

ECON 43260/MGA 63200

Political Economy of Development

Prof. Lakshmi Iyer

Fall 2023

GENERAL INFORMATION

Class Time: Mondays and Wednesdays, 9.30-10.45am.

Location: Jenkins Nanovic B052.

Course website: Canvas– accessible to registered students. This is where you can access the syllabus, readings, lecture slides etc.

Email: liyer@nd.edu

Office hours: Tuesday 2.00-3.30pm; Wednesday 3.30-5.00 on Zoom:

<https://notredame.zoom.us/j/98049982495?pwd=M2E4dW85aVNGcWVMZFd6ZlFIa0NhQT09>

Meeting ID: 980 4998 2495

Passcode: 936189

You can also email me to schedule an appointment at a different time. In general, the best way to communicate with me is via email.

COURSE OVERVIEW

The course will focus on why and how political institutions affect economic development. The goal is to understand core theoretical concepts in political economy, discuss the political determinants of economic policy choices and learn how to understand and evaluate empirical evidence. The course will use evidence and examples from both developed and developing countries. Topics will include the role of historical circumstances and political leaders in fostering economic development, the incentives and constraints of political leaders, and the economic determinants of corruption and conflict.

The course will have two main components. First, we will be mainly reading academic journal articles; there is no textbook for this class. We will discuss the conceptual basis for the questions we study, how to model them theoretically and how to test these ideas empirically. We will discuss the methods and findings of the empirical papers, and identify their strengths and weaknesses. Second, you will develop an empirical project to address an original research question. This will involve data collection, descriptive data work, regression analysis and advanced econometric techniques as appropriate.

PRE-REQUISITES

This class is meant as an advanced undergraduate course. As such, I will assume that you are comfortable with intermediate macro or microeconomics and basic calculus. Since a core component of the course is an empirical research paper, you must have taken Econometrics (ECON 30331) or an equivalent course

(e.g. MGA 60204) prior to enrolling in this class. You may use Stata (or any other statistical package) for the empirical analysis.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

A. Class participation (20%)

Everyone is expected to participate in class discussions. Quality is valued over quantity. Good quality comments will help explain concepts from readings, highlight puzzles or inconsistencies or question the conclusions of the instructor or other classmates. I will cold-call frequently during class sessions. Since there are no negative points for class participation, you should view being called upon as an opportunity to improve your grade. You will also provide feedback on a peer's research paper.

It is difficult to participate effectively if you do not attend and prepare for class. Required readings for each class are indicated on the syllabus, and will be available on Canvas. You must read these before coming to class. The syllabus will often indicate which tables or sections will be the focus of class discussion. In addition to required readings, the syllabus lists several optional readings, which you may read if you are interested in exploring a specific topic further. These are usually available through the library e-journal resources.

If you miss a class for any reason, you may email me brief written answers (one page maximum) to the discussion questions posed in the syllabus for partial participation credit. These written answers must be sent by the end of the same class day.

B. Problem sets and assignments (25%)

There will be several assignments during the semester; due dates are listed on the class schedule. The assignments are geared to help assess your understanding of the course, prepare you for the midterm exam or guide you in the development of your empirical paper. Your three best assignments will contribute towards your grade.

C. Midterm (25%)

A midterm exam will be held in class on **November 1, 2023**. Attendance is mandatory. Only university-approved absences will be allowed (death in the immediate family, sickness resulting in hospitalization). Unexcused absences will earn you a zero on the exam.

D. Research paper (30%)

In lieu of a final exam, you will write an empirical research paper of 10-15 pages. More details and guidelines will be provided as we proceed in the course. The final paper is due at noon on **December 11**. There are several interim deadlines for submission of different parts of the paper (literature review, one-page proposal, summary statistics, tables of results etc) to enable you to complete the paper on time. While these interim deadlines are not graded assignments, submitting your work on this schedule enables me to give you several rounds of feedback along the way. Your classmates will also give you feedback on your full paper draft on **December 4**, which you can incorporate prior to final submission. I will provide email feedback on your papers during finals week.

HONOR CODE

You are expected to adhere to the Academic Code of Honor Pledge: *“As a member of the Notre Dame community, I acknowledge that it is my responsibility to learn and abide by principles of intellectual honesty and academic integrity, and therefore I will not participate in or tolerate academic dishonesty.”*

Please see <http://honorcode.nd.edu> for full details. Note that, in this class, all submitted work (graded or ungraded) must be the student’s own work. You are welcome to discuss the readings with your classmates before or after class, but the assignments and midterm must be done independently. You are encouraged to seek feedback on your research paper from your classmates and other peers.

Note that AI-generated submissions are not permitted in this course. You can choose to use such technologies (like ChatGPT) to help with your paper writing, but I do not recommend it. If used, these technologies, like any other source, must always be attributed in a manner that can be reproduced by the reader. An example of “reproducible” attribution includes the date accessed, the web address or URL accessed, and a description of the prompt. When using generative AI technologies as a source of information, you are responsible for assessing the quality, completeness, and accuracy of the cited information.

RESOURCES

All required readings will be available through **Canvas** (see Files/Required Readings folder).

All slides shown in class will also be posted to **Canvas** (in the Files/Class Slides folder).

Stata (statistical software for data analysis) is available in all classrooms and clusters on campus, but can also be purchased for your personal computer through the university’s GradPlan:

<http://www.stata.com/order/new/edu/gradplans/student-pricing/>

If you are not familiar with Stata (or need a refresher), the Hesburgh Library has a great review:

<http://libguides.library.nd.edu/friendly.php?s=stata>

Assignments 1 and 2 are also designed to review Stata.

SCHEDULE

Classes	Date	Topic	Readings	Questions for class discussion/Assignment due dates
1	Aug 23	Introduction		
2	Aug 28	Property Rights	Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001); focus on Tables 2,3,4 Tools: Regression analysis, instrumental variables	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is the primary research question in the paper? 2. How do the authors construct the variables of interest? Are there better ways to do this? 3. Why do the authors need data on settler mortality? 4. What are the key findings of the paper?
3	Aug 30	Property Rights	Banerjee and Iyer (2005); focus on Table 3 Tools: Regression analysis	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How is the primary research question similar or different from AJR (2001)? 2. Are the data and methods similar? 3. Are the results similar or different from the cross-country findings of AJR (2001)?
4	Sep 4	Colonial Rule	Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2003 (Sections 1-3); Iyer (2010) Tools: Case study; instrumental variables	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How did Botswana achieve high growth? What can other poor countries learn from Botswana's experience? 2. Why does Iyer (2010) look at how and when Indian rulers died? 3. Are the results in Iyer (2010) consistent with Botswana's experience? <p>Assignment 1 due on Sep 4.</p>
5	Sep 6	Democracy	Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) Tools: Difference-in-differences estimation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is democracy? What rules and institutions do we need to sustain democracy? 2. Would you expect democracy to deliver better economic outcomes than autocracy? Why? 3. Why do the authors use a difference-in-differences regression rather than a simple regression of growth on democracy (as in Assignment 1)?
6	Sep 11	Institutional Change	Olson (1993); Przeworski (2009): Table 2. Tools: Testing alternative theories	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. According to Olson, why might autocracies persist? When might autocracies evolve into democracies? 2. What does Przeworski's data suggest about the conditions under which democratization occurs? <p>Assignment 2 due on Sep 11.</p>
7	Sep 13	Institutional Change	Guest lecture by Professor Aníbal Pérez-Liñán	<p>Read Coppedge et al (2016) OR the V-Dem Democracy Report 2022 OR watch the guest lecture by Professor Michael Coppedge. Check out the V-Dem website and data at https://www.v-dem.net/en/.</p>
8	Sep 18	Do Leaders Matter?	Jones and Olken (2005) Tools: Difference-in-differences estimates	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is the main question Jones and Olken are trying to answer? Under what assumptions does their empirical strategy identify the effects of leaders (and not other factors)? 2. Why do you think the impact of leaders differs across democracies and autocracies? <p>Assignment 3 due on Sep 18.</p>

9	Sep 20	Voter turnout	Gerber and Green (2000); Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) Tools: Field experiments	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Based on the papers assigned, what factors are likely to increase voter turnout? How can such factors be activated without a researcher-driven experiment? 2. Are the results of the paper likely to generalize to other areas or time periods? Why or why not? <p><i>Do the Political Predictions Poll by Sep 20.</i></p>
10	Sep 25	Voters and information	Banerjee et al (2011): sections 1,3,4. Tools: Theoretical modeling, interpreting interaction coefficients	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Based on the results in the paper, what kinds of information are likely to change voter decisions? 2. Are the results of the paper likely to generalize to other areas or time periods? Why or why not?
11	Sep 27	Voters and information	Della Vigna & Kaplan (2007); focus on tables 3, 4, 6, 7. Tools: Difference-in-difference estimation, interpreting interaction coefficients	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How do the authors control for the possibility that places or viewers exposed to Fox News may be quite different from those that were not? 2. What can you conclude about the role of the media in shaping voter decisions?
12	Oct 2	Median voter theorem	Shepsle (2010), Chapter 5, pp 90-99, 110-123. Tools: Formal modeling	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What does the median voter theorem imply about policy choices in a democracy? 2. What are the underlying assumptions for the median voter model? Are they plausible approximations to real life situations? <p><i>Two page literature review on an area of interest due on Oct 4.</i></p>
13	Oct 4	Median voter: Empirics	Fujiwara (2015) Tools: Regression discontinuity	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How does Fujiwara identify the electoral and policy effects of introducing voting machines in Brazilian elections? 2. Are his empirical results consistent with the predictions of the median voter model?
14	Oct 9	Do Women Leaders Matter?	Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004); skim section 3, focus on section 4 and tables V and VI. Tools: Formal modeling, natural experiments	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Will electing women instead of men make a difference to policy outcomes? Why or why not? 2. How do Chattopadhyay & Duflo identify the impact of women leaders on policy outcomes? 3. Are their results generalizable to other contexts? <p><i>Fill out the Political Participation and Ambition Poll by Oct 9.</i></p>
15	Oct 11	Why So Few Women Leaders?	Kornblut (2011), Chapter 7; Iyer and Mani (2019)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What factors might be deterring women from political candidacy? 2. What policy options can address such barriers? <p><i>One-page research proposal due on Oct 13.</i></p>

16	Oct 23	Collective action	Miguel & Gugerty (2005), Sections 1-2.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the inefficiencies in collective decision making and how can they be addressed? 2. How does group size and group diversity affect contribution towards public goods?
17	Oct 25	Ethnic divisions	Miguel & Gugerty (2005), Sections 3-6.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. How do Miguel & Gugerty empirically identify the impact of ethnic diversity on public goods provision? <p><i>Assignment 4 due on Oct 27.</i></p>
18	Oct 30	<i>No class; Additional office hours to help with midterm prep and data collection.</i>		
19	Nov 1	Midterm Exam		
20	Nov 6	Decentralization	Galiani et al (2008), Sections 1-2; Bardhan & Mookherjee (2000)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. When will local governments provide better public services than provincial or federal governments?
21	Nov 8	Decentralization	Galiani et al (2008), Sections 3-6	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. What do the results of Galiani et al (2008) imply about decentralization? 3. What settings will these results generalize to? <p><i>Summary statistics for paper due on Nov 8.</i></p>
22	Nov 13	Controlling corruption	Olken (2007)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is corruption? How does Olken measure corruption in Indonesian road projects? 2. What do Olken's results tell us about the best way to control corruption?
23	Nov 15	Controlling corruption	Bjorkman and Svensson (2009)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. When will community monitoring be effective in improving public service delivery? 2. What are the differences between the community monitoring intervention in Bjorkman & Svensson (2009) compared to Olken (2007)? 3. What settings will the Uganda results generalize to?
24	Nov 20	<i>Bring draft of results table(s) to class for peer feedback.</i>		
25	Nov 27	Why do wars happen?	Fearon (1995)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What "rationalist" explanations does Fearon provide for wars to happen despite their huge human and economic costs? 2. Which of these explanations (if any) do you find credible? Why? 3. Can you think of alternative reasons why wars happen?
26	Nov 29	Economic shocks and civil war	Dube and Vargas (2013)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Why should changes in global commodity prices affect conflict in Colombia? 2. What do the results in the paper tell us about the role of economic factors in conflict? 3. What policies should governments adopt to reduce conflict? <p><i>Email draft of complete paper to me and your assigned peer by Nov 30.</i></p>
27	Dec 4	<i>Peer-review of research projects + 3-5 minute paper discussions</i>		
28	Dec 6	<i>3-5 minute paper discussions (contd.)</i>		<i>Final paper due at 12 noon on Dec 11</i>

READING LIST

(* indicates required readings; they will be discussed on the dates listed in the schedule above)

A. The Role of Institutions

A1. Institutions and Development

- *Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369–401.
- * Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson. 2003. "An African Success Story: Botswana," in *In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth* edited by Dani Rodrik, Princeton University Press, pp. 80-122.
http://scholar.harris.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/jamesrobinson/files/jr_africansuccess_0.pdf
- *Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. "History, Institutions and Economic Performance: the Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." *American Economic Review* 95(4): 1190-1213.
- *Iyer, Lakshmi. 2010. "Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-term Consequences." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 693-713.
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/REST_a_00023
- *Papaioannou, Elias and Gregorios Siourounis. 2008. "Democratisation and Growth." *The Economic Journal*, 118 (October), 1520–1551.
- Blinder, Alan S. and Mark W. Watson. 2016. "Presidents and the US Economy: An Econometric Exploration." *American Economic Review* 106(4): 1015-1045.
- Kenny, Charles. 2005. Why are we worried about income? Nearly everything that matters is converging. *World Development*, 33(1), 1-19.
- Pritchett, Lant. 1997. "Divergence, Big Time." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 11 (3):3-17.
- Nunn, Nathan. "Long Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123, no. 1 (2008): 139–76.
- North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *The Journal of Economic History* XLIX (4):803-32.
- Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2004. "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes." *American Economic Review* 94(1): 25-45.
- Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2006. "Democracy and Development: The Devil is in the Details." *American Economic Review* 96(2): 319-324.
- Vietor, Richard H.K. and Hilary White. 2015. "Singapore's 'Midlife Crisis'?" Harvard Business School Case 714039.
- Xu, Chenggang. 2015. "China's Political-Economic Institutions and Development." *Cato Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp 535-548. <http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2015/9/cj-v35n3-4.pdf>

A2. Institutional Change

- *Olson, Mancur. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–76.
- *Przeworski, Adam. 2009. "Conquered or Granted: A History of Franchise Extensions." *British Journal of Political Science* 39: 291-321.

- *Coppedge, Michael, Staffan Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning and Jan Teorell. 2016. "Measuring high level democratic principles using the V-Dem data." *International Political Science Review* 37(5): 580–593.
- *V-Dem Institute. 2022. *Democracy Report 2022: Autocratization Changing Nature?* https://v-dem.net/documents/19/dr_2022_ipyOpLP.pdf
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6, "Democratization."
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2000. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 1167-99.
- Alesina, A., P. Aghion, and F. Trebbi (May 2004) "Endogenous Political Institutions" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 565-612

B. The Role of Voters in Democracies

B1. Voter Turnout and Voting Decisions

- * Gerber, Alan and Donald Green. 2000. "The effects of canvassing, telephone calls, and direct mail on voter turnout: a field experiment." *American Political Science Review* 94(3):653–63
- *Gerber, Alan, Donald Green and Christopher Larimer. 2008. "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 33-48.
- *Banerjee, Abhijit V., Selvan Kumar, Rohini Pande and Felix Su. "Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India." Working paper, 2011.
- *Della Vigna, Stefano and Ethan Kaplan. 2007. "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122: 1187-1234.
- Pons, Vincent. 2018. "Will a Five-Minute Discussion Change Your Mind? A Countrywide Experiment on Voter Choice in France." *American Economic Review*, 108(6): 1322–1363.
- Durante, Ruben and Emilio Gutierrez. 2014. "Political Advertising and Voting Intentions: Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Ads Viewership." Working paper. http://media.wix.com/ugd/dc1c3f_5aa108d540d441e88ba6804541718d82.pdf
- Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. "Clientelism and voting behavior: evidence from a field experiment in Benin." *World Politics* 55(3):399–422
- Benjamin, Daniel and Jesse Shapiro. 2009. "Thin Slice Forecasts of Gubernatorial Elections." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 91(3): 523–536.
- Pande, Rohini. 2011. "Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies." *Annual Review of Economics* 3 (1):215-37.
- Aker, Jenny C., Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente. 2017. "Is Information Power? Using Mobile Phones and Free Newspapers during an Election in Mozambique." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 99 (2): 185–200.
- Miguel, Edward, Marco Manacorda, et al. "Government Transfers and Political Support." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*.
- Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123, no. 2 (2008): 703–45.
- Gentzkow, M. (August 2006) "Television and Voter Turnout" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121 (3): 931-972.

DellaVigna, Stefano, John List, Ulrike Malmendier and Gautam Rao. 2017. "Voting to Tell Others." *Review of Economic Studies* 84(1): 143–181.

B2. Voters and Policy Choices

*Shepsle, Kenneth. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions, 2nd Edition*. W.W.Norton.

*Fujiwara, Thomas. 2015. "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil." *Econometrica* 83(2): 423-464.

Fujiwara, Thomas, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2013. "Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 5 (4): 241-55.

Miller, Grant. "Women's Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123, no. 3 (2008): 1287–327.

Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richards. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89, no. 5 (1981): 914–27.

C. Political Leaders and Governance Structure

C1. Political Leaders

*Jones, Benjamin F. and Benjamin A. Olken. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, no. 3 (2005): 835–64.

*Chattopadhyay, Raghendra and Esther Duflo. 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence From a Randomized Experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72 (5): 1409–43.

*Iyer, Lakshmi and Anandi Mani. 2019. "The Road Not Taken: Gender Gaps along Paths to Political Power." *World Development* 119: 68-80.

*Kornblut, Anne E. 2011. *Notes from the Cracked Ceiling: What It Will Take for a Woman to Win*. New York: Broadway Paperbacks.

Bhalotra, Sonia, Irma Clots-Figueras and Lakshmi Iyer. 2018. "Pathbreakers? Women's Electoral Success and Future Political Participation." *Economic Journal*, 128 (613): 1844-1878.

Iyer, Lakshmi, Anandi Mani, Prachi Mishra and Petia Topalova. 2012. "The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4(4): 165-193.

Pande, Rohini. "Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities." *American Economic Review* 93, no. 4 (2003): 1132–51.

C2. Social Capital

*Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty. "Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya." *Journal of Public Economics* 89, no. 11–12 (2005): 2325–68.

Easterly, William and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1203-1250, 1997.

Miguel, Edward. "Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania." *World Politics* 56, no. 3 (2004): 327–62.

Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press, 1965. ISBN: 9780674537507.

Ray, Debraj, and Joan Maria Esteban. "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox." *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 3 (2001): 663–72.

- Alesina, A. and E. Le Ferrara (Sept. 2005) "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance" *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 43, 3: 762-800.
- Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, et al. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114, no. 4 (1999): 1243–84.
- Guiso, L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales (Spring 2006) "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 23-48

C3. Decentralization

- *Galiani, Sebastian, Paul Gertler, Ernesto Schargrotsky. "School decentralization: Helping the good get better, but leaving the poor behind." *Journal of Public Economics* 92 (2008) 2106–2120.
- *Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee. 2000. "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels." *American Economic Review* 90(2): 135-139.
- Galasso, Emanuela and Martin Ravallion. 2004. "Decentralized Targeting of an Antipoverty Program." *Journal of Public Economics* 89: 705– 727.
- Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee. 2005. "Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 89: 675-704.
- Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2004. "Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia." *Journal of Public Economics* 88: 867– 893.
- Joanis, M. 2014. "Shared Accountability and Partial Decentralization in Local Public Good Provision." *Journal of Development Economics* 107: 28-37.

D. Failures of Politics

D1. Corruption

- *Olken, Benjamin. "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia." *Journal of Political Economy* 115, no. 2 (2007): 200–49.
- *Björkman, Martina, and Jakob Svensson. "Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment of a Citizen Report Card Project in Uganda." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124, no. 2 (2009): 735–69.
- Björkman, Martina, Damien de Walque and Jakob Svensson. 2017. "Experimental Evidence on the Long-Run Impact of Community-Based Monitoring." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 9(1): 33-69.
- Fisman, Ray. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections." *American Economic Review* 91, no. 4 (2001): 1095–102.
- Olken, Benjamin A., and Patrick Barron. "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh." (PDF) *Journal of Political Economy* 117, no. 3 (2009): 417–52.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1975. "The Economics of Corruption." *Journal of Public Economics* 4: 187-203.
- Svensson, Jakob. 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19 (3):19-42.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2007. "What Have we Learned about the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-national Empirical Research?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 10:211-44.
- Becker, Gary. 1968. "Crime and punishment: An economic approach." *Journal of Political Economy* 76, 169-217.

- Di Tella, Rafael, and Ernesto Schargrotsky. "The Role of Wages and Auditing During a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires." *Journal of Law and Economics* 46, no. 1 (2003): 269–92.
- Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. "Corruption." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108, no. 3 (1993): 599–617.
- Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, and Atif Mian. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 121, no. 4 (2005): 1371–411.
- Lewis-Faupel S, Neggers Y, Olken BA, Pande R. 2016. "Can Electronic Procurement Improve Infrastructure Provision? Evidence from Public Works in India and Indonesia." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 8(3): 258-283.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, Stuti Khemani. 2010. "Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from three randomized experiments in education in India." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 2 (1)*.

D2. Conflict

- *Fearon, James D. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414.
- *Dube, Oeindrila and Juan F. Vargas, (2013) "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia." *Review of Economic Studies* 80: 1384-1421.
- Erik Melander, Therése Pettersson & Lotta Themnér. 2016. "Organized violence, 1989–2015." *Journal of Peace Research* 53(5): 727–742.
- Jackson, Matthew and Massimo Morelli. 2007. "Political Bias and War." *American Economic Review* 97(4): 1353-1373.
- Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach." *Journal of Political Economy* 112 (4): 725–53.
- Blattman, Chris and Edward Miguel. 2010. "Civil War." *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(1): 3–57.
- Fearon, James. 2008. "Economic Development, Insurgency and Civil War," in Elhanan Helpman, ed., *Institutions and Economic Performance*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bruckner, Markus and Antonio Ciccone. 2010. "International Commodity Prices, Growth and the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Economic Journal* 120 (May), 519–534.
- Bazzi, Samuel and Chris Blattman. 2014. "Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 6(4): 1–38.