17. Carol Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 25.

18. See, for example, Saul Alinksy, *Reveille for Radicals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1969).

19. Harry C. Boyte and Nancy N. Kari, *Building America: The Democratic Promise of Public Work* (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1996).

20. Michael Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 126.

21. See, for example, Frederick Taylor, *Shop Management* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1919).

22. West, "Moral Obligations," 12.

THIRTEEN

College, Character, and Social Responsibility

Moral Learning through Experience

Jay W. Brandenberger

HIGHER EDUCATION HAS UNIQUE CAPACITIES TO FOSTER MORAL MEANING and to channel students' good will, openness to the world, and developing intellectual abilities for the common good. Each fall, thousands of youths begin a journey of higher learning with a mixture of wonder, trepidation, and trust. Students of traditional college age, while negotiating both new freedoms and challenges, also feel the potentials and callings of young adulthood, and search for something of enduring value worthy of their commitment. Concurrently, college and university mission statements emphasize character development and preparing students for productive roles in society. Students are expected to engage—traditionally through texts—with

society, its institutions, and its challenges. Whether named or hidden, there is a great deal of moral education taking place in such contexts. And recent pedagogical developments emphasizing service and civic engagement provide enhanced means to foster moral learning.

Yet amid increasing calls for character development and engaged pedagogies, essential theory building and formative research are too often missing in action, so to speak. That higher education has the potential to foster moral learning and social responsibility is obvious to many, but challenges set in quickly. Moral growth does not fit neatly into traditional disciplines. Mission objectives contrast with increasingly specialized areas of expertise. Deep-set assumptions about objective, distant, and passive knowing still dominate. And few faculty receive training or reward for knowledge of student development and moral education.

This chapter addresses such concerns, drawing from developmental theory to examine moral development during the college years, especially through engaged forms of learning. The goal is to explore the intersection of character, college, and pedagogy, providing both a conceptual lens and applicable resources. My hope is to provide a broad review of relevant works and a theoretical mapping that can inform future practice and research.

THE MORAL ECOLOGY OF HIGHER EDUCATION

A focus on moral and civic principles is fundamental to higher education. While early colleges and universities were more explicit in their efforts to influence character and moral development (Mattson and Shea 1997), Schweiker (2001) reminds us that "Moral questions—questions about how we can and should live—are present in some form, no matter how modest, in every human inquiry" (22). Similarly, the moral domain is not limited to religious contexts. Moral is used here broadly to include both public and private concerns (see Ehrlich et al. 2003, for a thoughtful discussion on the essential integration of moral and civic principles).

Thus, higher education represents a moral crossroads for many. Institutions facilitate faculty inquiry into complex historical, social, and technological issues. Individual students confront the (personally expanding) world through courses as well as extracurricular involvements. All such encounters are shaped by changing cultural contexts, or moral ecologies. Terrorism delineates moral differences. Previous ethical certainties become current points of departure. Poverty, environmental challenges, and globalization are all pressing—though sometimes distant—moral concerns.

Amid such challenges, colleges and universities may contribute to the common good through direct institutional efforts, offering faculty expertise and relevant resources as appropriate. In addition, many realize the long-term importance of addressing the moral development of the students who course through higher education. Most leaders and public servants are and will be college graduates. Future institutions, from day care to Wall Street, will be shaped by those whose ability to identify, process, and act on moral concerns was enhanced or left fallow by higher education.

Nonetheless, while colleges and universities may hold a symposium on global warming or publish findings regarding the spread of AIDS, fostering character development among students still appears to many as tangential, impractical, or ineffable (Schwartz 2000; Brandenberger 2002). Is it appropriate for colleges to address character development and expect social responsibility? What pedagogies may facilitate development? Can we define common constructs and measure progress? These and similar questions underscore the need for theory development that can account for individual moral growth among dynamic social contexts and shape institutional initiatives.[1]

ENGAGED PEDAGOGIES: EXPERIENCE AND MORAL GROWTH

A call to involve young persons in social challenges to enhance their moral development is not new. Recall William James's proposal (1995) for a "moral equivalent of war." As an alternative to military conscription, James envisioned enlisting youth in challenging community efforts to promote justice while enhancing their own growth: "The military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fibre of the people; no one would remain blind as the luxurious classes now are blind, to man's relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life" (24–25). Similar educational visions were inherent to early conceptions of the Peace Corps (originally conceptualized as an additional fourth year among five overall in college).

Yet the culture of higher education overall and assumptions about pedagogy change slowly. Experiential pedagogies have remained largely on the margin as Germanic models of the university (distancing learners from the phenomena of study) prevailed (see Boyer 1997). Currently, however, there are signs of change: we hear about inquiry-based learning, active pedagogies, and creative links between the academic and residential life, often framed in moral or civic tones. Derek Bok (1982),

former president of Harvard, presents an early vision of the socially responsible university. Ernest Boyer (1996, 1997), past president of the Carnegie Foundation, argues persuasively for new and applied paradigms within the academy, and outlines a *scholarship of engagement*. Walshok (1995) and Palmer (1987, 1998) point out that knowledge itself is connected, that we come to know largely though social relationship.

Consistent with such conceptions of higher education, experiential pedagogies, especially those addressing community concerns, are finding new favor and empirical support (Bringle, Games, and Malloy 1999; Eyler and Giles 1999). Many campuses have a center or office that facilitates service learning, integrating service with academic study.

Such initiatives, however, while welcome on many levels, have been built more from intuition and opportunity than social science theory, especially theory delineating the developmental trajectories of college-age youth (see Brandenberger 1998). Recent pedagogical efforts also want for further clarification of relevant processes and expected outcomes. Service learning places individuals in relational contexts; likewise, the term *engagement* is reciprocal in nature. Community-based learning and research address community concerns and potentials collaboratively. Such pedagogies are thus inherently moral (see Mattson and Shea 1997) and may be framed as efforts to build character or promote justice. Yet, too often discussion of inherent, complex processes of moral and prosocial development remains at the implicit or speculative level, with limited reference to what is known within the social sciences about moral development.

While research on engaged pedagogies has begun to catch up with increased activity in the field, most is atheoretical and does not explicitly examine moral and ethical growth. What is the role of experience in morality? How can colleges foster sensitivity to ethical issues and long-term moral commitment through engaged learning, and what developmental challenges and strengths of college youth shape the process? To address such questions, I draw on moral psychology and research, including cognitive developmental theory.

THEORIES OF MORAL AND CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT
DURING COLLEGE

A variety of literatures provide context to examine character and moral development during the college years. Two schools of thought prevail (for a thorough overview, see Goodman and Lesnick 2001). One, often associated with the term *character educa-*

tion, centers on cultural transmission of accepted values and the inculcation of habits through authority and discipline. A second tradition, emphasizing reflective judgment, prioritizes methods that foster understanding of moral principles and cognitive growth. While the forming of moral habits is important—habits are framed as tools in Dewey's work—cultural transmission models have been critiqued for lack of explicit grounding in theories of human development and for susceptibility to indoctrination. The cognitive developmental perspective, building on the work of Dewey, Piaget, and Kohlberg, provides a refined theoretical framework focused on means to address moral development in a diverse society.

Two concepts are central to moral development theory in this tradition: *interaction* and *construction*. For Piaget (see Gruber and Vonèche 1995), intelligence is based on activity, on interacting with the environment to learn. Through such interaction, individuals construct their own understandings of reality. Our cognitive structures are thus, to a significant extent, a product of "'practical' interventions in the world" (Blasi 1983, 187). With respect to pedagogy, Piaget (1970) emphasized the need to build on the constructive activity of each student: "development is essentially dependent upon the activities of the subject, and its constant mainspring, from pure sensorimotor activity through to the most completely interiorized operations, is an irreducible and spontaneous operativity" (40).

Such constructive processes are particularly operable in the moral domain (for further theoretical development and analysis of proposed stage sequences, see Piaget 1948; Kohlberg 1969; and Lapsley 1996). Piaget (1970) argued for "morality in action" as a means to learn justice and "organic interdependence" (180). Through interactions with parents, peers, teachers, and community, youth construct moral hypotheses about themselves, other people, human nature, and social institutions. By college age, the majority of youth have sufficient cognitive abilities to address moral issues abstractly (formally) and a readiness to examine personal implications.

Although the cognitive developmental framework has influenced primary and secondary education (see, for example, DeVries and Zan 1994) more directly than higher education (a notable, early exception is the work of Whitely 1982), it provides a tested foundation for examining the potential for character development during college. And recent theoretical advances in moral psychology (Walker 2002), incorporating, for example, the roles of emotions, meaning, and identity formation, deepen the analysis. Such frameworks challenge the myth that moral development is basically complete though adolescence. The answer to the question, "Can college students of traditional age (and beyond) develop morally and ethically?" is a strong *yes*. The college years are a particularly sensitive period—described by Parks (1986) as

"the critical years"—for moral growth. Such a conclusion can be made on logical and empirical grounds, as will be described below.

Moral growth is complex and multifaceted. In the sections that follow I outline overlapping dimensions of moral and character development that may be facilitated through engaged learning during the college years, including: (1) moral reasoning/ judgment, (2) moral sensitivity and moral imagination, (3) moral identity, meaning, and purpose, and (4) moral commitment and behavior.[2] I then highlight the importance of examining moral responsibility and moral learning in relation to social change.

MORAL JUDGMENT: A COLLEGE EFFECT

How individuals reason about moral concerns and how thinking may change in scope and style are especially relevant to higher education contexts. Kohlberg's stage sequence recognizes increasing complexity and integration of principles at higher (post-conventional) levels of moral reasoning. Numerous studies have examined the development of moral thinking among college students. Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) and Rest and Narvaez (1991) provide two thorough reviews of such research, both of which document a positive college effect on cognitive moral growth, as measured, most often, by the Defining Issues Test (DIT scores overall are associated with level of education). A recent, comprehensive analysis by King and Mayhew (2002) demonstrates similar results. Overall, researchers have shown that the college effect is robust and distinct from age-related gains (though not all college students reach high levels of post-conventional thought).

That the college experience has a general and lasting effect has been easier to document than discerning what specific components of higher education may enhance moral judgment. This may be explained in part by the common use of undergraduate samples without intentional examination of associated college contexts (King and Mayhew 2002). Among studies that do explore potential contextual factors such as major or institutional type, few clear patterns emerge.

However, King and Mayhew (2002) report that most published studies of interventions designed to enhance moral reasoning show positive results. While this may be partially a result of underreporting of nonsignificant findings (the "file drawer problem"), it may also suggest developmental readiness for moral growth among college-age youth. King and Mayhew emphasize the need for future research examining what successful interventions may have in common and hypothesize that ex-

periential and cocurricular involvements (e.g., community outreach, leadership opportunities) may play a key role in enhancing moral development.

Research by Boss (1994, 1995) is instructive here. She compared participants in two sections of an undergraduate ethics course, one of which was randomly selected to integrate service-learning components. Both classes were taught by the same instructor, incorporated the same readings (including the work of Kohlberg and Gilligan), and used matching examinations. Results showed significantly higher gains on the DIT for the engaged class. Following the semester, over 50% of the service-learning class scored 50 or higher on the DIT (suggesting the use of principled reasoning as a preferred mode) compared to only 13% of the comparison class (the sections demonstrated statistically equal scores at the start). Analyses also showed no differences on pre-test DIT scores by previous community service involvements. Such findings are consistent with the argument that service learning (built on the integration of community involvement with academic reflection) may be more powerful than direct service or class work alone.

Boss hypothesized that while both classes presented ethical challenges and cognitive disequilibrium, the added dimension of social disequilibrium—active role-taking via service involvement—facilitated more advanced (post-conventional) moral reasoning. Consistent with Gardner (1991), Boss suggests that often what is learned in "scholastic" settings becomes bounded and difficult to apply in other, active contexts. Engaged learning provides practice in the transfer of ethical thinking across domains.

MORAL SENSITIVITY AND MORAL IMAGINATION

Moral reasoning does not take place in a vacuum. To respond morally, *moral sensitivity* is also essential (see Rest 1986; Rest et al. 1999). We must notice moral concerns and cognitively situate what we see in a moral context. Such processes are complex and involve both learning and, according to Johnson (1993), imagination.

Certainly, higher education provides significant cognitive content for students to grapple with (or at least remember long enough for the exam), and some faculty are adept at drawing out moral meaning from texts (e.g., challenging assumptions or pointing out the social implications of a dominant metaphor). Yet too often such insights are left at an impersonal level—fact, value, and personal experience remaining separate. Efforts to promote critical thinking among students younger than those they "criticize" may lead to a mistrust of action (see Loeb 1994). Students may read that we are connected by a vast array of interacting forces, from market to environment to

media network, but remain unsure of how to maneuver such interdependence. They are expected to assimilate information and give it back while following pre-designed curricular paths. Concurrently, they accumulate meaningful experiences outside the classroom (which are often salient when alumni recount their undergraduate years). The challenge is to facilitate integration of such elements for personal and academic growth, fostering ongoing moral attention. Pedagogies based on experience have much to offer toward this end, exposing students to moral contexts and highlighting inherent ethical concerns.

Support for an experiential sensitivity and understanding of morality is grounded in the work of Dewey. For Dewey, morality begins in experience, and "moral philosophy is thus a function of the moral life, and not the reverse" (Pappas 1998, 103). Moreover, Dewey (1897) suggests that "the best and deepest moral training is precisely that which one gets through having to enter into proper relations with others in a unity of work and thought." He (1996) describes the process of deliberation in relation to a moral encounter:

> Deliberation is actually an imaginative rehearsal of various courses of conduct. We give way, *in our mind*, to some impulse: we try, *in our mind*, some plan. Flowing its career through various steps, we find ourselves in imagination in the presence of consequences that would follow, and as we then like and approve, or dislike and disapprove, these consequences, we find the original impulse or plan good or bad. Deliberation is dramatic and active, not mathematical and impersonal. (135, emphasis in original)

For Dewey, then, moral processes involve both encounter and imagination. Individuals need to develop a willingness to enter into moral situations, trusting their abilities (character) to engage the inherent complexity; each moral situation is a new challenge, requiring an individual to actively address relevant issues in context using past experience as a guide but creating an appropriate original response when needed (Pappas 1998). Engaged pedagogies may prompt and enhance such moral processes in relatively safe contexts.

Mark Johnson (1993) attempts to integrate moral philosophy (including Dewey) and cognitive science, emphasizing the role of moral imagination over moral tradition or reasoning. Johnson emphasizes that "human beings are fundamentally *imaginative* moral animals" (1). While moral mottos may remind us of our values and moral desires, they are insufficient given the complexity of moral matters. And principles, while important, must be applied in context. Johnson argues that "our moral under-

standing depends in large measure on various structures of imagination, such as images, image schemas, metaphors, narratives, and so forth. Moral reasoning is thus basically an imaginative activity, because it uses imaginatively structured concepts and requires imagination to discern what is morally relevant in situations, to understand empathetically how others experience things, and to envision the full range of possibilities open to us in a particular case" (ix–x). Johnson points out that such imaginative processes begin in experience: "In general, we understand more abstract and less well-structured domains (such as our concepts of reason, knowledge, belief) via mappings from more concrete and highly structured domains of experience (such as our bodily experience of vision, movement, eating, or manipulating objects). Language . . . is based on systems of related and interlocking metaphorical mappings that connect one experiential domain to another" (10). For Johnson, moral reasoning is dependent on "frame semantics." In any context, multiple framings lead to different conclusions. A fetus may be viewed, he points out, as a human being or as an impersonal biological entity. Thus the conceptual metaphors we inherit from our culture, and construct personally through interaction and reflection, significantly impact our moral thinking. Accordingly, Johnson highlights the narrative aspects of morality.

Johnson's emphasis on moral imagination complements the cognitive developmental perspective, especially with respect to understanding the links between moral reasoning and moral action. Inherited moral laws have important instrumental value, but an active, reflective individual must compose moral meaning within relative contexts and envision alternatives. One does this best, according to Johnson, not in abstract isolation but via "communal discourse and practice" (217). Such a model has important implications for college life and is consistent with engaged pedagogies.

Johnson describes the self in experiential, dynamic terms. We look to a variety of resources to build moral meaning and understanding: "ideals, people we regard as morally exemplary, cultural myths, stories of moral conflict and resolution, principles, and our sense of history" (180–81). These are the raw materials of our experience that we use to construct moral narratives that can guide our actions. Since moral imagination develops later than other capacities, the college years are ripe for growth. According to Johnson, youth need to develop a "mature, experientially grounded moral imagination" built on "experience that is broad enough, rich enough, and subtle enough to allow them to understand who they are, to imagine who they might become, to explore possibilities for meaningful action, and to harmonize their lives with those of others" (183). This is the work of college students in the classroom and beyond.

Such developmental change is built, according to Johnson, upon metaphor and narrative. He cites evidence that a majority of "moral concepts—cause, action,

well-being, purpose, state, duty, right, freedom and so forth—are metaphorically defined" (193). Such metaphors are built through experience into personal narratives that shape future decision making. Echoing the work of Parks (1986, 2000), Johnson maintains that "Morality is thus a matter of how well or how poorly we construct (i.e., live out) a narrative that solves our problem of living a meaningful and significant life" (180). Toward this end, an intentional college experience, one that integrates meaningful engagement in socially challenging contexts with relevant texts and probing personal reflection (hallmarks of engaged pedagogies), can foster significant student development.

MORAL IDENTITY: MEANING, PURPOSE, AND FAITH

The traditional college years are, of course, a time of identity development and idealism (consider the often displayed photograph of a resolute Chinese student challenging a tank in Tiananmen Square). Identity is an important area of focus here for a least two reasons. First, various theorists (see Blasi 1984, 1993) have in recent years postulated a central, organizing role for moral identity in overall moral functioning; and second, the college experience provides various opportunities to facilitate students sense of meaning and purpose.

Identity development—central to Erikson's psychosocial theory—involves both internal and social processes (Erikson 1975). Identity is complex, dependent on maturing cognitive abilities developed through interactions in social contexts that change over time. Explorations of self in peer, family, career, and moral contexts are important for mature identity formation. Young persons enjoy exploring ideological issues as a means to test their moral wings, though at times they may employ "totalistic" (Erikson 1975, 206) or utopian thinking. There is much in Erikson's work to recommend direct experience and engaged pedagogy as means to explore and refine moral identity (for a brief review, see Brandenberger 1998).

Chickering and Reisser (1993) present the most thorough review of identity development in higher education. They outline seven relevant developmental "vectors" along a trajectory, from (1) "developing competence" to (6) "developing purpose" and (7) "developing integrity," each of which presents challenges and opportunities during the college years. For Chickering and Reisser, integrity is built on humanizing values, moral principles, a sense of purpose and meaning, congruence, socially responsible behavior, and spiritual awareness, all of which are constructed according to individuals' experiences. They cite consistent evidence (see also Pascarella and Ter-

renzini 1991) that during the college years students show a "movement toward greater altruism, humanitarianism, and social conscience . . . and more social, racial, ethnic, and political tolerance" (Chickering and Reisser 1993, 237–38). Again, we observe support for engaged pedagogies: "Finding meaning in life is a by-product of engagement, which is a commitment to creating, loving, working, and building" (264).

The work of Sharon Parks (1986, 2000) provides a rich and comprehensive view of development during the young adult years. Integrating the theories of Erikson, Piaget, Perry, and others, she describes the journey from adolescence to adulthood with an emphasis on how individuals compose meaning. Meaning is central to human functioning: "we seek pattern, order, coherence, and relation in the disparate elements of our experience" (1986, xv). "To be human," Parks suggests, "is to seek to understand the fitting connections between things . . . [and] to desire relationship" (1986, 14). She describes this basic human "activity of composing and being composed by meaning" as *faith* (for a similar use of the term, see Erikson 1975). This is faith with a small *f,* not necessarily religious in nature. With or without religious tradition, all persons, especially young adults, seek to understand the larger world, examine their potential roles, and learn what may be worthy of their time and talents. This is an active process involving both cognitive and affective change. Parks invokes the metaphor of a journey at sea as young persons push away from the dock (their parents and inherited authority) and examine new worlds (through peers, texts, teachers, mentors, and experience) with a sense of freedom and adventure yet trepidation (is my boat seaworthy? what is my compass, my lighthouse?).

The metaphor captures well the excitement, hope, and ambivalence many college students feel. How they come to compose meaning and what they learn to have faith in (which worldviews, political frames) will have significant impact on their adult moral lives. Parks describes three key aspects in the process: (1) forms of knowing—how individuals learn what to trust as a source of truth and guidance, (2) forms of dependence—how young adults negotiate the challenges of individuation as well as interdependence, and (3) forms of community—how youth form and reform networks of relationship and belonging that they trust to influence them. In each domain, individuals must navigate using evolving cognitive processes in relation to a changing world. Each mooring along the way, each form of faith chosen or developed has implications for the moral life.

Parks, drawing on the work of Marstin (1979), notes that the "character of one's composition of the whole of reality (one's faith) will condition what one finds tolerable and intolerable" (Parks 1986, 67). She concurs with Marstin that "Issues of social justice are essentially about who is to be cared for and who neglected, who is to be included in

our community of concern and who excluded, whose point of view is to be taken seriously and whose ignored. As faith grows, it challenges all the established [assumed and conventional] answers to these questions" (Marstin quoted in Parks 1986, 68).

Parks also emphasizes the role of imagination (distinct from fantasy). Young adults begin to name and develop passion for the "ideal," utilizing new critical thinking abilities. "A central strength of the young adult is the capacity to respond to visions of the world as it might become. This is the time in every generation for renewal of the human vision." (Parks 1986, 97). Building on Kant and Coleridge, she describes imagination as a composing activity that "can apprehend transcendent, moral truth" (Parks 2000, 107). Imagination—grounded in experience—is the raw material of faith that subsequently frames moral choices and commitments.

Since many images for life are available, and presented unceasingly by advertisers and media, how do youth avoid a sense of relativism? Parks suggests that the search should be for "right images," positive visions of an integrated, just world informed by a "empathic, moral imagination" (2000, 124). Young adults need mentors and communities that can help them reflect upon and build such visions.

Two qualitative studies have significant relevance here. In *Some Do Care* (Colby and Damon 1992, 1993) and *Common Fire* (Daloz et al. 1996a, 1996b) researchers examined the lives of individuals nominated by others for their sustained moral commitment. Colby and Damon interviewed twenty-three moral exemplars, employing a form of assisted autobiography that welcomed subsequent input from the interviewees after the authors outlined tentative insights. They discovered a number of qualities shared by the majority of exemplars, including a sense of optimism or positivity, the willingness to take personal risks to sustain their work, and a "certainty of response about matters of principle" (1992, 293). However, while exemplars scored reasonably high on measures of moral judgment (though not at the highest level), what most distinguished them was an apparent fusion of self and morality. Often through salient social interactions early in life, the exemplars developed a "steadfast commitment to purposes larger than themselves" (291). Somewhat paradoxically, the majority of the exemplars developed the ability to recruit ongoing social relationships that would challenge, and thus recharge and expand, their moral orientations. The exemplars were consistently collaborative in their moral pursuits, seeking out colleagues who could offer support, critique, and insight.

Most of the exemplars—more than the authors predicted—drew from religious inspiration to sustain their commitments. And those who were less religious exhibited a sense of meaning similar to that described by Parks, a "common sense of faith in the human potential to realize its ideals" (Colby and Damon 1992, 311). This sense

of faith sustained the exemplars, providing a "glue joining all the self's systems of action and reflection." The authors suggest that it is the exemplars engagement in moral concerns that fosters the resilient "unity of self" they demonstrate (Colby and Damon 1992, 311).

How may the college experience enhance the integration of self and meaning exemplified by such exemplars? Daloz et al. (1996a, 1996b) suggest that higher education, especially through the social interactions it fosters, can play a key role. These authors interviewed over one hundred individuals who demonstrated a long-term commitment to the common good. Among this group of exemplars the authors found evidence for common "habits of mind," including: (1) an orientation to dialogue as a source of understanding, (2) the capacity for perspective-taking, to see the world from others' point of view, and (3) an ability to think critically and holistically in terms of connected systems (1996b, 12). Such orientations may begin during the college years, especially in an atmosphere where mentoring is common and a "civil space" is created for developmental interactions.

In addition, the authors suggest that the single most important factor found among their sample of committed adults was an experience the authors label "constructive engagement with otherness": "At some point in their formative years virtually everyone in our sample had come to know someone who was significantly different from themselves. This was not simply an encounter, but rather a *constructive engagement* by means of which they could empathically recognize a shared humanity with the other that undercut old tribal boundaries and created a new 'we' from a former 'they'" (1996b, 12; original emphasis). Certainly colleges and universities, through the efforts to promote diversity on campus and engaging students in community-based learning and research outside of campus, can play a key role in prompting such a movement beyond boundaries, one that seems to have lasting effects.

Robert Coles (1993) offers a personal view of identity development and idealism in relation to the "call of service." Coles points out that "idealism and altruism [have] to do with putting oneself in the shoes of others, absorbing their needs, their vulnerability, their weakness, and their suffering, and then setting to work" (205). Drawing from the writings of Anna Freud, Coles suggests that "What [matters is] not so much the various motivations, per se, as the manner in which all the yearnings and vicissitudes and consequences of a person's childhood and experiences . . . are worked into a life" (204). Yet the path of idealism is not always direct. Genuine empathy may mix with personal emotional needs, multiple ambitions, and concrete thinking to form a complex set of ideals in tension. What is needed along the way is time for reflection, the company of supportive peers, and positive mentors.

Overall, experiential learning may be an important form of meaningful "work" for young people (whose main idea of work may previously have been school assignments to complete). An early encounter with the work of making a better world can have far ranging implications for identity and professional development: "to work is first and foremost to make oneself through the act of transforming reality" (Martin-Baro 1994, 39). In a study of individuals known for joining excellence and ethics for "good work," Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, and Damon (2001) emphasize the importance of early professional experiences in a moral milieu.

FROM THOUGHT TO ACTION:
MORAL COMMITMENT AND BEHAVIOR

Morality, of course, is more than cognition and disposition. The gap between moral belief and personal action can be wide and uninviting. Much of immorality, so to speak, is not the lack of moral knowledge but the ignoring of it in action (Blasi 1983). What, then, facilitates moral behavior generally, and social responsibility in particular, and what role does the college experience play? The authors outlined above point to the central role of the moral self. The sense of self as a moral person, poised for commitment and involvement, is a critical factor that predicts behavior, that mediates between moral reasoning abilities (judgments about moral questions) and personal moral behavior or conduct (see Blasi 1993; Goodman and Lesnick 2001; Damon and Hart 1992).

The challenge is to facilitate a movement from (in William Perry's terms) moral relativism to moral commitment, both cognitively and behaviorally, and to foster ongoing moral motivation. How? Pedagogies of engagement have a key role to play. Years before the service-learning movement, Perry emphasized authentic involvement in "the risks of caring" (1970, 200) as the most effective means for students to test and strengthen their commitments (he also stressed that institutions and faculty need to model such risks in their own programming and commitment to social concerns).

Engaged pedagogies present creative opportunities for students to grow cognitively as well as form moral habits, integrating the alternative emphases found in the moral development and character education literatures. Well-designed service-learning and community-based learning initiatives provide opportunities for students to (1) join with and learn from peers in prosocial activities, (2) witness the commitments demonstrated by community leaders who serve as role models, (3) experience social issues both cognitively and emotionally, (4) experience the worldviews and perspectives of others like and unlike themselves, (5) grapple with academic texts

in relation to personal experience, (6) test their developing moral thinking in a challenging environment they may otherwise avoid, (7) work in partnership with faculty who also are themselves exploring issues and appropriate responses, and (8) learn how to learn in moral domains.

Experiential pedagogies thus have strong potentials to unite elements too long separated in the academy: thinking and feeling, reflection and action, theory and practice. Throughout, attention to what students are learning about themselves as moral persons is critical. Students often claim, following a service-learning experience, that they learned more than they gave (for research on service learning and self-knowledge, see Eyler and Giles 1999), but faculty, focused on traditional academic outcomes, often do not feel equipped to handle the personal and developmental aspects that emerge. For this and other reasons, multidimensional approaches are warranted. A comprehensive college environment that fosters an integrated ethical ethos may prove to be one of the best means to enhance character development.

It is also important to note that moral behavior is not simply an end point in a process from moral notice through cognition to application (Rest et al. 1999). A student's new behavior of participating in structured service learning may lead to a reconceptualization of identity: "I find myself serving, so I must be a moral person." At some colleges, students who break campus rules are directed to participate in "community service" programs. Such students sometimes later emerge as passionate advocates and leaders in the service domain. How such transformations take place should be a research focus.

Marcia Baxter Magolda (2001) outlines a comprehensive theory of self-development in higher education. She highlights the importance of assisting students in "becoming the author of one's life" and points to three key dimensions: the epistemological (how and what a student believes), the intrapersonal (his or her thinking about self), and the interpersonal (how one relates to others). College is a key period for development in these realms, building on prior cognitive and social gains; and engaged learning may prompt vital discovery. One student in her research described the process using the metaphor of clay: "You've been formed into different things, but that doesn't mean you can't go back on the potters' wheel and instead of somebody else's hands building and molding you, you use your own, and in a fundamental sense change your values and beliefs" (119). To facilitate growth, Baxter Magolda emphasizes "including students' own lived experiences and questions in exploration of knowledge and mutual construction among members of the knowledge community" (329). She also recommends fostering coherence for students through "an integrated cocurriculum" (328).

To the extent that colleges foster such moral self development, lasting behavioral change may develop. Those "whose self-concept is organized around their moral beliefs are highly likely to translate those beliefs into action consistently throughout their lives. . . . Such peoples tend to sustain a far higher level of moral commitment in their actual conduct than those who may reason well about morality but who consider it to be less pivotal for who they are" (Damon and Hart 1992, 445; also quoted in Goodman and Lesnick 2001, 244).

If the college experience in general and engaged pedagogies in particular foster moral development, what evidence do we see among graduates? A variety of studies provide strong confirmation. Using data collected from over three thousand students at forty-two colleges and universities, Sax and Astin (1997) examined the effect of service participation in college on thirty-five potential outcomes, many of them moral in nature. On *each* of the variables, service participants showed significant positive differences compared to nonparticipants, with effects strongest in relation to civic responsibility. Service participants were, for example, more likely to show increases (from freshman data) in their commitment to "influencing social values," "serving the community," and "promoting racial understanding" (28). A second study by the same authors (Sax and Astin 1997; see also Astin, Sax, and Avalos 1999) of twelve thousand college alumni indicates that such changes can be long lasting. Undergraduates who participated in service or service learning were more likely five years after graduation to be civically engaged, and showed greater gains on measures of "helping others in difficulty," "empowerment," and, some will be glad to hear, inclination to donate to their college (Sax and Astin 1997, 30). A study by Hill, Brandenberger, and Howard (2005) employing interviews of service-learning participants compared to nonparticipants ten years later also showed positive long-term effects.

Thus, the college experience, and especially service learning, may have a channeling effect. Students who find their way into the reciprocal relationships and growth experiences of service or social action may develop long-term readiness for similar involvements after college. Character is not a simple matter of adult choice in the moment. The time demands of early career and family may present few realistic opportunities to *begin* prosocial involvements. Foundations need to be laid early and steeled during periods of readiness that to some extent coalesce during late adolescence and youth, when identity and adult habits are in prime development. In Erikson's terms, youth of college age are developmentally poised to find causes and images of the future that warrant their *fidelity* and facilitate "initiative of imagination and action" (1975, 213).

MORAL AND CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY

A discussion of character and moral behavior leads logically, if not always naturally, to issues of social responsibility. In a complex society, morality has increasing collective import. "The basic fact of the modern world" says British author Geoff Mulgan, "is that it is connected" (1998, 19). Mulgan suggests the word "connexity" to signify the escalating ways people are connected by technology, environmental challenges, mobility, and media. Such links have moral implications: "a more connected world brings with it a moral duty to consider the effects we have on others, and a need for moral fluency that goes beyond simply learning codes of right and wrong." Echoing Einstein's dictum at the dawn of the atomic age, Mulgan suggests we "have to think in a different way, understanding the world as made up of complex systems rather than linear relationships, ecologies rather than machines" (11).

Toward such ends, Mulgan finds hope in the new fact of interdependence itself: "Connexity is undoubtedly breaking down many of the barriers and separate identities that have been the main cause of human suffering and war, and nurturing a new, more open type of human being" (29). Yet success is not guaranteed; governments and educational institutions must assist in the process. College students and faculty are in a prime position to explore and discuss such issues. Perry even hypothesizes an advanced Piagetian "period of responsibility"(Perry 1970, 205) potentially overlapping with the college years (see also Flanagan 1998).

Blasi (1993, 2002) provides a conceptual framework for understanding the development of responsibility and its relation to identity. He argues that responsibility develops, in part, through being an agent in the world, experiencing the consequences of one's behavior, and reflectively (though not necessarily explicitly) appropriating perceptions of self during the process. The result is, for some, a personal "ownership" of relevant values, cohering in an identity wherein moral responsibility is salient. Parallels here to engaged learning are apparent. The challenge is to foster experience that leads to authentic ownership of moral values among young persons whose senses of autonomy and identity are being influenced by multiple processes and forces.

In an early, thorough examination of education and responsibility, Romein (1955) notes that perspectives of responsibility are inherently tied to deep questions of human nature, freedom, and community. The "human capacity to be accountable may be fulfilled in response to a rule or to the dictations of a powerful state or to the inner law of the 'ought' or to the divine imperative of love" (xi). Examining a variety of educational traditions—classical, progressive, humanist, and religious—Romein

underscores the role of experience in prompting awareness of human connection and commonality.

Schweiker (2001) claims that responsibility, learned through human interaction, is essential to ethics: "Whereas Kantian-style ethics conceives of human beings as under duties, and virtue theory focuses on patterns of self-formation and well-being, the ethics of responsibility pictures humans as dialogical creatures existing in patterns of interaction" (18). Engaged pedagogies build on such interaction. Berman (1997) notes that a focus on "*relationship* shifts the context of our thinking beyond individual maturation and environmental context to the meaning that people derive from their interactions and the receptivity of the environment to the individual" (18). Berman examines how individuals make sense of social challenges and provides a theoretically grounded view of the development of *social responsibility*, defined as a combination of both character and civil/political commitment to promoting the common good.

Berman suggests that the construct of social responsibility integrates and extends the moral voices of justice and care outlined by Carol Gilligan (1982), and incorporates important elements of social learning theory. Social responsibility, he maintains, involves the following: (1) social and political consciousness, (2) a sense of connectedness, (3) acting on ethical considerations, (4) prosocial behavior, (5) integrity of action, and (6) active participation (Berman 1997, 14). These elements have both cognitive and behavioral components that develop through interactive, social processes. Berman outlines a variety of educational strategies, especially at the secondary level, that studies have shown to foster social responsibility, including direct involvement in the social/political domain. In a similar work, Youniss and Yates (1997) examine the development of responsibility among youth, noting, for example, the link between responsibility and personal agency.

A sense of responsibility at the core of self-definition or identity may be a key factor in prosocial behavior (see Lapsley 1996). Further, the concept of responsibility moves us beyond an individualistic framework common to some character education programs (Berman 1997). Too often morality is framed in private terms while institutional influences and systemic inequalities remain unexamined. Service learning and similar pedagogies are oriented toward what can be (Goodman and Lesnick 2001), toward potential solutions for complex social challenges. And student experiences of working in collaboration for the common good may foster lasting notions of *collective responsibility*. Conceptions of individual responsibility, while important, are insufficient in an interdependent world (Romein 1955). Engagement in service and social action is an important balance to higher education's focus on individual achievement and career preparation.

The most comprehensive study of moral and civic responsibility in higher education has been directed by Tom Ehrlich and Ann Colby of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Ehrlich's edited volume (2000) integrates scholarship from many disciplines. And the book by Ehrlich et al. (2003) documents the Foundation's study of twelve exemplary institutions that have developed a campus-wide focus on moral and civic responsibility. Ehrlich and Colby argue that moral and civic responsibility are inherently intertwined, and their focus on responsibility moves the dialogue beyond discussion of means (pedagogies and methods) to positive outcomes framed in public terms. They call for creative responses to current political disinterest among youth and emphasize the need for improved assessment and research within and across contexts.

James Fowler (1992) suggests the need to move beyond essentially cognitive or sociological explanations to "reclaim a more comprehensive understanding of the *moral* in moral development" (234). "Moral" needs to be understood in public not just private terms (an argument consistent with Kolberg's emphasis on social perspective taking and the just-community approach to education). Fowler presents a comprehensive model of the "responsible self" built on cognitive abilities, character virtues, recognition of community narratives, professional accountability, and citizenship obligations. He suggests that the development of morally responsible persons is an integrated process that also is informed by the "theological virtues of faith, hope, and love" (247). Whether built on religious beliefs and identities or on more civil framings, such virtues give context to and reinforce moral principles and commitments. While faith-based institutions may more directly address such theological virtues (see Howe 1995; Byron 2000), many service-learning participants—forty-six percent in a study by Eyler and Giles (1999)—report spiritual growth as an important outcome even though service experiences were framed in secular, not religious, terms.

MORAL LEARNING AND WAYS OF KNOWING

Moral growth is, broadly defined, a learning process.[3] We learn by assimilation as well as adaptation. We emulate models and mentors. Engaged forms of learning often bring to awareness students' own epistemological assumptions and patterns of learning. In a world of shifting social landscapes and complex human systems, the ability to learn about moral issues—to teach oneself what is morally relevant, salient, and worthy—is essential. Peter Vaill (1996) suggests that social flux and change, which he labels *permanent white water*, is the dominant characteristic of our current age.

Such instability can lead to confusion and doubt, and cannot be addressed adequately through "institutional learning" traditions that rely on transfer of static content. Vaill quotes John Gardner on the potential for self-renewal and innovation: "The ultimate goal of the education system is to shift to the individual the burden of pursuing his own education. This will not be a widely shared pursuit until we get over our odd conviction that education is what goes on in school buildings and nowhere else. . . . The world is an incomparable classroom, and life is a memorable teacher for those who aren't afraid of her" (quoted in Vaill 1996, 76). Vaill makes a strong case for "learning as a way of being," which is self-directed, experiential, holistic, and continuous.

The challenge is to make moral sense out of ongoing experience. "Facts do not speak for themselves, for if they did, humans would find it easy to agree," suggests Vaill. "Meanings, implications, significances, and portents are wrested from the flow of events, *wrested* by men and women who have a felt stake in how things are unfolding" (1996, 141). Socialization explains only part of the process. We need comprehensive and dynamic theories of moral learning able to account for individual development within complex, changing social systems. Experiential educators may draw from the learning models described below.

Kolb (1981, 1984), building on Dewey, Piaget, and related cognitive theory, presents an integrated theory of experiential learning incorporating active experience and ongoing reflection. Individuals (and disciplines) exhibit varying learning styles, necessitating means to promote self-awareness with respect to learning assumptions and processes. "Experiential learning," according to Kolb (1981), is not merely an "educational concept" but a "central process of human adaptation to the social and physical environment." Thus, "learning becomes a central life task" for which the individual must develop the abilities "to experience, observe, conceptualize, and experiment" (248). Kolb's emphasis on learning how to learn in varying contexts provides an important counterbalance to the linear transmission models of teaching students often encounter. Through intentional experiential learning, individuals learn "through both intimate involvement and distanced reflection" and consider "how differences between these processes enable us to better understand our complicated world" (Mattson and Shea 1997, 15).

While various forms of engaged pedagogy may broaden conceptions of knowledge, the reciprocal nature of service learning presents unique opportunities for moral growth. In a national survey (Eyler and Giles 1999), over fifty percent of participants identified learning "that people I served are like me" as a most important or very important outcome of service learning; seventy-seven percent indicated

learning "how complex social problems are" as most or very important. These and similar reported outcomes have important moral implications.

The focus here on the role of experience does not devalue the role in moral education of authority, generational influence, or learning about the good. Schwartz (2002) cautions that an overemphasis on the primacy of experience can obscure our awareness that much is learned via moral *transmission*. He describes, for example, how college honor codes as well as teaching of maxims—condensed forms of wisdom of how to live—can have positive impacts. He questions the logic of elevating the autonomous self to the highest moral position. Yet a focus on experience does not imply that all moral truth needs to be discovered independently. Piaget's concept of autonomy, for example, is collectively framed, building on perceived mutual interests and respect through peer interaction (see Philibert 1994). Schwartz (2002) and Carver (1997) point out that even Dewey stressed the role of transmission, framed as the "principle of continuity": "every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after" (Dewey 1938, 35). Our previous experiences thus condition, but do not determine, our responses to later events and encounters.

Science itself, which frames much of higher education, is built on experience (see Cromer 1997). Just as scientific theory provides the basis for understanding experience in the lab, an individual's moral "theories" frame how personal experience is interpreted. The challenge is to develop theories of moral learning that both incorporate continuity and change and foster means to learn in a morally dynamic world.

Anthropologist Mary Catherine Bateson (1994) describes the task succinctly: in a changing society, we must learn "to improvise responsibly, and with love" (6). Bateson outlines the importance of "learning along the way":

> Meeting as strangers, we join in common occasions, making up our multiple roles as we go along—young and old, male and female, teacher and parent and lover—with all of science and history present in shadow form, partly illuminating and partly obscuring what is there to be learned. Mostly we are unaware of creating anything new, yet both perception and action are necessarily creative. . . . Men and women confronting change are never fully prepared for the demands of the moment, but they are strengthened to meet uncertainty if they can claim a history of improvisation and a habit of reflection. (6)

Bateson richly describes current learning challenges, with implicit support for engaged pedagogies. "It is hard to think of learning more fundamental to the shape of

society," she points out, "than learning whether to trust or distrust others" (41). She emphasizes that we "bring one-another into being" (63), and suggests a more accurate form of Decartes' *cogito:* "You think, therefore I am. I think, therefore you are. We think . . ." (63). She points out that ideas about the self are learned, then easily challenged by change. New experiences are an essential part of learning, but put our ideas of self at risk. So we need to learn how to learn, to trust that "from a sense of continuing truths . . . we can draw the courage for change" (79).

Mentkowski and associates (Mentkowski 2001; Mentkowski and associates 2000) at Alverno College provide a thorough developmental model of "learning that lasts." Research at Alverno confirms the positive impact on moral growth of an integrated overall curriculum that involves experiential learning. Mentkowski points out that during the college years moral growth may be "seeded" as students develop patterns of learning and commitment that last into the adult years. Similarly, experiential educators may draw from the work of Mezirow (2000) on transformational learning among adults.

From an international perspective, the work of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (1970, 1994) is critical. Freire's analysis of the moral and political assumptions built into all levels of education challenge teachers and learners to proceed with respect and awareness of patterns of power and oppression. Such awareness begins in experience. Freire (1994) describes an early, formative incident that drew him out of the "certainty" of the academy. As he lectured, interestingly for the current paper, about Piaget's work on moral development, he was challenged by a poor worker to experience directly the conditions and perspectives of those living in poverty.

Freire's work also emphasizes that solutions to social inequalities are not often solved by those who create or benefit from systems in place (see Rivage-Seul 1987). Martin-Baro (1994) of El Salvador argues that psychology is too often blind to social structures and that "social context is thus converted into a kind of natural phenomenon, an unquestioned assumption" (37) that may lead to a limited private morality. Martin-Baro builds on Freire's call for *concientization,* or a critical consciousness developed through learning to "read" the word and the world via an ongoing dialogical process. Both Freire (see Escobar et al. 1994) and Martin-Baro (1991) offer well-developed visions of higher education as a means to foster critical awareness and social responsibility. Martin-Baro, for example, provides a prescient vision of community-based research in which both faculty and students apply *conscience* and *science* "to the analysis of reality's structural problems and present viable solutions as well as prepare those who can carry out such solutions" (1991, 240).

Berkowitz and Fekula (1999) outline five potential means for colleges to foster character development and moral learning: (1) teaching about character and morality, (2) displaying character, (3) demanding character, (4) apprenticeship/practice, and (5) reflection (19). Relying on one method would be inadequate. The displayed motto "Duty, honor, and country" serves as helpful reminder of values at West Point, though it may be less salient to students at Notre Dame or Berkeley, and certainly would not be sufficient alone for moral growth. An integrated approach implemented intentionally is warranted (Berkowitz and Fekula suggest ethics audits as a means of comprehensive planning). Service learning and related pedagogies integrate many of the five elements suggested. Quality service learning provides opportunities for learning across the curriculum, interaction with others who are displaying character, involvements that demand positive behavior, ongoing practice and shared governance, and individual and group reflection/analysis.

The above models demonstrate the need and potential for moral learning. Note that the moral exemplars studied by Colby and Damon demonstrated an "active seeking of new knowledge" (1992, 199) and an interest in learning about alternative perceptions of others. Similarly, Thorkildsen (1994) and George Lind (2002, personal communication) outline the interaction between moral perceptions and attitudes toward learning. Further research on such topics is warranted.

FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: A SUMMARY

Engaged pedagogies, forms of learning emphasizing the integration of experience and reflection, are, then, well suited to foster character and moral development during the college years. Such pedagogies, thoughtfully implemented, are consistent with developmental theory and integrate potentially disparate aspects of moral education (and higher education): habit and experience, theory and action, reasoning and emotion, virtue and analysis, continuity and imagination. They have the potential both to foster character traits and moral identity and to extend frames of moral awareness into the sociopolitical realm, enhancing moral and civic responsibility. They provide opportunities for perspective taking, interaction with moral exemplars, and development of prosocial peer relations and understandings of community. Further, such pedagogies give students important practice in self-directed moral learning in a changing society. And, perhaps most importantly, they seem to have a channeling effect, prompting ongoing awareness and long-term moral commitment.

Engaged forms of learning thus represent new ways of knowing, alternative episte-mologies relevant to moral complexities encountered in higher education and beyond.

While the potentials are many, some cautions are important. Not all moral learn-ing takes place through direct engagement, and not all experience leads to moral growth. Fragmented approaches may yield inconclusive results that can then be used to fuel counterarguments that character development cannot be enhanced intention-ally during college. We must search for integrated models within higher education, recognizing that one size does not fit all and building on local contexts and strengths. Educators must avoid fostering a sense of noblesse oblige (Illich 1968) or framing so-cial challenges simply as individual or community deficits (see McKnight 1989, 1995). Community members need to be welcomed as educational partners.

Fortunately, various recent initiatives provide direction for future development. In addition to the thorough outline of Ehrlich et al. (2003) and other sources cited in this review, educators may want to consult *Colleges that Encourage Character Devel-opment*, produced by the John Templeton Foundation (1999), and a new electronic publication edited by Jon Dalton, the *Journal of College and Character*. See also a com-prehensive document (and national initiative) written by young adults themselves: *The Content of Our Character* (Behr et al. 1999). This manifesto, written by fifty engaged youth from across the United States and paralleling the Port Huron Statement by students in the 1960's, presents a stirring vision of ethical leadership for the current generation.

HIGHER LEARNING: MORAL IMPLICATIONS

What are the implications of this exploration of moral development through expe-rience in the context of social change? I offer the following twelve recommendations as a start. College faculty and administrators would do well to:

1) Rediscover institutional mission statements, noting the centrality of moral and character development and the call to social engagement. Address re-ward structures accordingly.
2) Identify and question epistemological dualisms and disciplinary bound-aries within the academy that may limit integrated scholarship and applied learning. Recognize the need for new epistemologies.
3) Prompt moral notice, cultivate habits of reflection on experience, and fos-ter moral imagination of alternatives.

4) Develop learning opportunities that intentionally foster habits basic to character *and* the development of moral reasoning abilities.
5) Attend to the development of moral identity among students (and fac-ulty). Avoid leaving the self out of the learning process.
6) Foster study of and contact with moral exemplars, and facilitate peer col-laboration in learning.
7) Frame moral issues in ways that move beyond the personal domain, high-lighting social responsibility and attention to social structures. Foster civic engagement and social analysis through attention to political issues and processes.
8) Build on student initiative and foster relevant leadership development op-portunities.
9) Be willing to address "transcendent" and spiritual issues that arise when individuals encounter social challenges.
10) Promote self-directed moral learning and learning how to learn (consis-tent with the concept of discovery at the heart of the academy).
11) Link moral learning to students' professional development to foster prepa-ration for "good work" (Gardner et al. 2001).
12) Foster comprehensive assessment of moral and character development and related institutional efforts.

Such recommendations underscore the need for relevant theory development and research. Let us build integrated scholarship to identify means to enhance moral and civic responsibility. Given the central role higher education plays in developing future leaders and promoting moral learning in a complex, knowledge-based society, much is at stake.

NOTES

1. This chapter serves, in part, to introduce those promoting engaged forms of learn-ing in higher education to relevant theory and research in moral psychology. The terms *character* and *moral* are used broadly. Sources for further conceptual clarification (e.g., of constructs and inherent psychological processes) beyond the scope of this work are cited throughout the text.

2. Here I build on the four-component model of morality outlined by James Rest (1986). See also Rest et al. (1999).

3. The focus here on moral *learning* is meant to emphasize means by which individuals (as well as organizations) may learn proactively to be moral and ethical in a changing world. It presumes a degree of moral motivation and self-direction. Higher education is a fruitful environment for such.

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POSTSCRIPT

Concluding Themes and Issues for the Future

F. Clark Power and Daniel K. Lapsley

A NUMBER OF CONSISTENT THEMES EMERGE FROM THIS VOLUME. ONE IS that character psychology, and moral functioning more generally, will profit from deeper integration with other psychological literatures, specifically the literatures of social cognition, cognitive science, personality, and motivation. A second theme is that self-identity, in particular, is foundational to our understanding of moral character and provides a better basis for conceptualizing moral motivation, commitment, and self-worth than traditional trait notions of personality. A third theme is that rich conceptions of character psychology are a prerequisite for effective character education. Moreover, many chapters in this volume converge on a number of specific recommendations concerning the aims and purposes of character education (e.g., democratic citizenship) as well as on matters of pedagogy and instructional practices, including, for example, the cultivation of ethical skills and conversational virtues, the formation of moral

PSYCHOLOGY

AND

EDUCATION

EDITED BY

Daniel K. Lapsley and F. Clark Power

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS   NOTRE DAME, INDIANA

Jay Brandenberger

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Orienting Themes and Issues

Daniel K. Lapsley and F. Clark Power

THE TITLE OF THIS WORK GIVES AWAY ITS PREMISE AND STRUCTURE. THE central premise is that important insights about character and character education will be forthcoming only when there are adequate advances in character psychology. How one understands the moral formation of persons must be conditioned on what we know about personality and development. How we manage the moral education of character must be conditioned on what we know about selfhood and identity. The structure of this volume follows this premise. The first half examines critical issues in character psychology, where character psychology is understood broadly to include not only psychological literatures that address moral functioning, but also recent trends in ethics that take these literatures seriously as a point of departure for ethical theory. The second half of the volume takes up the challenge of character education in several contexts, including schools, families, and sports. Our concluding Postscript identifies a number of unifying themes evident among the various chapters along with five prospects for productive interdisciplinary work in character psychology and education.

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