The Rise of History: Kant, Herder, and the End of the Enlightenment

MATT TIMMEL
History brings forth new creatures in uninterrupted succession, and on each she bestows as its natural birthright a unique shape and an independent mode of existence.”

-Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*

The place of history in present academia is assured, not even questioned. Yet such a state of affairs was not always the case, as the professional historian did not even come into existence until the nineteenth century with the rise of a modern conception of history. Ernst Cassirer’s assertion that history shapes and creates by “natural birthright” marks the ascendancy of history as an independent academic discipline.¹ The moment when we allowed history to determine our conception of human nature, rather than describe it, is the birth of history; freeing the discipline from the constraints of theology and natural law. My intention is to examine this historical moment straddling the end of the Enlightenment and the beginning of the Romantic era. The critical figure of this moment is Johann Herder, whose cautious rejection of unity and embrace of the unique revolutionized the practice of history. Herder broadened the horizons of history, widening the scope and implications of its practice. In light of this achievement, I intend to analyze Kant’s critique of Herder, particularly his critique of Herder’s methodology. Herder’s divergence with Kant reflects his empiricist tendencies and a fundamental epistemological disagreement that expresses Kant’s isolation from the emerging historicist movement. Herder’s deviation profoundly shaped historicist modes of thought and expanded the possibilities and applications of history.

**History in the Enlightenment**

The intellectual movement, known as historicism, owes a significant intellectual debt to the Herder’s historical revolution, and therefore, it seems wise to take into account the wider implications of historicism before delving into the intricacies of Herder’s thought. George Iggers defines historicism as the “outlook on the world which recognizes the historical character of all
existence; but views history not as an integrated system but as a scene in which a diversity of human wills express themselves.”

Iggers stresses the ‘diversity of human wills’: the intellectual imprint of Herder. The dismissal of identity broadens the scope of history, opening all historical events to the historian’s interest. Iggers goes on to describe historicism as the rejection of “positivistic attempts to explain social behavior by theoretical models; [I]t rejected not only natural law theory but any attempt to formulate norms of political behavior or rights of men.”

Norms, natural rights, and standards for behavior are no longer referential to an external object; instead norms are the product of human experience, in which human experience and cultural norms mutually reinforce themselves in a cyclical understanding of “who we are” and “what we were.” History finds utility in the rejection of unifying concepts like natural law theory.

Theoretical models for behavior reduce history to a descriptive role; but by abandoning natural law theory, history attains determinative power.

The Enlightenment, while not broadening history’s scope, does set the intellectual groundwork for Herder’s historical revolution. Cassirer credits the Enlightenment break with tradition and the impulse to ground all knowledge in reason as critical for the development of a new philosophy of history. By eliminating theology as an epistemological basis, the Enlightenment developed a ‘historical’ way of thinking. The end of mankind is no longer determined by theological assumptions, but by the logical processes of reason. Cassirer describes the ascendancy of historical ways of thinking in the Enlightenment as the methodological counterpart of mathematics.

Just as mathematics becomes the prototype of exact knowledge, so history now becomes the methodological model from which the eighteenth century acquires new understanding for the general task and the specific structure of the abstract sciences. Here again the first step consisted in emancipating these sciences from the tutelage of theology.
History developed as a methodology for use in other fields of study. The abandonment of transcendental concepts strips philosophy of an external point of reference. Instead, the material for abstract philosophy must come from the physical world and sense impressions. The Enlightenment, while not possessing the historical scope of the nineteenth century, thought in a historical manner, taking all known phenomena into consideration.

Cassirer offers Bayle and Montesquieu – thinkers still miles away from Herder – as examples of nascent historical thought during the eighteenth century. Bayle freed the Bible from the restriction of traditional theology by interpreting the Bible as a historical text, using historical methods to interpret it. Bayle observed all known phenomena, much like the encyclopedists D'Alembert and Diderot. Indeed, the historicist tradition owes a great deal to the encyclopedists and their application of Baconian ideals, making the *Encyclopédie* the paradigm for the development of history. Bayle’s willingness to treat the Bible, not as an article of faith and tradition, but as a document subject to the critical eye of reason, is fundamental. Montesquieu’s use of history to evaluate the civil laws and the state is equally significant. A rationally organized state must learn from past mistakes, something that can only be achieved by the painstaking evaluation of historical particularities. Assumptions about the end and purpose of humanity, before based upon theology, are now reassessed through the lens of history. Still, Bayle and Montesquieu, along with the rest of the Enlightenment, only laid the foundation for Herder’s work. The revolutionary aspect of Herder’s new philosophy of history must not be overshadowed by its intellectual debts.

Herder takes what Cassirer calls the “final decisive step” by breaking “the spell of analytical thinking and of the principle of identity.” Herder resisted the temptation to group generalized evidence into universal categories, a temptation that seduced many before him. The
idea of natural law and natural rights loses out to cultural norms understood through anthropology. The anthropological aspect of Herder – which we will soon discuss in greater detail – limits him to the diverse. Each action and individual is unique. There are no essential qualities that unite human experiences, but instead, human history constantly reinvents itself in its plurality. The voyages of Captain Cook and other explorers brought back studies from Tahiti and other primitive cultures, providing an anthropological perspective of mankind never before experienced. The job of a historian, in Herder’s tradition, is to “suit his standards to his subject and not, conversely, to make his subject fit into a uniform, stereotyped pattern.” Aristotle’s judgment that man is a “political animal” seems naïve now that it is put into the context of the Greek polis. Herder’s anthropological breadth shows Aristotle’s conclusions about human nature to be far less objective than previously thought, as they are the product of his cultural surroundings. They take empirical evidence and form universal statements. After Herder’s achievement, generalizations like Aristotle’s must now take into account the wider scope of human experiences before addressing the nature of our existence.

**Herder’s Achievement**

Herder mainly develops his historical ideas in two works, first, in *This Too a Philosophy of History* (1774), and later, with the longer work, *Idea for the Philosophy of History of Mankind* (1784-1791). These works develop the fundamental characteristics of Herder’s historical philosophy: namely, the foundation of an anthropological and psychological approach to history and the appreciation of the uniqueness of national cultures. Herder creates meaning out of the collection of cause-effect conclusions gathered from history. These conclusions allow for a better understanding of the past and better control of the future. In this sense, Herder liberates history and sets the stage for nineteenth century historians, most notably, Hegel. However, there
is a skeptical edge to Herder that lurks beneath the surface. Michael Forster, for one, argues that Herder’s subtle skepticism sets him apart from Hegel and his philosophical descendents. Herder, influenced by Hume’s critique of causal relationships, to which Kant introduced him, must be skeptical about our ability to construct an effective and useful history.\textsuperscript{14} The union of all experience into a universal history would invalidate the uniqueness of human cultures that he believes can form and educate individual nations.

This vacillation between optimistic application of history and skepticism over its possibility is critical to any understanding of Herder. The title of \textit{This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Mankind} is a perfect example of Herder’s uneasy relationship with the application of history. The German word, \textit{Bildung}, is often translated into English as ‘formation’. However, this translation does not quite capture the word’s depth of meaning. To better understand the word, consider the development of the novel during this period. One of the dominant novelistic forms was the \textit{Bildungsroman}, or a novel focused around the education, development, and formation of the novel’s hero. Presumably, the accumulation of these experiences leads towards an end, in which the hero or heroine attains a more universal and objective understanding of his or her identity and the significance of their experiences. Indeed, such novels, on a miniature scale, express a historical way of thinking, emphasizing the transformation of subjective experiences toward objective understanding.

Herder seems to use \textit{Bildung} in a similar way, speaking of the gradual building up of individual societies and the wider human community through understanding of history; a history developed out of the understanding of human cultures.\textsuperscript{15} Yet, the work’s optimistic title is immediately offset by Herder’s choice of epigraph. Choosing a line from Epictetus, the epigraph reads, “It is not things that disquiet human beings but dogmas concerning things.”\textsuperscript{16} The
selection from Epictetus casts the shadow of doubt over the entire enterprise. The collection of experience into anything resembling natural law or natural rights is something to be mistrusted. A judgment like Aristotle’s assertion that man is a ‘political animal’ would draw Herder’s wary eye. Herder reserves judgment upon the utility of history, subtly questioning the extent to which the collected evidence of history can form a foundation for the formation of humanity.

The structure of This Too is similar to Herder’s more extensive work, Idea for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind. Idea is an anthropological history of mankind, tracing the development of human cultures, from Egypt to modern Europe. But before starting out upon this endeavor, Herder puts the work in its Enlightenment context, attacking the era’s tendency towards abstraction, an attack that David Denby cites as the work’s major aim. Unification of diversity under unitary concepts and terms is ultimately impossible and illusory, and the “drive towards progress” is only observable in man’s conflict with history and his environment. Herder considers the treatment of Oriental despotism in light of modern absolutism, pointing out that we unfairly compare the tyrants of the eighteenth century to those ancient and Oriental despots. Herder argues, “We have abstracted for ourselves an Oriental despotism from the most exaggerated, violent phenomena of realms mostly in a state of decay which are only putting on a struggle of resistance with it in their last terror of death.” The patriarchal systems of the past must be understood in their historical context and given their proper due. Placed in this context, he concludes by saying, “you will ‘meet inclinations as they could only be molded onto the human species over time in that land, in that way, for the great purposes of Providence.'

Comparing eighteenth century European government to ancient government is unfair to both parties, as it ignores the particularities of history, seeking to unite both subjects under the artificial concept of ‘despot’. Such a designation fails to understand the historical particularities
of the past and assumes the existence of abstract principles and concepts that exist above physical existence. Herder strikes out against abstract principles, in favor of calculated understanding of the historical and environmental reasons for the development of government and culture.

Having established the importance of the historical and environmental in the development of the human condition, Herder chronologically describes the development of the national cultures of the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Christians, and, finally, modern Europe. Each nation, Herder argued, developed in a specific way because of the cultural and historical developments before them and because of their physical situation. “The Egyptian was not able to exist without the Oriental, the Greek built upon them, the Roman raised himself onto the back of the whole world – truly progress, progressive development, even if no individual won in the process!”

Herder emphasizes the role of geography and climate upon civilizations, as the Phoenicians, for example, sandwiched between the coast and mountains became seafarers; whereas the Egyptians, although possessing a coast, retreated to the lush waters of the Nile, for the most part shunning the sea. ThisToo shows how each civilization is founded upon the developments of past civilizations, developing from the conflict with history and environment. They learn from their advancements and mistakes, but also are affected by forces outside their control. Climate may impede commerce; geography may impede the development of the arts or philosophy. Ultimately, culture is the product of pre-existent cultures and the environment that surrounds it.

Herder concludes ThisToo by considering the usefulness of the history he has just constructed. For while Herder has constructed a convincing argument for the diversity of human cultures and the cumulative nature of their development; he has determined neither the end of
this history, nor its utility. Herder began by suggesting the hand of Providence shapes history, molding one culture in this way, and the other in that, with the possibility of an end upon the horizon. Herder reconsiders that notion at the conclusion of the text, positing the construction of an objective history to guide the species. “And if one day we found a standpoint to take an overview of the whole merely of our species! – whither the chain between peoples and regions of the earth which initially advanced so slowly, then wound its way through nations with so much clashing…we will see the ripe harvest of seeds which…yield such ambiguous fruit.”

Herder clearly sees the possibility of an absolute history, applicable to life, for the construction of a cosmopolitan culture, the Bildung, uniting the diversity of humanity. His realistic attitude towards sensory experience allows him to admit the plausibility of such an achievement. The advancements of all cultures will be accumulated, unifying the diversity of human experiences.

Yet, he also has doubts at the possibility of this history; for while he will not discount its possibility, Herder also seems content with the development of distinct national cultures, what he calls fragments of life. He inquires rhetorically as to the meaning of the fragments, responding with an ambiguous quotation from Lucan. The quotation may be translated as “How deeply beneath the night lay our day,” or as “How great lay our day beneath the night!” The passage’s ambiguity emphasizes the impossibility of determining the purpose of our distinct culture. Are national cultures part of a providential plan? Perhaps cultures, while building upon each other, are not aimed at a single pinnacle of human consciousness, as Hegel would argue, but instead possess parallel validity. Clearly, Herder has reservations about verbalizing a purpose for this history, pinning down history’s end. Indeed, he praises those who are firmly situated in their culture while understanding that our cultures’ lack universal validity. These people “who even then does not regret his fragment of life!”

History finds utility in the development of national
culture, even if it cannot create an overarching ‘standpoint’ from which to unite the diversity of humanity.

Herder’s develops the ideas from *This Too* and develops them in *Idea for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*. The *Idea* is the crowning achievement of his intellectual career. The central themes of *This Too* reappear in greater detail, such as his emphasis on cultural specificity and the role of the environment. The first six books of the *Idea* provide a backdrop on which he will then present his anthropological observations. These books describe the general structure of the world, beginning with basic characteristics of the Earth and the heavens and culminating with man. He sees that the powers of environment and history combine to shape individuals and cultures in a dynamic manner. When Herder says, in Book VII, that “the history of man is ultimately a theater of transformations,” he wants us to understand the cumulative nature of cultural development. Each culture builds on the next, so that “the whole course of man’s life is change: the different periods of his life are tales of transformations, and the whole species is one continued metamorphosis.” The change from generation to generation is an essential aspect of the Herder’s new history.

As in *This Too*, climate and environment remain significant forces. The ‘one species of man’ naturalizes itself to every climate and environment on earth, and each climate alters its inhabitants. Europe, for example, “was a dank forest; and other regions, at present well cultivated, were the same. They are now exposed to the rays of the Sun; and the inhabitants have changed with the climate. The fact of Egypt would have been nothing more than the slime of the Nile.” Yet, it is not only climate that affects mankind. We also are capable of shaping the land, so that cultures from seemingly similar climates may be quite different. Herder calls the force of climate “imperceptible” because it “strikes us indeed in the general view of life and
manners of indigenous nations, but is very difficult to be delineated distinctly.” The natural
powers of man, what he calls the “genetic power,” resist the degeneration of the species. Man is
“the most perfect animal plant, a native genius in human form” and so all humans are of the
same species. Climate and the genetic power intermingle to create the multitude of national
cultures, each equally valid in the history of man. For that reason, Herder discourages the
dismissal of indigenous cultures, instead calling for the “physico-geographical history of the
descent and diversification of our species according to periods and climates, which at every step
must accord us important results.” With the mapping of the cultures of the species throughout
history, the possibility exists for uniting the diverse elements of humanity into one culture. The
plausibility of universal culture is questionable of course; for, at its core, the Idea develops a
history for the development of individual nations. Unique national cultures (German, French,
Chinese, etc.) are the avenues down which mankind must travel to refine themselves. The
consideration of a universal history that unites individual cultures is secondary, and its possibility
depends upon this ‘mapping’ of cultures.

From this consideration, Herder concludes that “Humanity is the End of Human Nature;
and with this End, God has put their own Fate into the Hands of Mankind.” The development
of national cultures; of art, literature, and music is necessary for the refinement of humanity.
Herder wants to move mankind away from the crudest form of the senses, the sensations of pain
and pleasure, to a higher consciousness of art. Each culture develops from the next, so that a
“chain of cultivation may be drawn.” Cultures may improve or degrade, according to the
influence of history and environment. The remainder of the work is dedicated to exhaustively
cataloging this ‘chain of cultivation’ throughout human history and finding what, if any,
conclusions may be drawn from this history. The universalizing impulse of the Enlightenment is
under attack here, as Herder wants to place every era, even the Enlightenment in its context. To use the language of *This Too a History*, Herder wants to teach us that our cultures are ‘fragments of life,’ not cultures grounded in universal reason. History will “assign us our short and tranquil scene on that great theatre, where Reason and Goodness, contending indeed with wild powers, still, from their nature, create order, and hold on in the path of victory.”

The ascendancy of Europe over the rest of the world must be credited to the inheritance of past cultures, climate, and geography; and its failure to create unity in diversity must be accepted. Still, Herder holds out hope for this unity, when he concludes by saying, “Reason, however, and the effective joint activity of mankind, keep on their unwearied course; and it may even be deemed a good sign, when the best fruits ripen not prematurely.”

**Tutor and Pupil: Kant’s critique of Herder**

Herder was a student of Kant’s from 1762-1765 during Kant’s pre-critical period. This tutor-pupil relationship had an enormous impact upon Herder, as he admired Kant’s freedom of thought and encouragement of that freedom in his own pupils. Herder praised his teacher as not knowing “what intrigue was, sectarianism, and prejudice were alien to him. [H]is philosophy provoked independent thought, and I can think of no more efficient agency to this end than his lectures, his thought was borne before our eyes.”

Kant even introduced Herder to Hume, whose critique of causal relationships would have a profound impact upon both of them. The critical examination of physical phenomena through Reason is the Enlightenment’s intellectual legacy, inherited by Herder and extended into the nineteenth century by Herder’s historical revolution. Kant was very much part of movement before his Copernican Revolution, when he cast a more critical eye upon metaphysics. In this sense, Herder is a descendent of Kant, developing his pre-critical thought and applying it to history.
Yet, Kant still highly disapproved of his pupil’s work, particularly of its dependence upon analogy and poetic flourishes instead of logical rigor. After the publishing of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant wished to replace tradition with a ‘critical’ metaphysics; one in which the formal qualities of sense impressions were seen as the imposition of the mind upon the raw material of reality. We do not see things as they really are, but rather, as constructs of the mind. Herder’s application of history to life, as a means of forming culture (Bildung) runs contrary to Kant’s basic philosophy. Kant’s views on history and his reviews of Herder’s work reflect this basic disconnect between teacher and pupil.

In “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” published in 1784, Kant developed an Idea of history in consideration of his new critical metaphysics. Like Herder, Kant sees history as the workings of a providential force. He explains that “One can regard the history of the human species, in the large, as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally, and for this purpose, also an externally perfect national constitution.” Such an explanation seems to indicate a resemblance between Kantian and Herderian history. Both emphasize the manifest hand of Providence working its way through history. This resemblance, however, is a shallow one. In Kant’s reviews of Herder and “Universal History,” significant discrepancies are present. Kant’s Idea is a regulative one. The idea, he says, “is only a reflection of what a philosophical mind...could attempt to do from another perspective.” This history is founded in an *a priori* principle and cannot replace “history as such, whose composition is wholly empirical.” History is a completely empirical endeavor and should never be confused as constitutive.

In 1784, Kant published the first of several reviews on the *Idea for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*. Questioning Herder’s application of an ideal history to empirical science,
Kant particularly questioned the anthropomorphic nature of Herder’s history. When Herder describes how the arrangement of the body fulfills the practice of reason, Kant reminds the reader that they are about to take off on a “metaphysical wing.” The organic force which we spoke of earlier - what Herder saw as constitutive of all humans - cannot be admitted into natural science. “The unity of organic force, as self-constituting with respect to the manifold of all organic creatures and as subsequently acting upon organs according to their difference so as to establish their many genera and species, is an Idea which lies wholly outside the field of empirical natural science.”

The Kantian ‘Idea’ is regulative, not constitutive. The mind imposes itself upon the experiences of the understanding, so that this idea cannot tell us anything about the true nature of things (*noumena*). An Idea may bring unity from diversity, but it possesses no practical application. The difficulty with Herder comes from the fact that Herder’s idea of history is no longer regulative, but also constitutive. Herder’s history describes the nature of things as they are, not, as Kant would say, as if they are impositions of the mind.

Kant disapproves of Herder’s use of analogy and poetics to develop his idea of history because it takes sense impressions and, by analogy, makes a judgment as to the nature and purpose of man. It is not small thing to Kant when Herder tries to understand the structure of the human body, for,

To want to determine how a simple organization directed solely to this end could contain the ability to reason…that patently exceeds all human reason. For reason, thus conceived, totters on the top rung of the physiological ladder and is on the point of taking metaphysical wing.

Herder does not recognize the distance between the subjective imposition of cause-effect upon the ‘way things actually are’ in the manner Kant does. Herder’s dependence upon analogies is what Simon Swift calls an “inappropriate synthesis of British empiricism…to German school philosophy.” Herder takes it as a given that the sensory data he collects and organizes is the way
things actually are. The use of analogy from sense impressions lacks the logical rigor Kant requires. When reason fails, Herder retreats to metaphor, which for Kant is unacceptable.\textsuperscript{45} Such anthropomorphism is tantamount to metaphysics, as “humans are congenitally incapable, according to the ‘character’ of their form of understanding, of formulating a concept that adequately determines the cause of the parts of nature…the question of the purpose of existence is not to be answered according to…the kind of mishmash of philosophy of history and metaphysics that he found in Herder.”\textsuperscript{46}

Kant’s criticism of Herder – that he leans too heavily on the shoulders of analogy and experience to create a new history – are not unfounded. Kant pinpoints Herder’s tendency to metaphysics when reason fails him in explanation of ideas like ‘organic force’. Yet, this aspect of Herder may not be a weakness, but instead, a means of overcoming the faults of Kant’s own philosophical system. Joseph Zammito, for one, sees Herder as fitting into the larger framework of ‘epistemological liberalization’ taking place in the first half of the eighteenth century. Writers used poetic devices like metaphor and analogy in order to bring thought down to reality, widening the public audience.\textsuperscript{47} Kant’s concern that Herder mixed British empiricism with German philosophy is not unfounded, as it seems he was influenced by Hume’s “Of Essay Writing,” which sought to bring philosophy to the public. Herder’s methodology seeks to close the gap that Kant widens between the objective ‘what-is’ and the subjective reality imposed by the mind. Herder never seemed to accept Kant’s idea of a priori faculties like logic, saying that that are “nothing other than the experimental psychology of the higher faculties, and thus becomes quite different from what it is now.”\textsuperscript{48} Zammito explains the appeal to analogy as an expression of Herder’s empiricist impulses, based in the tradition of Bacon, Diderot, and Hume.
Out of the tradition of the *Encyclopédie*, it is not surprising that Herder retreats to generalization and analogy to explain the history and origins of cultures.

As we can see, Herder’s departure from Kant is founded in their differing epistemological views. A Kantian idea of history would never have liberated history because it would be an Idea of reason. Herder’s empirical methodology is significant because it made history applicable, and as German historicists owe a debt to Kantian thought, without Herder, their achievements would be impossible. Herder, of course, did not possess the same optimistic conception of history as progress that we see in Hegel. As Zammito says, Herder did not see project of human history as the tracing of “the trajectory of ‘progress’ but to discriminate the varieties of human excellence.”

As our earlier discussion of *This Too* and *Idea* demonstrates, Herder possessed significant skepticism as to the possibility of ascending to a universal, providential peak. Yet, he did see history as applicable to national cultures, for their development and refinement. The significance of Herder’s split with Kant is its daring; the willingness to embrace history, while still maintaining healthy skepticism as to its pragmatic use. “Herder’s utopianism is tempered and in his best work controlled, but it gives him the energy and the inspiration to dare to enter the hermeneutic circle and bring back to historical consideration treasures of the cultural past.”

Historicism grew out of this fertile ground.

By entering this hermeneutic circle, hoping, Herder set the stage for the nineteenth century historians, epitomized by Hegel. Hegel’s synthesis of Herder and Kant, drew on Herder’s analysis of ancient, medieval, and modern European cultures. The structure of Herder’s historical works and Hegel’s *Philosophy of History* are stunningly similar. Hegel’s willingness to take historical events (phenomena) and shape them into a compelling narrative of the World Spirit (Geist) is equally an intellectual descendent of Herder. The notion of a dialectic running
through history is quite similar to Herder’s notion of the development of cultures, which the Greeks building on the Phoenecians and the Romans building on the Greeks. The Hegelian vision of universal consciousness or the Marxist vision of the dictatorship of the proletariat took Herder one step further, side-stepping his predecessors’ skepticism and fixing ends to his insights on human development.

The empirical nature of history after Herder shows the significance of his divergence from Kant, freeing ideas from abstraction and rooting them in experience. By carefully scrutinizing this historical moment, one can see two paths develop: Kant’s highly abstract and systematic account of human experience; and Herder’s aesthetic and realistic account, one that spawns a historicist account of the world, which remains with us. Our present conception of human history as progressing and building upon itself in a linear chain is, in part, the product of Herder’s momentous split with Kant.

3 Iggers, p. 458.
4 Iggers, p. 458.
5 Cassirer, p. 200-201.
6 Cassirer, p. 207.
8 Cassirer, p. 214.
9 Cassirer, p. 231.
11 Cassirer, 231.
15 Forster, 272.
16 Forster, 272.
19 Herder, This Too, 280.
20 Herder, This Too, 299.
21 Herder, This Too, 284.
22 Herder, This Too, 358.
23 Herder, This Too, 358.
24 Herder, This Too, 358.
26 Herder, Reflections, 4.
27 Herder, Reflections, 19.
28 Herder, Reflections, 20.
29 Herder, Reflections, 23.
30 Herder, Reflections, 29.
31 Herder, Reflections, 82.
32 Herder, Reflections, 33.
33 Herder, Reflections, 100.
34 Herder, Reflections, 118.
35 Herder, Reflections, 398.
36 Zammito, 138.
38 Zammito, 150.
40 Kant, “Universal History,” 39.
41 Kant, “Universal History,” 39.
43 Kant, 38.
44 Kant, 38-39.
46 Swift, 228.
47 Zammito, 310.
49 Zammito, 333.
50 Zammito, 342.