2012–2013 VOLUME I / ISSUE 9

Journal of Undergraduate Research

2012–2013

Access More Papers in the Online Edition at:
www.nd.edu/~ujournal

MONICA VANBLADEL
Diffusing Authority: Borges on Identity, Tradition and Creation

AMY MASLAR
The Choice Was Theirs

REBECCA KIBLER
The Role of Translation Equivalents in Acquiring Difficult-to-Translate Second Language Vocabulary

MEGHAN MCKINNEY JONES
'Not Wholly True': The Myth of American Community in Nella Larsen's Passing

NATHALIE ROSADO
Chekri Ganem and the Comité Central Syrien: Syrian Nationalism in Paris, 1905–1921

MARIA SERAKOS
The Effects of Welfare Reform on the Postsecondary Degree Attainment of Young Adult Women

JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH

Front cover and design by
Georges-Philippe Toumayan
and Colleen MacDonald

University of Notre Dame College of Arts and Letters

Journal *of* Undergraduate Research

2012
2013

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND LETTERS
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The *Journal of Undergraduate Research* is a product of the work of many dedicated men and women. While the Editors-in-Chief and the Editorial Board have what are perhaps the most visible roles, it is the efforts of others that truly make this project possible.

As the *Journal*'s faculty advisor, Nicholas Russo, Assistant Dean in the College of Arts and Letters, deserves our gratitude for his help and guidance throughout the process. The Office of the Dean in the College of Arts and Letters continues to guarantee their support of the *Journal*, which enables our student board to produce a thoroughly professional publication each year. We also thank John McGreevy, Dean of the College, who continues to enliven the thesis culture among Notre Dame's liberal arts students. His leadership makes us confident for the future of the *Journal*'s quality content. We thank Service Printers, Inc. of Elkhart, Indiana — particularly Ray Mann and Kelly Luna — who have provided the layout and print production services necessary for a timely publication. Finally, special thanks go to Colleen MacDonald, a senior Graphic Design and Art History major, for her assistance with the *Journal*.

The *Journal* sources its material from the research of undergraduates in the College of Arts and Letters here at the University, and we owe our quality content to the students who submitted their work for consideration and to their professors and thesis advisors here at Notre Dame.

Perhaps most importantly, it is the *Journal*'s readership that makes this publication possible and meaningful. Thus, thanks also goes to you for picking up our 2012-2013 issue, and please feel free to pass it along.

EDITORIAL BOARD

2012-2013

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF:

Michael Massman '13	Economics, Political Science, Glynn Honors
Meghan Thomassen '14	English, Journalism, Ethics, and Democracy

EDITORIAL BOARD:

Bianca Almada '16	English, Spanish, Journalism
Emily Bieniek '13	Anthropology, Theology
Mairead Browne '13	History, Italian
Aubrey Butts '14	American Studies, English
Emily Frazzette '13	English, Italian Literature and Culture
Christine Gorman '14	Economics, Chinese, European Studies
Theodora Hannan '14	English, History
Emily Houtsma '13	English, Economics
Frances Kelsey '15	Program of Liberal Studies, Business Economics
Crystal Lee '13	Sociology, English, Latino Studies, Korean
R. Anthony Meena '14	Science Pre-Professional, Spanish, Theology, Glynn Honors
Shane O'connor '15	Economics, Mathematics, PPE, Chinese
Erin Portman '15	Program of Liberal Studies, French, Irish Language/Literature
Justin Sena '14	Political Science, Theology, Latino Studies
Andrew Spas '15	Economics, Political Science
John Stallings '14	Economics, Psychology
Evan Thompson '13	Philosophy, Political Science, Poverty Studies

TABLE OF CONTENTS

From the Desk of the Editors-in-Chief 1

Meghan McKinney Jones
'Not Wholly True:' The Myth of American Community in Nella Larsen's *Passing*

Nathalie Rosado
Chekri Ganem and the Comité Central Syrien: Syrian Nationalism in Paris, 1905-1921

Maria Serakos
The Effects of Welfare Reform on the Postsecondary Degree Attainment of Young Adult Women

ONLINE FEATURES

Rebecca Kibler
The Role of Translation Equivalents in Acquiring Difficult-to-Translate Second Language Vocabulary

Amy Maslar
The Choice Was Theirs

Monica VanBladel
Diffusing Authority: Borges on Identity, Tradition and Creation

FROM DESK OF THE EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

Now in its ninth year, the *Journal of Undergraduate Research* is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal that seeks to collect, review, and distribute outstanding academic research and writing produced by undergraduates in the College of Arts and Letters. As Editors-in-Chief, our most important task was the selection of members of the editorial board, as they have had a large role in shaping this year's *Journal*.

Through the selection and editing processes, our editors have had to make a number of decisions — choices made more difficult by the high caliber of papers submitted. While we only have room to publish a few, the papers featured here represent a diverse set of research topics and research methods from the College of Arts and Letters. We believe that they are informative, well-composed, and meaningful contributions to their different academic areas.

We hope that what we have produced this year attests to the range of voices emerging from the undergraduate researchers at Notre Dame. This *Journal* means to support, showcase, and amplify such work. We hope you enjoy reading it as much as we enjoyed publishing it.

Thank you,
Michael Massman and Meghan Thomassen

MEGHAN MCKINNEY JONES graduated from Notre Dame in 2012 with honors in English and a supplementary major in Spanish. Three weeks after graduation, she moved from her hometown of Mobile, Alabama, to Austin, Texas, where she works as a marketing coordinator for an engineering consulting firm. Meghan would like to express her sincere gratitude to Professor Cyraina Johnson-Roullier for fostering her love of critical theory in Introduction to Literary Studies and for guiding the development of her senior thesis.

‘NOT WHOLLY TRUE’: THE MYTH OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN NELLA LARSEN’S *PASSING*

MEGHAN MCKINNEY JONES

ABSTRACT

Published in 1929, Nella Larsen’s novel, *Passing*, illustrates the development of an unlikely relationship between Irene Redfield, an African-American woman, and Clare Kendry, an enigmatic woman of mixed race who mysteriously dies after her white husband discovers her black heritage. The effort of critics to identify the specific quality that attracts Irene to Clare is complicated by Irene’s obsession with projecting herself as the perfect middle-class female American citizen. After all, Clare appears only to disturb Irene’s national vision through her passing by exposing the tenuousness of class, racial, sexual, and national identity. The failure of scholars to resolve the contradictions between Irene’s two desires leaves a critical question unanswered: if Irene openly declares her desire to preserve her stable American identity, what motivates her to pursue a relationship with the exotic, inconstant Clare?

My thesis intends to answer this question by examining Irene’s behavior through the lens of Slavoj Žižek’s theory of national fantasy. According to Žižek, the national fantasy functions as an illusion that conceals the inherent impossibility of social unity caused by ongoing internal division. Citizens seek to belong within the idealized identity created by the national fantasy.

However, when the citizen examines the fantasy closely enough to recognize its shortcomings, the fantasy dissolves and inevitably returns to the original lack of unity.

In *Passing*, Irene's husband's desire to move to Brazil in an attempt to evade racial violence compels Irene to assert an exceptional national identity based on the fantasy that the United States is "one nation, indivisible." Irene attempts to uphold this fantasy of social cohesion by continually obscuring evidence of racism. As a mixed-race woman who appears to disregard social barriers, Clare initially functions as the embodiment of the fantasy out of which Irene imagines her exceptional American identity. However, the inability of Clare to find true community even with her husband makes Irene uncomfortable within her own fantasy. I contend, therefore, that Irene initially seeks a relationship with Clare in order to mask the difference between her idealized vision of the United States and the reality of the segregated nation in which she lives. By understanding how Irene transforms Clare into the national fantasy, the reader will understand why her proximity to Clare in the final scene leads not only to Clare's death but also to the destruction of the exceptional American identity that she represents.

Nothing is more desirable than to be released from an affliction, but nothing is more frightening than to be divested of a crutch.

- James Baldwin, *Nobody Knows My Name*

Introduction

The popularity of speakeasies, jazz music, and automobiles during the American Twenties marked an allegedly national climate of prosperity and unity, leading many citizens to adopt the belief that the United States represented the fulfillment of the dream of an ideal nation. However, the society underneath this jovial façade of American exceptionalism roared with violence resulting from widespread fixation on strict racial categorization. Nella Larsen addresses the clash between American exceptionalism and the reality of segregation in her novel *Passing* (1929) from the perspective of Irene Redfield, whose desire to be an accepted member of the American citizenry drives her to mask any impulse that appears to work against the norm imposed by the dominant society. Critics have defined the American identity as whiteness, blackness, middle class respectability, and even heterosexuality, claiming that the death of Clare Kendry in the final scene of the novel derives from Irene's desire to eliminate the mixed-race woman, whose enigmatic nature poses a threat to the security of her preferred identities (Brody 396, Toth 66, Rottenberg 497). While such interpretations offer plausible explanations of why Irene would want to remove the exotic, inconstant Clare, they ignore the fact that Irene demonstrates affection for Clare at various points throughout the novel. Deborah McDowell justifies this behavior in her landmark study of *Passing* with the claim that Irene is driven by repressed homosexual desire, but her narrow focus on sexuality neglects the latent racial conflict as well as the processes that drive Irene to identify herself as unabashedly American (McDowell 374). Moving beyond McDowell's more narrow interpretation, Slavoj Žižek's psychoanalytic theory of fantasy as a manifestation of desire offers a comprehensive interpretive method for using Irene's desire to uphold Twenties-era American exceptionalism to explain her desire for—and ultimately, I argue, her destruction of—the beautiful Clare.

The framework for understanding Irene's behavior rests on the elements that compose her vision of the exceptional American identity.

Using Žižek's theory of national fantasy, Donald Pease defines American exceptionalism as the "dominant structure of desire out of which U.S. citizens imagined their national identity" (Pease 1). The object of desire—the unattainable "state fantasy"—holds the national community together by "conceal[ing] the inherent impossibility of social cohesion precipitated by the law's transgression of itself" (Pease 15). In *Passing*, the national fantasy at stake is the myth of social unity propagated by American leaders like Herbert Hoover during the Twenties and upheld by citizens like Irene seeking to identify with an exceptional nation unaffected by racial violence. As a product of an interracial marriage and a socialite who appears to defy social divisions, the illusory Clare functions as the embodiment of the state fantasy out of which Irene imagines her identity as an "American" who "belong[s] in this land of rising towers" (Larsen 107). I contend, therefore, that Irene initially seeks a relationship with Clare in order to mask the difference between her idealized vision of Americanness and the reality of the segregated nation in which she lives. By understanding how Irene transforms Clare into the national fantasy, the reader will understand why her proximity to Clare in the final scene leads not only to Clare's death but also to the destruction of the exceptional American identity that she represents.

Irene's Acceptance of American Exceptionalism

In contrast to the image of "one nation, indivisible" contained in the Pledge of Allegiance that state laws increasingly required citizens to recite during the 1920s, the reality of racism exposed the truer image of the United States as one nation, rigidly divided (Jones and Meyer 110). The color line, or the social distinction based on mutually exclusive categories of whiteness and blackness, upheld a system that obliged each citizen to disclose whether he or she possessed black ancestry. Perceived whiteness, the dominant group identity, served as a ticket for admission into nicer neighborhoods and more lucrative professions. Perceived blackness, on the other hand, resulted in

degradation by white Americans and exclusion from luxuries such as meals in upscale restaurants and bedrooms in four-star hotels. The economic advantage that temporarily or permanently "passing" as white presented to "light-skinned Negroes" like Irene Redfield motivated thousands to transgress the color line; the *Outlook* and *Independent* estimated the number of passers to be 10,000 per year, and The Afro-American estimated that as many as 75,000 passed each day in Philadelphia alone (Johnson 121, "75,000 Pass" 123). The inability of journalists to detect the exact number of citizens who "decide[d] to drop all claim to Negro blood and enter the world of the white man" called attention to the fallaciousness of the essentialist notions of race that divided the American society (Hahn 119). However, the disruption of accepted racial identities only drove Americans to reaffirm the fixity of their whiteness or blackness by more aggressively policing the color line.

Rather than embracing the blurring of distinctions between races as an opportunity for genuine integration, both white and black Americans favored segregation as a way to preserve the security of their racial identities. Newspaper records indicate that the failure to maintain strict divisions drove white cohorts such as the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion to inflict such "material hell fire" as humiliation, exclusion, and lynching upon the party accused of racial deception (Du Bois 97, "Careful, Lyncher!" 125). In the famously sensationalized Rhinelander/Jones case, white juries forced Alice Rhinelander to strip to her waist "to prove that her husband could not have been ignorant of her racial descent" (Morgan 139). According to Carla Kaplan, this obsession with racial identity, combined with the suspicion that all whites were prejudiced, contributed to the "waning of black interest in integration" (Kaplan xviii). Leaders such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Alain Locke promoted notions of race loyalty that not only encouraged blacks to take pride in their culture but also discouraged miscegenation and passing. To marry outside the Negro circle was to attempt the reconciliation of ostensibly irreconcilable cultures, and to pass as white was to betray the vivacious

Negro culture in favor of social mobility and material wealth. The unwillingness of whites and blacks alike to erase the color line contributed to a sense of fear and volatility that led many to seek escape in the false promises of unity offered by the ideology of American exceptionalism.

In the face of a divided citizenry, American policymakers of the Twenties configured the discourse of national identity to promote a vision of America as a society not split by racial violence but rather unified by social progress. Herbert Hoover ironically used the language of race and borders to broadcast this national image in his 1929 Inaugural Address:

> The devotion to and concern for our institutions are deep and sincere. We are steadily building a new race – a new civilization great in its own attainments. The influence and high purposes of our Nation are respected among the peoples of the world. We aspire to distinction in the world, but to a distinction based upon confidence in our sense of justice as well as our accomplishments within our own borders and in our own lives. (374)

Donald Pease identifies this type of discourse as representative of the type of American exceptionalism described earlier, a state fantasy that, according to Slavoj Žižek, can only be imagined as coming into being when threatened by "complete dispossession" (Pease 18). Hoover's speech contributes to the construction of the fantasy by erasing the distinction between the national ideal of unity that citizens desired and the racial division that threatened to divest them of their American identity. Believing that the dream of an ideal nation had been fulfilled, citizens drawn under the veil of American exceptionalism imagined their national identity out of this constructed image of the United States as a nation comprised of one "new race."[1]

[1] Harlem Renaissance author Jean Toomer also attempted to eradicate racial division in his unpublished poem "The First American" by conceiving a "new race" in the United

It was during this era of assumed whiteness that increasing numbers of children in the typically segregated public schools were required to pledge their allegiance to the star-spangled flag representing "one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." By concealing the presence of racial division, the fantasy that promised an exceptional, indivisible nation paradoxically served as a crutch that allowed violently exclusive racial communities to persist underneath the noble façade.

In the same way that the threat of dispossession of the American ideal compelled Hoover's affirmation of the "new race," the threat of being removed from the United States compels Irene to assert her desire to assume an exceptional national identity based on social cohesion. In response to her husband's expression of his dream to move to Brazil, Irene adamantly insists that "she would not go to Brazil. She belonged in this land of rising towers. She was an American. She grew from this soil, and she would not be uprooted" (Larsen 107). Catherine Rottenberg suggests that Irene's desire to be a "viable and accepted subject in the United States" drives her to imitate the behavior, the culture, and the prejudices of members of the white community (502). By attending social events, mothering her boys, and overseeing her dark-skinned maid, Zulena, Irene arranges what Rottenberg calls a "civilized and cultured life" for her family and for herself (502). According to this interpretation, the "strange" idea of moving to South America "frightened her, and – yes, angered her" because the move threatens her attempt to gain the "reputation of belonging to the dominant American race" (Larsen 57, Harris 1747). However, the image of Brazil that politicians and the media disseminated during the Twenties discredits the idea that Irene would want to avoid the country on the basis that it represents a barrier to her social advancement. According to Melissa Nobles, the political elites

States formed from a mixture of existing races. George Hutchinson notes that leaders of the New Negro movement dismissed his developing ideology as a profession of whiteness.

of Brazil have, for most of the century, presented racial mixture in Brazil as "racial democracy" despite the actual presence of "profound disadvantages accorded to color" (92). An article appearing in *The Chicago Defender* shows that citizens of the United States received the idealized impression of Brazil:

> In Brazil anyone who has white blood is white. A Negro is merely a person who is a Negro in the biological sense. They had slavery in Brazil, and later than we had it, but the change came about easily and was not forcibly imposed upon the slave owners…In consequense [sic] of the different sociological line-up there is no stigma attacthed [sic] to Negro blood, such as obtains here. Mixed Negroes feel no discrimination – they mingle with people on similar social levels, and there is no race problem in Brazil. ("Writer Says" 107)

The fact that the Redfields are aware of this image of Brazil is evident in Brian's desire to move there in order to escape the racism that causes him to experience "dislike and disgust" for his country (Larsen 58). Since leaving the violently divided United States to live in a nation perceived to be without a race problem would likely facilitate identification with the dominant race, the idea that Irene resists the transition in order to "approximate the norms of whiteness" carries little critical weight (Rottenberg 502). Rather, Irene refuses to leave in order that she may approximate a specifically American identity based not on belonging to a specific race but on belonging in a community of collectively "rising towers." By refusing to be "uprooted" and planted in the allegedly unified Brazil, Irene vocalizes her acceptance of American exceptionalism—an acceptance that leads her to disregard signs that her perception of the United States as a cohesive society does not coincide with reality.

Just as the national desire is constructed by the social flaws that policymakers choose to mask, Irene's desire to identify with the

fantasy of the United States as "one nation, indivisible" emerges in the scenes in which she attempts to construct illusions of unity to mask evidence of racism. The most obvious example of Irene's effort to conceal flaws in American society is the conversation in which she scolds her husband, Brian, for talking about lynching with their two sons. While the ominous mention of lynching does, as Rottenberg suggests, reveal the threat of violence facing African Americans during the Twenties, Irene's response to the subject offers further insight into the way that she constructs her national identity. After Brian justifies his discussion by claiming that children who have "got to live in this damned country…better find out what sort of thing they're up against," an infuriated Irene disagrees on the basis that she wants "their childhood to be happy and as free from the knowledge of such things as it possibly can be" (Larsen 103). Not only does Irene refuse to acknowledge reports of lynching, but she also exhibits what Pease calls the "abnormal desire to propagate the U.S. model of nationalism" by trying to provide her sons with the vision of the United States as the ideal nation (Pease 22). Although Thadious Davis, critic and editor of the Penguin edition of *Passing*, argues that African American responses to racism are persistently driven by a desire for whiteness, Irene's attempt to conceal evidence of racial violence from her boys indicates neither shame of being black nor desire to be white but rather pride in being a member of an exceptional nation (Davis xix).

While Irene's refusal to discuss lynching represses intangible records of racial division, her destruction of a cup dating from the years before the Civil War indicates her readiness to deny even material evidence that the United States has transgressed its exceptional national image. Irene justifies the incident to Hugh Wentworth, a white integrationist, by emphasizing her distaste for the division that the cup represented. According to Irene, the broken cup:

> was the ugliest thing that your ancestors, the charming Confederates ever owned. I've forgotten how many thousands of years ago it was that Brian's great-great-grand

> uncle owned it. But it has, or had, a good old hoary history…I had only to break it, and I was rid of it for ever [sic]. (Larsen 94)

Jennifer deVere Brody analogizes the broken cup to the "broken body of the Nation," divided not only between North and South but also between white and black, master and slave (406). However, while the pieces of the cup do resemble a nation divided, the intact cup serves as a more plausible reminder of the era in which slaves would likely have used the cup to serve a white master. Irene paradoxically blinds herself to the brokenness of the United States by shattering the ugly reminder of the flaws that existed before the War and that continue to exist during her lifetime, as evidenced by the fact that the dark maid Zulena gathers the fragments. By examining the vision of Americanness that Irene attempts to uphold through the destruction of elements exposing its falsity, the reader can understand the desire that Irene wishes to satisfy through her relationship with Clare, the embodiment of national unity.

Clare as the National Fantasy

Although Jennifer DeVere Brody and Josh Toth focus primarily on Irene's aversion to Clare when addressing the construction of community identity in *Passing*, the language that Larsen uses to describe the first encounter between the two women clearly situates Clare as the object of Irene's desire. The chance encounter takes place in the rooftop restaurant of the luxurious Drayton Hotel, which both Irene and Clare access by passing as white women. Irene falls prey to Clare's alluring qualities several pages before discovering her name and origin: when Irene first sees the "lovely creature" at another table, she detects "a fascination, strange and compelling" but fails to recall Clare's name until she laughs a distinctively "lovely laugh" (17-18, 28). Rather than connoting friendship, however, the adjectives used to describe Clare through the free indirect thoughts of Irene suggest

that she desires a deeper relationship with the mysterious woman. The tension between the two grows stronger as the "arresting eyes, slow and mesmeric" lead Irene to declare that "Clare Kendry's loveliness was absolute" (29). Despite her initial resistance to Clare's invitation to meet again, Irene ultimately expresses "the desire, the hope, that this parting wouldn't be the last" (29). The romantic, almost erotic language that Larsen employs to expose Irene's perception of Clare clearly establishes Clare as the object of Irene's desire; however, the specific lack that constitutes Irene's desire for a relationship with Clare remains a source of critical debate between scholars who identify Irene as a lesbian and scholars who identify Irene as strictly heterosexual.

The most widely accepted interpretation of the erotic tension between the two women suggests that the struggle to express female sexuality within their middle-class African American society drives Irene to desire a fantasized homosexual relationship with Clare. Deborah McDowell articulated this position with her groundbreaking claim that the central story in *Passing* is "Irene's awakening sexual desire for Clare" cast against the backdrop of her reputable yet sexless marriage to Brian (374). The absence of passion in Irene's marriage generates her desire for the passion that Clare represents. According to McDowell, the suggestive language that Larsen employs to describe the encounter on the roof of the Drayton hotel provides support for her characterization of Irene's feelings. Clare does appear to constitute "both the embodiment and the object of the sexual feelings that Irene banishes" in order to maintain her safety and security: not only does Irene admire Clare's "arresting eyes" and "tempting mouth" when they meet at the Drayton, but Irene also dreads the thought of parting from her (McDowell 374, Larsen 28-29). Judith Butler builds upon McDowell's argument by linking sexuality with race, proposing that Irene desires Clare as well as the liberating "trespass that Clare performs" by passing as white and disregarding the norm of motherhood imposed upon middle-class African American women (429). The configuration of Clare as the alluring embodiment

of the "unlived political promise" of freedom from sexual and racial constraints highlights the dependence of Irene's desire upon the lack of freedom from the norms imposed by the middle-class ideology (429). While both McDowell and Butler offer convincing arguments of how Clare could satisfy various problems that afflict Irene, neither provides evidence that Irene seeks to escape her marriage or her African American identity at the precise moment that Clare emerges as the fantasized object of desire.

By investigating the specific discomfort that afflicts Irene in the moments preceding her identification with Clare, we can understand that Irene seeks neither a sexual partner nor whiteness but rather an illusion to uphold her vision of American unity. According to Pease, a fantasy always "comes into being as a self-consistent object" that the subject desires to attain due to the threat of its "complete theft or absolute annihilation" (18). In other words, the fantasy or object of desire represents the fulfillment of an ideal that the circumstances threaten to invalidate; the fantasy thus depends on the specific context of its inception to explain its meaning. The events surrounding the introduction of Clare to the action of the plot indicate that Irene feels "anger, scorn, and fear" due to the mysterious gaze of the light-skinned stranger at the Drayton (Larsen 16). While the text offers no indication that the gaze threatens the security of Irene's marriage, historical evidence of citizens being punished for passing suggests that Irene could feel threatened by the potential annihilation of her performance of whiteness: if the gazer were to detect Irene's heritage, Irene could be asked to leave the hotel. However, what actually disturbs Irene is not "being a Negro, or even…having it declared" but rather "the idea of being ejected from any place" (Larsen 16). The possibility of being excluded from the hotel on the basis of race, "even in the polite and tactful way in which the Drayton would probably do it," represents a direct threat to the idealized vision of an indivisible America that Irene strives to maintain by ignoring evidence of lynching and destroying relics of the Confederacy (16). In order for Irene to continue to produce herself as a citizen of the United States,

she must identify with an object that offers to mask the difference between the national ideal she desires and the racial division she fears at the Drayton Hotel.

The distraught Irene establishes Clare as the embodiment of her national fantasy when she expresses admiration of the mixture of dark and white features that contribute to Clare's loveliness. Clare, whose father was born of a marriage between a white man and a black woman, possesses some physical qualities associated with African Americans and some associated with Caucasian Americans. Stereotypical American novels about mixed-race women tend to affirm racist thought by representing negative traits as inherently black and positive traits as inherently white. However, Larsen, a mulatta herself with paternal roots in the Danish West Indies, subverts racism in the opening scene of *Passing* by identifying Clare's beauty as inherently interracial. Irene perceives Clare as "attractive-looking" due not to her "arresting eyes" or her "tempting mouth" but rather to the combination of the "dark, almost black, eyes and that wide mouth like a scarlet flower against the ivory of her skin" (Larsen 14). Irene later confirms her affinity for the "exotic" nature of Clare's appearance when she claims that "Clare Kendry's loveliness was absolute, beyond challenge" thanks to her "Negro eyes…set in that ivory face under that bright hair" (Larsen 29). The allure of Clare thus depends upon the marriage—the unity—of blackness and whiteness. Much like the mulatta represented through the poetry of Nicolas Guillén, whose work caught the attention of Harlem Renaissance intellectuals when Langston Hughes translated it to English, the mulatta represented through the observations of Irene in *Passing* emerges as the personification of the fantasy of unity among races. In the face of circumstances that threaten her exceptional national identity, Irene subconsciously transforms Clare from a figure to admire into a fantasized object to desire.

As the embodiment of the national fantasy, Clare appeals to Irene's desire by offering to conceal the impossibility of social cohesion indicated by the immediate threat of exclusion from the Drayton

Hotel. According to Pease, fantasy solicits the desire of the subject by "constructing a vision of society that is not split by internal division, a society in which relations among the parts appear organic and complementary" (15). Clare effectively constructs a vision of an organic community when she addresses Irene by name at the hotel. Despite the possibility that either of the women could be ejected if a staff member were to overhear the details of their conversation, Clare approaches Irene with an extraordinary degree of assurance indicating that she, like the citizen in Irene's ideal America, disregards the color line. Irene's responses to Clare's advances suggest that the rekindled relationship temporarily satisfies her desire for social unity: "the friendliness of [Clare's] smile" not only causes Irene's increasing "suspicions and fears [to] vanish" but also gives her "the sense of being petted and caressed" (Larsen 17, 29). If Clare represents Irene's national fantasy, the seemingly erotic sense of being "caressed" by her smile indicates a feeling of identification with the national community. Like American exceptionalism, Clare masks the reality of racism and creates in its place the illusion of a cohesive society; the semblance of satisfaction compels Irene to hope at the end of the conversation "that this parting wouldn't be the last" (Larsen 29). By replacing the threat of exclusion with the illusion of inclusion, Clare initiates a desire that Irene subconsciously embraces in order to avoid encountering the falsity of her fantasy.

In the same way that Clare's presence at the Drayton Hotel satisfies Irene's desire to identify with the national fantasy, Irene's decision to invite Clare to the Negro Welfare League dance allows her to uphold her identity as an exceptional American citizen. Since Irene is the sole member of the ticket committee for the Negro Welfare League, the crowd that attends the dance reflects upon her image; she benefits her own desire to identify with a unified America by ensuring a diverse guest list. According to Irene's recollection, the "bright crowd" at the ball comprises "young men, old men, white men, black men; youthful women, older women, pink women, golden women; fat men, thin men, tall men, short men; stout women,

slim women, stately women, small women" (Larsen 75). Although the gathering appears to validate Irene's national image of social cohesion, Irene herself spends the majority of the time "rushing around here and there;" the primary interaction among people of different groups at the Negro Welfare League dance involves Clare (Larsen 75). While she dances with both white and black men throughout the evening, the light-skinned woman draws the particular attention of Irene and Hugh Wentworth when she, "fair and golden, like a sunlit day" dances with Ralph Hazelton, who is "dark, with gleaming eyes, like a moonlit night" (Larsen 76). By bringing together the contrasting images of day and night, Clare offers Irene another vision of society as complementary—a vision for which Irene receives credit when Wentworth acknowledges Irene's role in facilitating Clare's attendance. The centrality of Clare to the success of the Negro Welfare League dance provides further evidence that a relationship with Clare benefits Irene by allowing her to receive distinction as a member of a unified community.

Although the superficial friendship that blooms between Irene and Clare after the dance seems to indicate the satisfaction of Irene's desire, the illusory nature of the alluring woman suggests that neither Clare nor the fantasy she embodies can be truly attained. From the beginning of the novel, Clare moves in and out of Irene's life as if she were a chimera, a "pure void" that exists "just to mask the emptiness of the place it occupies, the emptiness which is exactly the lack in the other" (Sublime Object 163, 195). Irene notes as she attempts to recall Clare's identity that "about the woman was some quality, an intangible something, too vague to define, too remote to seize" (Larsen 17). Although Irene describes her physical appearance in detail, the notion that Clare possesses a certain intangibility leads the reader to question whether she—or the national ideal—actually exists outside of Irene's imagination. Indeed, Clare bears resemblance to an imaginary friend when Irene claims that Clare needs "not to be entertained, or even noticed" when she comes to visit the Redfields (Larsen 79). The fact that Clare refuses to provide Irene with a

personal mailing address adds to the mystery. Claiming the need to keep their written correspondence secret from her bigoted husband, Clare "request[s] her to direct her answer to the post office's general delivery" (Larsen 62). Whether she actually possesses a physical address remains unknown. Clare lacks any definitive substance beyond her physical appearance, which suffices to function as an illusion to cover the lack of unity in the United States. By constructing Clare as an attractive woman who cannot be defined, seized, or contacted, Larsen foreshadows the inability of Irene to attain the fantasy of exceptionalism that Clare represents.

Resistance to the Encounter with Reality

As the newfound friendship collapses the distance between Irene and the illusory Clare, Irene discovers inconsistencies in her perception of Clare that bring her closer to recognizing the fact that her fantasy of an America devoid of internal division cannot be attained. According to Žižek, the object of desire "is an object which cannot be approached too closely: if we get too near it, it loses its sublime features and becomes an ordinary vulgar object…it can persist only in interspace, in an intermediate state, viewed from a certain perspective, half-seen" (Sublime Object 170). Irene gets dangerously close to Clare, her object of desire, when the two women share an earnest discussion about whether Clare should continue to visit Irene in Chicago. Over the course of the discussion, Clare reveals that she feels not only alienated from but also endangered by the segregated American society: she has "never anyone to really talk to" and therefore is "not close to a single soul" due to the fact that she must conceal her African American parentage from her bigoted white husband in order to maintain her personal safety (Larsen 67). At a later point in the novel, Clare bursts into tears for "no reason that Irene [can] discover" (Larsen 81). The fact that Clare does not feel "happy, or free, or safe" transforms her from a sublime embodiment of social cohesion into a vulgar representative of real racism (Larsen 67). When Irene sees

Clare fully rather than seeing simply the illusion of her, she comes face to face with the fact that she can never attain the fantasized relationship that she desires; only when Irene views Clare from a "certain perspective" can she sustain the image of her as the fulfillment of her fantasy. While Irene can veil external evidence of social division with a fantasized relation to Clare, she possesses no other object of desire that can mask the fact that the fantasy itself does not exist as a consistent order.

Rather than confronting the increasingly visible vulgarities in her perception of reality, Irene channels her feelings of internal instability into a paranoid construction of an affair between Brian and Clare. The instance in which Brian invites the lonely and desperate Clare to attend a party hosted by Wentworth leads Irene to suspect that Brian has feelings for Clare; even though "in all their married life she had had no slightest cause to suspect her husband of any infidelity," she is unable to believe "that it was all a silly invention on her part" (Larsen 96-97). According to Žižek, a paranoid construction such as this provides the subject with a "substitute formation" to the "breakdown of the symbolic universe" that occurs when he or she gets close to the object-cause of desire (Looking Awry 19). Irene essentially transforms the overall status of her broken society into a central lack—the lack of union in her marriage—in order to maintain the barrier between her national fantasy and reality; the separation creates the illusion that the fantasy is still attainable despite its destruction. While the paranoid construction of an affair between Clare and Brian temporarily allows Irene to keep her feet firmly planted in her exceptional American soil, the mysterious death of Clare in the final scene of the novel sends her into a state of hysteria that destroys her personal and national consciousness.

The Destruction of the National Fantasy

Although most agree that the death of Clare sends Irene into a crisis of consciousness, the ambiguity of the events leading up to the

tragedy creates a sense of mystery about what causes Clare to tumble out of the window. The party in the final scene begins "gaily," as if nothing could mar the gathering of the most brilliant and amusing members of Brian and Irene's black community at the house of Dave and Felise Freeland (Larsen 109). However, the party takes a turn for the worse when Clare's bigoted husband John Bellew intrudes, looking for his wife. Upon seeing his wife standing among a "dozen or so" African Americans, Bellew recognizes her heritage and indicts her for being a "damned dirty nigger" (Larsen 109, 111). In the confusion that ensues, Bellew strides toward Clare, the men spring forward, Felise "leap[s] between them and Bellew," and Irene runs "across the room, her terror tinged with ferocity, and [lays] a hand on Clare's bare arm" (Larsen 111). Upon contact, Clare disappears and plummets to her death, sending Irene into a state of shock that precludes her from providing readers with a reliable account of the events; what happens between the moment she touches Clare and the moment Clare dies Irene "never afterwards allow[s] herself to remember. Never clearly" (Larsen 111). The inability of Irene to clearly recall the incident leaves the direct cause of her fall—and thus the final message of the text—open to critical debate.

While some critics readily admit uncertainty, others have offered evidence that Clare's death is precipitated by a fall, a suicide attempt, or even murderous intentions by Bellew and Irene. The idea that the force that casts Clare to her death comes from no specific character, an interpretation championed by Nathan Irvin Huggins, aligns with his vision of Clare as the tragic mulatta whose fate rests in the hands of the formula that literally casts the mixed-race figure out of society and into oblivion (Huggins 160). Reading Clare's death as an unlucky fall resulting from Bellew's entry into the party does appear to reaffirm racial essentialism by propagating the view that the mulatta is doomed from birth. However, the interpretation of the novel as a concession to convention ignores the subtleties in the text that offer alternative messages about identity. While Lori Harrison-Kahan suggests that Bellew's bellowing intrusion causes Clare's death

by disabling her performance of whiteness, the overwhelming majority of critics place the cause of Clare's death in the hands—or rather, the singular hand—of Irene (127). Mary Helen Washington assumes that Irene intentionally "pushes Clare off the balcony" to preserve her marriage, while Ann duCille uses evidence of Irene fantasizing about Clare's death to suggest that the murder allows her to become "an active agent" in the ordering of her "middle-class marriage, bourgeois home, family, fidelity, and, above all, security" (Washington 355, duCille 442). The readings of Clare as the victim of murder conclude that Irene's effort to protect the fixity of her class and sexuality fails, thus exposing the fallaciousness of the notion of essential identities. Although evidence of Irene's anger toward Clare in the final scene supports the idea that she murders Clare, such interpretations fail to reconcile the identification of Irene as murderer with the fact that Clare embodies the fulfillment of Irene's desire.

A close examination of Irene's reaction to the intrusion of John Bellew in the final scene reveals that it is not Irene's willingness to eliminate her object of desire that leads to the destruction of Clare but rather her unwillingness to be dispossessed of it. We have already established that the object of desire—the embodiment of the fantasy—represents the attainment of an ideal that the circumstances threaten to invalidate. Bellew very clearly presents a challenge to Irene's fantasy of an America without racial division when he barges into the party and indicts his wife for her connections with the African American community. While Irene maintains the appearance of unity in previous situations by veiling racism or creating paranoid constructions, Bellew's derisive word choice and scathing tone completely eradicate the distance between the hidden struggles and the national fantasy. According to Žižek, if the appearance of a fantasy "were to be destroyed—if somebody were publicly to pronounce the obvious truth that 'the emperor is naked'…in a sense the whole system would fall apart" (Sublime Object 198). Irene responds not with a desire to murder but rather with a desire to prevent Bellew from harming the fantasy for which Clare is the placeholder; her thoughts

reveal that she runs across the room because "she couldn't have Clare Kendry cast aside by Bellew" (Larsen 111). Irene's race to place her hand on Clare's arm thus represents a final attempt to maintain a hold on her fantasy, a final attempt to prove to herself that her desire is attainable. However, the result of her determination not to be dispossessed of her national fantasy is, paradoxically, the complete destruction of it; Clare can no longer persist once Irene gets close enough to her to learn the truth that her vision of America does not exist.

Although Bellew assumes the duty of forcing Irene to encounter the true American reality, Irene herself causes the destruction of Clare when she gets close enough to gain physical access to a fantasy that, lacking substance beyond appearance, cannot actually be attained. As a result of her reaction to Bellew's bigoted indictment of Clare, Irene must "pay for access to desire with an irredeemable loss" (Looking Awry 59). Immediately after Clare touches Irene's arm, the features Irene uses to define her fantasy of unity in the opening scene disappear: "the soft white face, the bright hair, the disturbing scarlet mouth, the dreaming eyes, the caressing smile, the whole torturing loveliness that had been Clare Kendry" is suddenly "gone" (Larsen 111). The loss of Clare, the sublime object of desire, indicates that Irene has finally recognized the truth that the national fantasy offers her no place—no real, exceptional identity—in the symbolic order based on the indivisibility of the citizenry of the United States. Once the fantasy has been destroyed, neither the object nor the national subject can persist. Irene thus finds herself in what Žižek calls an "unbearable void" that results from the dissolution of her identity: as she attempts to recount the events leading up to Clare's fall, she becomes "submerged and drowned" in a "great heaviness" that leaves her only "dimly conscious" of herself and her surroundings (Looking Awry 44, Larsen 114). The catastrophic breakdown resulting from devotion to an unattainable fantasy brings Irene back to where she began, in an oppressive atmosphere governed by the threat of social division. Despite her efforts to uphold an ideal American identity,

her unwillingness to see the truth precludes her from attaining any true identity at all. Despite the fact that Bellew's intrusion initiates the events leading to Clare's tragic fall, it is not Bellew who invalidates American exceptionalism. Rather, it is Irene's blind devotion to the national fantasy that ultimately prevents her, and by extension, her nation, from living up to the ideals of an authentic American community.

Conclusion

In the same way that the disturbing existence of social division compelled American policymakers of the Twenties to propagate an alternative vision of the United States as a nation comprised of one unified race, the threat of being uprooted drives Irene Redfield to vocalize her own desire to assert her membership in an exceptional national community. Irene's adamant desire to uphold the fantasy of the United States as devoid of racial division leads her to disregard any evidence that her perception of her nation does not coincide with reality. While Irene can ignore instances of lynching and historical slavery that occur outside of her place and time, the direct threat of expulsion from the Drayton Hotel requires Irene to identify with an object that can sustain her fantasy by masking the difference between her national ideal and the racism she fears. Clare, whose alluring beauty and social prowess depend upon the unity of blackness and whiteness, fills the void by offering an illusion of a cohesive American society. The transformation of Clare into the embodiment of the national fantasy drives Irene to desire an unattainable relationship with the illusory woman, a relationship that ultimately brings Irene too close to her fantasy of unity. The disappearance of Clare out the window after Bellew's intrusion in the final scene indicates that Irene must finally encounter the frightening reality of racial division.

What seems most unsettling in Larsen's novel, however, is not the mere existence of social division but rather the unwillingness of Irene to let go of the unattainable fantasy that, in veiling these divisions,

allows them to persist. Žižek's method of psychoanalysis effectively illuminates the problem of a national bond based upon a shared lie and reveals that a true national community is unattainable when based on superficiality. Although the acute suffering that Irene experiences upon the destruction of her national consciousness does not appear favorable, Larsen seems to suggest that the ideology of American exceptionalism should be destroyed so that, "centuries after," we as a nation may all "have another look out that window" through which the national fantasy disappeared (114). By understanding the truth about the construction, maintenance, and ultimate disavowal of the national fantasy, readers can begin to form a national community that recognizes reality and attempts to solve rather than mask social problems. Unlike the symbolic order of American exceptionalism upheld by Irene, a model of a national community based on real experience cannot be constructed as a fantasy; it is attainable, and it is, "wholly true" (Larsen 65).

Works Cited

Baldwin, James. Introduction. *Nobody Knows My Name: More Notes of a Native Son*. New York: Dial Press, 1961. xi-xiv. *Black Thought and Culture*. Web. 23 Apr. 2012.

Brody, Jennifer DeVere. "Clare Kendry's 'True' Colors: Race and Class Conflict in Nella Larsen's *Passing*." *Callaloo* 15.4 (1992): 1053-65. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 393-408. Print.

Butler, Judith. "Passing, Queering: Nella Larsen's Psychoanalytic Challenge." *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex."* New York: Routledge, 1993. 167-85, 274-77. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 417-435. Print.

"Careful Lyncher! He May Be Your Brother." *The Philadelphia Tribune* 21 Jan. 1932: n.p. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 124-25. Print.

Davis, Thadious M. Introduction. *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Thadious M. Davis. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. vii-xxxii. Print.

Du Bois, W. E. B. "Passing." *The Crisis* (1929): 234, 248-50. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 97-98. Print.

duCille, Ann. "*Passing* Fancies." *The Coupling Convention: Sex, Text, and Tradition in Black Women's Fiction*. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. 103-09. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 435-443. Print.

Hahn, Emilie. "Crossing the Color Line." *New York World* 28 July 1929: n.p. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 117-20. Print.

Harris, Cheryl I. "Whiteness as Property." *Harvard Law Review* 106.8 (1993): 1707-1791. *JSTOR*. Web. 22 April 2012.

Harrison-Kahan, Lori. "Her 'Nig': Returning the Gaze of Nella Larsen's 'Passing.'" *Modern Language Studies* 32.2 (2002): 109-138. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 Oct. 2011.

Hoover, Herbert. "Herbert Hoover's Inaugural Address, March 4, 1929." *The Roaring Twenties*. Updated edition. By Thomas Streissguth. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007. 374-77. *Google Books*. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.

Huggins, Nathan Irvin. "Art: The Ethnic Province." *Harlem Renaissance*. New York: Oxford UP, 1971. 190-239. *Google Books*. Web. 19 Oct. 2011.

Hutchinson, George B. "Jean Toomer and the 'New Negroes' of Washington." *American Literature* 63.4 (1991): 683-92. *JSTOR*. Web. 22 Apr. 2012.

Johnson, Caleb. "Crossing the Color Line." *Outlook and Independent* 158 (1931): 526ff. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 121-23. Print.

Jones, Jeffrey Owen and Peter Meyer. *The Pledge: A History of the Pledge of Allegiance*. New York: Macmillan, 2010. *Google Books*. Web. 6 Apr. 2012.

Kaplan, Carla. "Introduction: Nella Larsen's Erotics of Race." *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. ix-xxvii. Print.

Larsen, Nella. *Passing*. Ed. Thadious M. Davis. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. Print.

McDowell, Deborah E. "Black Female Sexuality in *Passing*." *Quicksand* and *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Deborah E. McDowell. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1986. ix-xvi, xxiii-xxxv. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 363-379. Print.

Morgan, Archie. "Kip's 'Soul Message' Notes Read." *The Chicago Defender* 28 Nov. 1925: 1, 4. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 138-39. Print.

Nobles, Melissa. *Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2000. Print.

Pease, Donald. *The New American Exceptionalism*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009. Print.

Rottenberg, Catherine. "Passing: Race, Identification, and Desire." *Criticism: A Quarterly for Literature and the Arts* 45.4 (2003): 435-52. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 489-507. Print.

"75,000 Pass in Philadelphia Every Day." *The Afro-American* 19 Dec. 1931: n.p. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 123. Print.

Toth, Josh. "Deauthenticating Community: The Passing Intrusion of Clare Kendry in Nella Larsen's 'Passing.'" *MELUS* 33.1 (2008): 55-73. *JSTOR*. Web. 13 Feb. 2011.

Washington, Mary Helen. "Nella Larsen: Mystery Woman of the Harlem Renaissance." *Ms. Magazine* (1980): 44-50. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 350-356. Print.

"Writer Says Brazil Has No Color Line." *The Chicago Defender* Oct. 1925: n.p. Rpt. in *Passing*. By Nella Larsen. Ed. Carla Kaplan. Norton Critical Editions. New York: Norton, 2007. 107. Print.

Žižek, Slavoj. *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. Print.

_____. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso, 1989. Print.

NATHALIE ROSADO was born in Ponce, Puerto Rico and graduated from Notre Dame in May 2012 with departmental honors in history. During her time as an undergraduate, Nathalie held internships focusing on immigration advocacy and refugee resettlement, and she received funding from Notre Dame to conduct development work in India and Bulgaria. Nathalie is currently pursuing a year of service with a legal agency in Chicago, where she works with undocumented domestic violence and sexual assault victims to help them file U-Visa and VAWA petitions, provide guidance as they enroll in GED and college programs, and organize economic empowerment workshops that will bring them financial stability. She would like to thank professors Ghada Bualuan and Olivier Morel for guiding her as she studied Arabic and French, while at the same time fueling her passion for learning about the origins and legacies of French colonialism in the Middle East. This project would not have been possible without the guidance of her thesis advisor, Thomas Kselman, whose encouragement and good humor made everything worthwhile.

CHEKRI GANEM AND THE COMITÉ CENTRAL SYRIEN: SYRIAN NATIONALISM IN PARIS, 1905-1921

NATHALIE MARIE ROSADO

Introduction

During the period preceding the Great War, French foreign officials were in a quiet frenzy as it became apparent that the ancient Ottoman Empire was sure to fall. Often called the "sick man of Europe," the Ottoman Empire had lost significant territories over a series of wars and had fallen prey to economic difficulties. For over three centuries, France had established itself as the protector of the Maronites of Lebanon. The Maronite Church was one of the Eastern Catholic churches that had not broken its relationship with the Vatican because it did not support the Great Schism in 1054, and it remained in full communion with the Holy See. Because the Maronites were surrounded by Islam within the Ottoman Empire, the French established educational missions in Lebanon and built a strong bond with the communities in the region.

Within the Ottoman Empire, Syria and Lebanon were one territory. Therefore, many of the nationalists involved in the territorial settlements following WWI used "Syrian" and "Lebanese" interchangeably when referring to their ethnicity. During Ottoman rule and following the Turkish reforms of 1864, Ottoman Syria was divided into semi-autonomous regions: Mount Lebanon, which was predominantly Christian and considered a haven for Maronite Catholics, the Vilayet of Syria, and the Vilayet of Aleppo. This region, often loosely referred to the Levant, generally consists of the countries bordering the eastern Mediterranean.

Much is known about Lawrence of Arabia and British efforts to sway the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire with false promises of Arab independence, but little has been said about the efforts of France to maintain authority over a region where they had previously established a cultural presence. The French entrusted the mission to a Lebanese man named Chekri Ganem, who was a political exile living in Paris. Ganem had experienced personally the oppression of the Ottoman Empire and had established himself in France when his brother was condemned to death for his political activism. Knowing that he would probably follow the same fate, Ganem left Lebanon and began working for the French government, until he was appointed to represent French ambitions in the battle for the spoils of the dying Ottoman Empire.

Part I: Chekri Ganem's Entrance Into the French Public Sphere, 1905-1916

Chekri Ganem's Literary and Political Origins

Chekri Ganem's interview with the Maronite Patriarch Elias Hoyek during the priest's visit to Paris in 1905 marked Ganem's entrance into politics. In this interview, Ganem presented his plan for the future of Syria and of Lebanon, and the Patriarch argued that the time had come for France and the Maronites to march together towards the future under an enlightened government in Greater Syria, a region in the Middle East that encompassed Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and part of Jordan, and which found itself in political turmoil at that time.

> The Maronites, and you know because you are a Maronite, place their hopes in God, the Pope, and in France under the aegis of a tolerant Ottoman government. Our loyalty [to France] is appreciated, and I remain loyal to these [French] traditions that have given Lebanon a

> long period of tranquility. But the truth is in the reality of actions, and not in dreams. As the spiritual leader of the Maronites, [sic] [I] will march together [with them] towards the future, supported by France, our great and secular friend, under the enlightened government of the Ottoman sultan.[1]

These remarks, although seemingly naïve in that they assumed an easy pathway to Lebanese autonomy in the Ottoman Empire with the support of France, represented a message that the Patriarch, a leader in Lebanese affairs, was openly sending to the Ottoman Empire and to France. Endorsed by Ganem, the Patriarch defined a reformed Ottoman Empire and a Lebanon that would use French support to defend its interests. Ganem and Hoyek had determined that the time had come for the two nations to work together to rekindle their ancient relationship for the rights of the Syrians and Lebanese who had lived under the rule of the Ottoman Empire since 1516.[2] The bond formed with Patriarch Hoyek during this visit would inspire Ganem to call for stronger French policies in Syria and Lebanon. Syria and Lebanon were a part of the Ottoman Empire, but France maintained a relationship with Lebanon that went back to the 1500s during the Turkish Capitulations, which allowed France to pursue religious, commercial, and political ventures in the Ottoman Empire. France established itself as the protector of the Maronites in 1860, when the French government helped the Christian Lebanese in a bloody struggle against the Druze, a sect of Shi'a Islam with whom the Maronites had a tense relationship.[3] The Ottoman government had allowed France to establish educational institutions in Lebanon, which the French saw as an opportunity

---

1 "Le Patriarche d'Orient," *Le Figaro*, October 12, 1905, accessed March 11, 2012. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k287130k.r=le%20figaro%20.langEN.

2 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East.* 4th ed. (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2009), 13-18.

3 A. L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria,* (London: Macmillan, 1969), 21-25.

to support the Christian community of Lebanon.[4] The Patriarch was thus alluding to a relationship that he believed was at a turning point. Throughout their meeting, the Patriarch talked about his loyalty to France and his wishes for French support in Lebanon, which came from this longstanding relationship between France and the Maronites. Ganem wanted a stronger French policy in Lebanon and explicit French influence as opposed to a relationship that had until then been primarily religious, and he used his position as a correspondent for the national French newspaper, *Le Figaro*, in order to publicize those views. The Patriarch's visit to France marked an important moment in the relationship between France and the Syro-Lebanese community, and Ganem's role in the meeting established his place in developing France's commitment to the future of Syria.

Ganem's loyalty to France began during his activism in Ottoman Lebanon. As a young man during the 1870s, he helped a fifteen-year-old who was being brutalized by an Ottoman officer. "After escaping, I had to flee to the mountain and found refuge with a French family from Lyon. For two months, I lived a French life. Who knows if that time spent with [them] is what made me decide my future and what led me to France," he later recalled.[5] In 1882, he left Lebanon in order to pursue a post in the French protectorate of Tunisia that his brother, Khalil, had arranged for him. In 1894, after his brother Khalil was condemned to death for his political

[4] See Samy F. Zaka, "Education and Civilization in the Third Republic: The University of St. Joseph," (PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2006), 1-24, in which he analyzes the broader impact of French educational missions in Syria and Lebanon through the developments of the University of St. Joseph in Beirut. He argues that by the 1870s, the Ottoman Sultan had expressed concern over the number of Catholic French schools in Ottoman Syria and the threat they posed to the Ottoman Empire. The Patriarch's reference to the relationship between France and Lebanon was largely founded on the educational presence that France had established in the Levant through Catholic missionaries.

[5] Chekri Ganem, *Écrits Politiques,* ed. Georges T. Labaki (Beirut: Éditions Dar An-Nahar, 1994), xv. See Labaki's introduction to the political writings of Ganem, in which he provides a brief biographical overview of Ganem's life by using information obtained from newspaper interviews.

activism in the Ottoman Empire, Ganem established himself permanently in France in order to avoid the same fate. While serving as the president of the Ottoman Chamber of Commerce in Paris, he began to write plays, novels, and poems, many of which focused on the Middle East. These works won him initial praise and a broad audience in France. As a writer, he would also engage in free-lance work with *Le Figaro*, which allowed him to voice his opinions and reach a considerable French audience.

Three years after his meeting with Patriach Hoyek, in 1908, Chekri Ganem and George Samné founded the Association of Friends of the Orient (*l'Association des Amis de l'Orient*), which was a society of Syrian and Lebanese emigrants living in Paris, in order to more fully advocate for French involvement in the future of Syria. Samné was a wealthy Greek-Catholic physician from Damascus who also advocated for French authority in the Levant, and he personally financed many of the initiatives undertaken by the *Amis de l'Orient*. By founding the *Amis de l'Orient* shortly after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, Ganem sought to take advantage of the new constitutional era in Turkey for the advancement of Syrian society. The Revolution ushered in the Second Constitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire, dissolving Turkish Sultan Abdul Hamid's oppressive regime, which Ganem escaped shortly after his brother, Khalil, was condemned to death.

Ganem's society sought to promote progress in the Orient and a positive relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. With the liberal Young Turks on the Ottoman throne, Ganem and Samné used the organization to express their vision of a new civilization in the East.[6] They believed that the Ottoman Empire was

[6] Comité de l'Orient, "Notre Programme," *La Correspondance d'Orient,* October 1, 1908, accessed March 11, 2012. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58102442.image.langEN.r=la%20correspondance%20d'orient. Most issues of *La Correspondace d'Orient* stated the purpose of the writers, the affiliations of the journal, and the intent of their publication in a brief introduction. In general, they expounded similar beliefs about the need for a relationship between the Ottoman Empire and its surrounding European countries.

in the process of regenerating itself; furthermore, they anticipated the renaissance of Eastern culture, which they believed would be much different from that of Europe. The establishment of the *Amis de l'Orient* marked the beginning of *La Correspondance d'Orient*, a journal first published in 1908 that discussed a variety of issues concerning the Orient. This journal, published by the *Amis de l'Orient*, discussed economic, social, political, and literary issues concerning the internal aspects of the Orient, which included Eastern Europe and Asia in addition to the Middle East, and its relationship with Europe. The publication of Ganem's journal solidified his role within the French colonial movement. He was now a public figure and the most widely known representative of the Syro-Lebanese community in Paris. Through the journal, Ganem gave Parisians a portrayal of Syrian people as a Westernized, educated, and liberal community that supported the reformation of the greater Ottoman Empire. He thereby instilled in the French a desire to support the Syrian cause, as Parisians believed that Syrians advocated similar values to those of French society.

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 gave Ganem hope that the liberalism of the reformers would allow for the different ethnicities of the Ottoman Empire to gain autonomy and receive representation in the Ottoman parliament. Ganem, whose brother Khalil's political exile under Abdul Hamid's regime had influenced his own political activism, was personally committed to the cause of political freedom in the Levant. After finishing his work for the French protectorate of Tunisia from 1882-1895 and settling down in Paris, Ganem began to use his position in French society to advocate for French involvement in the cause of the Syrian people. Despite his advocacy for French influence, Ganem's writings in *La Correspondance d'Orient* from 1908 until the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 were not characterized by separatism or any desire for Syrian or Lebanese independence from the Ottoman Empire. Instead, he believed, as the *Comité de l'Orient* had expressed in the first issue of *La Correspondance d'Orient*, that the Young Turk Revolution offered

the opportunity for political autonomy of the different ethnicities of the Ottoman Empire in the newly reformed government.[7]

In seeking to achieve political autonomy for the Arabs, Ganem grew dissatisfied with the lack of action on behalf of the Syrian and Lebanese communities in the Ottoman Empire. He argued that the Ottoman Empire was crumbling not due to European pressure, but rather because of the absence of patriotism among the people of Syria within the Ottoman Empire. When he wrote about the political situation in Syria in November 1908 for the *La Correspondance d'Orient*, Ganem accused the Syrians living in the Ottoman Empire of having a careless attitude toward the political developments in the area. "Après moi le deluge," he said, "or to be more local, after my donkey, the grass should grow no longer. That is our patriotism."[8] Ganem saw the Young Turk Revolution as a chance for Syrians to define their political role in the Ottoman Empire, but he believed that Syrians preferred instead to continue with their present situation as a community unable to control its own destiny and resigned to a powerless status within the Empire. "What had to happen is happening: stagnation [and] sterile agitation, vain with impotent gestures and lifeless words."[9] Ganem feared for their political future, and he was often frustrated because he felt that the people of Syria did not see the potential to be recognized as a distinct nation, self-governing and unified under the same cause.

Although Ganem was actively involved with the *Amis de l'Orient*, he had not left his primary profession as a poet and playwright. In addition to his political writings, the idea of an independent Syria was also a major theme in Ganem's literary works, in which he envisioned a Syria that would one day rise up and be recognized as a nation. *Antar*, a play about the son of a slave who rises to become a warrior, made Ganem a recognized figure in Parisian society in

7 Comité de l'Orient, "Notre Programme," *La Correspondance d'Orient*, October 1, 1908.

8 Ganem, 10-11.

9 Ibid.

1910. The play exemplified the values of French liberalism at the time, by denouncing aristocratic privilege and calling instead for a meritocracy, in which power was based on capacity and not on privilege by birth. *Antar* depicted the rise of a common man to greatness, and within the story, Ganem visualized the rise of the Arab people:

> The future of a race and of a nation does not lie
> In one man, were he to be the arbiter of combats,
> The king of the world. Nothing stops a people united.
> They rise! I see them rising step by step,
> From the Levant, until sunset, in such a blaze,
> As that of a golden star fading in the depths of the sky.[10]

In *Antar*, Ganem illustrated the rise of the Syrians and predicted the birth of a nation from the initiative taken by its people. In his literary works as well as in his political activism, he sought the cultural development of the Arab people, and he hoped that the new regime in the Ottoman Empire would allow for the Arab culture to be recognized. At this time, Ganem applied the term Arab to himself in order to march in solidarity with the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire. Because Ganem wanted the people of Syria to unite against the religious intolerance and human rights violations of the Ottoman Sultan and his oppressive regime, he adhered to a narrative in which one could be an Arab, a Syrian, and a Christian at the same time.[11] Ganem never advocated a complete separation of Syria and

[10] Chekri Ganem, *Écrits Litteraires: Poésie*, Roman, et Théâtre, ed. Georges T. Labaki (Beirut: Éditions Dar An-Nahar, 1994), 408.

[11] Asher Kaufman argues that Ganem and other Lebanese Christians might have believed there to be cultural differences between Lebanese Maronites and Muslims in Syria and Lebanon, but that before 1916, most Lebanese Maronites, such as Ganem, had not strongly expressed their wishes for Lebanon to be separated from Syria nor for the Lebanese to be considered a race different from the Arabs. Some indeed believed that there were intrinsic differences between Maronites and the rest of the population of Syria, but they were still conscious of the Arab identity to which they had been exposed while living in Syria throughout their whole lives. Asher Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon,* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 82.

Lebanon from the Ottoman Empire, but he envisioned the emergence of Arab nationalism in a newly reformed Ottoman Empire and under the protection of France. The French values of liberalism present in his narrative suggest that he believed an autonomous Syria should have been modeled on French values and protected by the French government, even if Syria was to remain under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Both in his literary and political narratives, Ganem refrained from speaking of a distinct Maronite or Lebanese civilization that alienated Muslims and Syrians. He spoke of Greater Syria as a whole, and he sought to gain support from Arabs, Muslims, and Christians in order to advocate for a cohesive movement to demand recognition of the Arab people of Syria.

Ganem's references to a distinct Arab identity were accompanied by reassurance that his remarks were not meant to be politically separatist or critical of Ottoman authority. Ganem's efforts to balance his political activism can be seen in a letter he sent in April 1910 to *Le Temps* in Paris outlining the goals of the Arabs within the Ottoman Empire. For this document to reach an Ottoman audience, Ganem had originally sought to publish this letter in the *Tanin*, a newspaper that supported the new Turkish regime; however, the letter was rejected because of its criticism of the new government. In the article, Ganem questioned the Ottoman parliament for its lack of Arab representatives and therefore the underrepresentation of Arabs within the Empire.[12] He also condemned Turkish discrimination against Arabs in the Ottoman civil service, in particular that of the foreign ministry.

> Do you want to ignore everything that was said and published in the Arab press and in the whole world since the proclamation of the Constitution [established by the Young Turks after they came into power]? First, after the constitution was established, the Ottoman government

[12] "Bulletin de l'Etranger," *Le Temps*, April 11, 1910, accessed February 22, 2012. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k240081g.r=le%20temps%20paris%201861.langEN.

> proceeded to revoke the posts of all Arab officers – of the twelve that were in the Ottoman foreign ministry, all but one were told to step down, and the one Arab left was sent to Tiflis and replaced by a young doctor with no experience in the [political] profession. The Arab world is, at this very moment, deeply affected.[13]

Ganem was troubled by the fact that he, so far away from the Ottoman Empire, was the first to make note of such discrimination in the new government. Although the new regime claimed to have instituted a parliamentary government so as to represent the different voices of the Empire, Ganem believed they had failed to carry out their promises by allowing the Arab countries to remain underrepresented in Parliament. When Ganem's article was turned down by the *Tanin*, the editors of *La Correspondance d'Orient* accused the Young Turk regime of violating the principle of freedom of the press. They claimed that the Young Turk Revolution, which was supposedly a Western-oriented movement spearheaded by intellectuals, secularists, and ethnic minorities, had ultimately become a nationalist movement that only catered to Turkish citizens and failed to address the demands of certain ethnic minorities in the Empire, specifically those of the Arabs. As Chekri Ganem became aware of the exclusive nature of the Young Turk regime, he increasingly supported Arab nationalism and presented himself among the various Arab intellectuals who frequently gathered in Paris.

Ganem's writings about Macedonia, a country also vying for autonomy under Ottoman rule, give insight into the development of his political ideology for Syria. Ganem's nationalism rested on the possibility of a distinct Syrian nation. In his early writings, Ganem worried about the future of Syria if the Syrian people did not rise up and take advantage of what he believed was a new era that would

[13] "Turcs et Arabes," *La Correspondance d'Orient*. June 15, 1910, accessed February 22, 2012. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5805941h.image.langEN.r=correspondance%20d'orient.

regenerate the Ottoman Empire. Macedonia was a country whose fight for autonomy was crushed by the competing powers that sought to benefit territorially from its partition. The partition of Macedonia taught him that autonomy for Syria would require the support of a powerful nation. Even while he bemoaned the fate of Macedonia, Ganem insisted on the value of a continued connection with the Ottoman Empire. He had hoped that autonomy would also be in the near future for the Slavs of Macedonia, and he advised against decentralization from the Ottoman Empire:

> Decentralization! The word itself [sic] seems frightening. [Such a concept] would turn the Empire into a salon where the number of people involved does not allow for a general dialog. That way they will form into small groups and act each according to their own desires and interests in their small milieu.[14]

Ottoman control in Macedonia ended during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, but rather than achieving independence, Macedonia was divided among Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Ganem feared that the same would happen to Syria if Syrians did not seek to make demands concerning their political future. He knew that in order for Syria to avoid falling under the control of other nations, Syrians would need to ally themselves with a greater world power, which justified his efforts to foster an alliance with France. He did not wish for Syria to stand alone in its call for Arab recognition within the Ottoman Empire, and Syria's relationship with France became very important for Syrian autonomy. As Ganem's interest in Macedonia grew, he developed more precise political thoughts concerning Syria, and he began to explicitly demand Arab recognition within the Ottoman Empire, which went against his previous rejection of decentralization. The end of the Balkan Wars in May 1913 that resulted in the partition of Macedonia was a transitional event in Ganem's

[14] Ganem, Écrits Politiques, 34.

political thought and led to his call to action when organizing a gathering of Arab intellectuals in Paris in 1913.

The First Arab Congress, 1913

In 1912, Ganem headed a movement to unite Arabs in support of autonomy for Syria and became recognized as an important figure among those in French society who supported French colonialism. That same year, Ganem founded the *Comité Libanais de Paris,* and that same year, the *Association des Amis de l'Orient* changed its name to the *Comité de l'Orient*.[15] The *Comité de l'Orient* was closely tied to the French foreign ministry, also known as the Quai d'Orsay, and a number of government officials were involved with the organization. These changes within already existing organizations and the creation of new colonialist committees in 1912 suggest that Syrians in Paris strongly supported the French colonialist movement, which was gaining increasing support among members of the French government. By 1913, the French public regarded Ganem as a prominent political figure in addition to being an accomplished poet. "As he cultivates the French muse, he does not forget the brothers of his race," wrote *Le Figaro*, lauding his efforts to advocate for the recognition of Arabs in the Ottoman Empire.[16] The French began to recognize his love of Lebanon and his unique commitment to France, and they perceived him as an important figure in the pursuit of French policy in the Levant. *Antar* remained very popular during the Parisian season, and it depicted his political position as sympathetic to the right of France in the Levant, as well as being critical of the authority of the Ottoman Empire. He became the voice for oppressed Ottoman subjects, defending the values of liberty and equality for the Arab minorities in the Ottoman Empire.

[15] Christopher M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, *The Climax of French Imperial Expansion, 1914-1924* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 47.

[16] Jean Louis, "Quelques Croix," *Le Figaro.* February 21, 1913, accessed March 08, 2012. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k289866m.r=le%20figaro.langEN.

As his love of France was noticed by French society, the French in turn became sympathetic to French colonial interests in the Levant.

Ganem's wishes for the Turkish government to recognize Arab nationalism and his position as a political figure working with the French government allowed him to begin to work with other Arab nationalist organizations that were less sympathetic to the idea of French involvement in Syria and Lebanon. One of the challenges that Ganem faced was working with the members of *al-Fatat*, a secret Arab society founded in 1909 by two Arab students: Ahmad Quadri of Damascus and Awni Abd al-Hadi of Nablus. After the Young Turk Revolution, Quadri and al-Hadi were convinced that the Young Turks were solely concerned with Turkish nationalism and sought to subjugate all other nationalities of the Ottoman Empire once they came to power.[17] They then decided to organize a secret society based on the model of the Young Turks that advocated for an Arab nation to be placed within the ranks of other nations. Quadri and al-Hadi moved to Paris to finish their studies, and it was there that they established the first administrative committee of the society in 1911. The organization rejected the influence of the French in the Levant, a position that Ganem challenged when he reached out to them in order to discuss the future of Arabs within the Ottoman Empire. It was such challenges that initiated a significant discourse, which inspired Ganem to organize the First Arab Congress in 1913.

The First Arab Congress established Ganem as a key figure within the Arab émigré communities both in Paris and abroad that were concerned about the future of Arabs in the Ottoman Empire. Ganem's ability to negotiate with Muslims and Arab nationalists, such as those of *al-Fatat*, made him a valuable asset to the Quai d'Orsay. *al-Fatat* was an Arab nationalist and predominantly Muslim society, but in 1913, Ganem collaborated with its members in order to take part in their biggest initiative, an Arab congress that was to be held in Paris that year. When the Muslim reformers of

[17] Eliezer Tauber, *The Emergence of Arab Movements* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 91-92.

the Ottoman Empire suggested that the Congress be held in Paris, the Quai d'Orsay was taken aback, unsure of how to collaborate with organizations whose demands were not likely to coincide with French ambitions in Syria. Although France was not sympathetic to the Muslim cause concerning the future of Syria and Lebanon, Paris had long been seen as a place where activists and intellectuals could gather without fear of government oppression, and Ganem saw an opportunity for the Quai d'Orsay to become a major player in the initiative taken to demand Arab recognition. He knew that denying them the opportunity to hold the Congress in Paris would hurt French ambitions in Syria, and he advised the Quai d'Orsay to use the occasion to control the reformist movement.[18] Ganem had a vision of Syria and Lebanon that involved France, and but it was during the First Arab Congress that he began to use his position within the *Comité de l'Orient* to realize it.

The involvement of Ganem and the *Comité de l'Orient* in the First Arab Congress made them a credible voice for the demands of the Syrian people, although some critics called Ganem's authority into question because he worked for the French government and the *Comité de l'Orient* was headquartered in France.[19] During the period following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the Arab nationalism that most of the members of the First Arab Congress advocated still adhered to the Ottoman Empire, which meant that although they wanted to be recognized within the Ottoman Empire, they did not want to be independent from it. For the Syrians who advocated Arab nationalism during the Congress of 1913, political autonomy was limited to Greater Syria. Rather than being connected to the Arabs of Arabia, Arab nationalism during the First Arab Congress

[18] Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 51.

[19] In my primary source research, I did not come upon evidence that explicitly showed the terms of Ganem's contract with the French government. When reviewing secondary literature, I found that Asher Kaufman as well as Christopher Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner claim that Ganem was on the payroll of the Quai d'Orsay, with Kaufman referring to Ganem as a type of "mercenary."

demanded the recognition of Arab culture from the Ottoman government. Because most Syrians and Lebanese supported this earlier version of Arab nationalism and were united in an effort to demand autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, they frequently gathered in Paris from 1908-1919 to discuss political issues and organize political gatherings, in which Chekri Ganem played a significant role.[20] Ganem was therefore closely associated and aware of the political thought that began to develop among the Arab communities as the Ottoman Empire began to decay. During the time of the Arab Congress, he took the opportunity to engage in the general political discussions among Arabs following the Young Turk Revolution and kept French officials informed of the information that he gathered.[21] The dialogue that he maintained with other Arab nationalist organizations in and outside of Paris connected him to the reality of the politics of Syria. Although the Arab nationalists who gathered in Paris represented a variety of political beliefs, Ganem was aware of the numerous demands of these nationalists and held views that coincided with many of the agendas of these organizations.

Through his association with the Syrian and Lebanese political circles in Paris, Ganem subscribed to widely held views regarding the fate of Syria in the First Arab Congress. Historians Christopher Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner argue that Chekri Ganem and the *Comité de l'Orient* did not represent the wishes of the Syrian and Lebanese people regarding the fate of Syria because most Lebanese at the time wished for an independent Lebanon rather than a unified Greater Syria.[22] The First Arab Congress shows, however, that the ambitions of Arab leaders varied greatly and were not unified, and the problem of Lebanon had therefore not quite yet emerged during their meeting in Paris. The delegates at the Congress tried to address various issues that affected the Arab subjects of the Ottoman

[20] Kaufman, 80.

[21] Andrew and Kanya Forstner, 51.

[22] Ibid., 48.

Empire, but they failed to come up with a solid consensus on what course of action was best to take at the time. Part of the reason for the lack of consensus was the diversity of the delegations: there was a mix of eleven Christians, eleven Muslims, and one Jew.[23] With no single outstanding political sentiment within the Arab communities, these delegations were torn between alliances with the European powers, their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, and the political autonomy that they believed should be granted to the Arabs within the Empire. Ganem was another voice in the political discussion, in which no one could claim to represent the united ambitions of the Arabs. The Arab Congress of 1913 concluded with statements that reveal a competing mix of political agendas among the members of the delegations.

Among the delegates, there were two positions that closely mirrored Ganem's wishes for Syria. One position was represented by Ahmad Bayhum and Khalil Zénié, a Muslim and a Christian from Beirut who, like Ganem, advocated for French authority in Syria. The other was the delegation of Nadra Moutran, a Greek Christian from Baalbeck who advocated for a Greater Syria and who began talks with the *Comité de l'Orient* in support of a future French presence in Syria. Although he was Lebanese, Moutran believed that Lebanon belonged within Syria, but he differed from Ganem in that he believed that Syria was a Muslim nation rather than a Christian one. The desire among the delegates to include Lebanon as a part of Syria show that Ganem's political ideology concerning Lebanon was shared by other leaders; together they established a position that evoked the longstanding demand for an imperial affiliation that would also accept a powerful French influence.

Ganem did have slightly different approaches to the problem of Syria than those of Bayhum, Zénié, and Moutran, but their advocacy

[23] For information about the different viewpoints displayed in the First Arab Congress, I refer to Asher Kaufman, who provides a detailed summary of the different nationalist groups involved in the proceedings of the event. Kaufman, 80-82.

for a Greater Syria and their ties to the French government were similar. The leaders of the First Arab Congress nevertheless failed to achieve a consensus on what they thought to be the best solution to the goal of Arab autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. The officials at the Quai d'Orsay were relieved that they were able to adjourn the First Arab Congress without provoking hostilities from the Ottoman Empire. The inconclusive nature of the Congress meant that many of the nationalist delegations were unsatisfied. Despite the failure of the delegates to achieve a consensus on what they wished to demand from the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman government published a program for reforms that would potentially improve Arab representation in the Ottoman Empire, and the Arab leaders worked with Ganem to urge French officials to put pressure on the Ottoman government so that they would follow through with their promises of improvement.

In 1914, one year after the Arab Congress, the lack of changes implemented by the Ottoman government left many Arabs dissatisfied, and the *Comité de l'Orient* used *La Correspondance d'Orient* to demand change and galvanize the reformist Arabs. Albert Hourani argues that Syrians found themselves asking an important question during the time following the First Arab Congress:

> The nationalists found themselves faced with a question of great moment: what would be the fate of the Arab provinces when the Empire collapsed? Would it be possible for them to constitute an independent state, or would they fall into the hands of new masters?[24]

Furthermore, the people of Syria and Lebanon were not satisfied with the reforms of the First Arab Congress, and they slowly began to explore the possibility of independence or allegiance to a new nation. In an article entitled "Les Reformes Arabes," *La Correspondance*

[24] Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (London: Oxford University Press: 1946), 40.

d'Orient underscored the inadequacy of the reforms, and called into question the future of Syria and Lebanon within the control of the Ottoman Empire. In the article, *La Correspondance d'Orient* reported on the advances that had been made since the Ottomans had agreed to allow for more Arab autonomy in the Empire. By surveying the dissatisfaction of the Arab people in Egypt and in Syria, the authors, who were members of the *Comité de l'Orient*, sought to address the possibility of independence or allegiance to another great power. The article reported that a considerable number of Arabs had been named senators in the Ottoman Parliament, but that the Arab leaders all refused to participate in the Ottoman government. It went on to argue that naming known Arab leaders to the Ottoman Parliament was not going to be enough to hide the lack of progress concerning the Arab reforms promised at the First Arab Congress.

Taking advantage of the disappointment of the Arab leaders, Ganem and the editors of *La Correspondance d'Orient* suggested that other measures had to be taken. The interviews conducted by *La Correspondance d'Orient* showed that Arabs in the Ottoman Empire had realized that the reforms set forth by the First Arab Congress were not going to be granted by the Ottoman government to the extent that the Arab leaders expected. In the same article that portrayed the dissatisfaction of the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire, the writer for *La Correspondance d'Orient* used the example of Eastern Europe, as Ganem had done in the past, as a way to advocate for change in Syria. In his view, the example of Armenia, with Russian support, suggested the value of European influence when seeking to achieve reform.

> The [Ottoman Empire] should prevent Arabs from getting the impression that the reforms cannot be obtained without the pressure of European powers. [It is doubtful] that they have not realized that if the Armenians saw

> satisfaction in almost all of their demands, it was thanks to the support of Russia.[25]

Just as Armenia was being defended by Russia from the oppression of the Ottoman Empire in a crisis that lasted from 1912-1914, some Arabs wondered if European intervention was the only way for them to effect change within the Ottoman Empire. The article then interviewed one Arab who asked whether they had to place themselves under the rule of a great power in order for their demands to be heard.[26] By reporting on the Arab reforms, Ganem's journal began to suggest that the threat of European intervention was necessary for Arab nationalism to achieve its goals.

The Beginning of an Official French Policy in Syria

In 1914, Ganem's duties as part of the *Comité de l'Orient* became more closely tied to the Quai d'Orsay, and he began to work more with French officials than with other Arab nationalists. Ganem recognized Arab dissent in the Ottoman Empire, and he sought to garner the support of the French government in order to advocate for an official French policy in Syria. While Ganem and the *Comité de l'Orient* encouraged a direct French role in Syria, various French government officials and committees were unsure as to how France should establish a presence in the region. The divisions among the delegations in the Arab Congress of 1913 showed that separatist ideas were present among Arab subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Quai d'Orsay felt a duty to remain neutral so as to maintain peace in the region, various French diplomats and

[25] Comité de l'Orient, "Les Reformes Arabes," *La Correspondance d'Orient*, February 16, 1914, accessed March 07, 2012. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58057924.image.langEN.r=correspondance%20d'orient.

[26] Ibid. For more information on the Armenian Crisis, see Roderic Davidson's "The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914," *The American Historical Review,* 53 (Apr., 1948), pp. 481-505.

organizations, including Ganem and the *Comité de l'Orient*, began talks with nationalists who sought insurrection.[27]

Ganem's move toward a more separatist position developed through his growing acquaintances with Lieutenant Husson, a chief-adjoint to the Minister of War, and Nadra Moutran, one of the aforementioned leaders present during the Arab Congress of 1913. Both met with Ganem in order to devise a plan for a future government in Syria with the backing of the *Comité Libanais de Paris*, another organization that Ganem headed.[28] After the Arab Congress, Moutran had begun talks with the French parliamentary authorities that wished for French intervention in Syria. Moutran sought to obtain Ganem's support for his mission on behalf of the Quai d'Orsay and the *Comité Libanais de Paris*.

Ganem was not convinced, however, and the Quai d'Orsay still refused to take part in any measures that would render the Ottoman Empire vulnerable to partition. In their view, France was not at war against the Ottoman Empire, but rather opposed to a British and German expansion within the Ottoman Empire that threatened French influence.[29] The measures that the French government was taking were therefore preventive; they did not want the Ottoman Empire to know that they were gearing themselves for its demise, but they wanted to be ready to extend French influence in the region if and when it were to fall.

Parliamentary advocacy for immediate action in Syria was nonetheless strong in December 1914, which led Senator Etienne Flandin to advocate for French intervention in Syria and seek support from colonialists in parliament. He received enough to create a *comité parliamentaire pour action à l'étranger* in order to mobilize an operation in the region. Flandin's parliamentary committee built a

[27] Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 52.

[28] Vincent Cloarec, *La France et la question de Syrie, 1914-1918*, (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1998), 68.

[29] Ibid., 71.

relationship with Moutran's Syrian-Arab committee in Paris, as well as with Husson. Ganem, however, had to be cautious in his undertakings, because the Quai d'Orsay did not yet support the official stance on Syria that Flandin was advocating in the Senate. Although the *Comité de l'Orient* had been conducting talks with Moutran since the First Arab Congress, Ganem had to decline any pressure by Flandin to become involved in the Senate campaign for action in Syria. The Quai d'Orsay was adamant about pursuing a policy that would bring reconciliation between Turks and Arabs, thus avoiding the question of any Arab autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.[30] Although Ganem wanted to act quickly in Syria, he could not do so, nor could he devise plans of action with other colonial organizations because of his affiliation with the Quai d'Orsay.

Pressure from diplomats abroad to act in Syria was also very strong, but the Quai d'Orsay would not budge. Because of the insistence of Quai d'Orsay to maintain peace in the region, Ganem also could not support the position of diplomats like Albert DeFrance, the French Minister in Cairo, and Georges Picot, the Consul General of Beirut. Both diplomats wanted to send a French expeditionary force to Syria to establish a presence there that would allow them to be ready when the Ottoman Empire fell and before the British tried to invade.

The diplomatic pressure from Picot and DeFrance on the Quai d'Orsay was just as powerful as the parliamentary initiatives led by Husson. Both diplomats were stationed close to Syria and feared a growing British influence in the area. Picot was especially passionate about the Lebanese cause and made frequent appeals to the French government for action in the Levant. He was concerned with the threat of Zionism, the movement to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and advocated for a stronger French presence in Lebanon because he feared that the English were trying to make an alliance with the Zionist movement. When World War I began in

[30] Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 52.

1914 and Germany sided with the Ottoman Empire, his fears were justified; the British saw the Ottoman-German alliance as a threat and sought to ally themselves with the Zionist movement as a way to gain a foothold in Palestine and drive out of German ambitions in the Middle East. Although the French government had been approached by Jewish leaders about the possibility of a Jewish state, French officials considered the possibility to be almost laughable.[31] Picot, on the other hand, took the initiative of the Jews seriously, and he tried to convince the Quai d'Orsay to make plans with the Jewish leaders in order to come up with a post-war settlement for Palestine that would be favorable to France, an effort that did not gain the support of French officials.

The *Comité de l'Orient* had also been aware of the possible implications of Zionism. Shortly after the First Arab Congress, George Samné addressed the issue in *La Correspondance d'Orient*. Samné noted the influx of Jewish immigrants to Palestine and worried about the stance that the Ottoman government might take on their previous immigration policies, including an initiative to diversify the Empire that was allowing European Jews to migrate easily across the Turkish Empire.

Samné first address the issue of Zionism in *La Correspondance d'Orient* in 1914 and wrote of its effect on the Ottoman Empire, particularly on the parts of Palestine dominated by Germany. In his article, "*Le Sionisme*," he argued that Zionist migrations were causing German-speaking schools to demand that Hebrew become an official language in schools as well.[32] Samné believed that if the migrations continued, Hebrew could indeed become one of the official languages of Palestine, which would further solidify the alliance between Germany and the Zionists. His article on the issue showed

[31] Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 128.

[32] George Samné, "Le Sionisme," *La Correspondance d'Orient*, February 16, 1914, accessed February 2, 2012. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58057924.image.langEN.r=correspondance%20d'orient.

that the *Comité de l'Orient* had an accurate view of the events unfolding in Syria.

While the French government did not see the growing influence of Zionism, Samné feared the possibility that the education system, and eventually other parts of Palestine would be overtaken by Jewish influence and fall prey to German and British interests. Like George Picot, who was stationed in Beirut, the *Comité de l'Orient* was keenly aware of the growing power of Zionism and its possible effect on French authority in the Levant.

By 1915, Chekri Ganem and the *Comité de l'Orient* had established themselves at the forefront of French policy in the Levant. Due to parliamentary and diplomatic advocacy for a French presence in Syria, the French government resolved to use Ganem to connect with other Syrian nationalists who held similar views and who supported French influence in the restructuring of Syria as it became evident that the Ottoman Empire was doomed to fall.

Part II: The Comité Central Syrien, 1916-1918

Organizing a Revolution: La Legion d'Orient

By the fall of 1916, the French government had become more determined to claim their authority in Syria. To counter the British-supported Zionist movement in Palestine, the Quai d'Orsay assigned Chekri Ganem a secret mission in South America in order to survey the political makeup of populations from which France would be seeking support. Ganem was to raise an army made up of these émigrés to combat the Ottoman forces and secretly transport them back to France, where they would be sent to fight in the Middle East.

The countries of Latin America had long been a haven for Syro-Lebanese immigrants who sought to escape oppression from the Ottoman Empire, and at the time, Arab communities were growing rapidly in countries like Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela. French officials sought support from these communities for

three main reasons. First, they believed that they could easily garner support for French interests in Syria and Lebanon from these émigré communities because they had fled their countries due to oppression from the Ottoman government. Second, influencing these populations abroad would prove that Chekri Ganem, as a Lebanese émigré himself, was aware of the plight of Syrians and Lebanese, and having the support of these communities would restore credibility in Ganem's nationalist efforts by making him seem to be more than just a puppet of the French foreign ministry. Finally, because of the distance separating Ganem's expedition from the politicized regions of the Middle East, they would have an easier time when seeking to build a base of support. Such a project could never have been carried out in Syria and Lebanon because it could not have been kept secret and because there were other great world powers, such as Britain and Germany, vying for influence in the area.

Named "The Chekri Ganem Project," the French government gave Ganem the responsibility of organizing a *Légion d'Orient* to combat Ottoman forces in World War I. The Quai d'Orsay put Ganem in contact with two of its most experienced civil servants and officials of the foreign ministry, Jean Goût and Gaston Wiet, so that they might work together to plan an insurrection against the Ottoman Empire. Their efforts culminated in an organization called the *Comité Central Syrien*, of which Ganem was named president, and which was to recruit supporters favorable to the French cause in Syria. The official goals of the organization were to advocate for the liberation of the Syrian people under the protection of France and to serve as a mediator between Syrians and the French republic.[33]

To counter British efforts to establish authority in Palestine, the French government sought to recruit volunteers to form an army that would revolt against the Ottoman Empire. They used the *Comité Central Syrien* to lead the mission. For the *Comité Central Syrien*, the assignment signaled a change in the purpose of both Ganem

[33] Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 130.

and Samné's role within the French colonial movement. Rather than serving diplomatic roles, they now had military duties that thrust them into a different facet of French colonial efforts. Although the mission was a military one, the relationships built with the émigré communities abroad demonstrated the significance of the *Comité Central Syrien*'s efforts. The mission of the *Comité Central Syrien* involved budding relationships with élite communities favorable to French interests among the people of Brazil and Argentina in addition to gathering volunteers for what they believed would be an army of thousands.

Ganem knew that in order to gather support among Syrian and Lebanese émigrés, he needed to send reputable members of the *Comité Central Syrien* as representatives of the mission to recruit volunteers. He constructed a delegation to travel to Brazil and Argentina that represented the diversity of the *Comité* and served as the face of their mission. The group was led by: Jamil Mardam Bey, a Syrian Muslim; Joseph El Khazen, a Maronite intellectual; and César Jean Lacah, a distinguished physician. The composition of the delegation conveyed unity among people of different religions and professions, for a common cause: the liberation of the Syrian people from the Ottoman Empire. The aim of the expedition was twofold: they sought to garner support for the French cause and begin recruitment for the *Légion d'Orient*. The *Comité Central Syrien* was to be held responsible for all of the recruitment of Syrians and for the fees associated with bringing the volunteers to France, so they were given control of all the financial aspects of the operation. The mission was confidential, and extreme care was to be taken when transporting the volunteers to the main ports of Bordeaux, Marseille, and Le Havre. Although they were to publicize their trip to South America in order to generate enthusiasm among the Syrian émigrés, the operation of recruitment was to be carried out carefully.

The mission was a meticulously crafted ordeal that became difficult and inefficient as it sought to keep a low profile and at the same time recruit thousands of Syrians to fight under the name of France.

The *Comité Central Syrien* was charged with transporting volunteers who would become soldiers in the French initiative against the Ottoman Empire, but they were to take all the precautions of secrecy necessary while executing the mission. All volunteers were to be sent in separate boats, and the regional Syrian committees were to abstain from sending important groups that were likely to be noticed. The *Comité Central Syrien* and the Quai d'Orsay were to be addressed before each departure and after each arrival by telegram, and the whole mission was to be carried out carefully so as to not attract any unwanted attention.[34] The *Comité* also had the responsibility of choosing the contact persons who were to aid them once they reached the shores of France. The precautions were meant to avoid suspicion from the Ottoman government and any of its allies until the soldiers made it safely to Cyprus, where they were to be trained as soldiers before being deployed to Palestine. The Quai d'Orsay had not yet established an aggressive policy in the Levant, choosing instead to focus on the more imminent threats to the French mainland during the war, and the *Légion* provided a way for them to ease themselves into the Syrian community before fully pursuing an aggressive policy in the Levant.

Once the recruits arrived in Cyprus for training, it became apparent that the composition of the *Légion* was not ideal for accomplishing its military efforts. The *Légion* was not only made up of Syrians, but also of Armenians, who were likewise fighting for independence from the Ottoman Empire. The *Légion* is often deemed a failure because by November 1917, exactly one year after its formation, only 300 Syrian volunteers had been recruited. The number of Armenians in the *Légion* was eight times larger. The failure however, should not be attributed to the recruitment efforts of the *Comité Central Syrien*, but to the flawed ideology of the mission. The Armenian volunteers were recruited directly from Armenia and from

[34] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangeres (MAE), Paris. A. Ribot to A. Foch. May 18, 1917. Turquie: Levant, Syrie-Liban.

refugee camps in Port Saïd, Egypt. They were truly invested in the fight for their homeland because they were still a part of it. The Syrian soldiers, however, lived abroad independently and had built new lives for themselves away from the horrors of war that threatened to tear Syria apart. The problem in discipline did not lie with the recruitment efforts of the *Comité* nor with the training provided by the French military, but rather with the lack of interest of Syrian émigrés who would not be directly affected by the outcome of the war once they went back to the Americas. It appeared that in being far from home, the enthusiasm displayed upon the arrival of the mission completely evaporated.

Communication with the different branches and committees of the Quai d'Orsay also made the operation difficult, especially when it came to recruitment efforts. Many requests had been received from various soldiers who wished to devote their efforts to the Armenian and Syrian cause, but the hierarchical and bureaucratic procedures that were necessary for them to transfer those soldiers to the *Légion d'Orient* proved to be difficult.[35] There was a divide between the French army that had the support of a few foreign volunteers and the *Légion d'Orient* that Louis Romieu, the general of the *Légion*, was constructing. Eliezer Tauber argues that the *Légion d'Orient* was an effort by the French to make up for their lack of forces in Syria, but seeing as they were unwilling to provide the appropriate support to the *Légion*, the mission was not a military success.[36] While the British were working with Zionist organizations to legitimate their claims in Palestine, the French failed to use the *Légion d'Orient* to gain Syrian support and establish their authority in Syria.

French Intelligence Gathering in the Levant

Despite the failure of the military aspects of the *Légion*, it is important to note that the mission had a symbolic significance that

[35] MAE, G. Wiet to J. Goût. April 7, 1917. Turquie: Levant Syrie-Liban.

[36] Eliezer Tauber, "La Legion d'Orient et la Legion Arabe."

went beyond military successes. The efforts of Chekri Ganem and George Samné during the formation of the *Légion d'Orient* culminated in the creation of the *Comité Central Syrien*, which was specifically assigned to handle recruitment efforts and take on a new initiative to gather information on the public opinion of Syrians and Lebanese abroad. The creation of the CCS showed the interest of the Quai d'Orsay in gathering support among émigré populations in the Americas. While the relationship with these populations did not aid their recruitment efforts, it did serve to establish a political base in South America that allowed them to survey the political makeup and sources of dissent against the French Empire present within those communities abroad. Although the *Légion d'Orient* was not a military success, its creation suggests the development of a new French colonial strategy. Instead of conquest, French officials wanted to use a strategy that involved building relationships with the people of the lands they sought to conquer, and the *Comité Central Syrien* became a vital part of French efforts in the campaign to redirect policy in Syria.

The importance of gathering intelligence and building relationships with the governing classes of Syria and Lebanon followed a precedent set by General Louis-Hubert Lyautey during his command of the French protectorate of Morocco. Gathering intelligence and building relationships with communities abroad was important in French colonial efforts, since direct rule had previously failed to efficiently allow the French government to manage their colonial conquests. Before an official protectorate was established Morocco, for example, French forces were met with opposition from the Moroccan people, and many tribes were in revolt.[37] Lyautey's colonial ideology was based on a policy of indirect rule; he believed that the colonized country should retain its institutions, govern itself with its own agencies, and work under the simple control of a foreign power.

[37] Herbert Ingram Priestley, *France Overseas: A Study of Modern Imperialism*, (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938), 349.

> Instead of abolishing the traditional systems, make use of them: Rule with the mandarin and not against him. Offend no tradition, change no custom, [we must] remind ourselves that in all human society there is a ruling class, born to rule, without which nothing can be done, and a class to be ruled: [we should] enlist the ruling class in our service. Once the mandarins are our friends, certain of us and needing us, they have only to say the word and the country will be pacified.[38]

Lyautey believed in working with colonized peoples rather than exercising power over them and going against their traditions. Rather than exercise direct rule, Lyautey emphasized that the colonizing power's government should only aid in foreign representation and manage the finances of the colonized government in order to aid with economic development. In order to establish such a system, Lyautey understood that it was necessary to build relationships with the élite and use their influence in order to control the rest of the classes in Moroccan society.

When seeking to establish their power over Syria, French officials planned to develop similar relationships with the élite of Syria and Lebanon, and through the *Comité Central Syrien*, they sought to obtain information about their emigrant communities abroad. In addition to recruitment, the *Comité Central Syrien* was expected to "organize the propaganda that followed."[39] Ganem sought to have his representatives establish new branches of Syrian committees and liaise with the Syrian nationalist organizations that were already in existence abroad. Ganem's organization of Syrian committees amounts to an implementation of Lyautey's strategy. By putting other Syrians abroad in charge of these committees, the Quai d'Orsay gave Syr-

[38] Hubert Luaytey to his sister, November 16, 1894, quoted in Edward Berenson, *Heroes of Empire: Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 230.

[39] MAE. Memorandum. May 19, 1917. Guerre 1914-1918.

ians the impression that they had an important role in deciding the political future of their nation. Besides communicating with Syrians and Lebanese émigrés around the world, the *Comité Central Syrien* was not involved in any intelligence gathering efforts in Syria and Lebanon, which marked its primary difference from Lyautey's strategy. Lyautey's strategy was to work with the élite communities in Morocco and allow them to govern the rest of the classes, whereas the *Comité Central Syrien* reached out to Syrians and Lebanese abroad who were intellectuals, businesspeople, government officials, or generally successful in their professional endeavors. Rather than seeking to work with the Syrian and Lebanese élite that would govern Syria and Lebanon in the future, the Quai d'Orsay sought to formalize its relationship with émigrés in order to build a foundation for French claims to the Levant and make up for its weak military presence in Syria and Lebanon.[40]

The beginning of the *Comité Central Syrien*'s mission in Brazil seemed promising, and the delegates began to establish a method to reach out to the community. The delegation was warmly received by the Syrian population of Saõ Paulo, and Paul Claudel, the Minister of France to Brazil, believed that there was much patriotism, good will, and love for France among the émigrés.[41] From the moment they arrived, Claudel wanted to help Ganem's cause and had a plan to integrate the Syrian subjects so that they would be more closely tied to France. He knew that there was a class of Syrians in Brazil that was made up of successful merchants, businessmen, and intellectuals who felt isolated and vulnerable because they were so far away from their country. His plan was to work with Mardam Bey and Lacah in order to establish a committee in Saõ Paulo that would focus on reaching out to these individuals through propaganda and methodical recruitment. He was especially adamant about using the committees as a way to obtain *patentes de nationalité* for Syrian émi-

[40] Narbona, 154-156.

[41] MAE. P. Claudel to A. Ribot, June 29, 1917. Guerre 1914-1918.

grés so that by becoming official Syrian citizens, rather than Ottoman subjects, they could enjoy the privileges of French protection. By distributing these *patentes*, he hoped that he could disseminate individual propaganda and encourage sentiments that would promote a French presence among the Syrian communities.[42] Mardam Bey and Lacah agreed to proceed with his plans, and with the consent of the French Foreign Minister, Claudel collaborated with the *Comité Central Syrien* in order to implement a strategy that combined propaganda and Syrian naturalization in order to construct a bond between the Syrian élite of Brazil and the French government.

Paul Claudel's plans for the cultural integration of Syrian émigrés once again exemplified Lyautey's colonial strategy of working with the people they sought to colonize by instilling in them a loyalty to French culture. Claudel knew that the Syrian community in Brazil felt alienated and vulnerable after leaving Syria, and he wanted the Syrians of Brazil to fall into a haven of French influence that would make them sympathetic to French interests. By establishing committees in Saõ Paulo, the *Comité Central Syrien* sought to give the Syrian community a sense of security and reassured the Syrian émigrés that Ganem and the *Comité Central Syrien*, as fellow Syrians, were acting in their best interests.

The Syrian Alternative to Arab Nationalism in George Samné's La Syrie

While the *Comité* pursued support from Syro-Lebanese communities abroad, the British made a different promise to the Arabs who were now anxiously waiting for the demise of the Ottoman Empire. The British officials promised complete independence to the Arabs and rallied them around l'Emir Faysal, whom they vowed to enthrone as the king of the Arab kingdom of Syria. Arab nationalism, backed by British colonial interests, presented the biggest challenge

[42] Ibid.

to French ambitions in Syria and to the work that the *Comité Central Syrien* had pursued in Latin America. Although the British were using Faysal as a champion of Arab independence, French officials knew that there were serious British interests at hand. Christopher Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner argue that it was during the challenge presented by Prince Faysal that the Quai d'Orsay realized that it was not through the work of the *Comité Central Syrien* that they could react to Arab forces in Syria, but through the French military and the work of French diplomats in Damascus. The *Comité Central Syrien*, however, was not meant to serve diplomatic or military purposes outside of their role during the organization of the *Légion d'Orient*. Their work, even as they sought to gather an army in South America, maintained the larger purpose of establishing ties with the Syrian élite and serving as a liaison between the officials at the Quai d'Orsay and these communities. During Faysal's attempt to establish an Arab nationalist stronghold in Syria, the *Comité Central Syrien* appealed to Syrians by seeking to construct an Arab nationalism that was unique to Syrian aspirations. A distinctly Syrian nationalism, they believed, was the best way to dispel the anti-French characteristics of Arab nationalism while still maintaining the importance of the Syrian culture.

La Syrie by George Samné provides a way to look into the construction and development of a distinct Syrian nationalism under the aegis of France.[43] During the time of the Arab revolt, the British supported an insurrection of Arab nationalists against the Ottoman Empire. Arab nationalism developing under the encouragement of the British thus became predominantly Islamic and suspicious of the Western allies, particularly France. The *Comité Central Syrien* appealed to the historical roots of the relationship between Greater Syria and France in order to combat the alliance between Britain and

[43] George Samné, *La Syrie* (Paris: Bossard, 1921) 427-522. I focus on the chapters of Samné's work that deal with the Syrian experience of World War I. Samné portrays the loyalty of France to the citizens of Syria during World War I, thus depicting France as a protector of Syria, rather than as an invading force with imperial interests.

the Arabs, which proved to be just as threatening as their alliance with the Zionists. In reality, the movements were very similar – the Arab nationalists led by l'Emir Faysal were backed by British interests and the *Comité Central Syrien* was supported by French interests in Syria. Rather than being suspicious of the British, the Arabs welcomed their support because they truly believed the British promises of complete independence once Syria and Lebanon were free from Ottoman rule.

The *Comité Central Syrien* sought to legitimize their call for French authority in Syria by alluding to the ancient relationship between Mount Lebanon and France. "It is not France that came with its armies," claimed Samné.[44] France had maintained a mutually beneficial relationship with Syria, and George Picot, the Consul General, had been a figure of French authority in Syria during the war. The British, on the other hand, descended suddenly in Damascus at the end of the war with an army and claimed to support the authority of Faysal with neither the authority of France nor the consent of the Syrian people. The Comité ridiculed the English promise to help Faysal establish an Arab nation comprised of Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, of which Damascus would be the center. Samné portrayed the presence of France in Syria as one that had relentlessly worked alongside Syrians during the rule of the Ottomans, rather than as an invading force.

George Samné likely began writing *La Syrie* in 1918, and his writings addressed issues that he considered important to the Syrian cause during the concluding months of World War I. In order to present a distinct Syrian nationalism that was different from the British-supported Arab nationalism, Samné used *La Syrie* to express two main arguments. The first held that Faysal's Arab nationalism was an effort of the Hashemite dynasty of Jordan, backed by Britain, to exercise power over the Arab people. Samné believed that Faysal's Arab nationalism was imperialist and catered to British interests in

[44] Ibid.

addition to Hashemite interests in the Levant. He argued that Britain had not established a presence in Syria until they developed an interest in the region, while France had held an ancient and long-standing relationship with Syria. Samné considered France a part of Syrian identity, which made Syrian nationalism different from that of the Arab nationalism that Faysal advocated. The second focused on Syrian efforts during the war to show that Syria was a unified nation brought together by patriotism and solidarity during the time of war. Samné made clear that the only loyalty Syrians had was towards each other and not towards the Hashemite dynasty that was cultivating an Arab nationalism in order to gain power over Syria.

Samné's Syrian nationalism was one that allowed for a French presence in the formation of a Syrian identity, and he cited the solidarity between French forces and Syrian citizens during World War I in order to demonstrate the role of France during the unification of the Syrian community. Just as Syrian citizens were uniting to survive the horrors of war, French forces united with the Syrians to fight for a common cause. As Syrians were fighting for their homeland and their culture, the French provided unwavering support in order for the Syrian community to establish their identity as Syria sought independence from Ottoman control.

Samné does not portray the relationship between France and Syria as a solely imperial one, but rather as one of collaboration and support in order to achieve Syrian independence. Samné frequently corresponded with locals about the difficulties that Syrians faced during the war, and he alluded to the steady aid that France provided. He focused on the sacrifices of the Syrian people as a way of depicting their struggle, and he used the image of Georges Picot, the French General Consul in Beirut, as a paternal figure around whom the Syrian populace gathered in times of need. In *La Syrie*, he presented letters of Syrian locals, especially letters written by children, who looked up to Picot and supported the cause of the Syrian people. One little girl was said to have sent her hair in a chocolate box to Picot because she believed that it was worth a considerable

amount of money in France. "I am very poor, Monsieur le Consul," she wrote, "but fortunately I heard that hair is sold at a high price in France, so I have sent you mine."[45] Picot's eyes, wrote Samné, were moist with emotion as he felt for the plight of his Syrian people. Other children gathered every penny they could in order to donate to the efforts of the French Red Cross, which delivered aid in war-torn Syria. Samné argued that enthusiasm and Syrian patriotism pervaded the minds of Syrians of all ages, and that at the behest of George Picot, who had encouraged the people of Syria to render their services, no matter how small, a distinct Syrian patriotism was forming with the support of France.

Although the anecdote initially seems overly dramatized, it shows Samné's ability to appeal to the emotions of the Syrian people during a time that presented serious challenges to the Syrian way of life. During the war, Beirut's streets were filled with starving women and children, many of whom eventually died of hunger or disease.[46] Throughout this time of suffering, Syrians frequently wrote to the French authorities to tell of their misfortunes, and Samné uses the support for Picot from a young child to show their desire to ally themselves to France so as to escape British hatred. Elizabeth Thompson argues that while these letters might not have always been accurate, they nevertheless reflected a variety of stories that depicted the opinions of the regions.[47] Likewise, Samné's anecdote might not have been factual, but it depicted his perceived emotional bond between France and Syria.

Constructing a distinct Syrian nationalism required that both Christians and Muslims be included within the nationalist narrative,

---

[45] Samné, 435.

[46] See Elizabeth Thompson "Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon" (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 19-30. Thompson gives a detailed description of the trauma of wartime and famine that World War I inflicted on the people of Syria and Lebanon. She also uses collective memories of wartime among both Muslims and Christians to show how Christians frequently sent letters to the French in order to express their suffering.

[47] Ibid.

and Samné explicitly alluded to the suffering of people of both religious sects. He argued that the Turks wanted to create an exclusive movement composed only of people who were ethnic Turks, thus alienating all ethnic groups in the Ottoman Empire who could not trace their origins back to Turkey. Samné did not seek to alienate Muslims in his narrative, and he emphasized Christians and Muslims had a shared agenda in the Ottoman Empire: to oppose the radicalism of the Young Turks. Alluding to the evils of a German-Turkish alliance, he claimed that Syria was a victim of the interests of two movements whose advancement depended on the suffering of non-Ottoman Muslims and Christians. He argued that non-Turkish Muslims were also victims of the tyranny of the Ottoman Empire and sympathized with the struggle of Muslims as well as that of Christians in the empire, knowing well that Syrian Muslims had to be included in order to advocate for a Greater Syria that would encompass Palestine.[48] Samné also accused the Turks of not valuing the significance of Islam in their struggle and placing more importance on the superiority of their race rather than the common struggle of Muslims. He sought to build solidarity among all Syrians, whether Christians or Muslims, in order to rise against the oppression of the Ottoman Empire.

Because Syrian history had included a French element for such a long period of time, Samné argued that it was illogical to deny French authority in Syria. By including France as part of the Syrian nationalist narrative and denouncing Faysal's movement as an imperial British conquest, Samné distinguished the French presence in Syria as one that had been unwavering throughout the harsh consequences of war. He focused on the French war efforts alongside Syrians and included French influence as a part of the Syrian nationalist narrative. Because of the support of the French, the relationship between France and Syria was not tied to French political interests, but to a history of shared values and a longstanding bond between

[48] Samné, 428.

the French authorities and the Syro-Lebanese communities. In *La Syrie*, Samné acted as a spokesman for the *Comité Central Syrien* and set forth a plan to establish a "Syrian republic, secular, democratic, federal, and under the protection of France."[49]

Part III: The Paris Peace Conference and Chekri Ganem's Resignation from the *Comité Central Syrien*

The Comité Central Syrien at the Paris Peace Conference

In *La Syrie*, George Samné described the ideology of the *Comité Central Syrien* as a way of establishing an Arab nationalism that was distinctly Syrian and allowed for French tutelage on the road to Syrian self-determination. As the end of World War I approached, the *Comité Central Syrien* sought to use that ideology in order to actualize French policy in Syria. The way in which they presented their views at the Paris Peace Conference, however, contradicted Samné's inclusive narrative.

Establishing policies that were inclusive of all religious sects in Syria and Lebanon proved to be difficult, since French officials had a historical tendency to pursue policies that catered more to Lebanon and the Maronites. Establishing a relationship with Syria's Arab and Muslim populations after Faysal arrived in Damascus in 1918 was therefore difficult for French officials. By 1918, it was clear that the French had lost Palestine to the British. Because of this setback, the Quai d'Orsay became more adamant about pursuing a policy to retain what they had left of Syria and Lebanon. In order to pursue a policy that would maintain French influence in Syria amid the chaos of Faysal's Arab nationalist government, the *Comité Central Syrien* continued to make the case for a Greater Syria that included Lebanon.

[49] Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 286.

France had taken considerable measures to establish its authority in Syria after the end of the war, but the threat of Faysal's Arab nationalism was still present. Since his arrival in Damascus, Faysal had been making agreements with the British to diminish French claims in Syria.[50] In November 1919, General Gouraud arrived in Beirut to succeed George Picot, and he was determined to quell the Syrian struggle for independence and promote one that called for unity.[51] Although the *Comité Central Syrien* also advocated for unity among the people of Syria, the pressure of certain Lebanese groups began to change the French government's goal of a Greater Syria encompassing Lebanon.[52] Because Palestine had been lost to the British and Faysal's presence in Damascus threatened Lebanese Christians, the Quai d'Orsay wanted to maintain its influence over what was left of Greater Syria and could not risk losing the support of Lebanon. If it meant having a Lebanon that was autonomous and still under French influence, the French were willing to sacrifice their idea of a Greater Syria.

By March 1919, most of the efforts of the *Comité Central Syrien* were centered on garnering support for an independent Syria under the tutelage of a *puissance tutrice*, or guardian power, as it was widely believed that an independent Syria would eventually emerge after a period of French tutelage.[53] Ganem began to contact Syro-Lebanese committees abroad to obtain their written consent for the possibility of an independent Syria under temporary French control. At the Paris Peace Conference, Ganem detailed his wishes for Syria and Lebanon and presented them before the Big Four: President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, President George Clemenceau of France, Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Britain, and Prime

[50] Tibawi, 287.

[51] Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1932), 177.

[52] Kohn, 290.

[53] Comité Central Syrien de Paris. *La question Syrienne, exposée par les Syriens, A L.L. Excellences les Plénipotentiaires Alliés et Associés à la Conference de la Paix* (Paris, 1919), 54-56.

Minister Vittorio Orlando of Italy. Ganem stated that he spoke on behalf of Syrians worldwide, and he finished his presentation with the statements of other Syrian committees around the world, from nations such as Senegal, Egypt, Bolivia, and Uruguay.

Despite the *Comité Central Syrien's* previous desire to cater to Muslim interests, Ganem's presentation at the Paris Peace Conference reflected a departure from the inclusive language he had adhered to in the past and set the stage for a new policy that excluded Muslims from the political dialogue concerning the future of Syria. Ganem used the connections he had established with the Syro-Lebanese diaspora in the Americas to have other Syrian émigrés send statements to be read before the Big Four. He also submitted a statement to the delegation that he had compiled with the support of other Syro-Lebanese committees abroad. To show the different voices of the *Comité Central Syrien* and the other Syrian committees abroad, Ganem presented statements written by various authors from varying committees. Ganem believed that if he showed the support the *Comité Central Syrien* had received from its mission among Syrian communities abroad, he would be able to make a strong case before the delegations at the Conference.

As they presented their views at the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the war, it was evident that the original ideology of the *Comité Central Syrien* on how to approach policy in Syria remained the same. They believed that their relationship with Syrian and Lebanese communities abroad would be enough to maintain their reputation as the true voice of the Syrian people. The strategy that they planned to use to achieve their goals in Syria, however, changed to one that was less inclusive of the Muslim populations of Syria. This revealed the growing anxieties of the Christian Syrians and Lebanese who wanted to be distinguished from the Muslim Arab nationalist movement in Syria, and it brought into question the place of Lebanon, which remained largely Christian, within the narrative of a Greater Syria.

The statement that Ganem submitted to the delegations of the

Paris Peace Conference marked the beginning of his separation from a Syrian narrative that included all sects of Syria and Lebanon and his transition to one that was specifically Christian, and thus inevitably directed more towards the people of Lebanon. Ganem and the other Syro-Lebanese delegates argued that their demands were made on behalf of the Syrian and Lebanese people, but while seeking to challenge the statements of Faysal and the British, they focused on distinguishing themselves as not being Arabs. An essay by Abdullah Sfeir, the president of the *Federation des Comités Syriens et Libanaises d'Egypte*, and Alphonse Zenié, the Secretary General, stood out above the others. Until then, the discourse of Ganem and the *Comité Central Syrien* sought to distance the identity of Syrians from that of the Arab nationalists that threatened to take over Syria, but Sfeir's essay reflected a change in the way the *Comité Central Syrien* and other Syrian and Lebanese nationalists sought to determine the future of Syria. In the essay, Sfeir outlined what the *Comité Central Syrien* and other Syro-Lebanese committees abroad believed were the demands of the Syrian people concerning the political future of Syria.

> Ancient Arabia, stagnant in absolute obscurity, is and still remains far from the regions that constitute the Syrian lands and from where prosperous kingdoms and civilized peoples flourished, learned after some centuries to civilization by Greco-Roman philosophy and the Mosaic and Christian religions.[54]

Sfeir depicted Syrians as a conquered people who were unwillingly subjected to an Arab and Islamic way of life until it became a part of the Syrian culture. Syrians were not Arabs, but rather a mix of ethnicities and religions that were subjected to Islam through their Arab conquerors. Sfeir's viewpoint, supported by Ganem, was a very different argument than the previous ones the *Comité Central Syrien* had supported during the beginning of Ganem's political career.

[54] Comité Central Syrien de Paris, *La question Syrienne*, 19.

> After the appearance of Islam, the Arabs came to Syria as conquerors. Arab domination, being very intolerant [forced] a considerable part of the Syrian, Jewish, and Christian population to adopt Islam, and in the long term lose the usage of their native languages and adopt Arabic, the language of the Qu'ran, obligatory for all Muslims.[55]

According to Sfeir, Syria's Arab and Muslim identity was one that Syrians were obligated to adopt, rather than one that was an intrinsic part of the Syrian identity. He believed that invasion of Islam had led to the divisions that contributed to a separatist confessionalism, the mixture of religion and politics in a system of government, that continued to trouble Syrian society.[56] Sfeir argued that Arab nationalism was not Syrian, and that any propaganda supported by Faysal was anti-Syrian and based on a nationalism that was associated with Muslims, whom he believed were of a different ethnicity. Any Arab nationalist sentiments were therefore not to be associated with Syria, and Sfeir believed that Syrians should be thought of as a race completely different from the Arab race and the Hashemite dynasty. Different from Faysal's nationalism, which held that all Arabic-speaking people should be unified under one nation, Sfeir's Syrian nationalism focused on an ethnic identity, which held that Syrians were the descendants of Greco-Roman civilization and was geographically specific to the people of the Syrian lands.

When Ganem presented Sfeir's essay at the Paris Peace Conference in conjunction with other statements made by other international Syro-Lebanese committees, the rhethoric of the *Comité Central Syrien* had changed from being one of inclusivity to one that advocated a non-Arab and Christian identity among the people of the Levant. The *Comité Central Syrien's* presentation to the delega-

[55] Ibid.

[56] I do not seek to analyze confessionalist politics in Syria during this period, but rather to briefly characterize confessionalism as a quality that Sfeir believed contributed to separatism among Christians and Muslims in Syria.

tions of the Paris Peace Conference was problematic because it alienated Syrian Muslims by negatively depicting Islam and rejecting it as part of a Syrian identity. Outside of Mount Lebanon, where the population was predominantly Christian, the remaining regions of Lebanon included many religions, including Islam. Although he defended the religions of Greeks, Chaldeans, Catholics, Maronites, Arameans, Syriacs, and Hebrews, among others, Sfeir specifically spoke of Islam in a way that alienated Muslims from Syrian nationalism.

The failure of the *Comité Central Syrien* to pursue their goals for a Greater Syria at the Paris Peace Conference was due to Sfeir's identification of the Muslims of Arabia and the Muslims of Syria as belonging to the same ethnic and religious group. In the presentation of the *Comité Central Syrien* to the delegates, Sfeir spoke negatively of the conquest of Islam, which made it seem as if the Islam that Syrians practiced was tainted by its origins in Arabia. The Paris Peace Conference therefore saw a change in the discourse of the *Comité Central Syrien* to one that was not inclusive of the Muslim populations of Syria. This made their pro-French and predominantly Christian narrative more applicable to the population of Lebanon and thus not effective when pursuing French policy in Greater Syria. This change in ideology reflected Ganem's turn to a policy more focused on Lebanon, which represented a departure from the original goals of the *Comité Central Syrien* and those of Ganem.

A Defensive Colonial Strategy

While the Paris Peace Conference was being held, the Quai d'Orsay knew that Arab nationalist agitations were surfacing in Damascus, and Picot reported that some Syrians wanted absolute independence. The *Comité Central Syrien* sought to counter the possibility of any influence from other powers in Syria, and the period surrounding the Peace Conference put the Quai d'Orsay on the defensive as they sought to combat the different factions that stood against the possibility of French authority in Syria in the form of a

mandate. The defensive strategy of the Quai d'Orsay did not allow for dialogue with Syrian natives, and the French extended their colonial power so that they were at the head of all decision making and left the Syro-Lebanese community feeling as if they were inferior to French rule rather than collaborating alongside the Quai d'Orsay. It would seem as if such a strategy would provide the French with more control, but it ultimately aroused suspicion and animosity among Syrians, which left the French with a lack of support among the local communities they sought to govern.

The *Comité Central Syrien* realized that French authority in Syria was waning because they had failed to establish a relationship with Muslim Syrians and Lebanese and hold them as equals. Furthermore, the British had military superiority in the region, as well as better ties to the Muslim Arab populations, while the French were historically bound to Mount Lebanon. As it became evident that French authority in Syria was being questioned because of their failure to realign their interests with Syria's diverse populations, French officials at the Quai d'Orsay alluded to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 to justify their rights in the region.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, devised by French diplomat George Picot and Mark Sykes of Britain, held that if the Ottoman Empire were to fall after the war, France was to control parts of southern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and Britain was to control Jordan, Iraq, and the ports of Haifa and Acre.[57] The agreement also held that Palestine was to remain under an international regime because of its holy places, but as Turkey entered the war in 1916, the provisions between France and Britain regarding Palestine were disregarded. By allying themselves to the Zionist cause, British diplomats sought to gain control over Palestine, whose future had not been completely decided by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. By December 1917, Ganem was aware of the British threat to Palestine,

[57] Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002), 381-426.

and he had written to the Quai d'Orsay in desperation to demand French action in Palestine. Ganem knew that because of the imminent loss of Palestine, Syria was also at stake despite the Sykes-Picot agreement:

> The English are in Palestine. The necessities of war and of maintaining order in [Syria] have allowed the British to name a colonial officer the governor of Jerusalem. His authority has been called to extend along with the position of the army in the neighboring regions [of Jerusalem]. Where is [their authority] going to stop? What boundary separates Syria from Palestine? The Comité Central Syrien cannot ignore the difficulties that have arisen for France.[58]

Ganem's called for the French government to act, but the reality was that France did not have the military presence that Britain did in the region. Because of British gains in Palestine, Ganem was convinced that British interests would not stop in Palestine, but his suspicions were not enough to bring the French government to action.

The *Comité Central Syrien*, however, knew that pointing at a map and citing previous agreements was not going to be enough to rally the Syrian people under the French flag. In March 1919, Ganem wrote to Stéphen Pichon, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, saying that it was imperative that the French maintain control of the region. "The *Comité Central Syrien* has focused its efforts on guiding the Syrian people towards France," he wrote, "but the time has come for [the French government] to undertake the moral obligation of collaborating with the Syrian people to fulfill the intentions that the [it] has previously expressed."[59]

[58] MAE. Ganem to Ministère des Affaires Étrangeres. December 18, 1917. Guerre 1914-1918.

[59] MAE. Ganem to Pichon, March 24, 1919. Turquie: Levant Syrie-Liban.

Ganem was yet again dissatisfied with the French progress in Syria, and he knew that no progress would be made if the French were not willing to collaborate with the Arabs living in Syria, despite their efforts in Latin America. The *Comité Central Syrien* had been established to achieve an understanding with the Syrian and Lebanese nationalists, but French officials from the Quai d'Orsay rarely engaged in direct collaborations with other Syrians besides Ganem and Samné.

The lack of collaborations with the larger populations of Syria and Lebanon reveals a French colonial ideology that held colonizers to be superior to the colonized. Unlike the British, the French were not interested in garnering support among Syrian populations through campaigns that would require them to directly interact with Syrian leaders outside of Paris. Their only connection to Syria was through the *Comité Central Syrien*, and even Ganem recognized that the *Comité* was limited when making appeals for French authority on Syrian land. The French did not consider negotiations with Syrian leaders imperative in order to solidify their presence in Syria. The ideology of the Quai d'Orsay did not allow them to look upon all Syrians as equals, preferring instead to work with only highly educated Syro-Lebanese individuals, such as Ganem and Samné, and considering the larger Syro-Lebanese community as the class to be ruled. This made many Syro-Lebanese feel as though the French looked upon them with contempt. One of France's Syrian agents, Antoine Eddé, claimed that for a Frenchman, a Syrian would always be a "wog."[60] The *Comité Central Syrien* was aware of this contemptuous feeling among the Syrian people, and Ganem advised Pichon that Syrians would no longer tolerate policies in the region without the approval of Syro-Lebanese citizens.[61]

Ganem became worried that the reluctance of the Quai d'Orsay

[60] Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 155. The word "wog," translated from the French "bicot," was a derogatory term used for Arabs during the time.

[61] Ganem to Pichon, March 24, 1919.

to collaborate directly with the people of Syria would hurt French authority in the region, and his struggle to communicate with the officials at the Quai d'Orsay reflected a major flaw in French colonial strategy. The work of the French government with the Syrian and Lebanese élite, like Ganem and Samné, was effective because it allowed the French government to expound the idea of French authority in the Levant through well-known intellectuals who truly believed that France was culturally tied to both Syria and Lebanon. The *Comité Central Syrien* enjoyed the support of the Quai d'Orsay in return, but Ganem knew that in order for French authority to be established in Syria and Lebanon, French officials in the Levant would have to work directly with the native peoples. In this respect, the French government was not as quick to act and collaborate with Syrian locals. French officials considered intellectuals like Ganem to be their equals, but when it came to engaging in grassroots advocacy that involved the lower classes of Syria, the Quai d'Orsay was not active enough to garner support for their policies. Although they had once sought to draw upon Hubert Lyautey's strategy of working with Moroccan government officials in order to control all aspects of government functions in Morocco, the strategy of the Quai d'Orsay in Syria and Lebanon remained limited to working with the élite émigré communities in the Syro-Lebanese diaspora. Once that disconnect became apparent to Ganem, he became less hopeful that the French government would be able to gather support amid the Arab nationalism that was pervading Syria and Lebanon.

The Changing Dynamic of Intelligence Gathering

Ganem realized that the duties of the *Comité Central Syrien* would not succeed if the French government was not willing to collaborate with the Syrian communities. This growing disillusionment from 1919-1921 was also caused by changes in the collaboration between the Quai d'Orsay and the Syrian diaspora. The émigré populations and the committees they established in South America were

no longer needed to establish Syrian support, as this support was no longer crucial to the French agenda. Nevertheless, French officials did not wish to completely disband these committees. Intelligence gathering became more direct, and rather than using committees to spread French propaganda and study the political makeup of Syrian communities abroad, the French government began to use diplomats who could carry out such assignments and directly influence the people with whom they worked. The Quai d'Orsay had changed its ideology regarding the relationships it maintained with the native populations of its colonies, and it sought an approach that was more controlling of the native populations, thus rejecting the precedent set by Hubert Lyautey that it had once followed.[62] Instead of continuing to build relationships with the élite abroad, intelligence gathering turned into a tighter control over the Syrians communities in the Americas.

After the Paris Peace Conference and the provisional establishment of a French Mandate over Syria and Lebanon, the French government sought to keep the South American Syrian diaspora under tight control and prevent any dissenting views from challenging its authority. The French Mandate was instituted after the end of the war and went in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916; it gave France control of Ottoman Syria, which included Lebanon and some parts of Turkey. Because the French Mandate still needed international approval by the League of Nations, the Quai d'Orsay feared that anti-French propaganda in the Americas would tarnish their claims in the Levant.[63] This made the use of Syrian committees, such as the *Comité Central Syrien*, nearly obsolete, because they now sought a strategy that was based on surveillance,

[62] Narbona, 157-158. Besides summarizing the procedures taken during the involvement of the CCS in the formation of the Légion d'Orient, Narbona describes the significance of the intelligence gathering activities of the Comité Central Syrien. I base my section on the changing dynamic of intelligence gathering largely on her research, but also on my interpretation of the documents I had access to at the MAE.

[63] Ibid.

rather than on collaboration. The Syrian committees that the *Comité* established abroad were meant to build relationships with the people of the Syrian diaspora, and the new goal of the Quai d'Orsay to control the behavior of the Syrian communities went against the principles upon which the *Comité Central Syrien* and other Syro-Lebanese committees were established. By August 1920, anti-French sentiments in Buenos Aires were evident, and the Quai d'Orsay sought to counter them with even more force. The functions of the *Comité Central Syrien* were no longer needed, as the French government sought to control the dissenting populations by sending specialized diplomats skilled in languages that would work in what became a new system of surveillance abroad.[64]

Competing Nationalisms and the Problem of Lebanon

As the Paris Peace Conference showed, there was much contention and disagreement about the nationalist sentiments of Syrians, and the differences between the competing nationalisms divided Syrians to the point where it became difficult for them to demand a cohesive plan for the future of their country. The *Comité Central Syrien* did not fail to advocate for the wishes of the Syrian people, but their narrative became one among many when the Syrian people became torn between differing paths to take towards independence. Historian Meir Zamir argues that these conflicting interests among Syrian people of different religious sects led to a deterioration of the relationships between Syrians and Lebanese that had until then been amicable.[65] Before the Great War, the major religious sects of Syria were united behind the goal of achieving recognition and autonomy in the Ottoman Empire, but as the Ottoman Empire crumbled, many sects looked forward to secure their own interests. Faysal advocated an exclusive Arab nationalism that marginalized Christians when he landed in Syria in 1918, which the *Comité Central Syrien*

[64] Ibid.

[65] Meir Zamir. *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 2.

countered with Samné's *La Syrie*, in which they constructed a distinct Syrian nationalism. Syrian nationalism was different from Arab nationalism because it held that Syrian people were different from their Arab counterparts and that the roots of Syrian people could be traced back to the Greco-Roman race. Samné did not accuse Islamic sects of taking over Syria, but sympathized with Muslims as Syrians who were also suffering from the horrors of the Great War.

In 1919, Chekri Ganem continued to emphasize the difference between Syrian nationalism and Arab nationalism; however, because the two were frequently considered to be synonymous, he changed his stance to one that was more supportive of an independent Lebanon. This was different from his previous narrative that supported a united Syrian state comprised of regions, including Lebanon and Palestine, with limited autonomy. His transition is illustrated by the development of his relationship with Patriarch Hoyek, the Maronite leader whom he had interviewed in 1905. Ganem realized that Hoyek's support would be crucial for the establishment of a French mandate in Lebanon, and although a federated Syria was preferable, he became willing to sacrifice it for the support of the Maronite Patriarch in Lebanon. In September 1919, Ganem wrote to Philippe Berthelot, the director of foreign and commercial affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, asking for guidance before he met with Patriarch Hoyek:

> I know this good old man is well connected where he has lived, [that is to say] where he lives… he reigns. And a mandate that responds well to his desires and his views, is, I am told, imperative. If [his support] is [imperative], it is because your representatives over there have consented to it or wanted it. And if the representatives want that, [it means] the [French] government encourages it. In any case, I wonder what should be my conduct. I wrote to Pichon to explain my confusion and to request a meeting that I wish will be before the one I will have with the Patriarch. This will allow me to adjust my conduct and

> calculate, according to the instructions of the Minister, the stance that I must support in the meeting, my deeds, gestures, and language.[66]

Ganem was willing to do as the Quai d'Orsay wished in order to have the support of Patriarch Hoyek in the plans to formally establish a mandate over Syria and Lebanon with the approval of the League of Nations. With Faysal's threat to French authority, Ganem was ready to sacrifice the plan for a Greater Syria in order to help forge a policy that would appease the Maronite community of Lebanon and make it easier for the French government to govern in the region. Ganem's decision was strategic, but it also demonstrated his loyalty to the French government. By admitting that he knew an alliance with Hoyek was in conjunction with the wishes of the French representatives in Syria and Lebanon, he changed his previous interests for what seemed to be the most logical path to a French mandate in Syria and Lebanon, even if it meant an independent Syrian state and an independent Lebanese state.

Ganem did not blindly follow the French government, but rather believed that the wishes of the Quai d'Orsay were based on a realistic interpretation of the situation in Syria by French officials who were stationed there. French officials now believed that dividing Ottoman Syria into two states, an independent Lebanon and an independent Syria, would ensure a more efficient rule and bring peace to the region. Patriarch Hoyek became eager to seek intervention from the French government, and when Ganem met with him for a second time, he noted that Hoyek seemed very depressed because of the increasing violence between Muslims and Christians in Syria and Lebanon. "I noticed that he is not doing well," wrote Ganem to Pichon in October 1919. "He would really like to see you and

[66] Ganem to P. Berthelot. September 4, 1919. *Écrits politiques*, 236.

has begged me to arrange a meeting at your earliest convenience."[67] Although Ganem had tried to lead the Patriarch away from wishing for an independent Lebanon, violence had developed in the region that the French government could not ignore. The rivalry between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon eventually became very pronounced, and Muslim attacks on villages followed in May 1920, resulting in the murder of over fifty Christians.[68]

The *Comité Central Syrien* reported on the Treaty of Sevrès, which was signed in April 1920 and officially ended the war between Turkey and the victorious allies. Patriarch Hoyek's pleas to the French government were soon vindicated when the Quai d'Orsay declared Lebanon an independent state in September 1920, shortly after the agreements made by the Treaty of Sevrès. Many Muslims saw the independence of Lebanon as a French plot against Arab nationalism, and they brought into question the political legitimacy of Lebanon.[69] They believed that the French government artificially created an independent Lebanese state to provide a haven for Christians while blatantly disregarding the prevalence of Muslim populations in the area. Ganem, however, viewed this as a triumph for the Maronites who had for so long wished for autonomy, even though his views now greatly diverged from those of the *Comité Central Syrien*.

"Un Hommage à Chekri Ganem"

In April 1921, Chekri Ganem announced his resignation from the *Comité Central Syrien*. Although he cited his deteriorating health as the reason for his decision, Ganem's strong advocacy for an independent Lebanon had caused a separation between him and Samné in such a way that he no longer felt that the values of the *Comité*

[67] Ganem to Pichon. October 9, 1919. *Écrits Politiques*, 239.

[68] Zamir, 2.

[69] Ibid., 4.

Central Syrien were his own.[70] Ganem did not leave the *Comité* on negative terms, but rather slipped out quietly and moved to the South of France, where he continued write for newspapers.

Upon hearing of his departure from the *Comité*, a group of Syro-Lebanese nationalists from Egypt wrote to the *Reforme de l'Alexandrie*, praising him for his efforts:

> As signed below, we are Syrians and Lebanese and would like to express our sentiments of recognition for the admirable patriotic act that you have accomplished, and we thank you for all of your sacrifices and all of your efforts. You have been, for more than five years, the most ardent defendant of our cause, which you have argued for with devotion and talent that stands above any praise, and you can be proud of greatly contributing to its triumph.[71]

The Syrian and Lebanese nationalists from Alexandria considered the triumph of Ganem to be his exhaustive work with the French government and the final success of France to maintain a stronghold in Syria and Lebanon. They knew that his resignation was due to "general interests" as well as health reasons, so they recognized his new advocacy of an independent Lebanon, but they supported him as he pursued his new interests. "He will nevertheless cease to be interested in the causes that his compatriots demand him to [defend], since our cause has already been won because the liberation of Syria, the independence of Syria, and the mandate of France in these countries is, at present, a feat already accomplished."[72]

Despite the fact that Ganem and the *Comité Central Syrien* did not achieve the establishment of the Greater Syria for which they had advocated for so long, their achievements for the people of Syria

[70] MAE. Ganem to P. Berthelot. April 28, 1921. Turquie: Levant, Syrie-Liban.

[71] MAE. "Un Hommage à Chekri Ganem," *La Reforme d'Alexandrie*, April 8, 1921. Direction politique et commerciale: Colonies syriennes à l'étranger, 1920-1921.

[72] Ibid.

were praised by other émigré nationalists. The *Comité Central Syrien* had acted as a representative of Syrians and Lebanese who wished for independence under the aegis of France, and they reflected the political views, along with all their complexities, of a considerable number of Syrians and Lebanese during the time.

Conclusion

When Chekri Ganem died in 1929, *Le Figaro* published his obituary and praised his political efforts during the time he lived in France.

> The war came, and Chekri Ganem [gave his all to the Syrian cause]. An ardent patriot, he gave all of his thoughts, and all of his efforts to the unification of his little country, Syria, and his bigger country, France. One of the greatest joys of his life was seeing the French flag flying over Beirut. He had a noble heart and an ardent soul, [a friend] that France can consider as a son.[73]

After his death, Ganem was not only remembered as a Lebanese patriot, but as an admirable figure in the memory of the French people.

The *Comité Central Syrien* continued to be active under the direction of George Samné but was never again at the forefront of French policy in Syria the way it was during Ganem's presidency. The rise and fall of the *Comité Central Syrien* should not be seen as a failure, but as a representation of the inner workings of the Quai d'Orsay, their aspirations for influence in the Levant, and how they sought to actualize their authority in Syria and Lebanon. Chekri Ganem's position from 1908-1921 was typical of many other Syrians and Lebanese who had different perspectives concerning the political future of Syria and the role of France in the Levant. Both

[73] "Mort de Chekri Ganem." *Le Figaro*. May 4, 1929, accessed February 22, 2012. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k295857s.r=le%20figaro.langEN.

Ganem and George Samné, as Syro-Lebanese Christian émigrés, held political positions similar to those of many Syrians and Lebanese élites, whose positions changed from the time period after the Young Turk Revolution and the establishment of an independent Lebanon. The *Comité Central Syrien* reflected the changing political perceptions of many Lebanese during a time when the political future of Syria was uncertain, and their position within the French government provided them with a way to express those views to the Quai d'Orsay.

In July 2010, *L'Orient Le Jour*, a leading French language newspaper in present-day Lebanon, published an article about Chekri Ganem entitled, "Chekri Ganem: The Man Who Understood How to Reunite the Diaspora." This particular newspaper did not focus on the actual political outcome of Ganem's work, but rather on his ability to globalize his political efforts through the *Comité Central Syrien* in such a way as to attract many Syro-Lebanese nationalists across the globe.

> [The *Comité Central Syrien*], which became a rallying point for the emigrants of Dakar and Conakry, Montreal and Manchester, Sydney and New York, Santiago and Saõ Paulo, is not only a beautiful example of a globalized political engagement… but also the incarnation of this diaspora, scattered throughout the world, but sharing the same fierce devotion to their country of birth.

Although his political goals did not materialize in the way he had wanted, Chekri Ganem succeeded in mobilizing the many Syro-Lebanese emigrants living all over the world. His legacy is not just one of a political agenda, but rather one that characterized the emergence and ardent existence of Syrian and Lebanese patriotism in Paris and across the globe.

Works Cited

Primary Sources

Archives of the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), Archives Diplomatiques, Paris.

Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF), http://gallica.bnf.fr.

Comité Central Syrien. *La question syrienne, exposée par les syriens à L. L. Excellences les Plenipotentiaires alliés et associés à la Conférence de la paix*. Paris: Comité Central Syrien, 1919.

Ganem, Chekri. Écrits Littéraires: Poésie, Roman, et Théâtre. Edited by Georges T. Labaki, Beirut: Éditions Dar An-Nahar, 1994.

Ganem, Chekri. Écrits politiques. Edited by Georges T. Labaki, Beirut: Éditions Dar An-Nahar, 1994.

Samné, George. *La Syrie*. Paris: Bossard, 1921.

Secondary Sources

Andrew, Christopher, and A. S. Kanya-Forstner. *The Climax of French Imperial Expansion, 1914-1924*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981.

Arsan, Andrew. "Chekri Ghanem, l'homme qui a su réunir la diaspora." *L'Orient le Jour*, July 19, 2010.

Berenson, Edward. *Heroes of Empire: Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.

Cleveland, William L.. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 4th ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2004.

Cloarec, Vincent. *La France et la Question de Syrie: 1914-1918*. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1998.

Hourani, Albert. *Syria and Lebanon, a Political Essay*. London: Oxford University Press, 1946.

Kaufman, Asher. *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004.

Khoury, Philip S.. *Syria and the French mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Kohn, Hans. *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East*. New York: H. Fertig, 1969.

Narbona, María del Mar Logroño and Martin Thomas. *The French Colonial Mind*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011.

Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Mandel, Neville . "Attempts at an Arab-Zionist Entente: 1913-1914." *Middle Eastern Studies* 1, No. 3 (1965): 238-267.

Priestley, Herbert Ingram. *France Overseas: A Study of Modern Imperialism*. New York: Octagon Books, 1966.

Tauber, Eliezer. "La Légion d'Orient et la Légion Arabe." *Revue Française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer* 81 (1994): 171-9.

Tauber, Eliezer. *The Emergence of Arab Movements*. London: F. Cass, 1993.

Thompson, Elizabeth. *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Tibawi, Abdul Latif. *A Modern History of Syria, Including Lebanon and Palestine*. London: Macmillan, 1969.

Zaka, Samy F.. "Education and Civilization in the Third Republic: The University of St. Joseph," PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2006.

Zamir, Meir. *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*. London: Croom Helm, 1985.

CHEKRI GANEM AND THE COMITÉ CENTRAL SYRIEN: SYRIAN NATIONALISM IN PARIS, 1905-1921

MARIA SERAKOS graduated from Notre Dame in 2012 with a B.S. in mathematics. At Notre Dame she was highly involved with the Center for Social Concerns. Her service experiences at the CSC and interest in economics inspired this honors thesis. Maria is currently teaching in a high school in Yakima, Washington as part of a year of service through Lasallian Volunteers. This summer she will take a position Washington, D.C. to pursue a career in policy research and graduate study.

THE EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM ON THE POSTSECONDARY DEGREE ATTAINMENT OF YOUNG ADULT WOMEN

MARIA SERAKOS

Abstract

The United States welfare system underwent a significant transformation in the 1990s. Recognizing the need to gradually reduce the number of caseloads, a new welfare program was implemented. Beginning with the implementation of waivers for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program starting in 1992 and continuing with the establishment of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, the welfare system was altered so as to offer incentive to recipients to find employment and ultimately lead lives independent of public assistance. This "work-first" approach to welfare, however, often fails to recognize education as an acceptable work activity, leading to a significant employment-education tradeoff for recipients. In this paper, I first examine how welfare reform has impacted high school dropout rates for minors, finding that dropout rates have declined for those susceptible to relying on cash assistance. Second, I explore how this policy change has affected the postsecondary degree attainment of young adult women, discovering that this group has been more likely to pursue associate's degrees post-reform.

Introduction

In the 1990s the United States welfare system underwent a major overhaul. Prior to 1996, the primary source of aid for families with financial need was the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. During the Clinton administration many states received waivers to enact pilot welfare reform programs, which began to modify the landscape of the welfare system. With the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996 and the consequent establishment of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, welfare entered a new era geared towards promoting employment opportunities for recipients and reducing the number of people relying on welfare funds.

Welfare reform has led to empirical changes in the behavior of recipients. It has been successful in reducing caseloads, as there was an observed drop of 56.5% between 1994 and 2000, though it is difficult to separate the effects of macroeconomic conditions and policy changes (Blank 2002).[1] Additionally, the labor force participation rate has increased among recipients, particularly among single mothers with children, which is promising since acquiring work experience has been correlated with an increase in wages over time (Blank 2002; Gladden and Taber 2000). Other noteworthy effects of welfare reform include positive correlations with earnings and income and negative effects on poverty rates (Schoeni and Blank 2000). Together these results have elicited much acclaim among supporters of this "work-first" approach to welfare.

A major criticism of the work-first approach is that education and training are not typically promoted as acceptable work activities for adults. Although there have been observed decreases in the

[1] The early 1990s were a time of economic expansion, so many recipients left welfare due to prosperous times. There are discrepancies in the economic literature about how much of the decline in caseloads is attributable to policy independent of economic factors, and Blank (2002) suggests that less than 35% of the decline was due to welfare reform legislation.

quantity and duration of welfare receipts and increases in earnings, questions have risen as to whether or not this work-first approach will lead to improved outcomes in the long run. Because education is often not recognized as an acceptable work activity, this could lead to a decrease in educational attainment among welfare recipients. Minor-aged mothers, on the other hand, are targeted in a way consistent with a human capital approach. Under PRWORA minor mothers are required to attend high school or training in order to receive TANF funds, and as full time students, they are not subjected to time limits or work requirements.

Several researchers have investigated and discovered a negative correlation between welfare reform and enrollment in higher education programs (Dave et al. 2008, London 2006, Jacobs and Winslow 2003), though few have looked at college graduation. Analyzing how welfare reform has affected educational enrollment only acknowledges the short-term consequences of the policy change; the long-term implications of welfare reform are best assessed by focusing on graduation from a postsecondary program. Perhaps the work-first emphasis of welfare reform has discouraged welfare recipients from attending college long enough to obtain a degree, or perhaps welfare reform's time limits have encouraged recipients to earn college degrees so they have less of a chance of recidivism.

I explore these topics by studying the effects of welfare reform on educational attainment, specifically, the attainment of postsecondary degrees by young adult women. To date, the economic literature surrounding how welfare reform has affected postsecondary educational outcomes has focused solely on enrollment; I strive to contribute to this body of research by exploring the connection between welfare reform and the attainment of postsecondary degrees.

My research builds on the work of Dave, Reichman, and Corman (2008). First I replicate their findings that welfare reform has resulted in a lower high school dropout rate among young women. I then shift to my primary analysis, in which I examine the effects welfare reform has had on college graduation. My findings indicate

that despite the new work-first focus of the welfare system, the probability of attaining an associate's degree has actually increased for young women at risk of relying on welfare.

Background

History of Welfare Reform

Under AFDC, states were given the discretion to decide who would receive benefits and be entitled to federal funds. Beginning in 1962, the Secretary of Health and Human Services offered waivers for federal welfare rules if a state proposed a pilot program that advanced the goals of AFDC. These waivers were designed so states could reduce the number of people relying on public aid by increasing the strictness of work requirements, and they gained popularity during the Clinton administration in the early 1990s. By the 1996 passage of PRWORA, which represented the culmination of welfare reform, 27 states had statewide waivers in place.

The PRWORA legislation drastically altered the makeup of the U.S. welfare system by replacing AFDC with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. In an effort to emphasize self-sufficiency among welfare recipients, the major provisions of PRWORA included granting greater authority to states in setting up programs to distribute TANF funds, supporting work requirements for those receiving aid, and imposing a five year maximum time limit for the receipt of TANF-funded aid. As a result, many states have both explicit and latent work incentives embedded within their public assistance programs.[2] As long as they followed these and other parameters, states had the freedom to design and implement their own welfare policies, and, consequently, there is much interstate policy variation pertaining to these cash assistance programs, particularly regarding whether or not education counts as

[2] As an example, in order to receive TANF funds in 2000, states had to demonstrate that 50% of their welfare recipients was employed. Single mothers had to be working at least 30 hours per week in order to be included in this figure.

an acceptable work activity.

Educational Policy and Welfare Reform

Adult recipients were not restricted by employment or education requirements under AFDC; qualified individuals were entitled to benefits regardless of how they spent their time. However, opportunities for educational enrollment concurrent with welfare receipt lessened with the implementation of major statewide AFDC waiver programs starting in 1992. These waivers created stricter requirements within the welfare system by imposing time limits on welfare receipts, increasing earnings disregards, constructing a family cap, and/or establishing a work requirement time limit.[3] Because states could create their own waiver programs within a broad framework of requirements, there was substantial interstate variation in the composition of policies. The implementation of TANF under PRWORA further reinforced the stringent work requirements of the evolving welfare system. Together, both AFDC waivers and TANF dampened the flexibility welfare recipients had in choosing how to spend their time and may have given higher priority to employment over educational enrollment.

It is difficult to assess how educational policies were treated under AFDC waivers and TANF. Although states with AFDC waivers were required to file detailed reports with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, they were not obliged to include information about the treatment of education within their programs or the educational status of their recipients. The implementation of TANF made obtaining educational data easier, as states are now required to file this information with their other program specifics; and the extent to which education could count as an approved work requirement is more well-defined. However, since each state has the

[3] See http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/waiver-policies99/Table_A.htm and http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/waiver-policies99/Table_B.htm for a detailed table of when states approved and implemented major AFDC waivers and for an overview of the six types of major AFDC waiver policies.

freedom to create its own TANF-funded program, the vastness of interstate variation within TANF makes researching welfare reform complicated.

Postsecondary Education among Non-Traditional Students and Welfare Recipients

Higher education among non-traditional students is not uncommon. Of adult females enrolled in postsecondary education programs in 2009, 41.1% were age 25 or older (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 2009a).[4] Additionally, in 2009 75% of females taking vocational courses were age 25 or older (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 2009b).

A significant number of welfare recipients are enrolled in postsecondary programs. Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), London (2006) found that 17% of welfare recipients who were high school graduates attended college while on welfare.[5] According to a 2002 U.S. Census Bureau report, 22.6% of TANF recipients in 1998 had completed at least one year of college (U.S. Census Bureau 2002).

Returns to Education versus Employment for Welfare Recipients

There is much debate in the economic literature surrounding this work-first approach to welfare reform, particularly regarding the returns to education and employment. There is evidence that education is a worthwhile investment for welfare recipients. Many people on welfare attend two-year colleges, and there is a noticeable return on this investment. Kane and Rouse (1999) uncovered that each year of coursework at a community college returns an average of a 5 to 8% increase in annual earnings. This figure is comparable to the return from a four-year college, indicating that any type of

[4] Here postsecondary enrollment pertains to enrollment in either an undergraduate or graduate program.

[5] Data in the NLSY79 are from a pre-PRWORA time period, in which the work-first emphasis of welfare was not as prominent.

postsecondary education yields positive future benefits.

Much attention has also been given to the difference in earnings between those who graduate from college and those who attend college but do not receive a degree, and these measured "sheepskin effects" of a postsecondary diploma are worth noting.[6] Jaeger and Page (1996) indicate that a substantial part of the returns to education is due to sheepskin effects, finding a statistically significant return to postsecondary education that is 12% higher for those with a degree than those with an equal amount of schooling but no diploma. Park (1998) finds equally significant effects of 21% and 11% for bachelor's and associate's degrees, respectively.

London (2006) found that college attendance among welfare recipients has been correlated with a lower probability of recidivism. Using data from the geocode version of the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), London uncovered that college graduation while on aid decreases the chances of returning to aid or living in poverty within five years of leaving welfare. This result is promising since college graduation is not uncommon for welfare recipients enrolled in postsecondary programs: 36.2% of those enrolled in a postsecondary institution while on aid graduated at some point during the NLSY panel. However, this study has drawbacks, as the instrumental variables technique the author employs is potentially flawed. For example, by including the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) percentile ranking as an aptitude measure within the instrument for college attendance, London fails to recognize that this variable is correlated not only with educational enrollment but also with other outcomes, including employment and poverty. These provide for potentially large sources of error, so the results of this study should be interpreted with caution.

Despite these findings about the positive impacts of education,

[6] Sheepskin effects refer to the additional value in terms of wages and future earning power of a diploma itself, as compared to receiving an equal amount of education without a diploma.

the employment focus of cash assistance programs has remained prominent. Dave, Reichman, and Corman (2008) suggest that welfare policy evolved to where it is today because there were few findings that a human capital approach was more successful in promoting self-sufficiency. Complementing the scarcity of evidence in support of an education-based approach, the work-first paradigm has been corroborated by research highlighting several social benefits of the new welfare system, including caseload reductions and an increase in the labor force participation rate. Although this focus of moving recipients off of cash assistance and into the workforce is the quickest way to decrease caseloads, its long-run impact on well-being remains in question.

Welfare Reform and Educational Enrollment

There is a consensus in the economic literature that welfare reform has had a favorable impact on the high school enrollment of minor girls. Dave, Reichman, and Corman (2008)—henceforth referred to as DRC (2008)—found that welfare reform reduced female teen dropout by 15 to 19%, a figure I attempt to replicate in this paper. Several studies predated this one, each confirming that the reformed welfare system has increased high school attendance among minors.[7] These findings are consistent with the structure of the TANF system, as minors are required to attend school in order to receive TANF funds.

Recently, more research has emerged studying the potential effects that welfare reform has had on the postsecondary educational enrollment of adult women. Jacobs and Winslow (2003) performed one of the first studies on the topic, in which the authors assessed the impact of welfare reform on enrollment at community colleges and noncredit programs and examined whether states with more

[7] These studies include Hao & Cherlin (2004), Kaestner, Korenman & O'Neill (2003), Offner (2005), and Koball (2007). Although the results of these studies are reinforced by current findings, the techniques employed in these research projects are questionable. See DRC (2008) for a discussion of this.

restrictive welfare policies have experienced a lower educational enrollment among welfare recipients. Using information from both the 1995 to 2000 March Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 1995 to 1999 National Household Education Surveys (NHES), the authors reported that TANF has reduced access to higher education and shifted enrollment away from associate's and bachelor's degree programs towards short-term certificate programs. Additionally, the authors found that there are higher postsecondary enrollment rates in states that count higher education as an approved work activity. However, the methodology of this study has been questioned, as the CPS sample was restricted to women under the age of 25, the NHES analysis did not control for state differences in welfare policy, and all changes were attributed to PRWORA directly.[8]

Since the Jacobs and Winslow study, Dave, Reichman, and Corman (2008, 2011) have produced two papers highlighting the effects of welfare reform on the educational acquisition of young women and the enrollment in vocational education and training, respectively. In their earlier study, the authors found that the gains of welfare reform in terms of employment advocacy and caseload reduction have come at the expense of lower educational enrollment of young women at risk of relying on welfare. Using data from the 1992 to 2001 October CPS, the authors exploited variation across states in the timing of AFDC waivers and TANF implementation and a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) framework to construct a policy-relevant examination of the topic. As a result, they found that welfare reform has decreased the probability of college enrollment among young women by approximately 20%.[9] Additionally, welfare reform has had stronger negative effects in states

[8] See Dave, Reichman, and Corman (2011) for a detailed discussion of the drawbacks of this study.

[9] The target group for their analysis of college enrollment consisted of unmarried mothers between the ages of 24 and 49 with less than a college education; the control group was unmarried women of the same age and educational background but with no children.

with stricter policies, and women working upwards of 20 hours per week were significantly less likely to attend college than those working fewer hours. An important point to note about this study is that enrollment is the dependent variable, so these effects could merely represent a slowing down of schooling rather than a decrease in lifetime attainment.

The potential effects of welfare reform on vocational education programs have also come into question. Dave, Reichman, and Corman assessed this in their 2011 study, in which they used data from the Adult Education Supplements to NHES in the time period spanning welfare reform to examine this relationship.[10] Although the authors found no overall evidence that welfare reform has significantly impacted the vocational education enrollment trends of women at risk of relying on welfare, the authors did find a stronger negative effect on this outcome in states with stricter policies. Additionally, the negative effects on vocational education have been confined to women with less than a high school diploma, leading the authors to assert that the work-first strategy has had uneven impacts on education acquisition in that the most disadvantaged in terms of educational background fall farther behind those with higher levels of schooling.

While there is a wealth of literature surrounding several behavioral effects of welfare reform, there is a lack of research on educational attainment. The best way to explore the long-run implications of welfare reform on education is to see how it has affected the attainment of postsecondary degrees. If recipients are indeed incentivized to find employment, one would expect a negative correlation between reform and attainment. Conversely, if recipients recognize that they are limited by the new time restrictions of welfare and can no longer rely on public aid when these limits are exhausted, they might pursue higher educational opportunities to set themselves up

[10] These include the Adult Education Supplements from 1991, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005.

for prosperous futures. Additionally, the educational requirements for minors might increase their opportunities for higher education, as the attainment of a postsecondary degree requires high school completion. In order to contribute to the void in literature, I utilize similar techniques to those in DRC (2008) and examine how the new welfare system has impacted college graduation.

Data

For my analysis I use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from the years 1992-2010.[11] The CPS is composed of data from national surveys administered monthly to 60,000 households by the U.S. Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This survey gathers information on a wealth of topics, including the labor force, unemployment, and population demographics. My information comes from the March CPS in particular, which focuses on educational statistics, including school or college attendance and educational attainment. Since much of my paper relies on the previous work of DRC (2008), it is important to note that a point of divergence in our techniques stems from our utilization of different datasets. I use the March CPS, whereas they rely on data from the CPS October Supplement.

My research focuses on two areas: high school dropout and educational attainment. For my analysis of high school dropout, I mimic the techniques of DRC (2008). As in their paper, I narrow my date range to 1992 to 2001, a period spanning welfare reform. I also construct a dropout variable, indicating that a given individual is not enrolled in high school and lacks a high school credential.[12]

[11] These data were obtained through the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), a part of the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota. See: King (2010).

[12] The CPS October Supplement has an indicator for status dropout rates. Since I am not using this dataset, I construct my own using the variables for school enrollment and highest level of schooling completed. For a discussion of how the October Supplement indicator was constructed, see http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/supnotes/2011-n02.asp.

To assess welfare reform's effects on educational attainment, I look at the highest degree attained for unmarried women who were between the ages of 26 and 30 during the years 2001 to 2010.

Since welfare reform was implemented in phases across states, first with the installment of AFDC waivers starting in 1992 and then with the TANF block grant after the passage of PRWORA in 1996, I follow the convention in prior literature, including DRC (2008), of constructing two independent variables to reflect this staggered timing.[13] The first indicator measures the fraction of the year that a given state in a given year had a major AFDC waiver in place.[14] The second is analogous, measuring the fraction of the year a state had implemented TANF.

In order to rid of any bias with regard to interstate socioeconomic differences, I include several other variables in my analysis to account for observed time-varying state characteristics. I account for economic and labor market conditions, including measures of state unemployment rates and per capita personal income for the years of analysis.[15] I also include information about the number of welfare caseloads in each state.[16] To account for variations and shifts in educational policies across states, I include an indicator for whether or not a state had a strict high school exit exam in place (at or above the ninth grade level) and another indicator measuring the maximum state-mandated age for compulsory school attendance.[17]

[13] See also Blank (2002).

[14] For example, if a state did not have a waiver in place in a given year, the indicator would be set to 0. If a waiver was enacted on March 1st of that year, the indicator would be set to 0.841 to correspond to the 307/365 days the state had the waiver in place. If a state had a waiver in place for an entire year, the indicator is 1.

[15] These data are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Unemployment data can be found at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/all_nr.htm#SRGUNE and per capita personal income data can be found at http://bber.unm.edu/econ/us-pci.htm.

[16] These data can be found at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/index.htm.

[17] Information about exit exams comes from the Appendix of Dee and Jacob (2007), the Education Commission of the States, and the National Center for Education Statistics. Specifically, these data can be found in the Education Commission of the

Each of these techniques was employed by DRC (2008).

Methods

My research design follows that used by DRC (2008). Whereas their study focuses on educational enrollment among young women, I focus on the completed educational attainment for women who were impacted by welfare reform when they were younger. Like DRC (2008), I utilize a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) model with multivariate regression methods to produce causal estimates for my outcomes of interest.[18]

The model I use to examine how welfare reform has affected educational outcomes for women at risk of relying on cash assistance is the same model constructed by DRC (2008):

$$(1)\ E_{ist} = \alpha' + (\alpha_1 - \alpha^f_1)Target_i + (\pi_1 - \pi^f_1)(AFDCWaiver_{st} * Target_i) + (\pi_2 - \pi^f_2)(TANF_{st} * Target_i) + \pi^f_1 (AFDCWaiver_{st}) + \pi^f_2 (TANF_{st}) + X_{ist}\beta' + Z_{st}\delta' + State_s\lambda' + Year_t\varphi' + (State_s * t)\Phi' + \mu_{ist}$$

This DDD model is designed to measure the effects of variations in state welfare policies. Here E_{ist} is the dependent variable, a dummy variable measuring the educational outcome for the i^{th} woman living in state s during year t. My analysis focuses on two particular outcomes: high school dropout and educational attainment. For educational attainment I focus on the attainment of a high school diploma, associate's degree, or bachelor's degree, the completion of some college without a degree, and the enrollment in any level of

States' Clearinghouse Notes, "Compulsory School Age Requirements," for the years 1992, 1994, 1997, 2003, and 2005, and on the following website: http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_174.asp. Any gaps in these data were either interpolated within reason or further researched on state websites.

[18] Difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) models are commonly used in economics to mimic random assignment research designs. These models compare how two groups trend over time in response to a policy change or other shock. They are designed so that a target group, the group being examined with the model, is compared to a control group, and the observed differences between these two groups are the outcomes of interest.

schooling above the high school level, regardless of degree status. E_{ist} is a function of welfare policy, measured by the indicators $AFDC\text{-}Waiver_{st}$ and $TANF_{st}$, which represent the fraction of the year a state had an AFDC waiver or TANF in place, respectively. The outcome of interest also depends on a vector accounting for individual characteristics (X_{ist}), such as age, race, ethnicity, and urban residence, and another for time-varying state characteristics (Z_{st}), such as economic conditions and educational policies. State fixed effects ($State_s$), year fixed effects ($Year_t$), and linear state-specific time trends ($State_s*t$) are also included in the model, with μ_{ist} being the error term.

This DDD model permits an assessment of causal outcomes of welfare reform, which is achieved through adequate selection of target and comparison groups. The target group refers to the population that is most exposed to welfare reform. The comparison group is similar to the target group in many characteristics but was not affected by the policy change. I evaluate the effects of welfare reform by comparing the differences in means between these two groups. This is possible through the DDD framework, which utilizes a dichotomous indicator, $Target_i$, equal to one if an individual is in the target group and zero if the individual is in the comparison group. Therefore, the coefficients on the terms $(\pi_1\text{-}\pi^{\ddagger}_1)$ and $(\pi_2\text{-}\pi^{\ddagger}_2)$ measure the effects of welfare reform on the educational outcomes.

In order for this model to adequately identify the effects of welfare reform, the target and comparison groups should show similar trends in the dependent variable prior to the policy change. The assumption is that state-varying factors would affect each group similarly, so any differences in educational attainment post-reform must be due to welfare reform itself.

Choosing the appropriate target and comparison groups is imperative for producing valid estimates for the behavioral effects of welfare reform. My target group for analyzing how welfare reform has affected high school dropout consists of unmarried females between the ages of 16 and 20 from non-two-parent households, in which the highest level of education among the respondent and her

parent is less than a bachelor's degree.[19] This sample is further restricted to individuals above the state mandated age for compulsory school attendance. My comparison group is composed of similar males. My target group is nearly identical to that used in the DRC (2008) paper, with the exception that theirs restricts the highest level of education of anyone in the household to be less than a bachelor's degree and includes individuals of age 15.[20] As in the DRC (2008) paper, I restrict the upper bound of my sample to age 19 in order to compare my baseline means.

For my primary analysis of examining the effects of welfare reform on the eventual educational attainment of young women, I use a model similar to Model (1). Now instead of $AFDCWaiver_{st}$ and $TANF_{st}$ varying over time, they reflect the policy environment for an individual i in state s when that individual was at a particular younger age. I run regressions for each of the ages 16 through 21.[21] Here my dependent variable is a dummy variable reflecting the lifetime educational attainment for the individual, and I run regressions for high school diploma, associate's degree, bachelor's degree, some postsecondary education without a degree, and any level of schooling above the high school level, regardless of degree status.

Because this analysis involves looking at young women and not at minors, I construct different target and comparison groups than those used for my high school dropout regression. Since most individuals complete their higher education in their 20s, my target group consists of unmarried women who were between the ages of 26 and 30 during the years 2001 through 2010. I compare them to unmarried men of a similar age group. In both instances the policy

[19] Here unmarried is defined as divorced, separated, widowed, or never married.

[20] The reason DRC (2008) include individuals of age 15 is that they use CPS October Supplement data, in which the universe for the educational enrollment variable is all persons. However, for the non-supplemental March CPS data, which I use, this variable is limited to individuals between the ages of 16 and 24.

[21] For example, when considering the policy environment for age 16, $AFDCWaiver_s$ and $TANF_s$ would measure the policies that were in place when the individuals in my target and comparison groups were age 16.

variables measure the AFDC waiver and TANF status of the individual at an earlier age, namely ages 16 through 21.[22] I choose these years since this is the time during which most individuals consider attending a postsecondary institution. Additionally, these years span the threshold between being a minor and adulthood, so this allows me to see how behaviors change during this transitional phase in life. I focus my analysis on age 18, as this is the time when individuals first become adults. An important assumption made with this method is that individuals do not migrate between states between these earlier ages and when they were surveyed, which may introduce measurement error.[23]

As previously mentioned, it is important to check the validity of the selection of my target and comparison groups by comparing their mean educational outcomes and trends prior to the policy shift. For my high school dropout groups, I follow the techniques employed by DRC (2008) by looking at the means for the groups, defining the pre-reform period in three separate ways. First, I restrict the sample to states in which neither AFDC waivers nor TANF had been implemented. Second, I look at all non-AFDC waiver states in 1992. Third, I look at the entire pre-TANF period, specifically the years 1992-1995, regardless of AFDC waiver status. These results are given in Table 1. On average, 17% of females in my target group and 21% of males in my comparison group were high school dropouts. Although the difference in high school dropout rates is statistically significant between the target and comparison groups in all cases except for the 1992 sample restricted to non-waiver states,

[22] This construction is different than that used by DRC (2008) to study the educational enrollment among women susceptible to relying on welfare. They look at unmarried mothers ages 24 to 49 with less than a college education. However, due to the universe limitations placed on the educational enrollment variable in my March CPS data, I had to use a different technique to assess my outcome of interest.

[23] Although there is high mobility within the United States, 58.8% of Americans live in their state of birth. See the American Community Survey Brief from November 2011 entitled "Lifetime Mobility in the United States: 2010" for more information: http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-07.pdf.

these results are not alarming.[24] In order for the target and comparison groups in a DDD model to be valid counterfactuals, they must merely exhibit similar *trends* prior to the reform. Figure 1, which depicts the trends in high school dropout between the years of 1992 and 1995, indicates that the two groups are in fact fairly comparable, as is evidenced by the two similarly trending lines from year to year.

Table 2 contains the baseline means for my educational attainment target and comparison groups when considering their policy environments at ages 16 through 21, respectively. Since most of my analysis focuses on the policy status of individuals when they were 18, I will highlight those results here; the rest can be observed in Table 2. When considering the AFDC waiver and TANF policy environment at age 18 it is seen that 28% of women in my target group had a high school diploma as their highest level of education completed, as compared with 33% of similar males. A higher percentage of my target group completed an associate's degree than their comparison counterparts, with means of 9% and 8%, respectively. Similar trends hold for bachelor's degrees, in which 22% of the target group and 21% of the comparison group attained this level of education. Overall, it is seen that females were more likely to pursue postsecondary education than males. Similar trends are present when considering the policy environment at other years, with the exception of bachelor's degrees for ages 20 and 21, in which a higher mean is present for the comparison group than for the target group, although the difference is not statistically significant.

[24] In fact, throughout the U.S. males have higher dropout rates than females. See the following Statistical Analysis Report sponsored by the National Center for Education Statistics for supporting data: http://eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED438381.pdf.

Results

Effects of Welfare Reform on High School Dropout

My results for high school dropout are presented in Table 3 alongside those obtained by DRC (2008). These figures represent the coefficients from Model (1). It is seen that both AFDC waivers and TANF decreased high school dropout rates for the treated group. Both of our results for the AFDC waiver interaction term in specification 1 indicate that these waivers decreased the probability of high school dropout among unmarried females ages 16-20 (ages 15-20 for DRC (2008)) by slightly more than 0.8 percentage points (4.7% relative to the target group baseline mean), though this is not statistically significant. The coefficient on the TANF interaction term is slightly stronger in magnitude, with my regressions yielding a reduction by 1.8 percentage points (11% relative to my baseline mean) and DRC (2008) showing that TANF implementation reduced dropout rates by a statistically significant 3.4 percentage points (15% relative to their baseline mean), though my figures are not statistically significant. The findings for both AFDC waiver and TANF implementation remain similar when controlling for state-specific trends in specification 2. Additionally, both sets of results indicate that TANF had a greater impact on dropout rates than AFDC waivers, which is expected since minor mothers are required to remain in high school under TANF, whereas high school completion was not a target of all AFDC waivers.

My results successfully replicate those of DRC (2008) in terms of the coefficients on the treatment variables. Although my results captured the same trends as DRC (2008) in terms of the relative levels and impact of AFDC waivers and TANF on young unmarried mothers, my numerical estimates were not always consistent with theirs. Reasons for this discrepancy likely stem from the different CPS datasets employed. I was not able to include mothers of age 15, individuals who were likely not yet far along in their high school careers and bound by the compulsory schooling age.

Overall, both my findings and those of DRC (2008) indicate that welfare reform reduced the probability of high school dropout among young unmarried mothers. Most of this effect was due to the educational incentives in the TANF policy.

Effects of Welfare Reform on Educational Attainment

The primary aim of my paper is to extend the findings of DRC (2008) by focusing on the potential impact of welfare reform on educational attainment. In order to assess the effects of the policy shift, I examine the ultimate educational outcomes of unmarried women using TANF and AFDC waiver data for their surveyed state of residence at ages 16 through 21, though I focus my analysis on age 18. I will describe my findings before discussing their implications.

Table 4 presents my results for unmarried women ages 26 through 30, utilizing the retrospective AFDC waiver and TANF status for each respondent at age 18. These figures represent the coefficients from Model (1). None of my $TANF_s*Target_i$ indicators is significant, indicating that TANF had little impact on the ultimate educational attainment of the target group. AFDC waivers did, however, positively impact the eventual attainment of associate's degrees among these women but did not have any significant effect on other educational outcomes. Specification 1 indicates that AFDC waivers increased the probability of earning an associate's degree by 2.6 percentage points (30% relative to the target group baseline mean). This figure is robust to controlling for state-specific trends, as represented by the similar coefficient under specification 2.

I include my results for the policy environments at other ages in Table 5. Again, these values represent the coefficients from Model (1), and each controls for state-specific trends. These results indicate that the educational outcome most significantly affected by welfare reform was the attainment of associate's degrees. For the policy environments at ages 16, 17, and 18, the implementation of AFDC waivers increased the probability of a woman attaining a two-year degree by 0.0230, 0.0249, and 0.0261 percentage points, respec-

tively (26%, 28%, and 29% as compared to the baseline means). These coefficients are significant at the 0.01 confidence level. My results for the policy environment at age 19 show that the presence of TANF increased the likelihood of the treated group attaining an associate's degree by 0.0156 percentage points (17% relative to the baseline mean); this figure is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Considering the welfare environment at age 20 yields no statistically significant results for associate's degrees. At age 21 the attainment of associate's degrees is again affected through the TANF policy, though this time it operates in the negative direction. Here the coefficient on the TANF interaction term signifies that this policy decreases the probability of attaining an associate's degree by 0.0286 percentage points (29% compared to the baseline mean), which is significant at the 0.1 confidence level.

A few other statistically significant results occur in my regressions, though none are as widespread as the impact of welfare reform on associate's degree attainment. College enrollment without the eventual attainment of a degree is statistically significantly impacted by both AFDC waiver and TANF when considering welfare environment for my target group at age 16. AFDC waivers decreased one's probability of attending college by 0.0177 percentage points (8% relative to the baseline mean) and TANF decreased it by 0.0257 percentage points (12% compared to the baseline mean). Furthermore, the presence of TANF at age 21 increased the likelihood of attaining a bachelor's degree in by 0.0394 percentage points (19% relative to the baseline mean). All of my other results yield insignificant coefficients for the policy interaction terms in each year.

Discussion

Since I successfully replicated the high school dropout results of DRC (2008), I will not present an additional analysis of those findings. Instead, I will focus the discussion of my results to my primary outcome of interest: educational attainment.

Welfare reform most significantly impacted the attainment of associate's degrees. In interpreting these results, it is important to note that the implementation of AFDC waivers at ages 16 through 18 and TANF at age 19 actually *increased* one's probability of attaining an associate's degree. Given that time limits were a characteristic of most waiver programs, working towards an associate's degree, a degree that has proven to yield significant returns, seems to be the most time- and cost-effective way to acquire a postsecondary education. There is less of an opportunity cost in terms of enrollment time if the program takes only two years out of one's prescribed period for welfare eligibility.

Furthermore, the benefits of receiving such a degree in terms of increased future financial prospects would decrease one's chances of recidivism once not enrolled in welfare. Kane and Rouse (1995) note that pursuing an associate's degree is especially worthwhile for individuals living on the margin financially. They calculate the average tuition for a community college education in 1995 to be $351 per semester and figure an individual would concurrently forgo approximately $5211 in earnings. Additionally, Jepsen, Troske, and Coomes (2009) found the quarterly labor market returns of associate's degrees to be nearly $1500 for women and $2000 for men. Therefore, the costs of attaining an associate's degree are more than compensated for when considering the increased earnings an individual would receive over the course of his or her lifetime. It is consequently understandable that women at risk for relying on welfare would consider such a cost-benefit analysis when considering postsecondary education and work options, leading them to be more likely to choose both enrolling in an educational program and working despite welfare's work requirements.

These positive results only hold for women when considering the policy environments at these younger ages. Because minors were required to complete their high school education under welfare reform and were not subjected to time limits, perhaps this population naturally continued on to pursue postsecondary degrees immedi-

ately after high school, despite the work first incentives of welfare reform.[25] However, considering the policies at age 21 shows that TANF implementation no longer incentivized women at risk of relying on welfare to complete associate's degrees; in fact, it decreased the likelihood that these women would pursue such degrees. Perhaps at age 21, an age at which individuals are traditionally no longer in high school and are restricted by time limits, these women find the work-first incentives of welfare more appealing than any long-term returns to education.

An interesting pattern that emerges from these data is that the attainment of postsecondary degrees was affected primarily through the presence of AFDC waivers when considering the policy environment at ages 16 through 18 and by TANF implementation for ages 19 and 21. Since AFDC waivers predated TANF, there is little variation in TANF exposure for individuals at age 16, likewise for AFDC waiver exposure at age 21.

My results also indicate that when considering a woman's policy environment at age 16, she was 8 to 12% less likely to enroll in any level of higher education beyond the high school level. Perhaps being exposed to the work-first emphasis of welfare at this young age dissuades females at risk for relying on public assistance from enrolling in higher education without receiving degree. Since there is less of a return to going to school without receiving a diploma and time spent in an educational program would still count towards one's lifetime welfare time limit, a woman would want to either complete a degree or not enroll in higher education at all.

An additional significant outcome in my results is that for the attainment of bachelor's degrees when considering the policy environment for my target group at age 21. Here it is seen that despite the adverse schooling incentives embedded in the work-first emphasis of

[25] According to data from the National Center for Education Statistics (2009), 27.7% of high school completers in 2009 enrolled in a two-year college the fall immediately following their high school completion; 42.4% enrolled immediately in a four-year college.

TANF, these women pursued four-year degrees. Perhaps these individuals recognized that due to the newly imposed time restraints, they should set themselves up for financially stable futures by pursuing higher education. At age 21 individuals might have already completed some college, so it would be natural for them to sacrifice only a couple of additional years of their time on welfare to attain a bachelor's degree. This reasoning would be especially appealing if one considered the value of a bachelor's degree and its "sheepskin effects," in which the returns to a bachelor's degree itself are 21% higher than those for an equal amount of schooling without a diploma (Park 1998).

Overall, my results suggest that individuals at risk for relying on public assistance are incentivized to pursue associate's degrees over other forms of higher education. This is likely since the time spent pursuing such a degree is relatively short and justified by cost-benefit analysis.

Conclusion

In this study I was able to examine the effects of welfare reform on educational outcomes via two different avenues. First, I followed the techniques employed by DRC (2008) in order to mimic their results in terms of high school dropout. My results for the effects of AFDC waivers on high school dropout are virtually identical to theirs, demonstrating that these waivers reduced the probability of dropping out of high school by approximately 4.7% for young women between the ages of 16 and 20. TANF implementation also incentivized these young women to remain in high school, with my results indicating that they are 11% more likely to do so, slightly lower in magnitude than Dave, Reichman, and Corman's 15 to 19%.

My second and primary analysis focused on the ultimate educational attainment of individuals at risk for welfare, an area that to my knowledge has not been studied previously. Here I find that the welfare policies in place at ages 16 through 21 for women who

were in their late twenties from 2001 to 2010 caused them to alter their behavior regarding the attainment of associate's degrees. When considering the policy environment for my target group at ages 16 through 19, I discover that AFDC waivers actually caused individuals to pursue associate's degrees and that they were 26% more likely to do so. However, the behavior of my target group shifted for the policy environment at age 21, in which these women were 29% less likely to attain associate's degrees.

Despite these findings, there are several limitations to my paper. First, the nature of this CPS dataset prevented me from examining the educational enrollment status of individuals beyond the age of 24, causing me to deviate from some of the logistical aspects of the DDD scheme employed by DRC (2008). My method would have been better supported by a longitudinal dataset. As a result of my retrospectively designed study, I had to assume that individuals did not migrate between states between ages 16 and 21 and the year in which they were surveyed. Second, my primary analysis focuses on the ultimate educational attainment for women who were between the ages of 26 and 30. It is possible, however, that several of these women have or will return to school to pursue a higher level of education.

My paper does contribute to the existing literature by presenting information about how welfare reform has impacted educational attainment. Unlike earlier research, I am in the unique position of being able to follow up on the long-term impacts of welfare reform by assessing behaviors more than 10 years after the policy change. My results show that the work-first emphasis of welfare reform does not completely dissuade individuals from pursuing postsecondary degrees; they merely focus their attention on associate's degrees, which present less of a time opportunity cost. The findings in this paper indicate that the long run implications of welfare reform in terms of the completion of a postsecondary educational program are positive, suggesting that welfare has incentivized individuals to become self-sufficient by setting themselves up for financial stability by pursuing

two-year degrees. However, as the workforce becomes increasingly competitive, it is worth researching whether these individuals would benefit more from the attainment of four-year degrees.

References

Aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) and temporary assistance for needy families (TANF). 2009 [cited September 4 2011]. Available from http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/abbrev/afdc-tanf.htm.

Table A: State implementation of major changes to welfare policies, 1992-1998. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Human Services Policy.

Blank, Rebecca M. 2002. Evaluating welfare reform in the united states. *Journal of Economic Literature* 40 (4): 1105-66.

Committee on Way and Means, U.S. House of Representatives. 2000. *Section 7: Temporary assistance for needy families (TANF).*

Council of Economic Advisors. 1999. *The effects of welfare policy and the economic expansion on welfare caseloads: An update.*

Dave, Dhaval M., Nancy E. Reichman, and Hope Corman. 2011. Effects of welfare reform on vocational education and training. *National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 16659*.

———. 2008. Effects of welfare reform on educational acquisition of young adult women. *National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 14466*.

Gladden, Tricia, and Christopher Taber. 2000. Wage progression among less skilled workers. In *Finding jobs: Work and welfare reform.* Eds. David Card, Rebecca M. Blank. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Grogger, Jeffrey. 2003. The effect of time limits, the EITC, and other policy changes on welfare use, work, and income among female-headed families. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 85 (2): 394-400.

Hao, Lingxin, and Andrew J. Cherlin. 2004. Welfare reform and teenage pregnancy, childbirth, and school dropout. *Journal of Marriage and Family* 66 (1): 179-94.

Jacobs, Jerry A., and Sarah Winslow. 2003. Welfare reform and enrollment in postsecondary education. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science* 586 (194): 194-217.

Jaeger, David A., and Marianne Page E. 1996. Degrees matter: New evidence on sheepskin effects in the returns to education. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 78 (4): 733-40.

Jepsen, Christopher, Kenneth Troske, and Paul Coomes. 2009. The labor-market returns to community college degrees, diploas, and certificates. *University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research.*

Kaestner, Robert, Sanders Korenman, and June O'Neill. 2003. Has welfare reform changed teenage behaviors? *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 22 (2): 225-48.

Kane, Thomas, and Cecilia B. Rouse. 1999. The community college: Training students at the margin between college and work. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 13 (1): 63-84.

Kane, Thomas, and Elena Rous. 1995. Labor-market returns to two- and four-year college. *The American Economic Review* 85 (3): 600-61.

King, Miriam, Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Sarah Flood, Katie Genadek, Matthew B. Schroeder, Brandon Trampe, and Rebecca Vick. 2010. *Integrated public use microdata series, current population survey: Version 3.0.* [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

Koball, Heather. 2007. Living arrangements and school dropout among minor mothers following welfare reform. *Social Science Quarterly* 88 (5): 1374-91.

London, Rebecca. 2006. The role of postsecondary education in welfare recipients' paths to self-sufficiency. *The Journal of Higher Education* 77 (3): 472-96.

Marcotte, Dave E., Thomas Bailey, Carey Borkoski, and Greg S. Kienzl. 2005. The returns of a community college education: Evidence from the national education longitudinal survey. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 27 (2): 157-75.

Offner, Paul. 2005. Welfare reform and teenage girls. *Social Science Quarterly* 86 (2): 306-22.

National Center for Education Statistics. 2009. *Table A-21-3. Percentage of high school completers who were enrolled in 2- or four-year colleges the october immediately following high school completion, by sex and level of institution: 1975-2009.*

Park, Jin Huem. 1999. Estimation of sheepskin effects using the old and the new measures of educational attainment in the current population survey. *Economics Letters* 62: 240-.

Schoeni, Robert F., and Rebecca M. Blank. 2000. What has welfare reform accomplished? Impacts on welfare participation, employment, income, poverty, and family structure. *National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 7627*.

U.S. Census Bureau. May 2002. *Work and work-related activities of mothers receiving temporary assistance to needy families: 1996, 1998, and 2000.*

———. 2011. *Table 563: Temporary assistance for needy families (TANF)—Families and recipients: 1980 to 2008.*

U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey. October 2009. *Table 1: Enrollment status of the population 3 years old and over, by sex, age, race, hispanic origin, foreign born, and foreign-born parentage.*

———. October 2009. *Table 6: Enrollment employment status and enrollment in vocational courses for the population 15 years old and over, by sex, age, educational attainment, and college enrollment.*

———. 2010. *Table 1: Educational attainment of the population 18 years and over, by age, sex, race, and hispanic origin.*

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. 1997. *Setting the baseline: A report on state welfare waivers.*

Visdos, Robert J. 1990. *Report on family support act of 1988 job opportunities and basic skills (JOBS) training program.* Cleveland, OH: NETWORK: America's Two-Year Coll. Employment, Training, and Literacy Consortium, 141.

Table 1
High School Dropout Baseline Means
Current Population Survey, 1992-1995

Group	Target	Comparison	Target	Comparison
Sample	Unmarried females age 16-20 from non-two-parent households with household education less than college graduate [1]	Unmarried males age 16-20 from non-two-parent households with household education less than college graduate	Unmarried females age 16-19 from non-two-parent households with household education less than college graduate	Unmarried males age 16-19 from non-two-parent households with household education less than college graduate
		AFDC Waiver = 0 and TANF = 0		
Dropout Mean	0.1702	0.2108***	0.168	0.2128***
		1992 (non-AFDC Waiver States)		
Dropout Mean	0.1746	0.1996	0.1746	0.1996
		Pre-TANF (1992-1995)		
Dropout Mean	0.1754	0.2222***	0.1758	0.2207***

Note: Asterisks denote that the difference in means between the target and comparison groups is statistically significant: ***p≤0.01, **0.01<p≤0.05, *0.05<p≤0.10
[1] College graduate is defined as the attainment of a bachelor's degree.

Table 2

Baseline Means for Educational Attainment Using Policy Environment for Respondent at Ages 16-21 AFDC Waiver=0 and TANF=0
Current Population Survey, 2001-2010

Educational Outcome	HS	Associate's	Bachelor's	Some College, No Degree	Any Level of Schooling Above HS, Regardless of Degree Status
	Policy Environment at Age 16				
Target[1]	0.2784	0.0878	0.2258	0.2173	0.6066
Comparison	0.3329***	0.0771***	0.2111***	0.1857***	0.5320***
	Policy Environment at Age 17				
Target	0.2809	0.0877	0.2259	0.2199	0.6063
Comparison	0.3306***	0.0761***	0.2105***	0.1904***	0.5351***
	Policy Environment at Age 18				
Target	0.2816	0.0886	0.2230	0.2203	0.6061
Comparison	0.3329***	0.0777***	0.2076***	0.1931***	0.5365***
	Policy Environment at Age 19				
Target	0.2805	0.0907	0.2153	0.2225	0.6048
Comparison	0.3332***	0.0781***	0.2035**	0.1965***	0.5384***
	Policy Environment at Age 20				
Target	0.2821	0.0928	0.2127	0.2222	0.6029
Comparison	0.3309***	0.0766***	0.2037	0.1965***	0.5392***
	Policy Environment at Age 21				
Target	0.2900	0.0924	0.2055	0.2190	0.5970
Comparison	0.3314***	0.0792***	0.2062	0.1951***	0.5429***

Note: Asterisks denote that the difference in means between the target and comparison groups is statistically significant: ***p≤0.01, **0.01<p≤0.05, *0.05<p≤0.10
[1] The target group consists of unmarried women ages 26-30 during 2001-2010. The comparison group consists of similar males.

Table 3
High School Dropout
Comparisons with Dave, Reichman, Corman (2008) (DRC (2008))[1]
Current Population Survey, 1992-2001

Sample	Unmarried individuals age 16-20[2] from non-two-parent households with household education less than college graduate [3]			
Specification [4]	1	1	2	2
Paper	Serakos	DRC (2008)	Serakos	DRC (2008)
Target	-0.0513*** (0.0104)	-0.0170 (0.0136)	-0.0507*** (0.0106)	-0.0176 (0.0137)
AFDC Waiver	0.0094 (0.0176)	0.0049 (0.0207)	0.0029 (0.0161)	-0.0019 (0.0211)
AFDC Waiver*Target	-0.0087 (0.0177)	-0.0084 (0.0224)	-0.0091 (0.0179)	-0.0082 (0.0221)
TANF	-0.0865*** (0.0201)	0.0128 (0.0339)	-0.0845*** (0.0191)	0.0114 (0.0384)
TANF*Target	-0.0176 (0.0133)	-0.0338** (0.0167)	-0.0181 (0.0135)	-0.0331* (0.0169)
Year Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Specific Trends	No	No	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0284	0.040	0.0299	0.043
Observations	31,624	18,532	31,624	18,532

Notes: Coefficients of the estimates from Model (1) are presented in the table. Standard errors are given in the parenthesis and adjusted for correlation within each state. All target groups are females and comparison groups are males. All models include age and age squared, indicators for race, an indicator for no parents in the household, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. State covariates include indicators for the maximum compulsory schooling age, indicators for state high school exit exam requirements, state-level unemployment rate, real state per capita personal income, and the number of welfare caseloads by state. Significance levels are denoted as follows: ***$p \leq 0.01$, **$0.01 < p \leq 0.05$, *$0.05 < p \leq 0.10$.

[1] DRC (2008) data were gathered from the CPS October Supplement, whereas my data is from the March CPS.

[2] The DRC (2008) paper considers individuals age 15-20. See footnote 18 in the Methods section for a discussion of this.

[3] College graduate defined as attainment of bachelor's degree.

[4] Specification 1 refers to the absence of state-specific trends. These trends are present in specification 2.

Table 4

Lifetime Educational Attainment Using AFDC Waiver and TANF Environment for Respondent at Age 18
Current Population Survey, 2001-2010

Sample	Unmarried women who were ages 26-30 during the years 2001-2010									
Educational Outcome	HS		Associate's		Bachelor's		Some College, No Degree		Any Level of Schooling Above HS, Regardless of Degree Status	
Specification [1]	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Target	-0.0849*** (0.0104)	-0.0841*** (0.0104)	0.0090* (0.0053)	0.0090* (0.0053)	0.0788*** (0.0094)	0.0781*** (0.0095)	0.0153 (0.0105)	0.0152 (0.0105)	0.1397*** (0.0102)	0.1389*** (0.0103)
AFDC Waiver	0.0135 (0.0124)	0.0182 (0.0146)	-0.0088* (0.0050)	-0.0030 (0.0052)	-0.0129 (0.0112)	-0.0203* (0.0121)	0.0110 (0.0108)	0.0165 (0.0107)	-0.0091 (0.0132)	-0.0103 (0.0146)
AFDC Waiver*Target	-0.0133 (0.0111)	-0.0249 (0.0163)	0.0264*** (0.0073)	0.0261*** (0.0072)	-0.0030 (0.0126)	-0.0023 (0.0127)	-0.0123 (0.0140)	-0.0120 (0.0140)	0.0196 (0.0162)	0.0204 (0.0161)
TANF	0.0019 (0.0120)	0.0036 (0.0127)	-0.0032 (0.0044)	-0.0006 (0.0044)	-0.0010 (0.0096)	-0.0068 (0.0101)	0.0077 (0.0096)	0.0125 (0.0101)	-0.0018 (0.0100)	-0.0005 (0.0106)
TANF*Target	-0.0133 (0.0111)	-0.0142 (0.0111)	0.0088 (0.0067)	0.0088 (0.0066)	0.0061 (0.0095)	0.0069 (0.0096)	-0.0183 (0.0130)	-0.0180 (0.0130)	0.0058 (0.0115)	0.0067 (0.0116)
Year Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Specific Trends	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Adjusted R-Squared	0.0414	0.0423	0.0097	0.0106	0.0739	0.0748	0.0159	0.0169	0.0689	0.0699
Observations	71,988	71,988	71,988	71,988	71,988	71,988	71,988	71,988	71,988	71,988

Notes: Coefficients of the estimates from Model (1) are presented in the table. Standard errors are given in the parenthesis and adjusted for correlation within each state. All target groups are females and comparison groups are males. All models include indicators for race, number of children, residence in a metro area, residence in a city center, residence in a suburban area, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. State covariates include indicators for state-level unemployment rate, real state per capita personal income, and the number of welfare caseloads by state. Significance levels are denoted as follows: ***$p \leq 0.01$, **$0.01 < p \leq 0.05$, *$0.05 < p \leq 0.10$.

[1] Specification 1 refers to the absence of state-specific trends. These trends are present in specification 2.

Table 5

Lifetime Educational Attainment Using AFDC Waiver and TANF Environment for Respondent at Ages 16-21
Current Population Survey, 2001-2010

Sample	Unmarried women who were ages 26-30 during the years 2001-2010				
Educational Outcome	HS	Associate's	Bachelor's	Some College, No Degree	Any Level of Schooling Above HS, Regardless of Degree Status
	Policy Environment at Age 16				
AFDC Waiver*Target	-0.0068 (0.0099)	0.0230*** (0.0053)	-0.0058 (0.0112)	-0.0177* (0.0104)	0.0023 (0.0111)
TANF*Target	0.0002 (0.0101)	0.0019 (0.0064)	0.0154 (0.0107)	-0.0257** (0.0113)	-0.0050 (0.0114)
	Policy Environment at Age 17				
AFDC Waiver*Target	-0.0136 (0.0122)	0.0249*** (0.0058)	-0.0140 (0.0105)	-0.0070 (0.0116)	0.0052 (0.0115)
TANF*Target	-0.0094 (0.0098)	0.0069 (0.0058)	0.0059 (0.0094)	-0.0199 (0.0121)	0.0009 (0.0113)
	Policy Environment at Age 18				
AFDC Waiver*Target	-0.0249 (0.0163)	0.0261*** (0.0072)	-0.0023 (0.0127)	-0.0120 (0.0140)	0.0204 (0.0162)
TANF*Target	-0.0142 (0.0111)	0.0088 (0.0066)	0.0069 (0.0096)	-0.0180 (0.0130)	0.0067 (0.0116)
	Policy Environment at Age 19				
AFDC Waiver*Target	-0.0179 (0.0182)	0.0156 (0.0097)	-0.0075 (0.0162)	-0.0002 (0.0164)	0.0156 (0.0193)
TANF*Target	-0.0157 (0.0115)	0.0140** (0.0067)	0.0050 (0.0104)	-0.0164 (0.0131)	0.0116 (0.0127)
	Policy Environment at Age 20				
AFDC Waiver*Target	0.0082 (0.0222)	0.0020 (0.0138)	0.0096 (0.0215)	-0.0009 (0.0202)	0.0230 (0.0233)
TANF*Target	-0.0097 (0.0175)	0.0083 (0.0104)	0.0130 (0.0121)	-0.0130 (0.0178)	0.0205 (0.0185)
	Policy Environment at Age 21				
AFDC Waiver*Target	0.0356 (0.0363)	-0.0298 (0.0231)	0.0130 (0.0298)	-0.0011 (0.0377)	0.0180 (0.0305)
TANF*Target	0.0104 (0.0339)	-0.0286* (0.0153)	0.0394** (0.0167)	-0.0334 (0.0328)	0.0110 (0.0259)

Notes: Coefficients of the estimates from Model (1) are presented in the table. State-specific trends are included in the model. Standard errors are given in the parenthesis and adjusted for correlation within each state. All target groups are females and comparison groups are males. All models include indicators for race, number of children, residence in a metro area, residence in a city center, residence in a suburban area, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. State covariates include indicators for state-level unemployment rate, real state per capita personal income, and the number of welfare caseloads by state. Significance levels are denoted as follows: ***p≤0.01, **0.01<p≤0.05, *0.05<p≤0.10.

THE EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM ON THE POSTSECONDARY DEGREE ATTAINMENT OF YOUNG ADULT WOMEN

REBECCA KIBLER, class of 2013, is a senior from Yarmouth, Maine graduating with majors in Psychology and French and a minor in Education, Schooling, and Society (ESS). She plans to go into language education and next year will working be as an English teaching assistant in Paris. This study was conducted for her ESS capstone and was expanded for her senior thesis project. She would like to thank Dr. Lance Askildson and Dr. Julie Turner for providing invaluable advice throughout the process, the Glynn Family Honors Program for providing project funding, and all participants for giving their time to make this project possible.

THE ROLE OF TRANSLATION EQUIVALENTS IN ACQUIRING DIFFICULT-TO-TRANSLATE SECOND LANGUAGE VOCABULARY

Abstract:

Research has shown that both translation information and contextual information can be useful in helping students acquire second language vocabulary. However, words that are difficult to translate have been neglected in the research literature. The acquisition of such words represents a unique situation in which context and translation can provide mismatched or even conflicting information. Because of this, the acquisition of second language vocabulary provides an opportunity to investigate the relationship between translation and context information for language learners.

In this study, undergraduate students enrolled in a third-semester French class were taught new, difficult-to-translate French vocabulary. Half of the students were given sentences to study that used the words in a variety of contexts. The other half were given the same sentences as well as English translation equivalents. Students who received translations in addition to contexts spent less time studying the provided materials and demonstrated less word understanding on a written test but were more confident in their word understanding than were students who received only context. The addition of translation information seemed to have altered students' interaction with contextual information, leading to less overall word understanding belied by a higher level of confidence. These results indicate that students may approach translations with the assumption that they contain all necessary semantic information and that contextual information is therefore redundant.

An important implication of this research is that teachers should draw student attention to the possible inadequacies of translation equivalents in order to ensure that they are equipped to acquire precise and accurate semantic representations of second language vocabulary.

AMY MASLAR graduated from Notre Dame in 2012 with a B.A. in economics and political science and a minor in the Hesburgh Program in Public Service. She is currently pursuing a J.D. at the University of Illinois College of Law and plans to practice corporate and securities law. She hopes to eventually work in financial regulation to help write legislation and craft policy. This paper was written under the guidance of Professor Alexandra Guisinger and was the 2012 winner of the Guillermo O'Donnell prize for the best senior thesis in the field of comparative politics.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Alexandra Guisinger for her unwavering support throughout this project. With her encouragement, enthusiasm, and wise advice, she helped unfurl the complex world of post-Soviet Europe and clarify the intricacies of international finance. I would have been lost without her teaching and her guidance.

I am grateful to the Department of Political Science at Notre Dame for providing the funding that allowed me to complete the analysis section of this paper. I would especially like to thank Joshua Kaplan for his encouragement and his mentoring throughout my four years at Notre Dame. I will cherish our chats together.

Lastly, and most importantly, I wish to thank my family: my parents, David Maslar and Rene Balos, and my sister, Katie. They are my ultimate inspiration, and my guidepost in everything. It is to them that I dedicate this thesis.

Abstract:

This paper presents an empirical analysis of how reform choice affected growth rates in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe from 1990-2000. Countries in this region chose unique reform decisions based on the state of their political and economic systems after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While much of the existing literature has discussed the type and timing of political and economic reforms that can be implemented in transition states to achieve successful growth rates, legal reforms are largely ignored. The twenty-eight countries in the dataset can be divided into early reformers and late reformers, depending on when each implemented legal reforms. After creating a dataset to account for various types of legal reform, especially financial institutions and legislation, several multivariate regressions were run to measure how legal

reforms affected countries' growth rates. These analyses were done in both "normal times" (1990-1997) as well as "crisis times" (1998-2000) to examine if the effects of these reform decisions were impacted by the Russian Ruble Crisis of 1997. The results show that reform choice, in particular legal institutions, has limited effects on growth rates in "normal years." In years following the Ruble Crisis, however, it is clear that those countries that reformed early fared much better than their late reformer counterparts, as they were less severely affected by and recovered faster from the Crisis.

MONICA VANBLADEL graduated from Notre Dame in 2012 with a double major in Spanish literature and philosophy. Originally from Palatine, IL, she is currently serving with the Jesuit Volunteer Corps Northwest in Wenatchee, WA. She will begin graduate studies in the fall of 2013 in the Ph.D. program in Iberian and Latin American Cultures at Stanford University. Monica would like to thank her advisor, Professor Ben Heller, for his help with this project.

DIFFUSING AUTHORITY: BORGES ON IDENTITY, TRADITION AND CREATION

Abstract:

This paper is a selection from my thesis research, entitled "Diffusing Authority: Borges on Identity, Tradition and Creation." Its first chapter examines the themes of literary tradition, authorship, and the act of reading, as seen in critical essays written by Jorge Luis Borges. This analysis is centered upon the essay "El escritor argentino y la tradición," and I argue that it, along with Borges's other essays, elaborates a creative aesthetic in which the author draws equally from local and global dialogues. Further, within this dualistic balance, the creative enterprise is more productive when author and reader both cultivate multiple identities. Although Borges never detailed a structured theory of writing, his critical essays tend to develop various facets of this view of a creative balance between the local and universal, promoting a critical yet open engagement with foreign or universalized themes and works.

Having established this creative aesthetic, I analyze three of Borges's short stories, all of which center upon themes of creation and innovation: "Averroes's Search," "The Circular Ruins," and "Death and the Compass." The second chapter of my thesis examines how these processes of creation are depicted, as well as the implications of their successes (or failures).

The published excerpt features my analysis of "The Circular Ruins," through the critical lens of Borges's "irreverent cosmopolitan" aesthetic. I argue that this story can be read as an allegory of Borges's creative aesthetic, symbolizing a productive balance between the local and the universal.