Day: September 8, 2026

China Could Win Taiwan and Still Lose | By David Murphy

David Murphy

In 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Asked about the odds of conflict over Taiwan, Davidson warned: “I worry [China is] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States … Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade … in the next six years.”1

This “Davidson Window” reshaped the narrative surrounding China policy.2 Yet, as 2027 approaches, a Chinese invasion seems unlikely. The Intelligence Community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment concluded “that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.”3 Why? An invasion of Taiwan would be a disaster for the PRC. It would be operationally infeasible, economically crippling, and set back the PRC’s core strategic interests.

China is substantially stronger than Taiwan. The PRC’s defense budget is 15 times its size, and China has a 10:1 advantage in warships and combat aircraft.4 Despite this, the logistics of an amphibious assault create issues. The Taiwan Strait is 90 miles wide and characterized by rough seas, weather, and monsoon seasons that limit opportunities for invasion. A crossing would take hours and consist of a force larger than that of D-Day, leaving landing parties vulnerable to drone attacks.5 Taiwan’s mountainous terrain eliminates several possible landing sites, and what flat coastal terrain exists is mostly urban or agricultural.6 Factor in American intervention, and the situation quickly becomes untenable for China. 

A 2023 CSIS wargame illustrates these difficulties. Across 24 simulations, China failed to conquer Taiwan 22 times, suffering an average loss of 138 major ships–roughly 90 percent of its amphibious fleet–161 combat aircraft, and tens of thousands of personnel. Although most scenarios assumed U.S. intervention, conquering Taiwan alone still took China roughly 70 days and 70,000 ground casualties.7

This doesn’t even factor in the economic costs of invasion. Conservative estimates put the global cost of a Chinese blockade at $2–3 trillion, with a “major war” scenario entailing several months of armed conflict and roughly $10 trillion in losses. China would bear a significant portion of this through lost trade (20% of China’s GDP comes from exports), energy disruption, severe economic sanctions, capital flight (China is home to $3.6 trillion in inward FDI), and the seizure of Chinese overseas assets.8 Chinese industries dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductors could lose trillions in annual revenue, and energy imports through key chokepoints like the Straits of Malacca would be vulnerable to disruption or even an American blockade.9 Even if an invasion succeeded, China would face long-term isolation from global markets, incurring long-term economic damage.10

The worst part is an invasion would fail to achieve the PRC’s key strategic interests. Taiwanese industry would be devastated, including its semiconductor industry. A CSIS report determined that following any successful invasion, Taiwan would be a “damaged economy … without electricity and basic services.” Reconstruction costs would be staggering, and it’s unlikely that China would be able to reap the benefits of Taiwan’s invaluable semiconductor industry for several years. China would have to contend with local resistance, and the political victory of reunification may quickly become overshadowed by a drawn-out counterinsurgency campaign. A successful conquest may prompt alarm among China’s neighbors, pushing them closer to the United States.11

No matter how you look at it, a Taiwanese invasion would be a Pyrrhic victory at best, and a complete disaster at worst, jeopardizing Chinese military strength, economic prosperity, and long-term strategic position in exchange for an uncertain outcome.

  1. Iyer, G. S. “India – China Relations: Some Thoughts.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 19, no. 1/2 (2024): 34–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48813789. ↩︎
  2. Iyer, G. S. “India – China Relations: Some Thoughts.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 19, no. 1/2 (2024): 34–44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48813789.
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  3. Lariosa, Aaron-Matthew. “China Not Committed to 2027 Taiwan Invasion, U.S. Intel Report Says.” USNI News, March 19, 2026. https://news.usni.org/2026/03/19/china-not-committed-to-2027-taiwan-invasion-u-s-intel-report-says.
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  4. GlobalMilitary.net. “China vs Taiwan Military Comparison 2026: Who Is Stronger?” Accessed September 7, 2026. https://www.globalmilitary.net/compare/countries/chn-vs-twn/.
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  5. Sacks, David, Will Merrow, Michael Bricknell, and Sabine Baumgartner. “Why China Would Struggle to Invade Taiwan.” Council on Foreign Relations, August 22, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/articles/why-china-would-struggle-invade-taiwan.
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  6. Rawlins, MacKenna, and Dan Grazier. “Taiwan Up Close: Why Geography Complicates Invasion.” Stimson Center, May 19, 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/taiwan-up-close-why-geography-complicates-invasion/.
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  7. Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 9, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan.
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  8. Wright, Logan, Charlie Vest, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Zack Cooper, Jake Rinaldi, and Joel Wuthnow. “China’s Economic Escalation Dilemma.” In If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios, edited by Bonnie S. Glaser. German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2025. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep77909.4. 
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  9. Asthana, S. B. “What Cost Is China Willing to Bear to Invade Taiwan?” Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, October 20, 2025. https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/10/what-cost-is-china-willing-to-bear-to-invade-taiwan/; Chen, Cheng-liang, and Sam Garcia. “China Faces Heavy Costs in Invasion: Think Tank.” Taipei Times, July 6, 2026. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/07/06/2003860303. ↩︎
  10. Asthana, S. B. “What Cost Is China Willing to Bear to Invade Taiwan?” Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, October 20, 2025. https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/10/what-cost-is-china-willing-to-bear-to-invade-taiwan/
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  11. Blanchette, Jude, and Gerard DiPippo. “‘Reunification’ with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 22, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/reunification-taiwan-through-force-would-be-pyrrhic-victory-china. 
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