Author: David Murphy

Through policies and military operations across Venezuela, Cuba, Greenland, and the broader Americas, the second Trump administration has explicitly revived the Monroe Doctrine as a guiding principle of American foreign policy.

In December 1823, President James Monroe addressed Congress with a message outlining the future of American foreign policy and military grand strategy, a declaration that became known as the Monroe Doctrine. Under the Doctrine, the United States asserted that the Western Hemisphere was naturally within its sphere of influence, distinct from European powers.¹ Although the Doctrine originally emerged as a reaction to the War of 1812, its principles have reemerged two centuries later under President Donald Trump’s second administration. The United States has once again staked its claim over the Western Hemisphere, seeking military access, strategic infrastructure, and denying rivals the ability to jeopardize American hegemony, and it is doing so with decisive military force.

On January 23, 2026, the Department of War released its annual National Defense Strategy, which outlines the United States military’s top priorities. Most notably, in the first ‘Line of Effort’ subsection, this year’s report, in contrast with the 2025 counterpart, explicitly mentions Greenland and the Panama Canal as strategically significant: “We will actively and fearlessly defend America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and Greenland.”² While the 2025 National Defense Strategy was not as explicit in its nomenclature, both documents included the same striking statement: “This is the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.”³

The second Trump Administration marks a significant pivot in United States foreign policy, with a new focus on restoring American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. On January 3, 2026, the United States completed ‘Operation Absolute Resolve,’ a military operation resulting in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.⁴ The operation represented more than a confrontation with the Venezuelan government; it demonstrated the current administration’s willingness to use military strength to advance its interests in the region. 

Furthermore, throughout ‘Operation Southern Spear,’ initiated in 2025 and still ongoing, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducted multiple strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats in international waters, justifying the strikes action by declaring individuals aboard these vessels “narco-terrorists.”⁵ In a press conference following one such strike, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth referred to these targeted boat crews as the “Al-Qaeda” of the Western Hemisphere.⁶ It should be noted that these offensive operations did raise domestic concerns surrounding American due process and the legality of lethal action in international waters. As Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) put it: “I’m deeply concerned about the authority our president seems to be asserting to summarily kill people suspected of criminal activity outside the law.”⁷

The United States military is presently enforcing a fuel blockade against vessels transporting to Cuba, and has threatened tariffs against countries and companies attempting to export oil; On October 2, 2026, the Coast Guard announced the interception of the Grace, a “dark fleet” ship bound for Cuba, with the cooperation of the Mexican government.⁸

Since President Trump’s return to office, national elections across Central and South America have also heavily favored right-wing parties and coalitions. While this change has been largely driven by domestic concerns, the Trump Administration has been known to endorse candidates and apply diplomatic pressure, possibly in a bid to expand American influence in the region.⁹

Lastly, of recent occurrence, the Greenland Security Deal was signed between the U.S., the Kingdom of Denmark, and Greenland on September 22, 2026, resulting in the expansion of United States military access and its now permanent role in the security of Greenland and a framework for the restriction of foreign adversaries from establishing military and strategic presence on the island–one would not be mistaken in noting the deal’s striking resemblance to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁰

What do these changes in United States military and political grand strategy represent? Under the current administration, the U.S. is clearly pursuing a reorientation of American power toward the Western Hemisphere, denying foreign rivals the ability to establish strategic access to the region. Two centuries after the first declaration, the Monroe Doctrine is once again an explicit tenet of American foreign policy, and appears here to stay.

1. “Office of the Historian. ‘The Monroe Doctrine, 1823.’ U.S. Department of State. Accessed September 30, 2026. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe.” ↩︎
2. U.S. Department of Defense. 2026 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-national-defense-strategy.pdf
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3. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: The White House, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf
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4. U.S. Department of Defense. “This Week in DOW: Taking Down Maduro, Seizing Suspicious Vessels, Launching Arsenal Ships.” U.S. Department of Defense, 2026. https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4374940/this-week-in-dow-taking-down-maduro-seizing-suspicious-vessels-launching-arsena/
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5. Forbes Breaking News. “‘This Is The Al-Qaeda Of The Western Hemisphere’: Hegseth Denounces ‘Terrorist’ Drug Traffickers.” YouTube, accessed October 3, 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lsoqIF4XLo
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6. Nitzberg, Alex. “Hegseth Blasts ‘Narco-Terrorists’ Targeted by Trump Admin as ‘the al Qaeda of the Western Hemisphere.’” Fox News, October 31, 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hegseth-blasts-narco-terrorists-targeted-trump-admin-the-al-qaeda-western-hemisphere.
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7. Coons, Chris. “Senator Coons Pushes Attorney General Pam Bondi on Weaponizing the DOJ and Unconstitutional Boat Strikes in Fiery Hearing.” U.S. Senate, October 7, 2025. https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-coons-pushes-attorney-general-pam-bondi-on-weaponizing-the-doj-and-unconstitutional-boat-strikes-in-fiery-hearing ↩︎
8.  U.S. Coast Guard. “Coast Guard Intercepts Motor Vessel Grace, Continues Operations to Interdict Illicit Drug Trafficking.” U.S. Coast Guard, 2026. https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4616594/coast-guard-intercepts-motor-vessel-grace-continues-operations-to-interdict-ill/
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9.  Trump, Donald J. “Truth Social post, November 2025.” Truth Social, accessed October 3, 2026. https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115629335172411031
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10.  The White House. “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Together with the Government of Greenland.” September 22, 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/09/agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-kingdom-of-denmark-together-with-the-government-of-greenland-to-amend-and-supplement-the-agreement-of-27-apri/
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As botched executions become increasingly common, and states’ zeal to execute seemingly begins to supersede due process, the bulwark values of “restitution” and “deterrence” that capital punishment purports to uphold should be reanalyzed with increased scrutiny concerning today’s circumstances. Potential innocents remaining on death row, coupled with rising botched or unintentionally torturous executions, paint an unjust current reality of the death penalty and are a requisite backdrop to recognize when deciding the future of capital punishment in America.   

At 7:27 PM on September 30th, 2026, the curtain rose in the execution chamber of Riverbend Maximum Security to reveal 50-year-old Christa Pike strapped to a gurney, set to die for her brutal 1995 torture and murder of classmate Colleen Slemmer.¹ Injected with a lethal dose of pentobarbital, the execution was meant to be swift and painless. Instead, Pike remained conscious, gasping, snoring heavily, and writhing in pain–eventually knocking her gurney sheets loose. After an hour of suffering, the curtain closed at 8:53 PM, shielding the scene from media view. Today, Pike’s medical and legal future remains uncertain; yet, one fact remains crystal clear: her execution was a failure and a complete miscarriage of justice.² Yet, Pike’s failed execution is just a drop in the bucket of a practice that has continually failed to deliver its promise of final justice, both in physical practicality and in the societal benefits it supposedly purports.

The death penalty has been a contentious staple of U.S. justice for nearly its entire existence, though its practical failures have increased sharply within recent history.³ Historically the U.S. experienced an execution “botch” rate of about 3%.⁴ Yet, the botch rate for lethal injections, which have grown rapidly in popularity, sit at a starkly higher 8.4%, when measured from 2010 to 2020.⁵ While often lauded as a “humane” alternative, lethal injection has consistently produced deeply unsettling results.⁶ Over 84% of post-execution autopsies have found fluid in the deceased’s lungs–a telltale sign of a painful death.⁷ Beyond these botched executions, which have questionable 8th Amendment implications, the potential for wrongful executions is rising too, as states like Tennessee are accused of expediting executions before courts can have proper time for full legal prudence. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting in Nelsen v. Pike, which authorized the execution of Pike before lower court litigation had concluded, claims that Tennessee was seeking emergency expedited executions “solely to execute Pike before litigation over her conviction has run its course in lower courts,” and that there is “no reason to short circuit the ordinary process of appellate review, particularly in light of the grave consequences of an erroneous decision.”⁸ Pike’s guilt was absolute, but the zeal of the state to execute fast and supersede due process poses dangers not only for individuals challenging wrongful sentences, but also for innocents who have been wrongfully convicted. A 2014 study found that at least 4.1% of death penalty convictions were wrongly decided, with only 1.6% experiencing proper exoneration prior to their execution.⁹ These statistics indicate that there is not only a non-negligible number of innocents who have been or may currently be on death row, but also that should anyone reach the execution chamber, their deaths are increasingly likely to be botched or extraordinarily painful from a lack of comprehensive understanding surrounding lethal injection limitations.

Now, many will argue that there is little value in worrying about the comfort and life condition of indisputable criminals convicted of horrific crimes, and that the values of restitution and deterrence should prevail. That said, promises of the 8th Amendment–torturous punishment and the inescapability of death foreclosing exoneration or due process appeals–should at least lead us to question the validity of the arguments of restitution and deterrence. Restitution for victims, while primarily moral and less empirically measurable, holds validity when the process is assuredly proportionate to the crime and efficient in carrying out justice; yet, as argued above, a system that enables the execution of innocents or unintentional brutality is neither just nor an efficient form of restitution. After all, the proportionality of responding to crime with botched executions is unknown in and of itself, and a complete miscarriage of justice when applied to innocents. As for deterrence, the National Research Council found existing pro-deterrence research “fundamentally flawed.”¹⁰ At the same time, 88% of criminologists believe there to be no deterrence effect to capital punishment.¹¹

As Tennessee governor Bill Lee pauses further executions, politicians across the aisle once again revisit paths forward for capital punishment in America.¹² Perhaps this results in new restrictions that confirm criminality and promote humane execution. Perhaps it’s a national abolition of the death penalty. Perhaps it’s keeping it in name only. But, should the status quo continue, so too may grave miscarriages of justice, in which more innocents and more botched executions continue to bloody up our criminal justice system.

1. Associated Press, “How Tennessee’s Failed Execution of Christa Pike Unfolded, Minute-by-Minute,” Bangor Daily News, October 1, 2026, https://www.bangordailynews.com/2026/10/01/nation/how-tennessees-failed-execution-of-christa-pike-unfolded-minute-by-minute.
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2. Associated Press, “Tennessee Governor Halts Executions After Christa Gail Pike Survives Lethal Injection,” OPB, October 1, 2026, https://www.opb.org/article/2026/10/01/tennessee-governor-halts-executions-after-christa-gail-pike-survives-lethal-injection/.
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3. Meg Tirrell, “Why Botched Lethal Injections Are Becoming More Common,” CNN, via KEYT, https://keyt.com/?p=1482047.
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4. Death Penalty Information Center, “Botched Executions,” Death Penalty Information Center, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/botched-executions.
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5. Austin Sarat, “It Is Time to End the Lethal Injection Mess,” Verdict, June 27, 2022, https://verdict.justia.com/2022/06/27/it-is-time-to-end-the-lethal-injection-mess.
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6. Death Penalty Information Center, “BOOKS: ‘Gruesome Spectacles’ Reveals the History of Botched Executions,” Death Penalty Information Center, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/books-gruesome-spectacles-reveals-the-history-of-botched-executions.
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7. Death Penalty Information Center, “As Lethal Injection Turns Forty, States Botch a Record Number of Executions,” Death Penalty Information Center, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/as-lethal-injection-turns-forty-states-botch-a-record-number-of-executions.
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8. Nelsen v. Pike. No. 26A428 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2026). https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/26a428.html.
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9. Samuel R. Gross et al., “Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2014, https://repository.law.umich.edu/facarticles/1591.
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10. National Research Council, “Deterrence and the Death Penalty,” National Academies Press, 2012, https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/13363/chapter/2.
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11. University of Colorado Boulder, “Death Penalty Does Not Deter Murder, According to New CU-Boulder Study,” CU Boulder Today, June 16, 2009, https://www.colorado.edu/today/2009/06/16/death-penalty-does-not-deter-murder-according-new-cu-boulder-study.
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12. 12. NPR, “Failed ‘Torturous’ Execution Attempt on Christa Pike Reignites Death Penalty Debate,” NPR, October 2, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/10/02/nx-s1-5988832/christa-pike-reignites-death-penalty-debate;
    Associated Press, “Tennessee Governor Halts Executions After Christa Gail Pike Survives Lethal Injection,” OPB, October 1, 2026, https://www.opb.org/article/2026/10/01/tennessee-governor-halts-executions-after-christa-gail-pike-survives-lethal-injection/.
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In 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Asked about the odds of conflict over Taiwan, Davidson warned: “I worry [China is] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States … Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade … in the next six years.”¹

This “Davidson Window” reshaped the narrative surrounding China policy.² Yet, as 2027 approaches, a Chinese invasion seems unlikely. The Intelligence Community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment concluded “that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.”³ Why? An invasion of Taiwan would be a disaster for the PRC. It would be operationally infeasible, economically crippling, and set back the PRC’s core strategic interests.

China is substantially stronger than Taiwan. The PRC’s defense budget is 15 times its size, and China has a 10:1 advantage in warships and combat aircraft.⁴ Despite this, the logistics of an amphibious assault create issues. The Taiwan Strait is 90 miles wide and characterized by rough seas, weather, and monsoon seasons that limit opportunities for invasion. A crossing would take hours and consist of a force larger than that of D-Day, leaving landing parties vulnerable to drone attacks.⁵ Taiwan’s mountainous terrain eliminates several possible landing sites, and what flat coastal terrain exists is mostly urban or agricultural.⁶ Factor in American intervention, and the situation quickly becomes untenable for China. 

A 2023 CSIS wargame illustrates these difficulties. Across 24 simulations, China failed to conquer Taiwan 22 times, suffering an average loss of 138 major ships–roughly 90 percent of its amphibious fleet–161 combat aircraft, and tens of thousands of personnel. Although most scenarios assumed U.S. intervention, conquering Taiwan alone still took China roughly 70 days and 70,000 ground casualties.⁷

This doesn’t even factor in the economic costs of invasion. Conservative estimates put the global cost of a Chinese blockade at $2–3 trillion, with a “major war” scenario entailing several months of armed conflict and roughly $10 trillion in losses. China would bear a significant portion of this through lost trade (20% of China’s GDP comes from exports), energy disruption, severe economic sanctions, capital flight (China is home to $3.6 trillion in inward FDI), and the seizure of Chinese overseas assets.⁸ Chinese industries dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductors could lose trillions in annual revenue, and energy imports through key chokepoints like the Straits of Malacca would be vulnerable to disruption or even an American blockade.⁹ Even if an invasion succeeded, China would face long-term isolation from global markets, incurring long-term economic damage.¹⁰

The worst part is an invasion would fail to achieve the PRC’s key strategic interests. Taiwanese industry would be devastated, including its semiconductor industry. A CSIS report determined that following any successful invasion, Taiwan would be a “damaged economy … without electricity and basic services.” Reconstruction costs would be staggering, and it’s unlikely that China would be able to reap the benefits of Taiwan’s invaluable semiconductor industry for several years. China would have to contend with local resistance, and the political victory of reunification may quickly become overshadowed by a drawn-out counterinsurgency campaign. A successful conquest may prompt alarm among China’s neighbors, pushing them closer to the United States.¹¹

No matter how you look at it, a Taiwanese invasion would be a Pyrrhic victory at best, and a complete disaster at worst, jeopardizing Chinese military strength, economic prosperity, and long-term strategic position in exchange for an uncertain outcome.

1. Iyer, G. S. “India – China Relations: Some Thoughts.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 19, no. 1/2 (2024): 34–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48813789. ↩︎
2. Iyer, G. S. “India – China Relations: Some Thoughts.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 19, no. 1/2 (2024): 34–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48813789.
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3. Lariosa, Aaron-Matthew. “China Not Committed to 2027 Taiwan Invasion, U.S. Intel Report Says.” USNI News, March 19, 2026. https://news.usni.org/2026/03/19/china-not-committed-to-2027-taiwan-invasion-u-s-intel-report-says.
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4. GlobalMilitary.net. “China vs Taiwan Military Comparison 2026: Who Is Stronger?” Accessed September 7, 2026. https://www.globalmilitary.net/compare/countries/chn-vs-twn/.
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5. Sacks, David, Will Merrow, Michael Bricknell, and Sabine Baumgartner. “Why China Would Struggle to Invade Taiwan.” Council on Foreign Relations, August 22, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/articles/why-china-would-struggle-invade-taiwan.
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6. Rawlins, MacKenna, and Dan Grazier. “Taiwan Up Close: Why Geography Complicates Invasion.” Stimson Center, May 19, 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/taiwan-up-close-why-geography-complicates-invasion/.
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7. Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 9, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan.
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8. Wright, Logan, Charlie Vest, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Zack Cooper, Jake Rinaldi, and Joel Wuthnow. “China’s Economic Escalation Dilemma.” In If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios, edited by Bonnie S. Glaser. German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep77909.4. 
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9. Asthana, S. B. “What Cost Is China Willing to Bear to Invade Taiwan?” Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, October 20, 2025. https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/10/what-cost-is-china-willing-to-bear-to-invade-taiwan/; Chen, Cheng-liang, and Sam Garcia. “China Faces Heavy Costs in Invasion: Think Tank.” Taipei Times, July 6, 2026. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/07/06/2003860303. ↩︎
10. Asthana, S. B. “What Cost Is China Willing to Bear to Invade Taiwan?” Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, October 20, 2025. https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/10/what-cost-is-china-willing-to-bear-to-invade-taiwan/
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11. Blanchette, Jude, and Gerard DiPippo. “‘Reunification’ with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 22, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/reunification-taiwan-through-force-would-be-pyrrhic-victory-china. 
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