Author: Kimberly Hernandez

Economic Interdependence: Peace or Vulnerability? | By Kimberly Hernandez

Kimberly Hernandez

Abstract: Despite the long existing literature Liberal scholars have offered on the relationship between economic interdependence and security, recent trends in U.S. foreign policy has emphasized the need for American economic independence. Although there are certain vulnerabilities that have emerged from extreme dependence on China for materials needed for weapon production, the role of interdependence as an inhibitor of peace should not be completely disregarded.

In the 2025 National Security Strategy report, it declared that, “Going forward, we will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence.”1 In recent years, many have begun to fear that interdependence has created dependence, and thus weakness. Liberalist international relations theory has traditionally posited that interdependence offers a medium for peace. Even so, recent developments have raised doubts about the underlying assumptions behind the theory of economic interdependence, as advocated for in the U.S. National Security Strategy. Rather than pursuing complete economic independence, the U.S should strategically manage interdependence by diversifying critical supply chains and decreasing asymmetric interdependence that could be exploited. 

Popular liberalist international relations theory hinges on the idea that trade and conflict have a negative relationship. Consequently, “trading countries with significant trade relations would thus engage in less conflict, because they are most threatened by welfare losses associated with lost trade.”2 However, more recent literature has questioned this relationship, and argued that the relationship between trade and conflict is much more complex than simply being an inverse relationship. Farrell, for example, argues that “asymmetric network structures create the potential for “weaponized interdependence,” in which some states are able to leverage interdependent relations to coerce others.”3 In other words, interdependence alone is not the solution for peace, but interdependence must be deliberately and strategically managed. 

Asymmetric interdependence has been a key source of worry for the U.S. Different assessments have been conducted to determine just how dependent the U.S. is on other countries. Specifically, the Government Accountability Office in a 2024 report found that “critical materials—like rare earths, tantalum, and tungsten—are materials needed to supply U.S. military…Most of these materials are mined and processed in China, which makes DOD’s weapon system programs vulnerable to supply chain disruptions by an adversary nation.”4 This aligns with Farrell’s findings of how interdependence can create channels of vulnerability. 

The realization of the deep asymmetric economic interdependence that the U.S has with China has increased fears that complete economic decoupling is necessary to protect U.S. national security. For example, in July of 2025, the Department of Defense invested $400 million in MP Materials, demonstrating a leap into the goal to decrease dependence on China for rare earth minerals.5 While complete independence may seem the ideal choice, economic interdependence has proven to remain effective, and de-coupling would also eradicate the benefits of America’s relationship with China. Indeed, while “China’s autonomy has grown as its wealth has increased—but like every other actor in the international system, it remains constrained by its reliance on the global economy.”6 In other words, interdependence continues to be an effective means of constraining power. Similarly, academic literature posits that “The greatest hope for peace appears to arise from symmetrical trading relationships.”7

Echoing this sentiment, former Secretary of the Treasury, Janet L. Yellen, in a 2023 press release argued that “A full separation of our economies would be disastrous for both countries. It would be destabilizing for the rest of the world.”8 This view in particular considers the logistical hardships behind aiming to completely become economically independent. Similarly, a 2021 report by the CSIS considers the immense closeness between the economies and in the end, argues for “targeted decoupling,” as opposed to full and comprehensive decoupling.9

In the end, while there is an increasing sentiment that the US should seek to become independent as a means to cut the channels of vulnerabilities that asymmetric interdependence has created, especially in relation to the immense dependence that US has on certain materials needed for weapon production, complete decoupling should not be the answer. Interdependence so far has proven to have a relation to decreasing conflict when used strategically, and complete decoupling would create further problems considering the close relationship that the U.S. economy holds with others. As such, the U.S instead focuses on repositioning its independence to maximize its utility. 

  1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America November 2025. Accessed September 30, 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.  ↩︎
  2. Polachek, S. W. (1980). Conflict and Trade. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 55-78. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200278002400103 ↩︎
  3. Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79. ↩︎
  4. Office, U.S. Government Accountability. “U.S. Gao.” Critical Materials: Action Needed to Implement Requirements That Reduce Supply Chain Risks, September 12, 2024. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107176.  ↩︎
  5. Office, U.S. Government Accountability. “U.S. Gao.” Critical Materials: Action Needed to Implement Requirements That Reduce Supply Chain Risks, September 12, 2024. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107176.  ↩︎
  6. “Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on the U.S. – China Economic Relationship at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.” U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 20, 2023. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1425.  ↩︎
  7. The dangers of misunderstanding economic interdependence | Cato Institute.  https://www.cato.org/publications/dangers-misunderstanding-economic-interdependence.  ↩︎
  8. Barbieri, Katherine. “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 29–49. http://www.jstor.org/stable/425132. ↩︎
  9. Segal, Stephanie, and Dylan Gerstel. “Degrees of Separation: A Targeted Approach to U.S.-China Decoupling – Interim Report.” CSIS. Accessed October 1, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/degrees-separation-targeted-approach-us-china-decoupling-interim-report.  ↩︎

Threat of a Nuclear Iran | By Kimberly Hernandez

Kimberly Hernandez

In June of 2025, in what is known as the Twelve-Day War, the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear program in an attempt to prevent Iran from creating nuclear weapons.1 This attack was significant in impeding Iran’s progress in building its nuclear program. Key infrastructure such as the “two uranium enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz and a uranium processing facility at Isfahan” were all targeted.2 While Iran’s nuclear program took a significant hit, it is unclear if the efforts were successful in preventing nuclear proliferation. Despite the high stakes associated with nuclear proliferation, the threat of a nuclear Iran should not be continued to be addressed through military force alone. 

Past events have indicated that states often become further motivated to seek nuclear weapons in the wake of a clear opponent or threat. For example, “Israel’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was heavily influenced by the 1956 Suez Crisis and subsequent regional tensions.”3 Thus, historically, there has been a trend of high regional security threats resulting in nuclear proliferation. In literature, scholars such as Mark Bell have reflected this sentiment, noting that if a state is experiencing “the existence of serious international threats (territorial) or ongoing war,” they are likely to use nuclear weapons to move forward with aggressive and steadfast policy against that threat.4 In other words, high-security environments tend to cause states to use nuclear weapons to further more aggressive foreign policy. As such, military exchanges will exacerbate tensions by creating a high-security threat. Consequently, Iran is likely to feel an increased need for nuclear weapons and increasing tensions will only encourage nuclear weapons to be used as a political tool to further aggressive foreign policy. 

After the impact of the Twelve-Day War, Iran is predicted to need at least one to two years in order to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, and even longer to make a nuclear missile.5 Consequently,  after the attack on its nuclear program, Iran was left impeded and with limited resources. Yet, continuous attacks on their program will, in the end, only serve to hinder Iran’s capabilities. Military exchanges alone will not alter Iran’s motivation to seek nuclear weapons. In fact, statistically, coercion by punishment rarely succeeds in getting an actor to change their policy aims.6 Therefore, although military force by Israel and the U.S. did succeed in hindering Iran’s nuclear program, it remains unclear if Iran’s motivation to proliferate was successfully changed. 

Supporters of military intervention may consider it to be the most impactful force to inhibit Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Therefore, even if Iran’s motivations remain unchanged and nuclear weapons are still produced, at least Iran’s nuclear capabilities will be low. However, having a weak nuclear Iran could prove to be more dangerous compared to having a secured nuclear Iran. Strategic theory on nuclear weapons emphasizes the importance of having a secured second-strike capability, recognizing that possessing asymmetric nuclear capabilities can result in escalation rather than assurance and deterrence.7 To put it in perspective, Israel is estimated to have around 90 warheads.8 Therefore, if Iran develops a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, while Israel maintains their larger nuclear capabilities, this asymmetric dynamic could help to foster a mentality of “use it or lose it,” thus motivating Iran to deploy nuclear weapons. 

In all, despite the potential danger behind the reality of a new nuclear state, military force should not be pursued in addressing nuclear proliferation. This is for the reason that military efforts are likely, as seen in past scenarios, to increase Iran’s motivation to proliferate for the sake of protecting its security. Notably, continuous military force now is likely to backfire in the event that Iran does proliferate in the foreseeable future, as it raises interstate tensions and creates incentives for more aggressive foreign policy. Therefore, policy aimed at addressing the threat of proliferation should focus on the motivational aspects, as opposed to the capabilities. In effect, this can manifest through diplomatic means and reassuring Iran’s security, if nuclear nonproliferation is the main goal. 

  1. Farnia, Nina. 2025. “The 12-Day War and the Collapse of US Imperialism.” Middle East Critique 34 (4): 791–95. doi:10.1080/19436149.2025.2578034.
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  2. Rodgers, Joseph, Heather Williams, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. “Damage to Iran’s Nuclear Program-Can It Rebuild?” CSIS. Accessed September 25, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/damage-irans-nuclear-program-can-it-rebuild.
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  3. Horschig, Doreen. “Why Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad Idea.” Nuclear Network, October 31, 2024. https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/why-striking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-is-a-bad-idea/.
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  4. Bell, Mark S. 2019. “Nuclear Opportunism: A Theory of How States Use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics.” Journal of Strategic Studies 42 (1): 3–28. doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1389722.
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  5. Albright, David, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker. “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program after the 12-Day War: A Diagram of the Destruction.” Institute For Science And International Security. August 20, 2025. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/irans-nuclear-weapons-program-after-the-12-day-war-a-diagram-of-the-destruction.
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  6. Pape, Robert A. “Explaining Military Coercion.” In Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Cornell University Press, 1996. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v.5.
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  7. Narang, Vipin. “The Sources of Regional Power Nuclear Postures: Posture Optimization Theory.” In Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Princeton University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt6wq00j.6.
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  8. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. 2022. “Israeli Nuclear Weapons, 2021.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 78 (1): 38–50. Doi:10.1080/00963402.2021.2014239.
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