Category: Uncategorized

“Your Countries Are Going to Hell”: How Donald Trump Keeps Alienating America’s Allies | By Bobby Signorelli

Bobby Signorelli

Abstract: Trump has repeatedly utilized international forums, such as the UN, as stages for provocation rather than diplomacy. This year’s speech, his first since the U.S. went to war with Iran, continued a pattern of escalation, from telling European leaders their countries were “going to hell” in 2025 to threatening to “annihilate” Iran in 2026. World leaders have responded by refusing to cooperate and reducing reliance on the United States, representing a loss of trust in American leadership. A president who has lost the faith of his allies cannot build the coalitions that successful foreign policy depends on. 

While President Trump’s incendiary rhetoric feels unsettlingly common in contemporary politics, his recent UN address was a stark reminder of what that discourse has cost in diplomacy. For the fifth time, Trump stood before the General Assembly, this time with the United States seven months into a war with Iran.1 He told the world he must either make a deal or “annihilate the Islamic Republic.”2 However, in the same speech, he called on “all nations to join us” and promised that “if we stand united,” Iran’s threat would soon be gone.3 How can Trump expect a coalition of nations while pleading for their help and provoking them in the same breath?

If Trump wants to make serious strides in diplomacy with Iran, he must first change his approach. International relations are contingent on leverage, and Trump’s goal of the “complete economic isolation of Iran” is only plausible if allies agree to enforce it.4 Recent events suggest that international allies are unlikely to support the United States and are losing faith in hegemonic dependence, which refers to the reliance of smaller nations on a dominant power for security, economic stability, and political influence. As this dependence diminishes, allies may seek independent paths or reliance on a new hegemon.  Early signs of this shift have been visible in recent geopolitical developments in Iran. For example, when Trump asked NATO members to help secure the Strait of Hormuz in March, most declined, and EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, explained that Europe’s main concern about the war was that “[they] were not consulted” before the war began.5 Spain and Italy went further than the EU, refusing additional assistance and restricting the United States access to airspace tied to the conflict.6 The self-inflicted rift between the US and its allies was on full display one day after Trump’s address, when Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez used the same UN stage to declare Spain’s opposition to the war.7 This situation can be further understood through Robert Putnam’s theory of two-level games. According to Putnam, leaders must negotiate abroad while remaining accountable to their domestic constituencies.8 In this context, Trump’s provocative rhetoric has made it politically risky for allied nations to align with Washington, complicating diplomatic relations.9

Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric has not only strained global relations, but it has significantly impacted America’s relationships with its neighboring countries as well. In Canada, the share of people who describe the U.S. as a “reliable partner” fell from 83 percent in 2022 to just 35 percent in 2026.10 That distrust stems from Trump’s repeated talk of absorbing Canada as the “51st state,” making cooperation with Washington a liability.11 Allied nation leaders are quietly following their voters and reducing their reliance on the United States. The United Kingdom and Canada, two of America’s closest intelligence partners, have reportedly limited the information they share over concerns about the legality of U.S. strikes abroad,12 and Canada became the first non-European country to join the EU’s defense-loan program.13 Every partner that steps back leaves Trump with less leverage over Iran and only continues to prolong this seeming war of attrition. 

Trump closed his address by promising the General Assembly that “together, through bold action, we will make this world far safer.”14 It is a goal his allies definitely share, but unity cannot be demanded from a place of hypocrisy, where the United States infuriates other nations in the hope of peace. Until Trump trades provocation for diplomacy, the coalition he needs to end the war with Iran will remain out of reach. The consequences of this diplomatic strategy are directly affecting Americans, who have paid, and will continue to pay, for it at home. Gas prices are about $1.50 higher than before the conflict began, with this trend likely to escalate further.15 As the cost of living continues to rise on the back of military enterprise, Americans can only hope that decorum re-enters the diplomatic sphere.

  1. PolitiFact Staff, “Live Fact-Check: President Donald Trump Speaks to UN General Assembly in New York,” PolitiFact, September 22, 2026, https://politifact.com/article/2026/sep/22/trump-un-speech-live-fact-check/.
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  2. Donald J. Trump, “Address to the General Debate of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 22, 2026), United Nations, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/united-states-america. 
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  3. Donald J. Trump, “Address to the General Debate of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 22, 2026), United Nations, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/united-states-america. 
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  4. Donald J. Trump, “Address to the General Debate of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 22, 2026), United Nations, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/united-states-america. 
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  5. Franco Ordoñez, “Trump Lashes Out at NATO After Countries Decline to Help in Iran,” NPR, March 17, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/03/17/nx-s1-5750596/trump-lashes-out-at-nato-after-countries-decline-to-help-in-iran.
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  6. Suman Naishadham, “Spain Closes Off Its Airspace to US Planes Involved in the Iran War,” AP News, March 30, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/trump-spain-united-states-iran-war-05e23ef4e0bda9cb226a16b10cd9437c.
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  7. Pedro Sánchez, “Address by the President of the Government of Spain, Pedro Sánchez, to the United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 23, 2026), La Moncloa, https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/intervenciones/Paginas/2026/20260923-un-general-assembly-speech.aspx. ↩︎
  8. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.
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  9. Olivier Knox, “European Allies Tell Trump ‘No’ to Iran War: Why It Matters,” U.S. News & World Report, April 1, 2026, https://www.usnews.com/news/u-s-news-decision-points/articles/2026-04-01/european-allies-tell-trump-no-to-iran-war-why-it-matters.
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  10. Luke Fountain,”Trump Faces Xi as Strains with Allies Complicate U.S. Pressure on China,” CNBC, September 23, 2026, https://cnbc.com/2026/09/23/trump-xi-china-summit-allies.html.
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  11. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.
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  12. Tressa Guenov, “By Alienating Its Intelligence Partners, the US Risks Losing More Than Trust,” Atlantic Council, March 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/by-alienating-its-intelligence-partners-the-us-risks-losing-more-than-trust/. 
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  13. Lionel Laurent, “Canada and Europe Are Building a Hedge Against America,” Bloomberg Opinion, September 11, 2026, https://bworldonline.com/bloomberg/2026/09/11/776027/canada-and-europe-are-building-a-hedge-against-america/.
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  14. Donald J. Trump, “Address to the General Debate of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 22, 2026), United Nations, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/united-states-america.
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  15. Angi Gonzalez, “As U.S.-Iran War Hits 7-Month Mark, Rising Gas and Airfare Costs Squeeze Americans’ Wallets,” Spectrum News, September 28, 2026, https://spectrumlocalnews.com/us/snplus/international/2026/09/28/u-s–iran-war-7-months-gas-airfare-costs.
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Strategic Voting: Plurality vs. Proportional Election Systems | By Aiden Blake

aidenblake23

Abstract: America’s two-party, plurality system encourages strategic voting by forcing voters to weigh electability against political preference. Germany’s multiparty, proportional system shifts more of that compromise to post-election coalition building, allowing votes to more directly reflect what voters actually want.

In 1992, nearly twenty million Americans voted for independent candidate Ross Perot; he won zero electoral votes.1 Eight years later, roughly 97,000 Floridians backed the Green Party’s Ralph Nader, while George W. Bush carried the state, and the presidency, over Al Gore by just 537 votes.2

These elections and many others taught voters that a ballot cast outside of the two major parties can fail to translate into representation or, worse, help elect the candidate they least like. Therefore, many Americans vote strategically, backing parties based on the probability of victory rather than policy alignment. Political scientists since Maurice Duverger have recognized this behavior as largely systematic under plurality electoral rules, which are electoral systems in which the candidate who receives the highest number of votes in a given district wins the seat.3 But why might behaviors be different in a proportional system, where seat distribution reflects vote proportion?

The reason is not that voters in proportional democracies do not prioritize representation with their vote. Instead, the difference is that they can vote for a party without concern over falling within a majority. Under America’s two-party system, voters often compromise before casting their ballots. A voter who prefers a third-party candidate must consider whether that candidate can actually win and, if not, whether supporting them risks helping elect a less-preferred alternative. Additionally, because each of the two dominant parties group together a comprehensive set of policy positions before the election, voters can easily align within one of the two stronger options.

Proportional electoral systems, such as those used in multiparty democracies, shift much of that grouping to after the election. Germany provides a useful example. Its Bundestag is elected primarily through proportional representation, where ballots require two votes: first, specifically for member selection, and second, for party distribution.4 Each party’s share of the decisive “second vote” determines its relative strength within parliament.5 Instead of requiring every political interest to fit within one of two parties before an election, this system allows several parties to gain meaningful representation. 

Importantly, this system does not eliminate strategic voting entirely. Germany generally requires a party to receive at least 5% of second votes to participate in proportional seat allocation, giving voters who prefer parties near that threshold reason to think strategically.6 However, that pressure is different from a system in which only one candidate can win a state or a district.

Consider Germany’s Greens. In the 2021 federal election, the party received 14.7% of second votes.7 Those votes did not have to produce an outright Green victory to matter. The Greens gained representation in the Bundestag and ultimately joined SPD and FDP in forming the governing coalition.8 In other words, voters could support a smaller party, and the process of combining competing parties into a governing program happened afterward.

Every democracy eventually has to turn millions of different preferences into one government. By waiting to group policy positions until after the election process, proportional systems give voters a better chance to express what they actually want.

  1. “1992 Electoral College Results,” U.S. Electoral College, National Archives and Records Administration, accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.archives.gov/electoral-college/1992.
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  2. Federal Election Commission, “2000 Presidential General Election Results,” in Federal Elections 2000, accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/documents/1732/FederalElections2000_PresidentialGeneralElectionResultsbyState.pdf.
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  3. André Blais and R. K. Carty, “The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger’s Elusive Factor,” British Journal of Political Science 21, no. 1 (1991): 92.
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  4. “Each Voter Has Two Votes in the 2021 Bundestag Election,” The Federal Returning Officer, September 14, 2021, https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2021/37_21_zwei-stimmen.html.
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  5. “Each Voter Has Two Votes in the 2021 Bundestag Election,” The Federal Returning Officer, September 14, 2021, https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2021/37_21_zwei-stimmen.html.
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  6. “Restrictive Clause,” The Federal Returning Officer, accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/service/glossar/s/sperrklausel.html.
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  7. “Results Germany: Bundestag Election 2021,” The Federal Returning Officer, accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2021/ergebnisse/bund-99.html.
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  8. Nigel Walker and Eleanor Gadd, “Germany: 2021 Election and a New Coalition Government,” House of Commons Library, January 5, 2022, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9324/.
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Two Centuries Later, the Monroe Doctrine Once Again Defines American Foreign Policy | By Max Scharpf

David Murphy

Through policies and military operations across Venezuela, Cuba, Greenland, and the broader Americas, the second Trump administration has explicitly revived the Monroe Doctrine as a guiding principle of American foreign policy.

In December 1823, President James Monroe addressed Congress with a message outlining the future of American foreign policy and military grand strategy, a declaration that became known as the Monroe Doctrine. Under the Doctrine, the United States asserted that the Western Hemisphere was naturally within its sphere of influence, distinct from European powers.1 Although the Doctrine originally emerged as a reaction to the War of 1812, its principles have reemerged two centuries later under President Donald Trump’s second administration. The United States has once again staked its claim over the Western Hemisphere, seeking military access, strategic infrastructure, and denying rivals the ability to jeopardize American hegemony, and it is doing so with decisive military force.

On January 23, 2026, the Department of War released its annual National Defense Strategy, which outlines the United States military’s top priorities. Most notably, in the first ‘Line of Effort’ subsection, this year’s report, in contrast with the 2025 counterpart, explicitly mentions Greenland and the Panama Canal as strategically significant: “We will actively and fearlessly defend America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and Greenland.”2 While the 2025 National Defense Strategy was not as explicit in its nomenclature, both documents included the same striking statement: “This is the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.”3

The second Trump Administration marks a significant pivot in United States foreign policy, with a new focus on restoring American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. On January 3, 2026, the United States completed ‘Operation Absolute Resolve,’ a military operation resulting in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.4 The operation represented more than a confrontation with the Venezuelan government; it demonstrated the current administration’s willingness to use military strength to advance its interests in the region. 

Furthermore, throughout ‘Operation Southern Spear,’ initiated in 2025 and still ongoing, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducted multiple strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats in international waters, justifying the strikes action by declaring individuals aboard these vessels “narco-terrorists.”5 In a press conference following one such strike, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth referred to these targeted boat crews as the “Al-Qaeda” of the Western Hemisphere.6 It should be noted that these offensive operations did raise domestic concerns surrounding American due process and the legality of lethal action in international waters. As Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) put it: “I’m deeply concerned about the authority our president seems to be asserting to summarily kill people suspected of criminal activity outside the law.”7

The United States military is presently enforcing a fuel blockade against vessels transporting to Cuba, and has threatened tariffs against countries and companies attempting to export oil; On October 2, 2026, the Coast Guard announced the interception of the Grace, a “dark fleet” ship bound for Cuba, with the cooperation of the Mexican government.8

Since President Trump’s return to office, national elections across Central and South America have also heavily favored right-wing parties and coalitions. While this change has been largely driven by domestic concerns, the Trump Administration has been known to endorse candidates and apply diplomatic pressure, possibly in a bid to expand American influence in the region.9

Lastly, of recent occurrence, the Greenland Security Deal was signed between the U.S., the Kingdom of Denmark, and Greenland on September 22, 2026, resulting in the expansion of United States military access and its now permanent role in the security of Greenland and a framework for the restriction of foreign adversaries from establishing military and strategic presence on the island–one would not be mistaken in noting the deal’s striking resemblance to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.10

What do these changes in United States military and political grand strategy represent? Under the current administration, the U.S. is clearly pursuing a reorientation of American power toward the Western Hemisphere, denying foreign rivals the ability to establish strategic access to the region. Two centuries after the first declaration, the Monroe Doctrine is once again an explicit tenet of American foreign policy, and appears here to stay.

  1. “Office of the Historian. ‘The Monroe Doctrine, 1823.’ U.S. Department of State. Accessed September 30, 2026. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe.” ↩︎
  2. U.S. Department of Defense. 2026 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-national-defense-strategy.pdf
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  3. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: The White House, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf
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  4. U.S. Department of Defense. “This Week in DOW: Taking Down Maduro, Seizing Suspicious Vessels, Launching Arsenal Ships.” U.S. Department of Defense, 2026. https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4374940/this-week-in-dow-taking-down-maduro-seizing-suspicious-vessels-launching-arsena/
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  5. Forbes Breaking News. “‘This Is The Al-Qaeda Of The Western Hemisphere’: Hegseth Denounces ‘Terrorist’ Drug Traffickers.” YouTube, accessed October 3, 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lsoqIF4XLo
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  6. Nitzberg, Alex. “Hegseth Blasts ‘Narco-Terrorists’ Targeted by Trump Admin as ‘the al Qaeda of the Western Hemisphere.’” Fox News, October 31, 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hegseth-blasts-narco-terrorists-targeted-trump-admin-the-al-qaeda-western-hemisphere.
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  7. Coons, Chris. “Senator Coons Pushes Attorney General Pam Bondi on Weaponizing the DOJ and Unconstitutional Boat Strikes in Fiery Hearing.” U.S. Senate, October 7, 2025. https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-coons-pushes-attorney-general-pam-bondi-on-weaponizing-the-doj-and-unconstitutional-boat-strikes-in-fiery-hearing ↩︎
  8.  U.S. Coast Guard. “Coast Guard Intercepts Motor Vessel Grace, Continues Operations to Interdict Illicit Drug Trafficking.” U.S. Coast Guard, 2026. https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4616594/coast-guard-intercepts-motor-vessel-grace-continues-operations-to-interdict-ill/
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  9.  Trump, Donald J. “Truth Social post, November 2025.” Truth Social, accessed October 3, 2026. https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115629335172411031
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  10.  The White House. “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Together with the Government of Greenland.” September 22, 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/09/agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-kingdom-of-denmark-together-with-the-government-of-greenland-to-amend-and-supplement-the-agreement-of-27-apri/
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Are Politicians Remembering the Ladies? | By Elena Jarm

mpowel25

Do politicians remember to include women and women-centered policies within their campaign platforms? In a short analysis of four senatorial candidates in the 2026 midterm election, their policy platforms are analyzed for the explicit inclusion of women-centered policy. 

Abigail Adams’ legacy is not typical for the 18th-century first ladies. She is not solely known for being the wife of Founding Father John Adams, but for the letter she wrote to her husband imploring him to “remember the ladies.”1 As history has taught us, the Founding Fathers did not consider the ladies’ role; instead, women had to fight for representation in politics. Additionally, suffrage did not come until the 19th Amendment in 1920 and even later in 1965 for women of color.

As the 20th century progressed, women began to play a crucial role in both political parties and in various areas of politics: grassroots movements, nonprofit work, activism, as well as local and national government.2 Women continue to be crucial political players; in the 2026 midterm election cycle, women are running for office on both sides of the aisle. Within an era of polarized politics, it’s important to consider if politicians running in this midterm election, across gender and aisle, are “remembering the ladies.” 

For this brief analysis, four candidates running for US Senate in open-seat races were selected: N’Kiyla Jasmine Thomas (D-OK), Michelle Tafoya (R-MN), Charles Booker (D-KY), and Kurt Alme (MT-R). In order to be considered as “remembering the ladies,” the politician must include women-centered policies in the policy statements on their websites. “Women-centered” policies are not concretely defined, but typically involve gendered issues that affect the lives of women, such as domestic violence, sexual assault, and human trafficking.3 In addition, women are disproportionately concentrated in low-wage jobs, face the most sexual violence, and face high maternal mortality rates.4 Therefore, policy addressing any of these factors could be considered a women-centered policy. In addition, any reference to child-care policy will also be considered a “women-centered” policy, as childcare historically fell into the hands of women.5

First, this article will examine women politicians and their policy platforms. Thomas (D-OK) played with feminine imagery within her campaign promotional material, using butterflies as her campaign symbol. Within her policy section, she also goes into detail about reproductive health and maternal mortality rates. In addition to her section about “women,” she includes policies about safety, which mention a proposal to expand the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) as well as Missing & Murdered Indigenous Women (MMIW).6 On the other hand, Tafoya (R-MN) does not explicitly mention women’s rights as a policy sector, but she mentions women in her efforts to “get men out of women’s sports.”7Additionally, she mentions policies that could be considered as women-centered, such as creating “stronger schools” and advocating for “parents’rights.” 

While observing the male candidates, there might be an assumption that there would be a partisan divide similar to that of the women candidates: Democrats explicitly supported women-centered policies while Republicans supported family-centered policies. However, Booker’s (D-KY) policy section did not mention women, but he did mention women’s reproductive health under his affordable healthcare plan.8 It’s worth noting that Booker did mention women’s access to contraceptives as part of healthcare, but he did so without explicitly labeling it as a “women’s” issue, and instead labeled it as solely healthcare policy. In contrast, Alme’s (R-MT) did not mention women in his policy section, nor did he mention family-oriented policy outside of his work with different childhood programs such as serving as president of the “Yellowstone Boys and Girls Ranch Foundation.”9

From this limited analysis, it appears politicians are not “remembering the ladies” as Abigail Adams hoped they would. This could be because most Americans are less concerned with social issues than with matters such as the economy and affordability.10 However, it is important to consider what social policies are being proposed in this midterm election, as only 17% of the U.S. population has trust in the federal government.11 If constituents think that the implementation of certain policies would benefit their communities, such as policies focused on half the US population, then trust in government could increase.

Candidates are not remembering the ladies when campaigning and displaying their policy platforms. While the Republican male candidate did not mention women, the Democratic male candidate did mention women’s health, but did so as a side note. In addition, three candidates did not explicitly promote women-centered policies, excluding children-based policy. Even though women-centered policies encompass many different sectors of policy– reproductive healthcare, childcare, sexual violence, etc.– they are being forgotten in this midterm cycle. 

  1. .Adams, Abigail. 1776. “Founders Online: Abigail Adams to John Adams, 31 March 1776.” Founders Online. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-01-02-0241.
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  2. Schaeffer, Katherine. 2023. “Data on Women Leaders in the U.S.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/fact-sheet/the-data-on-women-leaders/. 
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  3. Women and Gender in Public Policy | U.S. GAO.” n.d. Government Accountability Office (GAO). https://www.gao.gov/women-and-gender-public-policy.
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  4. UNESCO. “Women in Policy- and Decision-Making.” In Fostering Women’s Leadership. UNESCO, 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep70572.8. ↩︎
  5. National Women’s Law Center. n.d. “Undervalued: A Brief History of Women’s Care Work and Child Care Policy in the United States.” National Women’s Law Center. https://nwlc.org/resource/undervalued-a-brief-history-of-womens-care-work-and-child-care-policy-in-the-united-states/.
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  6. 2026. Jasmine Thomas for Oklahoma | Join the Movement Now. https://www.jasmineforok.com/. ↩︎
  7. “Issues.” 2026. Michele Tafoya. https://micheletafoya.com/issues/. ↩︎
  8. “Meet Charles Booker | Kentucky’s Fighter for U.S. Senate.” 2026. Charles Booker. https://charlesbookerky.org/meet-charles.
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  9. “Media.” 2026. Alme for Senate. https://almeforsenate.com/media/.
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  10. Daniller, Andrew, Andy Cerda, Hannah Hartig, and J. Baxter. 2026. “As the 2026 Midterms Approach, Economy Is Front and Center.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2026/07/23/as-the-2026-midterms-approach-economy-is-front-and-center/.
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  11. “Public Trust in Government: 1958-2025.” 2025. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/12/04/public-trust-in-government-1958-2025/.
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What do deepfakes and democracy have in common? Both draw their power from the people | By Noirin Dempsey

noirindempsey1

As AI and deepfakes edge their way into electoral processes, it is important to recognize that voters control the influence of these tools.  Understanding voters’ psychological and behavioral responses to deepfakes is required in order to develop policy that can restore trust in democratic institutions and improve public awareness of AI’s role in electoral processes.

The chances that you’ve seen a deepfake video within the past year are pretty high – 60%, according to data from Jumio.1  Today, AI and deepfakes are all over the Internet, on topics from finance to healthcare to government and politics.  According to Łabuz and Nehring (2024), deepfakes are defined as “AI-generated or AI-manipulated audio, image, or video content that appreciably resembles existing persons, objects, places, or other entities or events and would falsely appear to a person to be authentic or truthful.”2  In recent years, deepfakes have increased in quality and availability to the average person while decreasing in cost, contributing to a surge in their proliferation.3

Deepfakes have been used in the lead-up to elections in many ways, varying in believability, timing, and impact.  Most of the time, deepfakes have next to no impact on elections, such as the 2024 U.S. presidential election, when deepfake images featuring Kamala Harris with communist imagery and Trump with the Taliban proliferated online.4 In some cases, though, deepfakes are strategically employed in ways that do influence elections.  For instance, a few days before the 2023 Slovakia parliamentary election, an audio deepfake circulated on social media depicting Progressive Slovakia party candidate Michal Šimečka talking with a journalist about a “scheme to rig the election by buying votes from the country’s marginalized Roma minority.”5  Although “police concluded the recording was not persuasive enough to warrant a criminal investigation,”6 Šimečka still ended up losing the election by 5%.

For the most part, however, unless deployed on a strategic timeline (usually close to an election), deepfakes tend to have minimal impact on elections.  Studies by the Institute of Political Science at the University of Bamberg show that even when parties use deceptive AI (such as impersonating public figures), public support for the party does not change.7  The study suggests that although “partisans disapprove of deceptive AI use in principle,” they “are unwilling to penalize their own party for it in practice.”8  Therefore,  candidate favorability within one’s own party is unaffected by the use of deepfakes, suggesting that candidates’ deceptive use of deepfakes in campaigning is unlikely to lose them votes.

That is not to say deepfakes have no real effect on politics – quite the opposite.  But the deepfake’s real power comes not from the content itself, but from voters’ reactions.  Deepfakes often elicit real psychological and behavioral responses.  For one, deepfakes encourage political polarization and extreme views.  As economist Zeynep Arzu Kelani and sociologist Darina Lepadatu explain in their article on deepfake propaganda during the 2024 U.S. presidential election, “deepfakes that depict political figures in a negative light tend to disproportionately impact members of opposing parties, resulting in intensified distrust and division” along partisan lines.9  Many deepfakes are emotionally manipulative, eliciting intense reactions to “emotionally charged content” which encourage  individuals to “share misinformation that resonates with their social identity, beliefs, or social norms.”10

Deepfakes can also diminish trust in elections and democracy overall.11 After interacting with deepfakes, people often begin to view legitimate government content with skepticism, including election results.  Fola Adeleke, Executive Director and co-founder of the Global Center on AI Governance, notes one key example that occurred in the 2022 Kenyan Supreme Court case Obinga v. Ruto.12  In this landmark case, the court ruled that the Kenya Integrated Electoral Management System, or KIEMS (a technological tool used for voter registration and identification, as well as transmitting election votes to be counted), was constitutional and had produced accurate election results for the 2022 presidential election.13  Despite the court’s ruling, however, Kenyan citizens largely distrusted the election results and questioned the government’s transparency in using KIEMS.14  Such citizen distrust can be dangerous because it often means that “political participation declines and government finds it difficult to command…legitimacy and respect,”15 thus contributing to the erosion of democratic institutions over time.

As AI and deepfakes continue to take on an ever greater role in government processes, leaders must develop policies focused on a framework centered on the human person.  Politicians must assure citizens of accountability and transparency in elections, and one way to do this is by creating policies that review election technologies to verify their ethicality.16  Adeleke also suggests that political institutions should consider partnering with private corporations such as nonprofits to run elections.  Doing so will increase transparency and trust in government, since multiple organizations will be involved in the electoral process, many of which the public see as “trustworthy.”17  Additionally, it is important for governments and citizens to recognize that people do not have equal access to technologies and may be illiterate.18  As such, investing time and resources in public education on AI and other technologies could be a helpful way to build public trust in government institutions. Additionally, education resources can promote acceptance of certain uses of AI while instituting legal consequences to dissuade people from unethical practices such as spreading misinformation through deepfakes.

Despite deepfakes’ inability to influence election outcomes on a large scale, their ability to elicit a psychological and emotional response should not be understated.  Nevertheless, the key takeaway is that deepfakes draw their power from the voters.  Therefore, it is up to the voters to decide how much power to give to them in our democratic institutions and whether we allow them to influence the way we approach and view our electoral processes.

  1. Jumio. “2024 Online Identity Study: Global Consumer Research.” Jumio, 2024. https://www.jumio.com/2024-identity-study/.
    ↩︎
  2.  Łabuz, Mateusz, and Christopher Nehring. “On the Way to Deep Fake Democracy? Deep Fakes in Election Campaigns in 2023.” European Political Science 23, no. 3 (2024): 454–73. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-024-00482-9. 
    ↩︎
  3. Ibid. ↩︎
  4.  Kelani, Zeynep, and Darina Lepadatu. “Generative Artificial Intelligence, Misinformation and Political Polarization: A Content Analysis of Deepfake Propaganda During the 2024 US Presidential Election.” Journal of Information Technology & Politics (2026). https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2026.2652897. ↩︎
  5. Labuz and Nehring. “On the Way to Deep Fake Democracy? Deepfakes in Election Campaigns in 2023.” ↩︎
  6. Kováčik, Timotej, and Veronika Frankovská. “How AI-Generated Content Influenced Parliamentary Elections in Slovakia: The Slovak Police Will Investigate the Recording for a Third Time.” CEDMO, November 25, 2024. https://cedmohub.eu/how-ai-generated-content-influenced-parliamentary-elections-in-slovakia-the-slovak-police-will-investigate-the-recording-for-a-third-time/. 
    ↩︎
  7. Jungherr, Andreas, Adrian Rauchfleisch, and Alexander Wuttke. “Artificial Intelligence in Election Campaigns: Perceptions, Penalties, and Implications.” Political Communication 43, no. 4 (2026): 585–606. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2025.2611913.
    ↩︎
  8. Ibid. ↩︎
  9. Kelani and Lepadatu. “Generative Artificial Intelligence, Misinformation and Political Polarization: A Content Analysis of Deepfake Propaganda During the 2024 US Presidential Election.” ↩︎
  10. Ibid. ↩︎
  11. Jungherr, Rauchfleisch, Wuttke. “Artificial Intelligence in Election Campaigns: Perceptions, Penalties, and Implications.” ↩︎
  12. Adeleke, Fola. “Reinstating Trust in Elections in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies.” Data and Policy 7 (2025): e38. doi:10.1017/dap.2025.14
    ↩︎
  13. Ibid. ↩︎
  14. Ibid. ↩︎
  15. Diamond, Larry. “The Political Drivers of Low Trust.” Open Government Partnership. Accessed October 4, 2026. https://www.opengovpartnership.org/trust/the-political-drivers-of-low-trust/. 
    ↩︎
  16. Fola. “Reinstating Trust in Elections in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies.” ↩︎
  17. Ibid. ↩︎
  18. Ibid. ↩︎

Rethinking America’s Death Penalty | By Matthew Deahl

David Murphy

As botched executions become increasingly common, and states’ zeal to execute seemingly begins to supersede due process, the bulwark values of “restitution” and “deterrence” that capital punishment purports to uphold should be reanalyzed with increased scrutiny concerning today’s circumstances. Potential innocents remaining on death row, coupled with rising botched or unintentionally torturous executions, paint an unjust current reality of the death penalty and are a requisite backdrop to recognize when deciding the future of capital punishment in America.   

At 7:27 PM on September 30th, 2026, the curtain rose in the execution chamber of Riverbend Maximum Security to reveal 50-year-old Christa Pike strapped to a gurney, set to die for her brutal 1995 torture and murder of classmate Colleen Slemmer.1 Injected with a lethal dose of pentobarbital, the execution was meant to be swift and painless. Instead, Pike remained conscious, gasping, snoring heavily, and writhing in pain–eventually knocking her gurney sheets loose. After an hour of suffering, the curtain closed at 8:53 PM, shielding the scene from media view. Today, Pike’s medical and legal future remains uncertain; yet, one fact remains crystal clear: her execution was a failure and a complete miscarriage of justice.2 Yet, Pike’s failed execution is just a drop in the bucket of a practice that has continually failed to deliver its promise of final justice, both in physical practicality and in the societal benefits it supposedly purports.

The death penalty has been a contentious staple of U.S. justice for nearly its entire existence, though its practical failures have increased sharply within recent history.3 Historically the U.S. experienced an execution “botch” rate of about 3%.4 Yet, the botch rate for lethal injections, which have grown rapidly in popularity, sit at a starkly higher 8.4%, when measured from 2010 to 2020.5 While often lauded as a “humane” alternative, lethal injection has consistently produced deeply unsettling results.6 Over 84% of post-execution autopsies have found fluid in the deceased’s lungs–a telltale sign of a painful death.7 Beyond these botched executions, which have questionable 8th Amendment implications, the potential for wrongful executions is rising too, as states like Tennessee are accused of expediting executions before courts can have proper time for full legal prudence. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting in Nelsen v. Pike, which authorized the execution of Pike before lower court litigation had concluded, claims that Tennessee was seeking emergency expedited executions “solely to execute Pike before litigation over her conviction has run its course in lower courts,” and that there is “no reason to short circuit the ordinary process of appellate review, particularly in light of the grave consequences of an erroneous decision.”8 Pike’s guilt was absolute, but the zeal of the state to execute fast and supersede due process poses dangers not only for individuals challenging wrongful sentences, but also for innocents who have been wrongfully convicted. A 2014 study found that at least 4.1% of death penalty convictions were wrongly decided, with only 1.6% experiencing proper exoneration prior to their execution.9 These statistics indicate that there is not only a non-negligible number of innocents who have been or may currently be on death row, but also that should anyone reach the execution chamber, their deaths are increasingly likely to be botched or extraordinarily painful from a lack of comprehensive understanding surrounding lethal injection limitations.

Now, many will argue that there is little value in worrying about the comfort and life condition of indisputable criminals convicted of horrific crimes, and that the values of restitution and deterrence should prevail. That said, promises of the 8th Amendment–torturous punishment and the inescapability of death foreclosing exoneration or due process appeals–should at least lead us to question the validity of the arguments of restitution and deterrence. Restitution for victims, while primarily moral and less empirically measurable, holds validity when the process is assuredly proportionate to the crime and efficient in carrying out justice; yet, as argued above, a system that enables the execution of innocents or unintentional brutality is neither just nor an efficient form of restitution. After all, the proportionality of responding to crime with botched executions is unknown in and of itself, and a complete miscarriage of justice when applied to innocents. As for deterrence, the National Research Council found existing pro-deterrence research “fundamentally flawed.”10 At the same time, 88% of criminologists believe there to be no deterrence effect to capital punishment.11

As Tennessee governor Bill Lee pauses further executions, politicians across the aisle once again revisit paths forward for capital punishment in America.12 Perhaps this results in new restrictions that confirm criminality and promote humane execution. Perhaps it’s a national abolition of the death penalty. Perhaps it’s keeping it in name only. But, should the status quo continue, so too may grave miscarriages of justice, in which more innocents and more botched executions continue to bloody up our criminal justice system.

  1. Associated Press, “How Tennessee’s Failed Execution of Christa Pike Unfolded, Minute-by-Minute,” Bangor Daily News, October 1, 2026, https://www.bangordailynews.com/2026/10/01/nation/how-tennessees-failed-execution-of-christa-pike-unfolded-minute-by-minute.
    ↩︎
  2. Associated Press, “Tennessee Governor Halts Executions After Christa Gail Pike Survives Lethal Injection,” OPB, October 1, 2026, https://www.opb.org/article/2026/10/01/tennessee-governor-halts-executions-after-christa-gail-pike-survives-lethal-injection/.
    ↩︎
  3. Meg Tirrell, “Why Botched Lethal Injections Are Becoming More Common,” CNN, via KEYT, https://keyt.com/?p=1482047.
    ↩︎
  4. Death Penalty Information Center, “Botched Executions,” Death Penalty Information Center, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/botched-executions.
    ↩︎
  5. Austin Sarat, “It Is Time to End the Lethal Injection Mess,” Verdict, June 27, 2022, https://verdict.justia.com/2022/06/27/it-is-time-to-end-the-lethal-injection-mess.
    ↩︎
  6. Death Penalty Information Center, “BOOKS: ‘Gruesome Spectacles’ Reveals the History of Botched Executions,” Death Penalty Information Center, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/books-gruesome-spectacles-reveals-the-history-of-botched-executions.
    ↩︎
  7. Death Penalty Information Center, “As Lethal Injection Turns Forty, States Botch a Record Number of Executions,” Death Penalty Information Center, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/as-lethal-injection-turns-forty-states-botch-a-record-number-of-executions.
    ↩︎
  8. Nelsen v. Pike. No. 26A428 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2026). https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/26a428.html.
    ↩︎
  9. Samuel R. Gross et al., “Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2014, https://repository.law.umich.edu/facarticles/1591.
    ↩︎
  10. National Research Council, “Deterrence and the Death Penalty,” National Academies Press, 2012, https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/13363/chapter/2.
    ↩︎
  11. University of Colorado Boulder, “Death Penalty Does Not Deter Murder, According to New CU-Boulder Study,” CU Boulder Today, June 16, 2009, https://www.colorado.edu/today/2009/06/16/death-penalty-does-not-deter-murder-according-new-cu-boulder-study.
    ↩︎
  12. 12. NPR, “Failed ‘Torturous’ Execution Attempt on Christa Pike Reignites Death Penalty Debate,” NPR, October 2, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/10/02/nx-s1-5988832/christa-pike-reignites-death-penalty-debate;
    Associated Press, “Tennessee Governor Halts Executions After Christa Gail Pike Survives Lethal Injection,” OPB, October 1, 2026, https://www.opb.org/article/2026/10/01/tennessee-governor-halts-executions-after-christa-gail-pike-survives-lethal-injection/.
    ↩︎

A D.S.A. Popularity Bubble Could Burst Democrats’ Midterm Chances | By Matthew Deahl

mpowel25

The recent rise of Democratic Socialist candidates is unprecedented and novel, but ballot-box underperformance from D.S.A. candidates and overinflation of popularity from online platforms may suggest that the narrowly successful D.S.A. candidates could face grave challenges come November. 

If there is one term defining the 2026 Midterm elections, it is “Democratic Socialism.” The wave of progressive candidates has dominated national headlines, with their hopes to shake the status quo and bring a populist relief to the left.1 This “blue wave,” first encapsulated by the 2025 election of Zohran Mamdani as mayor of New York City, has spread across the country, with candidates such as Abdul El-Sayed and Angie Nixon beating out establishment bulwarks.2 3 However, this ideological wave, which is dividing the left, is not of unlimited success, despite what media coverage may lead you to believe. On the contrary, Democratic Socialists have been vastly underperforming in early results, and their popularity “bubble” may pose great threats to Democratic victories come November.

It is a common thought across the nation that Democratic Socialists have been gaining ground this Midterm season, thanks to their promises of affordability and mass reform, with central policies including state-owned grocery stores, guaranteed housing, universal healthcare, and aggressive wealth taxation. From Zohran Mamdani’s social media-intensive campaign,4 to the youth-labor coalition of El-Sayed in Michigan,5 Democratic Socialist candidates have been rushing to secure new coalitions of disillusioned voters through creative marketing. But the narrative around these elections fails to consider the discrepancy between polling data or online political engagement and actual ballot-box performance. 

From the start of the DSA’s rise, which is considered to be Mamdani’s 2025 election, aggregate polling (which showed Mamdani at +14.3pts)6 had overestimated his performance (Mamdani +9.5pts).7 While that polling margin was not far outside the margin of error, it highlighted the danger of overconfidence: online polls and discourse do not inherently translate to success in the polling booth. In one of America’s most progressive cities, Mamdani won with only 50.8% of the vote, even with the scandals surrounding his opponent Andrew Cuomo.8,9

Mamdani’s slight underperformance compared to his expected performance, despite his never-before-seen online political engagement, was just foreshadowing the difficulty DSA candidates will face, especially in more competitive states.10 This could be best seen through Michigan’s El-Sayed, who led +13.2pts in polling before his +1.0pt “victory,”11 and others like Fransisca Hong in Wisconsin’s gubernatorial election, who lost her primary despite having led the polls by a whopping +25pts.12, 13 These systematic underperformances and razor-close victories suggest the possibility that a disproportionately active minority of Democrats may be setting the party up with ideologically unfavorable candidates, and developing a polling “mirage” of misleading popularity. 

Now it is certainly true to say that DSA candidates have fared far better this year than any election season in recent history; therefore, many argue that the sheer rise of the Democratic Socialists, and not necessarily their net performance, is important enough to drive the discussion around this Midterm season and the strategy of the Democratic Party.14 Yet the country at large yearns for bipartisanship and compromise (60%), especially among Democrats (71%), with this number only increasing in recent years.15, 16 As the country yearns for stability and bipartisanship, figures like Mamdani seem to turn the other way, remarking how even on unpopular DSA goals like “seizing the means of production … [they can] not give up one issue for another… and over time [they] will bring people to that issue”, positioning the DSA not to be a compromising alternative to the status quo, but a long-term means of revolutionizing it.17 

So regardless of the merits of Democratic Socialist policy in response to the affordability crisis, which is a separate discussion from their electoral performances, DSA candidates choosing to go all in, and mass media enabling the idea that Democratic voters are infatuated with Democratic Socialism, is ignoring both primary electoral realization and the underlying values of bipartisanship and moderation that are still a large part of the Democratic base.18, 19  Before the American Left inflates growing popularity with the inevitability of DSA victories, they must first consider the possibility that their popularity is a “bubble,” expanding through extensive media coverage and mass digital politicization. The Democratic Party, and its supporters who have narrowly placed these candidates on the ballot, must hope that the bubble does not pop come November.

  1. CBS News, “How Progressive Wins in Democratic Primaries Are Shaping the Midterm Landscape,” CBS News, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/democratic-primaries-progressive-wins-midterm-elections/
    ↩︎
  2. Associated Press, “Michigan 2026 Live Primary Election Results,” via ABC News, https://abcnews.com/Politics/michigan-2026-live-primary-election-results/story?id=134596717
    ↩︎
  3. PBS NewsHour, “Democratic Socialist Angie Nixon Won the Senate Primary in Florida. Can She Win in November?,” PBS NewsHour, August 19, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/democratic-socialist-angie-nixon-won-the-senate-primary-in-florida-can-she-win-in-november; see also ABC News, “Democratic Socialist Angie Nixon Won Tuesday’s Primary in Florida. Can She Win in November?,” ABC News, https://abcnews.com/US/wireStory/democratic-socialist-angie-nixon-won-tuesdays-primary-florida-135772633
    ↩︎
  4. NBC News, “Zohran Mamdani’s Social Media Strategy Was about More Than Viral Videos,” NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/zohran-mamdani-social-media-cuomo-nyc-mayor-win-rcna215051
    ↩︎
  5. People’s World, “El-Sayed Lead Widens with Support of Broad Coalition in Michigan,” People’s World, August 3, 2026, https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/el-sayed-lead-widens-with-support-of-broad-coalition-in-michigan/
    ↩︎
  6. RealClearPolling, “2026 Michigan Senate – Rogers vs. El-Sayed,” RealClearPolitics, https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/senate/general/2026/michigan/rogers-vs-el-sayed
    ↩︎
  7. “2025 New York City Mayoral Election,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_New_York_City_mayoral_election. AP-sourced final tally: Mamdani 50.78 percent, Cuomo 41.32 percent
    ↩︎
  8. Associated Press results for the 2025 New York City mayoral election, as compiled at “2025 New York City Mayoral Election,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_New_York_City_mayoral_election
    ↩︎
  9. NBC News, “Zohran Mamdani’s Social Media Strategy Was about More Than Viral Videos” (see note 4 above); on Cuomo’s 2021 resignation, see “Andrew Cuomo,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Cuomo
    ↩︎
  10. Truthout, “Over a Quarter of Voters Say They’re Supporters of DSA, Polling Finds,” Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/over-a-quarter-of-voters-say-theyre-supporters-of-dsa-polling-finds/
    ↩︎
  11. “Michigan Senate Race 2026 – Predictions and Polling,” Race to the WH, https://www.racetothewh.com/senate/michigan26 ↩︎
  12. “Polling for 2026 Governor Races – Updated Daily,” Race to the WH, https://www.racetothewh.com/governor/26polls
    ↩︎
  13. Associated Press, “David Crowley Wins Democratic Primary for Wisconsin Governor over Francesca Hong,” PBS NewsHour, August 12, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/david-crowley-wins-democratic-primary-for-wisconsin-governor-over-francesca-hong
    ↩︎
  14. “Democratic Socialists of America Are Seeing Surge in Membership,” NOTUS, July 3, 2026, https://www.notus.org/2026-election/democratic-socialists-of-america-primary-win-momentum
    ↩︎
  15. YouGov, “Likely Voters, Data Centers, ‘Woke,’ and More: August 21–24, 2026 Economist/YouGov Poll,” YouGov, https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/55436-likely-voters-data-centers-woke-and-more-august-21-24-2026-economist-yougov-poll ↩︎
  16. Bipartisan Policy Center, “Is Voter Interest in Bipartisanship on the Rise?,” Bipartisan Policy Center, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/is-voter-interest-in-bipartisanship-on-the-rise/
    ↩︎
  17. Fox News, “Video surfaces of Mamdani using slogan rooted in communist revolutionary language”, Fox News, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/mamdani-under-fire-over-resurfaced-2021-video-endorsing-socialist-goals ↩︎
  18. The Guardian, “Democratic Socialists Are Winning in US Cities with Message of Getting Stuff Done,” The Guardian, June 28, 2026
    ↩︎
  19. Associated Press results for the 2025 New York City mayoral election (see note 8 above)
    ↩︎

Threat of a Nuclear Iran | By Kimberly Hernandez

Kimberly Hernandez

In June of 2025, in what is known as the Twelve-Day War, the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear program in an attempt to prevent Iran from creating nuclear weapons.1 This attack was significant in impeding Iran’s progress in building its nuclear program. Key infrastructure such as the “two uranium enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz and a uranium processing facility at Isfahan” were all targeted.2 While Iran’s nuclear program took a significant hit, it is unclear if the efforts were successful in preventing nuclear proliferation. Despite the high stakes associated with nuclear proliferation, the threat of a nuclear Iran should not be continued to be addressed through military force alone. 

Past events have indicated that states often become further motivated to seek nuclear weapons in the wake of a clear opponent or threat. For example, “Israel’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was heavily influenced by the 1956 Suez Crisis and subsequent regional tensions.”3 Thus, historically, there has been a trend of high regional security threats resulting in nuclear proliferation. In literature, scholars such as Mark Bell have reflected this sentiment, noting that if a state is experiencing “the existence of serious international threats (territorial) or ongoing war,” they are likely to use nuclear weapons to move forward with aggressive and steadfast policy against that threat.4 In other words, high-security environments tend to cause states to use nuclear weapons to further more aggressive foreign policy. As such, military exchanges will exacerbate tensions by creating a high-security threat. Consequently, Iran is likely to feel an increased need for nuclear weapons and increasing tensions will only encourage nuclear weapons to be used as a political tool to further aggressive foreign policy. 

After the impact of the Twelve-Day War, Iran is predicted to need at least one to two years in order to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, and even longer to make a nuclear missile.5 Consequently,  after the attack on its nuclear program, Iran was left impeded and with limited resources. Yet, continuous attacks on their program will, in the end, only serve to hinder Iran’s capabilities. Military exchanges alone will not alter Iran’s motivation to seek nuclear weapons. In fact, statistically, coercion by punishment rarely succeeds in getting an actor to change their policy aims.6 Therefore, although military force by Israel and the U.S. did succeed in hindering Iran’s nuclear program, it remains unclear if Iran’s motivation to proliferate was successfully changed. 

Supporters of military intervention may consider it to be the most impactful force to inhibit Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Therefore, even if Iran’s motivations remain unchanged and nuclear weapons are still produced, at least Iran’s nuclear capabilities will be low. However, having a weak nuclear Iran could prove to be more dangerous compared to having a secured nuclear Iran. Strategic theory on nuclear weapons emphasizes the importance of having a secured second-strike capability, recognizing that possessing asymmetric nuclear capabilities can result in escalation rather than assurance and deterrence.7 To put it in perspective, Israel is estimated to have around 90 warheads.8 Therefore, if Iran develops a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, while Israel maintains their larger nuclear capabilities, this asymmetric dynamic could help to foster a mentality of “use it or lose it,” thus motivating Iran to deploy nuclear weapons. 

In all, despite the potential danger behind the reality of a new nuclear state, military force should not be pursued in addressing nuclear proliferation. This is for the reason that military efforts are likely, as seen in past scenarios, to increase Iran’s motivation to proliferate for the sake of protecting its security. Notably, continuous military force now is likely to backfire in the event that Iran does proliferate in the foreseeable future, as it raises interstate tensions and creates incentives for more aggressive foreign policy. Therefore, policy aimed at addressing the threat of proliferation should focus on the motivational aspects, as opposed to the capabilities. In effect, this can manifest through diplomatic means and reassuring Iran’s security, if nuclear nonproliferation is the main goal. 

  1. Farnia, Nina. 2025. “The 12-Day War and the Collapse of US Imperialism.” Middle East Critique 34 (4): 791–95. doi:10.1080/19436149.2025.2578034.
    ↩︎
  2. Rodgers, Joseph, Heather Williams, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. “Damage to Iran’s Nuclear Program-Can It Rebuild?” CSIS. Accessed September 25, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/damage-irans-nuclear-program-can-it-rebuild.
    ↩︎
  3. Horschig, Doreen. “Why Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad Idea.” Nuclear Network, October 31, 2024. https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/why-striking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-is-a-bad-idea/.
    ↩︎
  4. Bell, Mark S. 2019. “Nuclear Opportunism: A Theory of How States Use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics.” Journal of Strategic Studies 42 (1): 3–28. doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1389722.
    ↩︎
  5. Albright, David, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker. “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program after the 12-Day War: A Diagram of the Destruction.” Institute For Science And International Security. August 20, 2025. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/irans-nuclear-weapons-program-after-the-12-day-war-a-diagram-of-the-destruction.
    ↩︎
  6. Pape, Robert A. “Explaining Military Coercion.” In Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Cornell University Press, 1996. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v.5.
    ↩︎
  7. Narang, Vipin. “The Sources of Regional Power Nuclear Postures: Posture Optimization Theory.” In Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Princeton University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt6wq00j.6.
    ↩︎
  8. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. 2022. “Israeli Nuclear Weapons, 2021.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 78 (1): 38–50. Doi:10.1080/00963402.2021.2014239.
    ↩︎

Is Beijing to Blame: President Trump and OpenAI Raise Concerns Over Chinese Influence in American Opinion | By Max Scharpf

mpowel25

President Trump and various AI leaders have expressed concerns that Chinese social media accounts may contribute to American disapproval of new data center construction—but evidence that the foreign actors have significantly influenced discourse is limited.

On August 31, 2026, President Trump published a post on Truth Social promoting the construction of data centers under the slogan “Let Data Reign.” In his post, he cited that “China could not be happier with [the] anti-data center movement,” directly alluding to the American public’s recent opposition to data center expansion with China’s geopolitical interests.1 Earlier in the summer, OpenAI released a June Threat Report claiming that P.R.C.-linked accounts may be attempting to sway American AI debates. According to the report, Chinese actors prompted ChatGPT to produce images and political cartoons in English, raising concerns about increasing data center capacity, which OpenAI claims is intended for American audiences on social media.2 Nationally representative surveys from the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg Public Policy Center indicate that American opposition to local data centers rose sharply between February-March and June-July of 2026, with the former survey seeing 49% opposition, and the latter 61%, a statistically significant increase in a few months–during the same timeframe that OpenAI was investigating Chinese accounts.3 This raises the question: has Beijing-linked activity on social media contributed to American AI uncertainties, or has the development been a product of primarily domestic origin? While P.R.C.-affiliated accounts have attempted to exacerbate American hesitation over data center expansion, the rise in public opposition seems to have emerged predominantly over concerns raised by notable American political leaders such as Governor Greg Abbott (R-TX), and Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) regarding electricity costs, environmental impacts, and effects on local communities.4 5 They suggest that alleged Chinese influence is an attempt to further ignite American debate, not the source of it.

Discourse on the artificial intelligence development race, and the geopolitical relevance associated with it, has consistently made its way to Capitol Hill and China’s National People’s Congress. The United States has pushed policies such as President Trump’s ‘Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence’ executive order,6 and China has expanded its ‘AI Plus’ campaign in its Fifteenth Five-Year Economic Plan.7 Both Beijing and Washington have recognized that artificial intelligence is of supreme importance for the future of their national interests; As such, the motivation exists for China to influence American sentiments on data centers. 

This past June, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, headed by Congressman Brett Guthrie (R-KY) requested the FBI to give a “briefing to understand what actions the Trump Administration is taking to investigate foreign influence campaigns to slow U.S. AI development.”8 The request signals that there is evidence to suggest that China, Russia, and Iran are launching coordinated campaigns to sow discontent in the American public’s consciousness. However, the existence of these alleged campaigns does not sufficiently establish that Americans’ change in opinion was significantly influenced by foreign action. 

While OpenAI’s June Threat Report confirms the presence of suspicious Chinese accounts, it also points out that “most of the social media posts identified generated little or no observable engagement.” Darren Linvill, a researcher at Clemson University, confirms this assessment, as his work identified that Chinese bot accounts were quickly suspended from X and their posts received minimal traction.9

If Chinese inflammatory social media posts are not a major contributor to American AI data center disapproval, what is? As early as December 2025, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) raised concerns over utility cost implications of data centers, writing letters and launching an investigation of top AI-oriented companies.10 Since then, data center disputes have reached the forefront of the Democratic Party’s policy agendas—but distaste for data center construction is fairly bipartisan. According to the same Annenberg Public Policy Center survey, both Democrats (69%) and Republicans (54%) are opposed to local data centers.11 Per a Pew Research survey, the top issues cited are the environmental impact, home energy costs, and local quality of life.12

While investigations have confirmed the mild presence of C.C.P.-linked social media accounts spreading distrust of data center construction, evidence that it has caused a meaningful impact on American sentiment is limited. U.S. AI discourse had been consistently contentious before the Chinese accounts surfaced.

  1.  Trump, Donald J. “Truth Social Post.” Truth Social. August 31, 2026.https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117190477440173795. ↩︎
  2. OpenAI. June 2026 Threat Report. June 2026.https://cdn.openai.com/pdf/96b559fa-c165-4575-805d-e636909e2f78/June-2026-Threat-Report.pdf. ↩︎
  3. Annenberg Public Policy Center. “Opposition to Local Data Centers Rises Sharply, Annenberg Survey Finds.” August 11, 2026.https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/opposition-to-local-data-centers-rises-sharply-annenberg-survey-finds.
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  4. Greg Abbott. “Governor Abbott Directs PUC and ERCOT to Shield Texans from Data Center Infrastructure Costs.” Office of the Texas Governor, June 10, 2026. https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-directs-puc-and-ercot-to-shield-texans-from-data-center-infrastructure-costs.
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  5. U.S. Congress. “S. 4214 — 119th Congress (2025–2026).” Congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/4214.
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  6. The White House. “Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence.” January 23, 2025.
    https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/removing-barriers-to-american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence/.
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  7.  Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. “中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划纲要.” March 16, 2026.https://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2026/03/16/ARTI1773644951646391.shtml.
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  8.  U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. “Letter to Mr. David Sacks, Mr. Michael Kratsios, and Director Kash Patel.” June 4, 2026. https://d1dth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/2026_06_04_Letter_to_PCAST_and_FBI_on_Foreign_Influence_AI_Data_Centers_99f6aa6cda.pdf. ↩︎
  9.  Dickerson, Truman. “Many of the Chinese Bots X Says Posted Anti-Data-Center Content Had No Followers or Engagement, a Researcher Found.” Business Insider, August 28, 2026. https://www.bu sinessinsider.com/x-chinese-bots-data-center -debate-no-engagement-followers-2026-8. ↩︎
  10. Warren, Elizabeth. “Senator Warren, Lawmakers Open Investigation into Big Tech Data Centers’ Role in Driving Up Families’ Utility Costs.” December 16, 2025.https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases senator-warren-lawmakers-open-investigation-into-big-tech-data-centers-role-in-driving-up-families-utility-costs/.
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  11. Annenberg Public Policy Center. “Opposition to Local Data Centers Rises Sharply, Annenberg Survey Finds.” August 11, 2026.https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/opposition-to-local-data-centers-rises-sharply-annenberg-survey-finds/.
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  12.  Pew Research Center. “How Americans View Data Centers’ Impact in Key Areas, From the Environment to Jobs.” March 12, 2026.https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/03/12/how-americans-view-data-centers-impact-in-key-areas-from-the-environment-to-jobs/.
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Who Should Defend Europe? Rethinking the U.S.-NATO Relationship | By Maria Alice Souza Maia

mpowel25

Abstract: The United States may not need NATO, but NATO definitely needs the United States. This relationship is harming European defense capabilities and preventing them from taking action regarding the Ukraine conflict.

Between July 7 and July 8, 2026, the 2026 NATO Summit was held in Ankara, Turkey.1 President Trump claimed that there was “tremendous love in that room”.2 However, this loving atmosphere was not present during his March 2026 statement when President Trump posted on Truth Social that NATO was making a “very foolish mistake” by declining to help the United States in its conflict with Iran.3 This statement leads to a lot of questions: why should NATO help if the United States is not under direct attack? Should NATO get involved just to prevent Iran from advancing its uranium enrichment system? Yet, the most important question is: What should NATO do about the war in Ukraine? 

Since February 2022, Ukraine has been under constant attack from Russia. There have been 1.5 million casualties on both sides, 5.9 million Ukrainians registered as refugees, and a daily cost of the war of $190 million for Ukraine.4 Yet, with a massive war on its continent and the imminent threat of Russian attack, the question remains: why should NATO help assist the U.S. against Iran and not assist Ukraine?  The answer lies in a truth NATO refuses to face: the United States does not need NATO, but NATO cannot survive without the United States. Everything the United States does directly benefits NATO, such as switching a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in Asia to the Mediterranean to help NATO in a crisis. So, maybe it is understandable for the U.S. to demand NATO’s help during one of its most major conflicts in the last 5 years, considering that the U.S. spends 16% of its defense spending in NATO while most of the NATO countries invest only 5% of their GDP in security measures for the alliance.5, 6

Therefore, taking into account the numbers mentioned and the current situation, should European countries start taking more action to defend themselves? And then, is NATO still a useful organization? Firstly, the European Union’s defense spending is €454 billion in 2026, which is equivalent to 2.2% of GDP,7 compared with NATO’s 5% of GDP spent on defense, which was agreed during the 2026 summit. Even though EU defense spending increased by 75.3% since 2021, it has been shown that it is not enough to contain Russia and the threat that it poses to the entire European continent. NATO can protect the countries that signed the treaty, but it’s the EU’s mission to maintain peace and stability within Europe, even though the war has reached its fourth year and has no end in sight, alongside Russia’s hybrid attacks on Europe this past week.8 Also, looking at the data, the EU’s reliance on NATO and, therefore, on the United States, reinforces the lack of commitment to the continent’s security through its small contribution to Europe’s defense spending. 

As for the second question, the United States’ defense budget reached nearly $2.63 trillion this year, and its status as a major power in the Western world sets the U.S. in a position as the financial anchor of NATO.9 Moreover, NATO does not need a full shutdown; it needs less reliance on the United States and a reform that focuses its attention on the conflicts happening in the North Atlantic territory. 

Therefore, instead of flattering the United States with compliments every time there is a NATO Summit, the alliance should focus on restructuring its core values such as individual liberty, democracy, and human rights.10 The reform should focus on a future where Russia could dominate Europe and address the current crisis in Ukraine, with consistent negotiations with the United States about the current situation and the main priorities of the alliance, the concerns of European countries, and introducing a slow detachment from the U.S., proposing a reduction of its contribution to NATO’s defense budget.

  1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “The Ankara Summit Declaration.” NATO, July 8, 2026. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration ↩︎
  2. The Guardian. “Erratic Trump Dominates Final Hours of NATO Summit.” July 8, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/08/erratic-trump-dominates-final-hours-nato-summit ↩︎
  3. BBC News. “NATO Summit.” 2026 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0434932w ↩︎
  4. Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Russia-Ukraine War in 10 Charts.” CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-war-10-charts  ↩︎
  5. Reuters. “Fact Check: US Contributes 16% to NATO Annual Budget, Not Two-Thirds.” May 31, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/us-contributes-16-nato-annual-budget-not-two-thirds-2024-05-31/  ↩︎
  6. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Defence Expenditures and NATO’s 5% Commitment.” NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment ↩︎
  7. Council of the European Union. “Defence Numbers.” European Union https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/ ↩︎
  8. “Russia Warns Europe as Ukraine War Continues.” The New York Times, September 24, 2026. New York Times article   ↩︎
  9. U.S. Department of Defense. “Department of Defense.” USAspending.gov usaspending.gov/agency/department-of-defense  ↩︎
  10. Michaels, Jeffrey H. “The Nato Experience.” In Deterrence Warning Messages: A Short Guide for NATO, edited by Tim Sweijs. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep70752 ↩︎