{"id":26,"date":"2010-11-23T12:06:53","date_gmt":"2010-11-23T17:06:53","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.nd.edu\/iwmc\/"},"modified":"2010-11-27T10:47:48","modified_gmt":"2010-11-27T15:47:48","slug":"session-2","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/iwmc\/session-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Session 2: Intuition"},"content":{"rendered":"

Nov 12, 2010<\/strong><\/p>\n

Intuition and Morality <\/strong> <\/span>
\nUnderstanding the social intuitionist approach; examining prominent criticisms, replies, and its relationship to other intuitionist approaches to morality.<\/p>\n

Recommended readings:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Haidt, J. 2001. The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach.\u00a0Psychological Review<\/em> 108:814-834.<\/a><\/p>\n

Haidt, J. 2010. Moral Psychology Must Not Be Based on Faith and Hope.\u00a0Perspectives on Psychological Science<\/em> 5(2) 182-184.<\/a><\/p>\n

Kennett, J., and C. Fine. 2009. <\/a>Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? The Implications of Social Intuitionist Models of Cognition for Meta-ethics and Moral Psychology.\u00a0Ethical Theory and Moral Practice<\/em><\/a> 12:77\u201396.<\/p>\n

Narvaez, D. 2010. Moral complexity: The fatal attraction of truthiness and the importance of mature moral functioning.\u00a0Perspectives on Psychological Science <\/em>5(2): 163\u2013181.<\/a><\/p>\n

Narvaez, D. 2008. The Social-Intuitionist Model: Some Counter-Intuitions. In W. A. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.),\u00a0Moral Psychology, Vol. 2, The Cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity<\/em> (pp. 233-240). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.<\/a><\/p>\n

Fine, C. 2006. Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it?\u00a0Philosophical Explorations<\/em> 9(1): 83-98<\/a><\/p>\n

Horgan, T., and M. Timmons. 2007.\u00a0Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment.\u00a0Ethical Theory and Moral Practice<\/em> 10:279\u2013295<\/a><\/p>\n

Singer, P. 2005. Ethics and Intuitions.\u00a0The Journal of Ethics<\/em> 9: 331\u2013352<\/a><\/p>\n

Audi, R. 2008. Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics.\u00a0Ethical Theory and Moral Practice<\/em><\/a> 11:475\u2013492.<\/p>\n

Additional Readings:<\/strong><\/p>\n

MoralBecoming2010FINAL (2)<\/a><\/p>\n

Narvaez Triune Ethics final PDF<\/a><\/p>\n

Session Presentations:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Darcia Narvaez <\/a><\/p>\n

Robert Audi<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Nov 12, 2010 Intuition and Morality Understanding the social intuitionist approach; examining prominent criticisms, replies, and its relationship to other intuitionist approaches to morality. Recommended readings: Haidt, J. 2001. The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach.\u00a0Psychological Review 108:814-834. Haidt, J. 2010. Moral Psychology Must Not Be Based on Faith and Hope.\u00a0Perspectives […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":203,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-26","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/iwmc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/26","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/iwmc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/iwmc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/iwmc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/203"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/iwmc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=26"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/iwmc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/26\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":113,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/iwmc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/26\/revisions\/113"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/iwmc\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=26"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}