Month: September 2026

For all the criticism surrounding U.S. electoral systems–whether it be gerrymandering, campaign spending, or election integrity–there is little discussion of a particular system which offers several potential improvements to the current election process: ranked-choice voting.

Many of us have heard the term, but what actually is ranked-choice voting?  Ranked-choice voting, or RCV, is a system in which voters rank their preferred candidates on the ballot by first choice, second choice, third choice, and so on.  If a candidate has the majority of first-choice votes, they win the election.  If no candidate receives a majority, the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is dropped from the race, and the ballots which listed the dropped candidate as their first choice now contribute their second choices, and so on.  This process of removing the least-voted-for candidate continues until there is a candidate with a majority.  RCV is sometimes called “instant runoff” because there is no need for subsequent elections; voters have indicated their preferences in the event that their first choice or even their second or third choice does not get elected.  RCV is already used in municipal elections in some major US cities, including San Francisco and New York City.¹

Advocates for RCV list several benefits.  For one, RCV seems to improve voter experience.  Based on a Y2 Analytics poll of Utah voters in the 2021 municipal elections, 86% were satisfied with the voting experience, reporting it was “easy to use” with clear instructions.”² In addition, since a ranked-choice system levels the playing field for candidates, voters feel freer to choose candidates with whom they feel aligned on values rather than simply picking the person they think is most likely to win.  According to a 2022 survey conducted by Alan James Simmons et al., “Researchers asked survey respondents to vote in a hypothetical version of the 2020 US presidential election between Joe Biden (Democrat), Donald Trump (Republican), Howie Hawkins (Green), and Jo Jorgensen (Libertarian). Among respondents randomly assigned to vote under plurality rules, 3.75% voted for Hawkins or Jorgensen; among respondents randomly assigned to vote under RCV, 7% ranked Hawkins or Jorgensen first.”³  This indicates that voters are more likely to vote for third-party candidates in an RCV system.

Another benefit of RCV is that policy is more likely to reflect voter preferences.  In a “first-past-the-post” voting system like we use in the U.S., most candidates seek the support of interest groups and major political parties to propel them towards election.  As a result, such groups can motivate public elected officials to make policy decisions based on seeking party support instead of passing laws that voters want.⁴ RCV, on the other hand, creates incentives for candidates, once elected, to adopt moderate policy positions “with the knowledge that the extremists will be eliminated in the first round of the runoff.”⁵

Lastly, RCV systems seem to increase voter turnout.  According to a 2024 study of voter data conducted by Eveline Dowling and other researchers, “results show that people in RCV jurisdictions are significantly more likely to vote in off-year elections than individuals living in non-RCV places.”⁶  This may be because voters tend to interact more with candidates and campaigns in RCV elections.⁷

Not only does RCV improve the voting process, but it also seems to contribute towards a better overall experience for candidates.  In a RCV system, candidates must appeal to all groups of voters in order to win, not just their own base.  As Dowling and Tolbert explain, “this need for broader appeal can lead to more civil and cooperative campaigning.”⁸  Campaigns also become less negative, since candidates don’t want to “engage in negative campaigning” or malign the images of their opponents, as these actions “could alienate potential supporters.”⁹

RCV also encourages more candidates to run for office, as voters are free to cast their vote more sincerely.¹⁰  Unlike in a plurality or majority electoral system, candidates have a chance of winning even without the support of a major political party due to the ranking system.

Despite its benefits, RCV certainly comes with some drawbacks.  In a climate where Americans already distrust elections, decreased voter trust in the electoral system is a legitimate concern.  Derek Monson et al. found that “39% of Americans do not trust the fairness of elections in the U.S.,” which does not bode well for changing the voting system.”¹¹  Additionally, there is evidence of voter mistrust in RCV specifically.  In a recent study, participants were given a scenario in which RCV and first-past-the-post systems yielded different election outcomes.  The study found that US survey respondents were generally more accepting of the first-past-the-post outcome.¹²  Implementing RCV could exacerbate voter skepticism surrounding elections, which could be seriously damaging to democracy in the U.S.

Another frequently cited concern is a phenomenon known as ballot exhaustion.  Ballot exhaustion occurs when all of a voter’s chosen candidates on a ballot have been eliminated due to runoff and there are more than two candidates left in the race.  Then, the ballot would be considered exhausted¹³ because it no longer contributes a tally for the final winner.

Ballot exhaustion has raised questions about whether or not RCV is constitutional.  In 2011, Dudum v. Arntz challenged San Francisco’s ranked-choice voting system (known as Instant-Runoff Voting, or IRV) for city officials.¹⁴  San Francisco law limited the number of rankings on each individual ballot to three, so plaintiffs argued that “when more than four candidates run for a particular office, the IRV excludes exhausted voters from full participation.”¹⁵  Although the Ninth Circuit Court ultimately upheld IRV as constitutional, questions certainly remain regarding whether or not RCV conforms to the Constitution in all its various forms.

Overall, RCV provides key improvements to the current U.S. voting system; however, it still has several drawbacks that cannot be ignored.  Before considering implementing RCV in major elections, more data is needed to help predict the effects such a system would have in the U.S.  Other countries such as Italy and Brazil have implemented RCV more broadly, but their government systems are much different than that of the U.S., which makes it difficult to directly compare and predict the potential consequences of widespread institutionalization of RCV in the U.S.  The public must also be educated about RCV so that they can develop well-formed opinions on the system and perhaps build more trust in its legitimacy.  Still, even if the data advocates for the U.S. to implement RCV, it is ultimately the voters’ decision whether or not to do so.  True to RCV’s principles of representation, moderation, and amplifying voters’ unique preferences, the American public will have to decide whether there is more merit or fault in RCV.

1. Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/.
   ↩︎
2. Monson, Derek, Josh McCrain, Zachary Taylor, and Nadia Mahallati. “The Benefits and Drawbacks of Ranked-Choice Voting in Utah.” Sutherland Institute, 2022. https://sutherlandinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Benefits-and-Drawbacks-of-Ranked-Choice-Voting-in-Utah-2022.pdf.
   ↩︎
3. Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/.
   ↩︎
4. Monson, Derek, Josh McCrain, Zachary Taylor, and Nadia Mahallati. “The Benefits and Drawbacks of Ranked-Choice Voting in Utah.” Sutherland Institute, 2022. https://sutherlandinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Benefits-and-Drawbacks-of-Ranked-Choice-Voting-in-Utah-2022.pdf.
   ↩︎
5. Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/.
   ↩︎
6. Dowling, Eveline and Caroline Tolbert. “What We Know About Ranked Choice Voting, Updated for 2025.” ABA Task Force for American Democracy, March 6, 2025. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/election_law/american-democracy/our-work/what-we-know-about-ranked-choice-voting-2025/.
   ↩︎
7. Dowling, Eveline and Caroline Tolbert. “What We Know About Ranked Choice Voting, Updated for 2025.” ABA Task Force for American Democracy, March 6, 2025. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/election_law/american-democracy/our-work/what-we-know-about-ranked-choice-voting-2025/.
   ↩︎
8. Dowling, Eveline and Caroline Tolbert. “What We Know About Ranked Choice Voting, Updated for 2025.” ABA Task Force for American Democracy, March 6, 2025. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/election_law/american-democracy/our-work/what-we-know-about-ranked-choice-voting-2025/.
   ↩︎
9. Dowling, Eveline and Caroline Tolbert. “What We Know About Ranked Choice Voting, Updated for 2025.” ABA Task Force for American Democracy, March 6, 2025. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/election_law/american-democracy/our-work/what-we-know-about-ranked-choice-voting-2025/.
   ↩︎
10. Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/.
    ↩︎
11. Monson, Derek, Josh McCrain, Zachary Taylor, and Nadia Mahallati. “The Benefits and Drawbacks of Ranked-Choice Voting in Utah.” Sutherland Institute, 2022. https://sutherlandinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Benefits-and-Drawbacks-of-Ranked-Choice-Voting-in-Utah-2022.pdf.
    ↩︎
12. Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/.
    ↩︎
13. Monson, Derek, Josh McCrain, Zachary Taylor, and Nadia Mahallati. “The Benefits and Drawbacks of Ranked-Choice Voting in Utah.” Sutherland Institute, 2022. https://sutherlandinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Benefits-and-Drawbacks-of-Ranked-Choice-Voting-in-Utah-2022.pdf.
    ↩︎
14. Balser, Jimmy. “Ranked-Choice Voting: Legal Challenges and Considerations for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 2022. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB10837/LSB10837.1.pdf.
    ↩︎
15. Balser, Jimmy. “Ranked-Choice Voting: Legal Challenges and Considerations for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 2022. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB10837/LSB10837.1.pdf.
    ↩︎

If you’ve kept up with the Democratic primary elections over the summer, or have simply paid attention to the notifications from the New York Times subscription you’ve forgotten you had, then you’ve heard or read about the election of progressive Democratic candidate Dr. Abdul El-Sayed. Dr. El-Sayed won the Democratic primary for the Michigan Senate seat against moderate candidate Haley Stevens. This win upset people on the right as well as moderates on the left.¹ 

An issue that the Democratic Party seems to be having, especially seen in the 2024 presidential election, is that the Party is diversely divided and that the Democratic National Committee is vastly unorganized.² In addition to an internal divide, it’s clearly evident that the Democratic and Republican parties are increasingly polarized, especially as the Republican Party pushes further right. This measure of asymmetric polarization– polarization that occurs due to the Republican Party moving farther to the right than the Democratic Party has moved left– has benefitted the Republican Party.³ Republican congressional players respond to the policy needs that correspond with the rhetoric that’s reinforced within the Party, strengthening their support by conservative constituents.⁴

Increasingly, Republicans have benefitted from a more unified platform that has shifted more to the ideological right. As a response to this partisan shift away from centrist policies, there is an increased prominence of progressive politicians, such as Dr. El-Sayed, and the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). The DSA is a direct response to this pull away from the center– it’s the Democrats’ turn to pay attention to why this shift is necessary for their Party. 

The DSA is further to the ideological left compared to more moderate Democrats. They are fighting for “working people” as they believe the working class “should run both the economy and civil society.”⁵  In contrast, traditional Democrats believe that “every American deserves a fair shot at the American dream.”⁶ This American Dream is more centered on ideas of affordable and upward economic mobility as opposed to the DSA’s view of flourishing, through changing the systems, rather than simply surviving within the system. 

As the American people are voting for more candidates in the DSA, the Democratic Party should take a moment to reflect upon the implications of the polls. It’s no secret that the working class is becoming more distraught with the Democratic Party– support from working-class workers is split between Democrats and Republicans, neither having a majority.⁷ The working class is a major proportion of the population that still feels underrepresented by career politicians on both sides of the political aisle. In response to this despondency, many people are starting to feel represented by the DSA and other progressives who believe in the working class. Especially those who  are taking the initiative to address working-class issues directly. 

The most popular stream of support for a DSA member has been visible in New York City with Mayor Mamdani. Mamdani’s policies focus on the working-class, everyday New Yorker.⁸ On a city-wide level, he has instituted change and has become an online phenomenon. Since then, Democratic margins have increased. In fact, in a study done by the New York Times, 31% of eligible US voters stated that they had a very or somewhat favorable opinion of socialist policies.⁹ As socialism is becoming more popular amongst voters, it’s easy to question why the Democratic Party is not more accepting of this apparent shift. 

It is worth noting that this same study revealed that 50% of eligible voters believe the Democratic Party is too far to the left. However, out of that 50%, only 17% of respondents who felt this way were Democrats.¹⁰ Meaning that Democrats are willing to vote for progressive members, but not all American voters feel represented by them.  

Since there has been an increase in visibility and support for the DSA, perhaps career Democrats need to do what Republicans have been doing: take advantage of the asymmetric polarization. If the Republican Party has found success in a further shift to the ideological right, then Democrats need to take a shift to the ideological left if they want to push for unity within their Party. Democrats need to pay attention to why voters have been favoring progressive and socialist candidates– working-class Americans want direct support and outreach. That representation can lead to a more unified Party platform through a reevaluation of Party standards. Ultimately, this representation and a drawback from career politicians would be in the Democratic Party’s best interest. 

1. Peoples, Steve. 2026. “Democratic strategist breaks down DNC’s 2024 election autopsy.” PBS, May, 2026. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/democratic-strategist-breaks-down-dncs-2024-election-autopsy.
   ↩︎
2. Goldmacher, Shane. 2026. “Moderate Democrats Prepare for ‘War’ Against an Ascendant Left.” The New York Times, August, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/06/us/politics/democratic-party-socialists-moderates.html.
   ↩︎
3. Fishkin, Joseph, and David E. Pozen. “Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball.” Columbia
   Law Review 118, no. 3 (2018): 915–82. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26397699.
   ↩︎
4. Leonard, Naomi Ehrich, Keena Lipsitz, Anastasia Bizyaeva, Alessio Franci, and Yphtach Lelkes. “The Nonlinear Feedback Dynamics of Asymmetric Political Polarization.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 118, no. 50 (2021): 1–11. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27112692.
   ↩︎
5. Democratic Socialists of America. n.d. “What is Democratic Socialism?” Accessed September 16, 2026. https://www.dsausa.org/about-us/what-is-democratic-socialism/.
   ↩︎
6. Democratic Party. n.d. “What We’re Fighting For – Democrats.” Accessed September 16, 2026. https://democrats.org/what-were-fighting-for/.
   ↩︎
7. Wiederkehr, Anna. 2026. “Poll: Working class voters are still up for grabs.” Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/08/31/working-class-voters-midterms-poll-01054992.
   ↩︎
8. “Mayor Mamdani Launches First-in-the-Nation Office of Worker Power to Support Labor Organizing.” 2026. NYC.gov.
   https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/09/mayor-mamdani-launches-first-in-the-nation-office-of-worker-powe.
   ↩︎
9. The New York Times. 2026. “Cross-Tabs: September 2026 Times/Siena Poll of the Likely Electorate.” The New York Times, September 15, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/09/15/polls/times-siena-poll-likely-voter-crosstabs.html.
   ↩︎
10. The New York Times. 2026. “Cross-Tabs: September 2026 Times/Siena Poll of the Likely Electorate.” The New York Times, September 15, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/09/15/polls/times-siena-poll-likely-voter-crosstabs.html.
    ↩︎

A 2026 Gallup Poll found that the majority of Americans, approximately 61%, do not view socialist systems favorably.¹ Among their most frequently cited concerns are economic inefficiency and excessive government control. Regardless of the accuracy, these fears are commonly advanced by a historical argument–one that points to the failures of past socialist regimes as a means of discounting modern, democratic-socialist efforts. This logic was even deployed in a 2023 House resolution, “denouncing the horrors of socialism” on the grounds that it has “time and time again” led to regime collapse.² The fatal flaw of this argument, however, is that while the label “socialism” has persisted throughout history, the institutions attached to the term have varied radically.

The Soviet Union, Venezuela, Allende’s Chile, and the modern Nordic countries have all been associated with socialism, but their institutions differed dramatically. They range from centralized state ownership under an authoritarian government to democratic attempts at nationalization and redistribution to market economies paired with expansive welfare states. Their divergent outcomes therefore provide a useful test: which elements of socialism repeatedly produced economic problems, and which survived when separated from them?

One key axis of socialism is centralized planning and state ownership.³ In the case of the Soviet Union, the state controlled production, resource allocation, and pricing through comprehensive national directives. While it industrialized rapidly, the Soviet Union’s long-run growth, after accounting for its unusually high investment and human-capital accumulation, was the world’s worst from 1960-89.⁴ Its economy simply could not allocate resources efficiently enough to keep up with the large amounts of capital being poured into it. This instance demonstrates the risks of taking the centralized-planning axis to socialism to its extreme. However, it says considerably less about systems of social democracy that preserve markets and decentralized economic decision-making.

Another often cited “socialist failure” was Venezuela under Chavez and Maduro. Despite avoiding the Soviet-style comprehensively planned economy, Venezuelan state intervention was substantial, and mass redistribution was financed through oil revenues, which accounted for 96% of export income between 2004-13.⁵ This created a major dependency, and when oil prices collapsed beginning in 2014, that dependence interacted with foreign exchange controls and monetary expansion, intensifying inflation and economic decline.⁶ Extensive state intervention magnified, rather than independently caused, the consequences of commodity dependence in this case.

In relation to today’s discourse surrounding democratic socialism, the most relevant historical comparison is Chile under Salvador Allende. This is an example of a democratically elected “socialist failure” shaped by a mixture of self inflictions and external force. On one end, Allende implemented extensive price controls as a response to inflation, contributing to the country’s growing economic crisis.⁷ Simultaneously however, declassified U.S. records document covert efforts to weaken Allende’s government.⁸ Therefore, Chile demonstrates a scenario where democratic socialist policies did produce serious economic consequences, but the historical outcome cannot be evaluated independently of external political conditions.

The successful Nordic model provides an important final distinction. Although frequently associated with socialism, Nordic countries largely preserved market economies while pairing them with extensive redistribution, universal social programs, and strong labor institutions.⁹ Rather than demonstrating a socialist success, this suggests that expansive welfare states can operate without the comprehensive central planning that characterized historical socialist regimes.

The history of socialism therefore offers neither a blanket condemnation nor an endorsement of modern democratic socialism. Past failures emerged from distinct combinations of planning, state ownership, economic intervention, and external pressures, while the Nordic model succeeded following an almost entirely different path. Whether today’s democratic-socialist proposals are sound must be judged on their actual institutions and policies, not on a contested label shared between fundamentally different systems of the past.

1. Lydia Saad, “How Americans View Capitalism, Socialism and Free Enterprise,” Gallup, August 6, 2026, https://news.gallup.com/poll/713144/americans-view-capitalism-socialism-free-enterprise.aspx.
   ↩︎
2. US Congress, House, Denouncing the Horrors of Socialism, H.Con.Res. 9, 118th Cong., 1st sess., agreed to February 2, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/9/text.
   ↩︎
3. Economics in Context Initiative, “Comparative Economic Systems: Capitalism and Socialism in the 21st Century” (Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, 2021), 6, https://www.bu.edu/eci/files/2021/08/Comparative-Economic-Systems.pdf.
   ↩︎
4. William Easterly and Stanley Fischer, “The Soviet Economic Decline: Historical and Republican Data,” NBER Working Paper No. 4735 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 1994), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w4735/w4735.pdf.
   ↩︎
5. Rafael D. Ramírez, “The Venezuelan Oil Industry Collapse: Economic, Social and Political Implications,” IAI Commentaries 21|52 (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2021), https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom2152.pdf.
   ↩︎
6. Valerie Cerra, “Inflation and the Black Market Exchange Rate in a Repressed Market: A Model of Venezuela,” IMF Working Paper WP/16/159 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, August 2016), https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/_wp16159.pdf. ↩︎
7. Sebastian Edwards, “The Debauchery of Currency and Inflation: Chile, 1970–1973,” NBER Working Paper No. 31890 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2023), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w31890/w31890.pdf.
   ↩︎
8. US Department of State, “Paper Prepared in the Department of State: Action in Support of U.S. Posture Towards Chile,” October 16, 1970, Document 155, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d155.
   ↩︎
9. Johannes Tiemer, “The Success of the Nordic Countries as a Blueprint for Small Open Economies,” Intereconomics 53, no. 4 (2018): 209–214, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-018-0751-6. ↩︎

In 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Asked about the odds of conflict over Taiwan, Davidson warned: “I worry [China is] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States … Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade … in the next six years.”¹

This “Davidson Window” reshaped the narrative surrounding China policy.² Yet, as 2027 approaches, a Chinese invasion seems unlikely. The Intelligence Community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment concluded “that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.”³ Why? An invasion of Taiwan would be a disaster for the PRC. It would be operationally infeasible, economically crippling, and set back the PRC’s core strategic interests.

China is substantially stronger than Taiwan. The PRC’s defense budget is 15 times its size, and China has a 10:1 advantage in warships and combat aircraft.⁴ Despite this, the logistics of an amphibious assault create issues. The Taiwan Strait is 90 miles wide and characterized by rough seas, weather, and monsoon seasons that limit opportunities for invasion. A crossing would take hours and consist of a force larger than that of D-Day, leaving landing parties vulnerable to drone attacks.⁵ Taiwan’s mountainous terrain eliminates several possible landing sites, and what flat coastal terrain exists is mostly urban or agricultural.⁶ Factor in American intervention, and the situation quickly becomes untenable for China. 

A 2023 CSIS wargame illustrates these difficulties. Across 24 simulations, China failed to conquer Taiwan 22 times, suffering an average loss of 138 major ships–roughly 90 percent of its amphibious fleet–161 combat aircraft, and tens of thousands of personnel. Although most scenarios assumed U.S. intervention, conquering Taiwan alone still took China roughly 70 days and 70,000 ground casualties.⁷

This doesn’t even factor in the economic costs of invasion. Conservative estimates put the global cost of a Chinese blockade at $2–3 trillion, with a “major war” scenario entailing several months of armed conflict and roughly $10 trillion in losses. China would bear a significant portion of this through lost trade (20% of China’s GDP comes from exports), energy disruption, severe economic sanctions, capital flight (China is home to $3.6 trillion in inward FDI), and the seizure of Chinese overseas assets.⁸ Chinese industries dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductors could lose trillions in annual revenue, and energy imports through key chokepoints like the Straits of Malacca would be vulnerable to disruption or even an American blockade.⁹ Even if an invasion succeeded, China would face long-term isolation from global markets, incurring long-term economic damage.¹⁰

The worst part is an invasion would fail to achieve the PRC’s key strategic interests. Taiwanese industry would be devastated, including its semiconductor industry. A CSIS report determined that following any successful invasion, Taiwan would be a “damaged economy … without electricity and basic services.” Reconstruction costs would be staggering, and it’s unlikely that China would be able to reap the benefits of Taiwan’s invaluable semiconductor industry for several years. China would have to contend with local resistance, and the political victory of reunification may quickly become overshadowed by a drawn-out counterinsurgency campaign. A successful conquest may prompt alarm among China’s neighbors, pushing them closer to the United States.¹¹

No matter how you look at it, a Taiwanese invasion would be a Pyrrhic victory at best, and a complete disaster at worst, jeopardizing Chinese military strength, economic prosperity, and long-term strategic position in exchange for an uncertain outcome.

1. Iyer, G. S. “India – China Relations: Some Thoughts.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 19, no. 1/2 (2024): 34–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48813789. ↩︎
2. Iyer, G. S. “India – China Relations: Some Thoughts.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 19, no. 1/2 (2024): 34–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48813789.
   ↩︎
3. Lariosa, Aaron-Matthew. “China Not Committed to 2027 Taiwan Invasion, U.S. Intel Report Says.” USNI News, March 19, 2026. https://news.usni.org/2026/03/19/china-not-committed-to-2027-taiwan-invasion-u-s-intel-report-says.
   ↩︎
4. GlobalMilitary.net. “China vs Taiwan Military Comparison 2026: Who Is Stronger?” Accessed September 7, 2026. https://www.globalmilitary.net/compare/countries/chn-vs-twn/.
   ↩︎
5. Sacks, David, Will Merrow, Michael Bricknell, and Sabine Baumgartner. “Why China Would Struggle to Invade Taiwan.” Council on Foreign Relations, August 22, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/articles/why-china-would-struggle-invade-taiwan.
   ↩︎
6. Rawlins, MacKenna, and Dan Grazier. “Taiwan Up Close: Why Geography Complicates Invasion.” Stimson Center, May 19, 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/taiwan-up-close-why-geography-complicates-invasion/.
   ↩︎
7. Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 9, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan.
   ↩︎
8. Wright, Logan, Charlie Vest, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Zack Cooper, Jake Rinaldi, and Joel Wuthnow. “China’s Economic Escalation Dilemma.” In If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios, edited by Bonnie S. Glaser. German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep77909.4. 
   ↩︎
9. Asthana, S. B. “What Cost Is China Willing to Bear to Invade Taiwan?” Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, October 20, 2025. https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/10/what-cost-is-china-willing-to-bear-to-invade-taiwan/; Chen, Cheng-liang, and Sam Garcia. “China Faces Heavy Costs in Invasion: Think Tank.” Taipei Times, July 6, 2026. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/07/06/2003860303. ↩︎
10. Asthana, S. B. “What Cost Is China Willing to Bear to Invade Taiwan?” Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, October 20, 2025. https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/10/what-cost-is-china-willing-to-bear-to-invade-taiwan/
    ↩︎
11. Blanchette, Jude, and Gerard DiPippo. “‘Reunification’ with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 22, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/reunification-taiwan-through-force-would-be-pyrrhic-victory-china. 
    ↩︎