Month: October 2026

Catholic voters in the US do not belong to a single political party, yet they belong to the same Church. How do these Catholic values resonate with voters? More importantly, as political tensions rise in the midterm election, what factors should Catholic voters consider when heading to the polls? 

Republicans have coined the term “Religious Right,” and historically claim to promote conservative traditionalist values.¹ In fact, according to a 2024 Pew Research Center study, 85% of white Evangelical Christian voters tend to align more directly with the Republican party. However, the party’s hold on Catholic voters–white and nonwhite–is not quite as strong. In the same 2024 Pew Research Center study, it’s reported that out of all Catholics, 52% were likely to vote Republican, compared to 44% for Democrats. It is worth noting that a huge proportion of Catholic voters in the US are Hispanic voters who are more clearly divided between the parties–60% Democrat to 35% Republican–as compared to White Catholics.² Overall though, the data shows that Catholics still do not “belong” to any particular party. 

The mentioned Pew Research Center poll was from the 2024 election cycle, and a lot has changed in the world of US politics and in the Catholic Church since that time. In the realm of US politics, the Trump Administration has expanded its use of executive power, a move that remains highly controversial.³ The Trump Administration has also caused an uproar in issues of immigration and international intervention.⁴ On the other hand, in the world of Catholicism, Pope Francis passed away in 2025, leading way to the first Pope from the United States, hailing from the South Side of Chicago: Pope Leo XIV. Pope Leo since stepping into this vocation, has been outspoken against inhumane treatment of all individuals–vigorously calling for acts of peace.⁵

U.S. Catholics have experienced administrative changes in the Church and State, witnessing increased state-sanctioned violence within the US–such as deaths at the hands of ICE agents. As a result, it’s becoming increasingly imperative to watch Catholic voters as they face these dynamic shifts in authority figures. Knowing this, Pew Research Center recently conducted a new study on religious groups and their 2026 midterm preferences. From this study, it was revealed that the majority of Catholic voters, white and non-white, now prefer the Democratic Party (42%) to the Republican Party (39%). Despite this plurality, white Catholic voters still lean more Republican (50%) than Democrat (32%), but these margins are narrower than they were two years ago. Currently, data shows that the “Religious Right” only has a clear majority with White Evangelicals.⁶

There is no clear explanation for this new divide, but it’s worth noting that with the new Pope, there has been a strong emphasis on human dignity and peace. In Pope Leo’s Encyclical, he emphasizes that “ […] today we must once again reflect on the common good, the universal destination of goods, subsidiarity, solidarity and social justice.”⁷ This emphasis on the common good is in conversation with not only world leaders, but with all Catholics. 

Since Catholics have been assigned homework, or perhaps reminded of Church Doctrine, it’s important for researchers, as well as political actors competing for the Catholic vote, to question if the Encyclical had any effect on party allegiances. It’s also crucial for researchers to consider that as the parties are increasingly polarized, is there any true representation of Catholic doctrine by either party? It is true that it is not the job of the government to encompass Catholic ideas, nor should it, as doing so would violate the long-established separation of Church and State. However, it would be interesting to study how Catholics vote in the 2026 midterm election: would the shift away from the Republican Party continue? 

Despite any new patterns that may occur in the midterm election, it’s for the best that not one party “owns” the Catholic vote; it is the job of the Catholic voter to vote for policies that they believe will bring forth a more just society. In this election, Catholic voters must reaffirm and reassess their politics to consider human dignity and ask themselves what it means to build and maintain a society that values the common good. 

1. Wuthnow, Robert. “THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT.” In Red State Religion: Faith and Politics
   in America’s Heartland. Princeton University Press, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rjr5.12. ↩︎
2. Pew Research Center. 2024. “Party affiliation of US voters by religious group.” Pew
   Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/04/09/party-identification-among-religious-groups-and-religiously-unaffiliated-voters/. ↩︎
3. Hennen, Mia. 2025. “Trump’s number of executive orders surpasses first term.” Pew
   Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/12/16/trump-has-already-issued-more-executive-orders-in-his-second-term-than-in-his-first/. ↩︎
4. Baum, Matthew. n.d. “How do Americans feel about President Trump’s immigration
   policy?” Harvard Kennedy School. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/democracy-governance/how-do-americans-feel-about-president-trumps. ↩︎
5. Smith, Gregory A. 2026. “Religious Groups Differ Widely in Their 2026 Midterm
   Preferences.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/10/13/religious-groups-differ-widely-in-their-2026-midterm-preferences/ ↩︎
6. Pew Research Center. 2024. “Party affiliation of US voters by religious group.” Pew
   Research Center.
   https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/04/09/party-identification-among-religious-groups-and-religiously-unaffiliated-voters/. ↩︎
7. Pope Leo XIV. 2026. “Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Leo XIV Magnifica Humanitas  
   (15 May 2026).” The Holy See.https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/encyclicals/documents/20260515-magnifica-humanitas.html. ↩︎

Two years ago, RFK Jr. made a promise to the American people that he would fix the nation’s chronic disease crisis, and “Make America Healthy Again.” Under his leadership, the Department of Health and Human Services has drastically changed directions, targeting food standards, assistance programs, and vaccination policies. However, much is still left to be asked, and much is to be questioned.

On August 23, 2024, Robert Francis Kennedy Jr. suspended his independent presidential campaign and endorsed then-candidate Donald Trump, pledging: “If I’m given the chance to fix the chronic disease crisis and reform our food production, I promise that within two years we will watch chronic disease burden lift dramatically. We will make Americans healthy again.”¹ 

Since his appointment as Secretary of Health and Human Services on February 13, 2025, Secretary Kennedy has sought to translate this promise into policy under the “Make America Healthy Again” (MAHA) moniker. As the deadline for his end-of-campaign promise closes in, an evaluation of the Department under his leadership reveals the progress made toward reforming American public health and transparency, and whether MAHA policies are likely to produce measurable improvements in the nation’s wellbeing.

An immediate priority of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under Secretary Kennedy was a review of the American diet, with an emphasis on reducing exposure to highly processed foods, added sugars, and artificial food dyes.² In January 2026, the HHS and Department of Agriculture released the ‘Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2025-2030,’ detailing nutrition standards for schools, food programs, and future policy. The guide encourages Americans to “eat real food,” particularly whole, organic produce, and to consider calories, sodium, and added sugars.³ In a press conference, Secretary Kennedy remarked: “We spend three times more per capita than the European Union on healthcare, yet our life expectancy is five years lower, largely due to diet-related chronic disease.”⁴ While rhetoric and information promoting dietary conscientiousness represents a step in the right direction, the guidelines released by the HHS and USDA are not directly enforceable against food manufacturers nor consumers–their impact instead depends on the efficacy of other federal agencies in their implementation. A further consideration is food access: while the HHS may encourage the consumption of healthy dietary staples, its consideration of the ongoing increase in grocery prices and the consumer price index has been limited, if not inflammatory. Secretary Kennedy has been a vocal proponent of removing “junk food” from SNAP and other benefits programs–a policy implemented via waivers in 23 states, including Indiana.⁵ Critics of current HHS and USDA leadership argue that these restrictions place additional burdens on low-income Americans, due to the relatively higher cost of certain whole food products.⁶

Another tenet of the MAHA-era HHS policy is combatting the use of petroleum-based artificial food dyes, in response to research suggesting that their consumption may lead to exacerbated behavioral problems and hyperactivity, particularly in children.⁷ The HHS has initiated a campaign to phase-out artificial dyes via expanding previous policies that scrutinize labelling and authorizations, as well as by coordinating with the nation’s top manufacturers in voluntary programs, the progress of which can be reviewed publicly.⁸ Action against potentially harmful dyes, and increased research and approval of natural dyes represents one of the Department’s major wins over the past twenty months, but the lack of decisive regulations and the slow transition from participating manufacturers demonstrate the limits of this success. Thus far, commitments have been made on the basis of government pressure of future legislation and the ability of firms to reap reputational benefits, but until solid policy is passed, these efforts lack formal enforcement.

The third, and undoubtedly most divisive stance that Secretary Kennedy has taken regards vaccination: a subject he brought up numerous times in his campaign suspension speech, and has since made a central focus. In June 2025, the Secretary cleared house within the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, intending on replacing all of its sitting members with new appointees, marking a major change in American vaccination policy.⁹ In January 2026, an attempt was made to revise the federal immunization schedule for children, reducing the number of covered diseases. The overhaul has since been blocked in the courts by Democratic judicial appointees, such as District Judge Brian Murphy, and efforts have also been obstructed by numerous state lawsuits.¹⁰ It is the view of MAHA’s current direction that parents ought to be more involved in discussions with pediatricians regarding children’s vaccination–a position held on the basis of improving transparency and addressing distrust in profit-seeking pharmaceutical companies and government regulators.¹¹ Public reception is divided on this issue. Critics opposing Secretary Kennedy’s perspective call into question prior comments in which the Secretary linked autism and hypertension to vaccination, while those in favor approve of this skeptical approach and plans to further research the side effects of vaccines.¹²

As the deadline for these promises draws closer, it is clear that there is much left to be asked of Health Secretary Kennedy and his Department in addressing the chronic illness and broader health crisis that befalls the United States. While the Department has shown signs of direction and strong rhetoric, enforceable action has been limited and statistical improvement scarce. Today’s Verdict: No, America is not yet healthy.

1.  Rev. “RFK Jr. Suspends 2024 Presidential Campaign.” August 26, 2024. https://www.rev.com/transcripts/rfk-jr-suspends-2024-presidential-campaign. ↩︎
2. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. “HHS, FDA, and USDA Address Health Risks of Ultra-Processed Foods.” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/hhs-fda-and-usda-address-health-risks-ultra-processed-foods. ↩︎
3.  U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2025–2030. January 2026. https://cdn.realfood.gov/DGA.pdf. ↩︎
4.  CBS News. “RFK Jr. Announces New Dietary Guidelines and End to ‘War on Saturated Fats.’” YouTube video, January 7, 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8OqPdybG7eo. ↩︎
5.  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. “Secretary Kennedy Celebrates More States Removing Junk Food from SNAP at MAHA Monday on the National Mall.” August 4, 2025. https://www.hhs.gov/press-room/maha-monday-snap-waivers.html. ↩︎
6.  Sarah Todd, “Cost of New Food Pyramid Tested by Economists. Results Are Mixed,” STAT, January 16, 2026, https://www.statnews.com/2026/01/16/affordability-new-food-pyramid-dietary-guidelines-tested-by-economists/. ↩︎
7.  Miller, Mark D., Chris Steinmaus, Myra S. Golub, et al. “Potential Impacts of Synthetic Food Dyes on Activity and Attention in Children: A Review of the Human and Animal Evidence.” Environmental Health 21 (2022): 45. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12940-022-00849-9. ↩︎
8.  U.S. Food and Drug Administration. “Tracking Food Industry Pledges to Remove Petroleum-Based Food Dyes.” Accessed October 13, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/color-additives-information-consumers/tracking-food-industry-pledges-remove-petroleum-based-food-dyes. ↩︎
9.  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. “HHS to Restore Public Trust in Vaccines with New ACIP Members.” https://www.hhs.gov/press-room/hhs-restore-public-trust-vaccines-acip.html. ↩︎
10.  Raymond, Nate, Ahmed Aboulenein, and Leah Douglas. “US Judge Upends Kennedy’s Overhaul of Childhood Vaccine Policies.” Reuters, March 16, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-judge-blocks-efforts-reshape-childhood-vaccine-policy-2026-03-16/. ↩︎
11.  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. “HHS to Restore Public Trust in Vaccines with New ACIP Members.” June 9, 2025. https://www.hhs.gov/press-room/hhs-restore-public-trust-vaccines-acip.html. ↩︎
12.  Sanders, Bernie. “Sanders Statement on Voting No on RFK Jr.” Office of U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders. https://www.sanders.senate.gov/press-releases/news-sanders-statement-on-voting-no-on-rfk-jr/. ↩︎

Abstract: The reason many young people don’t vote isn’t that they’re apathetic – it’s that they lack political efficacy and political interest.

Among the many complaints circulating about Gen Z, one that surfaces every election cycle is this: most of Gen Z doesn’t vote.

While there is truth to this statement, it’s not entirely true that youth voter turnout is on the decline.  Data from the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) shows that the percentage of eligible young voters who cast ballots in the past three presidential elections rose from 39% in 2016 to 50% in 2020, and fell only slightly to 47% in 2024.¹  However, young Americans are historically notorious for having lower turnout rates compared to older groups of voters.² According to research conducted by the Pew Research Center, “citizens under age 30 constituted only 15% of all voters in 2024, considerably below their share of the age-eligible population (20%).”³  Additional data from CIRCLE shows that most youth aren’t regular voters – “approximately 53% of eligible voters aged 18-29 did not vote in 2024, and 77% did not vote in 2022.”⁴  So what accounts for the fact that despite rising turnout in their age group, many young people still are not showing up to the polls?

The reason may be somewhat surprising (spoiler: it’s not voter apathy).  Results from a CIRCLE and When We All Vote youth survey reveal that although “Gen Z is sometimes painted as apathetic and disengaged, only 7% of young people…don’t participate because they just aren’t interested in politics.”⁵  Youth voter turnout is also not strongly related to structural barriers.  The same survey shows that only 11% of youth “cited a need to ease burdens on the voting process by making registration and voting easier.”⁶  Instead, the main issue is psychological: young people lack the psychological incentives to vote.

Recent studies show that “among the most reliable predictors of political participation are two psychological attitudes…political efficacy and political interest.”⁷  Basically, if young people feel disengaged from politics and don’t believe that their vote matters, they are extremely unlikely to vote.  The expectancy-value model of motivation provides a useful framework for this phenomenon: “individuals are motivated to engage in tasks based on (1) expectations of success and (2) valuing those tasks.”⁸  The same principle can be applied to voting.

Let’s start by breaking down political efficacy–the extent to which voters believe their vote has the power to enact change.  Based on polling by CIRCLE, “While 70% of young people who believe their vote matters are extremely likely to vote, only 31% who disagree that their vote has power say they’ll cast a ballot,” and “Twenty-nine percent of youth said they would participate more if they felt like their vote and voice mattered.”⁹  Without political efficacy, voters struggle to find the motivation to cast a vote.  

It also doesn’t help that young voters don’t feel accurately represented by those in office, which is also partially a result of low youth voter turnout.¹⁰  In fact, 41% of youth say “they would participate more if there were different candidates or parties who better represent their generation or if candidates follow through on their campaign promises.”¹¹  Young people are also dissatisfied with a system in which wealthy corporations hold the power to influence candidates.  Additionally, young voters are discouraged by partisan gridlock that prevents Congress from passing legislation.¹²  Political alienation from candidates and from the two-party system in general can even lead people to vote for a candidate who is unlikely to win, just to provide “psychological satisfaction that one is able to express their disenchantment with the political world.”¹³ (Southwell)

Knowing that many young people don’t vote because they doubt the power of their own vote or because they feel “marginalized and disregarded by our political system”¹⁴ is key to improving youth voter turnout in the future.  Aside from electing representatives who will hear and support their Gen Z constituents and resist the influence of money in the political system, one way to address the lack of political participation and increase political interest among young voters is through education.  Giving teachers the educational resources they need to help students develop political interest and self-efficacy will “strengthen students’ likelihood of becoming active and involved in democratic processes.”¹⁵  In addition, since study results have shown that “adolescents’ political engagement appears to increase as they approach the legal voting age,”¹⁶ perhaps our attention should be focused on high school students who are nearing the age of voting with the goal of increasing their overall enthusiasm surrounding civic participation.

Overall, there is hope for Gen Z.  Dedicating our efforts to encouraging political efficacy and political interest among young voters has the potential to make a positive difference in civic participation.  And perhaps doing so will finally dispel the disapproval surrounding Gen Z’s voting record.

1.  Medina, Alberto, and Katie Hilton. “New Data: Nearly Half of Youth Voted in 2024.” America Is Calling, April 14, 2025. https://americaiscalling.org/new-data-nearly-half-of-youth-voted-in-2024/.
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2. Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE). “Dispelling Myths About Youth Voting.” Understanding Youth Civic Engagement, Tufts University. Accessed October 15, 2026. https://circle.tufts.edu/understanding-youth-civic-engagement/dispelling-myths-about-youth-voting#myth:-youth-voting-has-been-low-for-decades.
   ↩︎
3. Hartig, Hannah, et al., “1. Voter Turnout, 2020–2024,” in Behind Trump’s 2024 Victory, a More Racially and Ethnically Diverse Voter Coalition, Pew Research Center, June 26, 2025, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/06/26/voter-turnout-2020-2024/.
   ↩︎
4. Cosme, Danielle, et al., “Motivating and Supporting Youth to Vote Using Theory‐Driven Approaches,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 19, no. 12 (2025): e70110, https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.70110.
   ↩︎
5. Booth, Ruby Belle, and Scott Stetkiewicz. “Youth Are Likely to Vote in 2026—But Want to See Big Changes in Democracy.” Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), May 21, 2026. https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/youth-are-likely-vote-2026-want-see-big-changes-democracy.
   ↩︎
6. Booth, Ruby Belle, and Scott Stetkiewicz. “Youth Are Likely to Vote in 2026—But Want to See Big Changes in Democracy.” Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), May 21, 2026. https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/youth-are-likely-vote-2026-want-see-big-changes-democracy.
   ↩︎
7. Levy, Brett L. M., and Thomas Akiva. “Motivating Political Participation Among Youth: An Analysis of Factors Related to Adolescents’ Political Engagement.” Political Psychology 40, no. 5 (2019): 1039–1055. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12578. ↩︎
8. Levy, Brett L. M., and Thomas Akiva. “Motivating Political Participation Among Youth: An Analysis of Factors Related to Adolescents’ Political Engagement.” Political Psychology 40, no. 5 (2019): 1039–1055. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12578. ↩︎
9. Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE). “Dispelling Myths About Youth Voting.” Understanding Youth Civic Engagement, Tufts University. Accessed October 15, 2026. https://circle.tufts.edu/understanding-youth-civic-engagement/dispelling-myths-about-youth-voting#myth:-youth-voting-has-been-low-for-decades.
   ↩︎
10. Cosme, Danielle, et al., “Motivating and Supporting Youth to Vote Using Theory‐Driven Approaches,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 19, no. 12 (2025): e70110, https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.70110.
    ↩︎
11. Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE). “Dispelling Myths About Youth Voting.” Understanding Youth Civic Engagement, Tufts University. Accessed October 15, 2026. https://circle.tufts.edu/understanding-youth-civic-engagement/dispelling-myths-about-youth-voting#myth:-youth-voting-has-been-low-for-decades.
    ↩︎
12.  Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE). “Dispelling Myths About Youth Voting.” Understanding Youth Civic Engagement, Tufts University. Accessed October 15, 2026. https://circle.tufts.edu/understanding-youth-civic-engagement/dispelling-myths-about-youth-voting#myth:-youth-voting-has-been-low-for-decades.
    ↩︎
13. Southwell, Priscilla Lewis. “The Politics of Alienation: Nonvoting and Support for Third-Party Candidates Among 18–30-Year-Olds.” The Social Science Journal 40, no. 1 (2003): 99–107. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(02)00261-6.
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14. Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE). “Dispelling Myths About Youth Voting.” Understanding Youth Civic Engagement, Tufts University. Accessed October 15, 2026. https://circle.tufts.edu/understanding-youth-civic-engagement/dispelling-myths-about-youth-voting#myth:-youth-voting-has-been-low-for-decades.
    ↩︎
15.  Levy, Brett L. M., and Thomas Akiva. “Motivating Political Participation Among Youth: An Analysis of Factors Related to Adolescents’ Political Engagement.” Political Psychology 40, no. 5 (2019): 1039–1055. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12578. ↩︎
16. Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE). “Dispelling Myths About Youth Voting.” Understanding Youth Civic Engagement, Tufts University. Accessed October 15, 2026. https://circle.tufts.edu/understanding-youth-civic-engagement/dispelling-myths-about-youth-voting#myth:-youth-voting-has-been-low-for-decades.
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Abstract: The UN General Assembly meeting showed that countries are willing to change how the international system operates, but not for the better. The mission of peace and commitment to human rights must remain strong, even amid increasingly hostile rhetoric from global superpowers.

How can the United Nations restore global trust when its own General Assembly becomes a place for augmenting international divisions? The United Nations General Assembly met from September 8 to September 28, 2026. Delegations from 194 countries were represented and met under the theme of “Restoring trust, managing transformation: A United Nations that delivers for all”. In his speech, UN Secretary-General António Guterres addressed four critical issues: artificial intelligence, climate action, sustainable development goals, and global health and security. During the assembly, some speeches drew fierce condemnation.  Two examples of speeches that generated protests were those by Israel and the United States. President Donald Trump said that his other choice is to “annihilate the Islamic Republic” and that he plans to establish a “large military presence” on Greenland.  Israel’s speech addressed the genocide in Gaza, describing it as “the biggest lie of the century” and the invasion of Iran as “one of the easiest decisions I’ve ever had to make.” Multiple delegations left the assembly as a form of protest against Israel’s speech.¹

Moreover, the speeches were marked by different narratives from the same situation: Israel and the Palestinian leader; President Vladimir Zelenskyy of Ukraine and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov; President Donald Trump and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian.² These speeches shaped the thematic agenda of the General Assembly. With three major wars happening in the world right now, several civil conflicts and dozens of genocide cases being investigated. These sharp divisions call into question whether the UN can still function as an effective instrument of collective security.

The theme of this General Assembly was overshadowed by the tensions among some of the present countries, but behind the scenes, a proposal to dissolve the UN and start a new world organization was being discussed.³ The UN faces its most serious crisis since 1945, dealing with a low budget and a transition to a new secretary-general. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres cut the budget by 15% for this year, 2026. This is because a lot of countries, including the U.S., didn’t pay their dues, ending the last year with $1.57 billion in outstanding dues.⁴ The UN General Assembly is a more diplomatic and representative stage than the Security Council and its five permanent member states. Many countries see the UN as an ineffective organization that, amid several conflicts, shows inaction and, when faced with legal procedures on crimes, fails to enforce the law under the UN Charter. The organization’s crisis of legitimacy is further exacerbated by long-standing structural underrepresentation. For instance, African nations comprise 28% of total UN member states (54 out of 193) and represent over 1.4 billion people, yet lack a single permanent seat on the Security Council.⁵

However, would the true solution be a full makeover? Wouldn’t a reform solve the problem?⁶ A UN reform has been called for decades now, and little has been done regarding this claim. So, it is not a surprise that some countries are advocating for this approach. However, there are some counterarguments to these demands. First, realist International Relations theory posits that the global system is fundamentally anarchic. Without an overarching international authority, multilateral bodies like the UN serve as essential de-escalation forums rather than a coercive world police.⁷ So, when conflicts break out, there is no world police to call for help or assistance with a task force. The UN serves as a peacekeeping force and source of diplomacy and negotiation to help states navigate the nature of the international system. 

Ultimately, preserving and reforming the existing UN architecture remains the only practical safeguard against global instability. Since its creation, it has helped develop and create education and healthcare systems, peacekeeping missions, and holding perpetrators accountable through international legal mechanisms. Going back to the past and adopting a new system that would generate even more insecurity and violations of human rights is not what the world needs right now.  Dismantling the referee does not end the game; it merely leaves raw power as the only rule on the field. Remaining at the table sends a far stronger signal than walking away.

1. CNN, “United Nations General Assembly: Trump,” CNN, September 22, 2026.  ↩︎
2. CNN, “United Nations General Assembly: Iran, Trump, Ukraine,” CNN, September 23, 2026.  ↩︎
3. Bruno Cardoso Reis et al., “What’s at Stake at UNGA 2026?” Brookings Institution, September 23, 2026.   ↩︎
4. Vibhu Mishra, “UN Faces ‘Race to Bankruptcy’ as Guterres Unveils Sharply Reduced 2026 Budget,” UN News, October 17, 2025.  ↩︎
5. Andrew Stanley, “African Century,” Finance & Development, International Monetary Fund, September 2023.  ↩︎
6. Howard, Lise Morjé. “Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and UN Reform.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 2 (2015): 6–13. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43773690. ↩︎
7. Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. ↩︎

Abstract: Despite the long existing literature Liberal scholars have offered on the relationship between economic interdependence and security, recent trends in U.S. foreign policy has emphasized the need for American economic independence. Although there are certain vulnerabilities that have emerged from extreme dependence on China for materials needed for weapon production, the role of interdependence as an inhibitor of peace should not be completely disregarded.

In the 2025 National Security Strategy report, it declared that, “Going forward, we will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence.”¹ In recent years, many have begun to fear that interdependence has created dependence, and thus weakness. Liberalist international relations theory has traditionally posited that interdependence offers a medium for peace. Even so, recent developments have raised doubts about the underlying assumptions behind the theory of economic interdependence, as advocated for in the U.S. National Security Strategy. Rather than pursuing complete economic independence, the U.S should strategically manage interdependence by diversifying critical supply chains and decreasing asymmetric interdependence that could be exploited. 

Popular liberalist international relations theory hinges on the idea that trade and conflict have a negative relationship. Consequently, “trading countries with significant trade relations would thus engage in less conflict, because they are most threatened by welfare losses associated with lost trade.”² However, more recent literature has questioned this relationship, and argued that the relationship between trade and conflict is much more complex than simply being an inverse relationship. Farrell, for example, argues that “asymmetric network structures create the potential for “weaponized interdependence,” in which some states are able to leverage interdependent relations to coerce others.”³ In other words, interdependence alone is not the solution for peace, but interdependence must be deliberately and strategically managed. 

Asymmetric interdependence has been a key source of worry for the U.S. Different assessments have been conducted to determine just how dependent the U.S. is on other countries. Specifically, the Government Accountability Office in a 2024 report found that “critical materials—like rare earths, tantalum, and tungsten—are materials needed to supply U.S. military…Most of these materials are mined and processed in China, which makes DOD’s weapon system programs vulnerable to supply chain disruptions by an adversary nation.”⁴ This aligns with Farrell’s findings of how interdependence can create channels of vulnerability. 

The realization of the deep asymmetric economic interdependence that the U.S has with China has increased fears that complete economic decoupling is necessary to protect U.S. national security. For example, in July of 2025, the Department of Defense invested $400 million in MP Materials, demonstrating a leap into the goal to decrease dependence on China for rare earth minerals.⁵ While complete independence may seem the ideal choice, economic interdependence has proven to remain effective, and de-coupling would also eradicate the benefits of America’s relationship with China. Indeed, while “China’s autonomy has grown as its wealth has increased—but like every other actor in the international system, it remains constrained by its reliance on the global economy.”⁶ In other words, interdependence continues to be an effective means of constraining power. Similarly, academic literature posits that “The greatest hope for peace appears to arise from symmetrical trading relationships.”⁷

Echoing this sentiment, former Secretary of the Treasury, Janet L. Yellen, in a 2023 press release argued that “A full separation of our economies would be disastrous for both countries. It would be destabilizing for the rest of the world.”⁸ This view in particular considers the logistical hardships behind aiming to completely become economically independent. Similarly, a 2021 report by the CSIS considers the immense closeness between the economies and in the end, argues for “targeted decoupling,” as opposed to full and comprehensive decoupling.⁹

In the end, while there is an increasing sentiment that the US should seek to become independent as a means to cut the channels of vulnerabilities that asymmetric interdependence has created, especially in relation to the immense dependence that US has on certain materials needed for weapon production, complete decoupling should not be the answer. Interdependence so far has proven to have a relation to decreasing conflict when used strategically, and complete decoupling would create further problems considering the close relationship that the U.S. economy holds with others. As such, the U.S instead focuses on repositioning its independence to maximize its utility. 

1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America November 2025. Accessed September 30, 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.  ↩︎
2. Polachek, S. W. (1980). Conflict and Trade. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 55-78. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200278002400103 ↩︎
3. Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79. ↩︎
4. Office, U.S. Government Accountability. “U.S. Gao.” Critical Materials: Action Needed to Implement Requirements That Reduce Supply Chain Risks, September 12, 2024. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107176.  ↩︎
5. Office, U.S. Government Accountability. “U.S. Gao.” Critical Materials: Action Needed to Implement Requirements That Reduce Supply Chain Risks, September 12, 2024. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107176.  ↩︎
6. “Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on the U.S. – China Economic Relationship at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.” U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 20, 2023. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1425.  ↩︎
7. The dangers of misunderstanding economic interdependence | Cato Institute.  https://www.cato.org/publications/dangers-misunderstanding-economic-interdependence.  ↩︎
8. Barbieri, Katherine. “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 29–49. http://www.jstor.org/stable/425132. ↩︎
9. Segal, Stephanie, and Dylan Gerstel. “Degrees of Separation: A Targeted Approach to U.S.-China Decoupling – Interim Report.” CSIS. Accessed October 1, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/degrees-separation-targeted-approach-us-china-decoupling-interim-report.  ↩︎

Abstract: Trump has repeatedly utilized international forums, such as the UN, as stages for provocation rather than diplomacy. This year’s speech, his first since the U.S. went to war with Iran, continued a pattern of escalation, from telling European leaders their countries were “going to hell” in 2025 to threatening to “annihilate” Iran in 2026. World leaders have responded by refusing to cooperate and reducing reliance on the United States, representing a loss of trust in American leadership. A president who has lost the faith of his allies cannot build the coalitions that successful foreign policy depends on. 

While President Trump’s incendiary rhetoric feels unsettlingly common in contemporary politics, his recent UN address was a stark reminder of what that discourse has cost in diplomacy. For the fifth time, Trump stood before the General Assembly, this time with the United States seven months into a war with Iran.¹ He told the world he must either make a deal or “annihilate the Islamic Republic.”² However, in the same speech, he called on “all nations to join us” and promised that “if we stand united,” Iran’s threat would soon be gone.³ How can Trump expect a coalition of nations while pleading for their help and provoking them in the same breath?

If Trump wants to make serious strides in diplomacy with Iran, he must first change his approach. International relations are contingent on leverage, and Trump’s goal of the “complete economic isolation of Iran” is only plausible if allies agree to enforce it.⁴ Recent events suggest that international allies are unlikely to support the United States and are losing faith in hegemonic dependence, which refers to the reliance of smaller nations on a dominant power for security, economic stability, and political influence. As this dependence diminishes, allies may seek independent paths or reliance on a new hegemon.  Early signs of this shift have been visible in recent geopolitical developments in Iran. For example, when Trump asked NATO members to help secure the Strait of Hormuz in March, most declined, and EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, explained that Europe’s main concern about the war was that “[they] were not consulted” before the war began.⁵ Spain and Italy went further than the EU, refusing additional assistance and restricting the United States access to airspace tied to the conflict.⁶ The self-inflicted rift between the US and its allies was on full display one day after Trump’s address, when Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez used the same UN stage to declare Spain’s opposition to the war.⁷ This situation can be further understood through Robert Putnam’s theory of two-level games. According to Putnam, leaders must negotiate abroad while remaining accountable to their domestic constituencies.⁸ In this context, Trump’s provocative rhetoric has made it politically risky for allied nations to align with Washington, complicating diplomatic relations.⁹

Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric has not only strained global relations, but it has significantly impacted America’s relationships with its neighboring countries as well. In Canada, the share of people who describe the U.S. as a “reliable partner” fell from 83 percent in 2022 to just 35 percent in 2026.¹⁰ That distrust stems from Trump’s repeated talk of absorbing Canada as the “51st state,” making cooperation with Washington a liability.¹¹ Allied nation leaders are quietly following their voters and reducing their reliance on the United States. The United Kingdom and Canada, two of America’s closest intelligence partners, have reportedly limited the information they share over concerns about the legality of U.S. strikes abroad,¹² and Canada became the first non-European country to join the EU’s defense-loan program.¹³ Every partner that steps back leaves Trump with less leverage over Iran and only continues to prolong this seeming war of attrition. 

Trump closed his address by promising the General Assembly that “together, through bold action, we will make this world far safer.”¹⁴ It is a goal his allies definitely share, but unity cannot be demanded from a place of hypocrisy, where the United States infuriates other nations in the hope of peace. Until Trump trades provocation for diplomacy, the coalition he needs to end the war with Iran will remain out of reach. The consequences of this diplomatic strategy are directly affecting Americans, who have paid, and will continue to pay, for it at home. Gas prices are about $1.50 higher than before the conflict began, with this trend likely to escalate further.¹⁵ As the cost of living continues to rise on the back of military enterprise, Americans can only hope that decorum re-enters the diplomatic sphere.

1. PolitiFact Staff, “Live Fact-Check: President Donald Trump Speaks to UN General Assembly in New York,” PolitiFact, September 22, 2026, https://politifact.com/article/2026/sep/22/trump-un-speech-live-fact-check/.
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2. Donald J. Trump, “Address to the General Debate of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 22, 2026), United Nations, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/united-states-america. 
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3. Donald J. Trump, “Address to the General Debate of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 22, 2026), United Nations, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/united-states-america. 
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4. Donald J. Trump, “Address to the General Debate of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 22, 2026), United Nations, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/united-states-america. 
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5. Franco Ordoñez, “Trump Lashes Out at NATO After Countries Decline to Help in Iran,” NPR, March 17, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/03/17/nx-s1-5750596/trump-lashes-out-at-nato-after-countries-decline-to-help-in-iran.
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6. Suman Naishadham, “Spain Closes Off Its Airspace to US Planes Involved in the Iran War,” AP News, March 30, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/trump-spain-united-states-iran-war-05e23ef4e0bda9cb226a16b10cd9437c.
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7. Pedro Sánchez, “Address by the President of the Government of Spain, Pedro Sánchez, to the United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 23, 2026), La Moncloa, https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/intervenciones/Paginas/2026/20260923-un-general-assembly-speech.aspx. ↩︎
8. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.
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9. Olivier Knox, “European Allies Tell Trump ‘No’ to Iran War: Why It Matters,” U.S. News & World Report, April 1, 2026, https://www.usnews.com/news/u-s-news-decision-points/articles/2026-04-01/european-allies-tell-trump-no-to-iran-war-why-it-matters.
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10. Luke Fountain,”Trump Faces Xi as Strains with Allies Complicate U.S. Pressure on China,” CNBC, September 23, 2026, https://cnbc.com/2026/09/23/trump-xi-china-summit-allies.html.
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11. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.
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12. Tressa Guenov, “By Alienating Its Intelligence Partners, the US Risks Losing More Than Trust,” Atlantic Council, March 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/by-alienating-its-intelligence-partners-the-us-risks-losing-more-than-trust/. 
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13. Lionel Laurent, “Canada and Europe Are Building a Hedge Against America,” Bloomberg Opinion, September 11, 2026, https://bworldonline.com/bloomberg/2026/09/11/776027/canada-and-europe-are-building-a-hedge-against-america/.
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14. Donald J. Trump, “Address to the General Debate of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly” (speech, New York, September 22, 2026), United Nations, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/united-states-america.
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15. Angi Gonzalez, “As U.S.-Iran War Hits 7-Month Mark, Rising Gas and Airfare Costs Squeeze Americans’ Wallets,” Spectrum News, September 28, 2026, https://spectrumlocalnews.com/us/snplus/international/2026/09/28/u-s–iran-war-7-months-gas-airfare-costs.
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Abstract: America’s two-party, plurality system encourages strategic voting by forcing voters to weigh electability against political preference. Germany’s multiparty, proportional system shifts more of that compromise to post-election coalition building, allowing votes to more directly reflect what voters actually want.

In 1992, nearly twenty million Americans voted for independent candidate Ross Perot; he won zero electoral votes.¹ Eight years later, roughly 97,000 Floridians backed the Green Party’s Ralph Nader, while George W. Bush carried the state, and the presidency, over Al Gore by just 537 votes.²

These elections and many others taught voters that a ballot cast outside of the two major parties can fail to translate into representation or, worse, help elect the candidate they least like. Therefore, many Americans vote strategically, backing parties based on the probability of victory rather than policy alignment. Political scientists since Maurice Duverger have recognized this behavior as largely systematic under plurality electoral rules, which are electoral systems in which the candidate who receives the highest number of votes in a given district wins the seat.³ But why might behaviors be different in a proportional system, where seat distribution reflects vote proportion?

The reason is not that voters in proportional democracies do not prioritize representation with their vote. Instead, the difference is that they can vote for a party without concern over falling within a majority. Under America’s two-party system, voters often compromise before casting their ballots. A voter who prefers a third-party candidate must consider whether that candidate can actually win and, if not, whether supporting them risks helping elect a less-preferred alternative. Additionally, because each of the two dominant parties group together a comprehensive set of policy positions before the election, voters can easily align within one of the two stronger options.

Proportional electoral systems, such as those used in multiparty democracies, shift much of that grouping to after the election. Germany provides a useful example. Its Bundestag is elected primarily through proportional representation, where ballots require two votes: first, specifically for member selection, and second, for party distribution.⁴ Each party’s share of the decisive “second vote” determines its relative strength within parliament.⁵ Instead of requiring every political interest to fit within one of two parties before an election, this system allows several parties to gain meaningful representation. 

Importantly, this system does not eliminate strategic voting entirely. Germany generally requires a party to receive at least 5% of second votes to participate in proportional seat allocation, giving voters who prefer parties near that threshold reason to think strategically.⁶ However, that pressure is different from a system in which only one candidate can win a state or a district.

Consider Germany’s Greens. In the 2021 federal election, the party received 14.7% of second votes.⁷ Those votes did not have to produce an outright Green victory to matter. The Greens gained representation in the Bundestag and ultimately joined SPD and FDP in forming the governing coalition.⁸ In other words, voters could support a smaller party, and the process of combining competing parties into a governing program happened afterward.

Every democracy eventually has to turn millions of different preferences into one government. By waiting to group policy positions until after the election process, proportional systems give voters a better chance to express what they actually want.

1. “1992 Electoral College Results,” U.S. Electoral College, National Archives and Records Administration, accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.archives.gov/electoral-college/1992.
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2. Federal Election Commission, “2000 Presidential General Election Results,” in Federal Elections 2000, accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/documents/1732/FederalElections2000_PresidentialGeneralElectionResultsbyState.pdf.
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3. André Blais and R. K. Carty, “The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger’s Elusive Factor,” British Journal of Political Science 21, no. 1 (1991): 92.
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4. “Each Voter Has Two Votes in the 2021 Bundestag Election,” The Federal Returning Officer, September 14, 2021, https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2021/37_21_zwei-stimmen.html.
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5. “Each Voter Has Two Votes in the 2021 Bundestag Election,” The Federal Returning Officer, September 14, 2021, https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2021/37_21_zwei-stimmen.html.
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6. “Restrictive Clause,” The Federal Returning Officer, accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/service/glossar/s/sperrklausel.html.
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7. “Results Germany: Bundestag Election 2021,” The Federal Returning Officer, accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2021/ergebnisse/bund-99.html.
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8. Nigel Walker and Eleanor Gadd, “Germany: 2021 Election and a New Coalition Government,” House of Commons Library, January 5, 2022, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9324/.
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Through policies and military operations across Venezuela, Cuba, Greenland, and the broader Americas, the second Trump administration has explicitly revived the Monroe Doctrine as a guiding principle of American foreign policy.

In December 1823, President James Monroe addressed Congress with a message outlining the future of American foreign policy and military grand strategy, a declaration that became known as the Monroe Doctrine. Under the Doctrine, the United States asserted that the Western Hemisphere was naturally within its sphere of influence, distinct from European powers.¹ Although the Doctrine originally emerged as a reaction to the War of 1812, its principles have reemerged two centuries later under President Donald Trump’s second administration. The United States has once again staked its claim over the Western Hemisphere, seeking military access, strategic infrastructure, and denying rivals the ability to jeopardize American hegemony, and it is doing so with decisive military force.

On January 23, 2026, the Department of War released its annual National Defense Strategy, which outlines the United States military’s top priorities. Most notably, in the first ‘Line of Effort’ subsection, this year’s report, in contrast with the 2025 counterpart, explicitly mentions Greenland and the Panama Canal as strategically significant: “We will actively and fearlessly defend America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and Greenland.”² While the 2025 National Defense Strategy was not as explicit in its nomenclature, both documents included the same striking statement: “This is the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.”³

The second Trump Administration marks a significant pivot in United States foreign policy, with a new focus on restoring American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. On January 3, 2026, the United States completed ‘Operation Absolute Resolve,’ a military operation resulting in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.⁴ The operation represented more than a confrontation with the Venezuelan government; it demonstrated the current administration’s willingness to use military strength to advance its interests in the region. 

Furthermore, throughout ‘Operation Southern Spear,’ initiated in 2025 and still ongoing, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducted multiple strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats in international waters, justifying the strikes action by declaring individuals aboard these vessels “narco-terrorists.”⁵ In a press conference following one such strike, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth referred to these targeted boat crews as the “Al-Qaeda” of the Western Hemisphere.⁶ It should be noted that these offensive operations did raise domestic concerns surrounding American due process and the legality of lethal action in international waters. As Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) put it: “I’m deeply concerned about the authority our president seems to be asserting to summarily kill people suspected of criminal activity outside the law.”⁷

The United States military is presently enforcing a fuel blockade against vessels transporting to Cuba, and has threatened tariffs against countries and companies attempting to export oil; On October 2, 2026, the Coast Guard announced the interception of the Grace, a “dark fleet” ship bound for Cuba, with the cooperation of the Mexican government.⁸

Since President Trump’s return to office, national elections across Central and South America have also heavily favored right-wing parties and coalitions. While this change has been largely driven by domestic concerns, the Trump Administration has been known to endorse candidates and apply diplomatic pressure, possibly in a bid to expand American influence in the region.⁹

Lastly, of recent occurrence, the Greenland Security Deal was signed between the U.S., the Kingdom of Denmark, and Greenland on September 22, 2026, resulting in the expansion of United States military access and its now permanent role in the security of Greenland and a framework for the restriction of foreign adversaries from establishing military and strategic presence on the island–one would not be mistaken in noting the deal’s striking resemblance to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁰

What do these changes in United States military and political grand strategy represent? Under the current administration, the U.S. is clearly pursuing a reorientation of American power toward the Western Hemisphere, denying foreign rivals the ability to establish strategic access to the region. Two centuries after the first declaration, the Monroe Doctrine is once again an explicit tenet of American foreign policy, and appears here to stay.

1. “Office of the Historian. ‘The Monroe Doctrine, 1823.’ U.S. Department of State. Accessed September 30, 2026. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe.” ↩︎
2. U.S. Department of Defense. 2026 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-national-defense-strategy.pdf
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3. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: The White House, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf
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4. U.S. Department of Defense. “This Week in DOW: Taking Down Maduro, Seizing Suspicious Vessels, Launching Arsenal Ships.” U.S. Department of Defense, 2026. https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4374940/this-week-in-dow-taking-down-maduro-seizing-suspicious-vessels-launching-arsena/
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5. Forbes Breaking News. “‘This Is The Al-Qaeda Of The Western Hemisphere’: Hegseth Denounces ‘Terrorist’ Drug Traffickers.” YouTube, accessed October 3, 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lsoqIF4XLo
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6. Nitzberg, Alex. “Hegseth Blasts ‘Narco-Terrorists’ Targeted by Trump Admin as ‘the al Qaeda of the Western Hemisphere.’” Fox News, October 31, 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hegseth-blasts-narco-terrorists-targeted-trump-admin-the-al-qaeda-western-hemisphere.
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7. Coons, Chris. “Senator Coons Pushes Attorney General Pam Bondi on Weaponizing the DOJ and Unconstitutional Boat Strikes in Fiery Hearing.” U.S. Senate, October 7, 2025. https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-coons-pushes-attorney-general-pam-bondi-on-weaponizing-the-doj-and-unconstitutional-boat-strikes-in-fiery-hearing ↩︎
8.  U.S. Coast Guard. “Coast Guard Intercepts Motor Vessel Grace, Continues Operations to Interdict Illicit Drug Trafficking.” U.S. Coast Guard, 2026. https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4616594/coast-guard-intercepts-motor-vessel-grace-continues-operations-to-interdict-ill/
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9.  Trump, Donald J. “Truth Social post, November 2025.” Truth Social, accessed October 3, 2026. https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115629335172411031
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10.  The White House. “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Together with the Government of Greenland.” September 22, 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/09/agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-kingdom-of-denmark-together-with-the-government-of-greenland-to-amend-and-supplement-the-agreement-of-27-apri/
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Do politicians remember to include women and women-centered policies within their campaign platforms? In a short analysis of four senatorial candidates in the 2026 midterm election, their policy platforms are analyzed for the explicit inclusion of women-centered policy. 

Abigail Adams’ legacy is not typical for the 18th-century first ladies. She is not solely known for being the wife of Founding Father John Adams, but for the letter she wrote to her husband imploring him to “remember the ladies.”¹ As history has taught us, the Founding Fathers did not consider the ladies’ role; instead, women had to fight for representation in politics. Additionally, suffrage did not come until the 19th Amendment in 1920 and even later in 1965 for women of color.

As the 20th century progressed, women began to play a crucial role in both political parties and in various areas of politics: grassroots movements, nonprofit work, activism, as well as local and national government.² Women continue to be crucial political players; in the 2026 midterm election cycle, women are running for office on both sides of the aisle. Within an era of polarized politics, it’s important to consider if politicians running in this midterm election, across gender and aisle, are “remembering the ladies.” 

For this brief analysis, four candidates running for US Senate in open-seat races were selected: N’Kiyla Jasmine Thomas (D-OK), Michelle Tafoya (R-MN), Charles Booker (D-KY), and Kurt Alme (MT-R). In order to be considered as “remembering the ladies,” the politician must include women-centered policies in the policy statements on their websites. “Women-centered” policies are not concretely defined, but typically involve gendered issues that affect the lives of women, such as domestic violence, sexual assault, and human trafficking.³ In addition, women are disproportionately concentrated in low-wage jobs, face the most sexual violence, and face high maternal mortality rates.⁴ Therefore, policy addressing any of these factors could be considered a women-centered policy. In addition, any reference to child-care policy will also be considered a “women-centered” policy, as childcare historically fell into the hands of women.⁵

First, this article will examine women politicians and their policy platforms. Thomas (D-OK) played with feminine imagery within her campaign promotional material, using butterflies as her campaign symbol. Within her policy section, she also goes into detail about reproductive health and maternal mortality rates. In addition to her section about “women,” she includes policies about safety, which mention a proposal to expand the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) as well as Missing & Murdered Indigenous Women (MMIW).⁶ On the other hand, Tafoya (R-MN) does not explicitly mention women’s rights as a policy sector, but she mentions women in her efforts to “get men out of women’s sports.”⁷Additionally, she mentions policies that could be considered as women-centered, such as creating “stronger schools” and advocating for “parents’rights.” 

While observing the male candidates, there might be an assumption that there would be a partisan divide similar to that of the women candidates: Democrats explicitly supported women-centered policies while Republicans supported family-centered policies. However, Booker’s (D-KY) policy section did not mention women, but he did mention women’s reproductive health under his affordable healthcare plan.⁸ It’s worth noting that Booker did mention women’s access to contraceptives as part of healthcare, but he did so without explicitly labeling it as a “women’s” issue, and instead labeled it as solely healthcare policy. In contrast, Alme’s (R-MT) did not mention women in his policy section, nor did he mention family-oriented policy outside of his work with different childhood programs such as serving as president of the “Yellowstone Boys and Girls Ranch Foundation.”⁹

From this limited analysis, it appears politicians are not “remembering the ladies” as Abigail Adams hoped they would. This could be because most Americans are less concerned with social issues than with matters such as the economy and affordability.¹⁰ However, it is important to consider what social policies are being proposed in this midterm election, as only 17% of the U.S. population has trust in the federal government.¹¹ If constituents think that the implementation of certain policies would benefit their communities, such as policies focused on half the US population, then trust in government could increase.

Candidates are not remembering the ladies when campaigning and displaying their policy platforms. While the Republican male candidate did not mention women, the Democratic male candidate did mention women’s health, but did so as a side note. In addition, three candidates did not explicitly promote women-centered policies, excluding children-based policy. Even though women-centered policies encompass many different sectors of policy– reproductive healthcare, childcare, sexual violence, etc.– they are being forgotten in this midterm cycle. 

1. .Adams, Abigail. 1776. “Founders Online: Abigail Adams to John Adams, 31 March 1776.” Founders Online. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-01-02-0241.
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2. Schaeffer, Katherine. 2023. “Data on Women Leaders in the U.S.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/fact-sheet/the-data-on-women-leaders/. 
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3. Women and Gender in Public Policy | U.S. GAO.” n.d. Government Accountability Office (GAO). https://www.gao.gov/women-and-gender-public-policy.
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4. UNESCO. “Women in Policy- and Decision-Making.” In Fostering Women’s Leadership. UNESCO, 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep70572.8. ↩︎
5. National Women’s Law Center. n.d. “Undervalued: A Brief History of Women’s Care Work and Child Care Policy in the United States.” National Women’s Law Center. https://nwlc.org/resource/undervalued-a-brief-history-of-womens-care-work-and-child-care-policy-in-the-united-states/.
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6. 2026. Jasmine Thomas for Oklahoma | Join the Movement Now. https://www.jasmineforok.com/. ↩︎
7. “Issues.” 2026. Michele Tafoya. https://micheletafoya.com/issues/. ↩︎
8. “Meet Charles Booker | Kentucky’s Fighter for U.S. Senate.” 2026. Charles Booker. https://charlesbookerky.org/meet-charles.
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9. “Media.” 2026. Alme for Senate. https://almeforsenate.com/media/.
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10. Daniller, Andrew, Andy Cerda, Hannah Hartig, and J. Baxter. 2026. “As the 2026 Midterms Approach, Economy Is Front and Center.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2026/07/23/as-the-2026-midterms-approach-economy-is-front-and-center/.
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11. “Public Trust in Government: 1958-2025.” 2025. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/12/04/public-trust-in-government-1958-2025/.
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As AI and deepfakes edge their way into electoral processes, it is important to recognize that voters control the influence of these tools.  Understanding voters’ psychological and behavioral responses to deepfakes is required in order to develop policy that can restore trust in democratic institutions and improve public awareness of AI’s role in electoral processes.

The chances that you’ve seen a deepfake video within the past year are pretty high – 60%, according to data from Jumio.¹  Today, AI and deepfakes are all over the Internet, on topics from finance to healthcare to government and politics.  According to Łabuz and Nehring (2024), deepfakes are defined as “AI-generated or AI-manipulated audio, image, or video content that appreciably resembles existing persons, objects, places, or other entities or events and would falsely appear to a person to be authentic or truthful.”²  In recent years, deepfakes have increased in quality and availability to the average person while decreasing in cost, contributing to a surge in their proliferation.³

Deepfakes have been used in the lead-up to elections in many ways, varying in believability, timing, and impact.  Most of the time, deepfakes have next to no impact on elections, such as the 2024 U.S. presidential election, when deepfake images featuring Kamala Harris with communist imagery and Trump with the Taliban proliferated online.⁴ In some cases, though, deepfakes are strategically employed in ways that do influence elections.  For instance, a few days before the 2023 Slovakia parliamentary election, an audio deepfake circulated on social media depicting Progressive Slovakia party candidate Michal Šimečka talking with a journalist about a “scheme to rig the election by buying votes from the country’s marginalized Roma minority.”⁵  Although “police concluded the recording was not persuasive enough to warrant a criminal investigation,”⁶ Šimečka still ended up losing the election by 5%.

For the most part, however, unless deployed on a strategic timeline (usually close to an election), deepfakes tend to have minimal impact on elections.  Studies by the Institute of Political Science at the University of Bamberg show that even when parties use deceptive AI (such as impersonating public figures), public support for the party does not change.⁷  The study suggests that although “partisans disapprove of deceptive AI use in principle,” they “are unwilling to penalize their own party for it in practice.”⁸  Therefore,  candidate favorability within one’s own party is unaffected by the use of deepfakes, suggesting that candidates’ deceptive use of deepfakes in campaigning is unlikely to lose them votes.

That is not to say deepfakes have no real effect on politics – quite the opposite.  But the deepfake’s real power comes not from the content itself, but from voters’ reactions.  Deepfakes often elicit real psychological and behavioral responses.  For one, deepfakes encourage political polarization and extreme views.  As economist Zeynep Arzu Kelani and sociologist Darina Lepadatu explain in their article on deepfake propaganda during the 2024 U.S. presidential election, “deepfakes that depict political figures in a negative light tend to disproportionately impact members of opposing parties, resulting in intensified distrust and division” along partisan lines.⁹  Many deepfakes are emotionally manipulative, eliciting intense reactions to “emotionally charged content” which encourage  individuals to “share misinformation that resonates with their social identity, beliefs, or social norms.”¹⁰

Deepfakes can also diminish trust in elections and democracy overall.¹¹ After interacting with deepfakes, people often begin to view legitimate government content with skepticism, including election results.  Fola Adeleke, Executive Director and co-founder of the Global Center on AI Governance, notes one key example that occurred in the 2022 Kenyan Supreme Court case Obinga v. Ruto.¹²  In this landmark case, the court ruled that the Kenya Integrated Electoral Management System, or KIEMS (a technological tool used for voter registration and identification, as well as transmitting election votes to be counted), was constitutional and had produced accurate election results for the 2022 presidential election.¹³  Despite the court’s ruling, however, Kenyan citizens largely distrusted the election results and questioned the government’s transparency in using KIEMS.¹⁴  Such citizen distrust can be dangerous because it often means that “political participation declines and government finds it difficult to command…legitimacy and respect,”¹⁵ thus contributing to the erosion of democratic institutions over time.

As AI and deepfakes continue to take on an ever greater role in government processes, leaders must develop policies focused on a framework centered on the human person.  Politicians must assure citizens of accountability and transparency in elections, and one way to do this is by creating policies that review election technologies to verify their ethicality.¹⁶  Adeleke also suggests that political institutions should consider partnering with private corporations such as nonprofits to run elections.  Doing so will increase transparency and trust in government, since multiple organizations will be involved in the electoral process, many of which the public see as “trustworthy.”¹⁷  Additionally, it is important for governments and citizens to recognize that people do not have equal access to technologies and may be illiterate.¹⁸  As such, investing time and resources in public education on AI and other technologies could be a helpful way to build public trust in government institutions. Additionally, education resources can promote acceptance of certain uses of AI while instituting legal consequences to dissuade people from unethical practices such as spreading misinformation through deepfakes.

Despite deepfakes’ inability to influence election outcomes on a large scale, their ability to elicit a psychological and emotional response should not be understated.  Nevertheless, the key takeaway is that deepfakes draw their power from the voters.  Therefore, it is up to the voters to decide how much power to give to them in our democratic institutions and whether we allow them to influence the way we approach and view our electoral processes.

1. Jumio. “2024 Online Identity Study: Global Consumer Research.” Jumio, 2024. https://www.jumio.com/2024-identity-study/.
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2.  Łabuz, Mateusz, and Christopher Nehring. “On the Way to Deep Fake Democracy? Deep Fakes in Election Campaigns in 2023.” European Political Science 23, no. 3 (2024): 454–73. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-024-00482-9. 
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3. Ibid. ↩︎
4.  Kelani, Zeynep, and Darina Lepadatu. “Generative Artificial Intelligence, Misinformation and Political Polarization: A Content Analysis of Deepfake Propaganda During the 2024 US Presidential Election.” Journal of Information Technology & Politics (2026). https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2026.2652897. ↩︎
5. Labuz and Nehring. “On the Way to Deep Fake Democracy? Deepfakes in Election Campaigns in 2023.” ↩︎
6. Kováčik, Timotej, and Veronika Frankovská. “How AI-Generated Content Influenced Parliamentary Elections in Slovakia: The Slovak Police Will Investigate the Recording for a Third Time.” CEDMO, November 25, 2024. https://cedmohub.eu/how-ai-generated-content-influenced-parliamentary-elections-in-slovakia-the-slovak-police-will-investigate-the-recording-for-a-third-time/. 
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7. Jungherr, Andreas, Adrian Rauchfleisch, and Alexander Wuttke. “Artificial Intelligence in Election Campaigns: Perceptions, Penalties, and Implications.” Political Communication 43, no. 4 (2026): 585–606. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2025.2611913.
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8. Ibid. ↩︎
9. Kelani and Lepadatu. “Generative Artificial Intelligence, Misinformation and Political Polarization: A Content Analysis of Deepfake Propaganda During the 2024 US Presidential Election.” ↩︎
10. Ibid. ↩︎
11. Jungherr, Rauchfleisch, Wuttke. “Artificial Intelligence in Election Campaigns: Perceptions, Penalties, and Implications.” ↩︎
12. Adeleke, Fola. “Reinstating Trust in Elections in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies.” Data and Policy 7 (2025): e38. doi:10.1017/dap.2025.14
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13. Ibid. ↩︎
14. Ibid. ↩︎
15. Diamond, Larry. “The Political Drivers of Low Trust.” Open Government Partnership. Accessed October 4, 2026. https://www.opengovpartnership.org/trust/the-political-drivers-of-low-trust/. 
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16. Fola. “Reinstating Trust in Elections in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies.” ↩︎
17. Ibid. ↩︎
18. Ibid. ↩︎