TC1: Automated Permission Authorization Requests (PARs)
We will develop a solution for replacing the non-scalable, time-consuming process of manually evaluating sUAS Permission Authorization Requests (PARs) with a fully automated solution that grants, denies, or issues probationary access almost instantaneously for both simple and complex flight requests with full transparency about the decision. We address five sub-topics as follows:
- TC1.1 Socio-Technical Challenges of the DRP: We address two fundamental questions of “Under what conditions is an sUAS safe for its intended mission?” and “when and how is it appropriate to collect this information?” Specifically we will study reported sUAS incidents, interview sUAS safety assessors, review approved FAA waivers to identify effective safety claims, and conduct focus groups with a broad set of domain experts including sUAS pilots.
- TC1.2 On-Entry Safety Case Assessment: On receiving an aPAR, the SAM must determine whether a specific sUAS can operate safely under current conditions in the targeted SADE zone. The SAM makes this determination through generating and reasoning over a Safety Assurance Case (aka Safety Case). The Safety Case is a set of hierarchically composed logical arguments that give reason to affirm that the safety goals of a product are met under specific environmental conditions, assumptions, constraints and concrete evidence supporting the argument.
- TC1.3: Automating On-Entry Decision Making: Upon entry leverage the safety-assurance case in order to consistently make fair, correct, and transparent decisions so that any sUAS that is capable of completing its requested flight safely and legally is authorized to do so, whilst others are either denied authorization or admitted on a probationary basis with appropriate constraints and/or monitoring requirements.
- TC1.4: Integrating Anomaly Detection into SADE: To maintain and evolve the DRP (Drone Reputation Model) we need to collect, monitor, and analyze flight data at various phases of the operation. Anomalies detected in flight logs upon exiting a SADE Zone provide critical information that is used to evolve the sUAS’ DRP and guide maintenance and remediation processes prior to subsequent flights. As part of our currently funded NASA project [#80NSSC21M0185; 06/21-05/24]) we have developed multiple techniques for sUAS flight data analysis, diagnostics, and real-time flight adaptations, which we will utilize in the proposed work.
- TC1.5: Tamper-proof, Controlled, and Encrypted DRP: sUAS operators are likely to rebuff any form of monitoring that is perceived as privacy invading – even if only activated in well-defined, congested, or urban areas. Therefore, we emphasize the criticality of operator privacy along with other essential qualities such as accuracy of the data and correctness of decisions. We adopt a blockchain approach in order to provide three critical security and privacy guarantees. First we guarantee that DRP records are tamperproof, meaning that DRPs will only be updated when predefined, authorized qualifying events occur, for example, when the SAM updates the sUAS’ DRP upon its exit from a controlled SADE Zone. Second, we guarantee that DRP records will remain encrypted, that they can only be accessed by authorized entities, and that those entities only access essential information that is needed to perform their current task. Finally, we guarantee that any entity making an authorized request for DRP information will receive the latest version of the DRP, and not an earlier stale version.
Go to: Home, Technical Challenges Overview, TC2, TC3