President Trump and various AI leaders have expressed concerns that Chinese social media accounts may contribute to American disapproval of new data center construction—but evidence that the foreign actors have significantly influenced discourse is limited.
On August 31, 2026, President Trump published a post on Truth Social promoting the construction of data centers under the slogan “Let Data Reign.” In his post, he cited that “China could not be happier with [the] anti-data center movement,” directly alluding to the American public’s recent opposition to data center expansion with China’s geopolitical interests.1 Earlier in the summer, OpenAI released a June Threat Report claiming that P.R.C.-linked accounts may be attempting to sway American AI debates. According to the report, Chinese actors prompted ChatGPT to produce images and political cartoons in English, raising concerns about increasing data center capacity, which OpenAI claims is intended for American audiences on social media.2 Nationally representative surveys from the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg Public Policy Center indicate that American opposition to local data centers rose sharply between February-March and June-July of 2026, with the former survey seeing 49% opposition, and the latter 61%, a statistically significant increase in a few months–during the same timeframe that OpenAI was investigating Chinese accounts.3 This raises the question: has Beijing-linked activity on social media contributed to American AI uncertainties, or has the development been a product of primarily domestic origin? While P.R.C.-affiliated accounts have attempted to exacerbate American hesitation over data center expansion, the rise in public opposition seems to have emerged predominantly over concerns raised by notable American political leaders such as Governor Greg Abbott (R-TX), and Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) regarding electricity costs, environmental impacts, and effects on local communities.45 They suggest that alleged Chinese influence is an attempt to further ignite American debate, not the source of it.
Discourse on the artificial intelligence development race, and the geopolitical relevance associated with it, has consistently made its way to Capitol Hill and China’s National People’s Congress. The United States has pushed policies such as President Trump’s ‘Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence’ executive order,6 and China has expanded its ‘AI Plus’ campaign in its Fifteenth Five-Year Economic Plan.7 Both Beijing and Washington have recognized that artificial intelligence is of supreme importance for the future of their national interests; As such, the motivation exists for China to influence American sentiments on data centers.
This past June, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, headed by Congressman Brett Guthrie (R-KY) requested the FBI to give a “briefing to understand what actions the Trump Administration is taking to investigate foreign influence campaigns to slow U.S. AI development.”8 The request signals that there is evidence to suggest that China, Russia, and Iran are launching coordinated campaigns to sow discontent in the American public’s consciousness. However, the existence of these alleged campaigns does not sufficiently establish that Americans’ change in opinion was significantly influenced by foreign action.
While OpenAI’s June Threat Report confirms the presence of suspicious Chinese accounts, it also points out that “most of the social media posts identified generated little or no observable engagement.” Darren Linvill, a researcher at Clemson University, confirms this assessment, as his work identified that Chinese bot accounts were quickly suspended from X and their posts received minimal traction.9
If Chinese inflammatory social media posts are not a major contributor to American AI data center disapproval, what is? As early as December 2025, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) raised concerns over utility cost implications of data centers, writing letters and launching an investigation of top AI-oriented companies.10 Since then, data center disputes have reached the forefront of the Democratic Party’s policy agendas—but distaste for data center construction is fairly bipartisan. According to the same Annenberg Public Policy Center survey, both Democrats (69%) and Republicans (54%) are opposed to local data centers.11 Per a Pew Research survey, the top issues cited are the environmental impact, home energy costs, and local quality of life.12
While investigations have confirmed the mild presence of C.C.P.-linked social media accounts spreading distrust of data center construction, evidence that it has caused a meaningful impact on American sentiment is limited. U.S. AI discourse had been consistently contentious before the Chinese accounts surfaced.
Abstract: The United States may not need NATO, but NATO definitely needs the United States. This relationship is harming European defense capabilities and preventing them from taking action regarding the Ukraine conflict.
Between July 7 and July 8, 2026, the 2026 NATO Summit was held in Ankara, Turkey.1 President Trump claimed that there was “tremendous love in that room”.2 However, this loving atmosphere was not present during his March 2026 statement when President Trump posted on Truth Social that NATO was making a “very foolish mistake” by declining to help the United States in its conflict with Iran.3 This statement leads to a lot of questions: why should NATO help if the United States is not under direct attack? Should NATO get involved just to prevent Iran from advancing its uranium enrichment system? Yet, the most important question is: What should NATO do about the war in Ukraine?
Since February 2022, Ukraine has been under constant attack from Russia. There have been 1.5 million casualties on both sides, 5.9 million Ukrainians registered as refugees, and a daily cost of the war of $190 million for Ukraine.4 Yet, with a massive war on its continent and the imminent threat of Russian attack, the question remains: why should NATO help assist the U.S. against Iran and not assist Ukraine? The answer lies in a truth NATO refuses to face: the United States does not need NATO, but NATO cannot survive without the United States. Everything the United States does directly benefits NATO, such as switching a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in Asia to the Mediterranean to help NATO in a crisis. So, maybe it is understandable for the U.S. to demand NATO’s help during one of its most major conflicts in the last 5 years, considering that the U.S. spends 16% of its defense spending in NATO while most of the NATO countries invest only 5% of their GDP in security measures for the alliance.5,6
Therefore, taking into account the numbers mentioned and the current situation, should European countries start taking more action to defend themselves? And then, is NATO still a useful organization? Firstly, the European Union’s defense spending is €454 billion in 2026, which is equivalent to 2.2% of GDP,7 compared with NATO’s 5% of GDP spent on defense, which was agreed during the 2026 summit. Even though EU defense spending increased by 75.3% since 2021, it has been shown that it is not enough to contain Russia and the threat that it poses to the entire European continent. NATO can protect the countries that signed the treaty, but it’s the EU’s mission to maintain peace and stability within Europe, even though the war has reached its fourth year and has no end in sight, alongside Russia’s hybrid attacks on Europe this past week.8 Also, looking at the data, the EU’s reliance on NATO and, therefore, on the United States, reinforces the lack of commitment to the continent’s security through its small contribution to Europe’s defense spending.
As for the second question, the United States’ defense budget reached nearly $2.63 trillion this year, and its status as a major power in the Western world sets the U.S. in a position as the financial anchor of NATO.9 Moreover, NATO does not need a full shutdown; it needs less reliance on the United States and a reform that focuses its attention on the conflicts happening in the North Atlantic territory.
Therefore, instead of flattering the United States with compliments every time there is a NATO Summit, the alliance should focus on restructuring its core values such as individual liberty, democracy, and human rights.10 The reform should focus on a future where Russia could dominate Europe and address the current crisis in Ukraine, with consistent negotiations with the United States about the current situation and the main priorities of the alliance, the concerns of European countries, and introducing a slow detachment from the U.S., proposing a reduction of its contribution to NATO’s defense budget.
Michaels, Jeffrey H. “The Nato Experience.” In Deterrence Warning Messages: A Short Guide for NATO, edited by Tim Sweijs. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep70752↩︎
For all the criticism surrounding U.S. electoral systems–whether it be gerrymandering, campaign spending, or election integrity–there is little discussion of a particular system which offers several potential improvements to the current election process: ranked-choice voting.
Many of us have heard the term, but what actually is ranked-choice voting? Ranked-choice voting, or RCV, is a system in which voters rank their preferred candidates on the ballot by first choice, second choice, third choice, and so on. If a candidate has the majority of first-choice votes, they win the election. If no candidate receives a majority, the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is dropped from the race, and the ballots which listed the dropped candidate as their first choice now contribute their second choices, and so on. This process of removing the least-voted-for candidate continues until there is a candidate with a majority. RCV is sometimes called “instant runoff” because there is no need for subsequent elections; voters have indicated their preferences in the event that their first choice or even their second or third choice does not get elected. RCV is already used in municipal elections in some major US cities, including San Francisco and New York City.1
Advocates for RCV list several benefits. For one, RCV seems to improve voter experience. Based on a Y2 Analytics poll of Utah voters in the 2021 municipal elections, 86% were satisfied with the voting experience, reporting it was “easy to use” with clear instructions.”2 In addition, since a ranked-choice system levels the playing field for candidates, voters feel freer to choose candidates with whom they feel aligned on values rather than simply picking the person they think is most likely to win. According to a 2022 survey conducted by Alan James Simmons et al., “Researchers asked survey respondents to vote in a hypothetical version of the 2020 US presidential election between Joe Biden (Democrat), Donald Trump (Republican), Howie Hawkins (Green), and Jo Jorgensen (Libertarian). Among respondents randomly assigned to vote under plurality rules, 3.75% voted for Hawkins or Jorgensen; among respondents randomly assigned to vote under RCV, 7% ranked Hawkins or Jorgensen first.”3 This indicates that voters are more likely to vote for third-party candidates in an RCV system.
Another benefit of RCV is that policy is more likely to reflect voter preferences. In a “first-past-the-post” voting system like we use in the U.S., most candidates seek the support of interest groups and major political parties to propel them towards election. As a result, such groups can motivate public elected officials to make policy decisions based on seeking party support instead of passing laws that voters want.4 RCV, on the other hand, creates incentives for candidates, once elected, to adopt moderate policy positions “with the knowledge that the extremists will be eliminated in the first round of the runoff.”5
Lastly, RCV systems seem to increase voter turnout. According to a 2024 study of voter data conducted by Eveline Dowling and other researchers, “results show that people in RCV jurisdictions are significantly more likely to vote in off-year elections than individuals living in non-RCV places.”6 This may be because voters tend to interact more with candidates and campaigns in RCV elections.7
Not only does RCV improve the voting process, but it also seems to contribute towards a better overall experience for candidates. In a RCV system, candidates must appeal to all groups of voters in order to win, not just their own base. As Dowling and Tolbert explain, “this need for broader appeal can lead to more civil and cooperative campaigning.”8 Campaigns also become less negative, since candidates don’t want to “engage in negative campaigning” or malign the images of their opponents, as these actions “could alienate potential supporters.”9
RCV also encourages more candidates to run for office, as voters are free to cast their vote more sincerely.10 Unlike in a plurality or majority electoral system, candidates have a chance of winning even without the support of a major political party due to the ranking system.
Despite its benefits, RCV certainly comes with some drawbacks. In a climate where Americans already distrust elections, decreased voter trust in the electoral system is a legitimate concern. Derek Monson et al. found that “39% of Americans do not trust the fairness of elections in the U.S.,” which does not bode well for changing the voting system.”11 Additionally, there is evidence of voter mistrust in RCV specifically. In a recent study, participants were given a scenario in which RCV and first-past-the-post systems yielded different election outcomes. The study found that US survey respondents were generally more accepting of the first-past-the-post outcome.12 Implementing RCV could exacerbate voter skepticism surrounding elections, which could be seriously damaging to democracy in the U.S.
Another frequently cited concern is a phenomenon known as ballot exhaustion. Ballot exhaustion occurs when all of a voter’s chosen candidates on a ballot have been eliminated due to runoff and there are more than two candidates left in the race. Then, the ballot would be considered exhausted13 because it no longer contributes a tally for the final winner.
Ballot exhaustion has raised questions about whether or not RCV is constitutional. In 2011, Dudum v. Arntz challenged San Francisco’s ranked-choice voting system (known as Instant-Runoff Voting, or IRV) for city officials.14 San Francisco law limited the number of rankings on each individual ballot to three, so plaintiffs argued that “when more than four candidates run for a particular office, the IRV excludes exhausted voters from full participation.”15 Although the Ninth Circuit Court ultimately upheld IRV as constitutional, questions certainly remain regarding whether or not RCV conforms to the Constitution in all its various forms.
Overall, RCV provides key improvements to the current U.S. voting system; however, it still has several drawbacks that cannot be ignored. Before considering implementing RCV in major elections, more data is needed to help predict the effects such a system would have in the U.S. Other countries such as Italy and Brazil have implemented RCV more broadly, but their government systems are much different than that of the U.S., which makes it difficult to directly compare and predict the potential consequences of widespread institutionalization of RCV in the U.S. The public must also be educated about RCV so that they can develop well-formed opinions on the system and perhaps build more trust in its legitimacy. Still, even if the data advocates for the U.S. to implement RCV, it is ultimately the voters’ decision whether or not to do so. True to RCV’s principles of representation, moderation, and amplifying voters’ unique preferences, the American public will have to decide whether there is more merit or fault in RCV.
Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/. ↩︎
Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/. ↩︎
Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/. ↩︎
Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/. ↩︎
Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/. ↩︎
If you’ve kept up with the Democratic primary elections over the summer, or have simply paid attention to the notifications from the New York Times subscription you’ve forgotten you had, then you’ve heard or read about the election of progressive Democratic candidate Dr. Abdul El-Sayed. Dr. El-Sayed won the Democratic primary for the Michigan Senate seat against moderate candidate Haley Stevens. This win upset people on the right as well as moderates on the left.1
An issue that the Democratic Party seems to be having, especially seen in the 2024 presidential election, is that the Party is diversely divided and that the Democratic National Committee is vastly unorganized.2 In addition to an internal divide, it’s clearly evident that the Democratic and Republican parties are increasingly polarized, especially as the Republican Party pushes further right. This measure of asymmetric polarization– polarization that occurs due to the Republican Party moving farther to the right than the Democratic Party has moved left– has benefitted the Republican Party.3 Republican congressional players respond to the policy needs that correspond with the rhetoric that’s reinforced within the Party, strengthening their support by conservative constituents.4
Increasingly, Republicans have benefitted from a more unified platform that has shifted more to the ideological right. As a response to this partisan shift away from centrist policies, there is an increased prominence of progressive politicians, such as Dr. El-Sayed, and the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). The DSA is a direct response to this pull away from the center– it’s the Democrats’ turn to pay attention towhythis shift is necessary for their Party.
The DSA is further to the ideological left compared to more moderate Democrats. They are fighting for “working people” as they believe the working class “should run both the economy and civil society.”5 In contrast, traditional Democrats believe that “every American deserves a fair shot at the American dream.”6 This American Dream is more centered on ideas of affordable and upward economic mobility as opposed to the DSA’s view of flourishing, through changing the systems, rather than simply surviving within the system.
As the American people are voting for more candidates in the DSA, the Democratic Party should take a moment to reflect upon the implications of the polls. It’s no secret that the working class is becoming more distraught with the Democratic Party– support from working-class workers is split between Democrats and Republicans, neither having a majority.7 The working class is a major proportion of the population that still feels underrepresented by career politicians on both sides of the political aisle. In response to this despondency, many people are starting to feel represented by the DSA and other progressives who believe in the working class. Especially those who are taking the initiative to address working-class issues directly.
The most popular stream of support for a DSA member has been visible in New York City with Mayor Mamdani. Mamdani’s policies focus on the working-class, everyday New Yorker.8 On a city-wide level, he has instituted change and has become an online phenomenon. Since then, Democratic margins have increased. In fact, in a study done by the New York Times, 31% of eligible US voters stated that they had a very or somewhat favorable opinion of socialist policies.9 As socialism is becoming more popular amongst voters, it’s easy to question why the Democratic Party is not more accepting of this apparent shift.
It is worth noting that this same study revealed that 50% of eligible voters believe the Democratic Party is too far to the left. However, out of that 50%, only 17% of respondents who felt this way were Democrats.10 Meaning that Democrats are willing to vote for progressive members, but not all American voters feel represented by them.
Since there has been an increase in visibility and support for the DSA, perhaps career Democrats need to do what Republicans have been doing: take advantage of the asymmetric polarization. If the Republican Party has found success in a further shift to the ideological right, then Democrats need to take a shift to the ideological left if they want to push for unity within their Party. Democrats need to pay attention to why voters have been favoring progressive and socialist candidates– working-class Americans want direct support and outreach. That representation can lead to a more unified Party platform through a reevaluation of Party standards. Ultimately, this representation and a drawback from career politicians would be in the Democratic Party’s best interest.
Fishkin, Joseph, and David E. Pozen. “Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball.” Columbia Law Review 118, no. 3 (2018): 915–82. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26397699. ↩︎
Leonard, Naomi Ehrich, Keena Lipsitz, Anastasia Bizyaeva, Alessio Franci, and Yphtach Lelkes. “The Nonlinear Feedback Dynamics of Asymmetric Political Polarization.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 118, no. 50 (2021): 1–11. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27112692. ↩︎
Critics of democratic socialism often point to the collapse of past socialist states. This argument, however, lumps a diverse range of regimes under a single label and overlooks the institutions that actually drove those outcomes. Centralized planning, commodity dependence, and price controls doomed the USSR, Venezuela, and Chile. Nordic-style redistribution, by contrast, has thrived without them.
A 2026 Gallup Poll found that the majority of Americans, approximately 61%, do not view socialist systems favorably.1 Among their most frequently cited concerns are economic inefficiency and excessive government control. Regardless of the accuracy, these fears are commonly advanced by a historical argument–one that points to the failures of past socialist regimes as a means of discounting modern, democratic-socialist efforts. This logic was even deployed in a 2023 House resolution, “denouncing the horrors of socialism” on the grounds that it has “time and time again” led to regime collapse.2The fatal flaw of this argument, however, is that while the label “socialism” has persisted throughout history, the institutions attached to the term have varied radically.
The Soviet Union, Venezuela, Allende’s Chile, and the modern Nordic countries have all been associated with socialism, but their institutions differed dramatically. They range from centralized state ownership under an authoritarian government to democratic attempts at nationalization and redistribution to market economies paired with expansive welfare states. Their divergent outcomes therefore provide a useful test: which elements of socialism repeatedly produced economic problems, and which survived when separated from them?
One key axis of socialism is centralized planning and state ownership.3 In the case of the Soviet Union, the state controlled production, resource allocation, and pricing through comprehensive national directives. While it industrialized rapidly, the Soviet Union’s long-run growth, after accounting for its unusually high investment and human-capital accumulation, was the world’s worst from 1960-89.4 Its economy simply could not allocate resources efficiently enough to keep up with the large amounts of capital being poured into it. This instance demonstrates the risks of taking the centralized-planning axis to socialism to its extreme. However, it says considerably less about systems of social democracy that preserve markets and decentralized economic decision-making.
Another often cited “socialist failure” was Venezuela under Chavez and Maduro. Despite avoiding the Soviet-style comprehensively planned economy, Venezuelan state intervention was substantial, and mass redistribution was financed through oil revenues, which accounted for 96% of export income between 2004-13.5 This created a major dependency, and when oil prices collapsed beginning in 2014, that dependence interacted with foreign exchange controls and monetary expansion, intensifying inflation and economic decline.6 Extensive state intervention magnified, rather than independently caused, the consequences of commodity dependence in this case.
In relation to today’s discourse surrounding democratic socialism, the most relevant historical comparison is Chile under Salvador Allende. This is an example of a democratically elected “socialist failure” shaped by a mixture of self inflictions and external force. On one end, Allende implemented extensive price controls as a response to inflation, contributing to the country’s growing economic crisis.7 Simultaneously however, declassified U.S. records document covert efforts to weaken Allende’s government.8 Therefore, Chile demonstrates a scenario where democratic socialist policies did produce serious economic consequences, but the historical outcome cannot be evaluated independently of external political conditions.
The successful Nordic model provides an important final distinction. Although frequently associated with socialism, Nordic countries largely preserved market economies while pairing them with extensive redistribution, universal social programs, and strong labor institutions.9 Rather than demonstrating a socialist success, this suggests that expansive welfare states can operate without the comprehensive central planning that characterized historical socialist regimes.
The history of socialism therefore offers neither a blanket condemnation nor an endorsement of modern democratic socialism. Past failures emerged from distinct combinations of planning, state ownership, economic intervention, and external pressures, while the Nordic model succeeded following an almost entirely different path. Whether today’s democratic-socialist proposals are sound must be judged on their actual institutions and policies, not on a contested label shared between fundamentally different systems of the past.
Rafael D. Ramírez, “The Venezuelan Oil Industry Collapse: Economic, Social and Political Implications,” IAI Commentaries 21|52 (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2021), https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom2152.pdf. ↩︎
US Department of State, “Paper Prepared in the Department of State: Action in Support of U.S. Posture Towards Chile,” October 16, 1970, Document 155, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d155. ↩︎
Johannes Tiemer, “The Success of the Nordic Countries as a Blueprint for Small Open Economies,” Intereconomics 53, no. 4 (2018): 209–214, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-018-0751-6. ↩︎
In 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Asked about the odds of conflict over Taiwan, Davidson warned: “I worry [China is] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States … Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade … in the next six years.”1
This “Davidson Window” reshaped the narrative surrounding China policy.2 Yet, as 2027 approaches, a Chinese invasion seems unlikely. The Intelligence Community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment concluded “that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.”3 Why? An invasion of Taiwan would be a disaster for the PRC. It would be operationally infeasible, economically crippling, and set back the PRC’s core strategic interests.
China is substantially stronger than Taiwan. The PRC’s defense budget is 15 times its size, and China has a 10:1 advantage in warships and combat aircraft.4 Despite this, the logistics of an amphibious assault create issues. The Taiwan Strait is 90 miles wide and characterized by rough seas, weather, and monsoon seasons that limit opportunities for invasion. A crossing would take hours and consist of a force larger than that of D-Day, leaving landing parties vulnerable to drone attacks.5 Taiwan’s mountainous terrain eliminates several possible landing sites, and what flat coastal terrain exists is mostly urban or agricultural.6 Factor in American intervention, and the situation quickly becomes untenable for China.
A 2023 CSIS wargame illustrates these difficulties. Across 24 simulations, China failed to conquer Taiwan 22 times, suffering an average loss of 138 major ships–roughly 90 percent of its amphibious fleet–161 combat aircraft, and tens of thousands of personnel. Although most scenarios assumed U.S. intervention, conquering Taiwan alone still took China roughly 70 days and 70,000 ground casualties.7
This doesn’t even factor in the economic costs of invasion. Conservative estimates put the global cost of a Chinese blockade at $2–3 trillion, with a “major war” scenario entailing several months of armed conflict and roughly $10 trillion in losses. China would bear a significant portion of this through lost trade (20% of China’s GDP comes from exports), energy disruption, severe economic sanctions, capital flight (China is home to $3.6 trillion in inward FDI), and the seizure of Chinese overseas assets.8 Chinese industries dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductors could lose trillions in annual revenue, and energy imports through key chokepoints like the Straits of Malacca would be vulnerable to disruption or even an American blockade.9 Even if an invasion succeeded, China would face long-term isolation from global markets, incurring long-term economic damage.10
The worst part is an invasion would fail to achieve the PRC’s key strategic interests. Taiwanese industry would be devastated, including its semiconductor industry. A CSIS report determined that following any successful invasion, Taiwan would be a “damaged economy … without electricity and basic services.” Reconstruction costs would be staggering, and it’s unlikely that China would be able to reap the benefits of Taiwan’s invaluable semiconductor industry for several years. China would have to contend with local resistance, and the political victory of reunification may quickly become overshadowed by a drawn-out counterinsurgency campaign. A successful conquest may prompt alarm among China’s neighbors, pushing them closer to the United States.11
No matter how you look at it, a Taiwanese invasion would be a Pyrrhic victory at best, and a complete disaster at worst, jeopardizing Chinese military strength, economic prosperity, and long-term strategic position in exchange for an uncertain outcome.
Wright, Logan, Charlie Vest, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Zack Cooper, Jake Rinaldi, and Joel Wuthnow. “China’s Economic Escalation Dilemma.” In If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios, edited by Bonnie S. Glaser. German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep77909.4. ↩︎
Recently, congressional redistricting has shifted from a decennial responsibility to a tool of mid-cycle partisan politics. Repeated redrawing undermines institutional productivity, creates electoral uncertainty, generates wasteful litigation, and fuels a self-perpetuating cycle of escalation. These consequences must be acknowledged and addressed.
This editorial critiques discretionary mid-cycle redistricting. It does not make normative claims about proportional representation, partisan fairness, or preferred substantive outcomes.
The Modern Landscape of Redistricting
Traditionally, state legislatures revise electoral districts following each decennial census to reflect updated population data. However, many states have recently pursued or considered redrawing congressional maps outside the normal post-census cycle. This unusually high level of mid-decade redistricting activity has not taken place since the 19th century.
Mid-decade, or “mid-cycle,” redistricting refers to a state legislature’s discretionary adoption of a new congressional district plan between decennial redistricting cycles. Court-ordered remedial maps designed to address constitutional or statutory violations are categorically different and should be excluded from this analysis.
Since the 2020 census, six states have implemented new congressional maps, and several others are considering mid-decade changes.1 Recent developments in Texas, California, and Indiana illustrate how mid-cycle redistricting has emerged as a partisan strategy. In Texas, Republican lawmakers enacted a mid-decade congressional map aimed at strengthening the party’s position in the U.S. House. California’s political leadership responded with a similar effort in an effort to counter those gains.2 Here in Indiana, lawmakers explored a similar mid-decade redraw, although it ultimately failed.3
These actions are emblematic of broader trends rather than isolated decisions. When one party redraws districts mid-cycle to secure a political advantage, the opposing party feels pressured to retaliate.The result is a cycle of strategic redistricting that departs from the traditional census-based process and increasingly resembles an interstate partisan arms race.4
Why Mid-Cycle Redistricting Occurs
The United States Constitution assigns primary responsibility for regulating congressional elections to individual states. In practice, state legislatures control congressional district lines, subjecting mapmaking authority to state-level partisan political strategy.5
First, in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the scope of federal courts because no judicially manageable standards exist to resolve them.6 While the Court maintained jurisdiction over claims grounded in federal law, including the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, Rucho substantially narrowed federal judicial review of redistricting undertaken for purely partisan advantage.7The result is a legal environment in which mid-decade redistricting is largely insulated from federal challenges.
This protection is further supported by the Court’s decision in LULAC v. Perry (2006). While the Court invalidated one district under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, it did not hold Texas’ 2003 mid-decade redistricting inherently unconstitutional.8 Importantly, while some may argue that mid-decade redistricting is not a contemporary problem because it occurred in 2006, the current concern is normalization rather than novelty.9
Some assert that Moore v. Harper (2023) meaningfully constrains strategic mid-decade redistricting because state courts may enforce state constitutional limits. However, because state standards vary and Moore does not provide a federal rule against partisan gerrymandering, state-court review does not eliminate the underlying incentive to redraw districts under partisan control.10
Finally, strategic redistricting is more common due to its predictable effects. Modern analytical tools can project likely outcomes with significant precision. As efforts like the Princeton Gerrymandering Project illustrate, parties can often assess whether a mid-decade redraw will yield a net electoral advantage.11 Consequently, mid-cycle redistricting has become an increasingly calculated and incentivized competitive strategy.
Why Mid-Cycle Redistricting is Harmful
Mid-cycle redistricting demands considerable time for committee hearings, map drafting, intra-party negotiations, and compliance analysis. It also predictably leads to litigation, which siphons additional state funding. This process transforms an already resource-intensive decennial task into a recurring strain on institutional capacity. The opportunity cost is substantial: effort spent redrawing maps is time not devoted to meaningful governance.12 Mid-cycle remapping also disrupts electoral accountability and administration by reshuffling constituencies between cycles and forcing rapid institutional changes amid legal uncertainty.13
Additionally, mid-cycle redistricting presents a classic strategic dilemma. If one party redraws districts to gain seats, the opposing party either faces a structural disadvantage or responds in kind. Due to the asymmetric cost of unilateral restraint, mutual restraint becomes unstable, resulting in a prisoner’s dilemma where both parties’ dominant strategy becomes redistricting. Even if both sides would prefer a stable equilibrium, they are incentivized to redraw mid-cycle, perpetuating frequent strategic interventions in the electoral map.14
Addressing Counterarguments
A common defense of mid-cycle redistricting is based on the principle of majority rule. Since legislatures are elected, they possess a democratic mandate accountable to voters.15 From this perspective, redistricting is merely an exercise of power by a duly elected majority. However, aggressive partisan redistricting can undermine the very mechanism that legitimizes that majority.16 If a mid-cycle redraw reduces electoral competition, it weakens the corrective function of elections and diminishes the accountability that the republican system aims to uphold.
The stronger counterargument is that some mid-cycle redistricting is legally compelled rather than driven by partisan motivations. Compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides clear examples.17 Under Thornburg v. Gingles(1986), courts may require map changes when a districting plan unlawfully dilutes minority voters’ opportunities to elect their preferred candidates, and Allen v. Milligan (2023) reaffirmed that Section 2 vote-dilution framework in the context of redistricting.18,19 Importantly, however, Section 2 merely authorizes remedies to address identified legal violations; it is not an open invitation to redraw lines whenever it is politically convenient.20
This distinction leads to a crucial procedural point. Court-ordered remedial redistricting is often necessary, while discretionary mid-cycle redistricting is not. The key nuance is that compliance and strategic advantage can be pursued concurrently.21A legislature can invoke the need to avoid legal exposure as justification for discretionary redistricting that maximizes partisan gain. Without constraints, “compliance” can become a permissive label for strategically timed consolidations of power.22
Reform
The primary reform concerning mid-cycle redistricting is clear: prohibit it unless required to remedy a constitutional or statutory violation.23 To prevent evasion, these court-ordered remedies should typically be final, enforceable decisions rather than preliminary injunctions.24 This rule would reduce incentives for strategic redrawing while allowing ordinary decennial redistricting to proceed. However, since electoral procedures are under the control of individual state legislatures, implementing such reforms would be procedurally difficult but ultimately administrable.25 This approach does not guarantee nonpartisan maps, nor does it eliminate politics from redistricting. It simply reduces the incentive for frequent, discretionary, and strategic redistricting in order to preserve institutional stability and enable governments to actually govern.26
“Before the war, it was said ‘the United States are’—grammatically it was spoken that way and thought of as a collection of independent states. And after the war it was always ‘the United States is,’ as we say today without being self-conscious at all. And that sums up what the war accomplished. It made us an ‘is.’”
The above quote, delivered by Shelby Foote as part of Ken Burns’ The Civil War miniseries, leapt from the stereo systems of homes across 1990’s America and perched itself on the bookshelf full of this nation’s canon. What Foote was getting at, outside of listing copulatives, was that the Civil War was a definitive point in time where Americans began conceiving of themselves as countrymen. No longer were men Ohioans who happened to be citizens of the United States. They were citizens of The United States who happened to live in Ohio.
This change in the state-nation relationship was not limited to the American psyche. In the decades leading up to the Civil War, state defiance to the dictates of the federal government was overt and occasionally even violent.1 The Civil War ushered in an era where Washington’s supremacy was settled, and, despite the failure of reconstruction and the post-1877 political and legal resistance to federal orders, politically armed organized opposition became illegitimate.
The post-war diminution of state authority and autonomy was perpetuated and strengthened throughout the 20th century. From the 17th Amendment and the first world war, through the New Deal and World War II, and on to the Cold War nationalization of security and the Civil Rights era, the US federal government firmly established its preponderance over state politics, solidifying Americans’ conceptions of their participation in a national community, not just a state one.
Over the past twelve months, this understanding of a continent-wide society has begun to unravel. President Trump’s return to the White House was interpreted by top Republican figures such as Stephen Miller, Susie Wiles, and JD Vance as a sweeping mandate to aggressively install a new conservative agenda, one that would be fully detached from the neoconservative holdovers who hampered Trump’s governance during his first term.2,3 The breadth and intensity of this new agenda has even surprised veteran party loyalists.4 The initiation of trade wars against friends and foes alike, the use of military force against Iran and Venezuela, the bellicose deployment of ICE to major US cities, and the attempts to coerce Jerome Powell into submission have signaled to Americans that the Trump Administration seeks to fundamentally alter the relationship between the State, its citizens, and the international community.5
The Democratic establishment appeared to be wholly unprepared to counter this Republican policy rollout. Having placed their political capital behind a candidate with deteriorating mental faculties,6 switched him out for his Vice President 107 days before the election, and then lost the House, Senate, and the White House, the DNC had neither the momentum, cohesion, or support necessary to deploy an effective opposition to Trump II’s early governance decisions.
In the wake of this political turmoil, the Democratic political apparatus has shifted its messaging strategy. Leaders and operatives within the DNC have realized that focusing on the policy failures, shortcomings, and missteps of President Trump and the MAGA generation of conservatives simply does not move the needle on American public opinion.7 Impeachments, felony convictions, attempts to disrupt the peaceful transition of power, and worrisome conflicts of interest were not enough to sideline President Trump’s third attempt at the White House. In fact, between 2016 and 2024, President Trump gained 14 million more voters. Democrats have come to understand that pointing to the faults in President Trump’s behavior, record, and ideology is not enough to win elections. They have come to terms with the fact that expending resources and bandwidth debating principles and norms does not resonate with voters overwhelmed with feelings of frustration and ostracization.
As a result, the Democratic political elite and media apparatus have turned away from promoting their ideology via criticizing Republican ideology. Instead, they have shifted their attention towards highlighting the physical, real-world disparities in outcomes between areas governed by Democrats and areas governed by Republicans. This was an impressive move by an establishment long marred by stubborn, antiquated leadership hesitant to change their approach to President Trump.8 With few opportunities to display good governance in a Republican-controlled Congress and Presidency, Democrats have simply pivoted to areas they do control: Cities, states, and regions.
This new strategy has long been floating at the periphery of Democratic messaging. Gavin Newsom, for example, has always appreciated the benefit of framing California as a semi-autonomous outcrop on the leading edge of American progressivism.9 However, over the past year, instances of Democrats using examples of high-performing political subdivisions as a way to demonstrate the superiority of Democratic governance over Republicanism has surged. One of the first areas where this campaign was rolled out was in discussions regarding which states contribute most to federal revenues.10
Unsurprisingly, Governor Newsom had some of the most high-profile commentary regarding this topic. The investment in this narrative from the left has been extensive. Saturating the media space with content highlighting the vast disparity between tax revenues from Democratic and Republican states achieves a variety of goals, the first of which being a discreditation of President Trump’s electoral base.
To the median, uninterested voter, learning that the core electorate propelling Trump to a second presidency resides in states consuming more federal resources than they contribute taints the supposed mandate received by the Republican party. The endgame of such efforts is to encourage dining room conversations such as this: “So you’re telling me the people who contribute less than everybody else get to dictate the future of this country, but those actually paying into the system have no say?” Various buzzwords have been thrown into the discussion as well, most notably the conceptions of “donor states” and “welfare states”, terms meant to further drive home that idea that it is Democrat-led states that are the most productive and prosperous within the Union.
Related to this last point, a second goal of this media strategy is to get voters to associate Democratic governance with economic success. For decades, Republicans have prided themselves on being the party of prosperity. Supporting tax cuts, limited social safety nets, and deregulation, Republicans have marketed themselves to American voters as the party that puts cash back into your pockets.11 By tying the political leadership of states to their “donor state” or “welfare state” status, DNC organizers are banking on voters seeing the Democratic platform as the key to unlocking economic growth and expansion.
Another area pounced on by this state-focused messaging strategy has been education. Much like with federal tax contributions, Democratic organizers have formed a unified approach to create a narrative that forges a causal link between educational outcomes and political governance.
The message here is simple: when Democrats govern, your children receive better educations. This phase of the new DNC media strategy is more confrontational than the federal tax contributions angle. Where the former campaign claims that blue state economic success is a result of Democratic policies creating more favorable economic conditions that Republican ones, the latter campaign directly accuses Republican-led states of legislative malpractice.
Again, much like the messaging on “donor states” and “welfare states”, there is a clear attempt here to further discredit President Trump’s legitimacy as an executive. The above tweet, along with many similar ones, latch state electoral results to state educational attainment. The anticipated effect of media content like this is to encourage voters to interpret Trump’s presidency as a triumph of the uninformed red states over the educated blue states.
One of the most clever ways Democrat-affiliated media has utilized state-level politics to market the efficacy of Democratic policy has been in the comparison of crime statistics between blue and red states. Starting during the 1960s, and certainly solidifying after the Willie Horton Case,12 the Democratic Party has dealt with the perception of being soft on crime. Republicans have taken full advantage of this in recent years. Countless campaign ads, tweets, Facebook posts, and TV segments have hammered home the idea that while Democrats let their states and cities devolve into warzones, Republican-led states fight tooth and nail to preserve law and order.
The DNC mediasphere has made significant strides in countering this narrative recently. Using the same strategies Republicans have implemented for years, Democrat-affiliated media have begun disseminating statistics and messaging showing Americans that Republicans are the real hypocrites. That, while grandstanding about law, order, and rule of law, they have sat idly by while their constituents suffer from crime at rates higher than their counterparts governed by Democratic state legislatures.
As with the strategy behind the messaging on education and federal tax contributions, the goal here is to manufacture causation. With President Trump in the White House criticizing blue states like Minnesota and California about their failure to enforce the law day after day, DNC organizers have tried to flip the narrative regarding leftist governance and crime enforcement. They have sought to reframe the discussion regarding the Democrat Party and crime to drill into voters that in the absence of Democratic pragmatism, Republican incompetence leads crime flourishing.
These discussions around conservatism and crime are a significant divergence from liberal strategies around education and “donor vs welfare state” debates. While even card-carrying Republicans would admit that economic productivity in California outpaces that of Mississippi and that a rural Alabama elementary school may have lower testing scores than a peer in Massachusetts, it is a much tougher proposition to convince voters that Democratic rule leads to lower crime. The aggressive attempts to flip this debate on its head is a sign that the Democrat Party is no longer satisfied with winning the middle ground – they want to beat Republicans on their home court.
The Democratic media apparatus has emerged guns a-blazing during the first year of this second Trump administration. Having started the year reeling from a disastrous presidential election and facing polls showing a disturbing trend among young voters,13 the DNC has turned to state-level politics to demonstrate to voters the virtues of their ideology. As midterms approach, legislatures and governor’s mansions have emerged as a battleground in the competition for Congress. States are now framed as if they in a vacuum, with their various goods and evils serving to encapsulate the projected result of either party’s federal governance.
Make no mistake though, Democrats are not the only ones who have dumped immense amounts of attention into state governments. Republicans have fully mobilized their mediasphere to counter these messaging campaigns from the Left. Just as liberal media sources have manipulated statistics and data to serve their interests, conservative voices have done their own gymnastics to raise their ideology on a pedestal.
Whether it be crime, taxation, education, or whatever else, GOP-affiliated media has gained a foothold in these debates raging around state politics. If a Democrat says blue states do better in education than red states, there are plentiful, equally convincing retorts from Republicans to discredit such claims.
In the end, this competition to link an individual state’s performance in a random category to whatever party has control leads to a media environment filled with low quality information. For every virtue, there is a vice. For every pro, there is a con. For every fact, there is a fact-check.
The Return
The point of this extensive delve into the world of Twitter messaging and influencing campaigns is that they are significantly altering how we view ourselves, our neighbors, and our nation. When Democrats and Republicans spew infographics about how blue states or red states edge out each other in certain categories, they aren’t just gaining political brownie points, they are promoting a perception of a fragmented Union. This media environment, paired with the efforts of states like California,14 Minnesota,15 Texas,16 and Florida17 to assert their autonomy, erode the conception of a cohesive American identity and suggest that there exists two separate, fundamentally opposed political systems under the mask of the federal umbrella.
These messaging campaigns are in no way executed in good faith either. Liberal and conservative agitants don’t concern themselves with the fact that state governments are dynamic, not static. A significant portion of the laws that govern affairs in red states like Ohio and West Virginia were codified by Democratic general assemblies of the past. California, a state that has had a Republican governor as recently as 2011,18 had six million of its residents vote for Donald Trump in 2024. Do those individuals not contribute to the behemoth that is California’s economy? Can the left-leaning tech gurus of Austin not share credit with Governor Abbott for Texas’ economic prosperity?
No matter how hard you try, you cannot rip causation from the mouth of correlation. You cannot attribute gun violence in a particular state to the fact that Republicans happen to have a majority in the legislature. You cannot establish a causal link between Democratic mayors and rampant violent crime rates within cities. The architects of these media campaigns know this, they just don’t care. They know their sensationalism won’t alter the opinions of the informed voter. They are targeting the disinterested, low-information, median voter to try to morph their perceptions of politics.
Despite aiming at only a specific portion of the voter population, these media strategies affect the entire American political arena. States have turned into conflict zones in demonstrating which political ideology is superior. They are increasingly viewed not as political subdivisions within a greater system, but as sovereign areas whose environments are a direct result of which party is heading the state.
Fracture, fissure, and divide can only spell bad things for unions. A uniform, consistent identity is essential for maintaining the unity of a political unit encompassing 350 million people settled across an entire continent. The newly-found hyperfixation on state politics encourages behavior and thinking that can unwind the very same fabric Shelby Foote commented on 40 years ago. We are more than a collection of 50 states. We are an interconnected people, all sharing an identity linking us with our past, present, and future.
Goldstein, Leslie. (1997). State Resistance to Authority in Federal Unions: The Early United States (1790–1860) and the European Community (1958–94). Studies in American Political Development. 11. 149 – 189. 10.1017/S0898588X00001620. ↩︎
This editorial evaluates competing United States grand strategies against established criteria for protecting state interests. It argues that a strategy of “selective engagement,” which focuses American resources on maintaining favorable regional balances through alliances, limited military force, and economic statecraft, is the only strategy that aligns with current structural and domestic constraints.
I. Introduction
The United States currently faces slowing economic growth, rising debt, and polarized politics. These circumstances have prompted a reevaluation of U.S. grand strategy to sustainably pursue critical interests within contemporary economic and political constraints. Competing proposals for a new grand strategy range from strict isolationism to a renewed version of primacy, but these ideas rest on assumptions misaligned with current political conditions and cost-benefit principles. This piece argues that, despite calls for a new doctrine, the United States should maintain the status quo of selective engagement.
II. Theoretical Groundwork
Grand strategy links political objectives to the military, economic, and diplomatic tools used to secure them. Objectives must be clearly defined and efficiently pursued. For example, Barry Posen characterizes grand strategy as a political–military means–ends chain through which a state achieves security.1 The pursuit of “security” through military force must recognize that war is a means to political ends rather than an end in itself.2 These ends must be realized through what theorist Nina Silove describes as plans, principles, and durable patterns of behavior.3
These formulations imply four evaluation criteria: a strategy must identify vital interests, specify the mechanisms required to defend them, align ends with available means, and avoid commitments that cannot be sustained over time. To satisfy these criteria, theorists and policymakers have proposed four competing grand strategies: Restraint, Liberal Internationalism, Primacy, and Selective Engagement.
Each of these grand strategies reflects assumptions derived from major paradigms in international relations theory. Restraint draws from “defensive realism,” arguing that the United States should protect its homeland through limited threats and avoid extensive foreign engagement.4 Liberal Internationalism reflects “institutional liberalism,” treating international rules and economic interdependence as stabilizing forces.5 Primacy incorporates elements of “offensive realism” and “hegemonic stability theory,” which assert that sustained military preponderance is necessary to suppress competition to U.S. power.6 Selective Engagement embodies “structural realism,” identifying where power shifts matter most and concentrating commitments accordingly while avoiding peripheral obligations.7 These paradigmatic assumptions generate different expectations about whether power, institutions, or norms generate stable security outcomes. The core test of any grand strategy is whether these expectations withstand theoretical and empirical scrutiny.
III. Evaluation of the Four Grand Strategies
A. Restraint
Restraint assumes that geography and nuclear deterrence sufficiently insulate the United States from major threats. It suggests that alliances and forward deployments introduce unnecessary liabilities.8 Its causal logic posits that reducing commitments lowers exposure to conflict without compromising homeland security. However, this reasoning misidentifies how regional balances shape global economic and security outcomes relevant to U.S. interests. Regional hegemons can reshape technological standards, production networks, and financial channels in ways that weaken U.S. leverage and limit economic autonomy.9 Rising powers also exploit institutional positions to gain advantages in trade, innovation, and coercive diplomacy.10 Historical evidence indicates that withdrawal accelerates renationalized defense, sharpens nationalism, and intensifies security dilemmas.11 These conditions can lead to arms racing, coercive bargaining, and nuclear proliferation.12 Because these mechanisms undermine essential U.S. interests and cannot be mitigated by geography alone, restraint fails to meet the grand strategic criteria of aligning available means with accurately identified national interests.
B. Liberal Internationalism
Liberal internationalism posits that supranational institutions and economic interdependence can stabilize international politics and reduce conflict.13 Its causal logic suggests that sustained U.S. engagement embeds states in predictable rules and encourages cooperative behavior. However, this mechanism relies on the acceptance of institutional constraints by rising powers and stable domestic support for broad commitments. Neither condition holds today. Major powers increasingly view institutions as tools rather than constraints, complying selectively when rules align with their interests.14 Domestic polarization and economic inequality further weaken support for ambitious international order-building.15 Institutions function reliably only when backed by capable and consistent power, meaning that less domestic support undermines U.S. capacity to sustain institutional commitments.16 Consequently, liberal internationalism fails the tests of feasibility and sustainability, as it depends on political and structural conditions that no longer exist.
C. Primacy
Primacy asserts that sustained U.S. preponderance is essential to deter adversaries and stabilize key regions.17 Its causal logic maintains that forward presence and active regional management prevent the emergence of peer competitors. This approach requires overwhelming material advantage and a stable domestic consensus. These two foundations have eroded as fiscal pressures rise and political support for intervention declines.18 Evidence from attempts at forced democracy promotion, covert regime change, and counterinsurgency indicates that large-scale interventions often fail to produce desired outcomes, instead generating spirals of overextension, coercive backlash, and threat inflation.19 Because primacy demands resources and political cohesion that the United States no longer possesses, it fails the sustainability criterion, even if its strategic aims were desirable.
D. Selective Engagement
Selective engagement posits that only a few regions materially affect the global balance of power.20 Its causal logic holds that outcomes in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East determine access to technology, industrial capacity, capital, and strategic geography, which underpin U.S. national power.21 Europe and East Asia possess the industrial and technological weight to produce hostile hegemons, while the Middle East influences global markets and chokepoints that, if dominated, could raise costs and reduce maneuverability for the United States. Because dominance in these regions would reshape global economic and security structures, selective engagement concentrates commitments where stakes are highest.
Alliances distribute burdens, deter aggression, and reduce the need for unilateral intervention; many exist by “invitation,” reflecting partner incentives to internalize U.S. leadership.22 Military force is reserved for contingencies where hegemonic outcomes are plausible and justified by clear cost–benefit logic.23 Economic engagement reinforces technological and industrial competitiveness rather than presuming unlimited primacy.24 Avoiding discretionary interventions preserves domestic consensus and prevents strategic drift.25 Selective engagement meets all four evaluation criteria: it accurately identifies vital interests, relies on mechanisms supported by empirical evidence, aligns tools with constraints, and limits commitments to what can be sustained.
IV. Counterarguments and Rebuttals
Common criticisms of selective engagement often misstate its scope or misunderstand its mechanisms. Claims that the strategy lacks clarity overlook the fact that defining vital interests through the risk of hostile regional dominance leads to a narrow and operational set of commitments. Warnings of entrapment in unnecessary affairs ignore the United States’ ability to impose explicit limits on allied commitments and partner behavior.26 Concerns regarding cost-benefit principles fail to consider that stabilizing key regions is less expensive than the long-term consequences of adversarial control over technological standards, supply chains, or financial rules. Assertions that selective engagement weakens deterrence disregard the reality that concentrated commitments produce clearer signals and more credible resolve than diffuse global activism. Therefore, these criticisms do not undermine the strategy’s feasibility or logic.
V. Strategy and Policy Prescription
Selective engagement remains the only viable grand strategy for the United States because it clearly identifies critical interests, aligns available instruments with those interests, and limits commitments to what contemporary economic and political conditions can support. Maintaining this strategy requires four policy choices. The United States must sustain alliances in Europe and East Asia, where power shifts most significantly affect the global balance. It must invest in technological and industrial capacity to ensure long-term competitiveness. It must maintain a military posture focused on deterrence rather than indefinite forward operations, with clear thresholds for the use of force. Finally, it must avoid discretionary interventions that do not impact the global distribution of power. Restraint underestimates the consequences of regional power shifts, while liberal internationalism and primacy overestimate the resources and domestic support available for expansive commitments. Selective engagement alone aligns U.S. objectives with the structural and domestic constraints that define grand strategy today.
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87–89.
Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy,’” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (2018): 27–57.
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 20–33.
Barry Posen, “The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (2013): 116–28.
Robert Wade, “The Invisible Hand of the American Empire,” Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 2 (2003): 77–88; Carla Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Thomas Christensen, The China Challenge (New York: Norton, 2015).
A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); James Joll, The Origins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1992); Sebastian Rosato, Europe United (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).
Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Mark Bell, Nuclear Reactions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021).
G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
Christensen, China Challenge.
Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 564–81; Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, The Triumph of Injustice (New York: Norton, 2019).
John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49; Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage.
Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth, “Lean Forward,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (2013): 130–42.
Benjamin Fordham, “Paying for Global Power,” in The Long War, ed. Andrew Bacevich (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 371–404.
Lindsay O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018); Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Benjamin Valentino, “The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 6 (2011): 60–73; Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005).
Posen, “Less Activist Foreign Policy.”
Michael Beckley, Unrivaled (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018); Brooks and Wohlforth, “American Primacy.”
Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation,” in The United States and Western Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan.
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).
Diana Mutz, Winners and Losers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021); Angus Deaton, The Great Escape (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Robert Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).
Conventionally defined as, “collaborative efforts on shared open spaces where participants share in the maintenance and products of the garden, including healthful and affordable fresh fruits and vegetables,” community gardens offer an integrated approach to building community, combating hunger, and fostering ecological protection in an urban environment. They solve complex problems and bond diverse peoples together. More localities ought to create and sustain beautiful community gardens to promote their residents’ flourishing.
Community gardens foster community.
Humans are fundamentally social beings with obligations to family, neighborhood, and nation. Alienation, boredom, and loneliness increasingly plague Americans of all backgrounds despite constant technological interconnectedness. Today, over half of Americans experience loneliness or consider themselves lonely. The American Time Use Survey underscores a drastic decline for in-person interactions as youths in 2025 meet with peers 35% less than their counterparts two decades ago. Thus, a need exists for spaces outside of work, school, and home to provide connection, belonging and purpose. Community gardens operate as such a “third place,” or a public place that hosts “the regular, voluntary, informal, and happily anticipated gatherings of individuals beyond the realms of home and work.” Gardeners of all stripes can help grow fresh produce and enjoy the fruits of their labor. Community gardens can fortify bonds of social trust and awaken obligations between the wealthy and common folk, allowing for class intermingling. Class mixing permits encounters with “superior persons,” who “encourage us to make something of ourselves, to impose difficult demands on ourselves, and to appreciate the satisfactions conferred by devoted service to an ideal.” Third places such as community gardens act as a kind of social leveler in that participation and enjoyment are accessible to the general public and not predicated upon socio-economic status. Reliant on the generosity of private donations from individuals and local businesses and corporations, community gardens motivate an embrace of noblesse oblige so that one may become “the mere trustee and agent for his poorer brethren.” Therefore, community gardens can bridge the growing social gap and renew reciprocal obligations between the elites and the masses by serving as a space for charity, connection, and community.
Community gardens cultivate civic friendship.
Nascent forms of technological distraction and the sanctification of individual autonomy have eroded concern for the prosperity of the extended American family, enabling self-interest to reign. But communal efforts can reverse romantic individualism and advance social communion. By the elementary reality of physical proximity, informal associations and communal gatherings unite American citizens as equals in a robust exchange of ideas and opinions that polish political habits and virtues. Informal rendezvous inspire practices of civility and compromise between diverse peoples, drawing together the community as equal parts of a whole working toward a common goal. Engagement in efforts to grow and sustain fresh produce takes patience, hard work, and consensus. The practices of mutual aid, problem-solving, and open conversation involved with communal gardening train participants for democratic governance and active citizenship, learning how to rule and be ruled. Political participation is imperative for a functioning democracy and citizens who engage in civic associations are more likely to be politically active. Thus, community gardens strengthen democracy by instilling volunteers with democratic skills and civic virtue, prompting them to partake in politics.
Community gardens improve health outcomes, especially for the poor.
Community gardens increase consumption of fruits and vegetables. Roughly 53.6 million Americans dwell in “food deserts,” areas in which access to affordable and nutritious foods is significantly limited due to economic or transportation barriers. Nutritional gaps persist for those struggling with food insecurity. A poor diet is a prominent contributor to chronic disease. Higher intakes of fruits and vegetables have been associated with a reduced risk for cardiovascular disease, cancer, and ischemic stroke, three leading causes of death in the United States. A study of urban adults in Flint, Michigan revealed that gardeners consumed roughly 1.5 times the amount of fruits and vegetables than non-gardeners and were 3.5 times more likely to meet the daily recommended intake amount. Community gardens offer an inexpensive solution to help close nutritional gaps among the poor and reduce the scale of food deserts as free produce within close proximity to one’s home eliminates limitations of cost and availability.
Community gardens promote environmental stewardship.
Americans suffer from what Richard Louv has coined, “nature deficit disorder,” an unnatural and accelerated disconnect from the physical world. A lack of access to green spaces in urban areas and the allure of a screen has left people disinterested and disenchanted with the environment. Scientific evidence illustrates that those who are withdrawn from nature experience higher levels of physical and emotional illness and exhibit a reduced use of the senses. Detachment from nature contradicts fundamental anthropology as the late Pope Francis remarked, “We are a part of nature, included in it and thus in constant interaction with it.” A lack of involvement in nature contributes to a failure to see the earth as our common home. A society that cherishes instant gratification and convenience will likely view nature as a utilitarian good to be exploited for maximal human satisfaction rather than a gift to be respected and taken care of for generations to come. We are called to be responsible stewards of the earth, to preserve it and make it fruitful. Community gardens offer a chance to establish an active connection to and respect for nature and promote a sense of awe and wonder of its complexity and beauty.
Unity Gardens in South Bend, Indiana, is a model for community gardens across the nation. Funded by donations from individuals, local businesses, and even large corporations such as Kohls and AEP, the organization operates over 40 satellite gardens in northern Indiana. In addition to offering free produce for locals, Unity Gardens hosts social events as well as gardening courses, gathering diverse members of the area together and teaching volunteers the value of working in and respecting nature.
Some critics of community gardens suggest that the responsibility of caretaking often falls on a few committed volunteers or that lots of precious land in urban areas could be better used in solving shortages of affordable housing units. While the housing crisis is a pressing matter, community gardens can and should be built alongside housing developments to beautify the area and provide a space for neighbors to meet. To avoid the labor falling on a few, gardens can partner with local schools to ensure a steady supply of volunteers and inspire the next generation to care for the environment.
Communities should follow the example of Unity Gardens and heed Frederick Douglass’ call “to make us the most perfect national illustration of the unity and dignity of the human family that the world has ever seen.” “Feverish consumerism and new forms of egotistic self-preservation” cause Americans to grapple with a growing wealth divide and isolation. A shared aim to construct local spaces of belonging and solidarity with the most vulnerable can combat grotesque economic and social inequalities that contradict a democratic conception of equality and dignity and thwart the ills of self-interest and materialism.. Sharing time, talents, and food within the space of a community garden establishes bonds of mutual trust and civic friendship that are essential for a thriving democratic republic. Efforts to ethically use the earth’s fruits to foster community and promote human flourishing therefore ought to become a priority of America’s future.
