

Enfranchisement, Political Participation and Political Competition: Evidence from Colonial and Independent India

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Appendix A: Figures and Tables

Table A1: Suffrage Requirements in the 1919 and 1935 Acts, by Province

Eligibility Rules to Vote (non-Special Interest Constituencies)		
Province	1919 Act	1935 Act
Bengal	Paid municipal taxes and fees of at least Rs 1-8-0 (Rs 3 in Howrah and Cossipore-Chitpur); paid road and public works cess of at least Rs 1; paid chaukidari tax of at least Rs 2; occupied a house with assessed value of at least Rs 150 in Calcutta; paid any income tax; retired or pensioned officer of armed forces.	Assessed any income tax, municipal tax in Calcutta, municipal tax of at least 8 annas, public works cess of at least 8 annas, chaukidari tax of at least 6 annas, or union rate of at least 6 annas; occupied a house of annual value at least Rs 42; passed matriculation exam of any university; retired, pensioned or discharged officers or soldiers; widows and mothers of officers and soldiers; literate women; wives of qualified voters (who are subject to much stricter property limits than above). No men allowed to vote in the Muhammadan women's constituency.
Madras	Madras City: paid any tax in previous year or occupied a house of at least Rs 60 annual value; Other areas: paid any income tax or at least Rs 3 of other taxes or owned or leased land with annual rent value of at least Rs 10; retired or pensioned officer of armed forces.	Assessed any income tax, profession tax, property tax, house tax (or tenants of such property) or motor vehicles tax; registered landholder or occupancy ryot; leased immovable property worth at least Rs 100 in annual rent (Rs 50 in rural areas); literate persons; retired, pensioned or discharged officers or soldiers; widows and mothers of officers and soldiers; wives of qualified voters (subject to stricter property limits than above).
Bombay (included Sind in 1919)	Occupied a house with annual rental value of at least Rs 36 (Rs 120 in Bombay and Karachi cities; Rs 24 in Panch Mahals or Ratnagiri districts); paid any income tax; retired or pensioned officer of armed forces; monthly wages of at least Rs 40 for Bombay city textile workers; owned or leased land paying at least Rs 32 in land revenue (Rs 16 in Panch Mahals, Ratnagiri and Upper Sind Frontier).	Owners and tenants on land assessed at least Rs 8 in land revenue; owners or tenants of houses with annual rental value of at least Rs 18 (Rs 60 in Bombay city) or capital value of Rs 750; those who have passed the matriculation of the University of Bombay; retired, pensioned or discharged officers or soldiers.
United Provinces	Occupied a house with annual rental value of at least Rs 36, or paid municipal tax on income of at least Rs 200; paid any income tax; retired or pensioned officer of armed forces; owned land paying at least Rs 25 in land revenue; tenants paying at least Rs 25 in rent for permanent tenure holder or fixed rate tenants, and Rs 50 for others.	Assessed any income tax; municipal tax on income of at least Rs 150; owner or tenant of a house with rental value at least Rs 24; owns land with land revenue of at least Rs 5 (or under-proprietor in Oudh of same); tenant of land with rent at least Rs 10; special provisions for Kumaon; passed the upper primary examination; retired, pensioned or discharged officer or soldier; widows and mothers of officers and soldiers; literate women; wives of qualified voters (with much stricter property limits than above).

Province	1919 Act	1935 Act
Punjab	Owned or occupied property of at least Rs 96 in annual rental value (or total value Rs 4000); paid municipal tax of at least Rs 50; paid any income tax; retired or pensioned officer of armed forces; owned or leased land paying at least Rs 25 in land revenue; was an assignee of land revenue of at least Rs 50.	Assessed any income tax; direct municipal tax of at least Rs 50; profession tax or district board tax of at least Rs 2; owner or occupancy tenant with land revenue assessed at least Rs 5; assignee of land revenue of at least Rs 10; tenant of at least 6 acres of irrigated land or 12 acres of unirrigated land; owned non-land immovable property worth at least Rs 2000 (Rs 50 for SC); tenant of immovable property with annual rental value at least Rs 60 (Rs 36 for SC); zaildars, inamdars, sufedposh or lambardar; attained the primary educational standard; retired, pensioned or discharged officers and soldiers; widows and mothers of officers and soldiers; wives of qualified men (with much higher property limits than above); literate women and SCs.
Bihar (included Orissa in 1919)	Paid municipal tax of at least Rs 3; paid any income tax; retired or pensioned officer of armed forces; holds estate paying at least Rs 12 in local cess; holds a tenure assessed at least Rs 100 for local cess; holds land as raiyat paying at least Rs 48 in land revenue (Rs 16 in Orissa and Chota Nagpur divisions, Rs 64 in Patna division and Munghyr district, Rs 24 in Santhal Parganas); paid Bengal Local Self-Government Act tax of at least Rs 1-8-0.	Assessed any income tax; municipal tax of at least Rs 1-8-0; chaukidari tax of at least 9 annas; occupies land or buildings with annual rent at least Rs 24 (Jamshedpur); holds land with rent of at least Rs 6 or cess of at least 3 annas (non-Jamshedpur); passed matriculation exam of any university; retired, pensioned or discharged officers and soldiers; widows and mothers of officers and soldiers; wives of qualified men (with much higher property limits than above); literate women. No men can vote in the Muhammadan women's constituency.
Central Provinces and Berar	Owner or tenant of a house of annual rental value at least Rs 36; paid municipal tax on income of at least Rs 200; paid any income tax; retired or pensioned officer of armed forces; lambardar of a mahal; owns estate of land revenue at least Rs 100; holds a tenure assessed at least Rs 50 in annual revenue (Rs 40 in Bhandara, Balaghat, Nimar, Chhindwara and Seoni districts; Rs 30 in Raipur, Bilaspur, Drug, Chanda and Betul districts).	Assessed any income tax; haisiyat tax of at least Rs 75; holds estate of land revenue at least Rs 2; owner or tenant of a building with annual rental value of at least Rs 6; watandar patel/patwari; registered deshमुख/deshpandia/lambardar; passed middle school examination; retired, pensioned or discharged officers and soldiers (also including Nizam's soldiers); widows and mothers of officers and soldiers; literate or primary educated women; wives of qualified men (with higher property limits than above). SCs qualified if he is a kotwar, jaglia or village mahar holding office.

Province	1919 Act	1935 Act
Assam	Paid municipal tax of at least Rs 3 (Rs 2 for Nowgong, Rs 1-8-0 for Sylhet, Rs 1 for rural constituencies); paid any income tax; retired or pensioned officer of armed forces; assessed tax of at least Rs 1 under Bengal Municipal Act 1876; owned land assessed at land revenue of at least Rs 1.	Assessed any income tax; municipal tax of at least Rs 2 (Rs 1-8-0 in Sylhet, Rs 1 in small towns); chaukidari tax of at least 8 annas in Sylhet, Cachar and Goalpara districts; owns land with land revenue at least Rs 7-8-0; pays local rates of at least 8 annas; rented land of at least Rs 7-8-0 in Lakhimpur, Sibsagar, Darrang, Nowgong, Kamrup and Garo Hills districts; passed middle school examination; retired, pensioned or discharged officers and soldiers; widows and mothers of officers and soldiers; literate women; wives of qualified men (with higher property limits than above). No man can vote in constituencies reserved for women.
NWFP	No legislative assembly.	Assessed any income tax; municipal tax of at least Rs 50; district board tax of at least Rs 2; owned immoveable property of at least Rs 600; tenant of immovable property with annual rental value of at least Rs 48; owner or tenant of at least 6 acres irrigated land or 12 acres unirrigated land or land assessed to land revenue of at least Rs 5; assignee of land revenue of at least Rs 10; zaildars, inamdars or lambardar; passed middle school examination; retired, pensioned or discharged officers and soldiers; widows and mothers of officers and soldiers; literate women; wives of qualified men (with higher property limits than above).
Orissa	No separate legislative assembly; see Bihar above.	Assessed any income tax; municipal tax of at least Rs 1-8-0; chaukidari tax of at least 9 annas (Cuttack, Puri, Balasore districts and Angul subdivision); pays rent or land revenue of at least Rs 2 (Rs 1 in Sambalpur); passed matriculation exam of any university; retired, pensioned or discharged officers and soldiers; widows and mothers of officers and soldiers; wives of qualified men (with much higher property limits than above); literate women.
Sind	No separate legislative assembly; see Bombay above.	Owners, permanent tenants and alienees on land assessed at least Rs 8 in land revenue; Hari cultivators on land assessed at least Rs 16 in land revenue; owners or tenants of houses with annual rental value of at least Rs 18 (Rs 30 in Karachi city) or capital value of Rs 750; those who have passed the matriculation of the University of Bombay; retired, pensioned or discharged officers or soldiers; widows and mothers of officers and soldiers; literate women; wives of qualified voters (who are subject to much stricter property limits than above).

Sources for the 1919 Act: H.N. Mitra (ed.). 1921. *The Govt of India Act 1919: Rules Thereunder and Govt. Reports 1920*. Calcutta: Annual Register Office.

Sources for the 1935 Act: *Government of India Act, 1935*. The Government of British India.

Table A2: Summary Statistics for Control Variables

	1921	1931	1951
Number of districts	201	201	167
Total population (millions)	1.13	1.24	1.59
Population growth rate (annual, since last census)	0.010	0.014	0.015
Fraction literate	0.044	0.044	0.166
Fraction female	0.480	0.480	0.482
Fraction urban	0.108	0.121	0.158
Fraction Hindu	0.698	0.701	0.847
Fraction Muslim	0.237	0.246	0.105
Fraction Sikh	0.013	0.015	0.024
Fraction Christian	0.011	0.012	0.014
Fraction in agriculture	0.700	0.276	0.701
Fraction in industry	0.112	0.045	0.102
Fraction in commerce	0.065	0.027	0.058
Fraction refugees			0.027

Figures for 1951 exclude districts that became part of Pakistan in 1947.

Figures for fraction of population engaged in agriculture, industry and commerce are defined differently in the census of 1931 and hence are not comparable to the censuses of 1921 and 1951.

Table A3: Impact of 1935 Reforms on Political Participation and Competition: Robustness Checks

	Enfranchisement with interpolated pop as denominator 1926 to 1937	Enfranchisement with age-specific pop as denominator 1926 to 1937	Control for change in #seats 1926 to 1937	Different time period 1930 to 1937	Drop districts that went to Pakistan 1926 to 1937	Province dummies as instrument 1926 to 1937
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Change in voter share of total population						
Change in % enfranchised	0.443*** (0.040)	0.144*** (0.018)	0.406*** (0.034)	0.402*** (0.039)	0.395*** (0.036)	0.310*** (0.051)
Observations	198	197	198	198	163	198
R-squared	0.497	0.378	0.498	0.484	0.503	0.455
Panel B: Change in candidates per 1000 registered voters						
Change in % enfranchised	-1.402** (0.572)	-0.624** (0.240)	-1.456*** (0.518)	-1.285*** (0.326)	-1.767*** (0.599)	-3.344*** (1.200)
Observations	198	197	198	198	163	198
R-squared	0.101	0.113	0.114	0.151	0.119	0.034
Panel C: Change in candidate-seat ratio						
Change in % enfranchised	2.348 (1.858)	1.171* (0.612)	2.137 (1.736)	2.151 (1.776)	1.219 (1.779)	3.432 (2.748)
Observations	198	197	198	198	163	198
R-squared	0.102	0.105	0.102	0.119	0.123	0.098
Panel D: Change in fraction of incumbents who get re-elected						
Change in % enfranchised	-0.787 (1.103)	0.234 (0.491)	-0.116 (1.098)	-0.383 (0.840)	-0.162 (1.249)	-2.395 (2.160)
Observations	198	197	198	198	163	198
R-squared	0.043	0.045	0.043	0.041	0.051	0.017
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Remove outliers	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***indicates statistical significance at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%. Controls include district population, literacy, urbanization, gender ratio, fraction of Hindus and Christians, and fraction of population employed in agriculture in 1921, and population growth rates between 1921 and 1931. Age-specific population data is missing for Cachar district.

Table A4: Impact of 1935 Reforms on Supplementary Political Outcomes

	1926 to 1937	<u>Controls</u> 1926 to 1937	<u>Remove Outliers</u> 1926 to 1937	<u>Control for pre-reform change in outcome</u> 1926 to 1937	<u>Control for district-specific trends</u> DID estimate	<u>Period after 1937 to 1945</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Change in voter turnout (contested seats only)						
Change in % enfranchised	-0.632** (0.247)	-0.730** (0.311)	-0.732** (0.367)	-0.711** (0.333)	-1.434* (0.794)	-0.069 (0.274)
Observations	199	199	196	196	1148	194
R-squared	0.031	0.074	0.078	0.163	0.682	0.245
Panel B: Change in candidates per 100,000 population						
Change in % enfranchised	1.140 (1.260)	2.428** (1.163)	3.359** (1.538)	3.421** (1.519)	2.433 (2.254)	-0.758 (0.863)
Observations	202	202	198	198	1188	198
R-squared	0.006	0.277	0.278	0.305	0.870	0.310
Panel C: Change in fraction of uncontested seats						
Change in % enfranchised	1.009* (0.554)	0.641 (0.737)	-0.069 (0.717)	-0.381 (0.515)	1.862 (1.526)	0.017 (0.669)
Observations	202	202	198	198	1188	198
R-squared	0.018	0.087	0.071	0.448	0.496	0.196
Controls	N	Y	Y	Y		Y
Remove outliers	N	N	Y	Y		Y

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***indicates statistical significance at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%. Controls include district population, literacy, urbanization, gender ratio, fraction of Hindus and Christians, and fraction of population employed in agriculture in 1921, and population growth rates between 1921 and 1931. Difference-in-difference estimates based on specification (2) in the paper.

Table A5: Impact of 1950 Reforms on Political Participation and Competition: Robustness Checks

	Interpolated pop as denominator 1945 to 1951	Age-specific pop as denominator 1945 to 1951	Control for change in #seats 1945 to 1951	Drop Punjab & Bengal 1945 to 1951
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Change in voter share of total population				
Change in % enfranchised	0.300*** (0.046)	0.094*** (0.020)	0.362*** (0.053)	0.325*** (0.050)
Observations	166	164	166	142
R-squared	0.306	0.274	0.330	0.402
Panel B: Change in candidates per 1000 registered voters				
Change in % enfranchised	-0.104*** (0.038)	-0.036*** (0.011)	-0.160*** (0.044)	-0.125*** (0.044)
Observations	166	164	166	142
R-squared	0.205	0.196	0.226	0.192
Panel C: Change in candidate-seat ratio				
Change in % enfranchised	1.820 (1.320)	0.042 (0.564)	3.164** (1.550)	3.030* (1.640)
Observations	166	164	166	142
R-squared	0.202	0.244	0.217	0.222
Panel D: Change in fraction of incumbents who get re-elected				
Change in % enfranchised	0.804** (0.374)	0.183 (0.152)	0.548 (0.407)	0.518 (0.458)
Observations	166	164	166	142
R-squared	0.158	0.139	0.177	0.178
Panel E: Change in fraction of Congress winners				
Change in % enfranchised	-0.047 (0.380)	0.134 (0.145)	0.404 (0.434)	0.770 (0.468)
Observations	166	164	166	142
R-squared	0.264	0.273	0.288	0.314
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Remove outliers	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***indicates statistical significance at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%. Controls include district population, literacy, urbanization, gender ratio, fraction of Hindus and Christians, and fraction of population employed in agriculture in 1931, population growth rates between 1931 and 1951, and the fraction of refugees in 1951.

Table A6: Impact of 1950 Reforms on Supplementary Political Outcomes

	1945 to 1951	<u>Controls</u> 1945 to 1951	<u>Remove Outliers</u> 1945 to 1951	<u>Control for pre-reform change in outcome</u> 1945 to 1951	<u>Control for district-specific trends</u> DID estimate	<u>Medium term effects</u> 1951 to 1957
Panel A: Change in voter turnout (contested seats only)						
Change in % enfranchised	-0.458*** (0.110)	-0.428*** (0.111)	-0.506*** (0.127)	-0.466*** (0.119)	-0.604** (0.247)	0.080 (0.059)
Observations	163	163	162	162	656	166
R-squared	0.090	0.219	0.227	0.324	0.835	0.239
Panel B: Change in candidates per 100,000 population						
Change in % enfranchised	6.245*** (0.963)	7.475*** (0.818)	7.508*** (1.038)	7.551*** (1.062)	6.671*** (2.202)	-4.194*** (1.285)
Observations	167	167	166	166	660	166
R-squared	0.198	0.458	0.448	0.460	0.882	0.403
Panel C: Change in fraction of unopposed seats						
Change in % enfranchised	-0.172 (0.300)	-0.105 (0.299)	-0.182 (0.357)	0.186 (0.116)	-0.241 (0.850)	0.035 (0.024)
Observations	167	167	166	166	660	166
R-squared	0.002	0.109	0.109	0.893	0.581	0.093
Panel D: Change in fraction of incumbents who run for re-election						
Change in % enfranchised	0.816*** (0.273)	0.870*** (0.291)	0.918** (0.375)	0.731** (0.336)	1.001* (0.602)	-0.650* (0.354)
Observations	167	167	166	166	660	166
R-squared	0.066	0.140	0.138	0.269	0.680	0.113
Panel E: Change in number of contesting parties per seat						
Change in % enfranchised	-1.283*** (0.409)	-1.384*** (0.443)	-1.677*** (0.476)			0.404 (0.267)
Observations	167	167	166			166
R-squared	0.064	0.246	0.255			0.213
Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Remove outliers	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***indicates statistical significance at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%. Controls include district population, literacy, urbanization, gender ratio, fraction of Hindus and Christians, and fraction of population employed in agriculture in 1931, population growth rates between 1931 and 1951 and the fraction of refugees in 1951. Difference-in-difference estimates based on specification (2) in the paper.

Table A7: Impact of 1950 Reforms on Demographic Indicators

	Mean of dependent variable	No controls (1)	Controls (2)	Remove outliers (3)
Panel A: Change in crude death rate, 1951-1961				
Change in % enfranchised	-5.95	-17.788 (11.197)	-15.391* (8.558)	-10.921 (11.255)
Observations		148	148	146
R-squared		0.031	0.169	0.140
Panel B: Change in infectious disease death rate, 1951-1961				
Change in % enfranchised	-3.20	-5.351 (5.051)	-2.703 (3.744)	0.433 (4.526)
Observations		145	145	143
R-squared		0.011	0.157	0.138
Panel C: Change in crude birth rate, 1951-1961				
Change in % enfranchised	-3.99	-29.500** (14.470)	-20.780 (14.428)	-2.821 (17.831)
Observations		145	145	143
R-squared		0.041	0.174	0.152
Controls		N	Y	Y
Remove outliers		N	N	Y

Notes: Robust standard error in parantheses. ***indicates statistical significance at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%. Controls include district population, literacy, urbanization, gender ratio, fraction of Hindus and Christians, and fraction of population employed in agriculture in 1931, population growth rates between 1931 and 1951 and the fraction of refugees in 1951. Crude death (birth) rate is calculated as the number of deaths (births) per 1000 population; infectious disease death rate is the number of deaths from cholera, fever, smallpox, diarrhea and malaria per 1000 population. Sample restricted to districts that had deaths data in both 1951 and 1961. Data obtained from *Vital Statistics of India* for 1961 (Office of the Registrar General) and *District Census Handbooks for Indian States* (Census of India 1961).

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Appendix B: Constitutional Reforms Prior to 1935

B.1. The Act of 1858: From Company to Crown

The British Empire in the Indian subcontinent lasted nearly 200 years. In 1757, following the battle of Plassey, the East India Company established a foothold in Bengal. Over the following five decades, large parts of the areas of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma (Myanmar) were brought under British political control by means of conquest or cession by local rulers due to treaty violations. In 1817–1818, after winning a series of battles in central India, the British emerged as the dominant political power in the subcontinent, with all remaining native states accepting the East India Company as the “paramount power” in India. Further territory was added to British India in the following decades by means of conquest, accusing the native rulers of “misrule” and, controversially, by refusing to recognize adoptions and annexing areas where the native ruler died without a natural heir.¹

Following the revolt of 1857, when Indian soldiers in the Company’s army mutinied against their officers, the administration of India was taken over by the British Crown in 1858. Historians disagree as to whether the mutiny was a planned war of independence against British power or an uncoordinated uprising of soldiers who felt a threat to their religion and traditional practices (Spear, 2002), or simply a mutiny by soldiers who wanted increased pay and greater career opportunities (David, 2002). After some initial reverses, the British rallied and were able to suppress the mutiny by the end of 1858. A decision was made

¹ See Iyer (2010) for details of these different modes of annexation, and Bowen (2008) and Stern (2012) for detailed analyses of the East India Company’s administrative and political arrangements.

to stop further annexation plans, with the queen's proclamation of 1858 stating specifically, "We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions." British India thus comprised 55% of the total area of the Indian subcontinent (excluding Burma and Sind) and about 77% of the total population in 1911.

The Act of 1858 set up a system of government centred in Whitehall, authorizing the Secretary of State in England with overarching powers, including the "superintendence, direction and control of all acts, operations and concerns which relate to the government or revenues of India, and all grants." The "Viceroy and Governor-General" was the Crown's representative in India, reporting to the Secretary of State. The Viceroy was advised by an Executive Council, whose strength was increased from four to five by the Indian Councils Act of 1861, with the possibility of 6-12 additional members for strictly legislative purposes. Provincial Governors had the power of making laws for issues related to the provinces; however, their powers were subordinate to those of the Governor-General. Administration was entrusted to a newly created Indian Civil Service (ICS), in which the entry of Indian officers was (very) gradually permitted over time.

B.2. Precursors to Direct Democracy: Making "Common Cause" with the People of India

Political figures in England soon became concerned with the political and administrative future of India. Prime Minister Gladstone was a strong advocate of having a more inclusive government, stating in 1878: "Let us only make common cause with her people: let them feel that we are there to give more than we receive;...Unless we can produce this conviction in the mind of India, in vain shall we lavish our thoughts and our resources upon a merely material defence..." Concerns about the growth of local political organizations led to the creation of the Indian National Congress by Allan Octavian Hume as a venue for the expression of Indian demands. The first session of the Congress was held in Bombay in 1885, where the main demands were for the enlargement of legislative councils and their powers, simultaneous examinations for the ICS in India and in England, and other administrative reforms.

Following Viceroy Dufferin's minute in November 1888, which stated that the "time has come to give a still wider share in the administration of public affairs to ... Indian gentlemen," the Indian Councils Act of 1892 was passed. This Act increased the strength of legislative councils in the central government

and in the provinces, and introduced some representation of Indian interests by stating that the majority of non-official seats should be filled on the recommendation of such bodies as municipalities, district boards, chambers of commerce and universities. However, the term “election” was sedulously eschewed (Menon, 1957). These councils had the right to ask questions and to discuss, but not vote upon, the budget.

The rise of “extremist” elements within the Congress, notably Tilak’s demand for *swaraj* (home rule) and *swadeshi* (boycott of British goods), and the extreme unpopularity of British actions like the partition of Bengal province in 1905, led the colonial government to think about further measures of devolution of power to Indians. Viceroy Minto stated: “The political atmosphere is full of change; questions are before us which we cannot afford to ignore, and which we must attempt to answer; and to me it would appear all-important that the initiative should emanate from us, that the Government of India should not be put in the position of appearing to have its hands forced by agitation in this country or by pressure from Home...” At the same time, the Muslim community began to mobilize politically, with the Aga Khan visiting the Viceroy and the establishment of the All-India Muslim League in 1906. One of the Muslim League’s objectives was “to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India,” as part of which many Muslims were in favor of separate electorates and reserved seats for Muslims in councils.

The Indian Councils Act of 1909 (also known as the Minto-Morley reforms) provided for greater inclusion of Indians into government by expanding the size of councils at both the centre and provincial levels, though officials and nominated members continued to be in the majority. The principle of elected members was introduced for the first time, with non-official members of these councils being elected indirectly by groups of local bodies, landholders, trade associations and universities. Muslims were given separate representation in the provinces of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces and East Bengal & Assam. The powers of the councils were expanded only slightly: they could now discuss the budget, propose and vote on resolutions (which the Viceroy could overrule), and ask supplementary questions. It was the reforms of 1919 that introduced directly elected representatives for the first time.

B.3. The Government of India Act of 1919: “Responsible Government”

World War I and the growth of the nationalist movement convinced the British administration that institutional and political changes should be enacted in India so as to co-opt a larger share of the Indian elite in the hope of “rallying the moderates” (Danzig, 1969; Gallagher and Seal, 1981).² Within a month of taking office, the new Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu, made an announcement in the British House of Commons on August 20, 1917, that promised “responsible government” in India for the first time.³ Following the publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report in 1918, this principle was given official form in the Government of India Act of 1919, which marked several clear departures from previous measures.

First, the Act instituted direct elections to provincial councils for the first time, and mandated that at least 70% of members in provincial councils were to be elected members, in contrast to the earlier policy of keeping elected members in a minority. However, suffrage was limited to those above a certain level of income or property. Our data indicate that only 2.5% of the population in a district were registered as electors in the first direct elections of 1921. As the franchise requirements were decided at the province level (see Appendix Table A1 for details of suffrage requirements in the 1919 and 1935 Acts), there was

² Referring to the 1919 Government of India Act, Rothermund (1962) for example writes: “Montagu was painfully aware that the reform scheme [...] was [...] a [...] compromise between Liberalism at home and the bureaucracy in India, between British interests and Indian national aspirations, political thought and administrative practice”. Tomlinson (1976) also writes that there were [three actors in the end of the British rule in India] “... imperial planners in London, Government of India in New Delhi and the central leaders of the Indian National Congress.” Danzig (1969) writes: “[...] British rule in India could not function without the active collaboration of an elite and at least the passive acquiescence of the mass. It was feared that repression of 'extremists' would alienate the 'moderates' whose support was thus deemed vital. The government in the period 1916–17 therefore decided to 'rally the moderates' by presenting them with an acceptable ideal which would counter the extremist demand for immediate home rule.”

³ The complete paragraph reads: “The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.” Danzig (1968) shows that the language of this announcement underwent many changes, and that the inclusion of the famous phrase “responsible government” owed much to the influence of Lord Curzon. Curzon’s motivation was not to encourage popular mandates but more to displace the “lawyer class” from control of Indian politics and so from any Indian home rule in the future i.e. “self-government” would mean handing over control to Indian politicians while “responsible government” meant giving it to the electorates.

considerable variation across provinces and districts in enfranchisement rates. All citizens who were eligible to vote were also eligible to contest the election as candidates.

Second, there was a clear demarcation of subjects over which provincial councils and ministers could propose legislation and implement policy. Certain areas, such as defence and foreign relations, remained under the purview of the central government. At the provincial level, subjects such as land revenue, finance and law and order were “reserved” for the Governor to make decisions. Others, including education and health, were “transferred” to the purview of elected ministers, responsible in front of their legislature.⁴ This system of dual control was known as “dyarchy.” Provinces had the option to enact further devolution to local governments over certain functions. While this was enacted by some provinces in the fields of education and health, the Simon Commission of 1929 felt that such devolution of responsibility was counter-productive because “Ministers responsible to the legislature have no effective control of the expenditure of money voted for mass education” (Great Britain and Simon, 1930, volume 1, pp. 51).

Third, to further cement provincial autonomy, revenues from provincial sources (including land revenue) were reserved to the use of the provinces, after they transferred a fixed proportion to the central government.

Fourth, the Act continued the 1909 policy of communal representation and separate electorates to Muslims nationwide, to Sikhs in Punjab, to Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians in several provinces, and set aside certain reserved seats for non-Brahmins in Madras and Mahrattas in Bombay. Separate electorates meant that, for example, there were separate Muslim electoral constituencies where only Muslims could vote and only Muslims could stand as candidates. Separate representation was also provided to landholders, universities and commercial and industrial interests; most of these did not allow for directly elected representatives and will be excluded from our analysis of voter and citizen participation. The Governor had the power to nominate members of any groups who might fail to secure adequate

⁴ Appointment of ministers was left to the discretion of the Governor, with the proviso that no person could be a minister for more than six months unless he became a member of the provincial councils by election or nomination.

representation. The income or property thresholds for suffrage (and therefore candidacy) were the same across members of different communities within the same geographical region.

The 1919 Act explicitly restricted suffrage to men. However, provinces could change these arrangements if they so wished. Starting with Madras in 1921, all provinces extended suffrage to women on the same terms as men by the end of the decade (Ali, 1936). Since suffrage was extended to women on the same terms as men, the property restrictions were the same for women as they were for men, meaning that in practice, most women could not be registered electors; the ratio of women to men in the electorate was 1:20.

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**Enfranchisement, Political Participation and Political Competition:
Evidence from Colonial and Independent India**

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Appendix C: Data and variable construction

C.1. Data Sources for Political Outcomes

We used several data sources to create a complete panel of winners' names over time. For the colonial period, our primary data source is several volumes of "Returns Showing the Results of Elections in India" published after each election. For the 1920 and 1923 elections, this source provides the names of electoral winners. For the 1926 and 1929-30 elections, this source does not contain the names of winning candidates. We, therefore, used the "Who's Who" publication from the Times of India yearbook for the years 1925-1926 and 1929-1930 to extract the names of winning candidates in both the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council elections for these election years.

The 1937 "Return Showing the Results of Elections in India" report also does not contain the names of candidates for the 1937 elections. We used the "Who's Who" publication of 1937-1938 to obtain the names of election winners. We used original archival documents from the India Office Records at the British Library to obtain the names of candidates who contested the 1937 elections but did not win. These files did not contain information on United Provinces and Punjab. For these provinces, we consulted earlier systematic compilations of electoral results (Reeves et al., 1975 for United Provinces and Yadav, 1987 for Punjab), which provided the names of all the candidates from the 1937 elections.

The 1945 "Return Showing the Results of Elections in India" report contains information on the name, party affiliation and votes polled by winning and non-winning candidates in the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council elections. The official election reports of the Election Commission of India provides the same information for elections in the 1950s..

C.2. Aggregation to the District Level

We should note that constituency-level boundaries differed from district boundaries in several ways. First, some districts contained several electoral constituencies; these are aggregated together by simple addition of the number of candidates, number of seats etc before computing district level ratios. Second, many districts contained separate constituencies for different religions, so that Hindus and Muslims living in the same area were in fact part of different electoral constituencies. Again, we aggregate our variables over these different types of constituencies. Note that such aggregation does not introduce any particular bias in our measures, since eligibility conditions for enfranchisement were the same across all religions. Third, some large constituencies are spread over several districts. For such cases, we “disaggregate” the outcome variables of this constituency over its constituent districts, weighted by how much of the population of that constituency came from each district. Such spanning across several districts mainly occurred for some urban constituencies and for several Muslim constituencies. We illustrate our aggregation procedure in more detail below.

Figures C.2.1 and C.2.2 consider the cases of two districts, A and B, each having a rural and an urban area. For the Hindus, District A is divided into three constituencies: Hindu Rural 1, Hindu Rural 2 and Hindu Urban 1. However, it is only divided in two Muslim constituencies: Muslim Rural 1 and Muslim Urban 1. Similarly, District B is divided along symmetric religious lines, however, note that the urban area in District B is part of the same constituency as the urban area in District A, both for Hindu and Muslims. Note also that while the rural area of District B has two distinct constituencies for Hindus, the rural area of District B is part of the same rural constituency as the rural area of District A for Muslims. Thus, Hindu Urban Constituency 1, Muslim Urban Constituency 1 and Muslim Rural Constituency 1 span the borders of several districts. This is problematic, since we observe our political outcomes only at the constituency level.

To compute electoral outcomes at the district level, we make the assumption that within constituency, the distribution of electoral outcomes mirrors the distribution of the population across space. That is (say), if the Muslims in district A represent 20% of the Muslim population in District A and B, then we will allocate 20% of seats, voters and electors of Muslim Rural Constituency 1 and Muslim Urban Constituency 1 to District A, and 80% to district B. We proceed similarly for Hindu

Urban Constituency 1. We then sum, at the district level, the total number of seats, voters and electors attributed to each district over religion and urban/rural areas to reach a district specific number of seats, electors and voters. In practice, this means that our final database of number of seats, electors and voters consists of weighted averages and that all values will not be integer values.

Figure C.2.1: District A





Figure C.2.2: District B



C.3. Tracking Individual Candidates Across Elections

To be able to track individuals across time, an extensive data cleaning effort was conducted since winners’ names are often spelled differently in different election years. Such variations can occur because of different English transliterations of the same Indian name (e.g. Chatterjee vs Chattopadhyay); the person’s title or honorifics (Khan, Doctor, Rai Bahadur etc) being included with the name in one year and not in another; only initials being provided in one year and full names in another; address or occupation included in the name field in one year and not in another etc. To account for these issues, we

used a combination of fuzzy matching computer algorithms and manual checking to systematically identify all instances of a candidate name in any election year turning up as a candidate name in the same district in any one of the other election years. The fuzzy matching procedure involved standardizing the names in the database (e.g. stripping out honorifics, educational details) and assigning a unique ID number to each person whenever the fuzzy matching indicated that the names were similar enough to be considered the same person. Such comparison was based on the full name of the person, not just on surnames, and many cases of intermediate match probability were checked manually by the authors. The following examples illustrate the procedure we followed:

Example 1 (perfect match after stripping out honorifics, place names and punctuations): “Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhuri Khan Bahadur, C. I. E.” was listed as the winner in the Mymensingh constituency in the 1920 election. In 1923, his name appears twice as “The Hon. Nawab Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhuri Khan Bahadur” in the Mymensingh and Dacca West constituencies. The first step of the procedure involved stripping out the honorifics, place names and punctuations (Nawab—Bahadur—C.I.—The Hon.—‘,’) from all variants of the name. Then, a single standardized version of the name was created as “Syed Ali Chaudhuri Khan.” The fuzzy match routine was then run on this standardized version of the name across the election years of 1921 and 1923, with the result coming up with a perfect matching score of 1.

Example 2 (imperfect match after stripping out honorifics, place names and punctuations): “Saiyad Muhammad Raza Shah” was listed as the winner in the Multan West constituency in the 1920 election. In 1923, his name was listed as “Makhdumzada Muhammad Raza Shah, Multan” in the Multan West constituency. In 1926 and 1929, his name appears as “Makhdumzada Muhammad Raza Shah” in the Multan West constituency. The first step of the procedure stripped out all the honorifics, place names and punctuations (Makhdumzada—Multan—‘.’). Then, two standardized versions of the name were created as “Saiyad Muhammad Raza Shah” and “Muhammad Raza Shah.” The fuzzy match routine was then run on these standardized versions of the name, resulting in matching scores above 0.96. These near perfect were then manually checked to validate that they did indeed correspond to the same individual.

Example 3 (imperfect match based on different transliterations of the surname): “Babu Haripada Chattopadhyay” was listed in the Nadia constituency in 1937. In 1945, his name appeared as “Mr. Haripada Chatterjee” in the Nadia constituency. In 1951, he was listed as “Haripada Chatterjee” in the Karimpur constituency of Nadia district. As before, the first step stripped out all the honorifics, place names and punctuations (Mr.—Babu). Then, two standardized versions of the name were created as “Haripada Chatterjee” and “Haripada Chattopadhyay.” The fuzzy match routine was then run on these standardized versions of the name, resulting in matching scores above 0.98. After manual checking, these were coded as corresponding to the same individual.

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