Month: September 2026

The recent rise of Democratic Socialist candidates is unprecedented and novel, but ballot-box underperformance from D.S.A. candidates and overinflation of popularity from online platforms may suggest that the narrowly successful D.S.A. candidates could face grave challenges come November. 

If there is one term defining the 2026 Midterm elections, it is “Democratic Socialism.” The wave of progressive candidates has dominated national headlines, with their hopes to shake the status quo and bring a populist relief to the left.¹ This “blue wave,” first encapsulated by the 2025 election of Zohran Mamdani as mayor of New York City, has spread across the country, with candidates such as Abdul El-Sayed and Angie Nixon beating out establishment bulwarks.^{2 3} However, this ideological wave, which is dividing the left, is not of unlimited success, despite what media coverage may lead you to believe. On the contrary, Democratic Socialists have been vastly underperforming in early results, and their popularity “bubble” may pose great threats to Democratic victories come November.

It is a common thought across the nation that Democratic Socialists have been gaining ground this Midterm season, thanks to their promises of affordability and mass reform, with central policies including state-owned grocery stores, guaranteed housing, universal healthcare, and aggressive wealth taxation. From Zohran Mamdani’s social media-intensive campaign,⁴ to the youth-labor coalition of El-Sayed in Michigan,⁵ Democratic Socialist candidates have been rushing to secure new coalitions of disillusioned voters through creative marketing. But the narrative around these elections fails to consider the discrepancy between polling data or online political engagement and actual ballot-box performance. 

From the start of the DSA’s rise, which is considered to be Mamdani’s 2025 election, aggregate polling (which showed Mamdani at +14.3pts)⁶ had overestimated his performance (Mamdani +9.5pts).⁷ While that polling margin was not far outside the margin of error, it highlighted the danger of overconfidence: online polls and discourse do not inherently translate to success in the polling booth. In one of America’s most progressive cities, Mamdani won with only 50.8% of the vote, even with the scandals surrounding his opponent Andrew Cuomo.^8,9

Mamdani’s slight underperformance compared to his expected performance, despite his never-before-seen online political engagement, was just foreshadowing the difficulty DSA candidates will face, especially in more competitive states.¹⁰ This could be best seen through Michigan’s El-Sayed, who led +13.2pts in polling before his +1.0pt “victory,”¹¹ and others like Fransisca Hong in Wisconsin’s gubernatorial election, who lost her primary despite having led the polls by a whopping +25pts.^{12, 13} These systematic underperformances and razor-close victories suggest the possibility that a disproportionately active minority of Democrats may be setting the party up with ideologically unfavorable candidates, and developing a polling “mirage” of misleading popularity. 

Now it is certainly true to say that DSA candidates have fared far better this year than any election season in recent history; therefore, many argue that the sheer rise of the Democratic Socialists, and not necessarily their net performance, is important enough to drive the discussion around this Midterm season and the strategy of the Democratic Party.¹⁴ Yet the country at large yearns for bipartisanship and compromise (60%), especially among Democrats (71%), with this number only increasing in recent years.^{15, 16} As the country yearns for stability and bipartisanship, figures like Mamdani seem to turn the other way, remarking how even on unpopular DSA goals like “seizing the means of production … [they can] not give up one issue for another… and over time [they] will bring people to that issue”, positioning the DSA not to be a compromising alternative to the status quo, but a long-term means of revolutionizing it.¹⁷ 

So regardless of the merits of Democratic Socialist policy in response to the affordability crisis, which is a separate discussion from their electoral performances, DSA candidates choosing to go all in, and mass media enabling the idea that Democratic voters are infatuated with Democratic Socialism, is ignoring both primary electoral realization and the underlying values of bipartisanship and moderation that are still a large part of the Democratic base.^{18, 19}  Before the American Left inflates growing popularity with the inevitability of DSA victories, they must first consider the possibility that their popularity is a “bubble,” expanding through extensive media coverage and mass digital politicization. The Democratic Party, and its supporters who have narrowly placed these candidates on the ballot, must hope that the bubble does not pop come November.

1. CBS News, “How Progressive Wins in Democratic Primaries Are Shaping the Midterm Landscape,” CBS News, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/democratic-primaries-progressive-wins-midterm-elections/
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2. Associated Press, “Michigan 2026 Live Primary Election Results,” via ABC News, https://abcnews.com/Politics/michigan-2026-live-primary-election-results/story?id=134596717
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3. PBS NewsHour, “Democratic Socialist Angie Nixon Won the Senate Primary in Florida. Can She Win in November?,” PBS NewsHour, August 19, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/democratic-socialist-angie-nixon-won-the-senate-primary-in-florida-can-she-win-in-november; see also ABC News, “Democratic Socialist Angie Nixon Won Tuesday’s Primary in Florida. Can She Win in November?,” ABC News, https://abcnews.com/US/wireStory/democratic-socialist-angie-nixon-won-tuesdays-primary-florida-135772633
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4. NBC News, “Zohran Mamdani’s Social Media Strategy Was about More Than Viral Videos,” NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/zohran-mamdani-social-media-cuomo-nyc-mayor-win-rcna215051
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5. People’s World, “El-Sayed Lead Widens with Support of Broad Coalition in Michigan,” People’s World, August 3, 2026, https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/el-sayed-lead-widens-with-support-of-broad-coalition-in-michigan/
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6. RealClearPolling, “2026 Michigan Senate – Rogers vs. El-Sayed,” RealClearPolitics, https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/senate/general/2026/michigan/rogers-vs-el-sayed
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7. “2025 New York City Mayoral Election,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_New_York_City_mayoral_election. AP-sourced final tally: Mamdani 50.78 percent, Cuomo 41.32 percent
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8. Associated Press results for the 2025 New York City mayoral election, as compiled at “2025 New York City Mayoral Election,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_New_York_City_mayoral_election
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9. NBC News, “Zohran Mamdani’s Social Media Strategy Was about More Than Viral Videos” (see note 4 above); on Cuomo’s 2021 resignation, see “Andrew Cuomo,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Cuomo
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10. Truthout, “Over a Quarter of Voters Say They’re Supporters of DSA, Polling Finds,” Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/over-a-quarter-of-voters-say-theyre-supporters-of-dsa-polling-finds/
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11. “Michigan Senate Race 2026 – Predictions and Polling,” Race to the WH, https://www.racetothewh.com/senate/michigan26 ↩︎
12. “Polling for 2026 Governor Races – Updated Daily,” Race to the WH, https://www.racetothewh.com/governor/26polls
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13. Associated Press, “David Crowley Wins Democratic Primary for Wisconsin Governor over Francesca Hong,” PBS NewsHour, August 12, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/david-crowley-wins-democratic-primary-for-wisconsin-governor-over-francesca-hong
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14. “Democratic Socialists of America Are Seeing Surge in Membership,” NOTUS, July 3, 2026, https://www.notus.org/2026-election/democratic-socialists-of-america-primary-win-momentum
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15. YouGov, “Likely Voters, Data Centers, ‘Woke,’ and More: August 21–24, 2026 Economist/YouGov Poll,” YouGov, https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/55436-likely-voters-data-centers-woke-and-more-august-21-24-2026-economist-yougov-poll ↩︎
16. Bipartisan Policy Center, “Is Voter Interest in Bipartisanship on the Rise?,” Bipartisan Policy Center, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/is-voter-interest-in-bipartisanship-on-the-rise/
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17. Fox News, “Video surfaces of Mamdani using slogan rooted in communist revolutionary language”, Fox News, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/mamdani-under-fire-over-resurfaced-2021-video-endorsing-socialist-goals ↩︎
18. The Guardian, “Democratic Socialists Are Winning in US Cities with Message of Getting Stuff Done,” The Guardian, June 28, 2026
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19. Associated Press results for the 2025 New York City mayoral election (see note 8 above)
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In June of 2025, in what is known as the Twelve-Day War, the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear program in an attempt to prevent Iran from creating nuclear weapons.¹ This attack was significant in impeding Iran’s progress in building its nuclear program. Key infrastructure such as the “two uranium enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz and a uranium processing facility at Isfahan” were all targeted.² While Iran’s nuclear program took a significant hit, it is unclear if the efforts were successful in preventing nuclear proliferation. Despite the high stakes associated with nuclear proliferation, the threat of a nuclear Iran should not be continued to be addressed through military force alone. 

Past events have indicated that states often become further motivated to seek nuclear weapons in the wake of a clear opponent or threat. For example, “Israel’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was heavily influenced by the 1956 Suez Crisis and subsequent regional tensions.”³ Thus, historically, there has been a trend of high regional security threats resulting in nuclear proliferation. In literature, scholars such as Mark Bell have reflected this sentiment, noting that if a state is experiencing “the existence of serious international threats (territorial) or ongoing war,” they are likely to use nuclear weapons to move forward with aggressive and steadfast policy against that threat.⁴ In other words, high-security environments tend to cause states to use nuclear weapons to further more aggressive foreign policy. As such, military exchanges will exacerbate tensions by creating a high-security threat. Consequently, Iran is likely to feel an increased need for nuclear weapons and increasing tensions will only encourage nuclear weapons to be used as a political tool to further aggressive foreign policy. 

After the impact of the Twelve-Day War, Iran is predicted to need at least one to two years in order to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, and even longer to make a nuclear missile.⁵ Consequently,  after the attack on its nuclear program, Iran was left impeded and with limited resources. Yet, continuous attacks on their program will, in the end, only serve to hinder Iran’s capabilities. Military exchanges alone will not alter Iran’s motivation to seek nuclear weapons. In fact, statistically, coercion by punishment rarely succeeds in getting an actor to change their policy aims.⁶ Therefore, although military force by Israel and the U.S. did succeed in hindering Iran’s nuclear program, it remains unclear if Iran’s motivation to proliferate was successfully changed. 

Supporters of military intervention may consider it to be the most impactful force to inhibit Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Therefore, even if Iran’s motivations remain unchanged and nuclear weapons are still produced, at least Iran’s nuclear capabilities will be low. However, having a weak nuclear Iran could prove to be more dangerous compared to having a secured nuclear Iran. Strategic theory on nuclear weapons emphasizes the importance of having a secured second-strike capability, recognizing that possessing asymmetric nuclear capabilities can result in escalation rather than assurance and deterrence.⁷ To put it in perspective, Israel is estimated to have around 90 warheads.⁸ Therefore, if Iran develops a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, while Israel maintains their larger nuclear capabilities, this asymmetric dynamic could help to foster a mentality of “use it or lose it,” thus motivating Iran to deploy nuclear weapons. 

In all, despite the potential danger behind the reality of a new nuclear state, military force should not be pursued in addressing nuclear proliferation. This is for the reason that military efforts are likely, as seen in past scenarios, to increase Iran’s motivation to proliferate for the sake of protecting its security. Notably, continuous military force now is likely to backfire in the event that Iran does proliferate in the foreseeable future, as it raises interstate tensions and creates incentives for more aggressive foreign policy. Therefore, policy aimed at addressing the threat of proliferation should focus on the motivational aspects, as opposed to the capabilities. In effect, this can manifest through diplomatic means and reassuring Iran’s security, if nuclear nonproliferation is the main goal. 

1. Farnia, Nina. 2025. “The 12-Day War and the Collapse of US Imperialism.” Middle East Critique 34 (4): 791–95. doi:10.1080/19436149.2025.2578034.
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2. Rodgers, Joseph, Heather Williams, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. “Damage to Iran’s Nuclear Program-Can It Rebuild?” CSIS. Accessed September 25, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/damage-irans-nuclear-program-can-it-rebuild.
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3. Horschig, Doreen. “Why Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad Idea.” Nuclear Network, October 31, 2024. https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/why-striking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-is-a-bad-idea/.
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4. Bell, Mark S. 2019. “Nuclear Opportunism: A Theory of How States Use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics.” Journal of Strategic Studies 42 (1): 3–28. doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1389722.
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5. Albright, David, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker. “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program after the 12-Day War: A Diagram of the Destruction.” Institute For Science And International Security. August 20, 2025. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/irans-nuclear-weapons-program-after-the-12-day-war-a-diagram-of-the-destruction.
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6. Pape, Robert A. “Explaining Military Coercion.” In Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Cornell University Press, 1996. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v.5.
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7. Narang, Vipin. “The Sources of Regional Power Nuclear Postures: Posture Optimization Theory.” In Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Princeton University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt6wq00j.6.
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8. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. 2022. “Israeli Nuclear Weapons, 2021.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 78 (1): 38–50. Doi:10.1080/00963402.2021.2014239.
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President Trump and various AI leaders have expressed concerns that Chinese social media accounts may contribute to American disapproval of new data center construction—but evidence that the foreign actors have significantly influenced discourse is limited.

On August 31, 2026, President Trump published a post on Truth Social promoting the construction of data centers under the slogan “Let Data Reign.” In his post, he cited that “China could not be happier with [the] anti-data center movement,” directly alluding to the American public’s recent opposition to data center expansion with China’s geopolitical interests.¹ Earlier in the summer, OpenAI released a June Threat Report claiming that P.R.C.-linked accounts may be attempting to sway American AI debates. According to the report, Chinese actors prompted ChatGPT to produce images and political cartoons in English, raising concerns about increasing data center capacity, which OpenAI claims is intended for American audiences on social media.² Nationally representative surveys from the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg Public Policy Center indicate that American opposition to local data centers rose sharply between February-March and June-July of 2026, with the former survey seeing 49% opposition, and the latter 61%, a statistically significant increase in a few months–during the same timeframe that OpenAI was investigating Chinese accounts.³ This raises the question: has Beijing-linked activity on social media contributed to American AI uncertainties, or has the development been a product of primarily domestic origin? While P.R.C.-affiliated accounts have attempted to exacerbate American hesitation over data center expansion, the rise in public opposition seems to have emerged predominantly over concerns raised by notable American political leaders such as Governor Greg Abbott (R-TX), and Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) regarding electricity costs, environmental impacts, and effects on local communities.^{4 5} They suggest that alleged Chinese influence is an attempt to further ignite American debate, not the source of it.

Discourse on the artificial intelligence development race, and the geopolitical relevance associated with it, has consistently made its way to Capitol Hill and China’s National People’s Congress. The United States has pushed policies such as President Trump’s ‘Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence’ executive order,⁶ and China has expanded its ‘AI Plus’ campaign in its Fifteenth Five-Year Economic Plan.⁷ Both Beijing and Washington have recognized that artificial intelligence is of supreme importance for the future of their national interests; As such, the motivation exists for China to influence American sentiments on data centers. 

This past June, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, headed by Congressman Brett Guthrie (R-KY) requested the FBI to give a “briefing to understand what actions the Trump Administration is taking to investigate foreign influence campaigns to slow U.S. AI development.”⁸ The request signals that there is evidence to suggest that China, Russia, and Iran are launching coordinated campaigns to sow discontent in the American public’s consciousness. However, the existence of these alleged campaigns does not sufficiently establish that Americans’ change in opinion was significantly influenced by foreign action. 

While OpenAI’s June Threat Report confirms the presence of suspicious Chinese accounts, it also points out that “most of the social media posts identified generated little or no observable engagement.” Darren Linvill, a researcher at Clemson University, confirms this assessment, as his work identified that Chinese bot accounts were quickly suspended from X and their posts received minimal traction.⁹

If Chinese inflammatory social media posts are not a major contributor to American AI data center disapproval, what is? As early as December 2025, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) raised concerns over utility cost implications of data centers, writing letters and launching an investigation of top AI-oriented companies.¹⁰ Since then, data center disputes have reached the forefront of the Democratic Party’s policy agendas—but distaste for data center construction is fairly bipartisan. According to the same Annenberg Public Policy Center survey, both Democrats (69%) and Republicans (54%) are opposed to local data centers.¹¹ Per a Pew Research survey, the top issues cited are the environmental impact, home energy costs, and local quality of life.¹²

While investigations have confirmed the mild presence of C.C.P.-linked social media accounts spreading distrust of data center construction, evidence that it has caused a meaningful impact on American sentiment is limited. U.S. AI discourse had been consistently contentious before the Chinese accounts surfaced.

1.  Trump, Donald J. “Truth Social Post.” Truth Social. August 31, 2026.https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117190477440173795. ↩︎
2. OpenAI. June 2026 Threat Report. June 2026.https://cdn.openai.com/pdf/96b559fa-c165-4575-805d-e636909e2f78/June-2026-Threat-Report.pdf. ↩︎
3. Annenberg Public Policy Center. “Opposition to Local Data Centers Rises Sharply, Annenberg Survey Finds.” August 11, 2026.https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/opposition-to-local-data-centers-rises-sharply-annenberg-survey-finds.
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4. Greg Abbott. “Governor Abbott Directs PUC and ERCOT to Shield Texans from Data Center Infrastructure Costs.” Office of the Texas Governor, June 10, 2026. https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-directs-puc-and-ercot-to-shield-texans-from-data-center-infrastructure-costs.
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5. U.S. Congress. “S. 4214 — 119th Congress (2025–2026).” Congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/4214.
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6. The White House. “Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence.” January 23, 2025.
   https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/removing-barriers-to-american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence/.
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7.  Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. “中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划纲要.” March 16, 2026.https://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2026/03/16/ARTI1773644951646391.shtml.
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8.  U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. “Letter to Mr. David Sacks, Mr. Michael Kratsios, and Director Kash Patel.” June 4, 2026. https://d1dth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/2026_06_04_Letter_to_PCAST_and_FBI_on_Foreign_Influence_AI_Data_Centers_99f6aa6cda.pdf. ↩︎
9.  Dickerson, Truman. “Many of the Chinese Bots X Says Posted Anti-Data-Center Content Had No Followers or Engagement, a Researcher Found.” Business Insider, August 28, 2026. https://www.bu sinessinsider.com/x-chinese-bots-data-center -debate-no-engagement-followers-2026-8. ↩︎
10. Warren, Elizabeth. “Senator Warren, Lawmakers Open Investigation into Big Tech Data Centers’ Role in Driving Up Families’ Utility Costs.” December 16, 2025.https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases senator-warren-lawmakers-open-investigation-into-big-tech-data-centers-role-in-driving-up-families-utility-costs/.
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11. Annenberg Public Policy Center. “Opposition to Local Data Centers Rises Sharply, Annenberg Survey Finds.” August 11, 2026.https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/opposition-to-local-data-centers-rises-sharply-annenberg-survey-finds/.
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12.  Pew Research Center. “How Americans View Data Centers’ Impact in Key Areas, From the Environment to Jobs.” March 12, 2026.https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/03/12/how-americans-view-data-centers-impact-in-key-areas-from-the-environment-to-jobs/.
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Abstract: The United States may not need NATO, but NATO definitely needs the United States. This relationship is harming European defense capabilities and preventing them from taking action regarding the Ukraine conflict.

Between July 7 and July 8, 2026, the 2026 NATO Summit was held in Ankara, Turkey.¹ President Trump claimed that there was “tremendous love in that room”.² However, this loving atmosphere was not present during his March 2026 statement when President Trump posted on Truth Social that NATO was making a “very foolish mistake” by declining to help the United States in its conflict with Iran.³ This statement leads to a lot of questions: why should NATO help if the United States is not under direct attack? Should NATO get involved just to prevent Iran from advancing its uranium enrichment system? Yet, the most important question is: What should NATO do about the war in Ukraine? 

Since February 2022, Ukraine has been under constant attack from Russia. There have been 1.5 million casualties on both sides, 5.9 million Ukrainians registered as refugees, and a daily cost of the war of $190 million for Ukraine.⁴ Yet, with a massive war on its continent and the imminent threat of Russian attack, the question remains: why should NATO help assist the U.S. against Iran and not assist Ukraine?  The answer lies in a truth NATO refuses to face: the United States does not need NATO, but NATO cannot survive without the United States. Everything the United States does directly benefits NATO, such as switching a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in Asia to the Mediterranean to help NATO in a crisis. So, maybe it is understandable for the U.S. to demand NATO’s help during one of its most major conflicts in the last 5 years, considering that the U.S. spends 16% of its defense spending in NATO while most of the NATO countries invest only 5% of their GDP in security measures for the alliance.^{5, 6}

Therefore, taking into account the numbers mentioned and the current situation, should European countries start taking more action to defend themselves? And then, is NATO still a useful organization? Firstly, the European Union’s defense spending is €454 billion in 2026, which is equivalent to 2.2% of GDP,⁷ compared with NATO’s 5% of GDP spent on defense, which was agreed during the 2026 summit. Even though EU defense spending increased by 75.3% since 2021, it has been shown that it is not enough to contain Russia and the threat that it poses to the entire European continent. NATO can protect the countries that signed the treaty, but it’s the EU’s mission to maintain peace and stability within Europe, even though the war has reached its fourth year and has no end in sight, alongside Russia’s hybrid attacks on Europe this past week.⁸ Also, looking at the data, the EU’s reliance on NATO and, therefore, on the United States, reinforces the lack of commitment to the continent’s security through its small contribution to Europe’s defense spending. 

As for the second question, the United States’ defense budget reached nearly $2.63 trillion this year, and its status as a major power in the Western world sets the U.S. in a position as the financial anchor of NATO.⁹ Moreover, NATO does not need a full shutdown; it needs less reliance on the United States and a reform that focuses its attention on the conflicts happening in the North Atlantic territory. 

Therefore, instead of flattering the United States with compliments every time there is a NATO Summit, the alliance should focus on restructuring its core values such as individual liberty, democracy, and human rights.¹⁰ The reform should focus on a future where Russia could dominate Europe and address the current crisis in Ukraine, with consistent negotiations with the United States about the current situation and the main priorities of the alliance, the concerns of European countries, and introducing a slow detachment from the U.S., proposing a reduction of its contribution to NATO’s defense budget.

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “The Ankara Summit Declaration.” NATO, July 8, 2026. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration ↩︎
2. The Guardian. “Erratic Trump Dominates Final Hours of NATO Summit.” July 8, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/08/erratic-trump-dominates-final-hours-nato-summit ↩︎
3. BBC News. “NATO Summit.” 2026 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0434932w ↩︎
4. Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Russia-Ukraine War in 10 Charts.” CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-war-10-charts  ↩︎
5. Reuters. “Fact Check: US Contributes 16% to NATO Annual Budget, Not Two-Thirds.” May 31, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/us-contributes-16-nato-annual-budget-not-two-thirds-2024-05-31/  ↩︎
6. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Defence Expenditures and NATO’s 5% Commitment.” NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment ↩︎
7. Council of the European Union. “Defence Numbers.” European Union https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/ ↩︎
8. “Russia Warns Europe as Ukraine War Continues.” The New York Times, September 24, 2026. New York Times article   ↩︎
9. U.S. Department of Defense. “Department of Defense.” USAspending.gov usaspending.gov/agency/department-of-defense  ↩︎
10. Michaels, Jeffrey H. “The Nato Experience.” In Deterrence Warning Messages: A Short Guide for NATO, edited by Tim Sweijs. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep70752 ↩︎

For all the criticism surrounding U.S. electoral systems–whether it be gerrymandering, campaign spending, or election integrity–there is little discussion of a particular system which offers several potential improvements to the current election process: ranked-choice voting.

Many of us have heard the term, but what actually is ranked-choice voting?  Ranked-choice voting, or RCV, is a system in which voters rank their preferred candidates on the ballot by first choice, second choice, third choice, and so on.  If a candidate has the majority of first-choice votes, they win the election.  If no candidate receives a majority, the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is dropped from the race, and the ballots which listed the dropped candidate as their first choice now contribute their second choices, and so on.  This process of removing the least-voted-for candidate continues until there is a candidate with a majority.  RCV is sometimes called “instant runoff” because there is no need for subsequent elections; voters have indicated their preferences in the event that their first choice or even their second or third choice does not get elected.  RCV is already used in municipal elections in some major US cities, including San Francisco and New York City.¹

Advocates for RCV list several benefits.  For one, RCV seems to improve voter experience.  Based on a Y2 Analytics poll of Utah voters in the 2021 municipal elections, 86% were satisfied with the voting experience, reporting it was “easy to use” with clear instructions.”² In addition, since a ranked-choice system levels the playing field for candidates, voters feel freer to choose candidates with whom they feel aligned on values rather than simply picking the person they think is most likely to win.  According to a 2022 survey conducted by Alan James Simmons et al., “Researchers asked survey respondents to vote in a hypothetical version of the 2020 US presidential election between Joe Biden (Democrat), Donald Trump (Republican), Howie Hawkins (Green), and Jo Jorgensen (Libertarian). Among respondents randomly assigned to vote under plurality rules, 3.75% voted for Hawkins or Jorgensen; among respondents randomly assigned to vote under RCV, 7% ranked Hawkins or Jorgensen first.”³  This indicates that voters are more likely to vote for third-party candidates in an RCV system.

Another benefit of RCV is that policy is more likely to reflect voter preferences.  In a “first-past-the-post” voting system like we use in the U.S., most candidates seek the support of interest groups and major political parties to propel them towards election.  As a result, such groups can motivate public elected officials to make policy decisions based on seeking party support instead of passing laws that voters want.⁴ RCV, on the other hand, creates incentives for candidates, once elected, to adopt moderate policy positions “with the knowledge that the extremists will be eliminated in the first round of the runoff.”⁵

Lastly, RCV systems seem to increase voter turnout.  According to a 2024 study of voter data conducted by Eveline Dowling and other researchers, “results show that people in RCV jurisdictions are significantly more likely to vote in off-year elections than individuals living in non-RCV places.”⁶  This may be because voters tend to interact more with candidates and campaigns in RCV elections.⁷

Not only does RCV improve the voting process, but it also seems to contribute towards a better overall experience for candidates.  In a RCV system, candidates must appeal to all groups of voters in order to win, not just their own base.  As Dowling and Tolbert explain, “this need for broader appeal can lead to more civil and cooperative campaigning.”⁸  Campaigns also become less negative, since candidates don’t want to “engage in negative campaigning” or malign the images of their opponents, as these actions “could alienate potential supporters.”⁹

RCV also encourages more candidates to run for office, as voters are free to cast their vote more sincerely.¹⁰  Unlike in a plurality or majority electoral system, candidates have a chance of winning even without the support of a major political party due to the ranking system.

Despite its benefits, RCV certainly comes with some drawbacks.  In a climate where Americans already distrust elections, decreased voter trust in the electoral system is a legitimate concern.  Derek Monson et al. found that “39% of Americans do not trust the fairness of elections in the U.S.,” which does not bode well for changing the voting system.”¹¹  Additionally, there is evidence of voter mistrust in RCV specifically.  In a recent study, participants were given a scenario in which RCV and first-past-the-post systems yielded different election outcomes.  The study found that US survey respondents were generally more accepting of the first-past-the-post outcome.¹²  Implementing RCV could exacerbate voter skepticism surrounding elections, which could be seriously damaging to democracy in the U.S.

Another frequently cited concern is a phenomenon known as ballot exhaustion.  Ballot exhaustion occurs when all of a voter’s chosen candidates on a ballot have been eliminated due to runoff and there are more than two candidates left in the race.  Then, the ballot would be considered exhausted¹³ because it no longer contributes a tally for the final winner.

Ballot exhaustion has raised questions about whether or not RCV is constitutional.  In 2011, Dudum v. Arntz challenged San Francisco’s ranked-choice voting system (known as Instant-Runoff Voting, or IRV) for city officials.¹⁴  San Francisco law limited the number of rankings on each individual ballot to three, so plaintiffs argued that “when more than four candidates run for a particular office, the IRV excludes exhausted voters from full participation.”¹⁵  Although the Ninth Circuit Court ultimately upheld IRV as constitutional, questions certainly remain regarding whether or not RCV conforms to the Constitution in all its various forms.

Overall, RCV provides key improvements to the current U.S. voting system; however, it still has several drawbacks that cannot be ignored.  Before considering implementing RCV in major elections, more data is needed to help predict the effects such a system would have in the U.S.  Other countries such as Italy and Brazil have implemented RCV more broadly, but their government systems are much different than that of the U.S., which makes it difficult to directly compare and predict the potential consequences of widespread institutionalization of RCV in the U.S.  The public must also be educated about RCV so that they can develop well-formed opinions on the system and perhaps build more trust in its legitimacy.  Still, even if the data advocates for the U.S. to implement RCV, it is ultimately the voters’ decision whether or not to do so.  True to RCV’s principles of representation, moderation, and amplifying voters’ unique preferences, the American public will have to decide whether there is more merit or fault in RCV.

1. Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/.
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2. Monson, Derek, Josh McCrain, Zachary Taylor, and Nadia Mahallati. “The Benefits and Drawbacks of Ranked-Choice Voting in Utah.” Sutherland Institute, 2022. https://sutherlandinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Benefits-and-Drawbacks-of-Ranked-Choice-Voting-in-Utah-2022.pdf.
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3. Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/.
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4. Monson, Derek, Josh McCrain, Zachary Taylor, and Nadia Mahallati. “The Benefits and Drawbacks of Ranked-Choice Voting in Utah.” Sutherland Institute, 2022. https://sutherlandinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Benefits-and-Drawbacks-of-Ranked-Choice-Voting-in-Utah-2022.pdf.
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5. Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/.
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6. Dowling, Eveline and Caroline Tolbert. “What We Know About Ranked Choice Voting, Updated for 2025.” ABA Task Force for American Democracy, March 6, 2025. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/election_law/american-democracy/our-work/what-we-know-about-ranked-choice-voting-2025/.
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7. Dowling, Eveline and Caroline Tolbert. “What We Know About Ranked Choice Voting, Updated for 2025.” ABA Task Force for American Democracy, March 6, 2025. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/election_law/american-democracy/our-work/what-we-know-about-ranked-choice-voting-2025/.
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8. Dowling, Eveline and Caroline Tolbert. “What We Know About Ranked Choice Voting, Updated for 2025.” ABA Task Force for American Democracy, March 6, 2025. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/election_law/american-democracy/our-work/what-we-know-about-ranked-choice-voting-2025/.
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9. Dowling, Eveline and Caroline Tolbert. “What We Know About Ranked Choice Voting, Updated for 2025.” ABA Task Force for American Democracy, March 6, 2025. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/election_law/american-democracy/our-work/what-we-know-about-ranked-choice-voting-2025/.
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10. Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/.
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11. Monson, Derek, Josh McCrain, Zachary Taylor, and Nadia Mahallati. “The Benefits and Drawbacks of Ranked-Choice Voting in Utah.” Sutherland Institute, 2022. https://sutherlandinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Benefits-and-Drawbacks-of-Ranked-Choice-Voting-in-Utah-2022.pdf.
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12. Eggers, Andrew, and Laurent Bouton. “Ranked-Choice Voting.” John Hopkins University School of Public Policy and The University of Chicago Center for Effective Government, 2024. https://sgp.jhu.edu/primers/ranked-choice-voting/.
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13. Monson, Derek, Josh McCrain, Zachary Taylor, and Nadia Mahallati. “The Benefits and Drawbacks of Ranked-Choice Voting in Utah.” Sutherland Institute, 2022. https://sutherlandinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Benefits-and-Drawbacks-of-Ranked-Choice-Voting-in-Utah-2022.pdf.
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14. Balser, Jimmy. “Ranked-Choice Voting: Legal Challenges and Considerations for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 2022. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB10837/LSB10837.1.pdf.
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15. Balser, Jimmy. “Ranked-Choice Voting: Legal Challenges and Considerations for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 2022. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB10837/LSB10837.1.pdf.
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If you’ve kept up with the Democratic primary elections over the summer, or have simply paid attention to the notifications from the New York Times subscription you’ve forgotten you had, then you’ve heard or read about the election of progressive Democratic candidate Dr. Abdul El-Sayed. Dr. El-Sayed won the Democratic primary for the Michigan Senate seat against moderate candidate Haley Stevens. This win upset people on the right as well as moderates on the left.¹ 

An issue that the Democratic Party seems to be having, especially seen in the 2024 presidential election, is that the Party is diversely divided and that the Democratic National Committee is vastly unorganized.² In addition to an internal divide, it’s clearly evident that the Democratic and Republican parties are increasingly polarized, especially as the Republican Party pushes further right. This measure of asymmetric polarization– polarization that occurs due to the Republican Party moving farther to the right than the Democratic Party has moved left– has benefitted the Republican Party.³ Republican congressional players respond to the policy needs that correspond with the rhetoric that’s reinforced within the Party, strengthening their support by conservative constituents.⁴

Increasingly, Republicans have benefitted from a more unified platform that has shifted more to the ideological right. As a response to this partisan shift away from centrist policies, there is an increased prominence of progressive politicians, such as Dr. El-Sayed, and the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). The DSA is a direct response to this pull away from the center– it’s the Democrats’ turn to pay attention to why this shift is necessary for their Party. 

The DSA is further to the ideological left compared to more moderate Democrats. They are fighting for “working people” as they believe the working class “should run both the economy and civil society.”⁵  In contrast, traditional Democrats believe that “every American deserves a fair shot at the American dream.”⁶ This American Dream is more centered on ideas of affordable and upward economic mobility as opposed to the DSA’s view of flourishing, through changing the systems, rather than simply surviving within the system. 

As the American people are voting for more candidates in the DSA, the Democratic Party should take a moment to reflect upon the implications of the polls. It’s no secret that the working class is becoming more distraught with the Democratic Party– support from working-class workers is split between Democrats and Republicans, neither having a majority.⁷ The working class is a major proportion of the population that still feels underrepresented by career politicians on both sides of the political aisle. In response to this despondency, many people are starting to feel represented by the DSA and other progressives who believe in the working class. Especially those who  are taking the initiative to address working-class issues directly. 

The most popular stream of support for a DSA member has been visible in New York City with Mayor Mamdani. Mamdani’s policies focus on the working-class, everyday New Yorker.⁸ On a city-wide level, he has instituted change and has become an online phenomenon. Since then, Democratic margins have increased. In fact, in a study done by the New York Times, 31% of eligible US voters stated that they had a very or somewhat favorable opinion of socialist policies.⁹ As socialism is becoming more popular amongst voters, it’s easy to question why the Democratic Party is not more accepting of this apparent shift. 

It is worth noting that this same study revealed that 50% of eligible voters believe the Democratic Party is too far to the left. However, out of that 50%, only 17% of respondents who felt this way were Democrats.¹⁰ Meaning that Democrats are willing to vote for progressive members, but not all American voters feel represented by them.  

Since there has been an increase in visibility and support for the DSA, perhaps career Democrats need to do what Republicans have been doing: take advantage of the asymmetric polarization. If the Republican Party has found success in a further shift to the ideological right, then Democrats need to take a shift to the ideological left if they want to push for unity within their Party. Democrats need to pay attention to why voters have been favoring progressive and socialist candidates– working-class Americans want direct support and outreach. That representation can lead to a more unified Party platform through a reevaluation of Party standards. Ultimately, this representation and a drawback from career politicians would be in the Democratic Party’s best interest. 

1. Peoples, Steve. 2026. “Democratic strategist breaks down DNC’s 2024 election autopsy.” PBS, May, 2026. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/democratic-strategist-breaks-down-dncs-2024-election-autopsy.
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2. Goldmacher, Shane. 2026. “Moderate Democrats Prepare for ‘War’ Against an Ascendant Left.” The New York Times, August, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/06/us/politics/democratic-party-socialists-moderates.html.
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3. Fishkin, Joseph, and David E. Pozen. “Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball.” Columbia
   Law Review 118, no. 3 (2018): 915–82. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26397699.
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4. Leonard, Naomi Ehrich, Keena Lipsitz, Anastasia Bizyaeva, Alessio Franci, and Yphtach Lelkes. “The Nonlinear Feedback Dynamics of Asymmetric Political Polarization.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 118, no. 50 (2021): 1–11. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27112692.
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5. Democratic Socialists of America. n.d. “What is Democratic Socialism?” Accessed September 16, 2026. https://www.dsausa.org/about-us/what-is-democratic-socialism/.
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6. Democratic Party. n.d. “What We’re Fighting For – Democrats.” Accessed September 16, 2026. https://democrats.org/what-were-fighting-for/.
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7. Wiederkehr, Anna. 2026. “Poll: Working class voters are still up for grabs.” Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/08/31/working-class-voters-midterms-poll-01054992.
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8. “Mayor Mamdani Launches First-in-the-Nation Office of Worker Power to Support Labor Organizing.” 2026. NYC.gov.
   https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/09/mayor-mamdani-launches-first-in-the-nation-office-of-worker-powe.
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9. The New York Times. 2026. “Cross-Tabs: September 2026 Times/Siena Poll of the Likely Electorate.” The New York Times, September 15, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/09/15/polls/times-siena-poll-likely-voter-crosstabs.html.
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10. The New York Times. 2026. “Cross-Tabs: September 2026 Times/Siena Poll of the Likely Electorate.” The New York Times, September 15, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/09/15/polls/times-siena-poll-likely-voter-crosstabs.html.
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Critics of democratic socialism often point to the collapse of past socialist states. This argument, however, lumps a diverse range of regimes under a single label and overlooks the institutions that actually drove those outcomes. Centralized planning, commodity dependence, and price controls doomed the USSR, Venezuela, and Chile. Nordic-style redistribution, by contrast, has thrived without them.

A 2026 Gallup Poll found that the majority of Americans, approximately 61%, do not view socialist systems favorably.¹ Among their most frequently cited concerns are economic inefficiency and excessive government control. Regardless of the accuracy, these fears are commonly advanced by a historical argument–one that points to the failures of past socialist regimes as a means of discounting modern, democratic-socialist efforts. This logic was even deployed in a 2023 House resolution, “denouncing the horrors of socialism” on the grounds that it has “time and time again” led to regime collapse.² The fatal flaw of this argument, however, is that while the label “socialism” has persisted throughout history, the institutions attached to the term have varied radically.

The Soviet Union, Venezuela, Allende’s Chile, and the modern Nordic countries have all been associated with socialism, but their institutions differed dramatically. They range from centralized state ownership under an authoritarian government to democratic attempts at nationalization and redistribution to market economies paired with expansive welfare states. Their divergent outcomes therefore provide a useful test: which elements of socialism repeatedly produced economic problems, and which survived when separated from them?

One key axis of socialism is centralized planning and state ownership.³ In the case of the Soviet Union, the state controlled production, resource allocation, and pricing through comprehensive national directives. While it industrialized rapidly, the Soviet Union’s long-run growth, after accounting for its unusually high investment and human-capital accumulation, was the world’s worst from 1960-89.⁴ Its economy simply could not allocate resources efficiently enough to keep up with the large amounts of capital being poured into it. This instance demonstrates the risks of taking the centralized-planning axis to socialism to its extreme. However, it says considerably less about systems of social democracy that preserve markets and decentralized economic decision-making.

Another often cited “socialist failure” was Venezuela under Chavez and Maduro. Despite avoiding the Soviet-style comprehensively planned economy, Venezuelan state intervention was substantial, and mass redistribution was financed through oil revenues, which accounted for 96% of export income between 2004-13.⁵ This created a major dependency, and when oil prices collapsed beginning in 2014, that dependence interacted with foreign exchange controls and monetary expansion, intensifying inflation and economic decline.⁶ Extensive state intervention magnified, rather than independently caused, the consequences of commodity dependence in this case.

In relation to today’s discourse surrounding democratic socialism, the most relevant historical comparison is Chile under Salvador Allende. This is an example of a democratically elected “socialist failure” shaped by a mixture of self inflictions and external force. On one end, Allende implemented extensive price controls as a response to inflation, contributing to the country’s growing economic crisis.⁷ Simultaneously however, declassified U.S. records document covert efforts to weaken Allende’s government.⁸ Therefore, Chile demonstrates a scenario where democratic socialist policies did produce serious economic consequences, but the historical outcome cannot be evaluated independently of external political conditions.

The successful Nordic model provides an important final distinction. Although frequently associated with socialism, Nordic countries largely preserved market economies while pairing them with extensive redistribution, universal social programs, and strong labor institutions.⁹ Rather than demonstrating a socialist success, this suggests that expansive welfare states can operate without the comprehensive central planning that characterized historical socialist regimes.

The history of socialism therefore offers neither a blanket condemnation nor an endorsement of modern democratic socialism. Past failures emerged from distinct combinations of planning, state ownership, economic intervention, and external pressures, while the Nordic model succeeded following an almost entirely different path. Whether today’s democratic-socialist proposals are sound must be judged on their actual institutions and policies, not on a contested label shared between fundamentally different systems of the past.

1. Lydia Saad, “How Americans View Capitalism, Socialism and Free Enterprise,” Gallup, August 6, 2026, https://news.gallup.com/poll/713144/americans-view-capitalism-socialism-free-enterprise.aspx.
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2. US Congress, House, Denouncing the Horrors of Socialism, H.Con.Res. 9, 118th Cong., 1st sess., agreed to February 2, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/9/text.
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3. Economics in Context Initiative, “Comparative Economic Systems: Capitalism and Socialism in the 21st Century” (Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, 2021), 6, https://www.bu.edu/eci/files/2021/08/Comparative-Economic-Systems.pdf.
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4. William Easterly and Stanley Fischer, “The Soviet Economic Decline: Historical and Republican Data,” NBER Working Paper No. 4735 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 1994), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w4735/w4735.pdf.
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5. Rafael D. Ramírez, “The Venezuelan Oil Industry Collapse: Economic, Social and Political Implications,” IAI Commentaries 21|52 (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2021), https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom2152.pdf.
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6. Valerie Cerra, “Inflation and the Black Market Exchange Rate in a Repressed Market: A Model of Venezuela,” IMF Working Paper WP/16/159 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, August 2016), https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/_wp16159.pdf. ↩︎
7. Sebastian Edwards, “The Debauchery of Currency and Inflation: Chile, 1970–1973,” NBER Working Paper No. 31890 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2023), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w31890/w31890.pdf.
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8. US Department of State, “Paper Prepared in the Department of State: Action in Support of U.S. Posture Towards Chile,” October 16, 1970, Document 155, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d155.
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9. Johannes Tiemer, “The Success of the Nordic Countries as a Blueprint for Small Open Economies,” Intereconomics 53, no. 4 (2018): 209–214, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-018-0751-6. ↩︎

In 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Asked about the odds of conflict over Taiwan, Davidson warned: “I worry [China is] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States … Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade … in the next six years.”¹

This “Davidson Window” reshaped the narrative surrounding China policy.² Yet, as 2027 approaches, a Chinese invasion seems unlikely. The Intelligence Community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment concluded “that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.”³ Why? An invasion of Taiwan would be a disaster for the PRC. It would be operationally infeasible, economically crippling, and set back the PRC’s core strategic interests.

China is substantially stronger than Taiwan. The PRC’s defense budget is 15 times its size, and China has a 10:1 advantage in warships and combat aircraft.⁴ Despite this, the logistics of an amphibious assault create issues. The Taiwan Strait is 90 miles wide and characterized by rough seas, weather, and monsoon seasons that limit opportunities for invasion. A crossing would take hours and consist of a force larger than that of D-Day, leaving landing parties vulnerable to drone attacks.⁵ Taiwan’s mountainous terrain eliminates several possible landing sites, and what flat coastal terrain exists is mostly urban or agricultural.⁶ Factor in American intervention, and the situation quickly becomes untenable for China. 

A 2023 CSIS wargame illustrates these difficulties. Across 24 simulations, China failed to conquer Taiwan 22 times, suffering an average loss of 138 major ships–roughly 90 percent of its amphibious fleet–161 combat aircraft, and tens of thousands of personnel. Although most scenarios assumed U.S. intervention, conquering Taiwan alone still took China roughly 70 days and 70,000 ground casualties.⁷

This doesn’t even factor in the economic costs of invasion. Conservative estimates put the global cost of a Chinese blockade at $2–3 trillion, with a “major war” scenario entailing several months of armed conflict and roughly $10 trillion in losses. China would bear a significant portion of this through lost trade (20% of China’s GDP comes from exports), energy disruption, severe economic sanctions, capital flight (China is home to $3.6 trillion in inward FDI), and the seizure of Chinese overseas assets.⁸ Chinese industries dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductors could lose trillions in annual revenue, and energy imports through key chokepoints like the Straits of Malacca would be vulnerable to disruption or even an American blockade.⁹ Even if an invasion succeeded, China would face long-term isolation from global markets, incurring long-term economic damage.¹⁰

The worst part is an invasion would fail to achieve the PRC’s key strategic interests. Taiwanese industry would be devastated, including its semiconductor industry. A CSIS report determined that following any successful invasion, Taiwan would be a “damaged economy … without electricity and basic services.” Reconstruction costs would be staggering, and it’s unlikely that China would be able to reap the benefits of Taiwan’s invaluable semiconductor industry for several years. China would have to contend with local resistance, and the political victory of reunification may quickly become overshadowed by a drawn-out counterinsurgency campaign. A successful conquest may prompt alarm among China’s neighbors, pushing them closer to the United States.¹¹

No matter how you look at it, a Taiwanese invasion would be a Pyrrhic victory at best, and a complete disaster at worst, jeopardizing Chinese military strength, economic prosperity, and long-term strategic position in exchange for an uncertain outcome.

1. Iyer, G. S. “India – China Relations: Some Thoughts.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 19, no. 1/2 (2024): 34–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48813789. ↩︎
2. Iyer, G. S. “India – China Relations: Some Thoughts.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 19, no. 1/2 (2024): 34–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48813789.
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3. Lariosa, Aaron-Matthew. “China Not Committed to 2027 Taiwan Invasion, U.S. Intel Report Says.” USNI News, March 19, 2026. https://news.usni.org/2026/03/19/china-not-committed-to-2027-taiwan-invasion-u-s-intel-report-says.
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4. GlobalMilitary.net. “China vs Taiwan Military Comparison 2026: Who Is Stronger?” Accessed September 7, 2026. https://www.globalmilitary.net/compare/countries/chn-vs-twn/.
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5. Sacks, David, Will Merrow, Michael Bricknell, and Sabine Baumgartner. “Why China Would Struggle to Invade Taiwan.” Council on Foreign Relations, August 22, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/articles/why-china-would-struggle-invade-taiwan.
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6. Rawlins, MacKenna, and Dan Grazier. “Taiwan Up Close: Why Geography Complicates Invasion.” Stimson Center, May 19, 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/taiwan-up-close-why-geography-complicates-invasion/.
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7. Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 9, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan.
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8. Wright, Logan, Charlie Vest, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Zack Cooper, Jake Rinaldi, and Joel Wuthnow. “China’s Economic Escalation Dilemma.” In If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios, edited by Bonnie S. Glaser. German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep77909.4. 
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9. Asthana, S. B. “What Cost Is China Willing to Bear to Invade Taiwan?” Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, October 20, 2025. https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/10/what-cost-is-china-willing-to-bear-to-invade-taiwan/; Chen, Cheng-liang, and Sam Garcia. “China Faces Heavy Costs in Invasion: Think Tank.” Taipei Times, July 6, 2026. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/07/06/2003860303. ↩︎
10. Asthana, S. B. “What Cost Is China Willing to Bear to Invade Taiwan?” Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, October 20, 2025. https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/10/what-cost-is-china-willing-to-bear-to-invade-taiwan/
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11. Blanchette, Jude, and Gerard DiPippo. “‘Reunification’ with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 22, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/reunification-taiwan-through-force-would-be-pyrrhic-victory-china. 
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