Are parties in decline? In many ways, this is like asking whether musicians’ performances have declined. Even in classical music, or the relatively stable and legitimate party systems of Western Europe, it is a difficult question to answer simply because styles and tastes change. For this reason, the editors of this volume rightly ask whether the perception of party decline might be the result of judging contemporary parties by old-fashioned models. They therefore suggest that we propose new models for describing parties and that we evaluate parties according to their ability to perform certain basic functions.

The question becomes even harder to answer when the focus shifts to Latin American parties. To continue the musical analogy, we are no longer talking about Mozart and Beethoven; parties in Latin America are more like pop musicians in several respects. First, there has been tremendous turnover. While there have been a handful of perennial favorites and a modest number that last a decade or so, there have also been quite a few “one-hit wonders,” or fenómenos. Second, most parties, like most bands, have never succeeded in winning much of a following. Third, there has always been a wide range of quality. Just as there are great bands and awful ones, there have been parties that perform their basic functions well and others that are dysfunctional in various ways and to varying degrees. This is true across the countries of the region and within most of the countries as well. Finally, we must ask whether a classical model rooted in Western Europe was ever a useful standard. For all these reasons, the question must be
reformulated before it can be answered in the case of Latin American parties.

I reformulate the question in several ways. First, given the accelerated pace of change in Latin America, what is the nature of change over the past ten to 15 years rather than over many decades? Second, are there any systematic differences between the parties that were important 30 years ago and those that were important at the end of the 1990s? Third, because high turnover makes it impractical to compare the same parties over time, have party systems become more functional or less so in recent years? And finally, do the forces that drive the process of turnover favor the survival of parties with certain characteristics?

There are only a few general tendencies across these cases. In the long run, population growth, urbanization, and the spread of the mass media have modified some of the ways in which the best organized parties operate. Although they continue to mobilize supporters during election campaigns, they rely less on routine mobilization and socialization through party-affiliated social organizations. Those that once hoped to finance themselves through dues collection have become dependent on outside campaign financing instead. And all parties that can afford it rely extensively on polling and the mass media to tap public opinion and get out their message.

In all other respects, individual parties have experienced very little organizational change. However, many parties have been, in effect, replaced by other parties with different organizational characteristics. This process of replacement can be understood as “political Darwinism”: the survival of the parties best adapted to the political environment of austerity and economic stagnation during the “lost decade” (from 1982 until the early 1990s). This environment tended to select in favor of right or center-right governing parties, and personalistic or center-left opposition parties. Differences in initial conditions, economic performance, and skill at adaptation meant that different party systems evolved in different directions. Surprisingly, however, these changes rendered party systems in the major countries less functional only in Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. This article illustrates these tendencies with brief case histories of Acción Democrática (AD) in Venezuela, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru, and the Partido Justicialista (PJ, or the Peronist party), in Argentina.

Change in the Major Parties

In some Latin American countries it is normal for parties to shrink or disappear. In 166 twentieth-century legislative elections in 11 Latin American countries, approximately 1,200 parties competed.1 Of these, only 15 participated in all the elections held in their country, and only three contested as many as 20 elections. More than 80 percent ran in just
TABLE 1—CUMULATIVE ELECTORAL VOLATILITY, 1982–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Cumulative Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s data.

one election before becoming defunct.

Another way to measure the degree of change after 1982 is to calculate volatility rates using the election closest to 1982 as a baseline and the most recent election as an endpoint. Table 1 reports these rates of change for the 11 Latin American countries with the most electoral experience. Table 1 shows that the initial party systems of Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia sustained severe damage, with less than half of their party systems remaining in the same form. The Peruvian party system of 1980 was nearly wiped out. Major parties in Venezuela, Argentina, and Mexico also lost a great deal of support. Only in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay did the pre-1982 party systems remain more or less intact. In these countries much of the change consisted of some splintering and name changes, in addition to some healthy vote fluctuation.

The generally high rate of turnover makes it impossible to trace long-term changes in the characteristics of all parties. However, some generalizations are possible with respect to the small number of parties that managed to survive several decades. Among these there have been parties that match, in some respects, several of the types defined by Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond in chapter 1 of this volume. As in Europe, the parties that predominated in the few countries that had competitive (though rarely fair) elections despite restricted suffrage during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were parties of local notables. Among them were the early incarnations of the Chilean Conservative and Liberal parties, the larger Costa Rican parties before the 1948–49 Revolution, the Civilista party of Peru’s “Aristocratic Republic” (1895–1919), and in some respects the state- and family-based oligarchic parties that distributed patronage during Brazil’s Old Republic (1888–1930). Many of these parties were more identified with a single national notable—in some cases, the party even took a leader’s name, for example, Montt-Varistas and Calderonistas—than was typically the case in Europe, and more Latin American leaders may have become notable on the battlefield than in peaceful pursuits, but in other respects, this type fits.

As suffrage expanded, some parties prospered by being, or becoming, clientelistic. Indeed, Colombia’s Liberals and Conservatives, which dominated electoral politics for a century, are very well described by Gunther and Diamond’s definition of this type. Although no other large party in the region fits the definition quite as well, most Brazilian
parties since 1945 and some small regional parties in Argentina could qualify if they are allowed to have some identifiable programmatic stance. Uruguay's Blancos and Colorados could be called clientelistic, but only if a hierarchical structure and lower-class or poorly educated clients are not essential to the definition. It must also be said that virtually all electorally successful parties in Latin America, even the more ideological ones, have learned to cultivate clientelistic ties at the grassroots. This tendency is a natural consequence of competing for the votes of poor citizens with little formal education.

An expanded suffrage also made it possible for socialist and Leninist parties to build a base of electoral support. Most Latin American countries have had several parties that attempted to mobilize the working class in support of some kind of socialist agenda. However, none of these has enjoyed success comparable to that of the major socialist, social democratic, or labor parties of Europe. One of the most successful was the Chilean Socialist Party, but the fate of Allende's government is well known. These parties' success was limited because industrialization came later to Latin America and never transformed society to the same degree that it did in Europe. Also, the suffrage tended to be extended relatively quickly in Latin America, creating incentives to organize broader cross-class coalitions. So a different type of party often occupied the political space that included the emerging working class: the "national revolutionary" parties, which sought to unite the middle class, workers, and peasants behind a diffuse nationalistic and anti-oligarchical platform. Although they initially fit the category of "nationalist" parties, their base of support was so broad that they tended to evolve into catch-all parties, though with two qualifications. First, they were all heavy practitioners of clientelism. Second, several of them built extremely strong party machines for recruitment, mobilization, and patronage distribution, unlike the catch-all type described by Gunther and Diamond. These parties were structured around sectoral organizations designed to mobilize unions, peasants, students, and some middle-class occupational groups. This family included the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru, Acción Democrática (AD) in Venezuela, Liberación Nacional (PLN) in Costa Rica, the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) in the Dominican Republic, and for some scholars, Mexico's Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and Bolivia's Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR).

In a region with a population that was for centuries more than 90 percent Catholic (at least nominally), religious parties have been defenders of Christianity against secularization rather than defenders of one religion against another. This religious versus secular divide was the most salient cleavage in nineteenth-century Latin America, often resolved through violent means. Notable- or caudillo-led conservative parties inherited the proclerical side of this struggle at the turn of the century,
but outside of Colombia it was already losing importance. However, in the 1930s and 1940s, progressive Catholic social teaching inspired some younger politicians to found Christian Democratic parties, which eventually enjoyed great electoral success in Chile, Venezuela (COPEI), and El Salvador, and some success in Peru (Partido Popular Cristiano) and Ecuador (Democracia Popular). They fit Gunther and Diamond’s category of “denominational” parties only approximately, however, because they were not denominational in the strict sense of admitting only Catholics or Christians as members; they were only loosely inspired by the Church, and therefore depended very little on the local bishop’s backing for their legitimacy; and they have also depended on clientelism and, in some cases, personal charisma, much like clientelistic and personalistic parties. As Protestant churches have grown in membership since the 1980s, a few parties have emerged as their vehicles, but none is yet a major force in politics. Neither can it be said that Latin America has any true religious fundamentalist parties.

Most Latin American countries have some ethnic diversity, but centuries of racial intermarriage blurred ethnic lines and strong pressures for assimilation kept the proportion of self-identified ethnic minorities small. These tendencies discouraged the formation of ethnicity-based parties, and they were complemented by active repression or cooption of occasional attempts to build indigenous parties in some countries. Nevertheless, in Bolivia, where perhaps 60 percent of the population identifies with Aymara- or Quechua-speaking indigenous groups, various “Katarista” parties sprang up after 1980. And in Ecuador, movements of the indigenous peoples of the Sierra, the Amazon, and the coast united in the 1990s. At first they preferred direct action over party politics, but toward the end of the decade they began to contest elections in alliance with unions, students, and small leftist parties, gaining a secure foothold in the party system. The “congress party” type, however, is absent in Latin America, probably because the ethnic cleavage lacks salience. National unity movements formed around class issues instead.

This discussion so far omits some important and fascinating political forces—Peronism and the Unión Cívica Radical in Argentina; Acción Popular and Alberto Fujimori’s vehicles in Peru; the Concentración de Fuerzas Populares and the Partido Social Cristiano in Ecuador; Aliança Renovadora Nacional/Partido Democrático Social (ARENA/PDS), Partido de Movimiento Democrático Brasilierno (PMDB), and Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil; Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) in Mexico; and others. It is tempting to slap one of the remaining labels—catch-all, programmatic, or personalistic—on these parties and be done with them, but this solution would mischaracterize them. Most of them, as well as most of those described already, are to some degree clientelistic, to some degree programmatic, and to some degree personalistic. These parties would
rest uneasily in ideal-type categories that are not really mutually exclusive to begin with. Gunther and Diamond’s expanded typology is a commendable effort, as previous typologies were indeed overly simplistic, but at some point it becomes counterproductive to shoehorn additional parties into even this improved classificatory scheme.

The fact is that partisan reality is still more complex. In reality, each party is unique and any strategy for simplifying this complexity encounters tradeoffs. One strategy is to define qualitative labels for various party characteristics—“working-class,” “hierarchical,” “clientelistic,” “institutionalized,” etc. When such labels fit well, they are revealing and useful. But in many cases, parties vary in the degree to which they represent a class or practice clientelism or are hierarchically structured, and so on, so assigning such labels without qualification or quantification can introduce distortions. A second strategy is to aggregate characteristics into types: parties that have a socialist ideology and a Leninist organization and a national base; or parties that have a charismatic leader and no clear program and practice clientelism; etc. Again, these types can be extremely useful when they fit, but given the unique combinations that all parties represent, one must either define myriad combinations to include every party or settle on a few combinations that fit some parties well, others partially or vaguely, and still others not at all. Gunther and Diamond deserve just credit for not aggregating some characteristics that others lumped together, but the many exceptions and qualifications mentioned above demonstrate that problems of aggregation remain for the Latin American cases. Some extra combinations would be required to flesh out the typology: catch-all parties with strong, hierarchical organization; personalist parties with definite programmatic commitments; and parties led by highly ideological elites who depend heavily on clientelistic practices at the base, among others. We need either more types or further disaggregation to do justice to the rich variety of parties in the world.

A third strategy is to narrow the focus to certain characteristics: just programmatic goals, or just organizational structure, or just the social base of support. The most valuable service Gunther and Diamond have performed is to unify disparate typologies that were focused on selected characteristics. This is a valuable service because it is unlikely that any narrow typology will tell us everything we could possibly need to know about a party. Different characteristics matter for different ends. A hierarchical organization, for example, may tell us something useful about a party’s internal democracy and recruitment patterns but nothing about its coalition strategies, campaign styles, or impact on public policy.

Given the inherent limitations of typologies for describing cases faithfully and generating appropriate hypotheses, my own preference would be to abandon the search for an adequate typology. We would progress more rapidly by narrowing attention to whatever party
characteristics theory holds to be relevant for the phenomenon of interest and measuring these characteristics as precisely as possible. This is what is attempted in the comparative analysis below, which leads to some generalizations about the kinds of parties that have electorally prospered or declined in Latin America, and why. Electoral success may not be one of the party characteristics highlighted as important by this volume's guiding typology, but perhaps that is because it is so essential that it is taken for granted. Yet in Latin America, electoral success cannot be taken for granted over the long term. For that reason, even though a one-chapter survey of parties in 20 countries must be selective, electoral success is the one characteristic that can least be ignored.

Has the nature of these important parties changed over the decades? In four respects, yes. First, most of these parties, if they existed before the 1950s, used to mobilize and socialize their membership through party-affiliated sports clubs, dining clubs, literacy workshops, and discussion groups, much as mass-based parties in Europe did in the 1930s. All of these activities have greatly declined as a consequence of population growth, urbanization, rising standards of living, greater personal autonomy, and higher levels of education. Most have fallen into disuse if they exist at all. Second, many of these parties initially attempted to be self-financing through dues collection; this effort was never all that successful, so now all of them have become dependent on outside public and private donations. Third, technological change has led all important parties in Latin America to make extensive use of polling, mass-media campaign advertising, and increasingly sophisticated U.S.-style campaign techniques. Fourth, more and more parties are experimenting with primaries for the selection of their candidates for president, congress, and governorships.

These secular changes might suggest that major Latin American parties have turned away from personal contact and face-to-face patron-client relationships as socialization and mobilization techniques. There is some change in this direction, but it should not be exaggerated because the new techniques often supplement the old ones rather than replacing them. For example, almost all of these parties continue their mass mobilization efforts during campaigns, partly because bringing supporters to rallies is one of the few ways local brokers can demonstrate that they can get out the vote and thus are valuable to the party leadership. As long as clientelism is rampant in Latin American politics, the mass mobilization will continue. And as long as poverty and deep inequalities plague Latin American societies, clientelism will remain a favorite political tool.

**Change in Party Systems**

Because the parties mentioned so far are only a small fraction of all the parties and are not representative of the others, it is necessary to
examine changes in a country’s whole system of parties. This can be
done by identifying certain basic functions that party systems should
perform and certain structural characteristics of party systems that are
functional according to these criteria, as well as analyzing indicators of
these characteristics. Party systems matter for democracy in two principal
ways. First, they are the chief vehicles for representation, and therefore
affect the quality of democracy. Second, they affect governability,
especially in the legislative arena, and therefore indirectly affect the
stability of a democratic regime in the long run. Both good representation
and governability require legitimacy and are enhanced when there is
strong party identification. In the long run, good representation promotes
governability. In a more immediate sense, however, what is good for
democracy is not always good for governability, or vice versa, and for
this reason we have conflicting notions about what sort of party system
would be “best” for stable democracy. Because many people focus
exclusively on the long-term compatibility between representation and
governability, it is instructive to compare party systems at the extremes
of fragmentation and polarization in order to highlight the tradeoffs that
present themselves in the short term.

If our goal were perfect representation, we would want a large number
of parties, to illustrate all possible combinations of positions on all
relevant issues, as well as rigid parties that resist compromising on the
mandate received from the voters and have sharp issue differences with
other parties. Such a party system would be highly representative in the
most pure sense of the term. But it would also tend to be divisive,
polarized, and indecisive, and therefore dangerously inclined toward
ungovernability in the legislative arena in the short term. If our goal
were perfect governability, we would want just one highly pragmatic
party that strives for consensus and whose activists are always willing to
compromise to achieve it, in order to guarantee and mobilize full support
for whatever the government decides to do. Such a party would be
wonderful for governability (unless it alienated a substantial body of
citizens and allowed them to organize an antisystem force), but it would
also be the very antithesis of democracy.

In the real world, we are willing to sacrifice some democracy and
some governability in order to achieve as much as possible of both.
Thinking about these tradeoffs is a useful way to identify a standard for
evaluating how functional a party system is for stable democracy. With
respect to fragmentation, there should be enough parties for meaning-
ful competition but not so many that it becomes difficult to form
governments and make decisions. A minimum of two parties is a
reasonable lower limit. If there are, in effect, fewer than two parties (in
the sense that there is one party that is much larger than any other), then
the system is insufficiently competitive because the largest party is
expected to win control of the national executive all the time. The
Laakso-Taagepera index of the Effective Number of Parties, which ranges from 1.00 to infinity, counts parties after weighting them by their shares of the votes or seats, producing an "effective" number of parties that can be expressed in fractional terms, such as "2.63 parties." This index has become the standard indicator of party-system fragmentation in political science.

Meaningful competition can also occur between more than two parties, but at some point further fragmentation undermines governability by making it harder to form a working majority in the legislature. Many cutoffs for this perilously large number of parties are conceivable, but one conservative standard is the number at which it becomes impossible for just two parties to form a majority. This number depends on the size of the largest (and presumably governing) party. If the largest party controls more than half the seats, a coalition is unnecessary; if it controls less than a quarter, any majority coalition must include at least three parties. When the largest party controls between one-quarter and one-half of the seats, it becomes impossible to form a two-party majority when there are 4.0 to 4.5 parties in the system (the maximum is 4.57 parties, when the largest party controls 37.5 percent of the seats).

With respect to polarization, the parties should take positions that are distinctive enough to provide the voters with a meaningful choice, but these positions should not be so far apart that they interfere with the construction of majorities for legislation and governing. One indicator of polarization (Index of Polarization, or IP) is the dispersion of the vote away from the relative center of the party system, which takes on values between zero (all of the vote in one ideological bloc) and 100 (half of the vote at each of the ideological extremes). A minimum functional level of polarization would be 25, which is the lowest level that guarantees that no bloc wins more than half the vote and therefore ensures some competition between blocs. The maximum functional level of polarization can be set at 60, which corresponds to a perfectly even distribution of voters among all blocs. (This "flat" distribution marks the threshold between the "unimodal" or "single-peaked" distributions that are more concentrated than dispersed and the "bimodal" distributions that are more dispersed than concentrated.)

The Figure on the following page depicts changes in the levels of party-system fragmentation and left-right polarization in the 11 countries surveyed here using these two indicators. Lines in the figure define the functional ranges of fragmentation and polarization. As shown here, functional party systems have between 2 and 4.57 effective parties (calculated on the basis of seats) and are from 25 to 60 percent polarized. The figure also displays a line for each country that begins at the fragmentation and polarization levels at the "initial" elections as defined in Table 1 on p. 175 and ends at the corresponding values for the "final" election in the period of analysis. Overall, during this period there was an increase
in fragmentation and polarization (as well as an association between these two tendencies). But in order to evaluate these changes it is essential to consider each party system's starting point and the magnitude of the change, for these facts determine whether fragmentation and polarization made these party systems more functional or less so.

Brazil and Ecuador suffered severe fragmentation and polarization that moved their party systems into a zone of great dysfunctionality. Mexico and Colombia also experienced growing fragmentation and polarization, but because they began with too little of each, these changes were in the direction of more meaningful and competitive elections. Venezuela, Uruguay, and Costa Rica experienced some changes, but not of sufficient magnitude to move them out of the functional zone.

Partial changes occurred in other countries. During this period in Bolivia, the party system remained fragmented (though not excessively so as two-party coalitions could still be formed), but the level of polarization declined dramatically by 1993 (after a surge in 1985) to a borderline low level. Similarly, Peru maintained a manageable number of parties, but leaped from excessively high polarization in 1980 to excessively low polarization in 1995, due to the dominance of Fujimori's depoliticizing Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría. In Chile, left-right polarization was lower in the 1990s, although some intense conflict remained over constitutional issues. Fragmentation increased to a potentially dysfunctional level, but the decline in polarization more than compensated for it, as solid multiparty coalitions sustained the first two democratic governments after Pinochet. The Argentine party system was not too fragmented in the 1980s, but in the base year (1973) it was dysfunctionally polarized. The polarization index IP does not reflect polarization well in Argentina because the principal dimension of
| TABLE 2—PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY |
|---------------------------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| **CONFIDENCE IN PARTIES**¹  | **ARGENTINA** | **BRAZIL** | **CHILE** | **MEXICO** | **PERU** | **URUGUAY** | **VENEZUELA** |
| MUCH/SOME  | 27 | 17 | 33 | 40 | 21 | 41 | 16 |
| LITTLE/NONE | 73 | 83 | 67 | 60 | 79 | 59 | 84 |
| **FEELINGS TOWARD PARTIES**² |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CLOSE | 9 | 13 | 10 | 17 | 6 | 26 | 11 |
| SYMPATHIZER | 30 | 22 | 28 | 37 | 42 | 46 | 26 |
| NOT CLOSE | 61 | 67 | 64 | 48 | 52 | 30 | 65 |
| **REGIME PREFERENCE**³ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| DEMOCRACY | 82 | 48 | 54 | 57 | 58 | 86 | 64 |
| AUTHORITARIAN | 12 | 25 | 19 | 17 | 26 | 8 | 23 |
| MAKES NO DIFFERENCE | 7 | 27 | 27 | 16 | 6 | 14 |  |
| **SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE**⁴ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SATISFIED | 53 | 31 | 34 | 24 | 47 | 59 | 38 |
| UNSATISFIED | 47 | 69 | 66 | 76 | 53 | 41 | 62 |

¹ "Por favor dígame para cada una de las instituciones que le voy a leer, cuánta confianza tiene usted en ellas: mucha, poca o ninguna? Los partidos políticos."

² "Respecto de los partidos políticos, cómo se siente Ud.: muy cercano, algo cercano, sólo simpatizando o no cercano a ninguno?"

³ "¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases está Ud. más de acuerdo? 1. La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno; 2. En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático; 3. A la gente como uno, nos da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático."

⁴ "En general, diría Ud. que está muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con el funcionamiento de la democracia en el país?"


competition was historically between Peronists and everyone else rather than between left and right.¹² By 1995, competition was perhaps insufficiently meaningful in left-right terms, but still quite meaningful in Peronist–anti-Peronist terms.

In summary, there were significant improvements in levels of fragmentation and polarisation in Mexico; a partial improvement in Argentina, Chile, and Colombia; no net change in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela; a partial decline in Peru; and disaster in Ecuador and probably Brazil. Eight of the 11 systems functioned as well as before or better, and only three deteriorated overall. The number of improvements is rather surprising, in view of the difficult economic times the region was going through. However, the claim that some Latin American party systems became more functional does not mean that they were functioning well, and still less that Latin American democracy in general was thriving. Many of these party systems started from great dysfunctionality; delegative democracy was on the rise in Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela at least; the drug trade was spreading corruption in the Andean region and Mexico; indigenous peoples were underrepresented in the same countries; the military was incompletely subordinated to civilian leaders.
leadership in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru; the courts and the rule of law were weak everywhere except Costa Rica and Chile; and human rights were violated far too often.

These conditions make it easier to understand why Latin Americans held their parties and other institutions in such low esteem in the mid-1990s. As Table 2 on the previous page shows for seven countries, most Latin American respondents in the Latinobarómetro survey of 1995 claimed to have little or no confidence in parties and, except for Uruguayans and perhaps Mexicans, claimed not to be close to any party. These subjective evaluations of parties correspond closely with the objective classifications of parties in the Figure on p. 182. Two of the countries (excluding Costa Rica, which was not included in the 1995 Latinobarómetro survey) that ended up on the zone of functionality—Uruguay and Mexico—had fewer negative evaluations of parties than all the rest, and the country with the most dysfunctional party system, Brazil, also had the most negative evaluations. (Chile is the only outlier here, probably due to the unusual degree of cooperation among the parties in the governing coalition, which has moderated the problems associated with fragmentation and polarization.) These poor evaluations did not affect Latin Americans' majority preference for democracy in principle (see Table 2), and they had only a light relation to the predominant dissatisfaction with actual democratic performance. These data suggest that political parties do not help legitimate the political system in these countries. If anything, the legitimacy of democracy may engender a reluctant toleration of parties in the population.

**Political Darwinism**

It should be clear by now that party politics in Latin America is a harsh struggle for survival with few survivors. It could be aptly called "political Darwinism" because there are several parallels between the evolution of party systems and the evolution of natural species. Both natural selection and the more artificial selection of political parties by voters involve competition for limited resources, whether votes or food; the winners of this competition grow (in popular support or numbers) while the losers decline and eventually become extinct; the survivors tend to reproduce themselves more or less faithfully for the next round of competition, although with some capacity for innovation; and the best adaptations to the environment are favored for growth and survival in future rounds.13

This view of the process suggests that four basic conditions shape the evolution of parties and party systems: 1) the amount of stress to which the party system is subjected; 2) the nature of the stress, which determines which party characteristics are rewarded and which are punished; 3) the vulnerability of the parties to this kind of stress; and 4) the parties'
### Table 3—Biggest Winners and Losers in Latin American Elections, 1982–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biggest Losers</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>Governed?</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unión Democrática y Popular</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1980–93</td>
<td>-38.7</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center-left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrático Social (PDS)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1982–94</td>
<td>-37.2</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acción Popular</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1980–95</td>
<td>-36.3</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conc. Fuerzas Populares</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1979–94</td>
<td>-28.8</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>personalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unión Cívica Radical</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1983–95</td>
<td>-25.9</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1979–94</td>
<td>-23.9</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center(-right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1982–94</td>
<td>-23.4</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND-MIR alliance</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1985–93</td>
<td>-22.0</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center-right + center-left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1980–95</td>
<td>-20.5</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center-left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservador</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1982–94</td>
<td>-18.8</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center-right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPEI</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1978–93</td>
<td>-17.2</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center-right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acción Democrática</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1978–93</td>
<td>-16.4</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center-right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberación Nacional (PLN)</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1982–94</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center-left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nacional (Blancos)</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1971–93</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center-right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izquierda Democrática</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1979–94</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center-left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renovador Nacional (PRN)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1990–94</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>personalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1971–93</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>center(-left)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Biggest Winners

**Pre-Existing Parties**

- **Social Cristiano (PSC)**
  - Ecuador 1979–94 +17.8 Y right
- **MNR**
  - Bolivia 1980–93 +15.4 Y center-right
- **Acción Nacional (PAN)**
  - Mexico 1979–94 +14.3 N center-right
- **Frente Amplio**
  - Uruguay 1971–93 +12.5 N left
- **Unidad Social Cristiana**
  - Costa Rica 1982–94 +11.3 Y center-left
- **Justicialista (Peronist)**
  - Argentina 1983–95 +5.5 Y center(-left)

**Emerging Parties**

- **Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría**
  - Peru 1985–95 +52.1 Y personalist
- **Frente Grande/FREPASO**
  - Argentina 1991–95 +20.9 N center-left
- **La Causa R**
  - Venezuela 1978–93 +20.4 N center-left
- **Social Demócrata**
  - Brasil 1986–94 +17.1 N center-left
- **Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE)**
  - Ecuador 1979–94 +16.8 Y personalist
- **P. Revolución Democratica (PRD)**
  - Mexico 1988–94 +16.7 N center-left
- **Nacional Velasquista (PNV)**
  - Ecuador 1979–94 +14.2 N personalist
- **Conciencia de Patria**
  - Bolivia 1985–93 +14.3 N personalist
- **Unión Cívica Solidaridad**
  - Bolivia 1989–93 +13.8 N personalist
- **Convergencia Nacional**
  - Venezuela 1988–93 +13.8 N center-left
- **Por la Democracia (PPD)**
  - Chile 1973–93 +11.8 Y center-left
- **Democracia Popular**
  - Ecuador 1979–94 +8.2 N center-left

Capacity to adapt appropriately. How did each of these conditions apply to Latin America after 1982? Did they combine to select in favor of parties with certain characteristics?
Table 3 on the previous page ranks the biggest winners and losers in elections during the "lost decade" and provides some clues about the selection criteria of the Darwinian struggle for survival. First, all of the biggest losers were governing parties at some time during this period. Apparently incumbency was frequently very costly. However, this was not always the case, as some of the biggest winners in the region were also governing parties, such as the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) in Ecuador, the MNR in Bolivia, and Alberto Fujimori's Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría. This suggests that the real impact of incumbency was to raise the stakes, because governing parties were held most directly responsible for government performance. A second tendency was that among the parties that predated the initial election, the biggest winners were usually on the right or center-right. Only one of the six was on the left, and that is sometimes considered center-left—Perónism's Justicialista party—shifted decisively to the center or even center-right by the late 1980s under the leadership of Carlos Menem. Third, among the new parties, the biggest winners were all either personalist or center-left parties. The implications of these last two tendencies are cloudy until the parties' governing status is also taken into account; then it seems likely that there were three types of parties that tended to do especially well after 1982: personalist parties, governing parties to the right of center, and left-of-center parties in the opposition.

All of these observations can be tested more rigorously with a larger sample of cases and data that are less aggregated. Such a test is reported below, and it confirms these ideas and adds some others. But first the theory must be fleshed out further.

**The amount and type of stress.** Parties are pressed to adapt whenever their environment changes in ways that affect the voters' beliefs and priorities. Many aspects of the politically relevant environment have changed rapidly in Latin America, creating (to a different degree in each country) regime change, rapid urbanization, economic boom-and-bust cycles, rising drug trafficking and related crime, high and wildly varying inflation, deepening social inequalities, terrorism, guerrilla war, and economic liberalization. Any party would be sorely challenged to adapt well to any of these conditions, so it should not come as a surprise that the stressful environments in Latin America coincide with volatile party systems. The average party-system volatility in Latin America is 29.3 percent in the 11 countries examined here, compared to an average of 8.6 percent in Western Europe from 1885 to 1985. The figures reported are both average, not cumulative, volatility, using the same counting rules. Any one of the kinds of change listed above could be cited to account for the large volatility gap between these two regions.

One type of stress was particularly common and particularly severe in Latin America in the period after 1982: economic stress. The 1980s were
such rough times for Latin America that they are referred to as the "lost decade." Only Colombia and Chile registered significant improvements in per capita GDP in this period; it fell 5 percent in Venezuela, 8 percent in Argentina, 20 percent in Bolivia, and 27 percent in Peru.\textsuperscript{17} As a result, between 1980 and 1992, inequality increased in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela; it decreased only in Colombia and Uruguay.\textsuperscript{18} Inflation was generally higher than levels that would be tolerated in Western Europe and the United States, and it reached the nightmarish rates of 2,938 percent in Brazil (1990), 3,087 percent in Argentina (1989), 7,482 percent in Peru (1990), and 11,749 percent in Bolivia (1985).\textsuperscript{19} A plausible working hypothesis, therefore, is that voters tended to reward parties that could claim credit for taming inflation, restoring economic growth, and improving the standard of living. Similarly, one may suppose that they tended to punish parties that made the economic situation worse in these respects.

\textbf{Parties' vulnerability to stress and capacity to adapt.} Voters do not treat all parties the same, however: In some countries voters are reluctant to question their party identification even if their party wrecks the economy or someone else's party produces a boom. In other countries, voters are far more generous in their rewards and more harsh in their punishments. The former type of party has a "solid" base of support; the latter, a "fluid" base. The strength of party identification therefore mediates the impact of economic performance on the vote. Identification with major parties is considered to be fairly strong in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela, but fairly or extremely weak in Ecuador, Brazil, and Bolivia.\textsuperscript{20} However, the strength of identification can vary among parties within the same country and can also change over time.\textsuperscript{21}

Beyond whether a party's base of support is solid or fluid, the impact of economic performance also depends on whether the party is in the government or in the opposition. While incumbents may be held responsible for economic performance, the opposition is not in a position to take the credit or the blame, whatever the case may be. Therefore, we would expect governing parties that reduce inflation to grow, and those that make it worse, to decline. These effects should be greater for parties with a fluid base than for parties with a solid one, and the tendencies should be more clearly defined for governing parties than for opposition parties.\textsuperscript{22}

Table 4 on the following page shows how the fates of selected governing and opposition parties varied, depending on the strength of identification, incumbency or opposition, and government success in fighting inflation. These estimates are based on regression analysis of 132 cases—the 23 most extreme cases reported in the table, plus 109 cases in which inflation rates were much lower. (For details, see the
| **TABLE 4—SELECTED EXAMPLES OF ELECTORAL SUCCESS AND FAILURE UNDER EXTREME INFLATION** |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----|------------------|--------------|--------------|
| **OPPOSITION PARTIES WITH A SOLID BASE**     |     | CHANGE IN        | % CHANGE IN  |
|                                              | COUNTRY | INFLATION        | VOTE         |              |
| **FALLING INFLATION**                        |     |                  |              |              |
| Unión Cívica Radical                         | Argentina | 1991     | -2,916       | -0.2         | +1.5         |
| Unión Cívica Radical                         | Argentina | 1993     | -161         | +1.3         | +1.6         |
| P. Unidad Social Cristiana                  | Costa Rica | 1986  | -78          | +12.4        | +1.6         |
| **MEAN**                                     |     |                  | +4.5         | +1.6         |
| **RISING INFLATION**                         |     |                  |              |              |
| Justicialista                               | Argentina | 1989 | +2,964        | +3.5         | -2.3         |
| P. dos Trabalhadores                        | Brazil  | 1990  | +2,812        | +1.3         | +9.2         |
| **GOVERNING PARTIES WITH A SOLID BASE**      |     |                  | +2.4         | +3.4         |
| **FALLING INFLATION**                        |     |                  |              |              |
| Justicialista                               | Argentina | 1991 | -2,916        | -4.6         | -3.4         |
| Justicialista                               | Argentina | 1993 | -161         | +3.0         | -2.0         |
| P. Liberación Nacional                      | Costa Rica | 1986 | -78          | -7.3         | -6.8         |
| **MEAN**                                     |     |                  | -3.0         | -4.1         |
| Unión Cívica Radical                         | Argentina | 1989 | +2,915        | -7.9         | -1.0         |
| **OPPOSITION PARTIES WITH A FLUID BASE**     |     |                  |              |              |
| **FALLING INFLATION**                        |     |                  |              |              |
| Acción Democrática Nacionalista             | Bolivia  | 1989 | -11,734       | -7.6         | -6.9         |
| Mov. de la Izquierda Revolucionaria         | Bolivia  | 1989 | -11,734       | +11.7        | +0.4         |
| Coordinadora Democrática (CODE) + PPC       | Peru  | 1992 | -7,408        | -24.6        | -19.6        |
| Frente Grande                               | Argentina | 1993 | -161         | +3.7         | +3.7         |
| **MEAN**                                     |     |                  | -4.1         | -5.3         |
| **RISING INFLATION**                         |     |                  |              |              |
| Acción Democrática Nacionalista             | Bolivia  | 1985 | +11,702       | +16.0        | +10.1        |
| Mov. Nacionalista Revolucionario            | Bolivia  | 1985 | +11,702       | +10.2        | +9.0         |
| P. Democrático Social                       | Brazil  | 1990 | +2,812        | +1.5         | +8.4         |
| P. da Frente Liberal                        | Brazil  | 1990 | +2,812        | -8.7         | +3.2         |
| FREDEMO                                      | Peru  | 1990 | +7,318        | +11.0        | +5.8         |
| **MEAN**                                     |     |                  | -6.0         | +7.3         |
| **GOVERNING PARTIES WITH A FLUID BASE**     |     |                  |              |              |
| **FALLING INFLATION**                        |     |                  |              |              |
| Mov. Nacionalista Revolucionario            | Bolivia  | 1989 | -11,734       | -4.7         | +16.0        |
| Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría                     | Peru  | 1992 | -7,408        | +32.3        | +13.6        |
| **MEAN**                                     |     |                  | +13.8        | +14.8        |
| **RISING INFLATION**                         |     |                  |              |              |
| Unión Democrática Popular                   | Bolivia  | 1985 | +11,702       | -32.5        | -27.1        |
| PMDB                                         | Brazil  | 1990 | +2,812        | -30.7        | -27.5        |
| APRA                                         | Peru  | 1990 | +7,318        | -25.6        | -25.3        |
| **MEAN**                                     |     |                  | -29.6        | -26.6        |

Appendix to this chapter.) All of the expected relationships hold true, but only at the extremes experienced by the cases included in the table.

The tendencies observed are as follows: 1) Parties with a solid base of support found it electorally costly to govern and electorally beneficial to be in the opposition. 2) Economic performance had no significant impact on this tendency among parties with a solid base: Governing
TABLE 5—IMPACT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ON VOTE FOR FOUR TYPES OF PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation to President</th>
<th>Strength of Party ID</th>
<th>Inflation Falling</th>
<th>Inflation Rising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>opposition</td>
<td>solid</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opposition</td>
<td>fluid</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governing</td>
<td>solid</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governing</td>
<td>fluid</td>
<td>+ +</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

changes were much larger, and both governing and economic performance mattered. 3) Opposition parties with a fluid base were hurt a little by falling inflation and helped a little by rising inflation. 4) On the other hand, governing parties with a fluid base were helped a lot by falling inflation and hurt a lot by rising inflation. These relationships are summarized in Table 5 above. As Table 3 on p. 185 indicates, there are some notable exceptions, because elections are not simply referendums on economic performance. The explanation offered here merely traces some general tendencies that account for 38 percent of the variance; 62 percent must be explained by other factors. These factors could be characteristics of the competitive environment such as noneconomic issues or economic issues besides inflation; or other forms of adaptation, such as leadership, campaign styles and tactics, and alliances and boycotts.

A note on emerging parties. As noted above, parties change by replacement as well as adaptation. If there are any commonalities among the emerging parties in Latin America it would be good to identify them. It cannot be said, however, that the new parties that emerged to completely or partially replace old major parties were necessarily to the right or to the left, or even that they tended to be personalistic; there were examples of all three. However, two generalizations can be made.

First, emerging parties tended to be reactions against some major party that failed to adapt, and therefore they tended to be its opposite in some respects. Some characteristics of emerging parties differed greatly from country to country, depending on what sort of party they were replacing. In reaction to the iron discipline of AD and COPEI, La Causa R in Venezuela was opposed, on principle, to requiring its activists to toe any party line. But in Brazil, where most parties—and especially the PMDB—were notoriously uncohesive, one of the most successful emerging parties was the PT, which achieved the tightest discipline of any party in the system. In Mexico, both the PAN and the PRD were committed to political democracy and voluntary participation, in contrast to the authoritarian mobilization techniques of the dominant PRI. Peru presents perhaps the most extreme case, in which Fujimori’s Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoria reacted against the legacies of the previous AP and APRA governments by trying not to be a party at all.
Second, the new parties favored by voters are those that had a credible chance of winning, which in turn was a function of two qualities. One was experience in governing at the regional or local level. In Mexico, PAN was the opposition party that had won the largest number of local elections before 1988 and the largest number of governorships before 1994. In Venezuela, La Causa R first became nationally prominent through the governorship of its leader, Andrés Velásquez, in the eastern state of Bolívar. And in Brazil, the PT won quite a few municipal elections in major cities before its presidential candidate, Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva, made it to the presidential runoff in 1989. The other token of credibility was earned if the new party had splintered away from one of the old major parties. This probably gave an advantage to the PRD in Mexico, led by Porfirio Muñoz Ledo and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, both formerly of the PRI; to Chile’s Partido por la Democracia (PPD), led by Ricardo Lagos of the Socialist Party; to Convergencia Nacional in Venezuela, led by Rafael Caldera, the founder of COPEI; to the Frente Grande and Frente del País Solidario (FREPASO) in Argentina, led by the Group of Eight and José Octavio Bordón, all ex-Peronists; and to the Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano in Ecuador, which split away from the Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP) in the early 1980s.

**Adaptation: Three Case Studies**

The rewards for economic stabilization in the post-debt-crisis environment explain why most of the biggest winners among established parties were on the right or center-right: Fighting inflation was a natural part of their agenda, for which little adaptation was required. For the governing parties to the left of center, survival required a wrenching adaptation. For them, implementing stabilization and structural adjustment meant reversing many of the policies they had championed for years—expansion of the state sector, aggressive regulation of the private sector, extensive state intervention setting wages and prices—and postponing attempts to reduce poverty and inequality. Often it also meant recruiting economic advisers from pro-market institutes and turning a deaf ear to demands coming from unionized workers who traditionally had been a source of strong support. For these parties, the 1982–95 period was a Mephistophelian environment that presented them with a Faustian bargain: Surrender your soul and you can live forever; otherwise, you will die. Most left-of-center parties either would not or could not keep such a bargain. Of the ten elections held with center-left parties as incumbents, only three took place while inflation was falling. By contrast, inflation was falling during 53 percent of the elections with center incumbents, 73 percent with center-right incumbents, and 63 percent with incumbents on the right.

Among the qualitative changes in parties with which this volume is
concerned—changes in recruitment, electoral mobilization, issue structuration, and societal representation—the most interesting examples were adaptations by center-left parties to the conservative environment. Case studies of three historically center-left parties will illustrate the dimensions of change and their consequences. Each was well-established, began with strong identifiers in the electorate, mobilized trade unions, and governed during part of this period. But these three parties responded to the challenges of the time differently. APRA in Peru misadapted—zigging to the left when it should have zagged right—and brought about its own destruction. Acción Democrática in Venezuela resisted adaptation, by withdrawing support from its own leaders who turned toward the market, and lost 40 percent of its voters. The Justicialista party in Argentina, however, followed Carlos Menem to the right and won more votes, but underwent profound internal reorganization in the process.

Before beginning, it should be noted that many characteristics of these three parties did not change significantly during this period. All three had long suffered from a poverty of practical policy ideas, which forced them to depend heavily on outside advisers for policy guidance in government. All three parties practiced very tight discipline in congress, and in Peru and Venezuela this discipline extended beyond the legislature. Other practices varied across the parties, but nevertheless remained constant over time. All of them mobilized voters with a mix of clientelism, mass meetings, and mass media, but better access to campaign funding enabled Acción Democrática (AD) to do all of these more intensively. Leadership was more personalized in APRA and the Partido Justicialista (PJ) than it was in AD, and procedures for recruitment and promotion were less institutionalized in the PJ. There are probably two reasons for the lack of change in these respects. The first is that every large party creates its own organizational subculture early in its existence, and this subculture tends to reproduce itself faithfully. The second is that these parties had few incentives to adapt these aspects of their organizational life. Rather, the kind of adaptation required by the political environment after 1982 concerned the parties' ideological positioning and relations with labor and business. Therefore, whatever changes occurred in the ways parties recruited leaders, mobilized voters, and formed or sustained governments were not the result of adaptation, but instead the replacement of old parties by new ones that performed these functions differently.

APRA: Misadaptation and replacement. The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) was founded by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre as an alternative to communism that would unite workers, peasants, and the middle class behind an anti-oligarchical program. From the 1930s to the mid-1960s it enjoyed a cult-like adherence among a substantial proportion of the urban middle class and workers in industry
and export agriculture. By the mid-1960s it exercised paternalistic control over 75 percent of the trade unions in Peru. It also informally sponsored paramilitary squads called búfalos that took violent action against rivals. At its peak, the party had an extensive grassroots organization that involved activists in a wide range of activities, including rallies, lectures, cooperatives, and soccer clubs. In 1945-48 and 1956-58, however, APRA briefly backed two relatively conservative governments; and during the 1963-68 presidency of Fernando Belaunde, Haya joined the conservative former dictator Manuel Odria to block attempts at land reform. In the increasingly pro-reform context of the time, such actions eroded APRA’s support base, especially among organized labor.

The transition to democracy after 1978 coincided with three challenges to APRA in addition to the debt crisis, which hit Peru early. One was the radicalization of many voters by the leftist military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–75), which had nationalized major industries, set up agricultural cooperatives, established close ties to Cuba, and placed former Socialist and Communist politicians in charge of some urban social programs. During the 1970s and afterwards, most unions affiliated themselves with the leftist Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos (CGTP) rather than APRA’s Confederación de Trabajadores Peruanos (CTP). The youth wing, Juventud Aprista Peruana (JAP), was even more radicalized, to the point of being openly and explicitly Marxist. A second challenge was the need to renovate the leadership, as most of the well-known leaders were quite old and discredited by Haya’s past compromises. Finally, the most serious challenge of all was the death of Haya himself in 1979. Although he had taken on several leaders in their twenties and thirties as proteges, he left neither a clear successor nor a means for choosing one, so the party languished in a leadership vacuum for the next four years.

The leader who eventually emerged as the winner of the presidential candidacy nomination in late 1983 was 34-year-old Alan García. Before long, activists treated him as the unquestioned leader, much as they had treated Haya, and it fell to him to guide APRA’s adaptation to the post-1982 political environment. At first he planted the party firmly in the center, where it was abundantly rewarded. Then he unexpectedly swerved to the left, which cost the party dearly.

García’s 1983–85 presidential campaign was designed to reshape APRA in order to attract votes outside its traditional base. One promise was targeted at radicalized workers and students: an announcement that Peru would use no more than 20 percent of its export earnings for servicing the foreign debt. (He lowered this figure to 10 percent on inauguration day.) This promise was also appealing to many voters who were not otherwise very radical, however, and most of his other appeals were directed toward less radical groups. He encouraged the formation of middle-class “Civic Communities” to endorse his candidacy; he initiated
consensus-building talks with the armed forces and the Church; he publicized the most technical policy studies Apristas had to offer (which were still not as detailed or rigorous as those of their rivals); he criticized unionized workers for being a labor elite less deserving of state support than the unemployed and underemployed; he repudiated some of Haya’s anticapitalist utterings; he distanced himself from the party’s violent past; and he advocated a “social pact” with business. The overall effect was to cast APRA in the role of a pragmatic, reasonable, moderate reformist alternative to the growing left. This strategy led to the party’s greatest electoral success ever: García won 47.8 percent of the vote in 1985, compared to less than 36 percent in all previous elections in which the party had run its own candidate.

At first, García was an extremely popular president, with approval ratings over 80 percent in his first year and over 60 percent in his second. But in July 1987 he suddenly shifted to the left by nationalizing all remaining private domestic banks, insurance companies, and finance corporations. This move instantly alienated the international financial community (which already distrusted García’s heterodox policies), Peruvian business leaders, opposition leaders on the right, and even most leaders of APRA—none of whom had been consulted before the decision was made—without winning the support of the parties on the left. The economy shuddered, then collapsed, and from this point on APRA suffered an unbroken series of disasters: García’s approval rating immediately plummeted to 30 percent; within months, a rival wrested control of the APRA congressional delegation from him; some CTP unions joined general strikes in 1988 and 1989; JAP youth began defecting to the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA, the same terrorist group that held hostages in the Japanese embassy for four months in 1997); and the party’s share of the vote shrank to 25 percent in 1990. In 1995, further discredited by Alberto Fujimori’s economic success and his virulently antiparty rhetoric, APRA’s share shrank to 6.5 percent—yielding just 6.7 percent of the seats in congress and 4 percent of the presidential vote—not enough to maintain its registration as a national political party. García himself went into exile in Colombia to escape corruption charges.

Peru is a clear-cut case of a change in the nature of parties due to replacement rather than adaptation. The major party in Peru after 1990 was Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría, the personalist vehicle of Alberto Fujimori, which controlled 67 of the 120 seats in congress as a result of the 1995 election. Its only ideology was to back whatever Fujimori wanted to do, without question. It had no grassroots presence. It screened candidates in focus groups and took polls to set priorities. It went farther in the direction of the unmediated electronic executive than any other party in the region, and perhaps the world. Conaghan has argued that “Peru’s party system has ceased to exist in any meaningful sense.”
Acción Democrática: Resistance and decline. Acción Democrática (AD), like APRA, was founded to bring together the middle class, workers, and peasants into a nationalistic anti-oligarchical alliance. Unlike APRA, it was very successful at winning power. After seizing power jointly with military conspirators in 1945, it won Venezuela’s first fair presidential election in 1948 with more than 70 percent of the vote, and won five of the eight presidential elections after the restoration of democracy in 1958. Although AD was fairly radical for its time in the beginning, by 1958 it had become a slightly center-left catch-all party. It won the votes of Venezuelans from all classes, occupations, and regions, and in this respect was indistinguishable from its principal rival, the Social Christian party COPEI. Unlike many catch-all parties, however, AD had a Leninist organizational structure explicitly based on democratic centralism, and it actively enforced party discipline among its legislators, leaders, and militants at the national, state, and local levels. As late as 1995 it was still expelling hundreds of members for ignoring the party line in local elections.

In addition to being tightly disciplined, AD aggressively penetrated most organizations in civil society aside from the Church and private businesses. Through infiltration, cooptation, and the creation of parallel organizations, AD and the other major parties succeeded in placing party members as leaders of student governments, professional associations, and unions. These leaders then mobilized their organizations in support of their party during and between elections. AD was much more successful than other parties at gaining control over labor unions and federations, and in winning the most important offices at the head of the peak labor confederation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV). The labor wing of AD was therefore a large and valuable component of the party. However, AD’s labor leaders habitually deferred to the party line in exchange for party support for labor demands in the long run. And to the extent that the labor wing had influence over party affairs, it was counterbalanced by the influence of the state party bosses, who used their regional patronage machines to deliver large blocs of votes at national party meetings. In general elections, both state bosses and labor leaders turned out large numbers of activists for open-air rallies, caravans, and processions, all festooned with party posters, banners, T-shirts, hats, and other paraphernalia. Since about 1973, parties have also made heavy use of high-tech polling, campaign consultants, and slick television ads, but not at the expense of this old-fashioned type of electoral mobilization.

During the long intervals between major national party meetings, however, a much smaller group of leaders made party decisions. Formally, that body was the National Executive Committee (CEN); informally, it was a group of five to seven leaders known as the cocollo. And when the president came from AD, the cocollo normally did its best to reach agreement with the president privately so that president and party could
appear united in public. When the national leadership was united, the *cogollo* had the power to dictate the party line to the Parliamentary Fraction and state and local party leaders. But when the national leadership was divided, as often occurred during the selection of the presidential candidate, de facto leadership reverted to state party bosses and labor leaders.

When the debt crisis hit Venezuela, AD resisted adaptation every step of the way. One president temporized with heterodoxy with the full support of the party; the next veered toward neoliberalism, but the party blocked his way; and when the next presidential candidate also endorsed the turn to the market, he and his supporters were marginalized, leaving the organization in the hands of an extremely pragmatic general secretary who supported minimal liberalizations only reluctantly and semipublicly. Jaime Lusinchi (1984–89) followed heterodox policies throughout his term, so there was not much of an attempt at adaptation for the party to resist. Lusinchi's policies were supported by a majority of the CEN, the Parliamentary Fraction, and the labor wing. Lusinchi's successor was Carlos Andrés Pérez, also from AD, who surprised everyone by announcing a shock economic liberalization package at his inauguration. Due to the concentration of policy-making authority in the executive branch in Venezuela, he managed to implement the easier parts of his program, but he was a very unpopular president throughout his term. As time passed, AD became less willing to support further reform, and after the two unsuccessful coup attempts in 1992, the party left its president without support and Pérez’s economic liberalization stalled. A minister in the Pérez cabinet wrote: “Pérez’s own party, Acción Democrática, having spent most of the 1980s profiting from the many opportunities to serve as broker between society and the state, adamantly opposed any changes resulting in reduced government intervention.” AD leaders were not happy when Pérez was impeached in 1993, but they expelled him from the party anyway while he awaited sentencing on corruption charges.

It could be argued that AD adapted in other ways. In 1988 and 1989, for example, the party voted for two electoral reforms that provided for the direct election of governors and mayors, as well as the election of half of the national deputies in single-member districts. These reforms were designed to make public officials more responsible to their own constituents and less responsible to national party leaders. It may appear that AD was adapting to the environment either by lessening *partidocracia* (the distortion of democracy by excessively strong parties) or by creating a diversion away from the economic situation. In reality, the party per se was not enthusiastic about political reform, either. The electoral reform was pushed by Pérez during the campaign itself, which was the time of his greatest influence over the party; as soon as the law went into effect, other party leaders took steps to minimize its decentralizing effects by, for example, exerting tight control over nominations
for governor, mayor, and national deputy. When grassroots demands arose for further constitutional reform in 1992, AD took the lead in delaying, watering down, and ultimately shelving the major reform bill. In spite of these efforts to resist adaptation, several governors or mayors with a regional base of support began to challenge the national leadership. One of these, Claudio Fermín, won the presidential nomination in a primary. He was very much the candidate of renovation, with calls for thorough economic liberalization and more openness and participation within the parties. But in the 1993 election, Fermín won only 23.6 percent of the vote, the worst performance ever for an AD candidate. After the election, hundreds of his supporters were purged from the party and Fermín himself was treated so coldly by other party leaders that he took refuge in the United States for several years.

Although AD was not hurt as badly as Peru’s APRA, both it and COPEI lost considerable support. From 1973 to 1988 they never won less than a combined 74 percent of the legislative vote; in 1993, they won only 46 percent, and in 1998, 36 percent. In presidential races, they customarily shared 90 percent of the vote until 1988; but in 1993 their combined share was 54 percent. In 1998, COPEI backed an independent candidate rather than attempt to win on its own, and then at the last minute both parties threw their support to a different independent, together contributing only 11 percent to his vote total.

The largest new parties that have filled the vacuum left by AD and COPEI are all either personalist or center-left, and all are in some ways reactions against the traditional parties. In 1993, one was Convergencia Nacional, the personalist vehicle of Rafael Caldera, who abandoned COPEI and won the presidential contest. The other that year was La Causa R, a center-left party that explicitly campaigned against the AD-COPEI “establishment.” It was committed to being the opposite of AD in several ways: it was responsive to the union rank-and-file rather than cooptative and controlling; pluralistic rather than disciplined; and respectful of the autonomy of new social movements. In 1998, independents dominated the field. For much of the long campaign, the frontrunner was Irene Sáez Conde, a former Miss Universe who earned a reputation as an efficient and honest mayor. Her star fell, however, when she accepted COPEI’s endorsement, which voters interpreted as “the kiss of death.” Much of her support then went to Henrique Salas Róm入 a state governor who also had a reputation for efficiency and honesty. But the big winner in 1998 was the candidate who combined all of these characteristics. Hugo Chávez Frías was the charismatic leader of a personalistic movement, the Movimiento V República (Fifth Republic Movement); he employed populist rhetoric, even if he was not certifiably on the center-left, and was allied with the center-left Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) and the Causa R splinter Patria Para Todos; and he vowed to wipe out corruption, which he associated with the traditional
parties. Furthermore, it was clear that he stood for radical change, as he was the leader of a nearly successful coup attempt in February 1992. No one else could have better personified the tendency of new parties to be reactions against the old ones.

The Peronists: Adaptation and growth. Even more than APRA or AD, the Partido Justicialista (PJ) in Argentina depended organizationally on the support of trade unions, monopolized union support, and gave the unions a prominent leadership role in the party. Before the late 1980s, the unions were customarily allocated one-third of the positions on the National Council; 1983 presidential candidate Italo Luder was backed strongly, if customarily, by the unions; 35 of the 115 PJ deputies were associated with the unions; and the head of the metalworkers union, Lorenzo Miguel, served as party president in 1983–84. The PJ was not exclusively a socialist or labor party, however, for three reasons. First, there was a strong element of personalism toward Perón before his death in 1974, and toward Carlos Menem after 1987. (In the intervening years the party struggled to produce a new unifying leader.) Second, because of its apparently all-encompassing diversity, the PJ for decades claimed to not even be a party, which would represent only a part of society, but instead a movement of the entire Argentine _pueblo_. And third, the party enjoyed vibrant grassroots organization structured around neighborhoods and provinces, not just sectoral organizations such as unions. Because identification with Peronism was so strong, there were self-mobilizing, unofficial _unidades de base_ (base units) in practically every neighborhood, often more in working-class neighborhoods; these were grouped together into local clientelistic factions called _agrupaciones_ by brokers called _punteros_. The _agrupaciones_ fed informally into the provincial factions that constituted the provincial parties, and the national party encompassed most of the provincial Peronist parties. Nevertheless, while not strictly a labor party, the PJ was more of a working-class party than AD or APRA, as there was a very significant differentiation of Peronist and anti-Peronist vote by class.

In spite of the strong working-class base of support, it is less clear that the PJ possessed a center-left ideology. Its prominent leaders spanned the entire left-right spectrum, from the Montoneros on the extreme left and the Peronist Youth of the 1970s on the left, to Herminio Iglesias, López Rega, and the _Guardia de Hierro_ ("Iron Guard") on the right or far right. Moreover, the corporatist labor interests that were dominant in the party before 1985 were often labeled "conservative." However, this conservatism consisted of nationalism, clericalism, and sympathy for authoritarianism rather than support for economic liberalization. Before 1989, most of the party's prominent leaders and factions shared an opposition to many of the pro-market reforms that were being prescribed for Argentina and other Latin American countries emerging from the
debt crisis. Privatization was up against especially vehement opposition due to its perceived negative impact on the Peronist unions. Even the anti-union "Renewalist" faction that won control of the party in 1985 was on the center-left in economic terms; its attack on the unions was directed only at the unions' power within the party organization and parliamentary caucus.

Menem himself adapted to the 1982–95 environment by shifting to the right. In 1985–87, as governor of La Rioja province, he had backed the "Renewalist" faction led by Antonio Cafiero that called for internal democratization of the party, institutionalization of the party organization, and a return to what it viewed as the party's ideological heritage on the center-left. Once the corporatist union leadership was defeated by the Renewalists, however, Menem broke with Cafiero to launch his own candidacy for the presidential nomination. During the campaign, his economic program was vague, and many feared (or hoped) that he would turn out to be a populist. Once in office, however, his shift to the right became clear. With the pro-business Unión del Centro Democrático as a coalition partner, and with the help of ministers recruited from prominent business groups and think tanks, Menem aggressively decontrolled prices, liberalized trade, sold off state enterprises, and cut the budget. By 1993 inflation was down to 10.6 percent and still falling, while investment poured in and growth returned.44

What is amazing is that Menem managed to keep the support of most of his party while carrying out this shift to the right. It helped considerably that the marginalization of the old "orthodox" labor wing had already been accomplished by the Renewalists. Led by Antonio Cafiero, this faction amended the party charter to reduce labor representation in the National Council from one-third to only 17 positions out of 110 (15 percent). It also promoted primaries for the selection of legislative candidates, which reduced the number of labor legislators from 35 to six. Even more importantly, the Renewalists sidelined all of the old labor representatives. Ever since the 1960s, an informal labor confederation known as the "62 organizations" had been the de facto representative of labor within Peronism. Cafiero simply refused to recognize this body, choosing to deal instead with a more cooperative set of labor leaders, though he did not grant them a formal role in the party. Menem encountered union opposition, especially from public employees opposed to privatization, but managed to hold onto most union and non-union support within the party. For example, the peak labor confederation CGT organized only one general strike during Menem's first term, compared to 13 during the 1983–89 government of Raúl Alfonsín. Some union leaders were brutally repressed; others were coopted; a few made their peace with market capitalism; and still others grumbled but stayed within the party.45 But almost all union leaders backed Menem for reelection in 1995.
Non-union opposition within the party was also skillfully marginalized. Due to the weak institutionalization of the party organization, Menem had little trouble in arranging for the lateral entry of nonpoliticians into party leadership positions, displacing politicians whose entire careers had been spent in Peronism. His one setback was the departure of the “Group of Eight” deputies, who defected in protest against Menem’s shift to the right and his authoritarian style. Overall, however, this defection was not very costly because Menem maintained the PJ’s share of the vote despite the defection of the Group of Eight and Governor José Octavio Bordón, who ran as the presidential candidate of FREPASO and won a startling 29 percent of the vote. Such was the success of Menem’s adaptation that even though Bordón had been a Peronist, his party drew votes away from other parties, principally the Radicals.

Patterns of Change

Latin America’s parties and party systems are too diverse and dynamic to provide a simple answer to broad questions about the decline of parties. They have changed in the past two decades, but then, they have always been changing; some parties lost mobilizational capacity and hierarchy, though they were not that common in the region to begin with, and some (Costa Rica and Uruguay) have not changed very much at all.

However, we can identify certain tendencies in the nature of this change. First, the nature of individual party organizations—centralization, discipline, cohesion, recruitment, mobilization, socialization, financing—seems to change very slowly, if at all. In the meantime, it is more likely that the party will be sidelined in the volatile electoral environment. Therefore the primary mechanism of change in parties is replacement by other parties rather than internal reform. Second, this evolutionary process, akin to Darwin’s principle of natural selection, tends to favor the survival of parties that are well adapted to the political environment. Parties are not the passive objects of the process, as they possess some capacity to adapt. Those that adapt well survive; those that stubbornly refuse to adapt, or misadapt, lose votes and move toward extinction. Third, in the “lost decade” of approximately 1982 to 1995, the environment selected in favor of governing parties of the center-right or right and opposition parties that were either personalist or left of center. But the environment has probably changed already, so we can expect to see different sorts of parties favored in future elections. In particular, the environment seems to favor the center-left over the center-right. By September 2000, Fujimori’s approval ratings had declined enough to make his reelection either extremely close and at least partially fraudulent. Hugo Chávez remained popular with a populist platform, and the Peronists had been turned out of office by a center-left alliance.
Evaluating the consequences of these changes is a separate question, and its answers are not simple either. Changes that improve the quality of representation sometimes weaken governability, and vice versa. Whether or not a change takes a party system into or away from a zone of functionality (defined by a happy medium of fragmentation, polarization, and other characteristics) depends on the starting point and the nature, magnitude, and direction of the change. In Latin America, the party system became less functional for representation and governability in Brazil and Ecuador but more functional in both respects in Colombia and Mexico. It became less functional for representation in Peru and possibly Argentina, and less governable in Venezuela (see the Figure on p. 182). In the other four major countries, there was either no significant change or a gain in one respect that was offset by a loss in another. This summary assessment is not a cause for celebration, but it should temper the much more negative impression left by a handful of dramatic electoral upsets (by Collor in Brazil, Fujimori in Peru, ADM-19 in Colombia, Caldera and Chávez in Venezuela) that were the focus of disproportionate media coverage and scholarly discussion. In view of the grim economic environment, we should have expected party-system change to be much worse. Perhaps a quiet, sober celebration would be in order after all.

Appendix: A Model of the Impact of Inflation Changes on Changes in Legislative Vote Shares

The dependent variable for this model is the change in the percentage of the vote won by a party from one legislative election to the next. The sample consists of 132 such changes for parties that had been, were, or would become major parties in 11 Latin American countries from 1978 to 1995. The sample therefore includes all the presidential parties and all major opposition parties in this period in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Two of the independent variables are control variables. The first is simply the percentage of the vote won by the party in the previous election. This is included because the percentage of the vote that is potentially available to add to a party’s share is 100 minus its previous share. Parties that are already large may shrink easily, but they find it difficult to grow beyond a certain point. Small parties have a greater potential for growth, but they can lose only so many votes before they are eliminated. The negative coefficient of the lagged vote correctly specifies these different constraints on large and small parties. The second control variable is the percentage of the vote won previously by parties that merged with the party of interest (a positive number) and the percentage of the vote currently won by parties that split away from it (a negative number). When these splits and mergers occur (only 10 instances are included in this sample), they have an obvious direct impact on vote shares. Controlling for them makes it possible to estimate the impact of economic performance with less bias.

The only indicator of economic performance used here is the change in ln(inflation) from the last year of the previous government to the last year of the current government. Lower inflation is represented by positive numbers and higher inflation by negative numbers. The model reported below contains interactions
between economic performance as measured in this way, on the one hand, and incumbency and the strength of party identification, on the other (see note 20 on party ID).

\[
\Delta \ln(\text{inflation}_{\text{incumbent with fluid base}}) \quad \text{represents the change in logged inflation for all incumbent parties with a fluid base of support.}
\]

\[
\Delta \ln(\text{rising inflation}_{\text{opposition with fluid base}}) \quad \text{applies to all opposition parties with a fluid base, but only if inflation was rising.}
\]

- The model also includes a dummy variable for all parties classified as having a fluid base of support. The OLS regression estimates are:

\[
\Delta \text{vote} = 11.03 - 0.32*\text{lagged vote} - 7.30*\text{weak ID} + 0.46*\text{splits and mergers}
\]

\[
(2.00)** (0.05)** (1.74)** (0.19)*
\]

\[
+ 3.32*\Delta \ln(\text{inflation}_{\text{incumbent with fluid base}}) - 2.14*\Delta \ln(\text{rising inflation}_{\text{opposition with fluid base}})
\]

\[
(0.76)** (0.90)*
\]

\[
N = 132, \quad \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .381
\]

Standard errors are in parentheses. \* = significant at the .02 level; \** = significant at the .001 level

NOTES

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1. I define parties simply as organizations that compete in legislative elections. This definition necessarily includes many ephemeral organizations that managed to get on the ballot, and it excludes some political organizations that were never willing or able to compete in elections.

2. The volatility index is the sum of the absolute values of the differences of the shares won by all parties from one election to the next, halved to adjust for double-counting. This index was first defined in Mogens Pedersen, “The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility,” European Journal of Political Research 7 (1979): 1–26. Although volatility is normally calculated for pairs of consecutive elections, it may apply to any pair of elections. The index reported in Table 1 applies to the first and last elections in the periods listed. This method better reflects cumulative change over a long span of time because it measures all the changes that last, and only changes that last. The more commonly reported average volatility in consecutive elections counts changes that are subsequently undone. For example, if two parties’ shares in four elections were 65–35, 45–55, 55–45, and 60–40, the average volatility would be \((20 + 10 + 5) / 3 = 11.7\), while cumulative volatility would be only 5.0, better reflecting a system that is very similar at the beginning and the end of the period.


10. The effective number of parties is the reciprocal of the sum of squared party shares. Its value is 2.0 for a 50–50 party system and 4.0 for the 25–25–25–25 party system. When parties are unequal in size, it usually takes on fractional values. This indicator was originally described in Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with application to Western Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (1979): 3–27.

11. The relative center can be farther to the right or the left than the absolute center as defined in the classification criteria and is operationalized here as the Mean Left-Right Position of all parties in the system (MLRP). MLRP measures how far to the left or the right the average party was in each election, based on the left-right positions of all the parties and their shares of the vote. This indicator assumes that all parties classified left (whether Christian or secular) are approximately twice as far from the center as parties classified center-left, and right parties are twice as far to the right as the parties of the center-right. This assumption permits the calculation of MLRP as: right % + .5 center-right % – .5 center-left % – left %. The formula for left-right polarization is therefore: 11–mlrp*right % + 1.5–mlrp*center-right % + 1–mlrp*center-left % + 1–mlrp*left %, where mlrp = MLRP/100.

The index can reach its maximum only when half of the vote goes to the right and half to the left; if all of the vote went to just one extreme, polarization would be zero because the relative center would be at the extreme as well and there would be no dispersion. It is important to remember that this is an indicator of left-right polarization and does not reflect the intense personal, ethnic, ins-outs, or other rivalries that sometimes exist between parties that are relatively close in left-right terms.

12. See note 43 for elaboration.


14. All left-right ideological labels applied to parties in this chapter come from a comprehensive classification of 97 percent of the parties in the major countries of
Latin America. I drafted a classification myself, obtained feedback from 53 country scholars, then did my best to reconcile their suggested corrections consistently over time and across countries. This project is fully documented in Michael Coppendge's, "A Classification of Latin American Political Parties," Kellogg Institute Working Paper No. 244 (November 1997).

15. Methodological sophisticates will object that I have selected on the dependent variable for all the arguments in this paragraph. They are correct, but I have done so only to generate hypotheses that are tested with a larger and far more appropriate sample below.


18. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America 1994 (Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 1994), 35–45. Comparable data were unavailable for Ecuador and Peru.


20. No cross-nationally comparable data on the strength of party identification in Latin America yet exist. One study tracks the stability of self-reported party preferences in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, but the survey questions are not strictly comparable and cover only four cases. Lauro Mercado Gasca, "Visiting Party Loyalties in Latin America," paper prepared for the 20th International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, 17–19 April 1997. Comparable instruments were used in the 1995 and 1996 Latinobarómetro surveys in eight countries, but a one-year span is not long enough to justify inferences about the stability of party loyalties, and the data have not been shared with the scholarly community. An independent assessment based on the best data available is Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, "Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 17–21. The coding of my data coincides with Mainwaring and Scully's conclusions.

21. Here, PRI and PAN in Mexico, PT in Brazil, and the UCR and PJ in Argentina are treated as having a solid base of support, while PRD in Mexico, PMDB and PFL in Brazil, and Frente Grande and FREPASO in Argentina are treated as having a fluid base. In Peru, identification with APRA was strong before 1968 but weak afterwards.

23. There is no way to know whether the insignificance of economic performance for solid parties is due to their strong ID or to the fact that none of them happened to experience inflation changes of 3,000 percent or greater. Also, it is possible that the association between strong ID and inflation is no accident, as solid governing parties may be less likely to allow inflation to surge to such extraordinarily high levels.


25. Other cases include Izquierda Democrática, the CFP in Ecuador, and PMDB in Brazil.

26. Similar cases of resistance and decline are the Radicals in Argentina, Acción Popular in Peru, and the Blancos and Colorados in Uruguay.

27. Other parties that adapted and grew were the Christian Democrats and the Socialists in Chile. More conservative parties prospered electorally without having to adapt as drastically. Examples are the PUSC in Costa Rica, the Social Christian Party in Ecuador, and MNR in Bolivia which, despite having led the 1952 Revolution, was already right of center by 1985.

28. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties, ch. 4.


30. The best study of the impact of this government on voters is Susan C. Stokes, Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).


32. All of this evidence comes from Carol Graham, Peru's APRA, 84–91.


34. Carol Graham, Peru's APRA, 111–21.

35. In 1995, Fujimori raised the signature requirements for registering a national party from 100,000 to about 490,000 signatures, which the remnant of APRA failed to meet. It nevertheless ran many candidates as independents in the November 1995 mayoral races, and privately claimed to have elected about 1,000. Private communication from Charles Kenney, 29 May 1997.


38. Lusinchi was not able to impose his choice for the presidential nomination, but this was because most state bosses and national leaders considered the alternative more electable, not because of any disapproval of Lusinchi's policies. Michael Coppedge, *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks*, chs. 4 and 6.


43. I am also deeply indebted to Pierre Ostiguy for his "Peronism and Anti-Peronism: Social-Cultural Bases of Political Identity in Argentina," paper prepared for delivery at the 1997 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, 17–19 April 1997. Ostiguy argues that the diversity within the Peronist and anti-Peronist blocs obscures the fact that they are consistently divided by what he calls the "high-low" cleavage. Those at the high end of this divide are "refined," cosmopolitan, and inclined to favor formal procedures; those at the low end are "crude," localist, and personalist or caudillista. It is a class cleavage defined in sociocultural rather than economic terms. In this scheme the Peronists, Montoneros, and Carapintadas are "low" and the Radicals, Socialists, UCEdE, and FREPASO are "high."

44. I am again heavily indebted to Steven Levitsky, "Crisis, Party Adaptation, and Regime Stability in Argentina," for these arguments.


46. Steven Levitsky, "Crisis, Party Adaptation, and Regime Stability in Argentina."

47. Ibid., 4–5.