{"id":548,"date":"2018-02-11T13:16:26","date_gmt":"2018-02-11T17:16:26","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/world-politics-2018\/?page_id=548"},"modified":"2018-02-11T13:16:26","modified_gmt":"2018-02-11T17:16:26","slug":"as-west-fears-the-rise-of-autocrats-hungary-shows-whats-possible","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/world-politics-2018\/as-west-fears-the-rise-of-autocrats-hungary-shows-whats-possible\/","title":{"rendered":"As West Fears the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What\u2019s Possible"},"content":{"rendered":"

By\u00a0PATRICK KINGSLEY<\/a><\/strong>FEB. New York Times, 10, 2018<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

BUDAPEST \u2014 The senior leaders of Fidesz gathered on the banks of the Danube, in a building known as the Hungarian White House, stunned by the scale of their good fortune. Their right-wing party\u00a0had won unexpectedly sweeping political power<\/a>\u00a0in national elections. The question was how to use it.<\/p>\n

Several men urged caution. But Viktor Orban, the prime minister-elect, disagreed. The voting result, Mr. Orban continued, had given him the right to carry out a radical overhaul of the country\u2019s Constitution.<\/p>\n

Mr. Orban won the argument.<\/p>\n

The private meetings, recounted by two people who were in the room and by a third who was briefed on the discussions at the time, occurred in early May 2010. Nearly eight years later, Mr. Orban has remade Hungary\u2019s political system into what one critic calls \u201ca new thing under the sun.\u201d Once praised by watchdog groups as a leading democracy of post-Soviet Eastern Europe, Hungary is now considered a democracy\u00a0in sharp, worrisome decline<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Through legislative fiat and force of will, Mr. Orban has transformed the country into a political greenhouse for an odd kind of soft autocracy, combining crony capitalism and far-right rhetoric with a single-party political culture. He has done this even as Hungary remains a member of the European Union and receives billions of dollars in funding from the bloc. European Union officials did little as Mr. Orban transformed Hungary into what he calls an \u201cilliberal democracy<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Now Mr. Orban is directly challenging the countries that have long dominated the European bloc, predicting that 2018 will be \u201ca year of great battles<\/a>.\u201d At home, he is pushing new legislation, this time to place\u00a0financial penalt<\/a>i<\/a>es<\/a>\u00a0on civil society groups that help migrants. His domestic political standing is largely unchallenged, partly because of changes he has made to the electoral system; he is almost certain to win another term in April elections.<\/p>\n

In the European Union\u2019s political hierarchy, Mr. Orban has often been cast as an unruly outsider \u2014 a loud, populist voice peripheral to the mainstream, and peripheral to real power. But he is now possibly the bloc\u2019s greatest political challenge. He is arguing that Europe\u2019s postwar liberal consensus \u201cis now at an end\u201d \u2014 and his vision is being emulated in Poland, while his influence is felt\u00a0elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u201cViktor Orban has demonstrated that in Europe things are possible,\u201d the leader of Poland\u2019s governing Law and Justice party, Jaroslaw Kaczynski,\u00a0said in 2016<\/a>. \u201cYou have given an example, and we are learning from your example.\u201d<\/p>\n

Mr. Orban is emblematic of a strongman age. He\u00a0has courted President Vladimir V. Putin<\/a>\u00a0of Russia and praised President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey. In 2016, he became the first Western leader to\u00a0endorse the\u00a0<\/a>Republican presidential\u00a0<\/a>nominee<\/a>, Donald J. Trump. Although Mr. Orban lacks the global profile of those leaders, what he is doing in Europe is seen as part of a broader decline of democracy in the world.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhat makes this place so important and interesting is that something new is taking place,\u201d said Michael Ignatieff, the president and rector of Central European University, an American college in Budapest\u00a0that<\/a>\u00a0Mr. Orban has tried<\/a>\u00a0to close<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u201cOrban has pioneered a new model of single-party rule that has spread through Eastern Europe, which is unlikely to spread west because civil society, independent institutions and the rule of law is too strong in Western Europe,\u201d said Mr. Ignatieff, who is also a human rights scholar and a former\u00a0leader of the Liberal Party in Canada<\/a>. He added, however, that it \u201ccould break the E.U. apart if this conflict between liberal democracy in the West and single-party states in the East can\u2019t be resolved.\u201d<\/p>\n

Zoltan Kovacs<\/a>, the Hungarian government spokesman, and the only current official who agreed to speak on the record for this article, defended Mr. Orban\u2019s actions as a determined effort \u201cto get rid of the remnants of communism that are still with us, not only in terms of institutions but in terms of mentality.\u201d<\/p>\n

Mr. Orban is undeniably popular with many Hungarians, and recent polls show that roughly 50 percent of decided voters support Fidesz. A weak, divided opposition helps him, as does a pliant news media. In a small nation troubled by historical anxieties, he also has positioned himself as a buffer against what he portrays as modern-day threats: such as European Union bureaucrats; or George Soros, the liberal Hungarian-American philanthropist; or, above all, migrants who seek to settle in the country.<\/p>\n

\u201cMigration fits into a wider agenda about the protection of the Hungarian people,\u201d said Andras Biro-Nagy, a politics lecturer at Corvinus University of Budapest. \u201cHe\u2019s protecting us from everything.\u201d<\/p>\n

To understand how Mr. Orban has reshaped Hungary, start with the private meetings in 2010. Fidesz had just won national elections by a margin that qualified the party for more than two-thirds of the seats in Parliament, even though it had only won a slim majority of votes. Party leaders had a mandate. But to what extent could they legitimately wield it?<\/p>\n

Weeks later, Mr. Orban and his lieutenants began a legislative assault on the Hungarian Constitution, curbing civil society and, to less fanfare, diverting billions of euros in European Union and federal money toward loyal allies.<\/p>\n

First, he moved simultaneously to curb\u00a0the Hungarian media<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0the judiciary<\/a>. Next came the erosion of the country\u2019s\u00a0checks and balances<\/a>, which has helped Mr. Orban share the spoils of power with close friends and important businessmen.<\/p>\n

And then, came the electoral process. The restructuring of Hungary\u2019s election system, including a redrawing the electoral map, has helped him remain in power, even as his party has won fewer votes.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe election law does not correspond to democratic features,\u201d said Imre Voros, a founding member of the Hungarian constitutional court, \u201cand Hungary is therefore not a democratic country.\u201d<\/p>\n

Institutions Under Assault<\/p>\n

Sworn into office on May 29, 2010, Mr. Orban re-engineered Hungary\u2019s institutional framework so swiftly that even Fidesz lawmakers were stunned. During the next five years, Fidesz used its two-thirds majority in Parliament to pass more than 1,000 laws, many of them enacted after a few hours of debate \u2014 and often presented by low-ranking lawmakers who had neither written nor read them.<\/p>\n

Gergely Barandy, a Socialist lawmaker, recalled being asked by a Fidesz counterpart in October 2011 about a proposal to bar criminal suspects from speaking to a lawyer for the first 48 hours of their detention.<\/p>\n

Mr. Barandy said a shocked Fidesz lawmaker had asked him, \u201cHave you seen this bill?\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cYes, I did see it,\u201d Mr. Barandy said he replied. \u201cBut did you know you were the one who introduced it?\u201d<\/p>\n

The new laws represented an assault on a Hungarian democracy that Freedom House, a watchdog group that measures democracy around the world,\u00a0had rated<\/a>\u00a0as one of the strongest in post-Soviet Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n

Two media laws created a chill for independent journalists pursuing stories that displeased the government. The laws allowed Mr. Orban to appoint his own candidates to lead the country\u2019s two main media regulators, while simultaneously giving those regulators more power to fine and punish independent news outlets. (Most of those outlets have subsequently been bought by allies of Mr. Orban.)<\/p>\n

But the country\u2019s state-run news outlets were also under threat. Soon after Mr. Orban took power, several new managers appeared in the newsroom of Hungarian public radio. \u201cThese guys were not exactly journalists,\u201d said Attila Mong, then a popular public radio host. \u201cThey were more like propagandists.\u201d<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Mr. Mong said that, before the 2010 elections, he had felt free to cover politics as he saw fit. That changed after the new managers arrived and the new laws took effect.<\/p>\n

\u201cThere was this fear in the newsroom that we didn\u2019t have before,\u201d Mr. Mong said. Around 1,000 employees were pushed out at public broadcasters \u2014 about a third of the total staff. Mr. Mong, who held a minute\u2019s silence on air in protest, was one of them.<\/p>\n

Two decades earlier, the founders of Hungary\u2019s post-Communist democracy created nonpartisan government monitors to keep the country\u2019s leader in check. Seeking to dismantle this system, Mr. Orban put ex-Fidesz politicians in charge at several institutions, including the State Audit Office, which monitors government expenditures, and the State Prosecution Service, which oversees criminal prosecutions. His supporters also now control the board overseeing the National Fiscal Council, an independent body scrutinizing economic policy.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0National Fiscal Council<\/a>, which angered Mr. Orban by expressing mild concern about his first budget in October 2010, is now \u201ccompletely irrelevant,\u201d said Balazs Romhanyi, who was chief of staff at the council before being fired in December 2010. \u201cTheir mandate and their tools are designed to have zero effect.\u201d<\/p>\n

Yet it is Hungary\u2019s judiciary that has perhaps been most affected. During the country\u2019s democratic transition, a Constitutional Court was created to protect fundamental rights and uphold rule of law. Judges had to be nominated by a committee staffed by representatives of all the parties in Parliament \u2014 ensuring that all judges were chosen by consensus.<\/p>\n

But Fidesz voted to give itself complete power in choosing the candidates. Eight years later, the court is made up entirely of judges appointed during Fidesz\u2019s tenure. Two were previously Fidesz lawmakers. A third was once a top aide to Mr. Orban. And the vast majority have usually voted with the government, according to\u00a0research published by the University of Wisconsin<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The government has been undeterred by the occasional disagreement. When the Constitutional Court struck down Fidesz laws that, among other things, criminalized homelessness, Parliament amended the Constitution to\u00a0include most of the laws<\/a>\u00a0that the court had rejected.<\/p>\n

Homelessness is once again a crime in Hungary.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt was incredibly unscrupulous, and the kind of thing you see in Azerbaijan,\u201d said Judge Laszlo Kiss, one of the last constitutional judges to have been appointed before Mr. Orban came to power. (He retired in 2016.)<\/p>\n

At the same time, Mr. Orban\u2019s party has taken aim at the broader judiciary, giving one of his oldest friends, Tunde Hando, the overall say over which judges get appointed to senior positions.<\/p>\n

Numerous judges were appointed before Mr. Orban took office, but his tightening grip on the judiciary has placed them under heavy political pressure, said Judge Peter Szepeshazi, one of the few judges to publicly criticize the system.<\/p>\n

\u201cIt\u2019s not a totalitarian system,\u201d Judge Szepeshazi said. \u201cBut it\u2019s very autocratic.\u201d<\/p>\n

In 2012, a Fidesz mayor in the town of Szekszard privately told his councilors that their town was among several that would be installing new streetlights, paid for by European Union funds. Nothing would be made public about the tender process for more than a year. But the mayor said he was already in contact with one potential bidder. The company was new to the lighting business. But it was part-owned by Mr. Orban\u2019s son-in-law,\u00a0Istvan Tiborcz<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, the company got the contract.<\/p>\n

Akos Hadhazy, one of the councilors, thought something was fishy. \u201cA company belonging to the prime minister\u2019s son-in-law was already meeting with mayors about a future public procurement before an E.U. grant was even announced \u2014 and then he ended up as the main contractor,\u201d said Mr. Hadhazy,\u00a0who recorded the meeting<\/a>. \u201cThis has more than just a bad smell. We can see that the system is rotting.\u201d<\/p>\n

Crony capitalism, critics argue, has become rampant. Five associates of Mr. Orban have particularly benefited: Mr. Tiborcz; Lorinc Meszaros, the mayor of Mr. Orban\u2019s childhood village; Arpad Habony, one of Mr. Orban\u2019s closest advisers; Istvan Garancsi, who watches soccer games with Mr. Orban; and Lajos Simicska, one of Mr. Orban\u2019s oldest friends. Between 2010 and 2016 alone, these five men won roughly 5 percent of government and European Union contracts, a total of $2.5 billion, according to\u00a0an\u00a0<\/a>analysis<\/a>\u00a0by the Corruption Research Center Budapest.<\/p>\n

Mr. Simicska, however, had a falling out with Mr. Orban in 2015, and he stopped winning government contracts around that time. Mr. Meszaros, a former gas-fitter with little previous business experience, has since won many more public procurements. Since the start of 2018, Mr. Meszaros\u2019s company has already won more than $400 million in European Union contracts.<\/p>\n

Mr. Orban\u2019s critics say that such cronyism is possible because of the erosion of Hungary\u2019s democratic checks and balances. The country\u2019s chief prosecutor, Peter Polt, is supposed to be an independent official, but \u201cseems to be a friend of the Orban government,\u201d said Miklos Ligeti, a former prosecutor who is now head of legal research at the Hungarian branch of Transparency International, a global anticorruption watchdog.<\/p>\n

\u2018Dance of the Peacock\u2019<\/p>\n

Mr. Orban has been able to accrue so much power in Budapest partly because he met little effective opposition from Brussels, the seat of the European Union, which was founded on the principles of rule of law and liberal democracy.<\/p>\n

Mr. Orban\u2019s constitutional overhaul quickly drew the eye of the European Commission, the bloc\u2019s executive arm. The European justice commissioner at the time, Viviane Reding,\u00a0did win some concessions<\/a>\u00a0from Mr. Orban on certain issues, but most of the commission\u2019s rulings had little practical effect on the overall picture.<\/p>\n

The main problem was that the founders of the European Union never considered the possibility that a member state would backslide, and did not create procedures to deal conclusively with such an event, Ms. Reding said.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe never thought that someone would go the other way,\u201d Ms. Reding said. \u201cIt was unthinkable.\u201d<\/p>\n

The so-called nuclear option \u2014 the suspension of Hungary\u2019s voting rights \u2014 was considered too drastic for the situation. Mr. Orban has subsequently claimed to have tricked European officials into believing that he had made substantive changes, even though they were largely cosmetic, a tactic he has publicly described as the \u201cdance of the peacock.\u201d<\/p>\n

Europe\u2019s main alliance of center-right parties, the European People\u2019s Party, which relied on Fidesz\u2019s votes in the European Parliament, did not offer much resistance, either. And leaders of the alliance feared that expelling Mr. Orban could tilt power in the European Parliament toward center-left parties.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe seat difference between us and the Socialists is not monumental,\u201d said Frank Engel, a lawmaker with the European People\u2019s Party.<\/p>\n

Faced with minimal resistance in Brussels, Mr. Orban\u2019s next test is in the Hungarian general election in April. He is expected to win easily, despite the possibility that Fidesz could win fewer votes than in any election in 20 years. That\u2019s what happened in 2014: Fidesz formed a second supermajority in Parliament, even though it had won more votes in not only the 2010 election, but also in the elections the party lost in 2002 and 2006.<\/p>\n

Fidesz officials attributed this awkward fact to lower turnout, to the popularity of their nationalist policies and to the weakness of the opposition. But the opposition, as well as several analysts and academics, argued that the constitutional changes had gamed the electoral system through gerrymandering.<\/p>\n

Voting districts that had historically leaned to the left were reshaped to include around 5,000 more voters than districts that traditionally leaned right, according to\u00a0an analysis by polling specialists<\/a>\u00a0at Political Capital, a Hungarian think tank. This meant that leftist parties needed more votes to win a seat than Fidesz did.<\/p>\n

The new system still allowed parties that won no voting districts to enter Parliament via a system of proportional representation. But even that system, which had previously given a leg up to smaller parties, was amended to favor parties that had won more constituencies \u2014 another boost to Fidesz.<\/p>\n

\u201cSometimes I feel like I\u2019m traveling in a time machine and going back to the \u201960s,\u201d said Zoltan Illes, a Fidesz lawmaker from 2010 to 2014, who has since become a critic of the government.<\/p>\n

\u201cAll the characteristics and features on the surface are of democracy,\u201d he added. \u201cBut behind it there is only one party and only one truth.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By\u00a0PATRICK KINGSLEYFEB. New York Times, 10, 2018   BUDAPEST \u2014 The senior leaders of Fidesz gathered on the banks of the Danube, in a building known as the Hungarian White House, stunned by the scale of their good fortune. Their right-wing party\u00a0had won unexpectedly sweeping political power\u00a0in national elections. The question was how to use […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":114,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-548","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/world-politics-2018\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/548","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/world-politics-2018\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/world-politics-2018\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/world-politics-2018\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/114"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/world-politics-2018\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=548"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/world-politics-2018\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/548\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":549,"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/world-politics-2018\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/548\/revisions\/549"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.nd.edu\/world-politics-2018\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=548"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}