *Kulturbolschewist*) this was a mean-spirited, envious insinuation; but Hindemith's own subsequent attitudes corroborate this diagnosis of the trends in which he had so conspicuously participated, especially where Krenek writes of the "common . . . tendency to whittle down, a reduction of music from a spiritual art to a professional craft."[52]

"Social-democratic primitive" that he was,[53] Hindemith recoiled not only from this co-optation but from social commitment *tout court,* symbolizing his own withdrawal, and sublimating it, in the figure of "Mathis der Maler," the

title character of his opera of 1934, who retreats, spiritually wounded, from the turbulent world of fifteenth-century politics—a world replete with class warfare and book burnings—into the timeless world of art. At the time of the opera's belated première (Zurich, 1938), the expatriated composer identified himself not only with Mathis, who "decides in his work to develop traditional art to its fullest extent," but also, as ever, with "Bach, who two centuries later proves to be a traditionalist in the stream of musical development."[54] A new mission, a new ethos, a new Bach. Hindemith's later writings—like the tepid if cranky Norton lectures he published as *A Composer's World,* delivered exactly a decade (but what a decade!) after Stravinsky's—were as merciless a polemic against his own younger self as was his recomposition of *Das Marienleben.* By then the new ethos of preservation-cum-obligation had degenerated, in his music, into academic complacency and, in his thinking, into a timid housebroken estheticism he nevertheless tried to pass off as the "everlasting values" and the "moral power" of the ancients.[55] In a sentimental bicentennial lecture delivered in Hamburg on 12 September 1950, Hindemith located Bach's crowning achievement precisely in the complete transcendence of the worldly: his "activity has become pure thought, freed from all incidents and frailties of structural manifestation, and he who ascended relentlessly has defeated the realm of substance and penetrated the unlimited region of thought."[56]

An even flabbier esthetic formalism has been the escapism of recent research into the history of music between the wars. To conceive of that history as mere style history is to engage in mythmaking and cosmetics. Recent German writings on neoclassicism have been especially symptomatic: an epitome of sorts is Rudolf Stephan's superficial attempt to equate Stravinsky's neoclassicism in all its particulars with the actual methodology of the Russian formalist school.[57] The Colloquium *Klassizität, Klassizismus, Klassik in der Musik 1920–1950,* held at Würzburg in 1985 and published three years later as the tenth volume in the series Würzburger Musikhistorische Beiträge, is—there is no other way to put it—a shockingly anodyne group of papers and discussions, in which the concept of purity, while inevitably emphasized, is anxiously sentimentalized and construed as benign—as equipoise, calm, serenity, *das Leibhaft-tanzerische,* and so on—even when the products of the National Socialist period (e.g., the musical works and writings by Gerhard Frommel, Stravinsky's foremost disciple in the Third Reich) are under discussion.[58]

Never is the question faced why such qualities were considered exemplary during those turbulent years—and of course Nazi classicism had its enforced Stalinist counterpart, which a glance at Myaskovsky's heap of symphonies will heartsickeningly betray[59]—or why the Bachian Stravinsky was an acceptable model for composers under Hitler. The dichotomization (read: the confusion) of esthetics and politics has never seemed so blind, or, for all its gentle affability, so sinister.

Unfortunately, it is Hinton, a Dahlhaus disciple, who attempts most explicitly to foreclose exploration of the relationship between Weimar esthetics and Nazi esthetics: "It cannot be a historian's task to describe past events using terms defined according to connotations that they have subsequently acquired," he pleads; still less is it appropriate "to take as his point of reference the consequences that are visible now" (81). Hinton's refusal to take ideology and its consequences on board is evenhanded. He wipes the young Hindemith clean of leftist taint by noting blandly that his collaborations with Brecht (*Lehrstück* and *Der Lindberghflug,* the latter a collaboration with Weill as well) "took place at least a year before Brecht's definitive conversion to communism" (203).

We have reached a familiar crux, a mightily fraught one, that haunts contemporary historiography and hermeneutics (as it does even such ostensibly innocent offshoots within the musical academy as "performance practice"), to say nothing of those depressingly familiar debates, such as that sparked by the threat of Wagner performances in Israel, that persist in pitting esthetics against ethics. Is the proper standpoint for a historian or an interpreter the actual contemporary world (one's own *Sachlichkeit,* so to speak) or an idealized, sanitized, purely notional past—the past as refuge, where dreams of a glorious future may be nurtured irresponsibly? Ought we as honest historians to imagine ourselves into the world between the wars as if we did not know what was coming? Or would that be a history without lessons, which is to say, no history at all?

It was precisely its utopian (its "scientific") aspect, as well as the myth of its political suppression, that facilitated serialism's seeming natural selection as the neomodernist lingua franca from out of the ashes of World War II. After the crimes visited on the world by an "organic society," the moral superiority of an art that implied, in Krenek's words, "the loneliness and alienation of humanity" seemed more palpable than ever[60]—especially while the yea-saying bromides of socialist realism were still being enforced with foul rituals of denunciation and contrition in a surviving organic state to the east. But if the dismal history of the twentieth century teaches us anything, it is that utopia, far from a refuge from inhumanity, is itself inescapably inhumane.

Formalism's claim to germ-free moral purity has been tarnished by the disclosure of Webern's political leanings, by the recognition of an officially tolerated school of twelve-tone composers in the Third Reich,[61] and perhaps especially by the self-indicting rhetoric—the purebred rhetoric of *Blut-und-Boden* or agitprop, take your pick—with which a new dialectical monstrosity asserted itself after the war at Darmstadt and Donaueschingen, synthesizing formerly antithetical categories (romantic "megalomania of self-infinitization" and technocratic rationalism) in an orgy of what Adorno would call the "jargon of authenticity," enunciated, appallingly enough, with

the aging Adorno's anxious complicity.[62] Meanwhile, one of the Nazi serialists, Paul von Klenau (1883–1946), had openly touted the method as "totalitarian" and claimed that its strict discipline made it "entirely appropriate to the future direction of the 'National Socialist World.'"[63]

The same discipline, among other stock classicizing claims, made the twelve-tone system attractive to Stravinsky—or so the old neoclassicist would tell reporters on his return to the old world after the war: "The twelve-tone composers are the only ones who have a discipline I respect. Whatever else it may be, twelve-tone music is certainly pure music.'"[64] Although he named no names, we know now that he had Schoenberg's Septet Suite (Ouverture—Tanzschritte—Thema mit Variationen—Gigue) foremost in mind and that he was promoting it exactly as he had promoted his own Bachianas thirty years before. Was this "catchphrase journalism" or was it "professional discourse"?

Or was it history—a better history than we have had since?

NOTES

1. Igor Strawinsky, *Symphonies d'instruments à vent: Faksimileausgabe des Particells und der Partitur der Erstfassung (1920),* trans. Anne C. Schreffler (Winterthur: Amadeus, 1991), 25. The view of the *Symphonies* as Russian summation is common. Compare Eric Walter White, in whose view Stravinsky's conception shows "a preoccupation with the instrumental development of the Russian popular material already used in many of his vocal compositions, particularly the numerous songs composed during his Swiss exile and *The Wedding,* and also in parts of *The Soldier's Tale.* The new composition can accordingly be looked on as a kind of symphonic summary of some of the musical ideas that had been fermenting in his mind during the previous six years" (*Stravinsky: The Composer and His Works* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966], 254–55).

2. Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music,* trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 5.

3. See chapter 38 above.

4. Milton Babbitt, untitled memoir in *Perspectives of New Music* 9, no. 2–10, no. 1 (1971): 106; quoted by Messing, *Neoclassicism in Music,* 193 n 5. Babbitt claimed to be quoting Stravinsky, nor is there any reason to doubt that that is exactly how the octogenarian Stravinsky would have wished to represent his earlier self to an American academic serialist. Yet one has to wonder not only at the relevance but also at the authenticity of the words attributed to the old man when one reads, "to Stravinsky, 'back to Bach' was just . . . an alliteratively catchy slogan." It was that only in a language Stravinsky did not use at the time that the phrase was (thanks to him) "à l'ordre du jour."

5. Babbitt, untitled memoir, 106.

6. See chapters 36 and 40.

7. Adorno launches his *Philosophy,* for example, with the flat assertion that "the state of composition itself" is "at all times the decisive factor influencing the state of music" (xi).

8. See Charles Rosen, "The Proper Study of Music," *Perspectives of New Music* 1 (1962): 80–88 passim.

9. For what is still the most provocative study of anxiety-of-influence in music (and without benefit of Bloom), see Carolyn Abbate, "*Tristan* in the Composition of *Pelléas,*" *19th-Century Music* 5 (1981): 117–41. It is eye-opening, considering the many salient echoes of Wagner's opera in the finished work, to learn how strenuously Debussy tried to suppress them. (And then, following the Bloomian paradigm, Debussy—yes, *Pelléas*—became a frightening father in turn: see Larry Stempel, "Not Even Varèse Can Be an Orphan," *Musical Quarterly* 60 [1974]: 46–60.) For a lurid idea of how engulfed in Wagner a less mature or vigilant French composer was likely to be even ten years later, see (or hear) Lili Boulanger's *Prix de Rome* cantata, *Faust et Héléne* (1913), which recommends itself because of the twenty-year-old composer's relative innocence and the imposed speed of contest composition, which precluded much critical reflection. The cantata is an inadvertently hilarious salad of *Tristan, Parsifal,* and the *Siegfried-Idyll.* See also Messing's ex. 1.1 (8–9) for an assortment of involuntary Tristanisms in fin-de-siècle French music, not to be confused with the veritable subgenre of Tristan spoofs that arose in anxious reaction, of which Chabrier's *Souvenir de Munich* (piano four-hands) and Debussy's "Golliwog's Cakewalk" are only the most familiar. (Hinton makes reference to a similar trend in Germany, culminating in Hindemith's *Das Nusch-Nuschi.*)

10. Messing cites a precedent for the interchangeability of *néoclassicisme* and the nonpejorative *nouveau classicisme* in a comment by Diaghilev from 1922: "But no, good heavens, one does not revive. . . . One evolves toward neoclassicism, as Picasso evolves toward Ingres. . . . My god, is it still necessary to explain such things?" (83).

11. Boris de Schloezer, "La musique," *La Revue contemporaine,* 1 February 1923 (Messing, 130).

12. Full details in my *Stravinsky and the Russian Traditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 1486–93.

13. For the famous passage (beginning, "For I consider that music is, by its very nature, essentially powerless to *express* anything at all," but proceeding to posit a "unique," specifically musical emotion that music does convey by its very nature), see Stravinsky, *An Autobiography* (New York: Norton, 1962), 53–54; the disavowal (as "an overpublicized bit," etc.) may be found in Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, *Expositions and Developments* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 101–3.

14. As a construction of national character, this cluster of terms is of course no more "real" than any other essentialism. The land of Racine and Couperin (and Cocteau and Satie) was also the land of Hugo and Berlioz; and Berlioz was a central arbiter (especially as mediated through Schumann, as well as through another non-German, Liszt) of the "German" essence—the discourse of "psychology, emotions, feelings, desires, aspirations"—in opposition to which the French now defined themselves.

15. See Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, *Dialogues and a Diary* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), 14.

16. Robert Craft, *Present Perspectives* (New York: Knopf, 1984), 220.

17. Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, *Conversations with Igor Stravinsky* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), 60.

18. Jean Schlumberger, "Considerations," *La Nouvelle Revue française* 1 (1909; rpt. Kraus, 1968), 9–11.

19. For a chronicle of Stravinsky's relations with the journal, see David Bancroft, "Stravinsky and the 'NRF' (1910–20)," *Music & Letters* 53 (1972): 274–88; and "Stravinsky and the 'NRF' (1920–29)," *Music & Letters* 55 (1974): 261–71.

20. Jacques Rivière, "Le Sacre du printemps," *La Nouvelle Revue française,* 1 November 1913 (rpt. in Rivière, *Nouvelles Études* [Paris: Gallimard, 1947], 73, 75–76); trans. adapted from Truman C. Bullard, *The First Performance of Igor Stravinsky's* Sacre du printemps (PhD diss., Eastman School of Music, 1971), 2:269–308.

21. *Feuilles libres* 27 (1922): 223–24. A further extract in translation from the original typescript is given in Stravinsky, *Selected Correspondence,* ed. Robert Craft (New York: Knopf, 1982), 1:158n.

22. Though hardly its "constructive principles," as he represented it one day to Craft (*Conversations,* 18)—for that is precisely the difference between "neoclassicism" and pastiche.

23. *Musical America,* 10 January 1925 (Messing, 141); these interviews were what provoked Schoenberg's *Drei Satiren,* op. 28. See Leonard Stein, "Schoenberg and 'Kleine Modernsky,'" in *Confronting Stravinsky,* ed. Jann Pasler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 310–24.

24. Some Russians found this hard to swallow: "Stravinsky has delivered himself of a horrifying piano sonata, which he himself performs not without a certain chic," Prokofieff wrote back home to his friend Myaskovsky. "He declares that he is creating a new epoch with this, and that this is the only way to write nowadays, but the music itself sounds like Bach with smallpox (don't get me wrong: I love old Sebastian, but I don't like faking him)" (*S. S. Prokof'yev i N. Ya. Myaskovskiy: Perepiska,* ed. M. G. Kozlova and N. R. Yatsenko [Moscow, 1977], 195, 211, 217–18 [excerpts from three letters conflated]).

25. Nadia Boulanger, "Concerts Koussevitsky," *Le Monde musical,* November 1923 (Messing, 133).

26. Letter of 14 August 1922 (Messing, 124); Stravinsky goes on to say that "this Hindemith is a sort of German Prokofieff, infinitely more sympathetic than *les autres sous-Schoenberg.*"

27. Actually, anti-Semitic sentiments had been built into French (neo)classicism as early as the founding of D'Indy's Schola Cantorum in 1894, the Dreyfus year (see Messing, 19ff.).

28. Ian Kemp, *Hindemith* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 11 (Hinton, 167).

29. Coinage of the term *neue Sachlichkeit* is credited to Gustav Hartlaub, director of the Mannheim Museum; see Jost Hermand, "Unity within Diversity? The History of the Concept 'Neue Sachlichkeit,'" in *Culture and Society in the Weimar Republic,* ed. Keith Bullivant (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), 166–67; also Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 120–22.

30. See Paul Hindemith, *A Composer's World: Horizons and Limitations,* Charles Eliot Norton Lectures, 1949–50 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), viii.

31. Heinrich Besseler, "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens" (Hinton, 14; my italics).

32. It is reproduced in Robert P. Morgan, *Twentieth-Century Music* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 222.

33. Aaron Copland, "Baden-Baden," *Modern Music* 5 (1927): 34 (rpt. in *Copland on Music* [New York: W. W. Norton, 1963], 188).

34. See *Dialogues and a Diary,* 51.

35. Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, *Memories and Commentaries* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), 86.

36. Theodor W. Adorno, "Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik" (1932) (Hinton, 72–73).

37. Arnold Schoenberg, "Linear Counterpoint" (1931), in *Style and Idea: Selected Writings of Arnold Schoenberg,* ed. Leonard Stein, trans. Leo Black (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 294.

38. Arnold Schoenberg, "Glosses on the Theories of Others" (1929), in *Style and Idea,* 315.

39. See his letter to Ansermet, 9 September 1923, in which Hindemith is now written off as "a kind of H. Wolf" (*Selected Correspondence,* 1:171; also *Stravinsky in Pictures and Documents,* ed. Vera Stravinsky and Robert Craft [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978], 250).

40. See Arthur Lourié, *Sergei Koussevitzky and His Epoch* (New York: Knopt, 1931), 196. Stravinsky's worshipful attitude toward the Italian dictator is documented by Robert Craft in "Stravinsky's Politics: Left, Right, Left," in *Stravinsky in Pictures and Documents,* 547–58. For additional information and quotations, see chapter 31 above.

41. Igor Stravinsky, *Poetics of Music in the Form of Six Lessons* (bilingual ed.), trans. Arthur Knodel and Ingolf Dahl (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 9, 21–23, 99.

42. Ibid., 105.

43. Alexandre Benois, "Vrubel,'" *Mir iskusstva* 10 (1903): 40.

44. *Dialogues and a Diary,* 8–9.

45. "Stravinsky's *Oedipus*" (24 February 1928), in Schoenberg, *Style and Idea,* 483.

46. An essential document of Viennese Back-to-Bachianism is Webern's detailed analysis of op. 28, written at the request of Erwin Stein, the Boosey & Hawkes editor (who, however, did not see fit to publish it in *Tempo*). The essay places equal emphasis on the Quartet's congruence with established tradition, both generally contrapuntal and specifically twelve-tone, and on its successful extensions of traditional technique in both domains. Webern's comments on the derivation of the row, in particular, display the combination of pride in structural density and triumph at its concealment from the uninitiated that has become so familiar in the literature of postwar serialism. The essay, in Zoltan Roman's translation, is given as appendix 2 of Hans Moldenhauer (in collaboration with Rosaleen Moldenhauer), *Anton Webern: A Chronicle of His Life and Work* (New York: Knopf, 1979), 751–56.

47. Schoenberg's remark to Josef Rufer on the significance of his "discovery" of twelve-tone technique is by now so famous that the word *supremacy* has surely brought it to every reader's mind: quotation is superfluous. The dogma of Germanic supremacy in the arts, and in music in particular, is very stimulatingly traced to its romantic roots in Sanna Pederson, "On the Task of the Music Historian: The Myth of the Symphony after Beethoven," *repercussions* 2, no. 1 (Fall 1993): 5–30.

48. "National Music" (1931), in Schoenberg, *Style and Idea,* 173.

49. Ibid., 170, 171.

50. The Moldenhauers presented Webern's Nazism as wartime hysteria (*Anton Webern: A Chronicle,* chap. 30 ["Webern and 'The Third Reich'"], 515–32). Louis Krasner's memoirs of Webern show him a convinced sympathizer as early as 1936: "Some Memories of Anton Webern, the Berg Concerto, and Vienna in the 1930s" (as told to Don C. Siebert), *Fanfare* 11 (1987): 335–47. On Schenker, see William Drabkin, "Felix-Eberhard von Cube and the North-German Tradition of Schenkerism," *Proceedings of the Royal Musical Association* 111 (1984–85): 180–207, esp. the letter of May 1933 (quoted on 189) that gives startling evidence of personal identification with Hitler. Common to these manifestations is the striking faculty of dissociation, the ability to ignore contradictions: Webern maintained good relations with Jews and even deplored Nazi anti-Semitism (though usually ascribing reports of it to anti-German propaganda); Schenker of course was himself a Jew. As Leonardo Sciascia observed (in "Open Doors") of the Italian population under Mussolini, they saw no need to confront the problem of judging fascism as a whole.

51. See Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 30, 36.

52. Quotations from Krenek in this paragraph are from *Music Here and Now,* trans. Barthold Fles (New York: W. W. Norton, 1939), 75.

53. The slur in this case comes not from the right but from the left (Ernst Bloch, "On the Threepenny Opera," in *Erbschaft dieser Zeit* [1935], rpt. in *Marxism and Art,* ed. Maynard Solomon [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979], 576), proving once again that German totalitarian ideologies, whether "left" or "right," were indistinguishably united in their contempt for liberalism.

54. Program note to the première production (28 May 1938), rpt. in the libretto booklet accompanying the Angel recording (SZCX-3869, 1979).

55. See chap. 1 ("The Philosophical Approach") in Hindemith's *A Composer's World,* 1–13.

56. Paul Hindemith, *Johann Sebastian Bach: Heritage and Obligation* (trans. of *J. S. Bach: Ein verpflichtendes Erbe*) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 40–41.

57. "Zur Deutung von Strawinskys Neoklassizismus," first given as a paper at a Stravinsky centennial conference in Milan and published in the Stravinsky issue of *Musik-Konzepte* 34–35 (1984): 80–88. The same line was followed by Alan Lessem in another centennial piece: "Schoenberg, Stravinsky, and Neo-Classicism: The Issues Reexamined," *Musical Quarterly* 68 (1982): 527–42.

58. For documentation of Stravinsky's efforts to keep himself *persona grata* in the "NS-Staat" even after the Düsseldorf Entartete Musik exhibition of 1938, see the letters to B. Schotts Söhne excerpted in Stravinsky, *Selected Correspondence,* vol. 3 (1985), 217–72. For more on Frommel in relation to Stravinsky, see Wolfgang Osthoff, "Symphonien beim Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs: Strawinsky—Frommel—Schostakowitsch," *Acta Musicologica* 49 (1987): 62–104.

59. Stalinist neoclassicism can be dated precisely to the Pushkin centenary of 1937—which for Soviet music meant the zealous cultivation of Pushkin settings in a pastiche period style—for it was precisely during the peak of political terror that Soviet composers were first explicitly directed to emulate "russkaya klassika" as a timeless model and as a return to healthy, "normal" musical values after the excesses of early Soviet modernism (see Anna Shteynberg, "Pushkin v tvorchestve sovetskikh kompozitorov," *Sovetskaya muzika* 1 [1937]: 53). From then until the war, much Soviet

music makes a jarringly tame, incongruously "bourgeois" impression in the context of political exhortation to participate in the turbulence and heroics of "Soviet reality" in the period of the five-year plans. But that is precisely the point. Behind all the activist rhetoric, the arts (and music above all) were under new pressure to provide not stimulus (or not just stimulus) but an anodyne.

60. Obituary, *New York Times,* 24 December 1991.

61. Hans Günter Klein, "Atonalität in den Opern von Paul von Klenau und Winfried Zillig—zur Duldung einer im Nationalsozialismus verfemten Kompositionstechnik," in *Internationaler musikwissenschaftlicher Kongress Bayreuth 1981* (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1983), 490–94.

62. The term "megalomania of self-infinitization" is Daniel Bell's: see *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 49. For the Adorno concept, see his *The Jargon of Authenticity,* trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Darmstadt rhetoric still has its unembarrassed public defenders. Glossing the young Boulez's most notorious apothegm ("Any musician who has not experienced—I do not say understood, but truly experienced—the necessity of dodecaphonic language is USELESS") after forty years, Jonathan Harvey, an English composer, has written: "In our age of tolerant pluralism this could sound like a statement of Erich Honecker. And yet, is it asking so much? To experience this necessity is the gateway to seeing a fresh (!) issue for mainstream European musical language" ("Experiencing Modern Music," *Times Literary Supplement,* 19 June 1992, 16). For a somewhat lurid account of the emergence of this neo-fascist *neuere Sachlichkeit* in postwar Europe, narrated from the perspective of an excluded member of the older generation of serialists, see John L. Stewart, *Ernst Krenek: The Man and His Music* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 266–71, 296–300.

63. Erik Levi, "Atonality, 12-Tone Music and the Third Reich," *Tempo* 178 (1991): 21. These remarks, made in connection with von Klenau's opera *Michael Kohlhaas* (premièred November 1933), were quoted the next May in the journal *Zeitschrift für Musik,* where the composer further justified dodecaphony as "consistent with Nazi insistence on technical competence" and held it up as an antidote to "individualistic arbitrariness." See Michael Meyer, *The Politics of Music in the Third Reich* (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 312. For Schoenberg's pained comment, see "Is It Fair?" (1947), in *Style and Idea,* 249–50.

64. "Rencontre avec Stravinsky," *Preuves* 2 (1952): 37.