



CHAPTER

26

INTEGRATIVE ETHICAL EDUCATION

DARCIA NARVAEZ

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

Much of the debate over moral education in recent decades has centered around the advantages and disadvantages of two dominant educational approaches to the moral formation of children, referred to as *traditional character education* and *rational moral education*. Traditional character education focuses on the inculcation of virtuous traits of character as the proper aim of education. In contrast, rational moral education seeks to facilitate the development of autonomous moral judgment and the ability to resolve disputes and reach consensus according to canons of fairness. The first approach, then, is concerned with the educational requirements that contribute to the formation of character. The second is concerned with the development of reasoning and autonomy. Unfortunately, the debate has often taken on an either/or quality that has obscured common ground and integrative possibilities. In this chapter a third way, called *integrative ethical education*, is introduced. It offers a holistic approach to ethical education that, on the one hand, acknowledges the goal of cultivating reflective reasoning and a commitment to justice, required for the development of democratic communities and, on the other hand, acknowledges that the demands of citizenship in a pluralistic democracy and the ability to engage in deliberative democratic procedures depend on having a character of a certain kind.

In this chapter, the main themes of the two dominant approaches to moral and character education are reviewed. These prototypes align tolerably well with philosophical positions associated with Aristotle and Kant, respectively. The relation of these prototypes to specific educational strategies employed in moral and character education are discussed, including how recent models have attempted to reconcile them. Integrative ethical education is introduced as a view that is built on the best from these two traditions but also incorporates knowledge from cognitive science, best practice instruction, and the ancient Greek notions of *techné* and *eudaimonia*.

These debates are better understood once they are placed in historical context. In the first section, the stage is set by identifying the terms of reference for the debate between traditional character education and rational moral education (the cognitive–developmental approach).

MORAL¹ EDUCATION IN A PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACY

Guttmann (1987) pointed out the universal agreement that the family has preeminent responsibility for the moral and character formation of children. Nevertheless, democratic polities have a profound interest in the moral formation of its citizens. Although families have first priority in educating their children, the state has its own interest because democracies require skilled and active citizens. Indeed, according to Guttmann (1985): “Moral education in a democracy is best viewed as a shared trust of the family and the polity, mutually beneficial to everyone who appreciates the values of both family life and democratic citizenship” (p. 54).

The state’s interest in moral formation is manifested primarily through the common, or public, school where representatives of the state, the teachers, cultivate citizenship and civic engagement in their young charges. Nevertheless, the moral agenda of schools has proven to be contentious in the history of U.S. education, particularly as societal diversity increased. As the country became more culturally heterogeneous over the course of its history, the values that seemed obvious for public schools to teach became increasingly obscured by fundamental debates about the nature of a pluralistic democratic society and the purpose of schooling. Families became less willing to cede the proper role of character education to schools. In fact, some argued that parents should be the ones to teach values, not teachers. As Lickona (1991b) put it:

Should the schools teach values? Just a few years ago, if you put that question to a group of people, it was sure to start an argument. If anyone said yes, schools should teach children values, somebody else would immediately retort, *whose* values? (p. 3)

Prior to the 20th century, character development was one of the primary goals of education. Schools were considered places for conveying factual information, including facts about the moral life. Over the course of the 20th century the purpose of school narrowed to teaching “the basics” (i.e., reading, writing, arithmetic), and educators tried to stay out of the battles over religious and moral values. As if to fill the vacuum, new approaches to moral character formation arose. In the 1960s, more liberal, less directive approaches to values education were tried such as values clarification (e.g., Raths, Harmin, & Simon, 1976), which supports the values the child brings to the classroom, and moral dilemma discussion (e.g., Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989), which promotes critical thinking about fairness and the development of moral reasoning. These approaches were strongly criticized. Advocates of traditional character education attacked them for allowing students to have a say in decisions that the traditionalists consider adult prerogatives, and for avoiding the strong prohibitions and rewards that traditionalists think are better suited to fostering good character (e.g., Wynne, 1991). In fact, since the 1950s, traditional moralists have blamed youth behavior (e.g., crime, cheating, drug use, pregnancy) not only on the media, materialism, privatism, and divorce, but also on liberal programs in schools that convey value neutrality (e.g., Ryan & McLean, 1987) and “de-value America” (Bennett,

¹Note that *moral* and *ethical* are used interchangeably.

1992). As a means to stop the cultural decline, traditionalists rallied around directive character education (see Nash, 1997). Subsequently, they persuaded politicians, presidents, and legislatures to take up the call for character education. At the beginning of the 21st century, the number of schools adopting character education programs was on the rise; forty-seven states received federal funding for character education and fourteen states had mandated it (*Los Angeles Times*, 2003).

Irrespective of whether or not moral education is an explicit and intentional part of the curriculum, values education is embedded in the fabric of classrooms and instructional practice. For example, moral considerations are evident in how teachers treat students (DeVries, Hildebrandt, & Zan, 2000), in the policies and procedures teachers put in place and in the instructional strategies they use (Solomon, Watson, & Battistich, 2002), in how teachers set and uphold standards, decide on grades, and respect cultural differences (Kessler, 2001). In other words, moral considerations infuse the “hidden curriculum” (Jackson, 1968; Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1998). Values are inextricably linked to school and classroom life. Teachers, as representatives of the community and the primary liaison between the child and the society, must be given the authority to help children develop character skills that promote active and positive citizenship because the community, like the family, is responsible for raising good citizens (Gutmann, 1987).

Educators themselves bring up a pragmatic issue. How can they teach values when they are struggling to deliver on academics—basic knowledge in science, literacy, critical thinking? Of course, the same quick answer applies: schools are already teaching values, whether they want to or not, intentionally or not. There is no need to add a new course. The solution advocated here is well expressed by Starratt (1994):

Rather than add on new courses in ethics, teachers can make use of an abundance of ethically pregnant material already in the curriculum that has not been attended to. It is not a question of working longer hours; it is a question of working smarter, of improving the quality of all the human interactions now taking place in the normal school day. (pp. 11–12)

If citizens can agree that moral education necessarily is part of schooling and that educators teach values as much as they grade papers, can we agree on what should be taught and how; in other words, what moral education should look like in action? Not necessarily. This is contentious, too. In fact, this is the heart of the matter. We examine the foundations of the debate in the next section. The two contending approaches to the character formation of children are outlined in terms of their philosophical assumptions about character development.

TWO COMPETING PARADIGMS

Moral education debates can be characterized as a perceived clash between two philosophical perspectives (O’Neill, 1996), one representing particularist claims regarding virtue, or character ethics (MacIntyre, 1981; Noddings,² 2002), and the other representing universalist claims regarding justice and reasoning (Frankena, 1973; Kant, 1949), or rule ethics. The two types of theories are not mutually exclusive but differ in emphasis and in how they circumscribe morality (O’Neill, 1996). These disparate foci lead to different premises, conclusions, and applications.

²The caring perspective denoted by Noddings is a variant of particularism that emphasizes relation rather than agent-centered virtues, and emphasizes setting up the conditions for good relations.

Rule Ethics

A rule ethics approach focuses on what is the right thing to do in a particular moral situation (e.g., Frankena, 1973; Hare, 1963; Rawls, 1971). Rule ethics circumscribes morality to obligatory action and is driven by reasoning about such action. For Kant, famously, this means acting according to respect for persons (Kant, 1949). Moral conduct is that which accords with applicable principles for a particular situation, principles in conformance with universalizable obligatory action are necessary for anyone who finds himself or herself in a similar situation (e.g., Kant's categorical imperative).

In comparison to classical character ethics to be described, rule ethics is a minimalist theory in two senses (Norton, 1991). First, morality is simplified and few demands are made on individuals. Rule ethics attends to deontic judgments about obligation in narrow slices of human life, leaving free from moral evaluation huge stretches of life. It narrows the range of morality, excluding such things as one's choice of friends, vocation, and leisure activities from the auspices of the moral life (which fall under the guidance of prudence, which Kant considered separate from morality). Second, it is minimal not only because it shields from moral evaluation vast segments of human experience, but also because it reduces moral obligation to that which can be formulated with respect to universal moral principles. Morality becomes what is universally applicable.

Modern morality is minimalist by virtue of its understanding of rules as applicable uniformly to everyone under the requirements of "universalizability" and "impartiality." If what is right for anyone must be right for everyone in relevantly similar circumstances, then what is right must be such as can be recognized and acted upon by persons who possess very little in the way of developed moral character. (Norton, 1991, p. xi)

Thus, this lowest common denominator becomes what is demanded of everyone. Rule ethics attends to the development of character only when necessary for rule-abiding behavior. In contrast, conduct expected from virtuous individuals in character ethics—living a good life (e.g., cultivating courage and prudence)—becomes supererogatory, not required of the moral agent.

Character Ethics

The focal concerns for character ethics are the nature of a good life and the attributes necessary to live a good life (e.g., Anscombe, 1958; Hursthouse, 1999; McDowell, 1997). The central questions are "What sort of person should I be?" and "How should I live my life?" Hence the focus is on the agent. These concerns lead directly to the problem of character development because the attributes of moral character are not present at birth. Virtues or excellences must be deliberately nurtured. Although classical theory does not ignore the need for rules for those who do not have the requisite moral character to guide their behavior, rules are subordinated to character development and viewed instrumentally for that end.

In contrast to the rule-ethics perspective, character ethics maintains that nothing in a life is devoid of moral meaning. All human conduct has moral relevance. The choices one makes in all realms of life influence and reflect one's character development. Moreover, continuous moral growth is demanded of individuals, with no upper limit. Individuals are held responsible for their own self-actualization and for maintaining good character. There

are two areas in which rule ethics and character ethics are paradigmatically far apart, the nature of moral personhood and the importance of community.

The Nature of Personhood

The two philosophical paradigms are distinguishable in how they view moral personhood, “thinly” or “thickly” (Williams, 1985). Rule ethics focuses on action, defining the individual as a bearer of rights that others must respect through right action (O’Neill, 1995). Here, the moral person is defined thinly, as one who takes just action but whose required universalizable rules for actions denote negative duties (i.e., to do no harm) and are exclusive of positive duties such as benevolence and the responsibility for self-development. Character ethics, on the other hand, emphasizes the quality of agents, rather than action per se, and the inherently moral, social, and political aspects of individuality. In this view, personhood is defined thickly, as essentially moral, founded in virtues, values, and responsibilities (Hursthouse, 1999). The individual is responsible for discovering what virtues and values are inherent in the self, and for cultivating them. Moral action is derivative of moral character. Clearly then, whereas rule ethics requires only a thin notion of personhood to make it work, virtue ethics requires a fuller specification of personhood, a thick notion that says something about how virtues contribute to living well the life that is good for one to live (Cunningham, in press).

The Need for Community

Unlike rule ethics, character ethics emphasizes the support of the community in developing moral personhood. The individual is embedded in a community that offers support and encouragement in the process of self-actualization. “The conception of the polis, then, is that of an institutionalized social organization designed to afford maximum realization of values by individuals, as well as optimal utilization of the values realized” (Norton, 1991, p. 14). This is the essence of *eudaimonia* (flourishing). In this Aristotelian view, every individual actualizes virtues in self with the support necessary from friends, associates, and society as a whole. Thus, character ethics considers community vital for human virtue and human thriving. In contrast, the communal life of the Kantian agent is not assumed and may not be required (Norton, 1991). Although an abstracted community is used in determining principles and actions, rule ethics almost seems to view the concrete community as an obstacle to individual flourishing. Biological and psychological evidence suggest that the former perspective, that of character ethics, is the correct view. Individuals cannot flourish alone.

The next section discusses how the two dominant paradigms in ethics are instantiated in approaches to moral education. The moral education approach, associated with Kohlberg and the cognitive–developmental tradition, is better aligned with Kantian rule ethics, whereas traditional character education is better aligned with character ethics. In addition, several integrative educational approaches that seek to blend aspects of each philosophical paradigm are described.

APPROACHES TO MORAL THINKING AND CHARACTER EDUCATION

How are these two philosophical perspectives, rule ethics and character ethics, instantiated in approaches to moral and character education? Here, classic educational approaches

influenced by each philosophical perspective are illustrated, followed by brief descriptions of several integrative approaches.

The Cognitive–Developmental Approach of Kohlberg

Those who advocated a universalist, rule-ethics perspective (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981; Power et al., 1989) contend that the educator should facilitate the development of reflective reasoning about justice and fairness. This perspective is influenced not only by rule ethics, which emphasizes reason and intent, but by Piagetian stage theories of moral development, where the emphasis is on how children construct moral perspectives, think through competing options, resolve dilemmas, and justify conclusions (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984). A common instructional method of the rational moral education approach, also known as the “cognitive–developmental” approach, is moral dilemma discussion. The purpose of discussion is to help children advance to higher stages of moral reasoning. There is an internal standard of adequacy, that moral reasoning framed from the perspective of higher stages is better in that it can solve more complex social problems. Robust discussion of moral perspectives provides the disequilibrating experiences that motivate development to higher levels of moral reasoning.

In the rational moral education approach, the adult acts as a facilitator of student development, through the design of activities that include peer discussion of moral dilemmas and other perspective-taking opportunities. Foremost is learning to take an impartial moral point of view in which one considers the welfare of everyone alike, sets aside egoism, acts on principle, and is willing to universalize one’s principles (Frankena, 1973, p. 114). The goal of the cognitive–development approach is to move children to higher levels of understanding through the provision of role-taking opportunities and other practical sociomoral experiences that arise in the natural life of classrooms (Oser, 1991). Development occurs in a bottom-up fashion, among students: interaction with peers compels perspective taking and induces cognitive disequilibrium (Piaget, 1932/1965), pressing students to build new understandings that propel them forward to increasingly adequate and more complex reasoning and perspective taking.

Reflective reasoning is believed to bring about the appropriate attitudes and behaviors that are conducive to ethical behavior and citizenship (Oser, 1991) by nurturing autonomous moral agents who are able to function as rational actors committed to the higher demands of justice. In fact, interventions that use moral dilemma discussion positively influence moral judgment scores (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975; Rest, 1986), and moral judgment consistently contributes to predicting moral action (Thoma, 1994), although both effects are small.

The rational moral education approach is sometimes described as an indirect approach to moral development (e.g., Solomon, Watson, Battistich, Schaps, & Delucchi, 2002) because children are not directly instructed on what to believe and how to act but are rather encouraged to test their perspectives and examine their adequacy against the viewpoints of arguments made from the perspective of higher stage complexity. The teacher’s role is to facilitate the discussion, pitch arguments at higher stages, and make sure that multiple perspectives are aired. The aim is to change structure, not beliefs, by emphasizing the processes of thinking, not its content. Students develop in the processes of reasoning morally, taking the perspectives of others, making good decisions, and creating more complex conceptual understandings. By emphasizing the processes of reasoning about justice, the question about whose values are being taught is moot (Kohlberg, 1981).

Originally, Kohlberg focused on pure dilemma discussion to promote moral reasoning; little emphasis was given to anything else, including the school climate. But in the second generation of Kohlberg's school interventions, the implementation of "just communities" demanded explicit attention to how everyone was getting along. Students were immersed in an environment where they learned to "understand and to feel justice" by being treated justly and being expected to act justly (Power et al., 1989, p. 25). By adding the dimension of moral culture (Durkheim, 1925/1973), the just-community approach supported specific moral norms with corresponding behavioral content (e.g., be on time; do not fight; Power, 2004). Just-community schools were intended to "embody principles of justice in a moral atmosphere" that would "promote moral development" (Reed, 1997, p. 194). Dilemma discussion became a necessary tool that community members used to create a just and democratic community.

Kohlberg's approaches have been described as child centered and have been criticized for disregarding successful traditional educational methods, such as direct teaching of good and bad behavior (Benninga, 1991). Rational moral education has been denounced for its lack of explicit content and for giving too much power to children by allowing them to make decisions about rules that should be non-negotiable and adult prerogatives, such as punishments for rule violations (Wynne, 1991). For example, Wynne and Ryan (1993) decry "making schools and classrooms more" democratic, "which means more authority for pupils and less for teachers" (p. 16) and lament "the hostility towards the unapologetic use of appropriate punishment as a tool to maintain order" (p. 21).

Two additional criticisms bear mentioning. One of the deepest criticisms of Kohlberg's theory is the empirical gap between moral judgment and action (Blasi, 1980): individuals often do not act in accord with their reasoning. In other words, moral judgment alone is insufficient for moral action. Kohlberg eventually admitted there were factors other than justice reasoning that play a role in moral behavior (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hower, 1983). Second, not surprisingly given its roots, Kohlberg's approach neglects the personological dimensions of action, embracing a thin notion of character, and emphasizing reasoning over all other aspects of morality. Noted some time ago (Blasi, 1980), Kohlberg's theory neglects the broader emphasis on moral personhood (e.g., identity) that character ethics provides and is described in the next section.

What is particularly valuable about the rational moral education approach is the awareness that knowledge is constructed through stimulating cognitive experience (Piaget, 1932/1965), that adult coaching and student development go hand in hand (DeVries & Zan, 1999), and that deliberative reasoning skills are necessary for civic engagement (Gutmann, 1987; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Kohlberg's approach is commendable for its emphasis on right action and its avoidance of relativism in pressing for justice. Nucci (chap. 24, this volume; 2001) describes an offspring of Kohlberg's original cognitive-developmental approach, supplying various ideas on how to apply a domains approach to support a moral classroom climate, for example, through the discussion of dilemmas about conventions and morality.

A Traditional Character-Ethics Approach

There is no one dominant methodological approach to traditional character education as there has been in rational moral education. Instead, there are diverse perspectives on what good character education looks like. That said, it is possible to identify points of view that are widely shared and for which there is some consensus. The universal starting point is

an assumption that there are universal core values that should be taught. (For additional insightful discussion of the state of the world according to traditionalists, see Nucci, chap. 24, this volume.)

In most traditional character education programs, tradition, authority, and obedience are emphasized over reasoning, autonomy, and social justice. Wynne is illustrative of a more traditional approach whose followers believe that an educator should stress the development of habits and dispositions consonant with community traditions (Wynne, 1991; Wynne & Ryan, 1993). Rooted in rote methods and conventional content, the traditional character education perspective is less concerned about how children reason or solve social problems and more concerned about making sure children learn virtuous behavior and display traits of moral character (e.g., Wynne & Ryan, 1993). Here the results of character education are paramount. The content of morality is emphasized rather than the processes of moral reasoning in contradiction to the cognitive–development approach. The ultimate goal is to socialize individuals to behave properly. It is assumed that virtuous individuals living a good life by nature make for a strong community.

Wynne and Ryan (1993) recommend that, to “reclaim our schools,” the school as a whole must convey consistent messages to students about moral character, and the community must reward the proper attitudes and behaviors expected of students. A school that builds character emphasizes “core values” in all that it does (e.g., Ryan & Bohlin, 1999). The adults are clearly in charge and have the knowledge that children must learn. Instruction and knowledge flows top-down from adult to child, unlike in rational moral education where there is co-construction of moral practice. Instead, adults primarily guide and mentor children away from prohibited behaviors and toward appropriate personal attitudes, dispositions, and behaviors. As Wynne (1991) says, adults are expected “to shape and determine the immediate behavior of the young, to form their character” (p. 143).

Wynne (1997) names policies, people, and environments “for-character” if they help form good character. He says that for-character methods have been around for a long time and have been found in preliterate cultures. In his examples of instruction, Wynne is explicit in supporting a “sophisticated behaviorism” (1997, p. 65) because he contends that “a learner’s internal state is largely shaped by directing his behavior” (p. 65). Wynne’s (1997) greatest emphasis is on designing environments that support good character. For-character educators need to “recognize how environments help or hurt character formation” (p. 64). They analyze their school and classroom environments in terms of how supportive they are of good character formation and redesign the environments, if necessary, with the help of parents, colleagues, pupils, and community members. In his view, environmental factors such as teacher grading and instructional policies are as critical as focusing on content that increases patriotism. There is a clear awareness that everything a teacher does conveys values.

Wynne (1991) has suggested that for-character schools have a number of characteristics. For example, in these schools adults model good character and help to maintain a common sense of purpose in the school through ceremonies that stress school values. School documents describe the school’s policies clearly and with justification. Good behavior and swift discipline are emphasized. Although academics are primary and are emphasized with frequent testing and awards, there are also times for fun. Students have opportunities to engage in many kinds of service to others in and outside the school. If necessary, parents are confronted when their behaviors are harmful to their children. According to Wynne (1991, p. 146), an unpublished study found “favorable statistical relations between a pro-character focus and academic emphasis in some schools” (Wynne & Iverson, 1989).

Often called a teacher-centered and direct teaching approach (Benninga, 1991; Solomon et al., 2002), the traditional character education approach is rued by its critics for its superficiality, for its inability to adapt to the progressive transformation of educational practice, and for trying to solve the wrong problems (Kohn, 1997a, 1997b; Nash, 1997). For example, Kohn criticizes traditionalists for trying to solve social, political, and economic problems by changing the characters of individuals, a “fix-the-kids” approach, that ignores the well-documented influence of social context on behavior (e.g., Harman, 1999; Mischel, 1990). Second, Kohn scoffs at their use of ineffective, outdated teaching methods such as exhortation, memorization, and punishment, methods that make incorrect assumptions about how people learn (Anderson, 1989). Third, Kohn berates traditionalists for an implicit negative view of human nature that is evident in the emphasis on self-control, as if humans were inherently self-centered and aggressive, rather than on positive human characteristics like empathy (Hoffman, 2000). For these reasons, developmental psychologists have pointed to multiple limitations of the traditional approach, one of which is its lack of lasting effectiveness in promoting prosocial behavior (Leming, 1997). The approach might work for immediate compliance to moral exhortation, but the empirical evidence indicates most often that it has no lasting effects on moral motivation or moral reasoning (Solomon et al., 2002).

Kohlberg (1981) excoriates the traditionalists in several ways. He criticizes their use of indoctrination and the practice of rewarding and punishing compliance with an adult set of rules. He berates their interpretation of community as submission to authority. Foremost, he challenges the “bag of virtues” approach for two reasons. First, although individuals may agree on a set of labels for desirable virtues, they can in fact hold disparate understandings of what the labels refer to. Second, one can emphasize a set of virtues that rest on or lead to injustice, as in the case of the ancient Greeks whose *eudaimonia* was reserved for perhaps 10% of the population. Most fundamentally, Kohlberg was concerned about promoting ethical relativism, and the dangers of claiming that any set of core or “positive values” could be foundational (Kohlberg, 1984). One might also criticize the traditionalists for not fully embracing the teleological perspective of Aristotelian theory in which “virtue is the right action as the rationally determined mean between two extremes within the capabilities and conditions of a particular person” (G. Zecha, personal communication, August 14, 2004) and which accords with *eudaimonia* or human flourishing.

Two of the emphases of the traditional character education approach deserve a closer look. First, the importance of content. Progressive traditions have often deemphasized the content of learning and stressed the processes of learning (e.g., Dewey, 1913), focusing, for example, on critical thinking rather than on the memorization of facts. However, cognitive scientists have realized more recently that expert knowledge is a combination of content, having more and better organized knowledge, and strategic or process knowledge, knowing how and when to apply the knowledge (Hogarth, 2001). Experts not only think better, they have more to think about (Alexander, 1992). Of course, the content experts learn is not just any content, it is content critical to performance in the domain and it is learned in a developmentally appropriate manner.

Second, traditional character educators emphasize the importance of the environment in shaping behavior. Although the behaviorist paradigm reflected in this view has long been discredited, developmental psychology has since realized the power of ecological systems and the dynamic interactions between the person and context in shaping persons and their outcomes (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Human development occurs best in environments that match the needs of the child.

As noted, both the rational moral education and the traditional character education approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. Whereas rational moral education adopts constructivism and adult coaching, fosters reasoning for civic engagement, and avoids relativism, it can be criticized for a narrow emphasis on moral reasoning, whether in dilemma discussion or a just community, which is insufficient for moral action and misses the centrality of moral identity in moral behavior. Traditional character education rightly emphasizes the importance of content and demonstrated some insight into the impact of environments. However, it can be faulted for a changing set of core virtues open to the charge of relativism, for downplaying the importance of autonomy, and for a problematic pedagogy. Consequently, several research psychologists have attempted to build unifying models. To those we turn next.

Integrative Approaches

Discussion about the conflict between the rational moral education approach and traditional character education often becomes polarized. Indeed, on one level, the two camps use terms of reference that, in reflecting theoretical or ideological commitments, appear incommensurate or evoke different frames of understanding. For example, Kohlberg (1981) was averse to indoctrination whereas traditionalists (Ryan & Bohlin, 1999; Wynne, 1985/1986) argued that indoctrination is good. Several researchers have advocated bridging the divide (e.g., Benninga, 1991; Berkowitz, 2002; Lickona, 1991). Three integrative frameworks are described briefly.

Moral anatomy. Berkowitz (1997; chap. 25, this volume) proposed a multidimensional integrative model of the moral person and a comprehensive approach to moral education that is informed by various psychological literatures. More than anyone else, Berkowitz integrates moral identity and personality into a character education model. He proposes a moral anatomy, which comprises the seven necessary components of a moral person. (In his essays, he names the parts but does not necessarily define them.)

Berkowitz starts with the component that is the goal and outcome of all the other components, moral behavior. A person cannot be described as moral unless they behave morally. Second, a moral person must have a moral character, the dispositional and personological aspects of behavior, the “internalized tendencies that produce right behavior” (1997, p. 16) that result from habitual but reflective action. The third critical component is moral values, which are “affectively laden beliefs concerning the rightness and wrongness of behaviors or end states which are intrinsically potentially harmful and are universal and unalterable in their prescriptivity” (1997, p. 18). Fourth, moral reasoning adds moral authority, the ability to determine what is right and wrong. Fifth, moral emotion is the power supply for action, integrating values and reason, and occurs in two forms. One form may be described as affective responses to others. These prosocial emotions include empathy, sympathy, and compassion. The other form is composed of self-critical emotions such as shame, guilt, and regret. Sixth, moral identity is an aspect only recently studied but appears to be necessary for moral exemplarity. Finally, the moral person also enlists metamoral characteristics for effective moral functioning. These elements include such things as self-discipline and perseverance.

How does Berkowitz apply the moral anatomy to moral education? Moral education must be driven by an explicit school mission and be embedded in the context of total school reform (Berkowitz & Bier, in press). Educators must be committed to be role models and embrace a democratic governance structure. Educators should attempt to

positively influence peer norms. Berkowitz advocates cultivating character through peer moral dilemma discussion, community meetings, and opportunities for moral action. Berkowitz, Sherblom, Bier, and Battistich (chap. 25, this volume) go further and integrate the moral anatomy with cross-disciplinary approaches to positive youth development.

Berkowitz supports an approach that steers between rational moral education and traditional character education. He splits the moral person into separate pieces such as emotions, behavior, and reasoning without clear empirical evidence for doing so. He gives few details about each element in the anatomy, not describing any aspect precisely. Moreover, he speaks in generalities about instruction. As a result, content and process, what should be taught and how are largely unspecified. His view seems to resemble Lickona's, which is discussed next.

Educating for character. Lickona (1991a, 1991b) proposed an integrative model that incorporates right thinking, based in Platonic thought, and right behavior, based in Aristotelian thought. He agrees that the goal of character education is to build qualities of good character, called virtues. Virtues have three parts: moral knowledge, moral feeling, and moral behavior. It is not enough to behave well, one must know what justice is and what it means when relating to others; one must care about justice and react to injustice; and one must act justly. Character education is about knowledge, appreciation, and practice, or head, heart, and hand. Lickona blends cognitive development with traditional character education practices. For example, Lickona (2004, p. xxv) lists ten essential virtues to teach (wisdom, justice, fortitude, self-control, love, a positive attitude, hard work, integrity, gratitude, and humility) and he spells out how to lead a discussion about moral dilemmas (1991b, chaps. 13 and 14).

Lickona's (1997) comprehensive approach to character education advocates cultivating the virtues through "the total moral life of the school" (p. 46). Lickona describes twelve mutually supportive strategies for a comprehensive strategy toward character education. The first nine focus on the classroom and the last three, the school. First, the teacher is a caregiver, moral model, and moral mentor in relationships with the students. The teacher treats students with respect and discusses morally significant events occurring in the world around them. The teacher mentors students with direct moral instruction through story telling and discussion, providing corrective feedback when they are hurtful to others. Second, the teacher creates a caring classroom community by shaping a positive peer community through high expectations, discussion of positive virtues, and coaching on living them.

Third, teachers use moral discipline. This means that discipline is a tool for character development, used to help students develop respect, reasoning, and self-control. Rules are based on values (e.g., caring) and the needs of others. When violated, consequences reinforce obligations toward others and the benefits of the rule for self and others. Fourth, teachers create a democratic classroom community in which students are involved in shared decision making about classroom issues. The primary means for creating a democratic community is having class meetings in which students are able to voice their concerns and solve problems of getting along.

Fifth, teachers nurture values through the curriculum by "mining the school curriculum for its moral potential" (p. 53) and making use of published character education materials. Sixth, teachers use cooperative learning to help students learn to get along with each other and deepen a sense of community. Seventh, teachers develop a "conscience of craft" (Green, 1999) by combining high expectations with high support. Eighth, teachers cultivate ethical reflection, helping students to reflect on the perspectives of others, consider the

concrete requirements of the virtues and their practice, make thoughtful decisions, and critique themselves. Ninth, teachers help students to resolve conflicts peacefully with conflict resolution skills.

Strategies for character formation are applied at the school level as well. First, the school creates a positive moral culture by explicitly adopting practices that foster respect among all constituencies and that support the development of virtue. Second, the school develops opportunities for students to show care in the community through service learning and other face-to-face learning experiences. Third, the school recruits parents and community members as partners in character education efforts through mutual support. Schools should educate parents and community members on how character is formed and the importance of all adults in these efforts. Schools can provide school-based and home-based family activities that support the school's character education curricula. Lickona's Center for the Fourth and Fifth Rs offers workshops on these principles to hundreds of teachers annually.

Given that Lickona selects several core values to emphasize, he seems to fall into a "bag of virtues" approach, yet he offsets this with an emphasis on moral reasoning development. In addition, he tries to be more systematic by delineating the elements of moral functioning (moral knowing, feeling, and doing), although this splitting of functions is not grounded in psychological science. He takes a middle of the road approach to instruction, viewing teachers as both role models and facilitators of children's development. He does not provide a systematic pedagogy, unlike the Child Development Project, which is discussed next.

Child development project. The Developmental Studies Center offers perhaps the premier approach to character education in the country, perhaps in the world. Although it began in the early 1980s with school reform efforts aimed at increasing social and ethical development in what was called the Child Development Project (Solomon et al., 1988), Developmental Studies Center programs quickly expanded to include academic development, particularly literacy. From its inception, the Developmental Studies Center has developed research-based interventions strongly rooted in developmental psychology and motivation theory. Taking a clearly progressive approach to character education, Schaps, Battistich, and Solomon (1997) make evident their view of human nature:

Our basic assumption is that when children's needs are met through membership in a school community, they are likely to become affectively bonded with and committed to the school, and therefore inclined to identify with and behave in accordance with its expressed goals and values. (p. 127)

The Developmental Studies Center group agrees with Deci and Ryan (1985) that individuals have three basic needs—autonomy, belongingness and competence—that influence the level of individual engagement with school based on the degree to which the needs are met. According to the center (e.g., Battistich, Solomon, Watson, & Schaps, 1997), these needs are best met in a group setting which provides "a focus for identification and commitment" (p. 138) and in which students can "participate actively in a cohesive, caring group with a shared purpose; that is, a community" (p. 138). A *caring community* is one where members feel cared about and care about others, influence group activities, share in decisions relevant to the group, have common values, norms, and goals, and feel a sense of belonging to and identification with the group. The Developmental Studies Center builds a sense of community through activities such as collaborating on common academic goals; providing and receiving help from others; practicing social competencies; and exercising autonomy by making decisions about classroom life. Students are provided with multiple

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opportunities to discuss the experiences of others, which aids in building empathy and perspective taking skills. Students are guided in reflecting on their own behaviors in light of prosocial values such as fairness, respect, and social responsibility.

Developmental Studies Center programs are designed to broadly influence the intellectual, social, and ethical development of children through direct and indirect methods called "guided autonomy" (Solomon et al., 2002). This integrative methodology is apparent in the fact that teachers coach students as they construct understandings and make decisions in three realms, the social, the ethical, and the intellectual. Adults directly guide the students as they build autonomy and help students to become caring, principled, and self-disciplined. Indirect methods are reflected in the two "essential conditions" required for long-term learning and growth in intellectual, social, and moral domains namely, participation in a caring community of learners and challenging engaging learning experiences. Activities promote social awareness and skill development. The approach immerses the child in a coherent caring community that includes not only the classroom and the school, but after-school activities and parental involvement. Developmental Studies Center programs are implemented only within schools who demonstrate a commitment to its complete implementation, including teacher training and professional development.

Research studies of Child Development Project implementations indicate that in comparison to control schools, students make positive gains in targeted areas. Using classroom observations, individual interviews, and student questionnaires, program students exhibited more prosocial behavior in the classroom (Solomon, Watson, Delucchi, Schaps, & Battistich, 1988), more democratic values and interpersonal understanding (Solomon, Watson, Schaps, Battistich, & Solomon, 1990), and social problem-solving and conflict resolution skills (Battistich, Solomon, Watson, Solomon, & Schaps, 1989). Students in Child Development Project schools were more likely to view their classroom as communities that led them to adhere to salient classroom values and respond to hypothetical prosocial dilemmas with more autonomous, other-oriented moral reasoning (Solomon et al., 1992).

The most important variable positively influenced by participation in Child Development Project programs is students' sense of community. This variable is positively related to multiple positive outcomes including an increase in self-reported concern for others, conflict resolution skills, altruistic behavior, intrinsic prosocial motivation, trust in and respect for teachers, enjoyment of helping others learn as well as academic engagement (Battistich, Solomon, Watson, & Schaps, 1996; Watson, Battistich, & Solomon, in press).

The Child Development Project approach is the most comprehensive and systematic of those outlined here. It is rooted in motivation theory which highlights the importance of community. The project promotes the best of direct and indirect teaching in its use of guided autonomy. However, it delineates only a small set of concrete skills for students to learn constructively.

The integrative approaches of Lickona, Berkowitz, and the Developmental Studies Center are multidimensional, aligned with the best insights of important literatures, and bridge the divide between the traditional character education and rational moral education in interesting ways. A new approach, Integrative Ethical Education, has some of these same features. It extends these approaches by providing systematic views of both character and pedagogy. Moreover, these endeavors to integrate the ancient Greek notion of *techne*, expertise, as well as *eudaimonia*, human flourishing in community, an emphasis taken up by the positive psychology movement in recent years (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Snyder & Lopez, 2002). These efforts are made possible only now given advances in behavioral science.

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INTEGRATIVE ETHICAL EDUCATION

In recent years, an alternative approach to character education has been proposed in an attempt to reconcile the insights of traditional character education and rational moral education with current research (Anderson, Narvaez, Bock, Endicott, & Lies, 2003; Narvaez, 2005; Narvaez, Bock, & Endicott, 2003; Narvaez, Endicott, Bock, & Lies, 2005). The theoretical model is called *Integrative Ethical Education*, and it brings together the considerations discussed in previous sections. Three foundational ideas of the model are discussed, each followed by two implications for practice. The first idea, the notion of moral expertise, provides a specific content for what to teach. The second idea, moral education as transformation, focuses on the necessary changes in instruction and environment that must accompany the transformation of the child. The third idea, human nature as cooperative and self-actualizing, addresses the specific contexts for moral growth.

Foundational Idea 1: Moral Development Is Developing Expertise

The Integrative Ethical Education model is built on the notion of expertise development. *Expertise* refers to a refined, deep understanding that is evident in practice and action. It does not refer to a technical competence (Hansen, 2001) nor to mere intellectual ability. Expertise harnesses the full capacities of the individual, “flowing” in a synchrony of all systems working together in a goal-directed fashion to express virtue in action. First, expertise is described in a general way and then in the domain of morality.

Experts and novices differ from one another in three basic ways. First, experts in a particular domain have more and better organized knowledge than novices (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988; Sternberg, 1998). Expert knowledge is of several kinds that interact in performance, for example, declarative (what), procedural (how), conditional (when and how much). Second, experts perceive and react to the world differently, noticing details and opportunities that novices miss. Third, experts behave differently. Whereas novices use conscious, effortful methods to solve problems, expert skills are highly automatic and effortless. Expertise requires a great deal of practice that is beyond the usual everyday amount of exposure to a domain; therefore, it must be deliberately cultivated (Ericsson & Charness, 1994).

Moral experts demonstrate holistic orientations in one or more of the four processes. Experts in ethical sensitivity are better at quickly and accurately reading a moral situation and determining what role they might play. They role take and control personal bias in an effort to be morally responsive to others. Experts in ethical judgment have many tools for solving complex moral problems. They use reason about duty and consequences, responsibility, and religious codes. Experts in ethical focus cultivate ethical self-regulation that leads them to prioritize ethical goals. They foster an ethical identity that leads them to revere life and deepen commitment. Experts in ethical action know how to keep their “eye on the prize,” enabling them to stay on task and take the necessary steps to get the ethical job done. They are able to intervene courageously and take initiative for others. Experts in a particular excellence have more and better organized knowledge about it, have highly tuned perceptual skills for it, have deep moral desire for it, and have highly automatized, effortless responses. In short, they have more content knowledge and more process knowledge. (It should be noted that Ryan & Lickona [1987] also pointed to the importance of both content and process knowledge for moral agency).

Implication 1: Educators should teach the processes and skills of moral behavior. Moral behavior requires all four processes for successful completion: ethical sensitivity, ethical

judgment, ethical focus, and ethical action (based on Rest, 1983). Those who complete a moral behavior have applied skills in each of these areas. They noticed a moral need, imagined and reasoned about what action to take, focused themselves on taking the action, and followed through to its completion. Each process includes a set of skills. The notion of “skills” here is not equivalent to traits in the everyday sense, in which a trait is available for one to exhibit wherever one goes, like a badge or a birth mark. Such a notion is empirically unsupported (Mischel, 1990). Instead, skills align with the empirical finding that behavior is consistent in circumstances that correspond to a consonant set of person–environment features, including social–contextual expectations (Cervone & Shoda, 1999). That is, an individual acts the same way in similar situations. Skills form an embodied cognition (Varela, Thompson, & Roach, 1991), a holistic and contextualized understanding that engages the entire brain–mind–body system.

The sampling of skills listed in Table 26.1 represent the type of expertise each process entails (elsewhere, three subskills are suggested for each skill). The twenty-eight skills were sampled from those considered to be moral exemplars (e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr.),

TABLE 26.1

Integrative Ethical Education: Ethical Skills

Ethical sensitivity

- Understand emotional expression
- Take the perspective of others
- Connecting to others
- Responding to diversity
- Controlling social bias
- Interpreting situations
- Communicate effectively

Ethical judgment

- Understanding ethical problems
- Using codes and identifying judgment criteria
- Reasoning generally
- Reasoning ethically
- Understand consequences
- Reflect on the process and outcome
- Coping and resiliency

Ethical focus

- Respecting others
- Cultivate conscience
- Act responsibly
- Help others
- Finding meaning in life
- Valuing traditions and institutions
- Developing ethical identity and integrity

Ethical action

- Resolving conflicts and problems
- Assert respectfully
- Taking initiative as a leader
- Implementing decisions
- Cultivate courage
- Persevering
- Work hard

from classic virtues (e.g., prudence, courage) and modern virtues (e.g., assertiveness, resilience), as well as from a review of scholarship in morality, development, citizenship, and positive psychology. Skills include those that promote justice and the flourishing of self and others, individual and community. A minimal level of competence in these skills is required of adult citizens for a pluralistic democracy to flourish.

Implication 2: Educators should teach both moral virtue and moral reasoning. Moral expertise involves reasoning, virtue, autonomy, and excellence. Reason guides the individual in determining action according to the mean between two extremes, the mean appropriate in the circumstances and for the individual (G. Zecha, personal communication, August 14, 2004). Yet the common understandings of reasoning and virtue are inadequate in light of psychological science. Reasoning and virtue are described and reformulated, each in turn.

Deliberate moral reasoning and decision making are vital for mature moral judgment. Deliberative reasoning is able to provide objective rationale that can be challenged and revised, reputed, or accepted (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Mature reasoning about justice has often compelled changes in longstanding cultural practices and brought about key reforms such as the abolition of slavery and the promotion of human rights (Rawls, 2001). As Kohlberg championed (1981, 1984), programs that cultivate morality must nurture mature moral judgment.

However, the longstanding perspective in the social sciences, that conscious deliberative reasoning is primary and unconscious thought is secondary, is undergoing a paradigm shift, reversing this view (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, 1999). The conscious mind appears to be a secondary apparatus to a multiplicity of nonconscious, decision-making systems (Damasio, 1996, 1999; Hogarth, 2001; Reber, 1993; Varela et al., 1991). The common view of the human as rational agent is being challenged. Recent psychological research demonstrates that humans are not rational agents in the classical sense (e.g., Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Instead of being driven by the principles of a conscious rational mind, humans have a “bounded rationality” that uses subconscious, “good enough” heuristics to make decisions (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Kahneman, 2003). Heuristics are intuitions built from repeated experience that are retained in implicit memory systems and which may or may not be verbally expressible (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Keil & Wilson, 1999). Many decisions are made without reasoning at all but based on pattern recognition, as with experts when their skills are automatized (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). In fact, perception and behavior are closely intertwined (Hurley, 2002), so much so that biochemical–physiological changes and “somatic markers” built from perceptual experience often drive decisions and subsequent action (Damasio, 1999).

If most human behavior is not consciously controlled but automatic (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000), there are implications for the description and study of human morality (see Lapsley & Narvaez, in press, 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, in press). Moral decisions are made both by the conscious system and by systems outside of conscious awareness. Each system contributes to moral decisions and actions. Varela (1999) describes the interconnection of these systems in expert moral agency:

a wise (or virtuous) person is *one who knows what is good and spontaneously does it*. It is this immediacy of perception and action which we want to examine critically. This approach stands in stark contrast to the usual way of investigating ethical behavior, which begins by analyzing the intentional content of an act and ends by evaluating the rationality of particular moral judgments. (p. 4)

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Varela's definition of virtue is reminiscent of Ryan and Lickona's (1987, pp. 26–27) real-life example of a 14-year-old boy's response to a middle-aged woman who boarded a city bus in the middle of a Minnesota winter. She had a thin coat, no shoes, and worn socks. The boy walked to the front of the bus as she was placing her coins in the meter and handed her his shoes, saying that she needed them more than he. The integration of moral perception and behavior, of conscious and intuitive judgment, is apparent in this case of lightning quick response to human need in one's community, an expression of virtue in action.

What is virtue? Often the predominant interpretation of virtues appears to be that they are habits or patterns of behavior that are gained by repeating the desired behavior over and over. This, of course, is overly simplistic and represents only one of the ways that Aristotle (1988) understood the nature of virtues and how they are acquired. The less dominant interpretation of Aristotle's view is that virtues/excellences are patterns of behavior developed with practice, effort, and guidance from parents, teachers, and mentors, until external guidance is unnecessary (Urmson, 1988). In other words, virtue development requires apprenticeship under the guidance of others. In this view, virtues are not cultivated in isolation but with the help of the community. Moreover, virtues are not cultivated through blind obedience or rote memorization, but with guided reflection.

The outcome or goal of virtue cultivation is expressed by Plato's *techne* in the broadest sense, a type of know-how demonstrated by the successful artisan, politician, or just person (Plato, in *The Republic*). This know-how or expertise is more than procedural knowledge; it includes the whole of one's being (Hursthouse, 2003). For example, an expert desires excellence in the domain. Similarly, the virtuous person desires excellence in virtue, so much so that the desire is reflected not only in behavior but in preferences and choices, it is what the person likes to do (Urmson, 1988). Thus, cultivating virtue requires shaping not only behavior but also perceptions and desires in developmentally appropriate ways. Initial guidance from parents and teachers involves coaxing desires and motivation (perception and sensibilities) as well as reactions and responsive behaviors (habitual responses). Gradually, the individual takes on the shaping of these responses in the self. Character development becomes autopoietic or self-organizing (Maturana & Varela, 1980).

Foundational Idea 2: Education Is Transformative and Interactive

Education is transformative and interactive in at least two ways. First, children transform themselves in response to and by acting on the environment (Varela et al., 1991). It is now commonly understood that humans construct knowledge and understanding from active experience (Anderson, 1989; Piaget, 1952). From experience, individuals construct schemas (generalized knowledge structures composed of emotion–cognition–behavior concepts) that form and change with further experience (Piaget, 1952, 1970). These schemas facilitate information processing, direct attention, drive anticipatory sets and expectations, and orchestrate the understanding of events and goals (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Schemas filter stimuli based on what the person has learned to value and expect based on meaningful experience (Higgins, 1996; Kirsch, 1999). Schemas are built from incidental experience (influencing the intuitive mind) as well as coached experience (influencing also the deliberative mind). For example, a child whose attention is repeatedly drawn to his or her effect on the welfare of others develops different schemas from a child whose attention is drawn to looking attractive.

The notion of constructivism has been further refined by a greater understanding of how cognition is “situated” or contextualized (Derry & Lesgold, 1996), how cognition forms a dynamic system of interaction between actor and environment (Thelen & Smith, 1994), how cognition is ultimately embodied in multiple physiochemical systems (Damasio, 1999), and how mind is inextricably linked with body and environment (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Intelligence is embodied in action, including moral intelligence (Varela, 1999) and it can be cultivated in the community of the classroom.

Education is transformative and interactive in a second way. Children flourish and are highly motivated when the social environment meets their needs for belonging, competence, and autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Eccles, 2004). Consequently, to cultivate student expertise (in any area) adults should transform environments and instruction based on the needs of the students at their levels of development generally and within the domain.

Implication 1: Educators should set up well-structured environments that foster appropriate ethical intuitions. Human understanding can be split into two forms, that of the *adaptive unconscious*, which learns automatically without effort (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Wilson, 2002), and that of the *deliberative mind*, which learns through effortful processing (Hogarth, 2001). The former is discussed in this section. Most of what humans know resides in the adaptive unconscious, not the explicit mind. Environments automatically educate our intuitions about how to act and react (Hogarth, 2001). The mind learns from the structural regularities among people and objects in the environment (Frensch, 1998). Recurrent patterns are noticed and recorded effortlessly by more primitive parts of the brain (at least three forms of automatic information processing have been identified: basic, primitive, and sophisticated; see Hogarth, 2001). Perceptions are fine tuned from repeated attentive interaction with the environment. Most of what we know resides in tacit knowledge, including intuitions about how things work (Sternberg & Torff, 2001). Thus, for example, from repeated social interaction with members of their cultural group, children learn how close to stand to someone, how to share gaze with someone, how to treat different parts of the body, and so on (Hall, 1981). Many of these cultural behaviors are learned without explicit instruction and become automatized without effort.

Because much of our behavior is based on our tacit knowledge or intuitions (Hogarth, 2001; Sternberg, 2001), adults must create environments that tune up the right intuitions in children. The environment includes the climate or atmosphere, which refers to the culture of the social environment in both a broad and a specific sense. In the broad sense the climate includes the structures of the environment, the overt and hidden systems of rewards and punishment, the goals and aspirations of the environment, and the general discourse about goals. In the specific sense, climate has to do with how people treat one another, how they work together, how they make decisions together, what feelings are encouraged, and what expectations are nurtured. A positive climate meets the needs of the child and fosters a sense of belonging to the larger group (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

Prosocial behavior is nurtured in climates that foster flourishing and the “developmental assets” that support resiliency (Benson, Leffert, Scales, & Blyth, 1998; Wang, Haertel, & Walberg, 1998). In fact, caring schools and classrooms have specific characteristics that are associated with multiple positive outcomes for students. According to Solomon and associates (2002), caring school and classroom communities have the following characteristics: (a) student autonomy, self-direction, and influence; (b) student interaction, collaboration, and participation in open discussion; (c) teacher warmth, acceptance, support, and modeling; (d) training in social skills; and (e) opportunities for helping others. A well-structured environment for teaching character has these characteristics.

Implication 2: Educators should design instruction to move students from naïveté to competence in ethical know-how. Moral expertise can be built systematically using a holistic immersion approach that enlists both the deliberative mind and the intuitive mind. Based on Marshall (1995), Integrative Ethical Education presents four levels of knowledge in a fully developed conceptual network or schema. Through explicit instruction (to develop the deliberative mind) and immersion (to develop the intuitive mind) in the domain or skill, students learn to solve domain problems. First they build *identification knowledge*, learning to see the big picture of the domain through exposure to a myriad of examples. For example, in learning how to stop bullying, student attention is focused on multiple examples of bullying (e.g., what it looks like in different contexts, with different people and tasks). Once students have a sense of the big picture, they build *elaboration knowledge*. Their attention is drawn to key facts and specific detail in the domain to elaborate on their initial intuitions about the domain. For example, students are coached to practice techniques to say to bullies in particular situations. Third, students learn specific sets of procedures to apply and practice, building *procedural knowledge* in the domain. For example, students can learn to avoid bullying others by becoming more aware of the precursors to bullying (e.g., frustration). They learn techniques for expressing feelings in respectful ways. Last, students construct *execution knowledge*, by fine-tuning declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge as they solve problems of different kinds in varied contexts. For example, students can practice and coach one another in appropriate responses outside the classroom. As students cycle through these levels of schema building, theory is integrated in concert with the intuitions that form from immersion in a well-structured climate and environment. Children are apprentices to moral virtue, building expertise from situated experience filtered with explicit guidance and theory.

To develop sophisticated knowledge about something, one must be coached and practice extensively in a focused way (Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Ericsson & Smith, 1991). A good coach works within Vygotsky's (1935) "zone of proximal development" using Bruner's (1983) "scaffolding," providing only as much guidance as the student needs to solve the problem and "fading" as skills develop. With guidance, children build moral responses across a variety of contexts, accumulating a repertoire of schemas and responses to apply throughout their lives. Children cultivate their contextualized intelligence or embodied cognition, in the context in which it is to be applied (e.g., Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff & Lave, 1984). For example, children who experience coached, focused practice as volunteers continue to volunteer as adults (Youniss & Yates, 1997).

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Ethical education should not be an add on but become integrated in all that a school does (Simon, 2001). Rather than teach character opportunistically, teachers should slightly modify their academic instruction to systematically and regularly address ethical skills (Starratt, 1994). The skills are parsed in such a way that an educator can focus on one or several during instruction and assess progress in acquisition.³ Without encouraging environments and deliberative instruction of these skills in school, many children may otherwise never develop them.

Direct and indirect methods of instruction are used with each skill: directly, with explanation and metacognitive guidance for self-regulation (teaching the deliberative mind), and indirectly, with immersion in environments that promote the skill (teaching the intuitive mind) (Hogarth, 2001). For example, the teacher both models and expects respectful

³Although some skills overlap or could be placed into multiple categories, we have tried to simply the picture for the purposes of practicality in the classroom.

behavior (immersion) and also explicitly coaches the student on what it looks like. Learning the skill means changing oneself to be the kind of person who fully embodies the skill, consciously and intuitively. The skill flavors and modifies one's perceptions, attention, desires, and intuitions, as well as semantic, procedural, and conditional knowledge. The skills are simultaneously process focused and content rich and are refined throughout one's life.

Foundational Idea 3: Human Nature Is Cooperative and Self-Actualizing

Humans thrive under particular psychological and social circumstances that vary little with age. For example, children and adolescents flourish when they obtain the right balance of relatedness, competence, and autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Watson & Eckert, 2003). In short, humans' natural propensity for cooperative behavior is nurtured in communal settings. By its very nature, moral expertise is relational. It develops within a community and is shared in community. Virtue, reasoning, and community are not separable, as contemporary perspectives sometimes seem to imply. To live without one another is to live an incomplete, if not inhuman, life. In fact, evolutionary psychology is uncovering facts about human nature that suggest communal values are embedded in our genetic code and species memory (de Waal, 1996). Humans are by nature cooperative and social creatures (Fiske, 2004; Ridley, 1996). Indeed, Darwin wrote much more about humanity's moral sensibilities than about human selfishness (Loye, 2002). Significantly, Darwin's private notebooks, finally published in 1974, set forth a theory of moral agency as a culmination of his theory of natural selection (Loye, 2002). (Of course, our heritage promotes tribal loyalty at the expense of nontribal members so that control of bias toward outsiders becomes a necessary skill for the ethical person.)

Implication 1: Educators should help to build community inside and outside the school. There are two types of community that greatly influence the lives of children, the school community and the local community. Successful schools and classrooms form caring communities (Bryk & Schneider, 2002). In fact, intrinsic motivation for academic achievement is greatest within environments that nurture a sense of belonging, competence, and autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 1985). When teachers use pedagogical strategies that foster a climate with these three characteristics, they facilitate both academic achievement and moral development (Turner, Narvaez, & Mullen, 2004).

The importance of the local community cannot be overstated. Character development requires community in two ways. First, the child's community is the niche for learning character. The community builds the environments and provides the role models and necessary coaching by those with more expertise. Second, the child's community is the canvas for expressing character. It is the place where the skills of character are practiced and embodied. One cannot become virtuous by watching television or reading books. One must learn through interaction with others in the community, in both shaping responses and in applying them. Virtue is action (Aquinas) and it is developed through action in community (Aristotle).⁴

Integrative Ethical Education provides top-down principles for implementation that are to be balanced with a bottom-up adaptation to local community needs. The top-down portion is the set of guidelines for optimal functioning (twenty-eight skills) and the novice-to-expert pedagogy. As noted, the set of guidelines includes fundamental assumptions about the purpose of schooling (to nurture effective global citizens) and a set of skills

⁴Of course, the moral individual must be able to function in multiple communities and to step outside the perspective of one's tradition as in postconventional thinking.

for individuals to learn in community (for flourishing). The set of guidelines is presented to teachers and community members who in turn represent the bottom-up portion of the model.

The bottom-up aspect of the model is the necessary local adaptation of the framework of skills to the community context. Each community discusses the framework in terms of specific community perspectives, needs, and diversity, adapting them according to its own common understandings of moral being. For example, in the Community Voices and Character Education project, small groups of educators met with community members to develop a local vision for ethical development. They decided how to distribute the teaching of the skills among subject areas, school-wide projects, and homeroom/advisory periods. School leadership teams involving educators and community members created activities that required students to involve community members in student learning (e.g., interviewing elders and parents about what a skill looks like in their culture). When using community-embedding approaches, students bring back information from the community to the classroom that provides the backdrop for conversations not only about the skills but about the diversity in how the skills are applied, showing how groups often have different practices that reflect the same underlying value (Fullenwider, 1996) or how practices may reflect conventional rather than moral differences (Nucci, 2001).

In the Integrative Ethical Education approach, universal principles and skills meet local particularities and are melded together by the community itself. Thus, optimal functioning is grounded in the specific context of the individual and his or her community. This top-down and bottom-up combination allows each community to adapt the guidelines within certain parameters, those of optimal functioning within a pluralistic democracy.

Implication 2: Educators should foster self-regulation in students and community members. Plato believed that human existence is essentially a problem to the self, in particular it is an identity problem. For Plato, "it is the problem of deciding what to become and endeavoring to become it" (Urmson, 1988, p. 2). In other words, the final responsibility for character development lies with the individual. In their choices and actions, orientations and time allocations, individuals address the question: Who should I be? In an Integrative Ethical Education environment, students are provided with tools for self-regulation in character formation.

Individuals can be coached not only in skills and expertise but in domain-specific self-efficacy and self-regulation (Zimmerman, Bonner, & Kovach, 2002). The most successful students learn to monitor the effectiveness of the strategies they use to solve problems and, when necessary, alter their strategies for success (Anderson, 1989). Coaching self-regulation requires enlisting the deliberative mind to help the intuitive mind. Armed with theoretical knowledge, the deliberative mind, for example, plays a critical role in learning by selecting the environments from which the intuitive mind learns effective behaviors, thereby accelerating implicit learning (Hogarth, 2001) (e.g., different intuitions are developed when reading a good book than when playing violent video games). Moreover, the deliberative mind can actually play a role in modifying brain malfunctioning by overriding harmful or misdirected impulses and replacing them with socially appropriate behaviors (Schwartz & Begley, 2002).

The perception of personal agency is formed from our self-regulatory skills and lies at the heart of the sense of self (Zimmerman, 2000). According to Zimmerman (2000), self-regulation is acquired in stages, which resemble the processes of scaffolding learning in the zone of proximal development. First, through observation the child vicariously induces the skill by watching a model. Second, the child imitates the model with assistance. Third, the child independently displays the skill under structured conditions. Finally, the child

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is able to use the skill across changing situations and demands. With adult coaching in identifying the path toward self-actualization, each student can monitor ethical skill development and hone a particular set of expert skills. Virtuous individuals must be autonomous enough to monitor their behavior and choices. Once developed, virtues must be maintained through the selection of appropriate friends and environments (Aristotle, 1988).

Truly democratic ethical education empowers all involved—educators, community members, and students—as they form a learning community together, developing ethical skills and self-regulation for both individual and community actualization (Rogoff, Turkkanis, & Bartlett, 2001). The purpose of ethical behavior is to live a good life in the community. Together community members work out basic questions such as: How should we get along in our community? How do we build up our community? How do we help one another flourish? Each individual lives within an active ecological context (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) in which, ideally, the entire community builds ethical skills together.

The Community Voices and Character Education Project

As mentioned, the Integrative Ethical Education model is an outgrowth from the work done during the Minnesota Community Voices and Character Education Project.⁵ In the final year of the project, the effects on middle school students and teachers were evaluated using self-report questionnaires of perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Because the application of the model was locally controlled, each site's implementation was unique and could not be compared with another. Thus, for a particular implementation the numbers tested were small. Nevertheless, for student responses, we compared experimental schools with a matched control group (from another school not involved in the project) and we compared schools with high and low activity in the project. There were three schools who implemented broadly (curriculum, school-wide projects, advisory/homeroom) and fairly deeply (almost all if not every teacher). We compared students at high implementing schools ($n = 151$) with schools that were low implementers ($n = 183$). Students at high implementation schools showed significantly more gains than students at low implementation schools in several variables such as student connectedness to school and positive perceptions of teacher attitudes and behavior ($p < .01$). Students at high implementation schools also showed significant gains in concern for others whereas students at low implementation schools showed a loss ($p < .01$). Two of the high implementing schools reported that they spent the majority of their time on ethical sensitivity skills. In comparison to the control school, students at these two sites were significantly higher on gain scores in concern for others, a measure of ethical sensitivity. Thus, deep and broad implementation of ethical skill instruction had positive significant effects on students, whereas minimal implementation had little positive effect (Narvaez, Endicott, Bock, Lies, & Anderson, 2004).

CONCLUSION

Living well depends upon reweaving our ethical theories into the warp and woof of our scientific heritage, attending to the myriad consequences such a project will have for the way we live our lives and the manner in which we structure our collective moral institutions. Casebeer (2003, p. x)

⁵Materials, including activity guides and teacher-designed lesson plans, are available from the Minnesota Department of Education or from the author.

The goal of this chapter was to present a model of character education that integrates cognitive science with traditional and progressive approaches to character development. The Integrative Ethical Education framework was introduced, which combines individual and community flourishing, rational moral education, and traditional character education perspectives with a cognitive science view of human learning and cognition. In comparison to other integrative approaches, it provides a more cohesive and systematic framework. Moreover, Integrative Ethical Education views the ancient Greek understanding of ethics as still relevant today: ethics is the practical and moral wisdom learned for community living and under the guidance of the community.

In the realm of character formation there are many questions yet to be researched. First, we need to know more about each area of ethical expertise. Simon (1995) argued that to study a phenomenon we must have a mental representation of the problem area. Ericsson and Smith (1991) suggest that for any expert domain, researchers must capture the nature of superior performance, spelling out the nature of daily expert performance. Peterson and Seligman (2004) have paved the way by identifying a set of twenty-four character strengths and virtues, many of which are moral, using a systematic method of selection. Next, experts demonstrating these strengths need to be studied to determine the nature of their skills and how they were developed.

Second, there are a myriad of issues concerning instruction and acquisition, many of which overlap with issues in subject matter areas. For example, how can we help students develop self-regulation in ethical development? Alexander, Kulikowich, and Schulze (1994) found that development in a domain occurs as a result of the interplay of skill (knowledge) and thrill (interest). Educators need to tap into the natural thrill of morality (Klinger, 1978) to enhance student's long-term and sustained personal investment in ethical skill development. For example, moral dilemma discussion engages student interest in moral judgment. Teachers need to develop methods for engaging the other processes of moral expertise.

Third, larger community issues bear examination as well. A successful approach to character development requires building and sustaining community in schools and neighborhoods (Damon, 1997; Selznick, 1992). How do we encourage sustainable, cohesive, mutually supportive communities in today's society? How do we motivate communities to take on a holistic construction of children's characters from an early age? Further, a well-structured environment for children includes regulating the aspects of culture to which children are exposed. Currently, our society is not conducive to the development of virtues or self-control (Baumeister & Exline, 1999). Instead, the mass media, one of the greatest influences on children in the 21st century, is geared to use children for economic gain (Quart, 2003) and has many negative effects on children (Strasberger & Wilson, 2002). How do we regulate the media to prevent its ill effects on the young (Steyer, 2002), such as promoting excessive consumerism (Kassler, 2003) and violence (Anderson et al., 2003; Huesmann, Moise-Titus, Podolski, & Eron, 2003)?

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Finally, to coach children to develop good character, we need adults who cultivate good character in themselves. How do we help teachers develop an orientation to the ongoing challenge of building and maintaining good character in themselves? Campbell (2004) offers valuable insight into the working minds and classroom challenges of teachers and their need for ethical knowledge and coaching. Professional ethics courses for teachers might be designed according to Integrative Ethical Education principles outlined here. Yet teachers are not the only adults who educate children in moral formation. Parents and community members are also character coaches. In a free society, how do we cultivate and support virtuous personhood in parents, community members, and each other in way

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that supports individual and community flourishing? These and other questions provide a full agenda for researchers in the years to come.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I want to express my appreciation to Dan Lapsley, Gerhard Zecha, Clark Power and my colleagues at the University of Notre Dame's Center for Ethical Education and Development and at the Erasmus Institute during 2003 and 2004, my students, and the volume editors. Thanks to the Erasmus Institute for supporting a year of writing.

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