Day: September 25, 2026

The recent rise of Democratic Socialist candidates is unprecedented and novel, but ballot-box underperformance from D.S.A. candidates and overinflation of popularity from online platforms may suggest that the narrowly successful D.S.A. candidates could face grave challenges come November. 

If there is one term defining the 2026 Midterm elections, it is “Democratic Socialism.” The wave of progressive candidates has dominated national headlines, with their hopes to shake the status quo and bring a populist relief to the left.¹ This “blue wave,” first encapsulated by the 2025 election of Zohran Mamdani as mayor of New York City, has spread across the country, with candidates such as Abdul El-Sayed and Angie Nixon beating out establishment bulwarks.^{2 3} However, this ideological wave, which is dividing the left, is not of unlimited success, despite what media coverage may lead you to believe. On the contrary, Democratic Socialists have been vastly underperforming in early results, and their popularity “bubble” may pose great threats to Democratic victories come November.

It is a common thought across the nation that Democratic Socialists have been gaining ground this Midterm season, thanks to their promises of affordability and mass reform, with central policies including state-owned grocery stores, guaranteed housing, universal healthcare, and aggressive wealth taxation. From Zohran Mamdani’s social media-intensive campaign,⁴ to the youth-labor coalition of El-Sayed in Michigan,⁵ Democratic Socialist candidates have been rushing to secure new coalitions of disillusioned voters through creative marketing. But the narrative around these elections fails to consider the discrepancy between polling data or online political engagement and actual ballot-box performance. 

From the start of the DSA’s rise, which is considered to be Mamdani’s 2025 election, aggregate polling (which showed Mamdani at +14.3pts)⁶ had overestimated his performance (Mamdani +9.5pts).⁷ While that polling margin was not far outside the margin of error, it highlighted the danger of overconfidence: online polls and discourse do not inherently translate to success in the polling booth. In one of America’s most progressive cities, Mamdani won with only 50.8% of the vote, even with the scandals surrounding his opponent Andrew Cuomo.^8,9

Mamdani’s slight underperformance compared to his expected performance, despite his never-before-seen online political engagement, was just foreshadowing the difficulty DSA candidates will face, especially in more competitive states.¹⁰ This could be best seen through Michigan’s El-Sayed, who led +13.2pts in polling before his +1.0pt “victory,”¹¹ and others like Fransisca Hong in Wisconsin’s gubernatorial election, who lost her primary despite having led the polls by a whopping +25pts.^{12, 13} These systematic underperformances and razor-close victories suggest the possibility that a disproportionately active minority of Democrats may be setting the party up with ideologically unfavorable candidates, and developing a polling “mirage” of misleading popularity. 

Now it is certainly true to say that DSA candidates have fared far better this year than any election season in recent history; therefore, many argue that the sheer rise of the Democratic Socialists, and not necessarily their net performance, is important enough to drive the discussion around this Midterm season and the strategy of the Democratic Party.¹⁴ Yet the country at large yearns for bipartisanship and compromise (60%), especially among Democrats (71%), with this number only increasing in recent years.^{15, 16} As the country yearns for stability and bipartisanship, figures like Mamdani seem to turn the other way, remarking how even on unpopular DSA goals like “seizing the means of production … [they can] not give up one issue for another… and over time [they] will bring people to that issue”, positioning the DSA not to be a compromising alternative to the status quo, but a long-term means of revolutionizing it.¹⁷ 

So regardless of the merits of Democratic Socialist policy in response to the affordability crisis, which is a separate discussion from their electoral performances, DSA candidates choosing to go all in, and mass media enabling the idea that Democratic voters are infatuated with Democratic Socialism, is ignoring both primary electoral realization and the underlying values of bipartisanship and moderation that are still a large part of the Democratic base.^{18, 19}  Before the American Left inflates growing popularity with the inevitability of DSA victories, they must first consider the possibility that their popularity is a “bubble,” expanding through extensive media coverage and mass digital politicization. The Democratic Party, and its supporters who have narrowly placed these candidates on the ballot, must hope that the bubble does not pop come November.

1. CBS News, “How Progressive Wins in Democratic Primaries Are Shaping the Midterm Landscape,” CBS News, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/democratic-primaries-progressive-wins-midterm-elections/
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2. Associated Press, “Michigan 2026 Live Primary Election Results,” via ABC News, https://abcnews.com/Politics/michigan-2026-live-primary-election-results/story?id=134596717
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3. PBS NewsHour, “Democratic Socialist Angie Nixon Won the Senate Primary in Florida. Can She Win in November?,” PBS NewsHour, August 19, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/democratic-socialist-angie-nixon-won-the-senate-primary-in-florida-can-she-win-in-november; see also ABC News, “Democratic Socialist Angie Nixon Won Tuesday’s Primary in Florida. Can She Win in November?,” ABC News, https://abcnews.com/US/wireStory/democratic-socialist-angie-nixon-won-tuesdays-primary-florida-135772633
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4. NBC News, “Zohran Mamdani’s Social Media Strategy Was about More Than Viral Videos,” NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/zohran-mamdani-social-media-cuomo-nyc-mayor-win-rcna215051
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5. People’s World, “El-Sayed Lead Widens with Support of Broad Coalition in Michigan,” People’s World, August 3, 2026, https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/el-sayed-lead-widens-with-support-of-broad-coalition-in-michigan/
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6. RealClearPolling, “2026 Michigan Senate – Rogers vs. El-Sayed,” RealClearPolitics, https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/senate/general/2026/michigan/rogers-vs-el-sayed
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7. “2025 New York City Mayoral Election,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_New_York_City_mayoral_election. AP-sourced final tally: Mamdani 50.78 percent, Cuomo 41.32 percent
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8. Associated Press results for the 2025 New York City mayoral election, as compiled at “2025 New York City Mayoral Election,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_New_York_City_mayoral_election
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9. NBC News, “Zohran Mamdani’s Social Media Strategy Was about More Than Viral Videos” (see note 4 above); on Cuomo’s 2021 resignation, see “Andrew Cuomo,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Cuomo
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10. Truthout, “Over a Quarter of Voters Say They’re Supporters of DSA, Polling Finds,” Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/over-a-quarter-of-voters-say-theyre-supporters-of-dsa-polling-finds/
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11. “Michigan Senate Race 2026 – Predictions and Polling,” Race to the WH, https://www.racetothewh.com/senate/michigan26 ↩︎
12. “Polling for 2026 Governor Races – Updated Daily,” Race to the WH, https://www.racetothewh.com/governor/26polls
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13. Associated Press, “David Crowley Wins Democratic Primary for Wisconsin Governor over Francesca Hong,” PBS NewsHour, August 12, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/david-crowley-wins-democratic-primary-for-wisconsin-governor-over-francesca-hong
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14. “Democratic Socialists of America Are Seeing Surge in Membership,” NOTUS, July 3, 2026, https://www.notus.org/2026-election/democratic-socialists-of-america-primary-win-momentum
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15. YouGov, “Likely Voters, Data Centers, ‘Woke,’ and More: August 21–24, 2026 Economist/YouGov Poll,” YouGov, https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/55436-likely-voters-data-centers-woke-and-more-august-21-24-2026-economist-yougov-poll ↩︎
16. Bipartisan Policy Center, “Is Voter Interest in Bipartisanship on the Rise?,” Bipartisan Policy Center, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/is-voter-interest-in-bipartisanship-on-the-rise/
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17. Fox News, “Video surfaces of Mamdani using slogan rooted in communist revolutionary language”, Fox News, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/mamdani-under-fire-over-resurfaced-2021-video-endorsing-socialist-goals ↩︎
18. The Guardian, “Democratic Socialists Are Winning in US Cities with Message of Getting Stuff Done,” The Guardian, June 28, 2026
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19. Associated Press results for the 2025 New York City mayoral election (see note 8 above)
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In June of 2025, in what is known as the Twelve-Day War, the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear program in an attempt to prevent Iran from creating nuclear weapons.¹ This attack was significant in impeding Iran’s progress in building its nuclear program. Key infrastructure such as the “two uranium enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz and a uranium processing facility at Isfahan” were all targeted.² While Iran’s nuclear program took a significant hit, it is unclear if the efforts were successful in preventing nuclear proliferation. Despite the high stakes associated with nuclear proliferation, the threat of a nuclear Iran should not be continued to be addressed through military force alone. 

Past events have indicated that states often become further motivated to seek nuclear weapons in the wake of a clear opponent or threat. For example, “Israel’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was heavily influenced by the 1956 Suez Crisis and subsequent regional tensions.”³ Thus, historically, there has been a trend of high regional security threats resulting in nuclear proliferation. In literature, scholars such as Mark Bell have reflected this sentiment, noting that if a state is experiencing “the existence of serious international threats (territorial) or ongoing war,” they are likely to use nuclear weapons to move forward with aggressive and steadfast policy against that threat.⁴ In other words, high-security environments tend to cause states to use nuclear weapons to further more aggressive foreign policy. As such, military exchanges will exacerbate tensions by creating a high-security threat. Consequently, Iran is likely to feel an increased need for nuclear weapons and increasing tensions will only encourage nuclear weapons to be used as a political tool to further aggressive foreign policy. 

After the impact of the Twelve-Day War, Iran is predicted to need at least one to two years in order to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, and even longer to make a nuclear missile.⁵ Consequently,  after the attack on its nuclear program, Iran was left impeded and with limited resources. Yet, continuous attacks on their program will, in the end, only serve to hinder Iran’s capabilities. Military exchanges alone will not alter Iran’s motivation to seek nuclear weapons. In fact, statistically, coercion by punishment rarely succeeds in getting an actor to change their policy aims.⁶ Therefore, although military force by Israel and the U.S. did succeed in hindering Iran’s nuclear program, it remains unclear if Iran’s motivation to proliferate was successfully changed. 

Supporters of military intervention may consider it to be the most impactful force to inhibit Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Therefore, even if Iran’s motivations remain unchanged and nuclear weapons are still produced, at least Iran’s nuclear capabilities will be low. However, having a weak nuclear Iran could prove to be more dangerous compared to having a secured nuclear Iran. Strategic theory on nuclear weapons emphasizes the importance of having a secured second-strike capability, recognizing that possessing asymmetric nuclear capabilities can result in escalation rather than assurance and deterrence.⁷ To put it in perspective, Israel is estimated to have around 90 warheads.⁸ Therefore, if Iran develops a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, while Israel maintains their larger nuclear capabilities, this asymmetric dynamic could help to foster a mentality of “use it or lose it,” thus motivating Iran to deploy nuclear weapons. 

In all, despite the potential danger behind the reality of a new nuclear state, military force should not be pursued in addressing nuclear proliferation. This is for the reason that military efforts are likely, as seen in past scenarios, to increase Iran’s motivation to proliferate for the sake of protecting its security. Notably, continuous military force now is likely to backfire in the event that Iran does proliferate in the foreseeable future, as it raises interstate tensions and creates incentives for more aggressive foreign policy. Therefore, policy aimed at addressing the threat of proliferation should focus on the motivational aspects, as opposed to the capabilities. In effect, this can manifest through diplomatic means and reassuring Iran’s security, if nuclear nonproliferation is the main goal. 

1. Farnia, Nina. 2025. “The 12-Day War and the Collapse of US Imperialism.” Middle East Critique 34 (4): 791–95. doi:10.1080/19436149.2025.2578034.
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2. Rodgers, Joseph, Heather Williams, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. “Damage to Iran’s Nuclear Program-Can It Rebuild?” CSIS. Accessed September 25, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/damage-irans-nuclear-program-can-it-rebuild.
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3. Horschig, Doreen. “Why Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad Idea.” Nuclear Network, October 31, 2024. https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/why-striking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-is-a-bad-idea/.
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4. Bell, Mark S. 2019. “Nuclear Opportunism: A Theory of How States Use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics.” Journal of Strategic Studies 42 (1): 3–28. doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1389722.
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5. Albright, David, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker. “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program after the 12-Day War: A Diagram of the Destruction.” Institute For Science And International Security. August 20, 2025. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/irans-nuclear-weapons-program-after-the-12-day-war-a-diagram-of-the-destruction.
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6. Pape, Robert A. “Explaining Military Coercion.” In Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Cornell University Press, 1996. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v.5.
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7. Narang, Vipin. “The Sources of Regional Power Nuclear Postures: Posture Optimization Theory.” In Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Princeton University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt6wq00j.6.
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8. Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. 2022. “Israeli Nuclear Weapons, 2021.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 78 (1): 38–50. Doi:10.1080/00963402.2021.2014239.
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President Trump and various AI leaders have expressed concerns that Chinese social media accounts may contribute to American disapproval of new data center construction—but evidence that the foreign actors have significantly influenced discourse is limited.

On August 31, 2026, President Trump published a post on Truth Social promoting the construction of data centers under the slogan “Let Data Reign.” In his post, he cited that “China could not be happier with [the] anti-data center movement,” directly alluding to the American public’s recent opposition to data center expansion with China’s geopolitical interests.¹ Earlier in the summer, OpenAI released a June Threat Report claiming that P.R.C.-linked accounts may be attempting to sway American AI debates. According to the report, Chinese actors prompted ChatGPT to produce images and political cartoons in English, raising concerns about increasing data center capacity, which OpenAI claims is intended for American audiences on social media.² Nationally representative surveys from the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg Public Policy Center indicate that American opposition to local data centers rose sharply between February-March and June-July of 2026, with the former survey seeing 49% opposition, and the latter 61%, a statistically significant increase in a few months–during the same timeframe that OpenAI was investigating Chinese accounts.³ This raises the question: has Beijing-linked activity on social media contributed to American AI uncertainties, or has the development been a product of primarily domestic origin? While P.R.C.-affiliated accounts have attempted to exacerbate American hesitation over data center expansion, the rise in public opposition seems to have emerged predominantly over concerns raised by notable American political leaders such as Governor Greg Abbott (R-TX), and Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) regarding electricity costs, environmental impacts, and effects on local communities.^{4 5} They suggest that alleged Chinese influence is an attempt to further ignite American debate, not the source of it.

Discourse on the artificial intelligence development race, and the geopolitical relevance associated with it, has consistently made its way to Capitol Hill and China’s National People’s Congress. The United States has pushed policies such as President Trump’s ‘Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence’ executive order,⁶ and China has expanded its ‘AI Plus’ campaign in its Fifteenth Five-Year Economic Plan.⁷ Both Beijing and Washington have recognized that artificial intelligence is of supreme importance for the future of their national interests; As such, the motivation exists for China to influence American sentiments on data centers. 

This past June, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, headed by Congressman Brett Guthrie (R-KY) requested the FBI to give a “briefing to understand what actions the Trump Administration is taking to investigate foreign influence campaigns to slow U.S. AI development.”⁸ The request signals that there is evidence to suggest that China, Russia, and Iran are launching coordinated campaigns to sow discontent in the American public’s consciousness. However, the existence of these alleged campaigns does not sufficiently establish that Americans’ change in opinion was significantly influenced by foreign action. 

While OpenAI’s June Threat Report confirms the presence of suspicious Chinese accounts, it also points out that “most of the social media posts identified generated little or no observable engagement.” Darren Linvill, a researcher at Clemson University, confirms this assessment, as his work identified that Chinese bot accounts were quickly suspended from X and their posts received minimal traction.⁹

If Chinese inflammatory social media posts are not a major contributor to American AI data center disapproval, what is? As early as December 2025, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) raised concerns over utility cost implications of data centers, writing letters and launching an investigation of top AI-oriented companies.¹⁰ Since then, data center disputes have reached the forefront of the Democratic Party’s policy agendas—but distaste for data center construction is fairly bipartisan. According to the same Annenberg Public Policy Center survey, both Democrats (69%) and Republicans (54%) are opposed to local data centers.¹¹ Per a Pew Research survey, the top issues cited are the environmental impact, home energy costs, and local quality of life.¹²

While investigations have confirmed the mild presence of C.C.P.-linked social media accounts spreading distrust of data center construction, evidence that it has caused a meaningful impact on American sentiment is limited. U.S. AI discourse had been consistently contentious before the Chinese accounts surfaced.

1.  Trump, Donald J. “Truth Social Post.” Truth Social. August 31, 2026.https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117190477440173795. ↩︎
2. OpenAI. June 2026 Threat Report. June 2026.https://cdn.openai.com/pdf/96b559fa-c165-4575-805d-e636909e2f78/June-2026-Threat-Report.pdf. ↩︎
3. Annenberg Public Policy Center. “Opposition to Local Data Centers Rises Sharply, Annenberg Survey Finds.” August 11, 2026.https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/opposition-to-local-data-centers-rises-sharply-annenberg-survey-finds.
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4. Greg Abbott. “Governor Abbott Directs PUC and ERCOT to Shield Texans from Data Center Infrastructure Costs.” Office of the Texas Governor, June 10, 2026. https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-directs-puc-and-ercot-to-shield-texans-from-data-center-infrastructure-costs.
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5. U.S. Congress. “S. 4214 — 119th Congress (2025–2026).” Congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/4214.
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6. The White House. “Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence.” January 23, 2025.
   https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/removing-barriers-to-american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence/.
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7.  Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. “中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划纲要.” March 16, 2026.https://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2026/03/16/ARTI1773644951646391.shtml.
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8.  U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. “Letter to Mr. David Sacks, Mr. Michael Kratsios, and Director Kash Patel.” June 4, 2026. https://d1dth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/2026_06_04_Letter_to_PCAST_and_FBI_on_Foreign_Influence_AI_Data_Centers_99f6aa6cda.pdf. ↩︎
9.  Dickerson, Truman. “Many of the Chinese Bots X Says Posted Anti-Data-Center Content Had No Followers or Engagement, a Researcher Found.” Business Insider, August 28, 2026. https://www.bu sinessinsider.com/x-chinese-bots-data-center -debate-no-engagement-followers-2026-8. ↩︎
10. Warren, Elizabeth. “Senator Warren, Lawmakers Open Investigation into Big Tech Data Centers’ Role in Driving Up Families’ Utility Costs.” December 16, 2025.https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases senator-warren-lawmakers-open-investigation-into-big-tech-data-centers-role-in-driving-up-families-utility-costs/.
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11. Annenberg Public Policy Center. “Opposition to Local Data Centers Rises Sharply, Annenberg Survey Finds.” August 11, 2026.https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/opposition-to-local-data-centers-rises-sharply-annenberg-survey-finds/.
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12.  Pew Research Center. “How Americans View Data Centers’ Impact in Key Areas, From the Environment to Jobs.” March 12, 2026.https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/03/12/how-americans-view-data-centers-impact-in-key-areas-from-the-environment-to-jobs/.
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Abstract: The United States may not need NATO, but NATO definitely needs the United States. This relationship is harming European defense capabilities and preventing them from taking action regarding the Ukraine conflict.

Between July 7 and July 8, 2026, the 2026 NATO Summit was held in Ankara, Turkey.¹ President Trump claimed that there was “tremendous love in that room”.² However, this loving atmosphere was not present during his March 2026 statement when President Trump posted on Truth Social that NATO was making a “very foolish mistake” by declining to help the United States in its conflict with Iran.³ This statement leads to a lot of questions: why should NATO help if the United States is not under direct attack? Should NATO get involved just to prevent Iran from advancing its uranium enrichment system? Yet, the most important question is: What should NATO do about the war in Ukraine? 

Since February 2022, Ukraine has been under constant attack from Russia. There have been 1.5 million casualties on both sides, 5.9 million Ukrainians registered as refugees, and a daily cost of the war of $190 million for Ukraine.⁴ Yet, with a massive war on its continent and the imminent threat of Russian attack, the question remains: why should NATO help assist the U.S. against Iran and not assist Ukraine?  The answer lies in a truth NATO refuses to face: the United States does not need NATO, but NATO cannot survive without the United States. Everything the United States does directly benefits NATO, such as switching a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in Asia to the Mediterranean to help NATO in a crisis. So, maybe it is understandable for the U.S. to demand NATO’s help during one of its most major conflicts in the last 5 years, considering that the U.S. spends 16% of its defense spending in NATO while most of the NATO countries invest only 5% of their GDP in security measures for the alliance.^{5, 6}

Therefore, taking into account the numbers mentioned and the current situation, should European countries start taking more action to defend themselves? And then, is NATO still a useful organization? Firstly, the European Union’s defense spending is €454 billion in 2026, which is equivalent to 2.2% of GDP,⁷ compared with NATO’s 5% of GDP spent on defense, which was agreed during the 2026 summit. Even though EU defense spending increased by 75.3% since 2021, it has been shown that it is not enough to contain Russia and the threat that it poses to the entire European continent. NATO can protect the countries that signed the treaty, but it’s the EU’s mission to maintain peace and stability within Europe, even though the war has reached its fourth year and has no end in sight, alongside Russia’s hybrid attacks on Europe this past week.⁸ Also, looking at the data, the EU’s reliance on NATO and, therefore, on the United States, reinforces the lack of commitment to the continent’s security through its small contribution to Europe’s defense spending. 

As for the second question, the United States’ defense budget reached nearly $2.63 trillion this year, and its status as a major power in the Western world sets the U.S. in a position as the financial anchor of NATO.⁹ Moreover, NATO does not need a full shutdown; it needs less reliance on the United States and a reform that focuses its attention on the conflicts happening in the North Atlantic territory. 

Therefore, instead of flattering the United States with compliments every time there is a NATO Summit, the alliance should focus on restructuring its core values such as individual liberty, democracy, and human rights.¹⁰ The reform should focus on a future where Russia could dominate Europe and address the current crisis in Ukraine, with consistent negotiations with the United States about the current situation and the main priorities of the alliance, the concerns of European countries, and introducing a slow detachment from the U.S., proposing a reduction of its contribution to NATO’s defense budget.

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “The Ankara Summit Declaration.” NATO, July 8, 2026. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration ↩︎
2. The Guardian. “Erratic Trump Dominates Final Hours of NATO Summit.” July 8, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/08/erratic-trump-dominates-final-hours-nato-summit ↩︎
3. BBC News. “NATO Summit.” 2026 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0434932w ↩︎
4. Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Russia-Ukraine War in 10 Charts.” CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-war-10-charts  ↩︎
5. Reuters. “Fact Check: US Contributes 16% to NATO Annual Budget, Not Two-Thirds.” May 31, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/us-contributes-16-nato-annual-budget-not-two-thirds-2024-05-31/  ↩︎
6. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Defence Expenditures and NATO’s 5% Commitment.” NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment ↩︎
7. Council of the European Union. “Defence Numbers.” European Union https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/ ↩︎
8. “Russia Warns Europe as Ukraine War Continues.” The New York Times, September 24, 2026. New York Times article   ↩︎
9. U.S. Department of Defense. “Department of Defense.” USAspending.gov usaspending.gov/agency/department-of-defense  ↩︎
10. Michaels, Jeffrey H. “The Nato Experience.” In Deterrence Warning Messages: A Short Guide for NATO, edited by Tim Sweijs. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep70752 ↩︎