Chapter 9

Developing Ethical Expertise and Moral Personalities

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The cognitive and neuro-sciences have made great strides in uncovering the nature of human psychobiology in recent years. Moral educators have yet to make much of their findings. The three theories presented here capitalize on recent research that has implications for building moral personalities and cultivating morally-adept citizens (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004b; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009).[1] The Adaptive Ethical Expertise blends deliberative and intuitive development for ethical expertise development. The Integrative Ethical Education model is a step-by-step model intended for integration into academic instruction at all levels. Multi-Ethics Theory, a more comprehensive theory of moral development rooted in neurobiological processes, has implications for moral education as well. All three theories address the development of moral personhood.

Approaches to education for moral character are typically divided into two opposing views that are rooted in different philosophical paradigms (see Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006; Narvaez, 2006). One philosophical paradigm represents particularist claims regarding virtue with a focus on the agent and the deliberate cultivation of virtues or excellences (MacIntyre, 1981). Of primary concern is the nature of a good life and the characteristics necessary to live a good life (e.g., Anscombe 1958; Hursthouse 1999; McDowell 1997). The individual is mentored in virtue by the community and gradually takes on the responsibility for discovering and cultivating the virtues and values inherent in the self (Urmson, 1988). From this perspective nearly everything in life has moral meaning, from friend selection to leisure activities. Traditional character education emerges from this view (Wynne & Ryan, 1993), although it seems to have misappropriated how virtue is best cultivated (Kohn 1997a, 1997b; Narvaez, 2006), resulting in minimal outcome success (Leming, 1997).

The contrasting view emphasizes universalist claims regarding justice and reasoning (Kant, 1949), addressing what is *the right thing to do* in a particular moral situation (e.g., Hare 1963; Rawls, 1971). Moral conduct is that which accords with applicable principles, derived from reasoning, for a particular situation and only in select slices of life. In comparison to virtue theory, typically, few demands are made on individuals, leaving many life choices out of the moral realm. Moral obligation is reduced to

that which can be formulated with respect to universal moral principles and becomes what is universally applicable (e.g., Kant's Categorical Imperative). "If what is right for anyone must be right for everyone in relevantly similar circumstances, then what is right must be such as can be recognized and acted upon by persons who possess very little in the way of developed moral character" (Norton, 1991, p. xi). Instead, to make moral judgments, one adopts a 'moral point of view,' a position detached from personal traits and conditions. Although Kohlberg's ideas about the relation between personality and judgment shifted repeatedly, he considered character dispositions inadequate for moral judgment and emphasized reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981). Approaches to moral education rooted in Kohlberg's work typically do the same.

There has been a longstanding assumption adopted from philosophy that moral reasoning drives moral behavior (e.g., Blasi, 1980; Kohlberg, 1981; Piaget, 1932). Most famously, Kohlberg emphasized deliberative moral reasoning and its advancement through moral dilemma discussion (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975), what can be called *rational* moral education (Narvaez, 2006). The robust findings in moral judgment research notwithstanding (e.g., Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999), the centrality of deliberative reasoning in behavior is a fading paradigm across psychology. To be sure, extensive reasoned argument has been instrumental in shutting down discriminatory practices, such as slavery, and instituting more equitable practices, such as woman's suffrage. Despite the indisputable importance of moral reasoning, there is only a weak link between moral reasoning capacities and moral action (Blasi, 1980; Thoma, 1994). In fact, the disparity between knowing and doing has become increasingly evident across psychological fields, instigating a paradigm shift in mainstream psychology (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).

In the paradigm new to psychology, unconscious parallel processing becomes dominant whereas conscious, serial processing becomes secondary (Bargh, 1997). Most information processing is automatic (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999); most decisions are made without deliberation (Hammond, 2000); and most activities are governed by preconscious, automatic processes (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). In other words, humans have two types of "minds" (e.g., Kahneman, 2003). The deliberative mind processes information serially and consciously. The intuitive mind is comprised of multiple non-conscious, parallel-processing systems that learn implicitly from environmental patterns and

behaves automatically, often without awareness (Hogarth, 2001). The intuitive mind develops appropriate sensibilities and habitual responses from immersed experience and comprises the "habits" that are valued in traditional character education whereas the conscious mind cultivates the sophisticated moral reasoning valued by rational moral education.

Despite the perceived conflict between these two approaches to moral character education, they can be viewed as complementary (O'Neill, 1996). The Aristotelian emphasis on intuition development evident in traditional character education is more empirically aligned with everyday human behavior. Yet it is deliberative reasoning that facilitates complex understandings of justice. Therefore, character education should not be approached as Either/Or, as a choice between rational moral education and character education, or between deliberative reasoning and intuition development (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006). Both systems are required for moral agency. The intuitive mind makes decisions and takes actions without conscious awareness most of the time. Yet the deliberative mind is vital for guiding intuition development and countering poor intuitions (Groopman, 2007; Hogarth, 2001). A person without one or the other is missing a critical tool for moral personhood.

In light of the dual nature of the human mind and the importance of both reasoning and intuition, how should we approach moral character education? A perspective that melds the paradigms is moral expertise development.

Adaptive Ethical Expertise as a Framework for Developing Ethical Character

The two seemingly opposed approaches to learning and becoming a moral person are brought together in expertise development, which emphasizes the development of appropriate intuitions and sophisticated reasoning. Experts-in-training are immersed in environments that foster good intuitions about the domain while receiving explicit guidance as to how to think about solving problems in the domain. For example, a working chef practices under the watchful eye of the master chef who models, guides and advises.

What do we mean by expertise? Experts differ from novices in several key ways. They have more and better organized knowledge (e.g., Sternberg, 1998). They have declarative (explicit), procedural

(implicit) and conditional knowledge. In short, they know what knowledge to access, which procedures to apply, how to apply them, and when. They perceive the world differently, noticing underlying patterns and discerning necessity where novices see nothing remarkable (Johnson & Mervis, 1997). Expert behavior is often automatic and effortless (Vicente & Wang, 1998). Experts function as more complex adaptive systems in their approaches to solving problems in the domain whereas novices miss the affordances for action available in the circumstance (Neisser, 1976; Hatano & Inagaki, 1986). Experts have highly developed intuitions as well as explicit knowledge. Moreover, experts' sense of self is highly connected to their efficacy. They are motivated for excellence.

The proposal here is that we should treat moral virtue or excellence as a type of adaptive expertise (Narvaez 2006; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005), much like the ancients did (e.g., Aristotle, 1988; Mencius, 1970). A virtuous person is like an expert who has highly cultivated skills—sets of procedural, declarative and conditional knowledge—that are applied appropriately in the circumstance. In other words, moral exemplars in the fullest sense demonstrate moral (knowing the good) and practical wisdom (knowing how to carry it out in the situation). Moral expertise is applying the right virtue in the right amount in the right way at the right time.

Expertise is a set of capacities that can be put into action. Moral experts demonstrate holistic orientations (sets of procedural, declarative and conditional knowledge) in one or more of at least four processes critical to moral behavior: ethical sensitivity, ethical judgment, ethical focus, and ethical action (Narvaez & Rest, 1995; Rest, 1983). See Table 1 for a list of skills. Experts in Ethical Sensitivity are better at quickly and accurately discerning the nature of a moral situation and determining the role they might play. They take on multiple perspectives in an effort to be morally responsive to others. Experts in Ethical Judgment reason about duty and consequences, and apply personal ethical codes to solve complex problems. Experts in Ethical Focus cultivate self-regulation that leads them to prioritize and deepen commitment to ethical goals. Experts in Ethical Action know how to keep their spirit focused on the moral goal and implement an action plan step by step. They are able to step forward and intervene courageously for the welfare of others. Experts in a particular moral excellence have more and better

organized knowledge about it, have highly tuned perceptual skills for it, have deep moral desire for it, and have highly automatized, effortless responses. In short, they have more *content* knowledge and more *process* knowledge, more moral wisdom and more practical wisdom.

As novices in virtually every domain including the moral, children are best taught using novice-to-expert instruction (Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999). Experts-in-training build implicit and explicit understandings about the domain, engaging both the deliberative and intuitive minds. Immersion in the domain occurs at the same time that explanations are presented, thereby cultivating both intuitions and deliberative understanding (Abernathy & Hamm, 1995). Their practice is focused, extensive, and coached through contextualized, situation-based experience. The learning environment is well-structured, providing appropriate and accurate feedback (e.g., the chef-in-training gets feedback both from the physical results of food prepared and from the coach who judges it). Through the course of expertise training, perceptions are fine tuned and developed into chronically accessed constructs; interpretive frameworks are learned and, with practice, applied automatically; action schemas are honed to high levels of automaticity (Hogarth, 2001). What is painfully rule-based as a novice becomes, with vast experience, automatic and quick for an expert (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1990).

Nevertheless, there appear to be vastly different mindsets that influence perception and orientation in moral behavior. Multi-ethics theory seeks to name these disparate orientations and find their roots.

Multi-Ethics Theory

Multi-ethics theory (MET; Narvaez, 2008) is derived from psychological, evolutionary and neuro-sciences. Unlike most moral psychological work which has focused on the neocortex (e.g., deliberate reasoning), MET and its four goals address multiple neural systems including the subcortical, self-regulatory, and motivational structures (for more detail, see Narvaez, 2008; 2012; in press). First, it emphasizes motivational orientations driven by unconscious emotional systems that predispose one to process information and react to events in particular ways. Second, MET helps explain individual differences in moral functioning. Individuals differ in early emotional experiences that influence

personality formation and brain wiring and in turn affect information processing. Third, MET suggests the initial conditions for optimal human moral development, the *evolved developmental niche* (EDN; Narvaez, Wang, Gleason, Cheng, Lefever, & Deng, in press). The EDN emerged over 30 million years ago, designed to match up with the maturational needs of young social mammals, and was was slightly altered during human evolution (Konner, 2010). The characteristics include: naturalistic childbirth with no interference with timing, separation of mom and baby or induced pain; breastfeeding 2 to 5 years; nearly constant touch; responsiveness to the cues of the child; free play; positive social support and multiple adult caregivers). Despite data showing that all these practices positively influence child health and wellbeing for the longterm, the EDN is no longer closely followed in the USA (Narvaez, Panksepp, Schore & Gleason, 2013). Interestingly, these practices also influence moral development (Narvaez & Gleason, 2012; Narvaez et al., in press). Fourth, MET offers an explanation for the power of situations in influencing moral responses.

The moral self, moral identity and moral motivation are areas of increasing interest to researchers (e.g., Hardy & Carlo, 2005, 2011). Blasi has suggested that a person with a moral identity has moral constructs central to the self and that moral identity acts as an important source of motivation for moral action (Blasi, 1983, 1985). MET contrasts with Blasi's view. Focusing on a person's subjective view, the central question is not about the strength of one's *moral* motivation but *what* moral motivation they have at the time of inquiry. All organisms are goal-driven, including humans (Bogdan, 1994). It is the nature of organisms to aim for what they perceive to be good in the moment so that, subjectively a person feels they are behaving morally (although reflection later may change opinion). Persons select goals they think are the best in the circumstances, never consciously choosing goals they think are evil or bad (although see "selfish goal theory" Huang & Bargh, in press). Even those who behave violently are motivated to right a wrong (i.e., revenge is felt as "good" in the brain; de Quervain, Fischbacher, Treyer, Schellhammer, Schnyder, Buck, & Fehr, 2004). Those who are impulsive feel that their goals are "right" in part because they feel them so strongly. Thus, from the individual's viewpoint in the moment (the subjective perspective), the person is behaving morally. However, from an objective viewpoint, self-centered

behavior that harms or mistreats others is generally considered to be less morally defensible. For example, although egoism and selfishness can be touted as moral (see Weiss, 2012), they are usually considered outside of many moral frames. However, MET does not dismiss some mindsets as non-moral but notes different types. The view here is that everyone has a subjective moral identity—one oriented towards the perceived good. What varies, based on experience and situation, is the type of moral identity active at any given moment.

Multi-ethics theory identifies three basic attractors for moral functioning based on brain evolution: Safety, Engagement and Imagination (MacLean, 1990; Narvaez, 2008, in preparation). The three basic orientations represent different global brain states that emerge from the interplay and dominance of different emotion systems or their suppression. As a result, each brain state or mindset differentially affects perception, information processing, affordances (perceived action possibilities) and goals, propelling moral action on an individual or group level. See Figure 1 for types and subtypes.

The first mindset, Safety, involves the extrapyramidal action nervous system (EANS; Panksepp, 1998; MacLean, 1990: "R-complex"). The Ethic of Safety is based primarily in systems that revolve around survival and thriving in context, instincts shared with all animals and present from birth. The emotion systems of fear, anger and exploration dominate here along with behaviors such as territoriality, imitation, deception, struggles for power, maintenance of routine and following precedent. How much these "survival systems" dominate personality depends in part on early life experience because caregiving shapes self-regulatory systems and the capacity of the frontal lobe to control these subcortical systems. Excessive stress in early life can undermine self-regulatory capacities and wire the brain for threat reactivity (Porges, 2011), leading to a greater propensity to use a Safety Ethic in social interactions (Narvaez, in preparation).

Like Kohlberg's preconventional stages, the Safety Ethic is concerned with self preservation and personal gain, although it operates primarily implicitly. Survival systems dominate thought and behavior when the person or ingroup is threatened (MacLean 1990). When the Safety Ethic is triggered, the brain is mobilized for self-protection, drawing energy away from executive function, hampering higher-order

thinking and compassion. Defenses go up, in-group/out-group differences, rivalry and the pecking order are stressed, and superorganismic (mob) mentality can be set in motion (Bloom, 1995). A moral self that is dominated by the Ethic of Safety may orient to flourishing through the acquisition of wealth, status and power (Bunker Safety), or submission to hierarchy and order (Wallflower Safety). Perceiving threat easily, it is moral to hold in contempt outgroup members or those who violate the moral rules. The virtues of the Safety Ethic are fortitude, loyalty (for protection, not out of love), and obedience.

Providing a safe, secure environment that meets young children's basic needs circumvents establishing the dominance of a Safety Ethic and promotes the ethics systems that better represent human aspirations, engagement and imagination. Nevertheless, control systems in the prefrontal cortex are not fully developed until the middle 20s (Giedd et al., 1999) and are easily overtaken by the hindbrain's self-protective impulsivity (Bechara, 2005) so that adults must still offer guidance to youth at least until the brain is fully developed, until the mid 20s.

The Ethic of Engagement involves the emotional systems (care, play) that drive us towards intimacy, identified by Darwin as the locus of human moral sense (Darwin, 1871; Loye, 2002). Although evolution has prepared the human brain for sociality and moral agency, early life care must follow the evolved developmental niche described above for optimal moral development. Proper care during early life is required for normal formation of brain circuitries necessary for successful social engagement, many of which are dominated by the right brain which develops rapidly in the first years of life. With expected care, the foundations of love and trust grow in early life (Narvaez & Gleason, 2012), leading to values of compassion, openness and tolerance in adulthood (Eisler & Levine, 2002; Greenspan & Shanker, 2004). Figure 2 illustrates foundations of sociomoral development provided by the evolved developmental niche, each layer interactively building on prior layers including brain system "wiring" and thresholds for hormones and neurotransmitters. In mammals, poor early care leads to brain-behavioral disorders, evident in poor sociality and greater hostility and aggression towards others (Kruesi et al., 1992; Weaver, Szyf, & Meaney, 2002). The self in the present, in relationship, in emotional context, drives the relational moral orientation towards trust, love, reciprocity and moral action (Engagement) when a person's brain/body

systems are well formed. With poor or misdeveloped self-regulation, personal distress may ensue instead in social situations, undermining moral functioning (see Schore, 1994).

A disposition for Engagement, dominated by right-brain functioning, represents the heart of moral wisdom and virtue. Engagement has a greater capacity for meaningful relationships and a deeper sense of connection to others, a sense of respect and cherishment and a sense of responsibility for the welfare of others, (Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Narvaez, in preparation). In fact when the Safety Ethic runs amok, the more humane engagement ethic may provide a counter pressure if awakened, shifting from the Safety Ethic's self-aggrandizement and urge for dominance to compassionate self awareness.

The third ethical mindset, the Ethic of Imagination, uses the recently evolved parts of the brain, the neo- and pre-frontal cortices. The Imagination Ethic responds to and coordinates the intuitions and instincts of the Engagement Ethic and the Safety Ethic, as well as sorting out the multiple elements involved in moral decision making (e.g., one's immediate and meta-goals, principles, mood, reactions, and those of others for whom the situation matters). The Imagination Ethic has the ability to countermand instincts and intuitions with "free won't" (Cotterill, 2000), the ability that allows humans through learning and willpower to choose which stimuli are allowed to trigger emotional arousal (Panksepp, 1998). For example, an enraged parent can counter the instinct to beat up a disobedient child. The Imagination Ethic also has the capacity to create narratives to guide behavior or rationalization. The deliberative mind, largely through the brain's "interpreter" (Gazzaniga, 1985), is facile in explaining any behavior, sometimes unaware that it is "making things up." Typically, the interpreter adopts the narratives of a cultural, familial or affiliative group. The social narrative is further refined into a personal narrative, both of which drive behavior (Grusec, 2002).

Like the brain areas related to the Engagement Ethic, the development of brain areas related to the Ethic of Imagination requires a nurturing environment. The prefrontal cortex and its specialized units take decades to fully develop and are subject to damage from environmental factors (e.g., Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999). Underdevelopment of the right brain can lead to a Detached Imagination that makes moral disengagement easy (Bandura, 1999).

When integrated with the Engagement Ethic, the Imagination becomes Communal Imagination and provides for a greater moral senese than the other ethics. Although humans have evolved to favor face-to-face relationships and have difficulty imagining those not present (such as future generations), the work of the Imagination Ethic provides a means for a sense of community that extends beyond immediate relations. Indeed, a self grounded in the Imagination Ethic is broadly aware of human possibilities, of the power of co-creation of community in the moment. Such a self is broadly reflective, demonstrating exquisite self command for envisioned goals. The virtues of the Imagination Ethic are the ability to step back from the present moment, take multiple perspectives and imagine alternative futures. However, when the Imagination Ethic is corralled by the Safety Ethic (e.g., using planning and reasoning skills for aggressive self-protection or emotional detachment), much harm can be perpetrated in the world through Vicious Imagination.

As noted, when the brain capacities for sociality and abstraction are not fully nurtured or damaged, the Safety Ethic becomes the default system, either at the basic levels (aggressive, Bunker Morality, or passive, Wallflower Morality) or at the elaborated levels (Vicious or Detached Imagination). Although parenting provides the most important context for early brain wiring for engagement and imagination, educators can have an influence on which ethic dominates the classroom. The brain remains plastic so that Engagement and Communal Imagination can be cultivated even in schools. The Integrative Ethical Education model seeks to provide stepwise guidance to nurturing ethical expertise in the engagement and imagination ethics.

Step-By-Step Integrative Ethical Education

The Integrative Ethical Education model (IEE; Narvaez, 2006; 2007) provides an intentional, holistic, comprehensive, empirically-derived approach to moral character development. It is informed deeply by both ancient philosophy and current science about what contributes to human flourishing. As Aristotle pointed out, human flourishing necessarily includes individuals and communities, a perspective corroborated by the biological and social sciences. No one survives or flourishes alone. In fact, humans

are biologically wired for sociality and love (Maturana & Verden-Zoller, 1996). With the proper care humans are deeply empathic, with ethics of high engagement and imagination (Narvaez, 2013; in preparation).

The IEE model is presented in a step-by-step format. Ideally the steps take place simultaneously, but for new teachers, deploying and adding one step at a time is recommended.

Step 1: Establish a caring relationship with each student.

Fundamental to any mentoring relationship is establishing a caring connection, the type of relationship that allows mutual influence for mutual benefit. Greenspan and Shanker (2002) describe how parental interaction with infants establishes the cognitive propensities for learning and social being. Ideally, the family home is a source for deep emotional nourishment as pleasurable intimate relationships foster capacities for open communication and growth. But this has become increasingly difficult to maintain, due in part to both parents working and a variety of distracting activities. In a day when children are emotionally malnourished, much rides on the adults they see everyday, educators. In fact the most important protective factors against poor outcomes for a child are caring relationships, first, with an adult in the family, and second, with an adult outside the family (Masten, 2003). Why is caring so vital? As mammals, humans are primarily social-emotional creatures, evolutionarily prepared for the rewards of caring, emotionally-engaged relationships. The cool logic of a non-emotional Dr. Spock is a sign of pathology, not health (Damasio, 1999). It is through caring relationships and supportive climates that teachers nurture motivation and an engagement ethic.

When students have good relationships with their teachers, they are more likely to feel welcome in the classroom and have a greater sense of belonging, which is related to higher motivation and achievement (Klem & Connell, 2004; McNeely, Nonnemaker, & Blum, 2002; Roeser, Midgley & Urdan, 1996). Teacher caring and support are related to increased student engagement in learning (Libbey, 2004), especially among at-risk students (Connell, Halpern-Felsher, Clifford, Crichlow & Usinger, 1995; Croninger & Lee, 2001). Teachers can individualize their care for students, like a good parent. Of course, this means getting to know the child, respectfully, as much as possible. Some students with troubled

backgrounds require a longer warm-up period before they trust the teacher, requiring teacher persistence and patience (see Watson, 2003; this volume). Establishing a caring relationship is easier with some children than others, and is easier for elementary teachers than high school teachers who see many students relatively briefly. Nevertheless, as long as teachers maintain a humane classroom, students will be more likely to feel safe and engaged in learning, fostering moral character at the same time.

Human minds and hearts are prepared for emotional signaling and emotional motivation (Greenspan & Shanker 2004; Lewis, Amini & Lannon, 2000; Panksepp, 1998). If these are ignored or mishandled by the educator, then the Safety Ethic may predominate. The student may then spend most energy towards self-protection, leaving little energy for openness to learning. When the educator establishes healthy emotional communication with each student she provides the bridge for communication and influence. Without it, academic motivation is reliant on the residue of family motivation (which may be enough for some students but not others, e.g., Steinberg, 1996; Li, 2005).

Step 2: Establish a climate supportive of achievement and ethical character.

In simpler times, children learned morality through direct experience with adults during the basic chores and activities of life at home and in the local community. Today, children's lives are generally divorced from the everyday life of most adults and take place in the artificial learning settings, revolving around the classroom and school. So now it is here they learn how to get along with peers, how to participate in group work and decision making, how to be a citizen, and many other skills they take with them into adulthood. "The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life" so schools should be constructed as social institutions that integrate intellectual and moral development through active learning (Dewey, 1909/1975, p. 14).

Organizational climates and cultures shape perceptions and behavior (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989; Power & Higgins, this volume). In the broad sense, the climate includes the structures of the social environment, the overt and hidden systems of rewards and punishment, the goals and aspirations of the social group, and the general discourse about goals. In the specific sense, climate has to

do with how people treat one another, how they work and make decisions together, what feelings and expectations are nurtured.

Considerable research points to the importance of a caring classroom and school climate for optimal student outcomes. When classrooms have climates of mutual respect and caring—when the teacher fosters the Ethics of Engagement in self and students--everyone feels greater physical and psychological safety, leading to a greater sense of belongingness (Anderman, 2003; Ma, 2003). Bonding to school not only increases school engagement and commitment to learning among students (Goodenow, 1993), but also growth in achievement (Libbey, 2004) and healthy development generally (Catalano, Oesterle, Fleming, & Hawkins, 2004, Catalano, Hawkins, & Toumbourou, this volume). Caring classrooms and schools with high expectations for achievement and behavior are related both to high achievement and to moral behavior (Battistich, 2008; Zins, Weissberg, Wang, & Walberg, 2004). According to Solomon, Watson, and Battistich (2002), caring school and classroom communities have the following characteristics:

- Students are able to demonstrate autonomy, self-direction, and influence teacher decisions.
- Students interact positively with one another, collaborating and discussing course content and classroom policies.
- Students are coached on social skills as teachers exhibit warm acceptance of students, providing support and positive modeling.
- The teacher provides multiple opportunities for students to help one another.
- In a caring classroom, discipline is not punishment but is coached character development.

Educators can emphasize both engagement and imagination ethics, asking "who should I be?" as well as "how can we show respect for one another?" and "How can we help one another feel cared for in the classroom?" Schools can establish programs that take up part of the burden for developing empathy and fostering compassion that families are unable to address (e.g., Schonert-Reichl, Smith, Zaidman-Zait, & Hertzman, 2012).

Steps 1 and 2 are integral to best-practice teaching, yet in an era where children are exposed to many negative role models through popular culture, these two steps may no longer be enough to help students develop moral character (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). The next three steps identify more intentional cultivation of moral character.

Step 3: Teach ethical skills across the curriculum and extra-curriculum using a novice-to-expert pedagogy.

As mentioned above, training for ethical expertise includes developing appropriate intuitions and sophisticated deliberations in at least four areas: Ethical Sensitivity, Ethical Judgment, Ethical Focus and Ethical Action. But what competencies can or should be emphasized in schools? The Integrative Ethical Education model suggests skills and subskills for each of the four processes. These are skills critical for social and emotional intelligence and living a good life generally (see Elias et al., this volume). These skills are also important for active global citizenship. In a multipolar world, educators can help students minimize the Safety Ethic and develop engagement and imagination. See Table 1 for the suggested skills for each of the four processes described earlier.

How should moral character education be structured? As in training for expertise, educators should instruct both the deliberative mind and the intuitive mind. The intuitive mind is cultivated through immersion in active environments where skills are practiced and developed. This involves imitation of role models and appropriate feedback from the environment about what works. Social-cognitive moral personality theory suggests that a moral personality is built from social and practical experiences that foster automatized moral schemas (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004a; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005; Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006).

The deliberative mind can be coached in ways that fine-tune action and in metacognitive skills such as how to select good environments for one's own intuition development. By providing developmentally-sensitive theoretical explanation and dialogue, the deliberative mind builds understanding that coordinates implicit knowledge. Teachers are, first and foremost, role models. They

can model a moral orientation to life by thinking aloud about their own moral decisions, telling stories about striving for moral goals, reading stories that develop students' moral imaginations.

Learning involves an active and interactive process of transforming one's conceptual structures through selective attention and by relating new information to prior knowledge (Anderson, 1989). Best practice instruction provides opportunities for students to develop more accurate and better organized representations and the procedural skills required to use them (ibid). In order to do this, children must experience an *expert-in-training pedagogy* for each skill that they learn. Teachers can set up instruction to help students develop appropriate knowledge by designing lessons according to the following four levels of activities (Narvaez, Bock, Endicott, & Lies, 2004; Narvaez, 2005):

Level 1: Immersion in examples and opportunities. Teachers provide models and modeling of the goal, draw student attention to the "big picture" in the subject area, and help the students learn to recognize basic patterns.

Level 2: Attention to facts and skills. As students practice subskills, teachers focus student attention on the elemental concepts in the domain in order to build more elaborate concepts.

Level 3: Practice procedures. The teacher allows the student to try out many skills and ideas throughout the domain to build an understanding of how skills relate and how best to solve problems in the domain.

Level 4: Integrate knowledge and procedures. The student finds numerous mentors and/or seeks out information to continue building concepts and skills. There is a gradual systematic integration and application of skills and knowledge across many situations.

The ethical expertise approach was initially developed in the Minnesota Community Voices and Character Education project. In the final evaluation year, after being familiarized with the framework of skills and pedagogical approach, teacher teams determined which skills their students needed and which academic courses would integrate which skills. Using materials provided by the project designers and teacher-designed lessons, the skills approach had a significant effect on students in schools that implemented broadly over one year's time in contrast to a comparison group and to low implementing

schools (see Narvaez et al., 2004; see also (Narvaez, 2009; Narvaez & Bock, 2009; Narvaez & Endicott, 2009; Narvaez & Lies, 2009).[2]

Step 4: Foster student self-authorship and self-regulation.

Self-regulation (equilibration) has been a central, driving force of evolution and development within organisms (Darwin, 1871). Self-authorship (autopoesis) is what living systems do (Varela, Maturana, & Uribe, 1974). Self-authorship requires a coordinated partnership between the different minds (intuition and deliberation) and prosocial ethics (engagement and imagination) in a type of reflective abstraction (Piaget's *prise de conscience*; Gruber & Voneche, 1995). As Aristotle pointed out, individuals need mentors for self-regulation and self-development (self-authorship) until they can guide themselves through the selection of virtuous friends and activities (Urmson, 1988). Plato understood human existence to be a problem to the self, "the problem of deciding what to become and endeavoring to become it" (Urmson, 1988, p. 2). In other words, the final responsibility for character development lies with the individual. In their choices and actions, orientations and time allocations, individuals address the question: *Who should I be? Who are my role models and how do I get there?* In an enriched moral environment, students are provided with tools for self-regulation and self-authorship in character formation.

Individuals can be coached not only in skills and expertise, as noted previously, but in domain-specific self-regulation (Zimmerman, Bonner, & Kovach, 2002). The most successful students learn to monitor the effectiveness of their problem-solving strategies and, when necessary, alter their strategies for success (Anderson, 1989). Coaching for self-regulation requires enlisting the deliberative mind to select the environments from which the intuitive mind learns effective behaviors, thereby accelerating implicit learning (Hogarth, 2001). For example, different intuitions are developed when reading a good book than when playing violent video games. Teachers thinking aloud about solving challenging problems and their decision making processes provides students with examples of how to monitor progress during goal execution. Students can learn the metacognitive skills that moral experts have, such as noticing moral

problems, guiding one's attention away from temptations, self-cheerleading when energy fades, and selecting or redesigning an environment to maximize goal completion (Zimmerman, 1998).

Step 5: Restore the Village: Asset-Building Communities and Coordinated Developmental Systems

It bears emphasizing that the good life is not lived in isolation. One does not flourish alone. IEE is implemented in and with a community. It is the community who establishes, and nourishes the individual's moral voice, providing a moral anchor, and offering guidance as virtues are cultivated. Indeed, both Plato and Aristotle agreed that a good person is above all a good citizen. Hunter (2000) suggests that we find the answers to our existential questions in the particularities that we bring to a civic dialogue: "Character outside of a lived community, the entanglements of complex social relationships, and their shared story, is impossible" (p. 227). It is in the community that students apply and hone their ethical competencies.

Truly democratic ethical education empowers all involved—educators, community members and students—as they form a learning community together, developing ethical skills and self-regulation for both individual and community actualization (Rogoff, Turkanis, & Bartlett, 2001). The purpose of ethical behavior is to live a good life *in the community*. Together community members work out basic questions such as: How should we get along in our community? How do we build up our community? How do we help one another flourish? Each individual lives within an active ecological context (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) in which, ideally, the entire community builds ethical skills together.

Overall, we can strengthen the connections among children's life spaces: home, school, and community at various levels. Children who live with coordinated systems are adaptationally advantaged (Benson, Leffert, Scales, & Blyth, 1998). The type of person a child becomes is determined in large part by the dynamic interaction among community, family and culture. Caring communities with high expectations and involved adults are more likely to raise morally-engaged citizens.

Shaping Moral Perceptions

> *"[Television is] a cultural environment into which our children are born, and which tells all the stories…who tells the stories of a culture really governs human behavior. It used to be the parent,*

the school, the church, the community. Now it's a handful of global conglomerates that have nothing to tell, but a great deal to sell." - George Gerbner (Oliver, 2005)

At no time in US history have children's minds been more shaped by non-family members, specifically advertisers who peddle dissatisfaction with self and the need for consuming an endless array of products (Halton, 2008). Neuroscience research shows the effects of popular media on brain maturation, and much of it is worrisome (Quart, 2003; Kasser, 2002). The Ethic of Safety is activated by media from which we develop a 'mean world syndrome,' desensitization towards violence (it is fun and rewarding) and towards victims of violence, culminating in a general lack of trust in others (Gerbner, 1994). The Ethic of Safety is aggravated when we see what others have that we do not ("affluenza," Hamilton & Denniss, 2005), promoting addictive status seeking. The Ethic of Imagination is hijacked by these artificially-manufactured desires so that virtue is converted into being a good consumer. The Ethic of Engagement, being physiologically 'in tune' with others, is experienced less as interaction with others occurs more and more through electronic means (Vandewater, Bickham & Lee, 2006).

Children learn cultural narrative structures and when to use them through direct experience with stories that provide reasons for action (Narrative Practice Hypothesis, Hutto, 2007). Teachers can foster narratives to counter the hedonism and status-enhancing messages of popular media and instead foster discourse that draws attention to moral issues and the child's social purpose. Teachers can encourage students to construct their own moral goals and moral life story (e.g., *How are you going to make the world a better place for everyone? What skills do you need for it?*). Individuals operate according to the narratives they tell themselves (McAdams, 1993; Schank, 1995). Adults help structure personal narratives by the types of questions they ask (e.g., *How did you help someone in school today? What positive actions did you take over vacation? What positive goals do you have for today?* Nelson & Gruendel, 1981). Teachers (and adults in general) influence children's narratives by what they emphasize, expect, and encourage in the environments they design for children. Teachers can fill children's memories with positive concrete experiences in which they helped others and teachers can remind them of these times.

Providing satisfying social experiences that engage student emotion and motivation can shape not only perceptions and sensibilities but also goals and dreams. By providing a purposeful prosocial narrative, the child internalizes a personal narrative and the deliberative mind's imagination is engaged in activities that bring it about.

Conclusion

Educators play a large role in the moral character development of their students. The Integrative Ethical Education model encourages educators to take on an intentional, conscientious approach to cultivating moral character. Specifically, IEE informs educators how they can cultivate their students' expertise in Multi-Ethic Theory's engagement and imagination ethics. IEE's step-by-step, empirically-derived framework is intended to help educators actualize their important responsibility of helping develop their students' moral character.

Footnotes

1 Note, we use ethical and moral interchangeably.

2 Earlier versions of these booklets were created under grant #R215V980001 from the U.S. Department of Education Office of Educational Research and Improvement to the Minnesota Department of Children, Families and Learning during 1998-2002 and can be downloaded at http://cee.nd.edu/curriculum/curriculum1.shtml

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Table 1. Ethical Skills and Suggested Subskills

ETHICAL SENSITIVITY	ETHICAL JUDGMENT
Understand emotional expression	Understand ethical problems
Take the perspectives of others	Using codes & identifying judgment criteria
Connecting to others	Reasoning critically
Responding to diversity	Reasoning ethically
Controlling social bias	Understand consequences
Interpret situations	Reflect on process and outcome
Communicate well	Coping and resiliency
ETHICAL FOCUS	ETHICAL ACTION
Respecting others	Resolving conflicts and problems
Cultivate conscience	Assert respectfully
Help others	Taking initiative as a leader
Being a community member	Planning to implement decisions
Finding meaning in life	Cultivate courage
Valuing traditions & institutions	Persevering
Developing ethical identity & integrity	Working hard

Figure 1. Multi-Ethics Theory Types and Subtypes



Figure 2. Baselines for Virtue Development Co-Constructed by Early Experience