

Microeconomic Development I: Political Economy and Institutions
Professor Lakshmi Iyer
ECON 70571, Fall 2024

GENERAL INFORMATION

Class Time: Mondays and Wednesdays, 11.00-12.15 pm, in JNH 3005.

Office hours on Zoom: Mondays and Tuesday 2.00-3.30pm

<https://notredame.zoom.us/j/95400497024?pwd=GG9OX3HatVbvdOZP5apdYpEQjdpJab.1>

Meeting ID: 954 0049 7024

Passcode: 162106

You can also email me (liyer@nd.edu) to schedule an appointment at a different time.

COURSE OVERVIEW

This half-course focuses on the importance of geography, history, political economy, institutions and societal factors in determining development outcomes. The goal is to introduce students to recent research in development microeconomics and understand the application of theory and econometrics to gain deeper insights into this research. Students must attend the Development Economics Working Group meetings on Wednesdays, 12.30-1.30pm (lunch provided). Please email Michele Davies (mdavies2@nd.edu) to be added to the mailing list. You are also strongly encouraged to regularly attend the Applied Micro seminar series on Tuesdays 3.30-5.00pm; speakers and topics are posted on the department's website.

COURSE MATERIALS

Classes will be mainly based on academic journal articles. Required readings are available on Canvas. All other readings can be easily obtained via the library. You must read the required articles before coming to class and be prepared to actively engage in class discussion.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

A. Class participation (20%)

Everyone is expected to read the required papers prior to class, and come to class prepared to discuss the papers and/or ask questions about them. A key part of being a professional economist is the ability to ask good questions in seminars (or otherwise) and be able to “think on your feet” and answer questions.

B. Paper presentation (20%)

You are required to present one paper in class over the course of the half-semester. Think of this exercise as both a practice for your own research presentations, and as a way to clearly communicate the findings of a paper to your classmates. You may pick any of the required readings, which are indicated with a * on the reading list (except those written by me). You should let me know by Thursday (Oct 31) which one you would like to present.

Each presentation will last roughly 25 minutes. It should address: (1) the paper's motivation and, potentially, its links to other papers we have discussed, (2) data used, (3) research design

(identification strategy), (4) results, and (5) constructive critique of the study i.e. identifying the key contributions and the limitations, and proposing extensions or improvements. If you are using slides, plan on at most 15 slides for a 25-minute time slot.

C. Referee report (20%)

You are required to write a referee report for one of the job market papers listed at the end of the reading list (due **Nov 11**). You should begin with a one or two-paragraph summary of the main contribution of the paper, and highlight the key strengths of the paper. You should then critique the paper, starting with fundamental concerns and concluding with more minor comments. You should include constructive and realistic recommendations for improvement. Each report should be 1-2 single-spaced pages. Sample referee reports are available on Canvas.

D. Paper proposal (40%)

The goal is to get you to formulate some research questions, that will hopefully lead you to a potential third-year paper and/or a thesis chapter. I have divided the task into two parts here. The first involves reading at least one book on the history and/or politics of a given country and provide a 3-page writeup with your thoughts on the following:

- (a) How has the country's development path progressed from the time it began existence as an independent country?
- (b) How have the country's geographic, historical, political or social factors shaped the country's development path? Do these conform to the theories or the cross-country patterns discussed in class?
- (c) Do your readings about the country lead to specific research questions that could be explored in future work? Try to come up with 2 or 3 questions.

We will do very short (2-slide) presentations based on your writeup in class on **Nov 20**. This writeup will count for **15%** of the class grade.

The second part would explore one of the questions highlighted above in more detail (or you could switch to a different one). I would like to see a short proposal (5-page maximum), due **Dec 16**, with the following components:

- (a) What is the question?
- (b) Why is this question important? Ideally it should be interesting to all economists, not just people in the development subfield.
- (c) Include a short literature review describing what we know about this question so far.
- (d) What potential methodological approach would you take to answer this question?
 - If theory: what will be your key building blocks, in what contexts are your assumptions justified.
 - If empirical, what data are available to answer this question, what will be your dependent and independent variables and your identification strategy.
 - Note that while the question may be motivated by observations from one country, you may choose to investigate it in a different country (with better data) or via cross-country comparisons or some other method i.e. you are not restricted to using only data from the country you read about.

HONOR CODE

You are expected to adhere to the Academic Code of Honor Pledge: *“As a member of the Notre Dame community, I acknowledge that it is my responsibility to learn and abide by principles of intellectual honesty and academic integrity, and therefore I will not participate in or tolerate academic dishonesty.”* Please see <http://honorcode.nd.edu> for full details. Note that, in this class, all submitted work (graded or ungraded) must be the student’s own work. You are welcome to discuss the readings with your classmates before or after class, and encouraged to seek feedback on your research paper from your classmates and other peers.

Note that AI-generated submissions are not recommended in this course. If used, these technologies, like any other source, must always be attributed in a manner that can be reproduced by the reader. An example of “reproducible” attribution includes the date accessed, the web address or URL accessed, and a description of the prompt. When using generative AI technologies as a source of information, you are responsible for assessing the quality, completeness, and accuracy of the cited information.

RESOURCES

All required readings will be available through **Canvas** (see Files/Required Readings folder). All slides shown in class will also be posted to **Canvas** (in the Files/Class Slides folder).

SCHEDULE

Date	Topic	Due dates
Oct 28	Course overview; Poverty traps Banerjee & Duflo (2007); Balboni et al (2022)-- skim	<i>Paper presentation choices due on Oct 31.</i>
Oct 30	Geography Alsan (2015); Nunn & Puga (2012)	
Nov 4, 6, 11	History (a) Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001); Banerjee & Iyer (2005). (b) Nunn (2008); Dell (2010). (c) Acemoglu & Robinson (2006, 2008); Przeworski (2009).	<i>Referee report #1 due on Nov 11.</i>
Nov 13	Political institutions Papaoiannou & Sirounnis (2008); Olson (1993).	
Nov 18	Voter behavior Gerber & Green (2000); Gerber, Green & Larimer (2008); DellaVigna & Kaplan (2007).	
Nov 20	<i>Short research presentations in class</i>	<i>3-page writeups due on Nov 22</i>
Nov 25; Dec 2, 4	Policy choice in democracies (a) Median voter model: Shepsle (2010); Miller (2008); Fujiwara (2015). (b) Elected leaders: Besley & Coate (1997)— can skip section V; Chattopadhyay & Duflo (2004); Burgess et al (2015). (c) Appointed officials: Alesina & Tabellini (2007); Iyer & Mani (2012).	
Dec 9	Corruption Di Tella & Schargrodsky (2003); Olken (2007); Bjorkman & Svensson (2009).	
Dec 11	Social norms Manski (1993); Bursztyn, Egorov & Jensen (2019); La Ferrara et al (2012).	<i>Paper proposal due on Dec 16.</i>

READING LIST

Required readings are indicated with a *.

1. Overview of Economic Development

- *Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2007). The Economic Lives of the Poor. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 21(1), 141–167.
- *Balboni, C. A., Bandiera, O., Burgess, R., Ghatak, M., & Heil, A. (2022). Why do People Stay Poor? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 137(2), 785-844
- Allen, R. C. (2017). Absolute Poverty: When Necessity Displaces Desire. *American Economic Review*, 107(12), 3690–3721.
- Kenny, C. (2005). Why Are We Worried About Income? Nearly Everything that Matters is Converging. *World Development*, 33(1), 1-19.
- Bick, A., Fuchs-Schündeln, N., & Lagakos, D. (2018). How Do Hours Worked Vary with Income? Cross-Country Evidence and Implications. *American Economic Review*, 108(1), 170–199.
- Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2008). What Is Middle Class about the Middle Classes around the World? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 22(2), 3–28.
- Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Grela, E., McKelway, M., Schilbach, F., Sharma, G., & Vaidyanathan, G. (2023). Depression and Loneliness among the Elderly in Low- and Middle-Income Countries. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 37(2), 179–202.
- Pritchett, L. (1997). Divergence, Big Time. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 11(3), 3–17.
- Ravallion, M. (2016). Measuring Welfare. In M. Ravallion (Ed.), *The Economics of Poverty: History, Measurement, and Policy* (Chapter 3). Oxford University Press.
- Blinder, A. S., & Watson, M. W. (2016). Presidents and the US Economy: An Econometric Exploration. *American Economic Review*, 106(4), 1015–1045.

2. Geography

- *Alsan, M. (2015). The Effect of the Tsetse Fly on African Development. *American Economic Review*, 105(1), 382–410.
- *Nunn, N., & Puga, D. (2012). Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(1), 20–36.
- Kraay, A., & McKenzie, D. (2014). Do Poverty Traps Exist? Assessing the Evidence. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28(3), 127–148.
- Sachs, J., & Malaney, P. (2002). The economic and social burden of malaria. *Nature*, 415(6872), 680–685.
- Alesina, A., Giuliano, P., & Nunn, N. (2013). On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(2), 469–530.
- Fenske, J. (2013). Does Land Abundance Explain African Institutions? *The Economic Journal*, 123(573), 1363–1390.
- Diamond, J. (1999). *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. W.W. Norton.
- Herbst, J. (2000). *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press.

3. History

Cross-country Studies

- *Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369–1401.
- *Nunn, N. (2008). Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1), 139-176.
- Sokoloff, K. L., & Engerman, S. L. (2000). History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14(3), 217–232.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, Robert W. (1998). Law and Finance. *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(6), 1113–1155.
- Nunn, N., & Wantchekon, L. (2011). The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa. *American Economic Review*, 101(7), 3221–3252.
- Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2016). The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa. *American Economic Review*, 106(7), 1802–1848.
- Gennaioli, N., & Rainer, I. (2007). The Modern Impact of Precolonial Centralization in Africa. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12(3), 185–234.
- Huillery, E. (2009). History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(2), 176–215.
- Comin, D., Easterly, W., & Gong, E. (2010). Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 BC? *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 2(3), 65–97.
- Feyrer, J., & Sacerdote, B. (2009). Colonialism and Modern Income: Islands as Natural Experiments. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 91(2), 245–262.
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4), 1231–1294.
- Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2014). National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(1), 151–213.
- Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2013). Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development. *Econometrica*, 81(1), 113–152.
- Michalopoulos, S., Putterman, L., & Weil, D. N. (2019). The Influence of Ancestral Lifeways on Individual Economic Outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 17(4), 1186–1231.
- Nunn, N. (2009). The Importance of History for Development. *Annual Review of Economics*, 1, 65-92.
- Landes, D. (1998). *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: why some are so rich and some so poor*. W.W. Norton.
- Albouy, D. Y. (2012). The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment. *American Economic Review*, 102(6), 3059–3076.
- Bruhn, M., & Gallego, F. A. (2012a). Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do They Matter for Economic Development? *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(2), 433–461.
- Eltis, D., & Richardson, D. (Eds.). (2008). *Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade Database*. Yale University Press.

- Elbl, I. (1997). The Volume of the Early Atlantic Slave Trade, 1450-1521. *The Journal of African History*, 38(1), 31–75.
- Dalton, J. T., & Leung, T. C. (2014). Why Is Polygyny More Prevalent in Western Africa? An African Slave Trade Perspective. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 62(4), 599–632.
- Bertocchi, G., & Dimico, A. (2019). The long-term determinants of female HIV infection in Africa: The slave trade, polygyny, and sexual behavior. *Journal of Development Economics*, 140, 90–105.
- Teso, E. (2019). The Long-Term Effect of Demographic Shocks on the Evolution of Gender Roles: Evidence from the transatlantic Slave Trade. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 17(2), 497–534.

Within-country Studies

- *Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005). History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. *American Economic Review*, 95(4), 1190–1213.
- *Dell, M. (2010). The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining “Mita.” *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863–1903.
- Iyer, L. (2010). Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92(4), 693–713.
- Dell, M., & Olken, B. A. (2020). The Development Effects of the Extractive Colonial Economy: The Dutch Cultivation System in Java. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 87(1), 164–203.
- Dell, M., Lane, N., & Querubin, P. (2018). The Historical State, Local Collective Action, and Economic Development in Vietnam. *Econometrica*, 86(6), 2083–2121.
- Mokyr, J. (2009). *The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain 1700-1850*. Yale University Press.

Institutional change and institutional persistence

- *Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Chapter 6 ‘Democratization.’ Cambridge University Press.
- *Przeworski, A. (2009). Conquered or Granted: A History of Franchise Extensions. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39, 291-321.
- *Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2008). Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions. *American Economic Review*, 98(1), 267–293.
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000). Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(4), 1167–1199.
- Grief, A. (2006). *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade*. Cambridge University Press.
- North, D. C. (1993). Institutions and Credible Commitment. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 149(1), 11–23.
- Papaioannou, E., & Siourounis, G. (2008). Democratisation and Growth*. *The Economic Journal*, 118(532), 1520–1551.
- Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). *How Democracies Die*. Crown.

- Runciman, D. (2018). *How Democracy Ends*. Basic Books.
- Barro, R. J. (1996). Democracy and growth. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 1(1), 1–27.
- Abdelal, R. (2001). *National Purpose in the World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective*. Cornell University Press.

4. Political Institutions

- *Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(3), 567-576.
- *Papaioannou, E., & Siourounis, G. (2008). Democratisation and Growth. *The Economic Journal*, 118(532), 1520–1551.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *The American Political Science Review*, 53(1), 69–105.
- Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2019). Democracy Does Cause Growth. *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(1), 47-100.
- Coppedge, M., Lindberg, S., Skaaning, S.-E., & Teorell, J. (2016). Measuring high level democratic principles using the V-Dem data. *International Political Science Review*, 37(5), 580–593.
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2004). Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes. *American Economic Review*, 94(1), 25–45.
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2006). Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details. *American Economic Review*, 96(2), 319–324.
- Campos, N. F., Coricelli, F., & Frigerio, M. (2022). *The Political U: New Evidence on Democracy and Income* (IZA Discussion Paper DP No. 15598).
- Bizzarro, F., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Hicken, A., Bernhard, M., Skaaning, S.-E., Coppedge, M., & Lindberg, S. I. (2018). Party Strength and Economic Growth. *World Politics*, 70(2), 275–320.
- Hariri, J. G. (2015). Foreign Aided: Why Democratization Brings Growth When Democracy Does Not. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(1), 53–71.
- Brückner, M., & Ciccone, A. (2011). Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity. *Econometrica*, 79(3), 923–947.
- Brückner, M., Ciccone, A., & Tesei, A. (2012). Oil Price Shocks, Income, and Democracy. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(2), 389–399.

5. Voter Turnout and Voting Decisions

- *Gerber, A., & Green, D. (2000). The effects of canvassing, telephone calls, and direct mail on voter turnout: a field experiment. *American Political Science Review*, 94(3), 653-663.
- *Gerber, A., Green, D., & Larimer, C. W. (2008). Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1), 33–48.
- *DellaVigna, S., & Kaplan, E. (2007). The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(3), 1187–1234.
- Gentzkow, M. (2006). Television and Voter Turnout. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(3), 931–972.

- DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., Malmendier, U., & Rao, G. (2017). Voting to Tell Others. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 84(1), 143–181.
- Banerjee, A. V., Kumar, S., Pande, R., & Su, F. (n.d.). *Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India*. Working paper (2011).
- Pons, V. (2018). Will a Five-Minute Discussion Change Your Mind? A Countrywide Experiment on Voter Choice in France. *American Economic Review*, 108(6), 1322–1363.
- Durante, R., Pinotti, P., & Tesei, A. (2019). The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV. *American Economic Review*, 109(7), 2497–2530.
- Durante, R., & Gutierrez, E. (n.d.). *Political Advertising and Voting Intentions: Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Ads Viewership*. Working Paper (2014).
- Giné, X., & Mansuri, G. (2018). Together We Will: Experimental Evidence on Female Voting Behavior in Pakistan. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 10(1), 207–235.
- Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin. *World Politics*, 55(3), 399–422.
- Benjamin, D. J., & Shapiro, J. M. (2009). Thin-Slice Forecasts of Gubernatorial Elections. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 91(3), 523–536.
- Aker, J. C., Collier, P., & Vicente, P. C. (2017). Is Information Power? Using Mobile Phones and Free Newspapers during an Election in Mozambique. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 99(2), 185–200.
- Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123, 703–745.
- Cantoni, E., & Pons, V. (2021). Strict ID Laws Don’t Stop Voters: Evidence from a U.S. Nationwide Panel, 2008–2018. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136(4), 2615–2660.
- Braconnier, C., Dormagen, J.-Y., & Pons, V. (2017). Voter Registration Costs and Disenfranchisement: Experimental Evidence from France. *American Political Science Review*, 111(3), 584–604.
- Stockemer, D. (2017). What Affects Voter Turnout? A Review Article/Meta-Analysis of Aggregate Research. *Government and Opposition*, 52(4), 698–722.
- Cheema, A., Khan, S., Liaqat, A., & Mohmand, S. K. (2023). Canvassing the Gatekeepers: A Field Experiment to Increase Women Voters’ Turnout in Pakistan. *American Political Science Review*, 117(1), 1–21.
- Zhuravskaya, E., Petrova, M., & Enikolopov, R. (2020). Political Effects of the Internet and Social Media. *Annual Review of Economics*, 12, 415–438.
- Marx, B., Pons, V., & Suri, T. (2017). *The Perils of Voter Mobilization* (Working Paper 23946). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Grácio, M., & Vicente, P. C. (2021). Information, get-out-the-vote messages, and peer influence: Causal effects on political behavior in Mozambique. *Journal of Development Economics*, 151, 102665.
- George, S., Gupta, S., & Neggers, Y. (2019). *Coordinating Voters against Criminal Politicians: Evidence from a Mobile Experiment in India*. Working Paper.
- Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2020). *Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization* (Working Paper 26669). National Bureau of Economic Research.

6. Policy Choice in Democracies

The role of voters

- *Shepsle, K. (2010). *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*. W. W. Norton, 2nd Edition.
- *Fujiwara, T. (2015). Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil. *Econometrica*, 83(2), 423-464.
- *Miller, G. (2008). Women's Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3), 1287-1327.
- Fujiwara, T., & Wantchekon, L. (2013). Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(4), 241–255.
- Pande, R. (2011). Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies. *Annual Review of Economics*, 3(1), 215–237.
- Manacorda, M., Miguel, E., & Vigorito, A. (2011). Government Transfers and Political Support. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(3), 1–28.
- Lenz, G. (2012). *Follow the Leader*. Chicago University Press.
- Cagé, J., Dagherret, A., Grosjean, P., & Jha, S. (2023). Heroes and Villains: The Effects of Heroism on Autocratic Values and Nazi Collaboration in France. *American Economic Review*, 113(7), 1888–1932.
- Broockman, D. E., & Butler, D. M. (2017). The Causal Effects of Elite Position-Taking on Voter Attitudes: Field Experiments with Elite Communication. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(1), 208–221.
- Agadjanian, A. (2020). *When Do Partisans Stop Following the Leader?* (SSRN Scholarly Paper 3301189).
- Lee, D. S., Moretti, E., & Butler, M. J. (2004). Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House*. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3), 807–859.
- Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. *Journal of Political Economy*, 89(5), 914–927.
- Peltzman, S. (1980). The Growth of Government. *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 23(2), 209–287.
- Profeta, P., Puglisi, R., & Scabrosetti, S. (2013). Does democracy affect taxation and government spending? Evidence from developing countries. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 41(3), 684–718.
- Husted, T. A., & Kenny, L. W. (1997). The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government. *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1), 54–82.
- Aidt, T. S., Dutta, J., & Loukoianova, E. (2006). Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830–1938. *European Economic Review*, 50(2), 249–283.
- Aidt, T. S., & Jensen, P. S. (2009). Tax structure, size of government, and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938. *International Tax and Public Finance*, 16(3), 362–394.
- Aidt, T. S., Daunton, M., & Dutta, J. (2010). The Retrenchment Hypothesis and the Extension of the Franchise in England and Wales. *The Economic Journal*, 120(547), 990–1020.
- Debnath, S., Kapoor, M., & Ravi, S. (2017). *The Impact of Electronic Voting Machines on Electoral Frauds, Democracy, and Development* (SSRN Working Paper 3041197).

- Cassan, G., Iyer, L., & Mirza, R. A. (2024). Enfranchisement, Political Participation and Political Competition: Evidence from Colonial and Independent India. *Journal of Economic History*, forthcoming.
- Levy, G. (2005). The Politics of Public Provision of Education. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(4), 1507–1534.
- Epple, D., & Romano, R. E. (1996). Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives. *Journal of Public Economics*, 62(3), 297–325.
- Trump voters shifted their views to match his—The Washington Post*. (n.d.). Retrieved October 17, 2023, from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/08/28/trump-voters-follow-opinions/?arc404=true>

The Role of Elected Leaders

- *Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1997). An Economic Model of Representative Democracy. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(1), 85–114.
- *Chattopadhyay, R., & Duflo, E. (2004). Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in India. *Econometrica*, 72(5), 1409–1443.
- *Burgess, R., Jedwab, R., Miguel, E., Morjaria, A., & Padró i Miquel, G. (2015). The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya. *American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1817–1851.
- Jones, B. F., & Olken, B. A. (2005). Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3), 835–864.
- Iyer, L., Mani, A., Mishra, P., & Topalova, P. (2012). The Power of Political Voice: Women’s Political Representation and Crime in India. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 4(4), 165–193.
- Pande, R. (2003). Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India. *American Economic Review*, 93(4), 1132–1151.
- Bhalotra, S., Clots-Figueras, I., Iyer, L., & Vecci, J. (2023). Leader Identity and Coordination. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 105(1), 175–189.
- Bhalotra, S., Clots-Figueras, I., Cassan, G., & Iyer, L. (2014). Religion, politician identity and development outcomes: Evidence from India. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 104, 4–17.
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9. Papers by Recent Job Market Candidates

Note: These are students who were on the market in Fall 2022,¹ so what you will see are likely updated versions of these papers. These are not necessarily their job market papers. For coauthored papers, the candidate is indicated in **bold**. You are also welcome to write a referee report on any other working paper that you are interested in reading closely—email me first!

Agte, Patrick and **Arielle Bernhardt**. “[The Economics of Caste Norms: Purity, Status, and Women's Work in India.](#)”

Althoff, Lukas and Hugo Reichardt. “[Jim Crow and Black Economic Progress After Slavery.](#)”

Chen, Wei-Lin. “[The Impact of Partisan Politics on Policing Practices: Evidence from North Carolina's Sheriff's Offices.](#)”

Enríquez, José Ramón. “[Democracy under Assault: Electoral Reform and Political Violence.](#)”

Gomez, Ariel. “[Rural Education, Nation-building, and Ethnic Assimilation in Post-Revolutionary Mexico.](#)”

Papazyan, Freddie. “[Power Consolidation in Groups.](#)”

Yaremko, Vitaliia. “[The Long-Term Consequences of Blacklisting: Evidence from the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33](#)”

¹ Most departments have removed their job market candidates from Fall 2023, but not yet put up their job market candidate websites for Fall 2024.