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Letter from the Editor

Dear Reader,

Whether you are reading these words on a screen or on paper, we are happy to celebrate the publication of the inaugural issue of the *Notre Dame Historical Review* with you. This logistical feat would not have been possible without the support of the History Department—especially Professors Lundberg and Köll—and the wonderful editors listed on the previous page. Together, their dedication has made this journal a reality.

The cover of this semester's issue features a photograph of Rev. John A. Zahm, C.S.C. and President Theodore Roosevelt while in South America, courtesy of the Notre Dame Archives. While depicting a well-known historical figure, this image also captures, like many of our authors' papers, a lesser-known event—and one that happens to be uniquely connected to Notre Dame. Additionally, we appreciate the photograph's international setting, which reflects our commitment to including historical topics from around the world.

Research, through publication, conveys ideas scholars can interface with years later. The two figures on this semester's cover appear to be in dialogue with one another. Just as they were able to learn from one another, we hope you will enjoy reading and engaging with the original ideas of our authors. We aim to foster meaningful conversations that transcend time and place, and we welcome future submissions that add to the discussion.

We have run the gamut with excellent papers this semester, from ancient European history to gendered Chinese history to a microhistory of an American community. No doubt you are eager to begin reading these articles, so, without further ado: I am pleased to present the first issue of the *Notre Dame Historical Review*.

Vincent Micheli

Editor-in-Chief

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HISTORY

About the Authors

Margaret Mathis is a graduating senior and Stamps Scholar from Notre Dame who will be attending law school in the fall. As an undergraduate, she pursued a major in Classical Languages and minors in the Glynn Family Honors Program and Constitutional Studies. She also participated in multiple archaeological excavations abroad, worked for the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture and the Religious Liberty Initiative, and served as a team lead for the Order of Christian Initiation of Adults and as Classics Club President. Her research interests include studying the human person and bioethics through analysis of archaeological and anthropological data, and her passion for protecting human freedom and individual rights inspires her to become an attorney.

Jessica Ferlazzo is an honors History undergraduate at UCLA with a research focus on gender and resistance in the Middle East and Atlantic world. Her work often explores the intersections of spirituality, sexual exploitation, colonialism, and power, with particular attention to the overlooked roles of women in historical narratives. She has conducted extensive research on African diasporic religions, the transatlantic slave trade, the Sultanate of Women, and feminist resistance movements. Jess is also a visual artist and writer, blending creative practice with academic inquiry. She aspires to pursue a career in law and human rights advocacy, centering marginalized voices in global justice work.

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Evan Gravdahl is a senior at the University of Rochester studying History and Political Science. Originally from Fort Collins, Colorado, his research has examined western immigration patterns, urban development, and race and labor in the early 20th century American West. He is currently completing a senior honors thesis titled *A Tale of Three*

Cities: The Twentieth Century Emergence of Class-Based Black Neighborhoods in Seattle, Portland, and Denver examining the Great Migration in the Pacific Northwest and Mountain West. He is currently employed as an associate in political research where he plans to continue working post-graduation.

Roger Spletzer is an undergraduate Junior at Baylor University, majoring in International Studies and History. His academic interests focus on Cold War history, European diplomacy, and the intersection of geopolitics and national identity. His research on Finnish neutrality during the Cold War explores the complex historical narratives surrounding Finland's geopolitical position between the Soviet Union and the West. His paper, *Western Perceptions of Finland During the Cold War: A Soviet Puppet or a Neutral Actor?*, examines the historiography of Finnish neutrality and its portrayal in Western discourse. Upon graduation, Roger plans to further his studies in international relations, with a focus on European security and diplomacy.

Caroline Dutton originates from Fort Collins, CO. She will graduate with a BA in History from Saint Mary's College in the spring of 2025, and she intends to pursue a career in public history. Her academic interests include Cold War history, the history of the Catholic Church, and women's history.

Aemilius Lepidus Paullus: Strategic Political Messaging

Margaret Mathis
University of Notre Dame

Abstract:

This undergraduate thesis provides an assessment of Lucius Aemilius Lepidus Paullus' political messaging strategy surrounding the major events of his second consulship. It relays the contextual background of Paullus' life and his difficult political and military position during the Third Macedonian War. Given this context, a brief examination of Paullus' reception thus far in both ancient and modern scholarship provides a better canvas for painting a sharper image of Paullus as a politician. Through analysis of certain events in Paullus' life, recorded in Plutarch's *Life of Aemilius*, it comprehends Paullus as an individual who is able to understand the complexities of cultural criteria and adapt to them in order to communicate proficiently to both Greeks and Romans. It concludes that through carefully curated oration and artistic propaganda, Paullus, in recognition of his sensitive position, fashions his image so as to appear in cultural allegiance with the Greeks and the Romans simultaneously, because he viewed true diplomacy as the ability to negotiate a political binary.

BACKGROUND

Aemilius Paullus came of age in the early second century B.C., when competitive¹ individuals of his caliber held ever-increasing political power and Rome simultaneously recognized her opportunity for expansion into Macedonian territories.² Though Rome had been victorious in its wars against Hannibal, its victories were costly. The Punic wars diminished Rome's political manpower. By the turn of the century, the negative effects of these victories trickled up to the ruling population. Rome had suffered severe casualties to the senatorial class and was left with a diminished number of established and respected statesmen. After waging the first two Macedonian wars successfully, Rome grew especially suspicious of Macedonian leadership when its king refused to perform his obligations specified in the peace treaty established after the Second Macedonian War. Further, the death of Alexander in 323 B.C. with no clear heir served as a precondition for political instability and civil war in Macedon and Greece.³ Even over 150 years after Alexander's death, the ruling Antigonid dynasty was still rich in resources, and its current king Perseus had access to many pecuniary assets.⁴ Though wealthy, Macedon under Perseus was still politically insecure, holding neither the full military protection of a monarchy nor the complete independence of a republic:

The people of the diverse Macedonian *poleis*...enjoyed self-government at the local level, each [locality] with its own magistrates, council, and assembly...These communities were by no means fully autonomous-they had no independent foreign policy, for example, and the land they occupied was entirely subject to the king's discretion as "spear-won land," but the king, so far as we can tell, did not suppress their freedom of political expression...The kingdom of Macedon was neither a fully integrated, unified state subject to the absolutist rule of a powerful king, nor a republican federation, such as the Aetolian and Achaean

¹ Beard 1985 argues that relatively short term limits caused consuls to compete with one another for glory. Since each elected official only held the public's attention for a brief time, a desire for recognition drove many individuals to compete for office using any means necessary to secure the votes they wanted for their offices, as well as compete for glory and fame once elected.

² Military landscape: See Erskine 2012 and Mackay 2009: 147, 157-159.

³ Goldsworthy 2016: 85-90.

⁴ Walbank 1984: Perseus' annual income from levying taxes was 200 talents (*Aem.* 20.6), and he gained another thousand talents from mining revenue (Dio 16.8.6).

Leagues, but an amalgam of the two nestled within a bifurcated state framework.⁵

Such political insecurity gave Rome the opportunity to establish itself militarily in Macedon and its surrounding territories, and Paullus was the consul ordered to conquer the region.

Aemilius Paullus is a well-documented figure, with accounts of his military life and conquest appearing in Polybius, Plutarch, and Livy. Paullus grew up in a fairly well-off family and entered the political scene as curule aedile in 193 B.C., concurrently serving as augur and leading a campaign against the Lusitanians in Spain from 191 to 189.⁶ He is most well-known for his victory against Perseus at Pydna in the Third Macedonian War during his second consulship in 168, which he followed with a visit to Greece and construction of a statue in Delphi. His bust is included among the busts of the *viri summi* in the *Forum Augustum*, confirming his significant public involvement in Roman politics.

INTRODUCTION

Aemilius Paullus' reception in the ancient and modern world has been less than consistent. The ancient historians Polybius, Plutarch, and Livy depict Paullus as the embodiment of Roman *virtus* and *gravitas*, and some later scholars similarly praise him. Eckstein argues that he was "mild und leutselig" towards the defeated during wartime. Klebs and McDonald echo Eckstein's praise,⁷ but not all are so keen on Paullus. Niebuhr's assessment of him as a cruel, ruthless commander who "cannot possibly be reckoned among the number of great and virtuous Romans"⁸ is possibly Paullus' most slanderous treatment. Erich Gruen argues that Paullus is a philhellene who imitates Greek culture both out of a personal "commitment" to Hellenism and as a symbolic politico-military "confiscation" of the culture of the conquered,⁹ while Amy Russell argues that this same type of "imperialist" notion exists especially in Paullus' religious decisions as he travels through Greece.¹⁰ These scholarly conclusions are incomplete.

Amid scholarly assessments of Paullus, Gruen and Russell hint at one of his traits: Paullus was an excellent communicator, and apt at positioning himself within multiple cultural frameworks to send a message.

⁵ Burton 2017: 7-8.

⁶ Erskine 2012.

⁷ For general information on Paullus' scholarly reception, see Reiter 1988: 1-19. For Eckstein's specific opinion, see Eckstein 1840: 181-182.

⁸ Niebuhr 1844: 281

⁹ Gruen 1992: 248.

¹⁰ Russell 2012: 167.

Paullus assumes the customary behaviors of the Greeks when he addresses the Greeks and the Romans when he addresses the Romans. His bicultural fluency is most evident in certain episodes of Plutarch's narrative. After Paullus defeats Perseus, he replicates Greek *paideia* in the setting he creates to address Perseus, and draws on a common Greek literary *topos* in his discourse to Perseus. When Paullus travels to Greece, he replicates traditional Greek leisure activities and builds a statue of himself which could indicate his allyship to either Greece or Rome. Paullus is also able to appeal to Roman sensibilities when he triumphs through Rome after his victory. A close examination of these episodes reveals Aemilius Paullus' desire to build a political portrayal of himself which kept him favorable to both Greece and Rome. This desire is achieved and enhanced by his use of pre-existing cultural norms to communicate effectively to enemies and Romans alike.

ON THE USE OF PLUTARCH

Since Plutarch's account of Paullus focuses most heavily on his personal actions and decisions, as opposed to Polybius' or Livy's accounts which focus on the historical ramifications of those actions, Plutarch's account is the best starting point for the most thorough assessment of Paullus' character. Plutarch also, unlike Polybius or Livy, "had at his command a variety of sources from which he could have extracted a detailed and balanced account of Paullus."¹¹ Plutarch avowedly sets forth that his work is a biography which is aimed at creating models for contemplation; as he states in at the outset of the *Life of Alexander*, οὕτως ἡμῖν δοτέον εἰς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα μᾶλλον ἐνδύεσθαι καὶ διὰ τούτων εἰδοποιεῖν τὸν ἐκάστου βίον, ἐάσαντας ἑτέροις τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας, "So I must be permitted to devote myself rather to the signs of the soul in men, and by means of these portray the life of each, leaving to others the description of their great contests" (Plut. *Alex.* 2.1).¹² In the introduction to his *Life of Timoleon*, Plutarch notes ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώμενον ἀμῶς γέ πως κοσμεῖν καὶ ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον, "My work involves using history as a mirror and endeavoring in a manner to fashion and adorn my life in conformity with the virtues herein depicted" (*Tim.* I. 1-4). This focus does not vitiate the desire to understand the decisions behind Paullus' actions, but rather aids it since his account deals primarily with τὰς ἀρετὰς (*Tim.* I. 1-4). Plutarch's method of pairing lives and

¹¹ Reiter 1988: 99. Plutarch likely had access to sources from Nasica (*Aem.* 15.5) and Poseidonius (*Aem.* 19.7). Also according to Reiter, Plutarch's account can be trusted in its "broad veracity" for historical accuracy.

¹² All translations are from the Loeb Classical Library edition, unless otherwise indicated.

comparing the virtues of each man he studies has a moralist frame meant to prove that there are similar personality archetypes across history. Plutarch's moralist framework does not interfere with close analysis of Paullus' decisions, but rather stimulates an accurate assessment of his character. Plutarch's focus on virtues requires him to pay close heed to particular actions, and that attention provides details that allow a sound reconstruction of Paullus' genuine priorities.

MILITARY CONTEXT

Recall that the battle of Pydna decided the Macedonian War, and ceded previously Macedonian-conquered territory in Macedonia and Thessaly to Roman control.¹³ However, merely because the battle had been waged and won did not automatically imply that Macedon would peacefully surrender itself to Rome. Paullus, upon securing victory at Pydna, had not yet opened political discourse with those inhabitants occupying the rest of Macedon or established its *merides*.¹⁴ Thus, he was physically surrounded by unknown peoples or recently conquered peoples with whom he had not yet communicated or attempted to establish peace through diplomacy. Pydna is situated right at the northwestern tip of Macedonia. To the north, Paullus faced unknown peoples in Thrace and Epirus,¹⁵ while to the south he faced conquered peoples in Thessaly and to the west was a gulf opening into the Aegean sea, followed immediately by a peninsula containing more previously Macedonian territory. From Paullus' perspective, he was surrounded on all sides by enemy forces or by water, and had no means of escaping should those surrounding enemies organize and take up arms against him.¹⁶ Paullus' actions needed to curb any resentment that Perseus or his troops had for Paullus and protect himself from political backlash or

¹³ Burton 2017: 171.

¹⁴ According to Plutarch, once Paullus reached Olympia, "he restored to the Macedonians their country and their cities for free and independent residence" (*Aem.* 28.6). Burton 2017 supplies a detailed description of the four zones, or *merites* in which Rome divided Macedon in the aftermath of the war: 173-177. However, at this specific point in the narrative, Paullus has not yet established a political presence in the rest of Macedon, and so he was a Roman commander surrounded on all sides by Macedonian enemies. Due to the technological constraints of communication at the time, individuals might not be yet aware of this shift in government. Paullus and his army, although victorious, are physically outnumbered and surrounded by locals. Thus, his actions in the hours and days immediately following his victory at Pydna were essential in securing his victory and shaping his image and favorability to those around him.

¹⁵ At this point, it is possible that Paullus had already been ordered to sack Epirus. Had he known his next task was to sack Epirus, his military situation would be even more grave, since he would have to travel back through the conquered Macedon with military impediments to reach Epirus and conquer it.

¹⁶ Descriptions of Paullus' physical orientation are based on Map 3 in Burton 2017: iv.

violence in the wake of the battle. Paullus displays an acute awareness of his fragile position and ability to create harmony between himself and the conquered Perseus.

PAULLUS AS PEDAGOGUE

Aemilius Paullus begins creating an ambiguous image of himself as both an educated Greek supporter and as a boastful Roman immediately after the Battle of Pydna. He simultaneously presents himself as sympathetic to and superior to an individual he overcomes in combat. Upon securing victory against Perseus, Aemilius Paullus does not address Perseus in a public setting, but rather pulls Perseus into his own private tent together with his own sons-in-law and the victorious Roman officers (*Aem.* 27.1). On the one hand, Paullus' action demeans Perseus since it positions him as a loser surrounded by his captors, and in the same position as men who are inferior to him in age and social rank. On the other hand, Perseus is also included among those impressionable individuals worthy of learning a lesson or receiving Paullus' instruction. Paullus's decision to address Perseus in this way both respects and belittles Perseus, which offers interpretive leeway to classify Paullus as a philhellene or bragging Roman.

Paullus presents himself in an even more particular relation to Perseus: an instructor of a child. Paullus does this by replicating the Greek institution of *paideia* through the ideas he chooses to discuss and by exploiting the natural situation. In this private address to Perseus and the Roman army, Paullus discusses the concept of "fortune" in human affairs and its role in securing victory in battle. At the conclusion of his speech, he advises, οὐ καταβαλόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι τὸ κενὸν φρύαγμα τοῦτο καὶ γαυρίαμα τῆς νίκης ταπεινοὶ καταπτήξετε πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ἀεὶ караδοκοῦντες εἰς ὃ τι κατασκήψει τέλος ἐκάστω τὴν τῆς παρούσης εὐπραγίας ὁ δαίμων νέμεσιν, "Abandon, then, young men, this empty insolence and pride of victory, and take a humble posture as you confront the future, always expectant of the time when the Deity shall at last launch against each one of you his jealous displeasure at your present prosperity" (*Aem.* 27.4-5). This advice enumerates for his listeners how they should act whenever they conquer others and whenever they are conquered, knowing that though they were successful in this battle, they might not be so successful in the next. *Paideia* was an educational system primarily aimed at teaching young boys how to be strong, capable Greek citizens.¹⁷ According to Plato, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλος, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης, "[education] makes a man easily desirous of becoming a perfect citizen,

¹⁷ Kepreotes 2022: 40-42.

understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously” (*Laws*. 1. 644a). This education was achieved through the role of Greek teachers who worked closely with young children. The main Greek teachers were the *paidagogos*, *paidonomos*, and *paidotribe*. The *paidagogos* oversaw the pupil’s conduct and manners, served as a confidant to the child and main point of contact with regards to him, and even served as an educator himself.¹⁸ Parenthood is a strong image to represent this relationship between teacher and pupil.¹⁹ The *paidonomos* and *paidotribe* also played important roles in the education of young men. The *paidonomos* was the “guardian of boys,” and acted as an inspector who supervised education, usually within the state educational institution, while the *paidotribe* supervised the child’s athletic education and physical well being.²⁰ Paullus broadly mimics these roles which concern the moral formation of children when he pulls Perseus into his tent and addresses him with the Roman army.

The social dynamic Paullus creates between himself and Perseus mimics the parental-style relationship that exists between the Greek *paidagogos* and his student. Paullus pulls Perseus aside together with his own sons and sons-in-law, as if to serve as an adoptive parent (*Aem.* 27.1). Paullus then chastises the group for being too prideful, much like a *paidagogos* might chastise a pupil or a parent might chastise a child. Paullus also represents the *paidonomos* and *paidotribe* in this scene because in his capacity as a military commander, he is implicitly concerned with the behavioral conduct and physical security of the men in his army, in which he has now included Perseus. Paullus also attempts to teach Perseus how to “be ruled,” when he reminds him of his subordination to the whims of the gods, just as Plato argues that Greek education should teach its pupils to “be ruled” by the state religion. In addition, the context of his reference includes the true relationship between these two men: Paullus as the conqueror and Perseus as the conquered. Paullus’ reminder to Perseus of his subordination to the gods could be interpreted as downplaying the verity of the situation, and Paullus’ way of sympathizing with Perseus by placing both men in equal subordination to the gods. Or, it could be interpreted to hint at the reality of the situation, that Perseus is militarily inferior to Paullus, just as Perseus is inferior to the gods. Paullus exploits the situation in order to replicate *paideia* and to seem dually condescending and concerned for Perseus’ moral well-being, just as a parent or teacher might chastise a child out of concern for his well-being. Such exploitation of *paideia* to accomplish this end illustrates Paullus’ familiarity with Greek culture and

¹⁸ Brill 2007: 344.

¹⁹ Morgan 1998: 269. Quint. *Proh.* 2.3 10-11, 4.2.

²⁰ Brill 2007: 345.

his ability to figure himself within it to send a message to the conquered Perseus. Paullus' treatment of him thereof is both degrading and respectful, and so Paullus moulds an image for himself ambiguous in his portrayal as either a sympathetic conqueror who pities Perseus, or as an arrogant conqueror who oppresses him.

ΤΥΧΗ AS ΤΟΠΟΣ

Paullus further emphasizes his familiarity with and allegiance to Greek culture through the context of his speech. Paullus dwells on the concept of "fortune" in human affairs and its role in securing victory in battle, which is a familiar Greek literary *topos*, present both in Thucydides and Homer.²¹ Paullus questions whether a man should feel "emboldened" by military success, or whether he should instead focus his attention on pitying the conquered, since the battle "sets before the warrior an illustration of the weakness that is common to all men, and teaches him to regard nothing as stable or safe" (*Aem.* 27.2). Paullus reminds his army that each time it is victorious, it might not be so lucky the next time. Paullus' discussion of fortune within a military context is one specific subvariant of the literary *topos* as a whole. Paullus²² uses the word θαρσέω for "emboldened," which is the same word that Thucydides uses to refer to men who are "emboldened" by victory in war. He also employs the term τύχη in both a general sense²³ in reference to a providential order²⁴ and in a specific sense in reference to a deity, which recalls both Thucydides and Homer's separate but related uses of the term.²⁵ Paullus uses this discourse both to appease Perseus and his army, and to remind the men in his own army of the meta context of their military victory.²⁶ His discourse makes him appear comfortable with Greek literary modes. It also diminishes his role as victor in the battle by distancing his own responsibility from the victory and placing responsibility instead in the hands of fortune. His inclusion of "fortune" in his speech is less ambiguous than his imitation of *paideia*, because where there exists a dichotomy between a Greek literary

²¹ Hom. *Il.* 8. 420-430, 11.116, 23. 857, and *Odyss.* 6.290. Thuc. *Hist.* 1.41.3, 1.69.5, 3.97.2, 4.3.1, 4.14.3, 5.104.1, 6.23.3, 7.67.4, etc.

²² It is impossible to know which exact words Paullus chose with complete certainty, however, in a broad sense, his speech still echoes ideals found in Greek literature.

²³ See Plut. *Aem.* 27.3 for the use of τύχη in general and Plut. *Aem.* 36.3, 36.8 for its reference to a deity.

²⁴ Tatum 2010: 457.

²⁵ See fn. 17 for concrete examples from Homer and Thucydides. N.B. Homer exclusively uses the term τύχη to refer to a godhead or some type of divine force, while Thucydides' use varies. Both of these Greek authors, in general, do not consider that fortune can be altered by human actions.

²⁶ See "Military Context."

interpretation of fortune and a Roman literary interpretation of fortune,²⁷ Paullus chooses to imitate the Greek interpretation by drawing on phrases from Thucydides. At this point in the narrative, Paullus adheres most closely to the Greek expression of a jointly Greek and Roman idea in his replication of it, but later he will adhere instead to the Roman expression of that same idea when he returns to Rome. He sends away the young men from his tent τοὺς νέους εὖ μάλα τὸ καύχημα καὶ τὴν ὕβριν, ὥσπερ χαλινῶ, τῷ λόγῳ κόπτοντι κεκολασμένους, “with their vainglorious insolence and pride well curbed by his trenchant speech, as by a bridle” (Plut. *Aem. Paul.* 27.6). This statement affirms that his speech was successful in its ability both to further his image as a teacher and conqueror, and to mollify Perseus, even if also mollifying his own army.

A SUBJECTIVELY SYMBOLIC STATUE

Paullus erected a statue of himself with a purposely ambiguous message. According to Plutarch, ἐν δὲ Δελφοῖς ἰδὼν κίονα μέγαν τετράγωνον ἐκ λίθων λευκῶν συνηρμοσμένον, ἐφ’ οὗ Περσέως ἔμελλε χρυσοῦς ἀνδριὰς τίθεσθαι, προσέταξε τὸν αὐτοῦ τεθῆναι, “At Delphi, he saw a tall square pillar composed of white marble stones, on which a golden statue of Perseus was intended to stand, and gave orders that his own statue should be set there” (*Aem.* 28.2). The statue’s “prominence at the heart of the Panhellenic sanctuary ensured a wide audience from across Greece and beyond.”²⁸ The statue is composed of a white rectangular pillar about ten meters tall, adorned with a frieze depicting Paullus’ victory at Pydna surrounding the upper portion of the pillar and an equestrian statue of Paullus atop the structure.²⁹

The statue’s presence at Delphi and in front of a temple of Apollo displays one interpretation of the statue: Paullus’ use of metaphorical Greek muskets to fire his own Roman bullets. It could communicate Roman supremacy over Greek peoples and Paullus’ personal victory over Perseus. By 168 B.C., Delphi was one of the four prominent panhellenic sanctuaries of Greece, had served as a site for worship of Apollo from as early as 800 B.C.,³⁰ and was the long-established home of the Pythian games. Delphi was a nexus of Greek state religion and hub of competition between individuals in both the games and political propaganda. Greek leaders had

²⁷ Virgil, in contrast to Greek authors Thucydides and Homer, views fortune as something that humans can control, or can earn through their actions. This Roman understanding of fortune is evident in his famous statement “audentis Fortuna iuvat” (Verg. *Aen.* 10.280).

²⁸ Taylor 2016: 559.

²⁹ Jacquemin A. and Laroche, D. 1982: 191-218.

³⁰ Goldberg 2015: 427-428.

likewise attempted prestigious building projects at Delphi in order to display their political influence.³¹ Perseus attempted such a project by beginning construction of a statue of himself on the south side of the eastern entrance to the Temple of Apollo, dedicated to Apollo for the victory at Pydna. Perseus' statue was supposed to be one large white pillar with a statue of himself riding horseback placed atop. "In a brilliant piece of propaganda, Aemilius Paullus chose to complete the monument, putting a statue of himself on horseback in place of that of Perseus, adding a sculptured frieze around the base depicting his victory at Pydna,"³² and removing the Greek inscription but replacing it with the Latin "L. Aemilius LF Imperator de rege perse macedonibusque cepet."³³ Paullus' symbolic action was both political in regards to his victory at Pydna and personal in regards to his particular relationship with Perseus. Perseus had a long-standing devotion to Delphi. In 174 B.C., Perseus performed sacrifices at the sanctuary in Delphi, consulted the oracle, and celebrated the Pythian games.³⁴ That same year, Perseus successfully defended the Macedonians against the Boeotians and celebrated a victory lap around the Greek islands, which included a stop at Delphi. Since Paullus had so prominently made use of Delphi as a religious spot and focus for his propaganda in the past,³⁵ Paullus' substitution of his own statue and visit to Delphi on that same victory lap (only this time, Perseus was in Paullus' possession as a prisoner of war) could serve to symbolically strip Perseus of political power with a tangible sign and show Paullus' personal victory over Perseus alongside his display of Roman supremacy.

The statue's presence may also be interpreted as broadcasting a deeper vindication that Paullus has a place among the Greeks but his military strategy and political messaging outperform theirs. Representations of Greek religion and Greek military commanders surround Paullus' statue, which stands in front of the eastern entrance to the Temple of Apollo. It is one of two statues flanking the sides of the entrance, the other being a monument to Prusias. Once hanging above these two statues was a pediment featuring Artemis, Leto, Apollo, and the Muses. Between this pediment and the statues were the shields the Greeks took from the Persians at the battle of Plataea, hanging on the outer side of the Doric columns. A great Altar of

³¹ Goldberg 2015: 428.

³² Scott 2014: 190.

³³ For physical descriptions or photographs of the statue, see Taylor 2016.

³⁴ Scott 2014: 189.

³⁵ Scott 2014: 189.

Apollo stood immediately across from the entrance and nearly touched a statue to Eumenes II immediately north of it.³⁶

Prusias, sharing the entryway to the temple with Paullus, was king of Bithynia from 230 to 182 B.C. and an ally of Macedon but enemy of Pergamum. Eumenes II, standing very close to Prusias and Paullus, reigned as king of Pergamum from 197 to approximately 159 B.C. Eumenes is a tricky character for the Romans. He supported the Romans in the naval battle at Corycus in 191 B.C., and so they supported him in a battle against Prusias in 183/7 B.C.³⁷ But later, he was suspected of conspiring with Perseus and became unpopular in Rome. The display of a victorious Roman military commander in between warring kings and prominent in an area so central to Greek worship of Apollo represented Apollo's association with bringing order among chaos. Evident in the frieze on the West pediment of the temple of Zeus in Olympia, where Apollo stands straight, located in the center of writhing bodies of centaurs and maidens, he represents the bringer of *stasis* to a world of *chaos*.³⁸ In the same way, Perseus' tall pillar with his equestrian statue placed between statues of individuals that had previously warred against each other reframes their disagreements. Regardless of previous conflicts between Prusias and Eumenes, the equestrian Paullus now rears³⁹ triumphantly above them, supported by a strong pillar, whose construction Paullus had redone and replaced with a representation of his victory over Perseus in the battle of Pydna. Through structural symbolism, Paullus uses the Greek grammar surrounding religious and political propaganda to write one possible message: regardless of previous military victory, Greek or otherwise, Paullus the Roman consul is the new conqueror, hero, and ruler. In Plutarch's words, τοὺς γὰρ ἡττημένους τοῖς νικῶσιν ἐξίστασθαι χώρας προσήκειν, "For it was meet that the conquered shall make room for the conqueror" (*Aem.* 28.2).

Michael Scott condenses the relevance of this placement of the statue:

[This] monument is not about thanking the gods for victory, it is about making a political statement of that victory in the most public and forceful way possible. This new monument stood on the temple terrace of the Apollo sanctuary at Delphi in the area where the major monuments to Greek victory

³⁶ For a visual depiction of the statue's placement and its context, see fig. 2 in Collas 1954: 22. See also his linguistic explanation: 29-31.

³⁷ There is scholarly disagreement over this date. Brill claims the battle occurred in 183, while Goldberg claims it occurred in 187. This slight discrepancy is irrelevant to the argument as a whole. For more information, see Brill 2007 and Goldberg 2015.

³⁸ Osborne 1998 points out the disparity between Apollo's "serious" and "calm" expression in opposition to the expressions of the centaurs on the frieze: 172.

³⁹ See reconstruction, Figure 15, Grzesik 2021: 157.

over foreign invading enemies had stood for centuries. Yet this time it was a Roman general commemorating his victory over a Greek force.⁴⁰

Just as Paullus' treatment of the conquered Perseus could be either sympathetic or belittling, Paullus' use of his statue could be, again, interpreted as either sensitive to the Greek plight as conquered peoples or communicative of Paullus' Roman supremacy.

Yet another interpretation of the statue is possible: Paullus as a peacebringer. A certain detail on the frieze makes use of another Hellenistic literary *topos* to further display Paullus as the bringer of order amidst chaos. In panel IV, two figures lie dead beneath the triumphant Roman soldiers: a nude Gallic warrior and a dead Macedonian warrior, the image of which "turn[s] the defeat of Perseus and his Macedonians into a simultaneous victory over the Celtic menace."⁴¹ Celts were generally portrayed as murderous barbarians in Greek literature,⁴² and to the Greek mind, "the Celts were formidable enemies in war but also cultural antagonists of the civilized Greeks" because they invaded Greece and attacked Delphi in 279 B.C.⁴³ Following the Greek victory over the barbarous Celts at Delphi, the representation of victory over Celts in Hellenistic art and sculpture served as a political motif for "Hellenistic kings to redefine their role in relation to their Greek subjects, which "enabled the kings to claim to be the protectors of civilization from chaos and barbarous annihilation."⁴⁴ Paullus' inclusion⁴⁵ of a single trampled Celt in his frieze supports the claim that he uses Greek artistic discourse to display himself as a bringer of order to chaos. His Romanness may or may not be stressed in this interpretation, and so he may appear as either an aid to the Greeks or a conqueror of the Greeks along with their enemies. This ambiguity in his representation parallels his ambiguity in his replication of Greek *paideia*, and offers another example of Paullus' ability to represent himself as an ally to both Romans and

⁴⁰ Scott 2014: 190.

⁴¹ Taylor 2016: 571.

⁴² See Polybius 18.37, Paus. 10.22.2, 10.21.2, also Liv. 38.17.

⁴³ Strootman 2005: 121.

⁴⁴ Mitchell 2005: 292.

⁴⁵ Paullus, through his speech to Perseus, has already proven to be incredibly sensitive to symbolic forms, and likely had a specific artistic program in mind. cf. Taylor 2016: 564, who claims "it is difficult to imagine Paullus micromanaging the production of the frieze," but "equally difficult to imagine that he would have been completely indifferent to the final appearance of his work." Between the two extremes of "micromanaging" and "complete indifference," Paullus' previous attention to detail in his portrayal of himself as a pedagogue indicates that he was fairly involved in the design of the statue.

Greeks. Either way, the statue still indicates that he deserves recognition within Greek culture. Just as the Greek god of the temple behind his statue is known as bringing order to chaos, as his depiction on the Temple of Zeus suggests, Paullus brings order amidst chaos by standing between two warring peoples and by displaying victory over the barbarians who threatened Greek security and culture.

PAULLUS' ROMAN TRIUMPH

Paullus is not only an excellent communicator when it comes to communicating with the Greeks, he also delivers a strong message to Romans using their relevant cultural grammar. Just as Paullus was a cultural outsider immediately following his victory over Perseus at Pydna, surrounded by Macedonians, Paullus was also a cultural outsider immediately following his return to Rome, having spent nearly two years away from his homeland enjoying Greek feasts and banquets⁴⁶ and replicating Greek culture in the ways heretofore described. Once Paullus arrives in Rome with his army and the captured Perseus, Paullus does not present the same type of ambiguous image, but rather presents himself as only a victorious Roman commander, by holding a triumphal procession and delivering a speech from the rostra. He places emphasis on those stereotypical culturally Roman aspects of his triumph through spectacle and downplays the Hellenistic aspects of his previous actions by boldly performing their Roman equivalents.

Paullus is granted a triumph, and he displays excellent knowledge and replication of Roman cultural norms both through the means by which he obtains permission to triumph and the way he performs it. Plutarch presents the idea of Paullus' triumph as somewhat controversial. He begins with an explanation of how Galba, upon Paullus' return to Rome, argues against the senatorial motion to approve the triumph and starts gaining support among the voters. Before the voting could commence, Paullus' trusted soldier Marcus Servilianus rushed forward, called Galba "sleek from delicate and cowardly effeminacy" and uncovered his battle scars, claiming,

Thou laughest at these scars, but I glory in them before my fellow-citizens, in whose defense I got them, riding night and day without ceasing. But come, take these people off to their voting; and I will come down and follow along with them all, and will learn who are base and thankless and

⁴⁶ After securing victory at Pydna but before obeying orders to sack Epirus, Paullus travels throughout Rome and attends feasts and banquets, even sacrificing to the Greek gods. Plut. *Aem* 28.7.

prefer to be wheedled and flattered in war rather than commanded (*Aem.* 31.8-9).

Presence of battlescars, or *cicatrices* on an individual basis have long served as a Roman literary *topos* to represent strength in battle and *virtus*.⁴⁷ It is not unlikely that Aemilius prompted his soldiers to argue on his behalf in order to secure a triumph. It would have been improper for Paullus to “claim” or “demand” a triumph, since they were customarily “bestowed on [generals] spontaneously by a grateful senate or people,” and publicly asking for a triumph would have been humiliating.⁴⁸ Regardless, Servilianus’ display of his scars convinced the mass of voters to vote in favor of it and the triumph was approved, despite Galba’s opposition. Once Paullus was granted his triumph, he triumphed for three days; and the event was accompanied by temples full of garlands and incense, trumpeters, and celebratory equestrian contests, among various displays (*Aem.* 32-33). After traveling extensively through Greece and participating so actively in Greek culture, Paullus had to return to Rome and claim his place again in Roman society. The ingredients in Paullus’ triumph closely followed the recipe of a typical Roman triumph: himself as *triumphator* riding in a chariot, followed by captives, spoils, shields, gold and silver, animals to be sacrificed, and the conquered general Perseus surrounded by his family.

It is nearly impossible to compare the grandeur of Paullus’ triumph to those of other generals, however, there is no doubt that Paullus’ was an amazing spectacle. One report claims that his procession included 2,700 wagon loads of captured weapons in addition to the captives, sacrificial animals, and other prizes.⁴⁹ He and his soldiers carry sprays of laurel, and he dons⁵⁰ a gold and purple garment, much like many triumphors before him (*Aem.* 33). The laurels harken back to his association with Apollo and symbolize victory to the Romans, which fits within Paullus’ ability to position himself in a role which would effectively grasp his audience’s attention. His triumph is representative of any Roman triumph, and he

⁴⁷ Ter. *Eun.* 482, Sall. *Bell. Jug.* 85, Suet. *Aug.* 65.

⁴⁸ Military triumphs were considered an extraordinary feat, and required approval by the senate. Much like a state judge would not be extremely likely to publicly request consideration for a federal clerkship, but might privately ask his friends for support or make political connections, a Roman commander like Paullus would not likely publicly petition for a triumph but might instead rely on a friend or on his soldiers to argue in favor of a triumph. For more information on Roman triumphs, see Beard 2007.

⁴⁹ Beard 2007: 102.

⁵⁰ Paullus’ previous displays of cultural sensitivity, including his extremely particular depiction of himself in his statue, indicate that he was, more than likely, extremely involved in the planning of his triumph.

followed the rulebook⁵¹ well for the necessary implements included in a triumphal procession.

Although Pompey's triumph of 61 B.C. celebrating his victory over Mithradates occurred over 100 years after Paullus' procession, it has survived in scholarly memory and shall serve as valid comparandum. Beard discusses the elaborate displays Pompey chose to include in his triumph: impressive vessels including one bronze gifted by King Mithradates VI Eupator,⁵² many military trophies, 75,100,000 drachmae, and allegedly 324 prisoners of war. Some of the most famous of these were five sons and two daughters of Mithradates himself, which Appian lists by name in his account (App. 117). Paullus' triumph was likely similar to Pompey's in grandeur since he also marched with the conquered Perseus, but probably included more religious aspects than Pompey's. Legend has it that Paullus also includes 77 vessels filled with gold coins, and brings Perseus' chariot filled with his captured arms, while Perseus marches behind it with his children (*Aem.* 33.5-34.2). Plutarch's account of Paullus' triumph emphasizes the amount of sacrificial animals included in the procession and the amount of garland and incense brought to the temples, while Appian's account of Pompey's triumph discusses only the trophies and captives, even listing them by name, and mentions no purely religious aspects. Paullus made his triumph stereotypical in regards to the items in his procession, yet also very extravagant in his display of wealth and its religious bent for a few reasons. These reasons emphasize his hyper-awareness of any opposing positions. First, Paullus atones for any possible objection to his seeming sympathy for Perseus or for his affiliation with Greek banqueting. Just in case anyone questioned Paullus' allegiance to Rome, or that he had become too philhellenic, Paullus' tremendous display of power through a spectacular romantic triumph confirms his desire to claim a seat amidst the Roman elite and to gain attention as a Roman victor. Paullus once invited Perseus into his tent and gave him license to enjoy Greek banquets, but now publicly humiliated him with a Roman display. Instead of an ambiguously sympathetic conqueror, Paullus now presents himself as a legendary conqueror in a way that other conquerors have before him and will after him. Paullus' triumph displays his military strength and *virtus* in the Roman socio-political scene to brag about his victory and to save himself from any

⁵¹ Beard 2007 outlines Pompey's third triumph of 61 BC. Although later than Paullus' triumph, Pompey's triumphal procession is one of the most well-documented and thus serves as legitimate comparanda.

⁵² Bronze vessel now housed in Rome: Musei Capitolini, Inv. MC 1068.

backlash for his previous actions. So publicly humiliating Perseus while triumphing through Rome contrasts sharply with the care Paullus took to host banquets with Perseus and seat his guests according to their social class while in Greece, yet it displays the same technical skill of negotiating a political binary and being able to appease both sides of a debate while remaining ever loyal to one. Second, Paullus made his triumph extravagant to serve as an awesome reminder that, just as he can be more Greek than the Greeks, he can be more Roman than the Romans. Not only can he make himself one of the Greeks while in Greece, he can even impress his audience, in the same way that he can make himself one of the Romans while in Rome while also impressing his audience. Paullus included such religious aspects of his triumph as sacrifices and celebrations within temples for the same reason that he performed sacrifices in Greece: in order to communicate that he is both one of the people and better than them. He can worship at a temple just like anyone else or lead sacrificial animals through the streets like any leader, but he will fill all the temples on the triumphal route with garlands and incense and lead “a hundred and twenty stall-fed oxen with gilded horns, bedecked with fillets and garlands” (Plut. *Aem.* 33.1).

Paullus argues that “the same spirit was required both in marshalling a line of battle and in presiding at a banquet well, the object being, in the one case, to cause most terror in the enemy, in the other, to give most pleasure to the company” (*Aem.* 25. 10-11). Paullus has already caused the “most terror in the enemy” by securing victory at Pydna and by capturing Epirus, and has also given the “most pleasure to the company,” now in both Greece and Rome. In Greece, where his “company” included Perseus and Greek nobles, Paullus held extravagant games, sacrificed to the gods, and even, much to the amazement of his guests, welcomed and seated each individual in a manner proper to his social rank within Greek society.⁵³ However, upon arrival in Rome, Paullus’ “company,” or rather, his audience, consists of the conquered Perseus, his victorious troops, the Roman Senate, and the people at large. He presents his Roman audience with an enjoyable spectacle in a manner which conforms to Roman cultural norms, albeit extravagant. Paullus’ triumph proves his character in regard to both Romanness and Hellenism, and his ability to negotiate a political binary which employs both cultural modes of expression.

THE QUESTION OF EPIRUS

Paullus’ conquest of Epirus represents a knot in the thread of many previous scholarly accounts, and any discussion of Paullus’ messaging strategy

⁵³ *Aem.* 25. 7-10.

without considering this episode would be incomplete. The conquest itself was extremely unique within the context of Roman history, as the Senate, motivated by Charops, ordered Paullus to execute a primarily slave-hunting operation.⁵⁴ In general, previous scholars have either let it define Paullus' entire tapestry, or have tried to understand its complexity but eventually conceded that it is inconsistent with the rest of the narrative. Plutarch himself refers to the episode as "so contrary to his mild and generous nature" (*Aem.* 30.1). For Niebuhr, the episode is a "massacre" which defines his opinion of Paullus.⁵⁵ Eckstein deals with the episode by admitting its cruelty but removing the blame from Paullus,⁵⁶ thereby avoiding it entirely in regards to assessing Paullus' character. Klebs and McDonald praise Paullus without considering his Epiroan victory a factor in their final assessment.⁵⁷ Niese sees Paullus as both a talented commander but also an unforgivable murderer for his slaughter of Epirus, and does nothing to pardon Paullus from responsibility for the attack.⁵⁸ Neither Gruen nor Russell deals with the Epirus episode specifically.

Eckstein is correct in his decision to remove Paullus from responsibility for the decision to sack Epirus, however, Paullus's personal responsibility cannot be removed from the methods he uses to achieve this end. The Senate ordered Paullus to sack Epirus, and he "exterminated the Epirotes under constraint, against his will and conscience."⁵⁹ Contrary to what these scholars claim, Paullus' decisions in his sacking of Epirus align with his previous actions. A consistent military strategy may seem more benevolent at some times and more ruthless at others, but the Epirus episode, though perhaps the more ruthless example, is in line with Paullus' main goal to justify his decisions by aligning his actions with culturally accepted principles. Just as Paullus has replicated Greek cultural themes and Roman cultural themes, he now replicates the cultural themes of good military commanders.

PAULLUS AS ALEXANDER

Paullus' actions in his episode are not inconsistent with his previous actions, and even offer another example of Paullus' ability to apply a cultural framework to his decisions in order to effectively mollify his audience, even when the culture of the place is somewhat unfamiliar to him. His audience here consists of citizens of multiple towns making up the northwestern

⁵⁴ Ziółkowski 1986: 69.

⁵⁵ Niebuhr 1844: 280-281.

⁵⁶ Eckstein 1840: 182.

⁵⁷ Reiter 1988: 11-12.

⁵⁸ Niese 1963: 187.

⁵⁹ Ziółkowski 1986: 71.

portion of Greece, his own army, and as always, future generations. When Paullus is assigned to take Epirus, he calls forth for the “ten principal men of each city” and tells them to plan to hand over their spoils on a fixed day (*Aem.* 29.2). He even sends a small group of soldiers along with these principal men, whom he instructs to “pretend” to search for and receive money (*Aem.* 29.3). Taken by itself, this decision respects the autonomy and local culture of each city, by warning each of attack and by first involving local governing bodies to communicate with their constituents.

Paullus uses his campaign in Epirus in order to sharpen the image he creates of himself: Paullus’ military actions imitate Alexander’s. Alexander often waits in camp outside a city he wishes to besiege for a short time in order to give its inhabitants a grace period, and he also relies upon informants and captured prisoners to supply him with relevant information before attacking city-states. For example, when Thebes tries to revolt against Alexander’s rule in 335 BC⁶⁰ and he arrives to put down the rebellion, he makes camp by the precinct of Iolaus “to give the Thebans a period of grace, should they wish to reconsider their disastrous decision and send out envoys to talk with him” (*Arr. Anab.* 1.7). Alexander relies on informants in the battle of Aornos Rock, when he chooses a trusted Indian informant to deliver a letter to Ptolemy with instructions to help besiege the mountain the next day (*Anab.* 4.29.4), much like Paullus now relies on the principal men of each city in Epirus to deliver instructions to their citizens in preparation of his attack. Further, Paullus still acts as a teacher in this situation, since he arranges the conquest such that it will result in little monetary gain for his soldiers, but still achieve the demands of the Roman Senate by enslaving thousands. According to Plutarch, “from all this destruction and utter ruin each soldier received no more than eleven drachmas as his share, and all men shuddered at the issue of the war, when the division of a whole nation’s substance resulted in so slight a gain and profit for each soldier” (*Aem.* 29.4). Here, Paullus finalizes his teaching on the nature of Fortune and human affairs with a destructive example that results in little monetary gain. Paullus’ use of this military takeover to teach his troops a lesson displays his abstraction from the war itself and his focus on constructing his own personal narrative across cultures. Giving “most pleasure to the company” is only one side of Paullus’ image (*Aem.* 28.9). In his Epirotic conquest, Paullus tries to “cause the most terror in the enemy,” or show the other side of his two-sided image (*Aem.* 28.9).

⁶⁰ Atkinson 2013: xiv.

A FEW MORE PIECES OF EVIDENCE

Two relevant factors confirm Paullus' ability to paint a peaceful picture of himself in whichever cultural canvas he inhabits. A certain minted coin implies that Paullus was a type of peacebringer to conquered peoples and Rome alike. In 62 B.C., a century after Paullus' victory, an individual tries to claim descent from Paullus by minting a coin with images that remind its user of Paullus' legacy.⁶¹ This coin's obverse displays the inscription PAULLUS LEPIDUS CONCORDIA and an image of the goddess Concordia, whose appearance Crawford argues "reflects the *concordia ordinum* which was central to Cicero's policy,"⁶² but also represents the goddess herself, affiliated with "harmonious agreement within the body politic of Rome."⁶³ The reverse holds the inscription TER PAULLUS, framing an image of the toga-clad Paullus, a large Roman soldier, and the conquered Perseus followed by his children. Supposedly this depicts the scene of Perseus' march in Paullus' triumph. This individual's choice to display Paullus with the image of Concordia to place in order to propagate his "spurious" descent from Paullus indicates that Paullus was historically affiliated with harmony. His decision to display himself as a "peacebringer" and remain favorable to multiple peoples must have been successful, if individuals are trying to present themselves as having the same qualities, even a century after his triumph.

The other factor is Paullus' own address to the forum, where he finishes painting his picture of himself. Paullus' address confirms his desire to stay politically relevant in Rome because he accounts for his previous Hellenistic actions and attributes them to an elitist Roman motive. He replaces his previous discourses on Fortune, once very replicative of a Greek literary *topos*, with a new discourse culturally relevant to the city of Rome, when he says νομίζω τὴν Τύχην ὑμῖν παραμενεῖν ἀβλαβῆ καὶ βέβαιον, "I think that Fortune⁶⁴ will remain constant [to our city] and do her no harm" (*Aem.* 36.8). This replacement serves also to cover his tracks and gloss over his Greek sentiments, just as his triumph did. Now that he is in Rome, he is again a Roman victor, no longer sympathetic to the conquered. In fact, he nearly calls to mind "Fortune" to argue that regardless of any of his previous actions, he now believes Fortune will always favor Rome. This time, he chooses the Roman, Virgilian conception of Fortune, which can be earned through audacity. In a picture of perfect Roman piety, he returns from battle victorious, triumphs, sacrifices, and ties his actions to a religious

⁶¹ Crawford 1974: 441.

⁶² Crawford 1974: 441. Coin #415.

⁶³ Goldberg 2015: 361.

⁶⁴ Note here his use of Fortune to refer to the deity.

theme. He understands the subordination of the individuals to the gods, and comes back with his shield.

CONCLUSION

Aemilius Paullus always wanted to impress his audience. Paullus set himself up in a way such that he could be considered a strong political leader in any area by symbolically assimilating himself to cultural norms. He wasn't just a philhellene, or a stellar example of Roman *virtus*, but a politician who strategically fashioned himself in outfits which could be worn to a victory party in Greece or Rome. When Paullus has an audience, he acts as a teacher of Fortune, convincing his men that Fortune controls the destiny of battle and the tide of war. These lessons on Fortune distance himself from personal responsibility on the battlefield. Even after a strong victory over Perseus, Paullus pulls Perseus aside and lectures him in a characteristically Greek way, pointing out that although Roman forces were victorious this time, they might not be so in the future because Fortune is the true controller of destiny. A bystander could easily argue that Paullus' treatment of Perseus respects him or belittles him. Paullus chose to treat Perseus in this way so that this ambiguity would exist, out of recognition of his own tenuous political position. While addressing Perseus, Paullus ambiguously gives either "the most pleasure to the company," by sympathizing with Perseus and feasting with him in Greece, but also might belittle him by surrounding him with his captives. However, once Paullus returns to Rome, those same actions, because of their ambiguity, now appear as an example of "causing the most terror" to the enemy Perseus.

When Paullus erects a statue in Delphi, he uses this same ambiguity to remain in favor of whoever might happen across it. A Greek might look at the statue within its religiously significant Delphic context (in front of the temple of Apollo), consider the popular Greek *topos* of victory over the barbarians depicted in a conquered Gallic warrior on one side of the frieze, and Paullus' representation of himself as a peace-bringer, and think that the leading motivation behind the statue is primarily philhellenic, or a desire to conform to Hellenistic ideals. A Roman might look at the statue within its context, consider the Romantic-style frieze juxtaposed against a Greek religious background, and assume that the leading motivation behind the statue was rather to boast of Roman supremacy over Greek culture. Paullus' markedly Roman triumph, with all its extravagance and impressive three-day duration, in part washed his dirty philhellenic laundry after arriving in Rome and dressed him instead as a pious Roman. Upon Paullus' return to Rome, the decisions he made in Greece cannot be changed, but rather, their ambiguity allows for the second, less sympathetic interpretation. He

changes his discourse on Fortune in his speech to the Roman discourse, making all his previous actions appear like they were never sympathetic.

Regardless of which military strategy Paullus employs, whether it be to communicate biculturally through the cities' leading men, to replicate Alexander's methods, to complete his military lesson on Fortune for his troops, or a combination of these, Paullus' Epirotic conquest is not inconsistent with his previous actions or with his *totum narratum*. However, it merely displays the ruthless side of his representation. Paullus participates in Greek culture better than the Greeks do, Roman culture better than the Romans do, and conquers better than Alexander did.

Female Slave Resistance Through Syncretic Religion: The Roles of Cécile Fatiman and Marie Laveau in Haitian and New Orleans Voodoo

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Abstract:

This paper explores how the syncretic religion of Voodoo empowered enslaved and freed African-descended women to resist racial, gendered, and spiritual oppression during and after the transatlantic slave trade. Rooted in the traditional religions of West Africa, particularly among Yoruba, Fon, and Kongo peoples, African spiritual practices endured systematic attempts at erasure through forced Christian conversion and colonial suppression. However, these practices adapted, giving rise to Voodoo in Saint-Domingue (modern-day Haiti) and New Orleans—blending African cosmologies with Catholic iconography to preserve cultural identity and resist white supremacy. Central to this resistance were women, who served as priestesses, healers, and spiritual leaders. The paper highlights Cécile Fatiman, whose leadership during the 1791 Bois Caïman ceremony catalyzed the Haitian Revolution, and Marie Laveau, the famed “Voodoo Queen” of New Orleans, who used Voodoo to provide protection, healing, and spiritual autonomy for Black women under oppressive rule. Through spiritual possession, ancestor reverence, ritual healing, and public ceremony, Voodoo offered women a powerful ideological and communal framework to reclaim agency. In doing so, it became not only a religious system but also a radical form of socio-political resistance and survival in the face of colonial violence and historical erasure.

Ripped from their homelands and packed into floating tombs, millions of Africans endured one of history's most systematic and brutal crimes: the transatlantic slave trade. Captured individuals endured inhumane conditions during the infamous Middle Passage. Enslaved Africans were crammed into overcrowded ships where disease, malnutrition, and abuse led to unimaginable suffering and death. Upon arrival in the Americas, enslaved people were stripped of their identities, families were torn apart, and living, breathing human beings were treated as expendable pieces of property. Not to mention the relentless physical and psychological violence they faced. Enslaved Africans utilized syncretic religions such as Voodoo, a religion rooted in West African spiritual traditions, to resist their oppression by drawing strength from philosophies and rituals that empowered them spiritually and socially. Shaped by colonial encounters in the New World, this religion provided tools for collective resistance—particularly female resistance. This is evident in Voodoo's role in the Haitian Revolution and its spread to New Orleans, especially seen through figures like Cécile Fatiman and Marie Laveau. Through the syncretic practices of Voodoo, enslaved African women and freed women of African descent enjoyed a newfound sense of agency and a means to fight for their own liberation from slavery and the ideological underpinnings of white supremacy that supported the institution.

Before enslaved Africans were forcibly brought to the New World via the transatlantic slave trade to work on plantations, in mines, and within domestic households, they enjoyed a rich social and political culture to which religion was central. African religions were passed down orally through the generations, from enslaved people to their descendants, with long-standing beliefs being shaped and modified in the Americas by the larger African Diaspora. Although it's difficult to pinpoint the exact regional and tribal origins of enslaved people, many individuals who were transported to the Americas originated from either West Africa or the Congo-Angola area. These regions encompassed the Mende, Yoruba, and Igbo peoples, among other diverse groups.¹ Despite some differences in belief and practice among various tribes and villages, some basic principles and common ritualistic tendencies remain. These shared characteristics create a general description of traditional African religion and spiritual practice that would serve as the basis for the syncretic slave religion Voodoo of the New World.²

¹ Albert J. Raboteau, *Slave Religion: The "Invisible Institution" in the Antebellum South* (Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 7.

² Note that 'Igbo' and 'Ibo' refer to the same group of people. Igbo is the accepted terminology post-1970's.

Many religious societies in Africa believed in a “High God:” an omnipotent yet distant supreme creator. Foreign travelers like William Bosman, head merchant for the Dutch West India Company, noted in his diary that Africans preferred the High God to lower deities, yet “they do not pray to him, or offer any sacrifices to him” because he is “too exalted above us, and too great to condescend so much as to trouble himself or think of mankind.”³ Although it is untrue that the populace never appealed to the High God, first-hand accounts like Bosman’s represent an essential characteristic of African spirituality— worshipers were more concerned with appeasing the lesser gods and spirits. These lesser deities populated large pantheons, each representing specific natural forces. For example, the sky deities included the god(s) of lightning, thunder, and rain. Earth deities governed fertility and punished sinful behavior, and the water deities were identified with the sea or specific rivers and lakes.⁴ Other divine beings were associated with the trees, wind, and natural features, known by many names— the Igbo called them the *alose*, while the Yoruba referred to them as the *orisha*.⁵ These spirits governed worldly affairs, rewarded good deeds, and punished evildoings.⁶ Devotees maintained daily praise and sacrifice, often at shrines or temples dedicated to a specific deity or group of deities whose favor they wanted to gain.

In addition to the different gods, worshipers also had to consider the ever-present world of spirits. For instance, the Kongo people believed in *minkisis*— sacred medicines embodying spirits that could either help or hurt the user. They typically consisted of containers, such as statues or bundles, filled with spiritually charged substances like herbs, minerals, or grave soil. Minkisi served purposes like healing, protection, or karmic justice; some were adorned with nails or blades and used to hunt wrongdoers or enforce agreements.⁷ Prepared and activated by spiritual leaders, they symbolized the fusion of the material and spiritual realms. And the divine realm didn’t stop there— a powerful class of spirits, the ancestors, could intervene in human affairs and grant good health and fertility to their descendants by representing their bloodline to the gods. Since the ancestors were such vital spiritual mediators, appeasing them via proper burial rites was of the highest importance. If proper rites were not administered, spiritual punishment

³ William Bosman, *A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of New Guinea* (London, 1705), p. 368a.

⁴ Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, p. 9.

⁵ Ashanti Rattray, A.B. Ellis, *The Tshi-Speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of West Africa*, (1st publ London, 1887), (Chicago: Benin Press, 1964), p. 177.

⁶ Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, p. 10.

⁷ Jason R. Young, *Rituals of Resistance*, p. 107.

would surely follow.⁸ MJ Field, a writer and anthropologist working in West Africa, noted that the Ga people of Southeast Ghana were “more afraid of offending these [ancestors] than of offending the gods, though in theory...they give the higher place to the gods.”⁹ Thus, rites honoring ancestor spirits were crucial in African spirituality, and they ranged from private offerings of food and drink to large-scale public ceremonies.¹⁰ This tradition of spiritually serving one’s family line would empower African slaves, particularly head matriarchs, to focus their energy internally to spiritually defend themselves and their loved ones from some of the horrors of slavery.

Among worshipers were skilled priests who served as diviners and herbalists to honor and pacify the gods and ancestor spirits. They presided over periodic festivals honoring the gods and were responsible for upholding proper ritual sacrifices to the spirits. These skilled priests were known to the Yoruba as *iyaworisha* or “wife of the orisha.” These titles indicate the influential role women played in African religion and spiritual communion with the divine.¹¹ Women of the priesthood underwent a complex training period in which they learned the rites of the gods, as well as a secret language, and were then publicly “resurrected” and initiated into the cult to start serving their community’s spiritual needs. Skilled spiritualist women in African religion were a crucial link between the worldly and divine realms— often acting as mediums to the gods via possession and the sole communicators of their wills. The community also consulted these priests to read an individual’s fate through forms of divination like reading the entrails of a fowl or water gazing.¹² Another central role of priest-diviner women was healing the sick, as illnesses were attributed to both physical and spiritual causes. Priests would use natural medicinal remedies like herbs, roots, and bark to cure the patient. They also produced portable charms and amulets (often referred to as ju-jus or gris-gris by outsiders) to prevent illness of the wearer, as well as charms placed at the entrances of villages or to safeguard dwellings.¹³

After a brief overview of West African spirituality and religious tradition, some common traits are evident. The gods (including the High

⁸ Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, p. 11.

⁹ Eugen L Rapp, “*Religion and Medicine of the Ga People*. By M. J. Field. London: Oxford University Press. 1937. Pp. Xii + 214. 17s. 6d.” p. 513–14.

¹⁰ Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, p. 13.

¹¹ Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, p. 10.

¹² Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, p. 15.

¹³ Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, p. 14.

God) and their human worshipers were intimately connected through sacrifice, divination, and spirit possession. Apart from the pantheon(s) of gods, spirits influenced daily life. The common worldview of West Africans was that of a close, interconnected relationship between the natural and supernatural—a balance which priests, who were overwhelmingly women, maintained carefully. Thus, the religious basis of enslaved Africans in the New World was an ideological framework that both recognized an unseen divine realm that governed the everyday activities of the physical plane. A religious creed that allowed, even encouraged, women to wield spiritual power and share their wisdom to help their communities. Enslaved African women would translate this foundation of religious strength into new syncretic religions—like Voodoo—to resist their oppression in the Americas.

Enslavers participating in the New World's Transatlantic Slave Trade System bolstered their control of their enslaved Africans by destroying their culture—particularly by disintegrating African spirituality through mass forced conversions to Christianity. This process began for enslaved people often even before the Middle Passage since, in theory, all captives designated for the transatlantic slave trade had to be certified as Christian before their journey. This rule was implied in King Phillip III of Spain's 1607 decree, stating that Christian conversion and religious education for all slaves was required.¹⁴ Unsurprisingly, King Phillip III's ideological framework was less a genuine worldwide mission for religious salvation and more so a false moral shield to hide the slave trade's true motivations— unrivaled money and power. The destruction of African spirituality through actions like this was done to disempower slaves from unifying through shared belief and subsequently rebelling against their masters. However, it's important to note that African religions did not suddenly die out in the Americas, nor did they remain static. African spirituality rapidly evolved during slavery, producing unique Afro-American beliefs and identities, which eventually included the development of a one-of-a-kind black-American culture. The adaptability of West African religions, which was based upon a fundamental respect for the divine in all its forms, enabled such belief systems to be open to syncretism with other world religions like Christianity to survive and thrive.

A *syncretic* religion is a belief system that emerges from blending elements of two or more distinct religious or spiritual traditions. This occurs when people from different cultures or belief systems come into close

¹⁴ Jason R. Young, *Rituals of Resistance: African Atlantic Religion in Kongo and the Lowcountry South in the Era of Slavery*. (Louisiana State University Press, 2007) p. 64.

contact— by choice or force— leading to an exchange and integration of ideas, practices, and values. Syncretism commonly arises in contexts of colonialism, migration, or trade, and results in a new religious tradition that combines aspects of its parent systems while also developing its own unique characteristics.¹⁵ Syncretic religions are typically flexible and adaptable, evolving to reflect changing cultural or societal influences. However, some modern scholars find the term *syncretic* to be illogical and problematic, as it implies that there are “pure religions” that exist, which is objectively false— religions have blended and developed from one another since the dawn of time.¹⁶ Still, syncretic religions illustrate the dynamic and evolving nature of spiritual belief systems through history and exhibit the human need for connection, personal autonomy, and higher meaning amid great pain and systemic suffering. An excellent example of an influential syncretic religion created and utilized by enslaved people was *Voodoo* in both French St. Domingue (modern-day Haiti) and subsequently New Orleans. This belief system enabled African women to fight against their exploitative circumstances under slavery.

Originating within enslaved African communities in the New World— most significantly in St. Domingue and eventually, in New Orleans— Vodou/Voudou served as an intrinsically rewarding form of rebellion against slavery for Africans, particularly for African enslaved women. For context, it is essential to note that there are at least four different meanings for this term: (a) Spelled Vodun, it refers to the traditional religion of the Fon and Ewe people residing in the modern-day Republic of Benin; (b) spelled Vodou, it is the syncretic Afro-Creole religion of Haiti; (c) commonly spelled Voodoo (in the 19th century usually spelled Voudou), it addresses the Afro-Creole counterculture religion of southern Louisiana; (d) but also Voodoo is the common term in American English for any African-derived magical or religious beliefs and practices, and it is often associated with black magic and witchcraft.¹⁷ For the purposes of this paper, only Vodou of Haiti and Voudou of New Orleans will be discussed, and the term Voodoo will be used to describe the theological and cultural commonalities of the two.

Theologically, Voodoo is centered around the worship of a distant supreme creator, *Bondye*. Spirits known as *loa* are associated with specific personal attributes and natural animistic forces and bridge the gap between

¹⁵ Jacob Pandian, “Syncretism in Religion.” *Anthropos* 101, no. 1 (2006), p. 231.

¹⁶ Jacob Pandian, “Syncretism in Religion.” *Anthropos* 101, p. 229.

¹⁷ Ina J. Fandrich, “Yorùbá Influences on Haitian Vodou and New Orleans Voodoo.” *Journal of Black Studies*, vol. 37, no. 5, 2007, p 779.

humans and the divine. The loa are central to Voodoo, as practitioners communicate with them through rituals to seek guidance, healing, and protection. Voodoo's foundation lies in the indigenous religious practices of West African peoples, particularly of the Yoruba, Fon, and Kongo, brought to the Americas during the transatlantic slave trade.¹⁸ These African spiritual traditions were then combined with Roman Catholicism, which was imposed by European slave masters under colonial law—for example, *code noir* in the French colonies.¹⁹ As more and more people were sold into the slave trade and transported to areas in the Americas—like St. Domingue—Catholic saints were equated with different loa. In Haitian Vodou, St. Patrick came to represent Damballa, and the Virgin Mary was popularly associated with Ezili Dantor.²⁰ This religious code switching enabled enslaved people to practice their faith under the guise of Catholic worship, with the two religions eventually bleeding into one another. It was this blending with Catholicism that ensured the survival of African spirituality in even the most hostile of colonial environments.

However, enslaved people fought hard to maintain African spiritual traditions through Voodoo rituals—integral community-wide events that included drumming, dancing, chanting, and offerings. Such practices served as a means of connecting with the loa and the spiritual world, just as priests in West Africa had done generations prior. Altars adorned with symbolic objects and offerings were focal points for these practices. The communal and participatory nature of Voodoo ceremonies reflects its emphasis on collectivism, the social cohesion of the family unit, and shared spiritual experience—all things that date back to traditional West African ancestor worship. This communal aspect provided spiritual practitioners—many of whom were enslaved African women—with a sense of empowerment and solidarity. In addition, due to the conditions of slave life, practitioners favored invoking certain spirits over others. For example, some enslaved Yoruba Voodoo practitioners concentrated on invoking one of the mightiest warrior spirits, Elegba, the divinity of the crossroads, during large-scale rituals in order to assist the enslaved in their fight for freedom.²¹ Voodoo quickly emerged as an act of resistance against slavery, allowing enslaved

¹⁸ Gérard A Ferère. "Haitian Voodoo: It's True Face." *Caribbean Quarterly* 24, no. 3/4 (1978), p. 40.

¹⁹ Gérard A Ferère. "Haitian Voodoo: It's True Face." *Caribbean Quarterly* 24, no. 3/4 (1978), p. 39.

²⁰ Ina J. Fandrich, "Yorùbá Influences on Haitian Vodou and New Orleans Voodoo." *Journal of Black Studies*, p. 783.

²¹ Ina J. Fandrich, "Yorùbá Influences on Haitian Vodou and New Orleans Voodoo." *Journal of Black Studies*, p. 783.

men and women to preserve their identity and foster community against all odds.

After their forced transplantation into Saint-Domingue, enslaved Africans lived through years of religious fragmentation, physically separated from their native places of worship and gods and presented with imperfect instruction in the religion of the European settlers. It was within the context of the brutal Caribbean sugar plantation economy of the 17th and 18th centuries that Haitian Vodou developed. Specific branches of Voodoo had certain theological qualities according to the societal conditions in which they operated. In the case of Haitian Vodou, the most prominent African deity that survived the Middle Passage and years of colonization was Ogou Ferrai, alternatively identified by worshipers as his Catholic symbolic representation, Saint Jacques Majeur. As a spiritual protector who is said to have governed military and political ventures, Ogou Ferrai is believed to have been a great warrior in the Haitian struggle for independence, and the revolting enslaved Africans of Haiti credited his aid for winning their freedom against the French Napoleonic army.²² St. Domingue was one of the most lucrative French colonies in the Caribbean until a slave insurrection began in 1791 and spread across the country. The rebellion finally resulted in victory in 1804, when St. Domingue became Haiti, the western hemisphere's first independent Black republic.²³

One of the most notable moments in Haitian Vodou history was the Bois Caïman (or Bwa Kayiman) ceremony, in which enslaved Africans invoked the *loa* for guidance and protection, marking a spiritual declaration of rebellion that catalyzed the Haitian Revolution. What is most remarkable about this ceremony was that it was led by a female Vodou practitioner and spiritual healer—Cécile Fatiman.²⁴ Remaining a somewhat mysterious figure in history, Fatiman was the daughter of an African slave and a Corsican Prince, with reportedly “green eyes, and long black silky hair.”²⁵ Separated from her family and sold as a slave into St. Domingue as a child, it is widely believed she freed herself along with thousands of other

²² Ina J. Fandrich, “Yorùbá Influences on Haitian Vodou and New Orleans Voodoo.” *Journal of Black Studies*, p. 783.

²³ Grete Viddal. “Vodou and Voodoo as Alternative Religion.” *Nova Religio* 26, no. 4 (2023), p. 3.

²⁴ Aisha K. Finch. “Cécile Fatiman and Petra Carabalí, Late Eighteenth-Century Haiti and Mid-Nineteenth-Century Cuba.” *Information As If She Were Free: A Collective Biography of Women and Emancipation in the Americas*, Cambridge University Press, 2020, p. 293.

²⁵ Charlier, Etienne D. *Aperçu sur la formation historique de la Nation haitienne* (Port-au-Prince: Presses Libres, 1954), 49.

enslaved people during the Haitian Revolution. As described in various historical accounts, in August of 1791, slaves from several local plantations gathered in the woods of Bois-Caïman near the region of Le Cap in the North. Fatiman presided over the ceremony— not only invoking the *loa* and paying homage to ancestral spirits with her brethren but also conducting ritual animal sacrifices of her own.²⁶ One French colonialist by the name of Antoine Métral, who witnessed the ritual, notes Fatiman’s important role in the Bois Caïman, in which she was described as “a young priestess, dressed in a white robe, plunged the sacred knife into his [a black pig’s] entrails following the customary ceremonies.”²⁷ An additional account from Haitian historian Céliney Ardouin states that after the customary animal sacrifice, Fatiman, alongside her fellow revolutionary Dutty Boukman, “swore with a dreadful oath to lead the uprising, an oath commanded by the priestess.”²⁸ Although Boukman did assist in the ceremony, Fatiman would have likely shared equal responsibility in facilitating the ceremony as a mambo— a historical detail that showcases the gender equality and female empowerment inherent to Vodou. While it is difficult to know what it meant to be a mambo in colonial St. Domingue, this role would have placed Cécile in one of the highest positions of her spiritual lineage, consecrating her as a respected leader at the Bois Caïman ceremony, tasked with spiritually defending against and resisting the brutality of slavery in St. Domingue.²⁹ All historical accounts of that day echo the same sentiment: without African spiritualist women like Cécile Fatiman, the Bois Caïman ceremony, and the resulting Haitian revolution could not have happened the way it did.

Fatiman’s leadership in the Bois Caïman ceremony exemplifies African enslaved women’s critical role within Vodou—where priestesses often served as influential community leaders and spiritual intermediaries— and highlights how Vodou empowered enslaved African women to resist oppression through spiritual means. This gathering symbolized so much more than just spiritual practice; it was a deliberate act of rebellion, providing ideological and moral cohesion for the Haitian Revolution. By

²⁶ Médéric Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et historique de la partie française de l’isle Saint-Domingue* (Port-au-Prince: Le Natal, 1983), 3.

²⁷ Antoine Métral. “Histoire de l’insurrection des esclaves dans le nord de Saint-Domingue,” F. Scherff (Paris), 1818, p. 15.

²⁸ Céliney Ardouin, *Essais sur l’histoire d’Haïti*, ed. Beaubrun Ardouin (Port-au-Prince: T. Bouchereau, 1865), p. 17-18.

²⁹ Aisha K. Finch. “Cécile Fatiman and Petra Carabalí, Late Eighteenth-Century Haiti and Mid-Nineteenth-Century Cuba.” *Information As If She Were Free: A Collective Biography of Women and Emancipation in the Americas*, p. 302.

facilitating this sacred ritual, Fatiman used Vodou during the Haitian Revolution to transform a fragmented population of enslaved Africans into a collective force against the colonial plantation system. Fatiman's role illustrates how the syncretic religion of Vodou, blending African spiritual traditions and colonial influences, became a tool for reclaiming sovereignty over the self and the community, offering enslaved women a means to fight against their intersecting oppressions of race, gender, and bondage.

The aftermath of the Haitian Revolution in 1804 was not only characterized by the dismantling of French colonial rule, but also triggered a massive migration of people to different colonial territories in the New World, including enslaved individuals, free people of color, and white colonists. For instance, approximately ten thousand migrants, originally from Saint-Domingue, more than doubled the population of New Orleans between 1809 and 1810. Many of these refugees fled to New Orleans, a city already rich in cultural diversity due to its French, Spanish, African, and Creole influences. Among the refugees were practitioners of Vodou.³⁰ Voudou rituals, such as the invocation of *Iwa*, ceremonial drumming, and ritualistic sacrifices, adapted to the urban environment of New Orleans while still retaining core elements of Haitian and West African traditions. This adaptation eventually evolved into what is now recognized as Louisiana Voodoo or *Voudou*—a distinct spirituality that remained deeply connected to its Haitian and West African roots. While Haitian Vodou maintained a focus on collective resistance and national identity, New Orleans Voudou adapted to its urban setting by emphasizing individual empowerment and creative expression. New Orleans Voudou's flexibility and adaptability illustrate its ability to thrive in a dynamic, multicultural environment. Voudou not only enriched the spiritual practices of New Orleans but also became a symbol of resilience and cultural survival for African-descended peoples in the Americas, with female practitioners like Marie Laveau emerging as cultural leaders, blending spiritual leadership with community activism.

Marie Laveau, popularly referred to as the "Voodoo Queen" of New Orleans, became a central figure in the city's Vodou tradition during the 19th century. Born in 1801 in the French Quarter as a "free mulatto" and baptized into the Catholic faith as a baby, she married a St. Domingue refugee, Jacques Paris, who intimately familiarized her with Haitian Vodou.³¹ Laveau combined her knowledge of African spiritual practices,

³⁰ Ina J. Fandrich, "Yorùbá Influences on Haitian Vodou and New Orleans Voodoo." *Journal of Black Studies*, p. 783.

³¹ Carolyn Morrow Long, "Marie Laveau: A Nineteenth-Century Voudou Priestess." *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association*, 2005, p. 270.

Catholic prayers, and herbal medicine to provide her community with spiritual guidance, healing, and protection. Beginning in the late 1820s or early 1830s, Laveau assumed leadership of a religious congregation and began to guide St. John's Eve celebrations at Lake Pontchartrain each year and hold weekly ceremonies at her home on St. Ann Street.³² Newspaper articles reported that "a house in the suburb Tremé [the neighborhood behind the Vieux Carré] has been used as a temple for certain occult practices and the idolatrous worship of an African deity called Voodoo. It is said that many slaves and some free people retired there on nights to practice superstitious, idolatrous rites, to dance, and carouse."³³ Referred to on record as "Her Majesty Queen Marie," Laveau was eventually called into the court of the Third District on July 11, 1859, for her home-based ceremonies when her neighbor, Bernardo Rodriguez, accused her of "disturbing his peace and that of the neighborhood with their fighting and obscenity and infernal singing and yelling."³⁴ Although what happened to this case remains unknown, what is evident is the plentiful community support Laveau had in her spiritual practice.

However, just as in St. Domingue, to be a Voodoo practitioner in New Orleans, especially as an African woman— free or enslaved— was dangerous business. Being white Southerners and products of a nineteenth-century environment, most outsiders fit the practice of Voodoo into their beliefs that black men and women were primitive, inferior, and not to be trusted. One of the earliest newspaper articles documenting the so-called evils of Voodoo was published in the *Louisiana Gazette* on August 16, 1820. The story notes the discovery of several illegal nighttime meetings for "occult practice and the idolatrous worship of an African deity. This article resulted in the arrest of several persons of color and fed into the popular stereotype of the perverse "sable" black woman.³⁵ Police frequently disrupted religious ceremonies and arrested participants— who were overwhelmingly female— in an attempt to curtail the city's "voodoo problem," especially during the Voodoo crackdown of 1850. By this time during the middle of the century, the demonization of Voodoo was higher and more established than ever before. In an article published in the *New Orleans Weekly Delta* on August 12, 1850, a correspondent described a commotion that erupted among a group of free Black people participating

³² Carolyn Morrow Long, "Marie Laveau: A Nineteenth-Century Voodoo Priestess." *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association*, p. 279.

³³ "Idolatry and Quackery," in *The Louisiana Gazette*, 16 August 1820.

³⁴ "Local Intelligence-Recorder Long's Court," *Daily Crescent*, July 12, 1859.

³⁵ "Idolatry and Quackery," in *The Louisiana Gazette*, 16 August 1820.

in a Voudou celebration. Receiving word of the disturbance, police “made a descent on a party of colored people, engaged in celebrating the rites and mysteries of Voudouism...No spell or incarnation which they could weave was sufficient to prevent the police from doing their duty, and so they made prisoners of the party.”³⁶ The root of white New Orleanians’ fear of Voudou was the concepts of emancipation and rebellion from Black bondage that were irreparably intertwined within the spirituality itself— and it made it even worse for white southerners that the spiritualists leading this socio-cultural rebellion were freed and enslaved women of African descent.

In another instance of police crackdown on Voudou worship, on the evening of July 30, 1860, Special Officer Long was investigating a suspicious meeting on Marais Street. When he and fellow officers entered the premises, Officer Long witnessed “about forty naked women— all colored except two— who were dancing the Voudou dance and performing rites and incantations pertaining to that ancient African superstition of Voudouism. As soon as the police entered, there was a great scattering of the nude sisterhood, notwithstanding which about twenty were arrested.”³⁷ When the case was eventually brought into court, it sparked massive controversy in the community. More than four hundred women of all colors, some practitioners, others not, appeared—twenty to fifty of those who refused to disperse were fined two dollars each. One such woman was Laveau. The twenty women arrested initially were held on bail until August 2, when all charges were dropped. Evidently, female Voudou practitioners faced oppression from police powers, yet despite the danger it attracted and with the guidance, organization, and knowledge of Laveau, Voudou in New Orleans was in equal part an avenue to which African women, both enslaved and free, could fight for their autonomy and religious expression and, in this specific case, successfully resist.

In addition to holding regular religious services, Laveau gave private consultations and made and sold *gris gris* for clients. Surprisingly, both black and white New Orleanians came to Laveau hoping to solve their problems involving love, revenge, money, health, or pending legal issues. Emancipated slaves and the lower classes in particular were especially prone to turn to the cures of Voudou doctors in lieu of the faltering public health services or the more expensive treatments.³⁸ Thus, the Voudou work of Marie Laveau became integral to the well-being of many New

³⁶ “Virgin of the Vodous,” *New Orleans Weekly Delta*, 12 Aug 1850.

³⁷ “Voudou Meeting Broken Up,” *Daily Picayune*, July 31, 1860.

³⁸ Blake Touchstone, “Voodoo in New Orleans.” *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association*, 1972, p. 382.

Orleanians, particularly African and African-descended women.³⁹ Although Laveau's work was functionally a business, clients interviewed after her death claim she was a kind and charitable woman whose fundamental purpose was serving her community. It is also reported that Laveau worked pro bono for community members in dire need of help and lacking the means to pay. According to Raymond Rivaros, "a poor woman came crying to Marie that her son was in jail, but she had no money. Marie Laveau told her to go home and not to worry. Within an hour, she came to the woman's house with the son and never asked a penny for her work."⁴⁰ This exemplifies the multifaceted resistance Marie Laveau enacted through the avenue of Voodoo. Through her spiritual authority and guided rituals, Laveau provided African and African-descended women a sense of protection, agency, and an outlet of expression to process the trauma of enslavement and its aftermath. In addition, her delicate approach with her clients, professional discretion, and her commitment to serving the most vulnerable in her community—with or without financial compensation—all challenged the social and ideological hierarchies that safeguarded slavery. Voodoo effectively allowed Laveau to advocate for the marginalized African and African-descended women, including herself and the women of her genetic line.

The two remarkable stories of both Cécile Fatiman and Marie Laveau exemplify how the syncretic religion of Voodoo empowered enslaved and freed African and African-descended women to resist their physical and ideological oppression. Fatiman's brave spiritual leadership at the Bois Caïman Vodou ceremony unified her community, transforming their collective anger and hope into a rebellion charge that created the first free black nation in the world. Similarly, Laveau's practice in New Orleans used Voodoo to shield her community and challenge racial and gender hierarchies. Through public ceremonies and private consultations, she advocated for the marginalized, empowering African and African-descended women to think more imaginatively about what they wanted their futures to look like. Voodoo enabled these women and so many others who remain unnamed within the historical narrative, to assert their agency and challenge the slave-holder mentality through means of cultural preservation and communal bonding, producing a different kind of liberty, equality, and

³⁹ Christopher L. Newman, "'Savages and Sable Subjects': White Fear, Racism, and the Demonization of New Orleans Voodoo in the Nineteenth Century." *Madison Historical Review*, Howard University, 2023, p. 14.

⁴⁰ Carolyn Morrow Long, "Marie Laveau: A Nineteenth-Century Voodoo Priestess." *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association*, p. 279.

fraternity that privileged and protected the bodies and spirits of black women for the first time in the recorded history of the New World.

The Threads of Technology: Women's Textile Labor and Technical Knowledge in China

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Abstract:

This article examines women's role in China's textile industry, and how it contributed to technological development and nation building. It highlights that women had an outsized role in constructing China's textile industry, and that the skill and practices they developed in doing so should be classified as technical knowledge. It focuses largely on the 20th century, and examines how the definition of "technical knowledge" shifted to a set of skills associated with industrialization, a process largely dominated by men. These skills were then prioritized by the state, sidelining women's historical knowledge to handicraft and factory jobs largely seen as "unskilled." This is placed in comparison with the early history of women in computer technology, as well as women's efforts in modern day online activism. This paper seeks to situate women's textile knowledge as technical in order to highlight its importance to the creation of the Chinese state, and examine how textile knowledge provides insight into relationships between women and their government.

Historically, the technical knowledge associated with textile production has formed a key part of China's construction of womanhood in relation to both civil society and the state. In cloth production, women acquired technical skills such as machine operation (through the use of machines like spinning wheels, at home looms, and later industrial looms) as well as environmental knowledge of the raw materials needed to make and process cloth, among other skills. This knowledge has, however, often escaped classification as technical, instead falling into the categories of art or handicraft. Women, and their skills, made up the vast majority of the force behind China's textile industry for centuries, an industry that was vital to the national economy. Innovation in the form of modern factories, railroads, and military technology is often heralded as a sign of a progressing, developing society. These fields are often placed squarely in the realm of "technical," a term that gives them a sense of scientific modernity associated with political progress. Why then, is women's textile work, which was also critical to nation-building in China, not included in this category?

This paper will focus on how this knowledge was produced and disseminated over the course of China's history. It will examine how industrial shifts, such as increased mechanization of cloth production in the early 20th century, and political shifts, mainly the communist revolution in 1949, altered societal perception of women's textile knowledge, as well as the boundaries of what was considered women's textile knowledge itself. As China's nation-building efforts focused increasingly on western, male dominated, and "modern" mechanical methods of cloth production, the technical knowledge that had historically been associated with women was sidelined to the realm of handicraft and unskilled labor, and the jobs considered technical were given to men. During the Mao era, this trend of sidelining technical knowledge continued, especially among rural women, who were discouraged from home spinning as agriculture became prioritized state labor. I argue that, despite state dismissals, women's textile knowledge still constitutes technical knowledge. Its relegation to unskilled labor served to devalue it economically and societally, and, as the late imperial and subsequent governments began to increasingly prioritize technical knowledge, allowed for lower compensation of women for their labor. I also engage in comparisons to the history of women in computer science, an area where women and the state take on similar roles to those seen in textile production.

Textile skills and their associated knowledge have extensive historical connections to the constructions of both womanhood in general and womanhood as it relates specifically to the Chinese state. Francesca Bray makes this connection directly, weaving together gender, technical

knowledge, and the state to create the term "gynotechnics," which she defines as "a technical system that produces ideas about women, and therefore about a gender system and about hierarchical relations in general."¹ Bray extensively details the skills that went into using the technology associated with cloth production such as spindles, spinning wheels, and weaving looms that grew increasingly complex with time and wealth. Nearly every woman had the ability to make cloth using a spindle, spinning wheel and loom, skills that require familiarity with technological processes and machine use.² Wealthier women were often able to afford larger, more complex looms, such as one that "used 120 patterning devices" to make patterned silk.³ Operating these looms meant switching out parts of the machine itself in patterns to make silk with the desired design, a task requiring a high degree of knowledge of the loom's working. These machine techniques were often invented by the women operating the looms,⁴ a clear example of technical knowledge. Both Bray and Dorothy Ko employ several specific examples of women in Imperial China who innovated new strategies for weaving and embroidery, such as Huang Daopo, "a thirteenth-century woman credited with the invention of several key cotton processing technologies including the treadle-operated multiple-spindle wheel which drastically speeded up the spinning process."⁵ The invention and creation of a new machine is a clear example of technical knowledge, and it is far from isolated. Ko describes the embroidery techniques pioneered by the Gu family, much of whose work mimicked paintings popular among male elites at the time.⁶ These advances in machine technology, techniques for increasing cloth production, and highly detailed embroidery highlight the technical nature of the skills involved in textile labor.

Bray also describes China's long history in which the production of cloth and the construction of womanhood, along with the technical knowledge produced as a result, have been one and the same. Cloth making was positioned as women's complement to men's agricultural labor, as Bray notes, "[t]he classic gender division of labor was expressed in the phrase

¹ Bray, Francesca. *Technology and gender: Fabrics of power in late imperial China*. University of California Press, 1997, 4

² Bray, *Technology and Gender*, ch. 4

³ Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 202

⁴ Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 202

⁵ Ko, Dorothy. "Epilogue: Textiles, Technology, and Gender in China." *East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine*, no. 36 (2012): 167–76.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43151280>, 168

⁶ Ko, "Epilogue," 169

'men till, women weave.'" ⁷ When applied to women, the idea of *qiao*, or practical skills, mainly meant textile arts, and "transcended class." Bray continues, "It was associated with 'womanly work,' primarily textiles: all girls were expected to learn the skills of spinning, weaving and needlework. Textiles were classed as fundamental goods, indispensable to the maintenance of the world order." ⁸ When discussing Huang Daopo, Bray states that Huang contributed immensely to the Chinese economy: "[w]hat is certain, as the fourteenth-century writer Tao Zongyi says in his short biography, is that all by herself this middle-aged woman developed a poor region into a prosperous center of cotton cultivation and manufacture." ⁹ More generally, taxes were often collected in the form of cloth, ¹⁰ meaning that a huge portion of China's women, from all socioeconomic backgrounds, contributed directly and vitally to the economy via their technical knowledge.

The skills associated with cloth production in Imperial China were wide ranging and instilled early. Bray writes "[i]n early China little girls of gentle birth were taught to spin and weave from the age of eight or nine." ¹¹ These skills were generally passed down matrilineally or through other female kinship relations. ¹² Textile production was also more generally local knowledge. Bray notes that peasant women often learned how to use more complex looms they themselves could not afford by working in the households of local noblewomen. ¹³ Women also made contributions to other forms of knowledge dissemination, such as technical literature. Dorothy Ko claims that "[i]n the field of embroidery, the first 'technical manual' that discloses stitching techniques to the point of being reproducible was authored by a gentry woman, Ding Pei, in 1821." ¹⁴ Instances like this reveal the complex realities of how textile knowledge was disseminated among women.

In the article "How China Works," Jacob Eyferth acknowledges that "many of China's most important industries, in particular, textiles, relied largely on female labor, and even elite women were encouraged to develop

⁷ Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 44

⁸ Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 47

⁹ Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 215

¹⁰ Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 186

¹¹ Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 189

¹² Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 189

¹³ Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 213

¹⁴ Ko, "Epilogue," 174

marketable skills."¹⁵ Dorothy Ko goes further into the division of skills between social classes: "[e]mbroidery with silk was deemed appropriate for genteel ladies; on a sliding scale next came weaving and spinning cotton and finally, the lowly tasks of sewing and mending. Such factors as the value of silk over cotton, the difficulty of required skills, and the extent of domestic seclusion all served to mark the 'class' status of the woman textile worker."¹⁶ Women of all classes engaged in textile labor, all of which, as established, was fundamental to the Chinese state—meaning that women's technical knowledge was a key driver of China's economic development for much of its history.

Not only do these cases provide examples of the technical knowledge produced by women engaging in textile labor, they also show how people at the time viewed it as such. Textile instructions frequently appeared with agricultural ones in technological treatises, appearing alongside descriptions and images of machines—a clear classification of textile skills as on the same level as other forms of technical knowledge.¹⁷ In addition, women's weaving rates were included in mathematical treatises, further showing the connection of this skill with those traditionally associated with technology and science.¹⁸

As China began to industrialize, women's role in the textile industry, still a key part of the Chinese state, began to change. As foreign influence in Chinese industry increased in the 19th and early 20th century, industrial textile production began to spread. While homespun cloth remained vital, especially in rural areas, urban areas increasingly supported mechanized cotton and silk mills.¹⁹ Despite this changing landscape of production, women continued to play a key role as workers in a variety of roles in the mills, all of which allowed for the creation and proliferation of new knowledge surrounding textiles. This change also took place in a context of increasing awareness of western science and technology's role in nation building.

In *Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919-1949*, author Emily Honig notes that the development of the working class occurred alongside the May Fourth Movement, a student movement that called for westernization across China's industrial and political

¹⁵ Jacob Eyferth, "Introduction," essay, in *How China Works: Perspectives on the Twentieth-Century Industrial Workplace* (Routledge, 2009), 1–19, 8

¹⁶ Ko, "Epilogue," 171

¹⁷ Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 185

¹⁸ Bray, *Technology and Gender*, 197

¹⁹ Emily Honig, *Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919-1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1999).

sectors.²⁰ One of the movement's publications, *New Youth*, even conducted a special investigation into women's recruitment into jobs in the cotton mills. She also notes that the "cotton industry was the most modern of the so-called modern enterprises in Shanghai."²¹ By connecting the primarily female-staffed cotton mills with science and modernity, and with the nationalist movements that prized it above all else, Honig emphasizes women's role in this development as practitioners and disseminators of technical knowledge.

But Honig also emphasizes that women were not understood in this way at the time by the power structures around them. She notes that men were "technicians, machine repairers and electricians." Their women coworkers, however, "did the unskilled jobs: they were machine operators."²² This differentiation means that at this point, women's technical knowledge around cloth production was already being devalued. Women weavers were "considered skilled only after two years of work."²³ Weaving, a skill that had previously been almost exclusively women's domain, was now subject to legitimation by male and often western dominated workplaces. Despite their role in bringing about western industrial and scientific modernity, women mill workers were not seen as possessing scientific or technical knowledge.

But this knowledge still existed. In the mills, women gained knowledge of how to operate and even sometimes fix machines. As an example of this, Honig describes the tasks involved in one part of the mill: "They placed six cans of slivers on one side of the drawing frame and fed the end of each strand into the machine. Occasionally, a sliver broke. Then the machine automatically stopped, the operator repaired the broken sliver and reset the machine." Later, "on one side of the slubber women moved cans of slivers into place. A woman doing this had to first thread the sliver onto the slubber, and then pull a lever that started the machine. Occasionally, a sliver broke and she then quickly rejoined the ends by rubbing them together between her palms."²⁴ Tasks like this required focus, quick thinking and an in-depth knowledge of the machinery in question, highlighting the technical nature of the knowledge women acquired inside the mills.

Traditional local knowledge networks were also adapted to new industrial environments. While men received formal education and training

²⁰ Honig, *Sisters and Strangers*, 1

²¹ Honig, *Sisters and Strangers*, 3

²² Honig, *Sisters and Strangers*, 56

²³ Honig, *Sisters and Strangers*, 48

²⁴ Honig, *Sisters and Strangers*, 43-44

in textile manufacturing, women developed their own methods of education: "Often a woman who held a regular job at a mill helped her sibling or relative sneak in, to learn the skills involved in textile production." This was done via the altering or swapping of identification cards the female employees held.²⁵ Once snuck inside, untrained girls gave workers an opportunity to rest, as "[s]cores of young girls brought into the spinning room by friends or relatives were grateful to be given an opportunity to practice piecing."²⁶ The informal, often familial nature of knowledge dissemination practiced in the mills was not far from its earlier (and contemporary rural) origins of sitting down to learn spinning from a relative or local noblewoman. Despite knowledge classifications at the time, women were as central to industrial and scientific modernity as they had been to earlier imperial systems. Technical knowledge was developed and disseminated in much the same way as it always had been, and the skills associated with loom work were preserved in practice, but not in societal respect.

Textiles are not the only technological field in which women have had a significant role, a particularly similar example being that of computer technology. Women's roles in the development of computers are, in many ways, similar to their roles in textile technology. This can be seen down to the machinery itself—early computer models took inspiration from complex weaving looms, especially the Jacquard loom, which could "store and process information at unprecedented speed and volume," and served as the basis for Charles Babbage's Analytical Engine.²⁷ As Sadie Plant writes, "The loom is the vanguard site of software development."²⁸ Plant also notes a specific Chinese connection in this history: "Even the drawloom, which is often dated back to the China of 1000 BC, involves sophisticated orderings of warp and weft if it is to produce the complex designs common in the silks of this period. This means that 'information is needed in large amounts for the weaving of a complex ornamental pattern. Even the most ancient Chinese examples required that about 1500 different warp threads be lifted in various combinations as the weaving proceeded.'"²⁹ These looms, which, as Francesca Bray notes, were almost exclusively used by women, highlight the long history of technical knowledge women

²⁵ Honig, *Sisters and Strangers*, 140

²⁶ Honig, *Sisters and Strangers*, 145

²⁷ Sadie Plant, "The Future Looms: Weaving Women and Cybernetics," *Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological Embodiment*, 1995, 45–64, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446250198.n3>, 51

²⁸ Plant, "The Future Looms," 46

²⁹ Plant, "The Future Looms," 51

possess and its connection to modern computer science, which is often thought of as one of the most intensely technical forms of knowledge one can possess.

Women had much the same hand in the advancement of computer technology that they did in textile technology: early innovators whose labor was pushed to the sidelines as the market grew and changed. From early figures like Ada Lovelace and Grace Murray Hopper, who pioneered the field of computer programming, women played an instrumental role in the development of computer technology. In the article "When Computers Were Women," Jennifer S. Light documents the history of female programmers during WWII, and argues that, during this period, computer labor became feminized and therefore lost its technological value, not unlike the labor performed by women in Shanghai's cotton mills. The term computer itself, Light states, was originally used to refer to women working on ballistics calculations for the United States military,³⁰ in the same way weaving and womanhood were often synonymous in imperial China. Mechanized cotton production and WWII computer programming share yet more similarities, as Light writes that "designing hardware was a man's job; programming was a woman's job. Each of these gendered parts of the project had its own clear status classification. Software, a secondary, clerical task, did not match the importance of constructing the ENIAC and getting it to work."³¹ This is not far from the gendered differences in the cotton mills. Similar to the technical knowledge required to operate a loom, Light asserts that "it would be hard to argue that deskilling accompanied mechanization...The six ENIAC operators understood not only the mathematics of computing but the machine itself. That project leaders and historians did not value women's technical knowledge fits the scholarly perception of a contradiction between the work actually performed by women and the way others evaluate that work."³² In popular media, women's roles were relegated to the most basic tasks. Light cites one photo spread: "[s]etting switches,' 'plugging cables,' and 'standing at function tables— such captions understate the complexities of women's work. While two men appear alongside the operators, they are 'maintenance engineers,' occupational titles suggesting technical expertise."³³ Light also argues that the job of programming was already aligned with gendered ideas of

³⁰ Jennifer S. Light, "When Computers Were Women," *Technology and Culture* 40, no. 3 (1999): 455–83, <https://doi.org/10.1353/tech.1999.0128>, 455

³¹ Light, "When Computers were Women," 469

³² Light, "When Computers were Women," 471

³³ Light, "When Computers were Women," 477

"women's work" (secretarial or clerical work),³⁴ again paralleling the historical construction of weaving as women's work in China.

By examining these histories side by side, the treatment of women's technical knowledge becomes clear. From the material to the digital, women play foundational roles, weaving fabric and operating computers, but these roles' association with women comes at the cost of their status as technical knowledge, especially as the objects they are associated with gain importance to society and the economy. This can be seen in the shift from women as contributing different but equally valuable labor in the form of textiles, to women as "machine operators" working below male technicians in the Shanghai mills. It can also be seen in the very definition of computers shifting from women who did math to a machine that was constructed and programmed by men.

After 1949, the fabric of women's relationship with technology and the Chinese state changed once again. Textiles remained a crucial export for China, their production now inextricably woven into its technological and industrial development. Jacob Eyferth notes that "[t]extile sales to the Soviet Union and its allies paid for the import of Soviet machinery and equipment; exports in the early 1960s paid for the grain that saved China's cities from starvation."³⁵ This resulted in a shift in the gender-technical labor connection: in the eyes of the state, cotton cultivation, rather than weaving or spinning, became viewed as feminine labor, "as women were expected to be more pliable and more easily trained in the intensive cultivation methods promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture."³⁶ Since homespun cloth was no longer of direct economic value, it was no longer seen as beneficial work for women to engage in. The state began to claim that women were uniquely suited to cotton cultivation, due to both the physical nature of their bodies and the fact that their longstanding familiarity with textiles would predispose them to working with the raw materials of cloth production.³⁷ Here, the state co-opted women's existing technical knowledge to divert it into a new field. Women learned through local organizations like Women's Federations how to cultivate cotton, their knowledge undergoing an expansion and shift at the behest of the state.³⁸

³⁴ Light, "When Computers were Women," 455

³⁵ Jacob Eyferth, "State Socialism and the Rural Household: How Women's Handloom Weaving (and Pig-Raising, Firewood-Gathering, Food-Scavenging) Subsidized Chinese Accumulation," *International Review of Social History* 67, no. 2 (2022): 231–49, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020859021000717>, 242

³⁶ Eyferth, "State Socialism," 244

³⁷ Eyferth, "State Socialism," 244

³⁸ Eyferth, "State Socialism," 244

This emphasis on cloth as an export highlights that the Chinese state valued what had historically been women's labor and, by diverting their efforts to cotton cultivation, sought to maintain the connection between women and textiles while also maintaining the state prioritization of agriculture.

In "Less for More: Rural Women's Overwork and Underconsumption in Mao's China," Eyferth also argues that women's time engaging in homespun cloth making was considered a distraction from women's capacity to engage in agricultural labor. This was problematic, considering textiles were the basis for both financial and social relationships throughout the countryside. Cloth "functioned as a cash equivalent—a universal means of storing, measuring, and exchanging value...large quantities of textiles were exchanged as bride price and dowry, and many important events, from births to funerals, involved gifts of textiles."³⁹ Women's technical knowledge of spinning and weaving created the social and financial underpinning for rural life, meaning that the discouragement of hand spinning as the emphasis on collective manufacturing and time devoted to agricultural labor increased caused a massive socioeconomic disruption. This, again, highlights the importance of the technical knowledge produced by clothmaking to Chinese society, even if it was no longer directly acknowledged. As Eyferth points out in the introduction to *How China Works*, women who were forced into agricultural jobs often lost a highly skilled and prestigious source of income, an enforced loss of knowledge to conform to the state apparatus. This provides another example of women's existing technical knowledge—cloth making—being sidelined to make room for agricultural knowledge to fit state needs.⁴⁰

But due to the state's inability to produce sufficient cloth for both domestic and export needs, many rural women continued to spin, weave and sew for their families, often on top of grueling agricultural work. Women used substitute materials, such as cotton that was unsuitable for state textile manufacturing, to make homespun cloth where manufactured cloth fell short. Despite the discouragement of home spinning, Jacob Eyferth argues that this substitution was accepted by the state, and indeed was incorporated into the official strategy of underconsumption.⁴¹ Women's knowledge of their environment was assumed: women were thought to be invariably able to find substitutes to make ends meet. In addition, while much of the cotton cultivated was sold to the state, women, often solely responsible for clothing

³⁹ Jacob Eyferth, "Less for More: Rural Women's Overwork and Underconsumption in Mao's China." *Clio. Women, Gender, History*, no. 41 (2015): 65–84.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26273630>, 70

⁴⁰ Eyferth, Introduction, *How China Works*, 10

⁴¹ Eyferth, "State Socialism," 241

their families, developed methods of diverting cotton to use for home needs. These included leaving cotton out in the fields in the rain to discolor it and make it industrially unusable.⁴² This demonstrates a profound informal knowledge of the raw materials and natural conditions surrounding cloth production, as well as the preservation of technical skills despite state repression. But the relationship between women's labor and the state during this period was not just one of defiance. Eyferth asserts that, through this creative substitution and preservation of the skills necessary to produce homespun cloth, "rural women's work at the wheel and the loom made it possible for the People's Republic [of China] to enter the global textile market, and thus begin its long climb towards its current position as an industrial superpower," demonstrating the crucial importance of women in supporting the national economy as well.⁴³

It is important to highlight that women's textile knowledge was not universally devalued with the rise of mechanized cloth production. A notable exception to this trend is Hao Jianxiu, a worker in a state-run cotton mill in Qingdao, Shandong province. Hao began working at 13, and was named a national model worker due to her work methods in the textile mill at which she was employed. She was then sent to East China Textile Engineering University and formally educated in the craft, after which she became an important political figure in Qingdao's trade unions and Women's Federation.⁴⁴ Hao's celebrated success in textile labor and state sponsored technical education highlight an example of women's labor being legitimated as technical knowledge in the eyes of the state, and, in cases such as these, translated into them gaining political power.

⁴² Eyferth, "State Socialism," 247

⁴³ Eyferth, "State Socialism," 248

⁴⁴ "Hao Jianxiu," *China Vitae: Biography of Hao Jianxiu*, accessed December 10, 2023, https://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Hao_Jianxiu.



Figure 1: *Hao Jianxiu, Who Created a Scientific Working Method*⁴⁵

This may or may not pose a larger question regarding the role of the rural-urban divide in the classification of women's textile labor. Although it is clear that rural women's textile work was treated as unskilled or even unnecessary, the classification of urban factory women workers remains murkier. Aside from women like Hao Jianxiu, many state propaganda posters show urban women workers in technical roles.

⁴⁵ Tianye Dong, *Hao Jianxiu, Who Created a Scientific Working Method*, November 1953, *Chinese Posters*, November 1953, BG C32/475 (chineseposters.net, IISH collection).



Figures 2 and 3: *Technological Innovation Makes Red Flowers Blossom*⁴⁶ and *A Cotton Grower Comes to Visit*⁴⁷

The poster to the left, titled "technological innovation makes red blossoms bloom," places women at the forefront of mechanized textile innovation. The second poster, "a cotton grower comes to visit," shows urban women textile workers showing rural workers around a mill, clearly more familiar with the machine technology. Although this deeper issue is outside the scope of this paper, it nonetheless begs the question of how rural-urban work played into the classification of women's textile labor as technical versus not technical. What was the classification of a hand-operated loom versus a mechanical one? Why was one labeled a handicraft and the other an indicator of a technological future?

Historical women's labor is technical. Knowledge of how to spin thread using a spindle and wheel, operate and fix a loom, and sew intricate embroidery is as technical as building the machine or factory itself. Women's labor and technical innovations drove China's key textile industry for thousands of years and continued to do so into the 20th century, even as the labor landscape changed drastically around them. Machine inventions like that of Huang Daopo, the women who powered Shanghai's cotton mills, and the preservation of hand spinning skills by rural women made countless

⁴⁶ Xinfu Cheng and Ming Jin, *Technological Innovation Makes Red Flowers Blossom*, October 1975, *Chinese Posters*, October 1975, BG E13/897 (chineseposters.net, Landsberger collection).

⁴⁷ Hejiang Xin, *A Cotton Grower Comes to Visit*, November 1965, *Chinese Posters*, November 1965, BG E15/271 (chineseposters.net, Landsberger collection).

contributions to China's economy for thousands of years, contributions that often went unseen. Today, technical knowledge and skills are often given prestige in public opinion and prioritized by the state. Re-classifying textile labor as technical brings women to the forefront of the nation they helped build, and puts their work within its proper context in China's history.

Greeley, Colorado: Fallen Utopia

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Abstract:

Greeley, Colorado: Fallen Utopia provides a historical account of a colony turned proverbial factory on the Great Plains. The narrative tracks the early origins of Greeley as an optimistic venture for East Coast utopians, seeking to manufacture a self-sustaining, pseudo-socialist site of Christian temperance and morality in the growing American West of the 1800s. Born as an ideological experiment by New York newsman Horace Greeley, managed by his disciple and town manager Nathaniel Meeker, the project faced major hurdles in achieving its stated goals. The internal mismanagement, unwelcoming terrain, and financial woes of the Union Colony ultimately handicapped the project, succumbing to the broader draw of external forces. The latter half of the paper tracks the region's full-throated embrace of local, national, and later global markets, a far-cry from the self-contained system once dreamt of by its progenitors. As certain utopian precepts faded, the foundational exclusionary ideology maintained and evolved to match the ever-fluid labor environment. Tracking the city's history through the twentieth century, its enthusiastic pursuit of capital, first through sugar beets, later cattle, and finally oil, portended pronounced side-effects for residents, industrial laborers, and regional ecosystems.

Resting some 30 miles east of the Colorado Rocky Mountains and 50 miles north of Denver lies a sprawling city of about 100,000 amidst a landscape peppered with industrial ranches and hydraulic fracking equipment. Greeley, Colorado named after famed *New York Tribune* publisher Horace Greeley, stands as a far cry from the bucolic images of snowcapped mountains and idyllic sceneries non-Coloradoans impose on the state. Nor does it resemble the booming urban Front Range corridor, sprawling nearly uninterrupted from the expansive Denver metro up north along the base of the foothills following Interstate 25. Rather, the city exists as a departure point from urban life, a last stop before entering the unending sea of wheat and grass to its north and east, reaching outward to sparsely populated prairies of Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, and beyond.

On paper, the city of Greeley and its metropolitan area may appear unremarkable, one of many Colorado municipalities experiencing decades of continued population growth. The western half of the city and surrounding exurbs boast acres of twenty-first century suburban housing developments, jutting starkly out of the barren plains. Inside these neighborhoods reside well-paid workers and managers in the oil and gas industry, drawn in by the region's fracking boom. Furthermore, the city is home to a vibrant arts and culture scene, with the University of Northern Colorado boasting a renowned music department and hosting an annual jazz festival, drawing in thousands of artists internationally. Once the Colorado Teacher's College, the university churns out hundreds of graduates from their education program, producing future generations of Colorado teachers and school administrators.

Yet despite these nominal markers of success, an undercurrent of economic and political isolation characterizes Greeley's solitary ethos. Beyond the recent uptick in oil and gas production, the ranching and meatpacking industry historically defined the city's identity, recognized as a global leader in beef output. In the outlying communities of Ault and Eaton just north of the city span acres of feeding lots, densely packed from end to end with cows destined for slaughter. The fumes from the industrial stockyards and meatpacking operations create an ambient brown fog and pernicious odor, carried far across the region by the blustery prairie winds. The name 'Greeley' has become synonymous with the foul stench of its leading industry for many Northern Coloradoans, a stain and unavoidable consequence of their keystone commodity.

As such, the investment from budding tech companies, the paragons of 21st century economic prosperity, found abundantly along the Front Range has largely elided Weld County, limiting the well-educated, high-pay workforce flocking to neighboring towns and suburbs. The aesthetic

dullness of the plains paired with the olfactory assault upon entering the city has imbued the city with an unyielding notoriety among its neighbors. Furthermore, the two prevailing industries have assured that while the rest of the state unapologetically embraces a broadly liberal sub-culture and pseudo-Californian ethos, Greeley and Weld County remain rigidly conservative, unwaveringly loyal to purported free market ideals and business interests. Growing cultural divisions between Northeast Colorado and the state's diversifying and increasingly urban Front Range have generated an underlying resentment for state governance with rumblings of secessionism cropping up in the 2010s.¹

Greeley's modern reputation as the black sheep (or cow) of Northern Colorado starkly differs from the city's envisioned future as a frontier colony. Greeley's conception came from deliberate and conscious planning in what represented a novel experiment of western settlement. While adjacent towns cropped up from military outposts, labor camps, or stops along the railroad, Greeley originated as the Union Colony, founded in 1870 by journalist and homesteader Nathaniel Meeker, with the eponymous Horace Greeley lending support and consultation to the project. While others came west with idealized visions of building a utopia, perhaps most famously the Mormons to Utah, the Union Colony arose from an Edenic mythos of western agrarianism crafted by Greeley and his contemporaries, built off ideological themes and doctrines borrowed from French utopian socialist Charles Fourier. Yet this early dream of utopia was short-lived, soon shifting away from the exclusionary restrictions for settlement and tight colonial control planned by its benefactors. Post-colonial era the settlement shifted toward a full-throated willingness to embrace the economic demands of the burgeoning Colorado territorial economy. Their foray into the market started first with agricultural production, particularly of sugar beets. In the early to mid-twentieth century, technological developments in ranching and increased post-World War II demand for beef facilitated the development of commercialized industrial factory feed lots throughout the county. Finally, the oil and gas presence has moved to the forefront of Weld County's economic prospects with the advent of shale fracking technology.

This paper probes into the evolution of Greeley, Colorado, from a late nineteenth century vision of American agrarian utopianism into a proverbial factory for the state and country, generating society's "fuel" first through sugar beets, later mass production of beef, and in time literal fuel through fracking. These economic endeavors came at the cost of idyllic

¹ Morgan Gstalter, "Group in Colorado County Seeks Secession from State to Join Wyoming," *The Hill*, January 29, 2021

land, an affluent, well-educated workforce, and, in turn, the loss of glamorous trappings of the materialist, capitalist lifestyle found replete throughout Colorado's Front Range corridor. Beneath this evolution lies a history of begrudging acceptance of "foreign" groups who dually served as necessary labor for the region's principal industries while facing oppression and systemic racism from the community. Greeley as a city represents a fascinating microcosm of the currents of modern capitalism through the twentieth century as conventional conceptions of labor and production eroded and the distinction between material and post-material labor intensified.

THE COLONY

In December 1869, longtime agricultural correspondent for the *New York Tribune* Nathaniel Meeker returned from a journey West, reporting back to the Union Colony Association on the prospect of establishing a colony in the Colorado Territory. He eagerly proclaimed to the association and later to the next week's readers of the *Tribune*, "A location which I have seen is well watered with streams and springs, there are beautiful pine groves, the soil is rich, the climate is healthful, grass will keep stock the year round, coal and stone are plentiful, and a well-traveled road runs through the property." Meeker's employer and mentor Horace Greeley, a staunch advocate for Western expansion, perhaps known best for his possibly misattributed "Go West, Young Man" quote, readily supported the proposal. The *Tribune* rapidly published an open call for "temperate, moral, industrious, intelligent men," circulating the message to the approximately 300,000 variations across Greeley's associated publications.² While the concept of a frontier "colony" far predated Meeker's plan, the sponsorship and direct promotion by a national news figure like Greeley lent credence through his financial and rhetorical backing, generating widespread interest among *Tribune* readers and prospective colonists. Greeley foresaw the town as a model for a moral, Christian society, hoping to spare young American men from what he described as the "blight and moral rot" of northern cities and "wastelands" of the South.³ From the outset, the Union Colony Association envisioned the Colorado settlement as a pilot program, with aspirations of it modelling future developments elsewhere throughout the Western plains. In his proposal, Meeker asserted, "In the success of this colony a model will be presented for settling the remainder of the vast

² James Willard, *The Union Colony at Greeley, Colorado, 1869-1871 - Volume 1* (W. F. Robinson Printing Co, 1918), 10.

³ James M. Lundberg, *Horace Greeley: Print, Politics, and the American Conflict* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019), 57.

territory of our country.”⁴ When responding to reader-submitted questions to the *Tribune*, Greeley recommended the formation of similar colonies, advocating for “ten thousand like this, or as much better as can be devised.”⁵ As an homage to his influence on the project, Meeker granted the colony Greeley’s name, indelibly marrying the newsman’s legacy with the Colorado town.

The colony Executive Committee began by organizing a Locating Committee, tasked with finding an ideal location for settlement.⁶ After entertaining sites near Pikes Peak and along the Arkansas River, deeming the regions too arid or unsuited to a large agricultural venture, the crew of four men settled on the Cache la Poudre River valley to the north of Denver. They briefly entertained the idea of selecting the then Weld County seat of Evans but rejected the notion on the basis that the existing “railroad building population” were incongruent with the colonists’ core ideological value of temperance, further concerned that the colony would lack enforcement power over municipal liquor regulation.⁷ These considerations stood as an early indicator of the colonists’ exclusionary approach, sternly refusing incorporation by outsiders into their utopia.

Notably, despite the colonial enterprise being advertised by proponents as an exploration of untouched frontier land, Weld County already housed a sparse array of early settlers. The area had previously seen disparate settlement by optimistic independent homesteaders, French fur traders, miners enroute to the mountains, and the aforementioned railroad builders of the Denver-Cheyenne line in Evans.⁸ This cohort of Weld County residents posed a hurdle to the scheming Easterners, who complained that “much difficulty was experienced in buying up the claims of the squatters.”⁹ Against campaigning from *Rocky Mountain News* editor and Colorado real estate advocate William Byers to fold old settlers into the Union Colony, Meeker and the Locating Committee sternly refused, deliberately acquiring property from locals without expressly stating their grand vision.¹⁰ While indigenous Ute and Arapaho had been displaced to the western third of the state in the years preceding the colony, the Greeley-Meeker settlement required additional evictions of first-generation settlers

⁴ David Boyd, *A History: Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado* (Greeley Tribune Press, 1890), 33.

⁵ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 84.

⁶ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 39.

⁷ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 40.

⁸ Richard Hogan, *Class and Community in Frontier Colorado* (University Press of Kansas, 2021), 79.

⁹ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 43.

¹⁰ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 42.

to the plains. Finally, despite Greeley's reputation as a leading East Coast abolitionist before and during the Civil War, he argued that western territory "shall be reserved for the benefit of the white Caucasian race."¹¹ While not explicitly stated in its founding charter, the Union Colony's selective screening process for its members guaranteed a homogenously white constituency of prospective settlers, specifically those with identified upstanding Christian morals and principles. The firm commitment to purity in the composition of the colony, as laid out by its progenitors, allowed no space or flexibility for the unchosen.

The movement's ideological roots originated from Meeker and Greeley's interpretation of the writings and ideology of French socialist Charles Fourier, an advocate for cooperative agricultural communities or "phalanxes." These communities sought to be self-supportive and a replacement for competitive capitalism, promoting cooperative enterprise that guaranteed basic security and prosperity for workers through shared production and services. His strain of socialist thought deviated from leftist contemporaries as it sought to "conserve property, position, and hereditary rights" while also placing emphasis on "universal harmony, flowing from and centering in God."¹² Greeley reproduced Fourier's rhetoric in the *New-York Tribune*, contending that "cooperative agriculture could be, with the proper group discipline, far more productive and personally satisfying than traditional (individual) farming endeavors."¹³ Prior to the conception of the Union Colony, Greeley dedicated ample time to promoting Fourier-modeled settlements throughout the U.S. and abroad in his *Tribune*.¹⁴ Several experimental phalanxes cropped up in the U.S. through the 1830s and '40s, with Meeker serving as a participant in the Trumbull Phalanx in Ohio. Meeker left the failed phalanx disillusioned with key tenets of Fourier's utopian principles, namely the values of communal living and a common fund, stating, "I learned [at Trumbull] how much cooperation people would bear."¹⁵ In his outline for the Union Colony, Meeker saw fit to eschew these aspects of Fourier's vision, believing he could quell the unproductivity and sloth he identified in Trumbull by thoroughly screening applicants for the program. Meeker sought to correct Trumbull's shortcomings by recruiting "temper[ate] men of good character," making

¹¹ William L. Katz, *The Black West*. (Simon & Schuster, 1987), 48.

¹² Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 14.

¹³ Peter Decker, *The Utes Must Go! American Expansion and the Removal of a People* (Fulcrum Publishing, 2004), 75.

¹⁴ Adam Tuchinsky, *Horace Greeley's New-York Tribune: Civil War-Era Socialism and the Crisis of Free Labor* (Cornell University Press, 2009), 185.

¹⁵ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 76.

residency in the community contingent on one's perceived moral standing.¹⁶ In doing so, he sought to guarantee success for his personal project in Colorado by doing away with varied communal institutions and imposing strict expectations for the backgrounds and behavior of those involved.

The anatomy and envisioned infrastructure of the Union Colony still aimed to infuse select Fourier based precepts into Meeker's vision for a productive center of self-sufficiency. From the start, Meeker opposed most forms of communal infrastructure in the colony, specifically shared living and dining spaces that had defined earlier American Fourier-based ventures. Greeley put forth a vision of patchwork independent farming for the colony, operating with cooperative methods (such as shared services, bartering of goods) but without cooperative returns (no community chest, no social security mechanisms). He went a step further, opposing the construction of a proper "town," arguing that cooperation should take place absent a central business hub. Upon visiting the Union Colony for the first time in 1870, he expressed dismay at the efforts and funds that had gone into building up the town rather than the wide swaths of unused potential farmland.¹⁷ His vision stood in an almost radical defiance to the von Thünen model of the city which posited a geographic model of centralized economic productivity with surrounding regional development contingent on ease and cost of transport from the central hub.¹⁸ The amalgamated Meeker-Greeley vision for the colony demonstrated a warped, selective application of Fourier's ideology, trading in community-based phalanxes for independent, nominally cooperative farms that perpetuated the competitive capitalist model he sought to replace. Their project sought to infuse the American, particularly western, ethos of individualism into the community as a guiding tenet.

Once in Colorado, colonists had to grapple with the seemingly incompatible promise of independent, self-sufficient farming while serving as participants in a larger investment scheme by East Coast capitalists. Within a year of its founding, Illinois lawyers A.E. Searles and George Augustus Hobbs returned to their hometown of Geneseo, IL decrying the failures of Greeley and warning all interested parties to beware. Publishing a screed in their local paper, *The Republic*, Searles qualified Greeley as, "the last place on the face of this terrestrial ball that any human being should contemplate to remove," further deriding it as "a delusion, a snare, a cheat,

¹⁶ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 82.

¹⁷ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 82.

¹⁸ William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (W.W. Norton, 1992). 46.

a swindle.”¹⁹ Much of Searles’s criticism circulated around the mismanagement and seeming unfamiliarity with the basics of civilization-building among colonial leaders. Additionally, the desire and promise of self-rule and isolation were frequently stymied by stratified levels of bureaucracy (state, county, and federal governments) and corporate interests (local ranchers, the Denver Pacific railroad, and land speculators) hindering the illusory self-governance promoted by Greeley and Meeker.²⁰ These amalgamated forces posed significant hurdles in the colony’s ability to determine water rights, participate in local markets, and dictate municipal/colony legislation. Colonial managers, comprised primarily of early Greeley farmers, struggled to share power with the Weld County government, an entity largely under the control of ranchers, reviving an age-old Western feud between farmers and ranchers, with disagreement over water rights and fencing. The well-established rural livestock interests had built political capital in the county before the establishment of Greeley and the emergence of an organized agricultural sector, leading to an inevitable impasse regarding the region’s economic future.²¹ As with previous “outsiders,” the cowmen possessed a lifestyle looked down upon by the men of the East, rife with consumption of alcohol, indiscriminate intercourse, and general mischief.²²

Beyond structural barriers to the colony’s success, the bureaucracy of the colony, under Meeker’s leadership, proved inept at financial and administrative management. Their attempt at implementing an irrigation system through canals led to widespread flooding in the colony’s business district while leaving intended farm acreage untouched and arid. These issues were only exacerbated by a drought and grasshopper infestation in the first year of production, crippling their planned primary industry.²³ From the outset, the economic conditions in the colony were unsteady. The buy-in for the project was roughly \$1,000 for each settler, supplemented by \$90,000 from Greeley himself, enough to get the project off the ground and purchase the necessary land. However, presumed support from other wealthy investors, aside from noted circus proprietor P.T. Barnum, failed to materialize, leaving the enterprise in a precarious financial position. This problem was only exacerbated by the continual departures from the colony, as many settlers were met with disappointment at the disorganized condition of the colony and unmet promises from the heavily propagandized ads in

¹⁹ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 52.

²⁰ Hogan, *Class and Community in Frontier Colorado*, 101.

²¹ Hogan, *Class and Community in Frontier Colorado*, 81.

²² Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 58.

²³ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 84.

the *Tribune*. Furthermore, many who had invested in the colony, with hopes of one day relocating to a thriving community, pulled out of the floundering operation before resettlement, worsening the colony's dire situation.²⁴

The Union Colony ended its first full calendar year with over \$10,000 in debt and no feasible path toward paying it off.²⁵ Amid dwindling numbers of colonists, Meeker remained averse to outsized immigration, prioritizing strict control of colony membership over economic expansion.²⁶ While Greeley and Meeker remained steadfast in their vision, other leaders within the colony became disillusioned and open to municipal rather than colonial government. Political pressure escalated as a reform party emerged to oppose the muddled governance of the Colony, led by General Robert Cameron, a Civil War veteran, colony vice president, and advocate for increased immigration and capital investment.²⁷ As the founder and proverbial "father" of the colony, Meeker found himself culpable for the widespread ills of the colony, scrutinized from both sides by colonists and his financiers in the East who similarly witnessed the shortcomings and limited returns of the utopian experiment. Meeker began transitioning away from the governance of the colony to his role as publisher of the colony's paper, *The Greeley Tribune*, ultimately departing the city in 1878 to serve as U.S. Agent for the White River Ute reservation.²⁸ In the decade following, the city incorporated as a municipality, shedding its colonial origins, later winning a drawn-out political fight to supplant Evans as the county seat.²⁹ Under reformist rule, the city of Greeley situated itself as an emergent regional economic hub with surrounding ranches and farming operations well-positioned for expansion.

In examining the early history of the Union Colony, the displacement of indigenous peoples to facilitate the settlement of white easterners requires deliberate, considerate attention, given explicit parallels between the exclusionary utopian vision and American imperialist sentiment toward indigenous displacement. Much like Greeley's avowed opposition to Black western settlement, he espoused shamelessly racist attitudes toward the indigenous population on the frontier. Amid the decades-long conquest of the American West, spearheaded by Manifest Destiny and rhetoric from Greeley and his contemporaries, states like Colorado had already made a concerted effort to address the "Indian

²⁴ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 85.

²⁵ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 84.

²⁶ Hogan, *Class and Community in Frontier Colorado*, 99.

²⁷ Hogan, *Class and Community in Frontier Colorado*, 97.

²⁸ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 91.

²⁹ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 175.

problem.” Greeley possessed a rich history of anti-indigenous sentiment, describing the American Indian as “a slave of appetite and sloth, never emancipated from the tyranny of [one’s] animal passion[s],” further alleging, “These people must die out—there is no help for them. God has given this earth to those who will subdue and cultivate it, and it is vain to struggle against His righteous decree.”³⁰ Greeley’s rhetoric that bordered on an explicit call for Indian genocide seeped into the xenophobic undertones of the Union Colony. Speaking on the possible threats posed to the colony by neighboring indigenous peoples, Greeley argued “no fears need to be entertained” regarding “danger from the Indians,” assuring prospective settlers that young men of the colony would readily step up in defense.³¹ When Colorado attained statehood in 1876, politicians treated “the removal of Indian tribes, by force if necessary,” as a guiding tenet of their new government.³² In 1869, the same year of Meeker’s visit to the state, the Colorado Ute signed a treaty confining their statewide population to the reservations, covering roughly the Western third of the state, displacing the few who remained in Northeast Colorado.

Meeker possessed his own strain of prejudice against the Ute, speaking often of their inferiority to the white race in their ability to work, suggesting an innate inability to organize or develop systems and structures, arguing that they were “without brain.”³³ However, he took a more proselytizing, assimilationist tone, playing into themes of reform and domestication of savagery, an outlook that led to his consideration for U.S. Agent for the Ute territory, arguing his goals of “Christianizing” Ute culture and practices. U.S. Agents for native reservations were administrative roles, in essence the designated federal bureaucrat supervising a given territory. After a prolonged deliberation process, involving the newly formed state’s two senators and governor, Meeker’s nomination to the position came in part from his record as a “foe of communal [land] arrangements,” and “advocate of individual ownership.”³⁴ Paralleling his paternalistic bravado that prematurely presumed prosperity for the Union Colony, Meeker firmly believed in his ability to reform the Ute, pointing to his time in Greeley, arguing in his application, “I have been laboring for seven years in a philanthropic way in organizing these people.”³⁵ Convincingly persuaded of the transposability of Meeker’s organizational acumen, he received the

³⁰ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 81.

³¹ Willard, *The Union Colony at Greeley, Colorado, 1869-1871*, 11.

³² Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 93.

³³ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 28.

³⁴ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 96.

³⁵ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 92.

appointment from President Rutherford B. Hayes and set to work on his task of asserting American hegemonic power over the Ute people.

In his time as U.S. agent, Meeker sought to quash the Ute's horse-oriented culture, teach "Western" agricultural practices, preach Christian ideals, and end their system of communal living, continuing his crusade for the individualized lifestyle. His efforts could be succinctly categorized as abject failures, failing to appease any of the involved parties. Meeker met his demise at the hands of the Ute in 1879 after a year of unsuccessful conversion and "civilizing" efforts did little but produce ill will between the White River Ute and the U.S. government.³⁶ His death and the associated "Meeker Massacre" served as grounds to dislocate the remaining Colorado Ute, with the Ute Removal Act rescinding previous land cessions by treaty, requiring near total relocation to Eastern Utah.³⁷ In a roundabout way, Meeker, post-mortem, brought to pass a near Indian-free fate for Colorado, mirroring the vision of white Christian supremacy and replacement he instated at the Union Colony.

The early years of the Union Colony, before municipal incorporation, represented an attempt at a pseudo-socialist utopian system of self-sufficient agrarianism, divorced from the realities and pressures of broader economic and political forces. While no epitaph exists for the colony and outspoken utopians remained in the city, the Union Colony as a concept slowly perished. The colony incorporated as a city in 1885, some fifteen or so years after its conception and with the two leading progenitors Meeker and Greeley deceased. The idyllic vision of a Fourier-esque community of society's most exceptional in the Western frontier, like many other utopian projects of the era, collapsed under poor leadership, an unsteady populace, and the temptation to integrate into regional commercial networks.³⁸ The fantasized secession from hedonism, sloth, and vice placed higher emphasis on the constitution of its members rather than the financial viability and sustainability of the enterprise. While the economic aspirations of the colony fell away, the cultural roots of isolationism and exclusion, irrevocably intertwined with themes of whiteness and Christian superiority, far outlived Meeker and the Union Colony, defining the city's identity for the decades ahead.

THE FARMER

After opening its doors to the Colorado economy, Greeley entered the twentieth century with two primary sectors: agriculture and ranching. The utopian vision of quaint farms and local artisans and tradesmen coexisting

³⁶ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 122.

³⁷ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 134.

³⁸ Decker, *The Utes Must Go*, 92.

in a morally superior Eden rapidly fell away to increasingly industrialized sugar beet and beef operations, churning out previously unprecedented output. The unfettered growth of both industries fundamentally reformed the societal demography and environmental composition of Greeley and its outlying hamlets while further demarcating the growing deviation from its utopian origins.

Agriculture had been foreseen by colonists as the region's foundational industry, with prospective plans to develop accompanying manufactories and mills. Yet it soon became evident that the men from the East, even those with a farming background, had little understanding of the region's topology, soil, and climate. Meeker, an agricultural writer for the *Tribune*, was presumed by his followers to be an adept farmer, a notion that had quickly evaporated. Early colony leader and later historian of Greeley's colonial days, David Boyd, recounted, "the old settlers believed and generally told us that the upper bench land was not good for anything for farming," a providential warning.³⁹ The early history of the colony was marked by failed attempts to grow potatoes, an inability to compete with neighboring towns in the wheat market, and the pernicious presence of unwelcome prickly pears.⁴⁰ In the withering indictment of the colony published in *The Republic*, Hobbs decried, "no crops of any description (except prickly pears) can be produced at Greeley for the next three years."⁴¹ Beyond their shortcomings in finding a suitable crop, farmers struggled to adequately water their fields. Those who originally scoped out the site misjudged the inflow and accessibility of the South Platte River with colonists soon realizing they would need to devise a canal system to bring water to the arid plains. Boyd attributed the failure to properly understand irrigation as a leading reason for the colony's failure. Colonists expended extensive funds to craft canals and ditches, many of which failed to reach their intended targets, with the one noted instance of canal mismanagement causing massive downtown flooding. Ultimately, the colony produced a middling output, enough to scrape by but far less than anticipated or enough to solidify a foothold in the local economy.

A boon of agriculture came to Weld County shortly after the formal institutions of the colony fell to municipal rule. Most notably the sugar beet, which had been grown in small quantities in the region since 1841, increased in demand amid population growth in the West and increasing

³⁹ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 58.

⁴⁰ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 48.

⁴¹ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 54.

industrialized ranching.⁴² By the end of the nineteenth century, Americans were consuming higher quantities of sugar, facilitated in part by the popularization of sugar beet refinement in the Western U.S. After several experimental forays into mass production in California, the American sugar beet industry took hold in the Platte River Valley, occupying the fields of Northeastern Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming, with Greeley serving as a critical regional hub. By 1930, a total of 82,000 acres of Weld County land were dedicated to sugar beet farming, four times more than any other county in the state.⁴³ To facilitate industrialized production, the three leading sugar beet companies, Great Western, American Beet Sugar, and Holly, required a robust workforce, a significant hurdle given the region's sparse population. While in its early years, the insurgent sugar beet industry depended on settler and seasonal workers, it quickly transitioned to using low-wage proletarian Mexican labor.

Historian Dennis Nodín Valdés identified three archetypes for beet laborers in the 1890-1940 era of sugar beet production; the settler, the sojourner, and the proletarian.⁴⁴ The first to work in the industry were German-speaking Russian settlers from the Great Plains. Companies recruited the workforce by providing residential infrastructure and high wages to prospective farmers. Once afforded the chance to settle, few chose to continue long-term wage employment for the company, becoming independent farmers and leaving companies with a labor void. A second wave came from Japanese farmers, recruited primarily from the West Coast and mountain mining colonies, who received opportunities akin to that of German-speaking Russians but with notably higher discrimination and lessened long-term settlement. Company recruiters then turned to "sojourners," migrant seasonal laborers from Mexico who were discouraged from settling and treated as "not a land-acquiring people."⁴⁵ The era of the sojourner was short-lived as World War I brought increased demand, increased competition for labor from rival industries, and limited retention of transient labor.⁴⁶ To accommodate, the major companies undertook a massive recruiting campaign, targeting Mexican families rather

⁴² William J. May, *The Great Western Sugarlands: The History of the Great Western Sugar Company and the Economic Development of the Great Plains* (Garland Publishing, 1989), 4.

⁴³ Robert Wuthnow, *Remaking the Heartland: Middle America since The 1950s* (Princeton University Press, 2011), 191.

⁴⁴ Dennis Nodín Valdés, "Settlers, Sojourners, and Proletarians: Social Formation in the Great Plains Sugar Beet Industry, 1890-1940" *Great Plains Quarterly* 10, no. 2, (1990), 120.

⁴⁵ Valdés, "Settlers, Sojourners, and Proletarians," 113.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

than single men to increase the total workforce.⁴⁷ Company recruiters showed films and images of pastoral American life to Mexican nationals, selling a future of homeownership, familial stability, and dignity through work.⁴⁸ Despite rhetoric portraying sugar companies as altruistic agents of assimilation and Americanization for the prospective worker, the relationship between management and labor had devolved from the earlier generations of pseudo-cooperative agriculture.

The proletarian period of sugar beet labor involved the mass import of Mexican workers, crafting a distinct social strata and previously unseen class hierarchy in Weld County. Mexicans were deliberately stripped of access to upward mobility in the region as employers sank wages and opportunities for independent settlement evaporated. U.S. Department of Labor investigator George Edson reported that of the regional Mexicans in 1927, “none, so far as known, owns a farm.”⁴⁹ Companies constructed housing or “*colonias*,” explicitly designed to place the “foreign” population in a confined space, preserving the constructed white space of Greeley. To maintain their steady workforce despite local opposition, sugar companies aimed to “allay Euro-American perceptions that beet workers were a welfare burden on the community” while maintaining a reliable pool of cheap accessible labor in the outskirt *colonias*.⁵⁰ To prove the economic value of the newcomers, Great Western labor commissioner C.V. Maddux argued that in 1924 Mexicans had earned over \$1.5 million for the county, with the government providing them a mere \$5,490.19 in “pauper funds” in return.⁵¹ Similarly, the deliberate placement of *colonias* on the outskirts of cities, like the Spanish Colony in Greeley, cut residents off from municipal services.⁵² Despite the omnipresent need for their labor, company bosses and political leaders crafted a segregated system to isolate Mexicans from their white neighbors, treating the group as a temporary presence.

Attempts to assuage citizen complaints from commercial sugar interests did little to quell xenophobic backlash from the local white population. Amid the national resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s, the regional Greeley chapter described itself as the “best organized and most efficient in the United States,” further establishing themselves as the “leader

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Meggan L. Bilotte, “Becoming Native: Family Labor and Belonging in the Sugar Beet Fields of Northern Colorado, 1900–1969” (University of Wisconsin, 2020), 124.

⁴⁹ Valdés, “Settlers, Sojourners, and Proletarians,” 114.

⁵⁰ Valdés, “Settlers, Sojourners, and Proletarians,” 116.

⁵¹ Rubén Donato, *Mexicans and Hispanos in Colorado Schools and Communities, 1920–1960* (State University of New York Press, 2007), 38.

⁵² Valdés, “Settlers, Sojourners, and Proletarians,” 116.

in Colorado in percentage of membership in proportion to population.”⁵³ Overt prejudice and systemic oppression extended into area schools with the pernicious use of Mexican child labor producing disparate outcomes for Spanish-speaking children. Employing children in the field predated the Mexican settlements in Northern Colorado with the earlier waves of German-speaking Russians enlisting their children in family farms.⁵⁴ However, the use of child labor among Russo-German families faced greater scrutiny by truancy officers, perceived as a barrier toward assimilation into white American culture. Conversely, a truant officer admitted, “We never pretend to keep track of them” regarding Mexican students enrolled in Colorado schools.⁵⁵ The continued use of child labor in the sugar beet industry came from deliberate coordination between local officials and sugar companies. Historian Rubén Donato contends that in Greeley, “compulsory school laws were disregarded and child labor was central to local political economies,” adding that Mexicans were treated as “intellectually inferior.”⁵⁶ Additionally, educators at the Colorado Teachers College approached the population with a patronizing and reductionist tone, arguing they were predisposed toward manual labor due to their innate intellectual deficiencies.⁵⁷ This perception supplemented arguments of inferiority made by company officials like the Holly Sugar’s Vice President J.C. Bailey who described beet farm labor as “a work that the white labor will not perform,” alleging “Mexican is a different caste.”⁵⁸

The dehumanization of the Mexican population reached a boiling point entering the Great Depression as employment rates skyrocketed and the market for sugar beet wavered. Companies readily scapegoated their foreign-born workers, laying Mexicans off first, blaming them for the area’s prevailing economic woes, and leading deportation charges. These tensions were supplemented by fearmongering from Greeley institutions like the *Greeley Tribune*, which falsely reported 448 illegal aliens receiving relief in the county, fueling the flame of nativist sentiment brewing among the city’s white residents.⁵⁹ The *Tribune*, founded by Meeker and incorporated into Greeley’s national network, continued parroting xenophobic tropes long past the fall of the Union Colony. Great Western provided free transportation to repatriate their labor force back to Mexico, with a total of

⁵³ Donato, *Mexicans and Hispanos in Colorado Schools and Communities*, 50.

⁵⁴ Mary Lyons-Barrett, “Child Labor in the Early Sugar Beet Industry in the Great Plains, 1890-1920” (*Great Plains Quarterly* 25, no. 1, 2005), 55.

⁵⁵ Valdés, “Settlers, Sojourners, and Proletarians,” 114.

⁵⁶ Donato, *Mexicans and Hispanos in Colorado Schools and Communities*, 119.

⁵⁷ Donato, *Mexicans and Hispanos in Colorado Schools and Communities*, 43.

⁵⁸ Valdés, “Settlers, Sojourners, and Proletarians,” 116.

⁵⁹ Bilotte, “Becoming Native,” 141.

100 Mexican families leaving Weld County. These deportation schemes were not discerning in who they targeted, often displacing native-born Colorado residents of Mexican descent.⁶⁰ Local extremists were unsatisfied with these efforts, prompting the formation of the Colorado State Vigilantes, a group formed to intimidate and chase Mexicans out of the state. In Greeley, the group called for “all Mexican and other aliens to leave Colorado at once.”⁶¹ To combat the rising xenophobia, Mexican-Americans in Greeley organized, attempting to recategorize themselves as “Spanish-American” and drop the pejorative connotations that “Mexican” carried.⁶² These efforts largely fell flat as the stratified segregation from earlier decades crafted an impermeable racial hierarchy in Greeley, descended from the precepts of purity and moral sanctity from its founding.

Greeley and Weld County epitomized the cruel labor system rampant throughout the sugar beet hubs of the early twentieth century. Mexican labor provided the backbone for the rise of Greeley’s agricultural staple, yet persistent hostility paired with institutional barriers precluded escape from the proletarian conditions of the sugar beet colonies. Notably, this import of an “outsider” class of laborers marked a stark departure from the envisioned purity of the Union Colony. Yet cultural remnants of the exclusionist mentality persisted in the restrictive residential guidelines and racist rhetoric directed toward Mexican workers. In particular, the disparaging characterization of the Mexican community’s intellect and alleged physical predisposition toward labor mirrored demeaning language used for the since-displaced Ute. While Greeley’s utopian dreams waned, the underlying colonial psyche of supremacy and segregation maintained. Prolonged fights for fair treatment eventually manifested some improved working conditions in the 1930s and ’40s amid national farm labor movements and tactical organized strikes, concurrent with waning influence and production of the sugar beet industry. The ugly strain of reactionary, anti-Mexican sentiment that emerged in early twentieth century Greeley never reached the same overt zenith, though undercurrents of racial othering and division persisted far beyond the sugar beet years. The rapid ascent of sugar beet production further defined Greeley’s post-colony identity as a responsive capitalist hub, raring to embrace rising industry with limited consideration for social ramifications. Incidentally, as the popularity of sugar beets as a source of refined sugar for human consumption declined, its use as a fattening supplement for cattle feed continued to grow.

⁶⁰ Donato, *Mexicans and Hispanos in Colorado Schools and Communities*, 56.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Bilotte, “Becoming Native,” 143.

THE COWMAN

Ranches predated the establishment of Greeley, cultivating an early economic foothold in Weld County and Northeastern Colorado. As noted in a previous section, the ranching parties of rural Weld County were early adversaries of the agriculturally inclined Union Colonists. The two groups found themselves at odds regarding matters of local governance, overlaying a deeper dissonance between the temperate lifestyle of the colonist and the free-spirited laissez-faire culture of the cowboy.⁶³ Yet unlike Meeker's misdiagnosis of Greeley as an arable site for robust, diverse agriculture, he foresaw the viability of ranching as a means of colonial production. In a speech announcing the formation of the Greeley Dairy and Stock Association, Meeker proclaimed, "we mean to cover the unoccupied prairie in every direction with our cattle," a statement that would prove to be profoundly prophetic.⁶⁴ While the defined political rift between the ranchers and colonists impeded cooperation between the county's leading interests during Meeker's lifetime, the next century would see the influence of Greeley's beef producers grow from a localized affair to a national industry.

Once the formal colonial administration fell away, the pronounced rural-urban divide weakened, with cattle interests taking root in Greeley, by then the county's central artery for commerce. Yet despite a longstanding presence, national repute for local beef production did not emerge till the 1940s, soon eclipsing sugar beet production as the region's predominant industry. This represented a marked shift in the geography of American beef production as the Western Plains supplanted the Corn Belt as its industrial nucleus. Additionally, the geneses of the industrial-scale output and vertical integration of feedlots with slaughterhouses both emerged from the Greeley-based Monfort ranch, irrevocably altering how beef was produced and distributed nationwide.

As with the increased demand for sugar beets, beef saw a massive uptick in popularity in the mid-twentieth century, experiencing a pronounced spike in and around Greeley. Both World Wars generated increased demand and subsequent production of beef, with the first war expanding the market outside the Corn Belt to Colorado and the second elevating it to its position as national leader. The closer proximity to expanding Western markets like California further supplemented the increasingly prosperous Colorado beef industry. Between 1930 and 1960, beef production in Northeastern Colorado exploded at a staggering rate. A 1954 report in *Economic Geography*, reporting on the topic shared that "for

⁶³ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 42.

⁶⁴ Boyd, *Greeley and the Union Colony of Colorado*, 67.

several years the total value of cattle and calves sold alive in Weld County, Colorado has exceeded that of any other county in the nation,” and that “since the middle 1930’s the number of cattle on feed in Colorado has increased by over 200 percent.”⁶⁵ Greeley’s rambunctious entrance into the national beef market came several decades after the formation of national beef networks, facilitated primarily by rail.⁶⁶ The increasing use of refrigerated cars for long-distance rail transport limited the historic geographic barriers separating meat production in the West and markets in the East, helping Denver become the seventh-largest cattle market in the nation.⁶⁷ Beyond the market maneuvering of those in the beef business, existing economic and environmental conditions in Northeast Colorado proved ideal for the industry.

The interplay between the ascendent beef industry and well-established agricultural infrastructure bears further examination. Weld County led the nation in sugar production in 1949 while ranking first among U.S. counties for barley acreage and second in alfalfa acreage.⁶⁸ A critical distinction separating Colorado livestock operations from their rivals in the Corn Belt was the proximity to robust feed crop sources. Sociologist Robert Wuthnow ascertained that “the strongest predictor of how much a county earned from selling cattle in the mid-1960s was the tonnage of hay and sugar beets it was already raising in the mid-1950s.”⁶⁹ The complementary relationship between local farmers and ranchers helped provide fertile grounds for ranching expansion, with ample access to crop surpluses. In particular, the excess roughage from beet tops could be easily converted into pellet and feed concentrates. Further, the carbohydrate-rich sugar beets made for a stellar fattening agent for cattle feed.⁷⁰ The cooperation between the once-rival industries propelled Colorado ranchers into the national limelight while keeping fading industries like sugar beet and alfalfa centers afloat.

Perhaps above all other factors, the inception of the vertically integrated commercial feedlot, or “beef factory,” revolutionized beef production in the United States. In the Corn Belt, feedlots were smaller operations, reliant on self-grown crops for feed while distanced from the

⁶⁵ David A. Henderson, “‘Corn Belt’ Cattle Feeding in Eastern Colorado’s Irrigated Valleys” (*Economic Geography* 30, no. 4, 1954), 364.

⁶⁶ Joshua Specht, *Red Meat Republic: A Hoof-To-Table History of How Beef Changed America* (Princeton University Press, 2009), 170.

⁶⁷ Henderson, “‘Corn Belt’ Cattle Feeding in Eastern Colorado’s Irrigated Valleys,” 365.

⁶⁸ Henderson, “‘Corn Belt’ Cattle Feeding in Eastern Colorado’s Irrigated Valleys,” 367.

⁶⁹ Wuthnow, *Remaking the Heartland*, 191.

⁷⁰ Henderson, “‘Corn Belt’ Cattle Feeding in Eastern Colorado’s Irrigated Valleys,” 367.

urban slaughterhouses and stockyards of Chicago and St. Louis.⁷¹ Meanwhile, back at the ranch, namely the Colorado ranch of one Warren H. Monfort in 1930, a groundbreaking innovation was underway. Monfort, largely recognized as the pioneer of producing cattle at an industrial scale, constructed a behemoth of a facility five miles North of Greeley that fed roughly 3,500 cattle at once, a staggering number for the era. Taking full advantage of the wide-open spaces of Weld County, Monfort's ranches expanded through the '40s and '50s, eating up acres of land for his ranching factories. By the 1960s, Monfort facilities housed about 100,000 cattle, claiming the title of the world's largest beef cattle feedlot by 1968.⁷² Monfort's second innovation came after negotiations fell through with a partner plant in Denver. Rather than continue their practice of trucking cattle south for slaughter, Monfort purchased a slaughterhouse in Greeley, localizing their operation and introducing a vertical integration scheme to their rapidly growing enterprise.⁷³ As a result, transportation and labor costs dropped dramatically, enabling further expansion by the company, including the purchase of a feedlot in Southwest Kansas.⁷⁴ This marked the companies first foray outside of the state and signaling an interest in expansion

To fully appreciate the circumstances of Greeley's embrace of beef as its principal product, one must consider the environmental conditions preceding and succeeding the industry's rise. For one, the climate of Northwest Colorado's plains proved ideal for cattle rearing. In particular, the region's dryness contrasted with the Corn Belt's humidity, limiting troublesome mud and allowing for dry pens, two critical factors that improve the stock's health.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the exceptional amount of sunshine and limited precipitation meant ranches frequently circumvented expenditures on large barns and other infrastructure to house their stock during storms. Yet discourse on the dynamic relationship between ranches and their environment must address the ecological toll inflicted by factory operations. Monfort's innovative arid lots earned the moniker of "dry lots" since they were barren and absent any plant life.⁷⁶ As this style gained in popularity throughout Northwest Colorado and elsewhere, whole acres of grassland were converted into Monfortian dry lots. Monfort's original

⁷¹ John Fraser Hart and Chris Mayda, "The Industrialization of Livestock Production in the United States" (*Southeastern Geographer* 38, no. 1, 1998), 61.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Wuthnow, *Remaking the Heartland*, 191.

⁷⁴ Wuthnow, *Remaking the Heartland*, 192.

⁷⁵ Henderson, "'Corn Belt' Cattle Feeding in Eastern Colorado's Irrigated Valleys," 368.

⁷⁶ Hart and Mayda, "The Industrialization of Livestock Production in the United States," 62.

feedlot closed in 1973 due to its proximity to the city of Greeley, as unfavorable northern winds coated the city in factory emissions, leading to outcry from the city's citizens.⁷⁷

It bears mentioning that much like its corporate cousins in agriculture, Monfort relied heavily on low-wage, predominantly Mexican labor to run their operations, serving as a reminder that the reliance on an itinerant workforce persisted beyond the decline of sugar beet production. As they expanded and developed into a proper American corporation, Monfort began cracking down on efforts to unionize among meat packers and feedlot operators, while propping up their truck drivers as the "aristocrats of their labor force."⁷⁸ The company and the United Food and Commercial Workers union stood off twice, in 1970 and 1974, with the strikers coming out on top both times.⁷⁹ Unlike the confrontational fights with organized labor inside their facilities, Monfort approached the risk of organizing amongst their largely white male truckers through appeasement, seeking to feed into their proclaimed independent spirits. In 1970, the company purchased 50 Kenworth trucks with explicit intentions of recruiting high caliber men who could drive "hard and fast," parroting the calls for industrious men made by Horace Greeley a century earlier. These "asphalt cowboys," coinage borrowed from Dr. Shane Hamilton, were "absolutely essential to the operation of the union-busting plans of the new rural meatpackers."⁸⁰ By playing into a manufactured, hypermasculine illusion of cowboy-esque independence and agency for truckers, management effectively pitted labor against themselves by imposing an informally racialized hierarchy onto their workforce, edifying the largely white male trucker over the predominantly non-white factory workers. The journey of Monfort, Greeley's largest employer, from a local family-run enterprise to a nationally traded, union-busting powerhouse spat in the face of the Union Colony's alleged principles of communal self-sufficiency.

The embrace of a national, later global enterprise, shed the original colonial promise of self-sufficiency while preserving archetypes of the morally upright white working man against the othered, non-white worker, predisposed for manual labor. The company's influence peaked in the 1970s before a spate of mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s left it under the ownership of the ConAgra megacorporation, themselves beings subsumed

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Shane Hamilton, *Trucking Country: The Road to America's Wal-Mart Economy* (Princeton University Press, 2008), 159.

⁷⁹ Wuthnow, *Remaking the Heartland*, 198.

⁸⁰ Hamilton, *Trucking Country*, 159.

into an expanding corporate empire.⁸¹ The Monfort name now means little to most Coloradoans outside heirs Richard and Charles Monfort, the much-maligned owners of the perennially beleaguered Colorado Rockies baseball team, a reputation shrouding the deeper, often insidious, history of Colorado beef production.

The industrialization and consolidation of beef production set a distinct trajectory for the regional economy. Growing demand, fertile environmental conditions, and industrious local entrepreneurs launched Greeley to the forefront of the national beef economy, positioning it as the reigning king of the industry. Amidst the mid-century cattle boom, the enthusiastic embrace of unrelenting ranching foreshadowed a resurgence and reification of cultural isolationism, later married to the region's next economic boom. Similarly, the gradual seepage of influence from national global forces produced a complete divorce from the Fourier-based colony of yore. Finally, the progressive loss of the pastoral beauty and idyllic scenery to capital-intensive exploits set the region on a trajectory to lose what would become Colorado's twenty-first-century commodity, oil.

The Union Colony, the enthusiastically planned endeavor by East Coast ideologues, convinced of the viability and moral supremacy of their vision for western settlement, rapidly became a mismanaged, economically unstable venture, incapable of self-sustaining independent the larger economic pressures of the region. Early aspirations of a pseudo-socialist Fourier-modeled community failed to balance Greeley and Meeker's envisioned cooperation with the rhetoric of individualized industriousness and responsibility. Despite inevitably succumbing to the allure of unfettered corporatized sugar and beef production, the underlying isolationist origins of Greeley persisted, imposing binary "us versus them" frameworks on systems of racialized labor. The deeply embedded exclusionary mindset, couched in a manufactured sense of Anglo-Saxon, Christian-work-ethic supremacy, allowed enough space to begrudgingly welcome outsiders into the utopia, while preserving a healthy physical and social distance. While not explored within the confines of this paper, further connections could be made between the history of the Union Colony and Greeley's early days with the persistent isolationist sentiment in modernity. Additionally, a deeper dive into oil extraction by fracking as the modern keystone for Northeast Colorado's economy and its parallels with earlier resource staples. The cycle observed in the region's approach to the sugar beet and beef booms emerges once again in the twenty-first century rush toward fracking. In the remains of the Union Colony's vision of independent

⁸¹ Wuthnow, *Remaking the Heartland*, 208.

prosperity, Greeley cultivated a cultural model for rapacious capitalist expansion, built on the backs of exploited labor, diving headfirst into ventures with little forethought to social, environmental, or cultural ramifications.

Western Perceptions of Finland During the Cold War: A Soviet Puppet or a Neutral Actor?

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Abstract:

This paper critically examines the historiography of Finnish neutrality during the Cold War, focusing on Finland's nuanced position between the Soviet Union and the Western bloc. Initially, Western narratives often characterized Finland as a Soviet satellite state, subordinated by its geographic proximity to the USSR. However, this study contends that such interpretations fail to capture the complexity of Finland's foreign policy, which was shaped by both Soviet influence and Finland's own strategic imperatives. Through a review of key scholarly contributions, including works by Vesa Vares, Erkki Berndtson, Norbert Götz, and others, this paper explores the various conceptualizations of "Finlandization" and its implications for Finnish agency and sovereignty. Scholars' interpretations of Finland's diplomatic and domestic strategies challenge reductive views of passive compliance, instead portraying Finland's neutrality as a dynamic and pragmatic policy aimed at preserving autonomy. By analyzing Finland's active participation in international organizations and selective integration into Western economic systems, the paper argues that Finnish neutrality was not merely a consequence of Soviet pressure but a deliberate and adaptive strategy. The analysis further extends to contemporary geopolitical parallels, suggesting that Finland's Cold War experience offers valuable insights for understanding the foreign policy challenges faced by small states in today's multipolar world.

The year is 1978 in Moscow. A chilly April rain greets the Finnish ambassador as he proceeds to the Kremlin under the fading light of sunset. The man holds a prestigious position in Finland, and his counterpart, the Soviet ambassador, has departed for Helsinki that same evening. This night is to be remembered in both countries—and nowhere else.¹ Half the world, if they are even aware, views what they are celebrating with contempt. The two nations commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Aptly named, the treaty formalized the friendly relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union. However, this friendship was paradoxical. Finland is a capitalist democracy, while the Soviet Union leads the totalitarian Communist Bloc. Despite this ideological divide, neither bordering country has engaged in military conflict, and each has maintained a relationship of high regard over the past 30 years. However, this peace has come at a cost to Finnish sovereignty, causing a raised skepticism in the West about Finland's proclaimed neutrality. The term "Finlandization" was coined to describe a situation where one nation's foreign policy is heavily influenced by another,² reflecting Finland's delicate balancing act with the USSR. Yet, by 1978, much of this skepticism had subsided. Finland's role as host and mediator of the 1975 Helsinki Conference—the conference aimed at easing East-West tensions—cemented its reputation as a neutral actor in global affairs.³ Yet, the earlier Western suspicion of Finnish neutrality remains a compelling topic for analysis. What, then, characterized Western perceptions of Finland before 1975? More specifically, how did Finland's "Finlandization" evoke both criticism and admiration within the Western Bloc? Between 1945 and 1975, Finland navigated the pressures of "Finlandization" by self-censoring and limiting its sovereignty to appease the Soviet Union. This generated contrasting views in the West, for some regarded Finland with contempt and doubted its neutrality, while others admired its democratic resilience, its active neutrality and its growing economic ties.

¹ "Finland and Russia Mark Treaty Anniversary," *The New York Times*, The New York Times Company, 1978, Keston Center Archives, Box 44, Folder Nine, Waco, TX.

² Erkki Berndtson, "Finlandization: Paradoxes of External and Internal Dynamics," *Government and Opposition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44482552>: 21.

³ Vesa Vares, "The Western Powers and Finland During the Cold War: What Was Finlandization?" *Arhivele Totalitarismului* (Romanian Academy: Institutul National Pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, n.d.), <https://web.p.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=e6d06bf2-f931-4f62-9b1e-43b9d37a581b%40redis>: 21.

THE HISTORY OF FINLAND AND RUSSIA UP TO 1948

For the past 200 years, Finland has faced persistent threats from Russia. In 1809, after a brief war, Finland was ceded to Russia from the Swedish Empire, becoming a semi-autonomous Grand Duchy under the Russians. This arrangement lasted until Finland gained independence in 1917. Following independence, tensions with the Soviet Union were high, stemming from Finnish anti-communist attitudes and Soviet territorial claims on Finnish land. Just a year after independence, Finnish Communists had revolted against the government, culminating in a short but brutal civil war where the anti-communist and pro-government side, the Whites, had won. In the aftermath of this brutal civil war, a sense of retribution overtook the government and population, which combined with continued Soviet claims on Finnish land coming from the times of Imperial Russia's borders caused a heightened sense of anti-communism in Finland. These tensions between the two states culminated in the 1939–1940 Winter War, after border negotiations broke down. Although the smaller Finnish forces demonstrated remarkable resilience against the Soviet military, they were ultimately forced to cede territory in the 1940 Moscow Peace Treaty, as Soviet advances began to overwhelm them.

The territorial losses suffered in the peace treaty and unresolved tensions caused grievances that led to the Continuation War (1941–1944), during which Finland joined Nazi Germany's Operation Barbarossa, launching an offensive against the Soviet Union. Finnish forces advanced to the outskirts of Leningrad but halted short of invading the city by late 1941. However, by 1943, Soviet counteroffensives again began to overwhelm Finnish forces and push them back, causing Finland to sue for peace in 1944, which they signed the Moscow Armistice.⁴

As a co-belligerent of Nazi Germany during World War II, Finland faced harsh postwar treaties that restricted its alignment with the West. The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty formally ended hostilities and treated Finland as a Nazi ally,⁵ despite its unique wartime status. Finland was required to pay the Soviet Union \$300 million in reparations (equivalent to \$4.6 billion today), lease the strategic Porkkala naval base, and formally recognize the borders established in the 1940 treaty. Moreover, Finland was placed firmly

⁴ Treaty signed between the Soviet Union and Finland in September 1944 that largely restored the 1940 treaty.

⁵ Norbert Götz, "In a Class by Itself: Cold War Politics and Finland's Position Vis-à-Vis the United Nations, 1945–1956," *Journal of Cold War Studies* (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 2008), <https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-abstract/10/2/71/12949/In-a-Class-by-Itself-Cold-War-Politics-and-Finland?redirectedFrom=fulltext>: 26.

within the Soviet sphere of influence because of their geopolitical situation and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.⁶

Finland had then agreed to another treaty with Moscow the next year in the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The treaty was meant to prevent Finland, or any Finnish-allied nations, from invading the Soviet Union again. It accomplished this deterrence in five stipulations, forcing Finland: to not align with any anti-Soviet states, to allow Soviet troops could be stationed in Finland to prevent threats to either of their securities, to allow the communist party in Finland was to be legitimized, to prevent any anti-Soviet activities within their borders, and to consult Moscow on important foreign policy matters. The treaty guaranteed the Finns their independence and political system yet also guaranteed Soviet political and military influence. All the elements of the treaty gave the Soviets significant political influence over Finland. They possessed such influence by forcing the Finns to be neutral, allowing Soviet troops to be in Finnish territory, allowing the dissident Finnish Communist party to function, forcing a self-censoring to avoid Soviet antagonization, and allowing the Soviets to de-facto decide important Finnish foreign policy decisions.

FINLANDIZATION AND FINNISH POLICY

Furthermore, to work with “Finlandization,” one must define the term. The conditions necessary for Finlandization are that no other great power can counterbalance the influence of a dominant great power over a country. In short, no external power can intervene to protect the country from the dominant power’s influence. This creates a situation characterized by two factors: power asymmetry and geographical proximity. Power asymmetry occurs when the great power possesses overwhelming military force that the smaller country cannot hope to resist, and the geographical proximity means that the smaller country is militarily accessible, often sharing a border with the great power.⁷

In the case of Finland, the Soviet Union possessed overwhelming technological, manpower, and industrial superiority, which it could easily bring to bear against its Finnish neighbor. This imbalance forced Finland to balance appeasement with self-assertion. Too much appeasement risked becoming a Soviet puppet state, while excessive self-assertion could provoke another Soviet invasion.

⁶ Vares, “The Western Powers and Finland During the Cold War,” *Arhivele Totalitarismului*: 8-10.

⁷ Timo Kivimäki, “Finlandization and the Peaceful Development of China,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 8, no. 2 (2015): 139–166, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pov003>: 142.

The solution to Finland's foreign policy dilemma was the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Doctrine. J.K. Paasikivi, Finland's president from 1945 to 1956, sought to maintain Finnish sovereignty and neutrality in the wake of World War II. His policy centered on three tenets: limited alignment with the West, avoiding provocation with the Soviet Union, and prioritizing negotiations with the Soviet Union before conflict. Urho Kekkonen, his successor, expanded on these principles during his 25-year presidency by adopting a more proactive approach to neutrality and Soviet relations.

After Finland's admission to the United Nations in 1956, Kekkonen worked to establish Finland as a neutral state and a champion of global détente. Leveraging Finland's unique geographical position, he sought to position the nation as a bridge between East and West. However, this approach came with domestic drawbacks: increased Soviet influence in Finnish politics. This was partly due to Finland's heightened international activities in advocating for neutrality in the United Nations, which invited greater Soviet scrutiny, and partly because Kekkonen sought Soviet approval to ensure Finnish policy objectives in such. Causally, such validation-seeking behavior allowed for more Soviet influence and caused greater reactions to Soviet displeasure. However, despite the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Doctrine, Finland's relations with the Soviet Union were marked by crises that tested its sovereignty. The two most significant incidents were the 1958 Note Crisis and the 1961 Night Frost Crisis. In the 1958 Note Crisis, the Soviet Union demanded that Finland sign a defensive pact and align its foreign policy more closely with Soviet interests. Such a reaction had been because of increased diplomacy between Finland and the West, which combined with wider Cold War tensions in West Germany in 1961, had made the Soviet Union to invoke a clause in the 1948 treaty that obligated Finland to resist armed attacks by "Germany and its allies". While the new geopolitical landscape had made Germany largely irrelevant as a threat to Russia, the invocation of the clause to protect against new Western threats told of a fear by Russia that threatened Finland. The threat soon escalated, as increased Soviet demands—demands of the matter not seen since 1939—of a defensive pack and increased policy alignment were sent. Such demands threatened to compromise Finnish neutrality, for it would have effectively made Finland a Russian satellite-state. President Kekkonen cautiously rejected these demands, walking the delicate balance of Finlandization by fearing an angering of the Soviets whilst still maintaining Finnish sovereignty. The 1961 Night Frost Crisis occurred during heightened Cold War tensions. Following U.S. President John F. Kennedy's visit to Finland, the Soviets accused the Finnish government of leaning too far westward. In response, the Soviets suspended trade negotiations, and

their ambassador temporarily left Finland. They also sent a stern letter reminding Finland to remain neutral, reminiscent of previous Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, such as the 1956 invasion and brutal repression of Hungary, that Finland knew all too well. The Finnish government, seeing the crisis' implications as it was and understanding that no one was coming to save them, reaffirmed their neutrality to the Soviets and later changed smaller elements of Finnish foreign policy to be more neutral.⁸

However, those were the only two major crises to Finnish sovereignty during the Cold War, of which they were able to assert their neutrality through the evacuation of the Porkkala naval base in 1956 and joining the European Free Trade Association in 1961 as an associate member. Before 1956, the Porkkala Naval Base had been a significant stain on the sense of Finnish Independence internationally, as a military base on their soil was occupied by a global superpower. However, new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had desired to be more agreeable to Finland than his predecessor Joseph Stalin, which he saw to propounding Finnish independence on the international stage by giving back the Porkkala naval base back to Finland. The base was the singular place Soviet troops were stationed in Finland and had another 35 years on its lease to the Soviets. Another victory also came to the Finnish five years later when they joined the European Free Trade Association, integrating themselves more with the West. This move of foreign policy was not scrutinized by the Soviet Union.⁹

After Finland was admitted into the United Nations in 1956, the Paasiviki-Kekkonen doctrine was able to capitalize on this to create an active neutrality. Finland was admitted into the United Nations in 1956 in a package deal between the east and west with other Eastern Bloc countries, which Finland had managed to negotiate with the previously admission-blocking Soviet Union for the smaller nation to be included in this deal. The nation's admission into the United Nations symbolized the country's shift into an active role in the international community away from its isolationist neutrality,¹⁰ and Finland had soon started to carve itself out a role. The role that Finland had carved out was two-fold, a champion of international demilitarization and a bridge between East and West. Both of these roles, especially as they were more realized over time, gave Finland more prestige as a neutral actor. The prestige eventually culminated in Finland being de-facto recognized as truly neutral and therefore being able to host and

⁸ Vares, "The Western Powers and Finland During the Cold War," *Arhivele Totalitarismului*: 18.

⁹ Götz, "In a Class by Itself," *Journal of Cold War Studies*: 27.

¹⁰ Götz, "In a Class by Itself," *Journal of Cold War Studies*: 10.

mediate the Helsinki Conference in 1975.¹¹ The resulting Helsinki Accords founded Europe's definition of sovereignty and human rights as well as contributing massively to the détente period.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

The historiography of Finnish neutrality during the Cold War has evolved to recognize Finland's unique position between the Soviet Union and the Western bloc. Scholars have examined Finnish neutrality through various lenses—conceptual, strategic, and diplomatic—each offering distinct interpretations of Finland's actions and decisions. These historiographical approaches, even those that portray Finland as a Soviet puppet, provide differing narratives about Finland's agency and moral standing. These two factors—agency and righteousness—ultimately shape how Finland is judged in history, with more favorable evaluations presenting a more positive historical image of the nation.

Vesa Vares' article, "*The Western Powers and Finland during the Cold War: What was 'Finlandization'?*"¹² offers an overview of Finlandization and its perception by Britain and the United States from 1956 to the mid-1970s. Vares defines Finlandization as a political construct shaped by Western interpretations, focusing on how Finnish President Urho Kekkonen's actions and policies were perceived. Initially, Western powers viewed Kekkonen negatively, criticizing him for being overly subservient to the Soviet Union and for consolidating unchecked power domestically. However, by the late 1960s as the general Western viewpoints of Finland improved to recognize Finnish neutrality, Kekkonen's image underwent rehabilitation as he was increasingly seen as a figure capable of resisting Soviet pressures. Vares' focus on Kekkonen positions him as central to Finlandization, challenging the broader historical narrative that attributes Finlandization policies to Finland's government as a whole. In terms of understanding power dynamics within a state and assigning agency, attributing policy to Kekkonen gives an understanding of his actions as well as not just the Western perceptions of Finlandization but their views of Finland as a whole in the time period.

Erkki Berndtson's article, "*Finlandization: Paradoxes of External and Internal Dynamics*," presents a nuanced analysis of "Finlandization," a term used in Western discourse to describe Soviet influence over Finland¹³. Berndtson revises simplistic interpretations of this "Finlandization" by

¹¹ Vares, "The Western Powers and Finland During the Cold War," *Arhivele Totalitarismului*: 18.

¹² Vares, "The Western Powers and Finland During the Cold War," *Arhivele Totalitarismului*.

¹³ Berndtson, "Finlandization: Paradoxes," *Government and Opposition*.

exploring the dual pressures that Finland navigated: Soviet external expectations and the nations' own internal drive for autonomy. His approach challenges Western narratives that depict Finlandization solely as a form of Soviet control, instead presenting it as a complex balancing act where Finland maintained sovereignty through pragmatic concessions. This article contributes to the historiography by emphasizing Finland's agency within the constraints imposed by Soviet proximity, demonstrating that Finlandization involved a strategic compromise rather than passive compliance.

Norbert Götz's article, "*In a Class by Itself: Cold War Politics and Finland's Position Vis-à-Vis the United Nations, 1945–1956*," examines Finland's diplomatic engagement in the United Nations as a means of asserting its neutrality¹⁴. Götz argues that Finland's active participation in the UN provided it with a platform to affirm its neutrality on the international stage, allowing Finland to engage both Eastern and Western blocs diplomatically. This institutional perspective highlights the importance of multilateral organizations in Finland's foreign policy and provides a detailed look at how Finland used the UN to navigate Cold War pressures. Götz's analysis contributes to the historiography by demonstrating that international organizations like the UN allowed Finland to legitimize its neutrality and project an image of autonomy within the Cold War order.

Timo Kivimäki's article, "*Finlandization and the Peaceful Development of China*," analyzes Finland's position during the Cold War through a geopolitical and power based-lens.¹⁵ Kivimäki defines Finlandization through a geographical proximity and power asymmetry, explaining that Finland was Finlandized because of its neighboring status to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union's almost absolute power comparative to Finland. This definition complicates the historical record by defining Finlandization largely out of Finland's control, highlighting parallels to other states facing similar geopolitical conditions.

Finally, Klaus Törnudd's article, "*Finnish Neutrality Policy During the Cold War*," takes a realist perspective, analyzing Finnish neutrality as a pragmatic policy rooted in economic and political strategies.¹⁶ Törnudd emphasizes that Finnish neutrality was dynamic and adaptable, carefully calibrated to balance relations with both the Soviet Union and the West. Unlike narratives that portray Finlandization as an externally imposed

¹⁴ Götz, "In a Class by Itself," *Journal of Cold War Studies*.

¹⁵ Kivimäki, T. (2015). Finlandization and the Peaceful Development of China. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*.

¹⁶ Törnudd, "Finnish Neutrality Policy," *The SAIS Review of International Affairs*.

condition, Törnudd argues that Finnish neutrality was a deliberate and flexible policy designed to maximize Finland's agency. His work underscores Finland's ability to maintain sovereignty while participating in Western economic systems, offering a compelling argument for Finnish autonomy during the Cold War.

FINLANDIZATION: THE SOVIET PUPPET

Per the terms of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, Finland was compelled to relinquish aspects of its sovereignty, particularly in domestic and foreign policy. The treaty and concessions that came with it led many in the West to fear that the nation was under excessive Soviet influence to the point that compromised its neutrality, fueling contempt and suspicion. Critics viewed Finland as overly submissive, doubting both its assertiveness and its capacity to function as a true democracy. Finland's neutrality was seen as compromised, with its foreign policy perceived as too aligned with Soviet interests to be genuinely impartial.

Unable to challenge the Soviets, Finland had to limit its sovereignty and self-censor, which many in the West saw as compromising its democracy. Such viewpoints can be shown through the origins of this label and Western reactions to the Finnish response to the stern note in the Night Frost Crisis. "Finlandization" had its origins in 1960's West Germany by conservative political scientist Ernst B. Haas to categorize the nation as separate yet similar to the communist puppet states of the Eastern Bloc. Conservatives in 1960's West Germany were often unabashedly Soviet-hating,¹⁷ meaning that such a characterization of Soviet alignment was meant as an insult. To Haas and many like him, Soviet alignment was a clear sign of weakness, for no state powerful or smart enough would allow themselves to be aligned with the Soviets. This could only mean one thing: Finland was too weak to align themselves to Finnish desires.¹⁸ Beyond a perception of an acquiescence of foreign policy, Finland was also thought of as having compromised its democratic ideals in its appeasement. A particular point was Finnish self-censorship of their own citizens, something very contradictory to western ideals.¹⁹ This contradiction was highlighted in Finland, which was forced to prevent any anti-Soviet activity in their own borders under the 1948 treaty, forcing them to engage in such

¹⁷Vares, "The Western Powers and Finland During the Cold War," *Arhivele Totalitarismului*: 7-9.

¹⁸ "Finland Will Go as Far Right as Moscow Allows," *The Observer*, Guardian Media Group Limited, 1983, Keston Center Archives, Box 44, Folder Nine, Waco, TX.

¹⁹ The First Amendment of the American Constitution states that the freedom of speech shall not be abridged.

actions as suspending a Lutheran priest for calling the Soviet flag a red rag.²⁰ To Americans, this forced control made it seem like Finland was a democracy under Soviet influence, which, combined with anti-Soviet ideologies during the Cold War, caused a viewpoint of Finland being a minion of the Soviets about to fall to communism.

On the international stage, Finnish neutrality was similarly viewed with skepticism, as many thought the nation to be under too much Soviet influence. Finland had been forced into neutrality explicitly and implicitly, for they had been forced into neutrality by the 1948 treaty, and such neutrality was upheld by Finnish geography and Finnish-Soviet power asymmetry. However, Finland's neutrality was frequently questioned, particularly in the context of its actions—or lack thereof—in the United Nations. Finland consistently abstained from policies or resolutions that directly or indirectly condemned the Soviet Union.²¹ This reticence did not go unnoticed, leading many to doubt Finland's impartiality and suspect that its foreign policy was overly influenced by Soviet interests. This caused many to fear that Finnish foreign policy was too heavily controlled by the Soviet Union,²² with critics viewing the nation as a “wolf in sheep's clothing” acting under Soviet influence.²³

A PROOF OF NEUTRALITY

However, many in the West maintained or even warmed up to Finland during the Cold War, recognizing that the nation had managed to preserve its democracy, played an active role in the United Nations, and increasingly integrated with Western economies. Despite widespread predictions that Finland would inevitably fall to communism, the preservation of democratic institutions by the 1960s reassured many that Finnish democracy was resilient. Moreover, Finland's active participation in international organizations affirmed its sovereignty and neutrality, with the nation positioning itself as a bridge between East and West. Additionally, Finland further demonstrated its economic independence by signing as an associate member of the 1961 European Free Trade Association, signaling its continued autonomy.

By the mid-to late 1960s, the resilience of Finnish democracy had become increasingly evident. The small, capitalist nation was not destined to succumb to communism. The case was strengthened by three matters: the

²⁰ “‘Insults’ Priest,” *The Guardian*, Scott Trust, 1980, Keston Center Archives, Box 44, Folder Nine, Waco, TX.

²¹ Götz, “In a Class by Itself,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*: 25

²² “Moscow Frets Over Finland,” *Christian Science Monitor*, The Christian Science Church, 1974, Keston Center Archives, Box 44, Folder Nine, Waco, TX.

²³ Törnudd, “Finnish Neutrality Policy,” *The SAIS Review of International Affairs*: 1-4.

Soviet evacuation of the Porkkala Naval Base, and the resolutions of the Night Frost Crisis and the Note Crisis. All three events were initially seen as potential first steps in the Soviet Union's efforts to turn Finland into a puppet state. The evacuation of the naval base was feared to be a precursor to a Soviet invasion; the Night Frost Crisis was seen as Soviet meddling in Finland's internal politics; and the Note Crisis raised concerns about Soviet military interference. Yet by the conclusion of all three matters, Finnish democracy had unquestionably prevailed.²⁴ It had prevailed past the expected slippery slope into communism. Furthermore, the 1960s ushered in a new era in the Cold War: détente. Both East and West sought to reduce tensions, which elevated Finland diplomatically and psychologically. Since its entrance into the United Nations, Finland characteristically advocated for international peace and stability,²⁵ almost always championing international policies to either preserve, increase, or negotiate peace.

After Finland was admitted into the United Nations in 1955, the small nation asserted its sovereignty and neutrality, positioning itself as the bridge between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc. Finland's sovereignty and neutrality were clearly reflected in its active membership as a neutral nation, delineating itself from the Soviet Union. Even in their earliest days of United Nations membership, Finnish delegates were instructed to keep out of debates that affected the interests of great powers, to facilitate consensus and decrease international tensions. Yet despite its reluctance to take sides, Finland was known for its strong support of international peacekeeping, multilateral agreements, and disarmament advocacy.²⁶ These actions portray a neutral nation with the intention to increase international peace and stability,²⁷ not a nation cowed into the Eastern Bloc by the Soviet threat. Furthermore, as the Cold War progressed, Finland had started to serve an invaluable role as the intermediary between the Soviet Union and the Western Bloc. Because of their geography, friendly relations, and neutrality with a known desire for international peace, Finland was able to serve as an advocate, intermediary, or host for both America and the Soviet Union. This all culminated in them being able

²⁴ "The European Leader Most Trusted by the Kremlin," *The New York Times*, The New York Times Company, 1981, Keston Center Archives, Box 44, Folder Nine, Waco, TX.

²⁵ "Why the Middle East Should Use Finland as a Model for Peace," *The Daily Telegraph*, Telegraph Media Group Limited, 1983, Keston Center Archives, Box 44, Folder Nine, Waco, TX.

²⁶ Götz, "In a Class by Itself," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7-13.

²⁷ "Detente Alive and Well in Finland," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1976.

to host the Helsinki Conference.²⁸ Finland's early involvement in arms control and confidence measures had served as a precursor for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), and Helsinki had occasionally served as an informal meeting place for American and Soviet diplomats, of which the trust built from these allowed Helsinki to host and mediate the Helsinki Conference. Besides the conference being a great success for Finnish and détente interests, Finland was able to further clarify its sovereignty and interests as a neutral nation apart from the Eastern Bloc.

A vast majority—about four-fifths—of Finnish trade was with the West, serving to upkeep relations between the multiple parties. Finland largely traded with the Soviet Union only for natural resources, crude oil being the main Finnish import, which Finnish-Soviet trade only comprised an average of about 17.8% of the nations trade. This left the most, almost eighty percent, of Finnish trade to be from other countries,²⁹ stemming largely from pre-World War II trade ties and importation of Western goods. Finland's decision to join the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as an associate member in 1961 further integrated the nation into the Western economic sphere. The EFTA aimed to reduce trade barriers and increase economic cooperation among its signatories, allowing Finland to partially integrate into the Western economic system.³⁰ Such integration to a large extent proved Finnish economic independence as Finland showed itself to be an independent nation strong enough to trade with whomever. Also, Finnish independence was further explained as Finland increased its western ties unhampered by the Soviet Union.³¹

CONCLUSION

All in all, Finland found itself in a difficult position during the Cold War, with many in the West perceiving its status of "Finlandization" as either a sign of excessive Soviet influence or a demonstration of a neutral nation navigating Soviet power asymmetry. Such a position was from World War II and the resulting multitude of treaties that had established Soviet influence, as well as the geography and power asymmetry that characterizes "Finlandization." As a result, Finnish policy was a delicate balance of assertion and appeasement, leading many to question whether Finland could

²⁸ Vares, "The Western Powers and Finland During the Cold War," *Arhivele Totalitarismului*: 13.

²⁹ Vares, "The Western Powers and Finland During the Cold War," *Arhivele Totalitarismului*. 20

³⁰ Vares, "The Western Powers and Finland During the Cold War," *Arhivele Totalitarismului*. 21

³¹ "The European Leader Most Trusted by the Kremlin," *The New York Times*, The New York Times Company, 1981, Keston Center Archives, Box 44, Folder Nine, Waco, TX.

truly be considered a democracy or a genuinely neutral state. However, over time, countering viewpoints emerged, painting Finland to be a neutral, sovereign democracy in a unique international position. In fact, similar dynamics can be found in various historical and contemporary contexts. For example, one can trace analogous situations in East Asia during the era of Imperial China or in Cold War Yugoslavia, both of which offer valuable studies of how proximity and power asymmetry shaped their respective foreign policies. Moreover, the concept of Finlandization can be observed in the present and even in potential future scenarios, such as in Central Asia in relation to China's rise or in the future of Ukraine or Taiwan, which may be influenced by the foreign policies of contemporary great powers. These cases carry significant implications, particularly for American foreign policy, as they reflect the ongoing complexities of geopolitical influence and the shifting nature of international relations.

“The Whole World is Radioactive”: Nuclear Narratives in the American Southwest, 1945–1963

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Abstract:

After World War II, the United States continued to test nuclear weapons above the ground, both abroad and within the continental US until 1963. Citizens living near nuclear weapons testing sites or working within the uranium mining industry experienced increased rates of cancer and illness, as well as the destruction of their livestock, as a result of nuclear fallout and uranium mining. During these years, the federal government enacted civil defense policies that raised concerns about the potential of nuclear war and encouraged people to be proactive in creating their own protections against nuclear fallout. In order to protect nuclear weapons development, the US government promoted parallel narratives that both alarmed citizens about the potential of a nuclear weapons attack and also assured people that nuclear testing and uranium mining within their region was safe. Citizens accepted the risk associated with these activities because of the increasing militarization of society through civil defense during the Cold War.

INTRODUCTION

By 1967, Navor Valdez knew he needed to get a new job. He had a six-year old daughter and his wife could no longer follow him doing seasonal work for the Forest Service and on oil rigs. His in-laws lived in Pioche, Nevada and had worked in the silver, lead, and zinc mines in the area. When a job opportunity in a uranium mine opened up, Valdez took it. He knew what the uranium was being used for: to build atomic weapons, and he knew that mining was inherently dangerous; he had grown up around it. What he didn't know was that a year later he would be undergoing surgery in Grand Junction, CO for a tumor in his neck. At the time the doctor didn't tell him that it was cancer, instead just informing his family. His radiation exposure in the mines had apparently been too short for it to be the cause of the cancer; however, it could have easily come from the fourteen years Valdez spent growing up in Utah. Valdez played sports, spent time outside in the mountains with friends, and drank raw milk his mother bought f, all while nuclear weapons were tested southwest of him at the Nevada Test Site, sending fallout, or tiny particles of debris made radioactive, into the air and over the vegetation livestock grazed on.¹

Between 1945 and 1962 the United States conducted 200 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests.² In 1963, the passing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty put an end to above ground nuclear testing, but the damage had already been done. Radioactive fallout had rained down on those living downwind, or in the direction of the prevailing wind, from the test site for several years now. As those living in the affected areas began to piece together stories and examine patterns of illness in their own communities, “downwind” became an identity for people affected by testing. The term “downwinder” would come into common usage in the 70's.³ Eventually, it even became the official language used by the federal government in the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act.⁴

The end of the Second World War almost immediately launched the US into another conflict, this time with the Soviet Union. The detonation of the nuclear bomb in Japan determined the course of this conflict. As part of

¹ Navor Tito Valdez, interview by Charlie Dietrich, June 20, 2005, MS-00818, Oral History Research Center, Special Collections and Archives, University Libraries, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, <http://n2t.net/ark:/62930/d1xp6vf6g>.

² United States Department of Justice, “Radiation Exposure Compensation Act,” accessed December 9, 2024. <https://www.justice.gov/civil/common/reca.dfg>

³ Sarah Alisabeth Fox, *Downwind: A People's History of the Nuclear West*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 2014), 150. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1d9nk3t>.

⁴ United States Department of Justice, “Radiation Exposure Compensation Act,” accessed December 9, 2024. <https://www.justice.gov/civil/common/reca>.

the global arms race, the US continued expanding its arsenal by developing and testing nuclear weapons, particularly in the Western US. It was an area primed for nuclear testing because of its low population density and high percentage of government owned land. Just as the US issued warnings to the public about potential nuclear war, it also assured communities downwind of test sites that they were safe, despite studies showing increased cancer rates among these populations. In order to protect nuclear weapons development, the US government promoted these paradoxical narratives that both alarmed citizens about the potential of a nuclear weapons attack and also assured people that nuclear testing and uranium mining within their region was safe. Citizens accepted the risk associated with these activities because of the increasing militarization of society through civil defense during the Cold War.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The experts on this topic include both historians and sociologists that study nuclear weapons and fallout, civil defense, environmental history, and history of the American West. Often, these categories overlap because of their tie to one another. Scholars analyze the environmental effects of the Cold War or the environmental history of the West. Scholars who study nuclear weapons often approach the topic from two perspectives: the communities affected and the government actors. In her book *Downwind: A People's History of the Nuclear West*, historian Sarah Fox writes about the downwind communities affected by nuclear weapons testing and communities affected by uranium mining using oral histories of downwinders themselves. She contends with the somewhat dubious nature of oral history and acknowledges that some people who were interviewed showed inaccuracies in their stories. Instead of using oral histories to uncover a factual truth, she claims that the benefit of personal narratives is their ability to demonstrate the values people ascribe to their own experiences. In this particular story, personal narratives also convey the loss of trust in their government downwinders experienced.⁵

Offering contrast to Fox, Sociologist James Rice examined the Atomic Energy Commission or the AEC, the federal agency that conducted nuclear tests, in his article, "Downwind of the Atomic State: US Continental Atmospheric Testing, Radioactive Fallout, and Organizational Deviance, 1951-1962." Rice approaches the topic of nuclear fallout and its effects on downwind communities from a different perspective than Fox. Instead, he focuses on the institutional practices of the AEC and how it affected their interactions with downwind communities. Rice used archival analysis of

⁵ Sarah Alisabeth Fox, *Downwind*, 17-19.

AEC documents to examine their decision making process. Through his research he concluded that the AEC assumed that fallout would disperse and that it would not be accumulative, that the effects would be acute, and that downwinders were prone to over reaction.⁶ Fox’s and Rice’s analysis showcase the typical scholarship on this topic. Scholars who study nuclear weapons analyze both the perspective of those who manufactured them, the populations that experience side effects of the manufacturing, and the overall effects nuclear development had on the public psyche.

Studying civil defense provides insight into how the government framed the Cold War for the American public and how the public responded. Scholars who study civil defense analyze the materials published by the government, in particular the Office of Civil Defense, and the public's perspective on these programs. In her book, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties*, historian Laura McEnaney details how nuclear war entered the home through civil defense programs. Civil defense bridged the gap between post war prosperity and the threats posed by the Cold War.⁷ McEnaney analyzes state actions within the realm of civil defense, as well as the civilian response to these programs and ideas. She does this through studying letters sent to the president, television shows, newspapers, radio shows, and magazines. The second chapter, “The Public Politics of Private Shelters,” focuses on private fallout shelters and the shift that occurred within policy away from large scale federal and state wide response toward individual family solutions both for ideological and practical reasons.⁸ Additionally, Guy Oakes and Andrew Grossman’s 1992 article, “Managing Nuclear Terror: The Genesis of American Civil Defense Strategy,” focuses on civil defense, approaching the topic through the concept of nuclear terror. Oakes and Grossman analyze magazines, particularly *Collier*, and materials published by the Office of Civil Defense, to demonstrate how civil defense strategy came to encompass controlling and harnessing the fear of nuclear war within the

⁶ James Rice. “Downwind of the Atomic State: US Continental Atmospheric Testing, Radioactive Fallout, and Organizational Deviance, 1951–1962.” *Social Science History* 39, no. 4 (2015): 647–76. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/90017485>.

⁷ Laura McEnaney, introduction to *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties*, (Princeton University Press, 2000), 3-10. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv15r577t>.

⁸ Laura McEnaney, “The Public Politics of Private Shelters,” in *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties*, (Princeton University Press, 2000), 40-67. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv15r577t>.

American public into defense preparedness.⁹ Scholars who study civil defense emphasize the changing nature of the policy and how it reflected Cold War ideology and fears.

“YOU COULD BOMB IT INTO OBLIVION AND NEVER NOTICE THE DIFFERENCE”: WHAT MADE THE WEST AN IDEAL LOCATION

While early atomic testing occurred in the Pacific, eventually the AEC decided to move it inland to Nevada. The West was the perfect region for weapons testing because of its preexisting military involvement and low population density. The AEC chairman Gordon Dean once described Southern Nevada as “a good place to dump used razor blades.”¹⁰ This language displays the low regard the government had for the land and people in the West. Because the West is a geographic region, often defined as everything west of the 100th meridian, it naturally lends itself to being defined by its environment. It is an area of environmental extremes, some of the hottest and coldest temperatures in the lower forty-eight states are recorded there.¹¹ The tension between environmental protection and economic expansion has existed in the West since its settlement by Americans. Many pioneers viewed the West as a place of Edenic myth. It was rich in natural resources and could fulfill all their desires. In this conception, the West was viewed as both a beautiful environmental landscape, but also a land to be exploited.¹² Nuclear testing and uranium mining would continue this legacy of exploitation.

Early atomic testing occurred on Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands and caused the immense deterioration and even destruction of the island within a few years. Eventually atmospheric testing was moved to the continental US for convenience. The AEC decided to move because it would be less expensive and there would be less international scrutiny on domestic land. When making the decision to move to the US, the AEC cited money and time efficiency as driving causes, but did not mention concern of radiation of the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands.¹³ Between 1946 and 1958, the US conducted twenty-three nuclear explosions on Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. This island was chosen because it was under US control at the time and contained adequate space to dock ships. Most of

⁹ Guy Oakes and Andrew Grossman. “Managing Nuclear Terror: The Genesis of American Civil Defense Strategy.” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 5, no. 3 (1992): 361–403. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20007050>.

¹⁰ Fox, *Downwind*, 52.

¹¹ Dant, *Losing Eden*, 1-2.

¹² Dant, *Losing Eden*, 5-6.

¹³ Fox, *Downwind*, 51.

these tests were conducted in order to test the strength of the US Navy for nuclear war. They also selected Bikini because there were relatively few inhabitants. In preparation for testing, one hundred and sixty-seven Bikinians were forced to leave their home. They were given less than a month's warning and sent to Rongerik, a nearby uninhabited atoll.

The extremely poor soil quality of Rongerik led to widespread malnutrition, so the Bikinians were then moved to another atoll, Kili. Kili had better soil, but lacked a lagoon or marine life, which was crucial for the Bikinians' way of life. Here, they experienced food shortages as well and eventually petitioned the United Nations to end nuclear tests and requested compensation. When nuclear testing concluded in the Marshall islands, Bikinians were anxious to return home. However, this would not be an easy process as testing had destroyed vegetation on the island, causing parts of it to disappear and contaminating virtually everything with radiation.¹⁴ Before establishing nuclear testing sites in the US, the AEC was deeply familiar with the destruction that nuclear testing could do to the environment. It had already displayed a pattern of displacing populations in order to carry out these tests. The Nevada site was already an established military base and therefore did not require moving civilian populations. However, thought patterns that would continue throughout testing were already apparent in the first decisions to move the Bikinians. Efforts were made to limit testing side effects to smaller populations; however, this often meant that these smaller populations experienced extreme negative effects from the testing.

The Nevada Test Site's location within the US was convenient and already on government occupied land, which made it ideal. It was close to the Los Alamos Laboratory and the Sandia Laboratory, both located in New Mexico.¹⁵ It was also on the edge of the Colorado Plateau, where the majority of uranium mining occurred.¹⁶ Regarding the location decision, the AEC wrote in its 1953 book, *Assuring Public Safety in Continental Weapons Tests*, that the “prevailing winds” at the site blew across “a relatively unpopulated region” for many miles.¹⁷ The implicit assumption in this decision was that testing, and the fallout from the testing, were

¹⁴ Martha Smith-Norris, “US Nuclear Experiments and the Bikinians: The ‘Nuclear Nomads’ Revisited” in *Domination and Resistance: The United States and the Marshall Islands during the Cold War*, (University of Hawai'i Press, 2016), 43-58. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvvn1rb.6>.

¹⁵ Atomic Energy Commission, *Assuring Public Safety in Continental Weapons Tests*, (United States Government Printing Office, 1953), 81.

¹⁶ Fox, *Downwind*, 51.

¹⁷ Atomic Energy Commission, *Assuring Public Safety*, 81.

inevitable, so it might as well be over a less dense population. Nevertheless, these less dense populations still felt the effects deeply. These populations were often not random. The federal government chose the Nevada Test Site for nuclear testing because they were already using it. Despite several tribal nations holding claims to the land, the government seized it and began using it as an air force base in 1940.¹⁸ The western regions with 'low population density' were seen as necessary sacrifices in order to continue testing. These populations were offered up as a sacrifice in order to secure the safety of the rest of America.

A strong military presence had always existed in the West; however, this was increased by the expansions during World War II. In an article published in 1990 titled, "The West and the Military-Industrial Complex," Gerald D. Nash discussed the economic relationship between the West and the US government and military. Nash outlines how major economic development in the West occurred through military projects. The Western states always had an elevated dependence on the federal government from the beginning of white American settlement in the West. The military followed settlers out West for protection and built the necessary infrastructure for development. As the US became a global military power during the Second World War and after, the military establishment in the West expanded.¹⁹

The pacific theater of the Second World War further increased federal presence in the West. They built airplane and ship manufacturing facilities, as well as military installations and research facilities.²⁰ Military bases became one of the main sources of employment in the West in the early twentieth century. In 1940, military personnel accounted for one third of all people employed in Nevada. Employment in public administration increased one hundred and forty-five percent in the Mountain West between 1940 and 1960.²¹ This strong military presence meant that it was much easier for the AEC to come in and begin testing. There were already ample government owned land and military bases and the residents were quite used to being surrounded by government projects.

Nuclear testing and mining severely destroyed the landscape of the West, one of its important defining features, and signaled a larger shift in environmental degradation at this time. Increasing globalization and

¹⁸ Fox, *Downwind*, 52.

¹⁹ Gerald D. Nash, "The West and the Military-Industrial Complex," *Montana: the Magazine of Western History* 40, no. 1 (1990): 72-75.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4519274>.

²⁰ Dant, "Booming the West," in *Losing Eden*, 207.

²¹ Nash, "The West and the Military-Industrial Complex," pp. 73.

industrialization following the Second World War caused widespread environmental destruction. The war demonstrated the extent of humankind's destructive capabilities, particularly through the atomic bomb. World War II increased the federal government's desire to control natural resources in order to fight a 'total war.' After the war, the reconstruction of Europe maintained a strain on US resources. Similarly, national security was of the utmost importance and had high material costs. Resource management became increasingly important during the Cold War in order to maintain an adequate military arsenal. This caused the US to extend control over resources. Many critics of big government programs were more tolerant of them during war time. The controversial Tennessee Valley Authority was criticized much less after its assistance with the Manhattan Project, which built the first nuclear weapon.²² One military official remarked that the only thing the Nevada desert was any good for was a bombing range because “you could bomb it into oblivion and never notice the difference.”²³ Many within the federal government and military viewed the West as a region only good for its natural resources and empty space.

Theorists have constructed a “treadmill of production,” wherein capitalism's inherently expansionary nature causes it to eat up natural resources. Sociologists Hooks and Smith built upon this concept and theorized that a treadmill of destruction exists as well. The treadmill of destruction theorizes that forces unique to state-building, military expansion, and arms races, create another treadmill that destroys natural resources and the environment. While capitalism's expansionary nature results in increased environmental destruction, capitalism itself is not the primary driving factor behind this military expansion, usually state policy and goals are.²⁴ The arms race between the Soviet Union and the US led to environmental devastation through nuclear war projects. As the US became increasingly expansionary in their goals to control resources and build weapons, they also encroached upon citizens rights in domestic areas as well.

²² Thomas Robertson, “‘This Is the American Earth’: American Empire, the Cold War, and American Environmentalism,” *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 4 (2008), 567-569. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24916001>.

²³ Gregory Hooks and Chad L. Smith, “The Treadmill of Destruction: National Sacrifice Areas and Native Americans,” *American Sociological Review* 69, no. 4 (2004), 564. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593065>.

²⁴ Gregory Hooks and Chad L. Smith, “Treadmills of production and Destruction: Threats to the Environment Posed by Militarism,” *Organization & Environment* 18, no. 1 (2005): 19-37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26161946>.

Fallout and its potentially harmful effects on people living in the western regions with low population density were seen as a necessary sacrifice in order to continue testing. These populations were offered up in order to secure the safety of the rest of America. Test sites were often former military bases or other government owned lands that could be quickly converted. Most of the land the government retained control of in the West was land that could not be sold to white settlers because it was difficult to cultivate and thus undesirable. Because of the long legacy of the government forcing Native American tribes west and onto reservations, federally owned lands and Native American lands shared these similarities and tribal lands were often near test sites.²⁵

In 2004 sociologists Gregory Hooks and Chad L. Smith conducted a study to determine the correlation between tribal lands and unexploded ordnance sites. They discovered that while there was not “a statistically significant relationship between Native American lands and ... less dangerous sites,” there was a positive relationship with extremely dangerous sites. They go on to explain that, “Native Americans experience a disproportionate exposure to the most dangerous unexploded ordnance.”²⁶ Most of the military bases deemed extremely dangerous were built during World War II and the Cold War, not before 1925. Therefore, they concluded that it was the “contingent intersect” of Native Americans having been pushed to remote lands with low population density that were near lands owned by the Federal government that “placed Native Americans at great risk of exposure to noxious military activities.”²⁷ Throughout history, the US has shown a continuous disregard for the lives of Native Americans which has had compounding effects. The removal and forced relocation of Native Americans onto reservations left them even more vulnerable to nuclear radiation.

The idea that progress would require the sacrifice of certain groups of people was not uncommon at this time. Overpopulation, concern that the earth was becoming too highly populated and could not sustain mankind, had become a growing concern in America and often attached itself to eugenics ideologies. Eugenics was coined by Francis Galton in the late 1800's and promoted selective reproduction of humans in order to produce

²⁵ The Indian Removal Act began the forcible removal of Native American from their home and relocation on reservations in the West by the federal government. For more information see Hooks and Smith, “National Sacrifice Areas and Native Americans,” 563.

²⁶ Hooks and Smith, “National Sacrifice Areas and Native Americans,” 569.

²⁷ Hooks and Smith, “National Sacrifice Areas and Native Americans,” 571.

the most fit population.²⁸ The eugenics movement influenced the population control movement, meaning that there was an inherent bias in the movement against people of color.²⁹ While population control promoted limiting the number of children among all people, these inherent biases meant that people of color were often specific targets of population control policy.³⁰ The combination of these ideas meant that certain groups of people, often people of color, were poised to bear the burden of progress.

Paul Ehrlich's 1968 book, *The Population Bomb*, included an imagined scenario where food riots in India lead to thermonuclear explosions in the US.³¹ In this scenario the nuclear future of the world and US national security was tied to resource allocation. In the intro of *The Population Bomb*, Ehrlich writes, “population control is the conscious regulation of the numbers of human beings to meet the needs not just of individual families, but of society as a whole.”³² In order to meet the “needs” of “society as a whole,” sacrifices had to be made or else the whole world was in imminent danger. The fears of nuclear war and overpopulation share these similarities. They also share similarities in the way they target certain populations to shoulder more of the burden of preventing these problems. In the nuclear West, sacrifices were made by Native Americans in order to protect the progress of society as a whole.

LIVING DOWNWIND: TESTING AND MINING'S EFFECTS ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Researchers have found increased risks of leukemia and thyroid cancers to be associated with exposure to radioactive materials in communities living near nuclear weapons test sites or uranium mines. These communities were assured that test sites posed little health concern by the AEC. When researchers published studies revealing the opposite, their findings were suppressed or discredited by the federal government. Uranium mining was also found to be associated with increased risk for lung cancer, even prior

²⁸ D. Marie Ralstin-Lewis, “The Continuing Struggle against Genocide: Indigenous Women's Reproductive Rights,” *Wicazo Sa Review* 20, no. 1 (2005): 74, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4140251>.

²⁹ Ralstin-Lewis, “The Continuing Struggle against Genocide,”

³⁰ One example of these policies was the forced sterilization of 3,400 to 70,000 native women during the 1960's and 70's. Many occurred as a part of programs by the federal government and were without full knowledge or consent. Native scholars have come to view the policy of sterilization as an attempt to eradicate native culture as a part of an ongoing genocide by the US government towards indigenous people. For more information see D. Marie Ralstin-Lewis, “The Continuing Struggle against Genocide,” 71, 81.

³¹ Robertson, ““This is the American Earth,”” 580.

³² Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb*, Revised Edition, (Ballantine Books, 1971), xi.

to the Cold War boom.³³ However, it continued and often occurred on tribal lands without adequate compensation to tribes and was often dangerous to workers. Many of the communities surrounding the Nevada Test Site relied on farming and ranching for jobs and radiation not only endangered livestock, but affected people through the animal products they consumed. Growing concerns about nuclear weapons testing were ignored by the government, which resulted in many people suffering from life threatening health issues.

Uranium mining became especially important during the Cold War due to its use in producing atomic weapons. This was first discovered during the Manhattan Project. The goal of the project was to create a new highly dangerous weapon in order to win the Second World War. Scientists discovered that two uranium isotopes could be synthesized into another extremely reactive element, plutonium, which could then be bombarded with atoms until it split, resulting in a massive explosion of energy through nuclear fission. Finding domestic uranium reserves became very important in light of this discovery. Uranium had been discovered in Southern Utah in the 1890's, but was not in high demand yet.³⁴ The invention of the atomic weapon and the Cold War would change this.

Uranium mining was viewed as a solution for the Navajo nation's economic issues which had been caused by a federal program of livestock reduction. One aspect of the economic development of the West during the first half of the 20th century were water projects. Work began on the Hoover Dam, then called the Boulder Dam, in 1931. The federal government was concerned with silt erosion in the Colorado river becoming a hazard to the dam and looked towards the Colorado tributaries on the Navajo reservation as the source of the problem. The federal government blamed overgrazing of livestock for the soil erosion in the rivers and devised a plan to reduce Navajo stock.³⁵ Since being forced onto the reservation, the Navajo nation had been farming sheep and goat herds. The Bureau of Indian Affairs even encouraged this as a sign of supposed assimilation to American culture. However, the herds had become so large that they were spilling outside of reservation lands. When faced with erosion issues, the government blamed overgrazing, despite the cycles of drought which likely contributed as well. The Navajo Project began in 1934 and resulted in the reduction of Navajo livestock. Stock reduction sounds quite benign on the surface, but the actual program included leaving dead sheep herds to rot in the fields. This program

³³ Fox, *Downwind*, 34.

³⁴ Fox, *Downwind*, 22.

³⁵ Dant, *Losing Eden*, 179.

economically devastated the Navajo and was the background for wartime production of uranium.³⁶ Without grazing as an economic option, many native people were forced to turn to mining. Many native people believed that mining would bring economic development and increase their quality of life; however, the opposite would prove to be true.³⁷

Uranium mining for nuclear weapons had a disproportionate effect on Native American communities because uranium reserves were found on Native lands and many lived near and worked in mines. One uranium mine was placed only two thousand feet from the Pueblo village of Paguete, New Mexico.³⁸ Uranium mining was already known to cause cancer prior to the Cold War, which caused an increase in production; however, workers were not alerted to the negative health effects until 1959.³⁹ Uranium refining creates leftover “tailings,” piles of which were left next to uranium mills. These tailings maintain eighty-five percent of the radioactivity of the original uranium. These piles stacked up next to native communities. Children would play in them and through wind and rain runoff, they were absorbed into the local food chain. Some residents even used tailings to construct homes in the traditional style using mud and dirt.⁴⁰

In this manner, Native lands acted as sacrifice zones. They were used for the ‘necessary’ harvesting of uranium, and the harmful effects to native communities were also ‘necessary’ side effects. This trade off was a sacrifice made for the nation's security and well-being. These lands were destroyed, and the people living there left to deal with the radioactive consequences so that the rest of America could be protected against nuclear threats. Health effects from uranium mining posed a heavy toll on Navajo populations that already received poor healthcare. It also introduced alcohol near the dry reservations, which had a devastating impact on families. Professor Yazzie-Lewis argues that the abused women and children of miners were also victims of atomic energy as well and that people must come to view nuclear power as a power that comes from abuse.⁴¹ Instead of being a solution for Native Americans’ economic struggle, mining brought terrible health problems, which further deteriorated communities.

Radioactive fallout from above ground nuclear testing had a profound impact on the natural environment of the surrounding area,

³⁶ Dant, *Losing Eden*, 190-192.

³⁷ Fox, *Downwind*, 26-27.

³⁸ Fox, *Downwind*, 28.

³⁹ Fox, *Downwind*, 34.

⁴⁰ Fox, *Downwind*, 44-45.

⁴¹ Dant, *Losing Eden*, 212.

especially on the agricultural communities nearby. Radioactive elements from above ground testing can enter food systems through fallout or cause harm to animal populations. Radioactive iodine can be found in cow's milk and affect the thyroid gland through consumption.⁴² In 1953, the first significant agricultural related fallout event occurred when sheep in Iron County mysteriously began to die. This event caused downwinders to begin to question the reliability of the government's narrative that there were no significant harmful effects from the test sites. When the AEC researched this event, they concluded that it was not a result of radiation, despite having prior knowledge that radiation could have a harmful impact on grazing animals after the Trinity Test.⁴³ In 1979, the event was revisited, and it was found that the radioactive elements in the animal's digestive tracts had caused the deaths.⁴⁴ At the beginning of nuclear testing, the AEC told Stephen Brower, an Agricultural Agent at the Utah State Agricultural College, not to view testing as an agricultural threat and to reassure his clients of this fact as well.⁴⁵ It is clear that the AEC was aware that nuclear testing could harm animals and there was a potential for agricultural concerns among local residents. However, they did not want residents to raise valid concerns.

As agricultural issues arose for the communities around the test site, the AEC continued to prioritize testing over residents' concerns. In 1953, downwinders expressed symptoms congruent with radiation related illnesses; however, the AEC insisted that no cases had been substantiated. The AEC began to implement new methods in an attempt to counteract a "latent local fear of radioactivity."⁴⁶ This included making an informational film intended for downwinders to watch that demonstrated a counterfactual experience of a specific nuclear test, Harry. The film depicted residents sheltering indoors in response to AEC guidance; however, in real life, residents were not alerted until five hours after the detonation.⁴⁷ There was a clear difference in the value that the AEC held for residents downwind of test sites as opposed to the rest of the American populace. The AEC encouraged downwinders to ignore their own experiences of the tests, which counteracted the idea that the AEC was trying to protect the public.

⁴² Joseph L. Lyon, "Nuclear Weapons Testing and Research Efforts to Evaluate Health Effects on Exposed Populations in the United States," *Epidemiology* 10, no. 5 (1999): 558, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3703346>.

⁴³ Fox, *Downwind*, 55-66.

⁴⁴ Fox, *Downwind*, 74.

⁴⁵ Fox, *Downwind*, 63.

⁴⁶ Atomic Energy Commission in Rice, "Downwind of the Atomic State," 663

⁴⁷ Rice, "Downwind of the Atomic State," 660-661, 663-664.

As Fox explains, “while local residents were assured they had nothing to fear from the tests, explosions occurred only when the wind was blowing due east, away from densely populated California and toward the more sparsely populated communities of eastern Nevada and Utah.”⁴⁸ The AEC prioritized the safety of densely populated areas. This caused a safety tradeoff which left less dense populations vulnerable to fallout.

Residents living downwind of test sites anecdotally recalled their family members and neighbors getting sick from cancer and dying. However, while these deaths were occurring, it was difficult to prove that they were due to fallout without adequate studies into their causes. Downwinder, Craig Booth recalled three of his brothers and his father contracting prostate cancer. This cancer was not one of the cancers covered by the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, which was established to compensate those affected by nuclear testing. Without direct evidence that radiation caused these cancers, Booth still found it unlikely that so many cancers would occur within one family.⁴⁹ His brother had been in a short black and white film for the AEC. In the film a flash goes off and then the narrator says, “See. There’s no danger to radiation.”⁵⁰ Booth says that if he could talk to the engineers from the AEC, he would ask them, “Do you know what it’s like living with radiation, knowing that you’re going to get cancer [fifteen or twenty] years from now? How does that feel?” Booth has already had cancer once before, but he still believes that he will again and “it isn’t a matter of if I get cancer, it’s when.”⁵¹ While speculations swirled in downwind communities, it took many years before the government would step in to acknowledge the damage done or fund adequate studies to research the illness rates.

In 1959, Congress held its first hearings regarding concerns about an increased risk of cancer from nuclear fallout; however, the government continued to ignore data revealing harmful effects of fallout and suppress studies into these concerns. In 1960, two investigations were launched as a result of the congressional hearings. Prior to the study, it was known that exposure to radiation could lead to increased leukemia mortality rates, and there were concerns that radioactive iodine would be found in milk,

⁴⁸ Fox, *Downwind*, 60.

⁴⁹ Craig Lang Booth, interview by Anthony Sams, June 12, 2017, Interview No. U-3495, The Downwinders of Utah Archive, American West Center and J. Willard Marriott Library Special Collections Department, University of Utah, 2,6, https://collections.lib.utah.edu/details?id=1379148&q=booth&facet_setname_s=uum_du a.

⁵⁰ Booth, Interview, 2.

⁵¹ Booth, Interview, 10.

potentially causing thyroid problems. Researchers found increased rates of leukemia across all ages among those living near the Nevada Test Site, but particularly in those under the age of nineteen. However, no effort was made to uncover if this was related to radioactive exposure. Ultimately, the AEC did not publish this study due to its small sample size, and nothing more was done to try again with a larger sample size. The AEC claimed that it did not want to alarm citizens by publishing the paper because the number of deaths was small.⁵² The second 1960 study investigated whether or not radioactive fallout had increased thyroid cancer among children in Southern Utah. However, the study did not collect data about the children's fresh cow's milk drinking habits, which was known to be the main way radiation reached the thyroid. Despite this error, this study was cited by the AEC in order to demonstrate that there was no correlation between cancers and nuclear testing. This practice of uplifting studies that demonstrated no correlation between exposure and cancer and suppressing studies that showed the opposite continued throughout the seventies and eighties.

In 1979, researchers published a study which found "children born in Southern Utah between 1951-1958 experienced 2.44 as many deaths from leukemia as children born before and after above-ground bomb testing."⁵³ Researchers followed up in a 1990 study and found "a 7.82 excess of deaths from leukemia" among downwinders under the age of nineteen during the period of testing. Someone leaked this paper and attempted to discredit the results of this study the day before it was published, when researchers could not yet respond to these claims.⁵⁴ Dr. Joseph L. Lyon, one of the researchers, described the pattern of the federal officials regarding research. He claims that the government suppressed data with the supposed motive of not wanting to alarm people. They suppressed studies that did not find any correlation between testing and diseases, labeled results that did find a correlation as inconclusive, and also attempted to prevent any further studies.⁵⁵

Living downwind of a test site or near a uranium mine posed health risks that people were not adequately warned about. Downwinders experienced increased cancer rates and environmental degradation. For the sake of protecting the projects of the AEC and the US's ability to compete in the Cold War, the government dismissed downwinders. Living in these

⁵² Joseph L. Lyon, "Nuclear Weapons Testing and Research Efforts to Evaluate Health Effects on Exposed Populations in the United States," *Epidemiology* 10, no. 5 (1999): 557, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3703346>.

⁵³ Lyon, "Nuclear Weapons testing and Research Efforts," 558.

⁵⁴ Lyon, "Nuclear Weapons testing and Research Efforts," 559.

⁵⁵ Lyon, "Nuclear Weapons testing and Research Efforts," 560.

locations put people at risk to bear an undue burden for their country that other citizens were not being asked to bear. The federal government chose to dismiss concerns from downwind populations and research from scientists that would have hindered its mission.

CITIZEN SOLDIERS: BEARING THE BURDEN OF THE COLD WAR

At the same time as they conducted above ground nuclear testing, the US government began civil defense programs which propagated conflicting narratives that alarmed citizens about the potential of nuclear war and assured them that they could handle it through adequate preparation. These narratives were intended for the whole national population and occurred all while the government continued to assure downwind populations that testing was safe. The federal government designed civil defense programs to prepare the general public for a nuclear attack. Through pamphlets, videos, and demonstrations they intended to train citizens to respond quickly and efficiently in the face of imminent death from a nuclear attack. Through civil defense programs there was a “gradual encroachment of military ideas, values, and structures, into the villain domain.”⁵⁶ These narratives helped to create citizens-soldiers who were expected to bear the burden of the Cold War. The shift from conventional weapons: bombs, guns, and tanks to nuclear weapons had a profound impact on how Americans viewed their safety at the time.

Sociologists Hooks and Smith point out the main difference between conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, which is their intended effect upon people. Conventional weapons intend to “pierce and crush” human bodies, whereas weapons of mass destruction kill people by making their environment uninhabitable. Through this transition, pollution of the environment becomes not just a side effect of war, but a weapon of it.⁵⁷ Despite the new developments in weaponry, the US government continued to describe nuclear weapons as not all that different from conventional weapons in their effects. The conventionalization of atomic weapons assuaged people’s fears of nuclear weapons by making them “‘normal’ instruments of military policy.”⁵⁸ It claimed that the damage of an atomic weapon was not vastly different from that of a conventional bomb and that the main concern with a nuclear attack was surviving the initial blast.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 6.

⁵⁷ Hooks and Smith, “Treadmills of Production and Destruction,” 19-20.

⁵⁸ Oakes and Grossman, “Managing Nuclear Terror,” 376.

⁵⁹ Oakes and Grossman, “Managing Nuclear Terror,” 378.

The nuclear bomb is a conflicting cultural symbol. It is used to both instill fear and also safety in the minds of the American public. It is regarded as being massively destructive, but also safely managed by the government. The federal government downplayed the clear differences in the intention and impact of these new weapons in order to alleviate the fears of the American public. Nuclear scholar Joseph Masco argues that the primary power of the nuclear bomb is cultural, not technological. It supposedly prevented future wars through its existence, not through its repeated use. That means that the nuclear age can never end, because nuclear war must always remain a threat in order to prevent future wars.⁶⁰ Civil defense policy was informed by the desire to maintain the cultural power of nuclear weapons as a deterrent, but also to assure the public that nuclear war would not necessarily harm them.

Civil defense planners tried to convince the public that the real fear was not the Soviet Union or nuclear weapons, but rather the American public responding irrationally to an attack. In civil defense planning, Americans were portrayed as typically panic prone.⁶¹ This portrayal made it easier for the AEC to write off people who raised valid concerns about nuclear fallout from testing as overreacting. Philip Wylie, an advisor to the chairman of the AEC, depicted a fictionalized nuclear attack in his 1954 novel, *Tomorrow!* In the novel those who were unprepared faced extreme devastation, but those who practiced civil defense were completely fine.⁶² The Connors, a white middle class family who were active in civil defense preparedness, survived the initial blast and the aftermath easily. Their son even goes on to marry the civil defense minded neighbor, Lenore. At the end of the novel, Lenore has managed to get pregnant just two years after the blast, despite the radiation she suffered.⁶³ The novel presents nuclear war as a total disaster, yet, it also maintains that through adequate civil defense, the American public could be totally safe and recover from it. This depiction of the terror of war, but also its conquerability, was present in many civil defense narratives.

Civil defense materials presented terrifying images of nuclear explosions for the public. The cover of *Time* magazine on October 2, 1950 featured a bust of General Lucius D. Clay, a high-ranking military official,

⁶⁰ Joseph Masco, *The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico*, New edition, Princeton University Press, 2020, 36.
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=2258677>.

⁶¹ Oakes and Grossman, "Managing Nuclear Terror," 386.

⁶² Oakes and Grossman, "Managing Nuclear Terror," 366.

⁶³ Oakes and Grossman, "Managing Nuclear Terror," 390-393.

looking sternly ahead while a mushroom cloud hangs over the New York skyline along with the Office of Civil Defense logo. The text across the bottom reads, “Civilian Defender Clay: No one is safe, but some can be saved.” The corresponding article discusses the precarious line between public fear, which incites panic, and calm, which leads to apathy.⁶⁴ According to the article, “Cities are pretty much useless and their populations are naked under the enemy.”⁶⁵ The mushroom cloud over New York city visualizes this future for the reader; however, it also presents a figure who is facing this danger head on, General Clay and the Civil Defense Administration. This article demonstrates the present fear with which the potential of war was discussed to the American public. The article encouraged people to support weapons development, and any encroachments into their own personal safety and life, if the alternative they are being presented with is whole cities being destroyed. The AEC allowed reporters to view weapons tests Operations Doorstep and Cue and their experiences were televised. These tests depicted homes with mannequin families being blown up. They got to the core of what nuclear war could threaten for American life.⁶⁶

The government used people's fear of nuclear war to convince the public to accept the increased militarization of society. Nuclear fear was strategically used by civil defense planners in order to encourage citizens to participate in civil defense; however, they were very careful not to create terror because they did not want people to become apathetic.⁶⁷ If nuclear war was unavoidable and going to destroy everything, there was no reason to prepare for it. War needed to be scary enough to be taken seriously, but also something that people could survive. There was a precise balance necessary for the government when discussing nuclear weapons with the public. As Sarah Fox puts it, “the public needed to be afraid enough of enemy weapons that they would throw their support behind the development of American nuclear technology but not so afraid that they would protest weapons testing or support a ban on nuclear weapons altogether.”⁶⁸

As part of their efforts to reshape attitudes, civil defense planners downplayed radiation to the public and emphasized sheltering from the

⁶⁴ “Civil Defense: The City Under the Bomb,” *Time*, October 2, 1950, 12-15.
<https://civildefensearchives.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/time-cd.pdf>.

⁶⁵ “Civil Defense: The City Under the Bomb,” 12.

⁶⁶ McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 54.

⁶⁷ Oakes and Grossman, “Managing Nuclear Terror,” 386.

⁶⁸ Fox, *Downwind*, 5.

initial blast. “Facts About Fallout” was a 1955 pamphlet from the Federal Civil Defense Administration aimed at civilians. On the third page, the pamphlet tells readers that “Radioactivity is nothing new... the whole world is radioactive.”⁶⁹ This phrase was also used in a pamphlet by the Office of Civil Defense in 1958, which was reprinted again in 1961.⁷⁰ By claiming that the “whole world is radioactive,” the FCDA turned exposure to radiation into a commonplace occurrence. While the pamphlet does acknowledge the difference between natural radiation and radiation caused by a nuclear explosion, its desire is still to normalize radiation through this comparison. The 1955 pamphlet tells the reader how the reader will know fallout is a problem for them; “Civil Defense radiological monitoring teams will detect fallout if it is present in your area. They will tell you when it is safe and when you must take protective measures.”⁷¹ Because civil defense workers determined whether or not civilians were safe, people had to put a lot of trust in them. They were in a position of power over the general populace and the attitudes they promoted toward nuclear war mattered.

⁶⁹ Federal Civil Defense Administration, *Facts About Fallout*, Pamphlet, National Archives, Government Publications between 1861-1992, (1955), 3, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/306714>.

⁷⁰ Federal Civil Defense Administration, *Facts About Fallout Protection*, National Parks Service, Civil Defense Materials, (1958), 4, <https://www.nps.gov/media/photo/gallery.htm?pg=6220772&id=1801122B-0EA6-4C12-9B06-2E8F522E96C9>.

⁷¹ Federal Civil Defense Administration, *Facts About Fallout*, 5.




Figure: Facts About Fallout⁷²

Changing perspectives on war and civil duty encouraged citizens to tolerate encroachment of the military into their daily lives as a patriotic duty. The high rates of civilian casualties during World War II “effectively

⁷² Federal Civil Defense Administration, *Facts About Fallout*, Pamphlet, National Archives, Government Publications between 1861-1992, (1955), 3, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/306714>.

collapsed the distinction between soldiers and civilians.”⁷³ More than ever, it seemed anyone could be subject to the terror of war. With this came an increasing responsibility to bear this burden for your country. In South Dakota, one hundred and fifty Minuteman missiles were placed around the state during the Cold War.⁷⁴ The reasons for selecting South Dakota were similar to the reasoning the AEC used when selecting Nevada for testing. South Dakota was chosen because it already had a military base and was far enough inland, but not out of reach of the Soviet Union.⁷⁵ In order to obtain land for the missiles, the government purchased private property, or even seized it through eminent domain.⁷⁶ In South Dakota people accepted these changes mostly without protest; however, this wasn’t true in all states that had Minuteman missiles. South Dakotans were happy to do their duty to help their country. Civil duty also motivated uranium miners. When interviewed, many miners brought up their veteran status and military service.⁷⁷

As the expectations and duties for American citizens during war times shifted because of the increase in civilian involvement and civil defense initiatives, the government expected people living near nuclear testing sites to take on an extra burden as well. Civil defense alarmed the public about the dangers of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, with the intention of inciting proactive action and planning. At the same time, the government downplayed the effects of nuclear fallout to animals and to human health to downwinders. Nuclear weapons were frightening when it was necessary to scare the enemy or American populace into action, but posed no threat when it came to testing within the US or the US’s ability to persevere through war.

CONCLUSION

Nuclear testing actually led to some of the first international environmental agreements. In 1963, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. It outlawed atmospheric nuclear testing.⁷⁸ While this treaty protected downwind

⁷³ Oakes and Grossman, “Managing Nuclear Terror,” 375.

⁷⁴ Gretchen Heefner, “Missiles and Memory: Dismantling South Dakota’s Cold War,” *Western Historical Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (2007): 181, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25443506>.

⁷⁵ Heefner, “Missiles and Memory,” 185.

⁷⁶ Heefner, “Missiles and Memory,” 187.

⁷⁷ Fox, *Downwind*, 33.

⁷⁸ J. R., McNeill and Peter Engelke, “Cold War and Environmental Culture,” in *The Great Acceleration: An Environmental History of the Anthropocene since 1945*, (Harvard University Press, 2014) 166, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjf9wcc.7>.

citizens from atmospheric fallout related to testing, many people were still required to work in these testing facilities and mining continued. Navor Valdez, whose story was mentioned in the introduction, was one of these workers. The Cold War was a time of intense development of nuclear weapons, which many believe was necessary in order to compete on a global scale with the Soviet Union, but a part of this rapid development was an oversight of the American populations which were negatively affected. Nuclear testing began with violent displacement of citizens in the Marshall Islands and this policy of ignoring or downplaying the harmful effects of radiation and nuclear testing continued when testing moved inland. Here the victims of nuclear testing became American citizens themselves. The US government maintained conflicting messages about nuclear safety. To the downwinders, testing and fallout posed little to no harm to them. To the public at large, nuclear weapons were terrifying and a nuclear war was imminent; yet, if they followed the government's directions they would be totally fine. US society became more militarized through these civil defense initiatives and civilians were increasingly expected to bear the brunt of mobilization for the war. In this way, testing made downwinders and miners into servicemen. They suffered from nuclear experimentation in order to protect the safety of their fellow citizens and the country at large.

In 1990, after years of advocacy from downwind groups, the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) was passed. This offered a one time monetary compensation of fifty thousand dollars to downwinders, one-hundred thousand to uranium miners, millers, and ore transporters, and seventy-five thousand to onsite participants at test sites. The act covered a specific range of cancers and other illnesses, including breast, thyroid, and lung cancers, among others. The diseases covered are specific to each group of those exposed. Uranium workers could not receive compensation for thyroid cancer, but mainly conditions of the lungs and kidneys. The act is also very specific in how it outlines exactly which counties are considered downwind. It only includes certain counties in the states of Utah, Nevada, and Arizona. In 2024 RECA expired amid attempts to expand coverage, one proposal being to include people affected in Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, and Guam.⁷⁹ This means that people can no longer file new claims and without adequate funding, civilians affected outside of the defined counties may never get any recompense.

⁷⁹ Kyle Dunphey, “The Senate Wants to Expand RECA. Downwinders Are Urging Utahns in the House to Follow Suit,” *Idaho Capital Sun*, October 25, 2024. <https://idahocapitalsun.com/2024/10/25/the-senate-wants-to-expand-reca-downwinders-are-urging-utahns-in-the-house-to-follow-suit/>.

As the title of this paper suggests, the entire world is radioactive. At least now it is. This radioactivity is not as natural as the FCDA suggested. Instead, it is a direct result of above-ground nuclear weapons testing. Because of weather and wind patterns, radioactive fallout has spread across the entire globe. As Fox suggests in *Downwinders*, “we all live downwind of a nuclear test,” it is just a matter of how far from the test site we actually are.⁸⁰ Nuclear weapons do not appear to be leaving the global arsenal anytime soon and it is time to reckon with what that really means. When reflecting upon the efforts to memorialize the minuteman missiles in North Dakota, Heefner writes, “perhaps for a war short on medals and battles, historic preservation and commemoration become the lone markers for the people who served.”⁸¹ Downwinders and uranium-affected people made sacrifices for the safety of their country as well. They adopted this burden, often without knowing its true consequences. While RECA provided compensation for certain downwinders, memorialization needs to place their sacrifices within the context of the wider Cold War and recognize the role they played in developing weapons which were and continue to be important parts of US foreign policy.

⁸⁰ Fox, *Downwind*, 15.

⁸¹ Gretchen Heefner, “Missiles and Memory,” 198.

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