In June of 2025, in what is known as the Twelve-Day War, the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear program in an attempt to prevent Iran from creating nuclear weapons.1 This attack was significant in impeding Iran’s progress in building its nuclear program. Key infrastructure such as the “two uranium enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz and a uranium processing facility at Isfahan” were all targeted.2 While Iran’s nuclear program took a significant hit, it is unclear if the efforts were successful in preventing nuclear proliferation. Despite the high stakes associated with nuclear proliferation, the threat of a nuclear Iran should not be continued to be addressed through military force alone.
Past events have indicated that states often become further motivated to seek nuclear weapons in the wake of a clear opponent or threat. For example, “Israel’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was heavily influenced by the 1956 Suez Crisis and subsequent regional tensions.”3 Thus, historically, there has been a trend of high regional security threats resulting in nuclear proliferation. In literature, scholars such as Mark Bell have reflected this sentiment, noting that if a state is experiencing “the existence of serious international threats (territorial) or ongoing war,” they are likely to use nuclear weapons to move forward with aggressive and steadfast policy against that threat.4 In other words, high-security environments tend to cause states to use nuclear weapons to further more aggressive foreign policy. As such, military exchanges will exacerbate tensions by creating a high-security threat. Consequently, Iran is likely to feel an increased need for nuclear weapons and increasing tensions will only encourage nuclear weapons to be used as a political tool to further aggressive foreign policy.
After the impact of the Twelve-Day War, Iran is predicted to need at least one to two years in order to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, and even longer to make a nuclear missile.5 Consequently, after the attack on its nuclear program, Iran was left impeded and with limited resources. Yet, continuous attacks on their program will, in the end, only serve to hinder Iran’s capabilities. Military exchanges alone will not alter Iran’s motivation to seek nuclear weapons. In fact, statistically, coercion by punishment rarely succeeds in getting an actor to change their policy aims.6 Therefore, although military force by Israel and the U.S. did succeed in hindering Iran’s nuclear program, it remains unclear if Iran’s motivation to proliferate was successfully changed.
Supporters of military intervention may consider it to be the most impactful force to inhibit Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Therefore, even if Iran’s motivations remain unchanged and nuclear weapons are still produced, at least Iran’s nuclear capabilities will be low. However, having a weak nuclear Iran could prove to be more dangerous compared to having a secured nuclear Iran. Strategic theory on nuclear weapons emphasizes the importance of having a secured second-strike capability, recognizing that possessing asymmetric nuclear capabilities can result in escalation rather than assurance and deterrence.7 To put it in perspective, Israel is estimated to have around 90 warheads.8 Therefore, if Iran develops a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, while Israel maintains their larger nuclear capabilities, this asymmetric dynamic could help to foster a mentality of “use it or lose it,” thus motivating Iran to deploy nuclear weapons.
In all, despite the potential danger behind the reality of a new nuclear state, military force should not be pursued in addressing nuclear proliferation. This is for the reason that military efforts are likely, as seen in past scenarios, to increase Iran’s motivation to proliferate for the sake of protecting its security. Notably, continuous military force now is likely to backfire in the event that Iran does proliferate in the foreseeable future, as it raises interstate tensions and creates incentives for more aggressive foreign policy. Therefore, policy aimed at addressing the threat of proliferation should focus on the motivational aspects, as opposed to the capabilities. In effect, this can manifest through diplomatic means and reassuring Iran’s security, if nuclear nonproliferation is the main goal.
- Farnia, Nina. 2025. “The 12-Day War and the Collapse of US Imperialism.” Middle East Critique 34 (4): 791–95. doi:10.1080/19436149.2025.2578034.
↩︎ - Rodgers, Joseph, Heather Williams, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. “Damage to Iran’s Nuclear Program-Can It Rebuild?” CSIS. Accessed September 25, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/damage-irans-nuclear-program-can-it-rebuild.
↩︎ - Horschig, Doreen. “Why Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad Idea.” Nuclear Network, October 31, 2024. https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/why-striking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-is-a-bad-idea/.
↩︎ - Bell, Mark S. 2019. “Nuclear Opportunism: A Theory of How States Use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics.” Journal of Strategic Studies 42 (1): 3–28. doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1389722.
↩︎ - Albright, David, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker. “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program after the 12-Day War: A Diagram of the Destruction.” Institute For Science And International Security. August 20, 2025. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/irans-nuclear-weapons-program-after-the-12-day-war-a-diagram-of-the-destruction.
↩︎ - Pape, Robert A. “Explaining Military Coercion.” In Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Cornell University Press, 1996. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v.5.
↩︎ - Narang, Vipin. “The Sources of Regional Power Nuclear Postures: Posture Optimization Theory.” In Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Princeton University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt6wq00j.6.
↩︎ - Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. 2022. “Israeli Nuclear Weapons, 2021.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 78 (1): 38–50. Doi:10.1080/00963402.2021.2014239.
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