International relations uses analogies of the past to describe situations today. The Munich analogy–appeasement–and the Pearl Harbor analogy–surprise attack–are two of the most common and well-known examples. Unfortunately, the overuse of these analogies often stems from a misunderstanding of their true history and subsequently distorts policy recommendations for the future.
In a conversation at the recent Yalta European Strategy Conference, Center for European Policy Analysis President Alina Polyakova declared that a Russian military collapse in Ukraine would be analogous to the breakup of the Soviet Union1. How does she know this? Is she a Kremlin insider, or does she enjoy unparalleled access to Russian federative politics? Today’s moment is different from the final years of the Cold War in many ways, not only because the Russian Federation is proportionately weaker than the Soviet Union was but also because the USSR did not disintegrate after battlefield collapse.
Analogies
Polyakova’s claim is one instance of international relations scholars using analogies of the past to advocate for positions in the present and future. Analogies are inferences based on the logic that if two events are similar in one respect, they may be similar in many other ways2. Two of the most commonly used analogies today are those of Munich and Pearl Harbor. At the Munich Conference of 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Nazi leader Adolf Hitler by granting him Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland. Chamberlain hoped that Hitler would be satisfied with the agreement but did not realize his hegemonic ambitions. Thus, Munich helped Hitler prepare for World War II, and scholars of history should know never to give an inch to a murderous dictator, as Chamberlain did in 1938.
A second analogy concerns Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Ostensibly, the United States was unprepared for the surprise attack, leading to President Roosevelt’s “a date which will live in infamy” declaration and America’s subsequent involvement in the Second World War. Instead, policymakers and the military must always be ready for conflict.
Are these analogies accurate? They are not. Analogies often incorrectly promote ahistorical policies. Analysts misunderstand both the Munich Conference of 1938 and Japan’s decision to bomb Pearl Harbor in 1941. The common stories promote war-mongering, intense defense spending, and remaining on constant alert. Leaders are fearful of surprise attacks and their publics labeling them as appeasers or pacifists.
Unfortunately, this historical distortion is common. For example, Republican Senator Kevin Cramer of North Dakota claimed in 2022 that the Biden administration had failed to respond to Putin decisively, instead creating a “new international policy of appeasement to dictators and thugs, rather than a demonstration of strength.”3 Furthermore, former President Donald Trump has declared that Biden’s poorly executed 2021 withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan emboldened Putin.4 To be clear, this is a bipartisan analogy: Michael McFaul, Ambassador to Russia during the Obama administration, has repeated this same language.5 Republican Senator Pete Ricketts of Nebraska has applied this same rhetoric to China, arguing that Biden’s foreign policy is “all about appeasement.” He continued that appeasing dictators is a worthless endeavor because “you cannot make these people happy,” since China “wants to be the world dominating power by 2049.”6
In the above cases, the implications are that the United States should have stayed in Afghanistan, even after more than two decades of fighting; the United States should have deterred Putin’s attack, although it is never clear how; and that the United States should incite an arms race against China. Indeed, many U.S. lawmakers today speak of a new “Axis of Evil” around the world to which America must respond.
The same is true for Pearl Harbor and its analogy to surprise attack. History remembers many wars as being started by one side’s surprise invasion: Stalin was supposedly unaware of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa, U.S. troops were caught off guard by the communist Tet Offensive in Vietnam, and the Israelis were ignorant of Arab preparations for the 1973 Yom Kippur War.7 Many witnessed Hamas’ invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023, through the same lens. Because such attacks can seemingly come at any time, the United States must remain prepared for battle. In fact, U.S. policymakers evoked memories of Pearl Harbor during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most tense nuclear standoff in history. Advisors to President Kennedy warned against a Soviet surprise attack and themselves argued against preemption.8
Reality
In reality, a close historical reading of the Munich and Pearl Harbor cases lend themself to vastly different lessons than those commonly promoted today.
The Munich story warns us about the dangers of disconnected military doctrine and diplomatic policy. After World War I, Great Britain promised to retrench from European commitments. She adopted the Ten-Year Rule, which “enjoined the services not to prepare for any major conflict” within a decade and limited military investment.9 Although the rise of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany’s rearmament caused considerable consternation in 10 Downing Street, the British Army was not prepared to maintain even a “rudimentary capability for combat” on the continent until 1939.10 When Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had to engage in diplomacy that reflected British capabilities. In fact, Chamberlain looked for a general settlement to “appease” the tense European situation–not towards Hitler in particular–because the post-World War I Versailles system had clearly failed.11 London’s allies were likely not strong enough to stand up to Berlin in September 1938: France’s military doctrine was defensive and unable to stand up to Germany, Stalin had purged most of the Red Army’s officer corps, and no other countries were strong enough to substantially impact a war against Hitler. 12
Thus, even had the British hoped to stand up to Hitler (and not “appease” him, although this use of the term is similarly ahistorical), war was risky. Chamberlain took the realistic route at the moment: ignorant of Hitler’s intentions but aware that another year of preparation would help the Allies in a possible war, he attempted to reach a settlement.
Pearl Harbor tells us that surprise attacks are often not truly surprises. Instead, they can be a careful and calculated step up the escalation ladder. Many Americans forget that Japan’s interwar economy was strongly tied to the United States, who supplied Japan with 80% of her energy requirements through crude oil.13 After Japan invaded northern Indochina in 1940, the U.S. strengthened economic sanctions, froze all Japanese assets in the United States, and introduced a total oil embargo. The Japanese, shocked by the abruptness of these actions, attempted to reach a modus vivendi for months. As Tokyo and Washington failed to come to an agreement, the Japanese continued to grow more desperate in the face of waning energy supplies. President Roosevelt and American units in the Pacific received information on December 6 that a Japanese attack was imminent, but the first offensive on the Philippines—and later on Pearl Harbor—was as overwhelming as if no warning had been sent out.14
Pearl Harbor was an escalation, but one that the United States anticipated and quite a logical maneuver on the part of the Japanese. Indeed, although surprise attacks have started most major wars since World War II, Richard Betts finds that the “element of surprise…was unwarranted” because “substantial evidence” of attack was available before it happened.15 Intelligence failures, rather than a lack of constant vigilance, are often the causes of “surprises.”
Conclusions
Even if scholars and the public were to understand Munich and Pearl Harbor, among other important historical cases, analogies remain of limited use for discerning and predicting the unpredictable world of international politics. Analogies aim to broadly connect two events that have at least one similarity. This can be useful for casual observers growing interested in the world of international relations, but it is unthinkably dangerous for seasoned politicians and world leaders.
The main danger that analysts face threatens the state’s existence and power. Appeasement and surprise attack analogies can lead to bloated defense spending and unnecessary constant alert. This, in turn, risks overextension. Overextension occurs when great powers commit themselves to areas, countries, or threats that they lack the capability to manage. The phenomenon can damage the home front and lead to a breakdown of international prestige. After the First World War, for example, Great Britain gained territories to grow her empire to its largest extent yet, but also faced a domestic economic crisis and skyrocketing unemployment. Although London won the Second World War, Britain failed to effectively defend her allies, and the Empire soon collapsed.
Washington’s insiders should rethink this approach, which would lead the United States into a dangerous period of international competition based on flawed historical understanding. No matter which analogies decision-makers grab onto, comparisons can promote nonsensical policies. America’s most important competitors today—and into the foreseeable future—are Russia and China. Although neither currently threatens the American homeland, miscalculation into confrontation has the power to take lives and soil. History can provide valuable lessons, but we cannot inflate its importance in singular cases. Politicians who scream bloody murder when they believe that a president is appeasing a dictator are ostentatiously advancing their foreign policy reputation. Unfortunately, in Washington, failure and exaggeration often breed promotion.16 The world is complicated—analogies won’t help.
Notes
*Headline image from “Münchener Abkommen (Munich Agreement)” by Bundesarchiv, licensed under CC-BY-SA 3.0.
- “Townhall: What is the Definition of Victory as of September 9, 2023?” YouTube, 10 September 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LIpLuvAjuZo. ↩︎
- Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 6-7. ↩︎
- Shannon Pettypiece, Scott Wong and Peter Nicholas, “How Putin’s war could cost Biden with American voters,” NBC News, 16 February 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/putins-war-cost-biden-american-voters-rcna16383. ↩︎
- Pettypiece, Wong and Nicholas, “How Putin’s war could cost Biden.” ↩︎
- Michael McFaul, “Calling for ‘Give Peace a Chance’ without a Strategy to Convince Putin To End His Invasion of Ukraine Is not Realism,” Substack, 18 August 2023, ↩︎
- “ICYMI: Ricketts on Biden’s Foreign Policy Following Xi Meeting: “It’s All About Appeasement,” Pete Ricketts, Senator for Nebraska, 16 November 2023, https://www.ricketts.senate.gov/press-releases/icymi-ricketts-on-bidens-foreign-policy-following-xi-meeting-its-all-about-appeasement/. ↩︎
- Richard K. Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning: Why Surprise Attacks Succeed,” Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 4 (1980-1981): 553-555. ↩︎
- Dominic Tierney, “Pearl Harbor in Reverse,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 3 (2007): 54. ↩︎
- Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 163. ↩︎
- Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 143. ↩︎
- Gerhard Weinberg, “Munich Conference: War Postponed,” in World War II: Roots and Causes, ed. Keith Eubank (Belmont: Wadsworth Learning, 1992), 154-166. ↩︎
- Weinberg, “Munich Conference,” 154-166. ↩︎
- Haruo Iguchi, “Japanese Foreign Policy and the Outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War: the Search for a Modus Vivendi in US-Japanese Relations after July 1941,” in The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective, ed. Frank McDonough (London: Continuum, 2011), 467. ↩︎
- Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning,” 554; and Iguchi, “Japanese Foreign Policy,” 474. ↩︎
- Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning,” 551. ↩︎
- Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York: Macmillan, 2018). ↩︎