Month: October 2024

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Is declaratory nuclear policy useful? The Soviet Union’s 1982 declaration of a no first use policy was met with inaction by Soviet military leaders who secretly maintained their ex-ante military doctrine. Declaratory policy is nothing without concurrent posture adaptations, suggesting that the United States and China are condemned to nuclear competition for the foreseeable future.

No First Use

China and India currently maintain no first use (NFU) pledges. They agree not to use nuclear weapons against another state unless in retaliation to a nuclear strike, claiming to deter without the option of a pre-emption.¹ The United States has pondered an NFU and related declaratory policy changes. The Obama administration stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that the “fundamental role” of US nuclear weapons is to deter attack on the homeland and allies, and President Biden’s 2022 NPR maintained this.² Both Obama and Biden, however, declined to adopt an NFU policy. The Trump administration maintained in 2018 that an NFU doctrine was not appropriate because it would not reflect the plethora of international threats that the United States faces. Similarly, although Biden, first as Vice President and later as presidential candidate, stated in 2017 and 2020, respectively, that the United States should adopt a “sole purpose” nuclear doctrine, his NPR hesitated to take the next step to its realization.³

The Soviet Union—and, after its dissolution, Russia—held an NFU posture from 1982 to 1993.⁴  Few analysts consider it when conversing about NFUs today. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko publicly announced the shift in Soviet doctrine at the United Nations, but it is widely known that the United States did not seriously believe that the Soviets would refrain from launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike in case of desperate emergency.

Understanding what an NFU would look like today depends, at least in part, on what NFUs looked like decades ago. The international climate has become more tense. In theory, an NFU declaration from major nuclear powers would significantly reduce the possibility of escalation because states would not be worried about nuclear threats or use against one another. As mentioned, China utilizes its long-standing NFU in diplomatic conversations today to portray itself as an actor opposed to escalation. Although the adoption of NFUs by countries like the United States and Russia may seem unlikely today,⁵ a greater understanding of what might bring about a serious pledge and how to maintain it can further the conversation on declaratory nuclear policy.

So, is declaratory policy useful for attenuating security competition? Unfortunately, the Soviet case suggests that political statements can be met with inaction by intransigent military brass. Concurrent changes in nuclear posture would ease this problem, but the United States and China’s nuclear postures are headed in a competitive, instead of conciliatory, direction.

The Soviet NFU

In 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev pledged that the Soviet Union would not launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike. In 1993, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the termination of the Soviet and Russian NFU.⁶ Over the course of that decade-plus, the United States intelligence community did not take the Soviet pledge seriously, and believed there was instead a possibility of a Soviet first strike. This is an old fear over NFU policies, however. More interestingly, archival documents indicate that Soviet military leadership did not shift its military doctrine to rule out a first strike possibility.   

The Soviet military and its civilian defense leaders resisted the political leadership’s NFU. Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov “believed in first strikes” even though they violated official Soviet policy and led the resistance against a doctrinal shift toward no first use.⁷ Institutional resistance followed. Documents from East German military archives demonstrate that the Soviet military “retained and exercised” the possibility for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against NATO, even during a contingency in which NATO only used conventional weapons.⁸ Furthermore, the Soviet NFU policy on its own seems to have turned few heads: US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated during the Reagan administration that recent Soviet SS-20 missile deployments with multiple nuclear warheads each dampened the credibility of the Soviet NFU.⁹

Contemporaneous CIA analysis of Soviet military doctrine reflected the military reality. A top secret 1983 memorandum stated that Soviet wartime plans for central Europe would include an attempt to pre-empt NATO’s use of nuclear weapons to preclude a large strike on Soviet conventional forces.¹⁰ A different 1989 CIA memorandum claimed that the Soviets were “well aware” of their poor economic standing vis-à-vis the West and supposed that the Kremlin may alter its military doctrine towards one which takes a defensive stance.¹¹ The CIA’s implication in this statement that Soviet doctrine was not presently defensive led to the conclusion that the Soviets had not effectively developed a no first use policy.¹² Additionally, while the memorandum claimed that Soviet military doctrine focused on the prevention of conventional and nuclear war,¹³ it analyzed the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance in depth, particularly as former President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative may have impacted stability.¹⁴ This may have reflected a distrustful belief about the Soviet NFU, or at least indicated that recent Soviet technological developments placed Moscow on a similar military footing as Washington.

Even a classified briefing of the Defense Policy Panel to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in 1988 stated that the Soviet NFU declaration represented the political presentation of its military doctrine instead of any military-technical or operational aspects. The concrete measures which the Soviet military took to prepare for and conduct warfighting did not change from before the NFU. The deployment of conventional and nuclear forces retained its “threatening posture.”¹⁵

Was the widespread distrust which met the Soviet NFU unique? Perhaps not. Chinese military officials, such as Major General Zhu Chenghu in July 2005, have claimed that Beijing’s NFU has only applied to non-nuclear weapon states.¹⁶ While the Chinese government distanced itself from Zhu’s statement, its NFU pledge has historically served propaganda purposes and was conditioned out of necessity and policy instead of peace-loving sentiment. China’s long-standing small nuclear arsenal has made it physically unable to launch a first strike against a nuclear weapon state without expecting complete annihilation, and its nuclear weapons were not created as part of a doctrine which extends past countervalue minimum deterrence.¹⁷ Indeed, although Beijing has undertaken significant restraining measures to convince states of its NFU, they are impossible to verify and the United States has continued to distrust China.¹⁸

Declaratory Policy and Nuclear Competition

The United States historically has not found NFU pledges to be credible, but analysts overlook an NFU’s civil-military strife. While Soviet political leadership announced an NFU in 1983, military leaders personally stated their opposition and worked to maintain a first strike doctrine.

What does this experience tell the nuclear community about NFUs today? A novel no first use pledge by non-NFU states like Russia and the United States seems unlikely in the midst of today’s tense geopolitical competition, but analysts should also question the domestic viability of such a policy. The U.S. military strongly opposes an NFU and the possible changes in nuclear posture that would follow.¹⁹ A U.S. NFU would not necessarily cause a civil-military divide, especially considering civil-military transparency and communication in Washington. But the consequences of other great powers adopting an NFU must be considered. For those states with significant political-military divides, an NFU declaration by political leaders may be met with inaction by military authorities.

This conclusion supports the belief that declaratory policy has little value without a concurrent adaptation of posture by military personnel. Because statements can be empty, the most effective way to create a credible NFU would necessitate action. States could eliminate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from their nuclear arsenal (or at least take them off high alert) and instead prioritize the survivable sea-based leg of the triad. This would represent qualified self-deterrence against a first strike because states would be unable to rapidly launch a debilitating first strike and would preclude effective pre-emption. Additionally, given land-based weapons’ vulnerability, their elimination would decrease the benefits and likely success of a first strike. Unfortunately, recent great power policies run counter to these long-term posture commitments that may ease tensions.

The United States is modernizing its ground-based leg with the development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD, LGM-35 Sentinel), while China is significantly expanding its siloed ICBM force.²⁰ Neither development benefits relations between Washington and Beijing, and in fact may lead American policymakers to doubt China’s NFU more. Given that China has considered the possibility of placing parts of its forces on a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture, Beijing’s strategic posture is changing, and debates about its NFU remain.²¹ Even though China has officially reiterated an “unqualified commitment” to its NFU, President Xi Jinping has called for the PLA to establish a “strong system of strategic deterrence,” pointing to a break in nuclear policy that may push American policymakers to question the continuity of the NFU.²² Although Chinese officials claim that LOW would be consistent with the NFU, Washington may link Beijing’s actions on one front of nuclear policy to another and sense a wholesale shift to a more aggressive nuclear doctrine. In a crisis bargaining scenario, uncertainty about an NFU may lead states to assume the worst case scenario.

Regardless of declaratory policy, the United States and China have adopted postures that risk quick escalation. The Chinese NFU declaration, for this reason, does not by itself preclude action-reaction spirals and American doubt about the validity of a no first use posture. The rivalry—for now—may be condemned to competition.

1. It remains important to distinguish between China and India’s NFUs, however. While China has gone to great lengths to make its pledge credible, India caveats its NFU by retaining the option to use nuclear weapons in response to a major biological or chemical weapons attack against India or its forces. Additionally, India has eroded belief in its pledge over conventional attack and nuclear preemption as tensions with Pakistan have grown for decades. Cf. Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use: Nuclear Weapons and Declaratory Policy,” War on the Rocks, 22 February 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/sole-purpose-is-not-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-and-declaratory-policy/. ↩︎
2. Ernest J. Moniz et al., “U.S. Nuclear Policies for a Safer World,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 2021, pp. 7-12; and Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn, “NTI Statement on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 28 October 2022, https://www.nti.org/news/nti-statement-on-the-2022-nuclear-posture-review/. ↩︎
3. A “sole purpose” declaratory policy states that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the United States and its allies. Cf. Moniz, “U.S. Nuclear Policies for a Safer World.” ↩︎
4. I refer to this primarily as the “Soviet NFU” because of its adoption during the Soviet years and the change in policy soon after the Russian Federation’s birth. ↩︎
5. The United States is unlikely to adopt an NFU today because allies, especially those who benefit from extended nuclear deterrence in east Asia, will worry that Washington will not stand up for them. Russia is unlikely to adopt an NFU today, as seen by its consistent use of nuclear threats and forward deployment in Belarus. ↩︎
6. Serge Schmemann, “Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of Atom Arms,” The New York Times, 4 November 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/04/world/russia-drops-pledge-of-no-first-use-of-atom-arms.html. Interestingly, Soviet generals clarified after terminating the NFU that it only applied to non-nuclear weapon states that signed the 1968 NPT, but still not those allied with nuclear weapon states. ↩︎
7. Matthew R. Costlow, “A Net Assessment of ‘No First Use’ and ‘Sole Purpose’ Nuclear Policies,” Occasional Paper 1, no. 7 (National Institute Press, 2021), p. 78. ↩︎
8. Costlow, “A Net Assessment,” p. 79; and Ankit Panda, “‘No First Use’ and Nuclear Weapons,” Council on Foreign Relations, 17 July 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons. ↩︎
9. Costlow, “A Net Assessment,” p. 82. ↩︎
10. “Soviet Planning for Front Nuclear Operations in Central Europe,” Central Intelligence Agency, June 1983, p. 11, archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-090-doc1.pdf. ↩︎
11. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 1989, pp. 13-14, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000499601.pdf. ↩︎
12. NFUs are defensive, instead of offensive, policies, because they are inherently responsive. They can still serve deterrent functions, because they warn against the response a state would face if they were to attack with nuclear weapons. But NFUs are not offensive because they eliminate the possibility of first use and preemption. ↩︎
13. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” p. 21. ↩︎
14. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” pp. 18-19. The SDI was intended to intercept ICBMs from space, which many argued would encourage another arms race and undermine established arms-control agreements. Earlier U.S.-Soviet treaties, like the ABM Treaty, were intended to reduce defensive anti-ballistic missile systems that would otherwise have pushed the powers to build more weapons for deterrence and undermined mutual vulnerability. ↩︎
15. “General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Military: Assessing His Impact So Far and the Potential for Future Changes,” The Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 2 August 1988, p. 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100030010-1.pdf. ↩︎
16. Stephanie Lieggi, “Going Beyond the Stir: The Strategic realities of China’s No-First-Use Policy,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 31 December 2005, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/realities-chinas-no-first-use-policy/. ↩︎
17. It is unclear how China’s nuclear expansion and modernization will impact this, but its arsenal as of this writing is still unlikely to comprehensively destroy U.S. second-strike capability and maintains an assured retaliation capability. Cf. Henrik Stålhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel, and Magnus Langset Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China’s Changing Nuclear Posture,” International Security 47, no. 4 (2023): pp. 147-187. ↩︎
18. Lieggi, “Going Beyond the Stir”; and Panda and Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use.” Panda and Narang further that China has implemented de-targeting agreements and has unilaterally separated warheads from ICBMS (a process known as de-mating), but because an NFU is a component of declaratory nuclear policy, there is no possible diplomatic arrangement that would verify or enforce a pledge. Furthermore, the pledge alone would not impact capabilities. For Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s distrust of China’s NFU, see Kumar Sundaram and M.V. Ramana, “India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 1 (February 2018): pp. 152-168. ↩︎
19. Panda and Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use.” ↩︎
20. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 148. Additionally, some scholars have written about the direct impact of new U.S. capabilities, such as ballistic missile defense and CPGS, on China’s ability to launch a retaliatory strike. China expanded its force structure in part to ensure survivability under assured retaliation, but it might be forced to abandon assured retaliation for a first-use posture. Chinese analysts also surmised during the Obama administration that Beijing would retaliate against a U.S. conventional attack on Chinese nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons, violating the NFU. These possibilities point to the unsure nature of declaratory policy. Cf. Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): pp. 8, 21. ↩︎
21. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 150. Additionally, some Chinese officials believe that a LOW posture would violate China’s NFU, proving the volatility of declaratory policy. Without concrete actions that distinctly support declaratory policy, the latter is confusing domestically and internationally. Cf. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” pp. 170-171. ↩︎
22. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 168. ↩︎

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Countries in the Indo-Pacific region are allying with the United States to contain China. But domestic defense initiatives have stalled, and allies continue to disagree with each other on critical issues, leading to the conclusion that China may be better off provoking conflict sooner (if at all) rather than later. The dilemma? China will be ready later rather than sooner.

China

Scholars disagree on the size of the Chinese threat.¹ Some describe China as a regional behemoth that may attempt to break out of its unfavorable geographic limitations at any moment.² Others claim that Beijing’s expansion is stalling, still short of U.S. power, constraining its ability to seriously threaten its neighbors.³ But no matter the specifics, many states in the Indo-Pacific are scared of China because no regional actor can individually stand up to Beijing from head to toe. Enter the United States and its balancing coalition.

States ally with each other against a powerful external threat to avoid military and economic dominance.⁴ The United States has led a policy of external balancing (consider the balancing scales of justice, but with adversarial countries creating a coalition to “balance” the other’s power) in the Indo-Pacific against a rising China. Since America’s superiority in the Western Hemisphere began in the late 19th century, Washington’s foreign policy has centered around ensuring that no country is strong enough to similarly dominate the economic and military activities of its own region.⁵

To halt the possibility that China’s power in the Indo-Pacific rivals America’s in the Western Hemisphere and around the world, the United States needs defense commitments from China’s neighbors. Many states that border China and its waters are happy to ally with Washington: China is larger, stronger, and wealthier than them, and they fear one-sided conflict or at least economic co-option. But have these balancing attempts been successful? And what do they tell us about the military and diplomatic balance in the Indo-Pacific, now and into the future?

Allying, or external balancing, is difficult because states understand that they primarily provide their own security.⁶ While the United States has led the charge in creating formal institutions to contain China, states have at times succumbed to infighting and shocking industrial setbacks. If China’s ambitions indeed exceed its current international standing, its window of aggression may remain open for a few years. But its own stagnant growth and ill-prepared military keep the balancers in an advantageous position.

The Good

The United States has laid the groundwork for an intricate web of alliances in the Indo-Pacific. Take the Quad. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue–consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India–was resuscitated in 2017 to ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”⁷ Grouping four states with little connection apart from their power in the region broadly defined, the Quad hopes to counter Chinese economic and military coercion and uphold democratic values.

Or consider AUKUS. The Australia-UK-US trilateral agreement of 2021 has since worked to exchange technology between the three countries, especially on developing Australia’s defense capability. The plan’s Pillar I includes Australia’s purchase of three US Virginia class conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines and the buildup of its sovereign submarine base. Pillar II of the alliance aims to develop joint capabilities through technology and information sharing, focusing on cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum, and undersea capabilities. AUKUS’s goal with submarine and technology sharing is specifically to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and bolster deterrence for allies in the region.⁸

And we shouldn’t forget Camp David. In August 2023, US President Biden, South Korean President Yoon, and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida gathered at Camp David to inaugurate a new trilateral centered around shared goals of containing China, denuclearizing North Korea, and maintaining American extended deterrence. The ROK-Japan rapprochement is significant in the face of long-standing nationalistic disputes, and at Camp David, the parties agreed to coordinate regional responses and policies.⁹

The Bad

Unfortunately, however, these alliances take time to get off the ground. As with NATO’s European parties, who have been slow to increase their defense spending and grow their industrial bases in the face of an obstreperous Russia,¹⁰ Asia’s balancing coalition has run into numerous domestic and industrial roadblocks that have produced mixed tangible results.

One example is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a grouping of US government controls on defense imports and exports. Simply put, ITAR is not structured for rapid technological innovation, trade, or international competition. Instead, it is a cautious ordinance better suited for American national security when the United States is not seriously competing against other great powers. 

The Biden administration and the legislatures of Australia and the UK are working to pass sweeping ITAR exemptions. But ITAR has already created problems for the alliance’s Pillar II in three ways. First, ITAR requires foreign states to prove that they protect sensitive technology to a standard comparable to the United States. Australia, in particular, has a significantly smaller defense industrial base than its allies, meaning that its export regime is historically not up to par. Second, the United States will work to make a release from ITAR sweeping; the exemption would apply to AUKUS nations generally and not to specific transactions by AUKUS countries. This comprehensive measure requires an equally extensive and time-consuming review. An exemption would lastly need to outline the mechanisms through which AUKUS countries can utilize the agreement, which follows from previous conversations about comparable standards and scope.¹¹

Legislation is not the only complication confronting AUKUS. An internal US Navy investigation from April found that the United States is running two to three years behind schedule on its construction of the new nuclear-powered Virginia class submarine. Washington may not be able to deliver these submarines, which will undergird Australia’s involvement in the alliance and Indo-Pacific, by the planned 2032 date. Other construction projects are also running late: the star nuclear-powered ballistic missile Columbia class submarine will be 12 to 16 months late and the attack Block IV Virginia submarines are running three years behind schedule.¹²

Multilateral domestic quibbles also threaten to weaken the American-led alliance regime in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad, for one, is plagued by differing motivations and domestic situations. All four countries share economic interdependence with China (although the United States is following a decoupling strategy), making containment, in part, a self-defeating policy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has assaulted civil liberties and minority rights, pulling the country away from mature democracy, even though democracy and freedom are supposedly among the Quad’s bedrock values.¹³ Given these disagreements, the Quad remains a loose diplomatic alliance instead of a security commitment à la AUKUS or Camp David.

Although the United States-Japan-South Korea trilateral has settled on commitments in East Asia, Tokyo and Seoul continue to have their differences on critical points of policy. In particular, the two states have exhibited varying willingness to publicly support Taiwan, US military deployments to Taiwan from their own soil, and the prioritization of a Taiwan contingency over tensions on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁴

The Ugly

What do these nascent alliances mean for China’s future? Beijing faces a dilemma of enormous proportions.

On the one hand, these alliances are nascent. If China seeks to expand, whether for security or greed¹⁵–and that’s a very important if–then its window of aggression may extend for a few years. Aggression could take any number of forms, from an invasion or blockade of Taiwan to an occupation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 

On the other hand, these alliances are unlikely to be nascent for long. AUKUS nations will move past ITAR and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida recently visited Washington to extend alliance commitments. China has serious domestic blockades of its own that make Beijing ill-prepared to strike in the short term. The People’s Liberation Army has not fought a serious war for decades and China’s military will only be prepared to invade Taiwan come 2027.¹⁶ Xi Jinping has structural nonmilitary problems, too: Chinese overdevelopment has built dozens of ghost cities, its energy policies cause significant environmental damage, and local authorities have taken on staggering debt to grow the economy. China may be neither a peer competitor to the United States nor declining, but its situation is one that few countries must envy.

One caveat to conclude: the United States is stretched thin internationally, and escalation in conflicts around the world may bode poorly for America’s continued focus on its Indo-Pacific alliances. Russia continues to move forward in Ukraine, albeit slowly, and congressional debates on aid to Kyiv have stalled.¹⁷ Iran’s retaliation against Israel caused little damage and both sides can reasonably claim to de-escalate tensions, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may yet seek to respond against his weaker adversary in Tehran.

If the White House were to pull itself further into either conflict (and especially in the latter scenario, considering that American servicemen are stationed in the Mediterranean to help Israel), the United States may be less prepared against an Indo-Pacific contingency. Although China is widely considered to be Washington’s major threat, three wars at once may be too much to handle. American overextension would ease Beijing’s dilemma.

1. And, importantly, on whether it represents a threat at all. ↩︎
2. Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021). ↩︎
3. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (New York: W.W. Norton, 2022). ↩︎
4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). ↩︎
5. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). ↩︎
6. Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, “Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 52. ↩︎
7. “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” The White House, 24 May 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/. ↩︎
8. Joseph Clark, “AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities,” Department of Defense News, 10 April 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3737569/aukus-partners-focus-on-indo-pacific-security-in-shaping-joint-capabilities/. ↩︎
9. “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” The White House, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/; and Jenny Town and Yuki Tatsumi, “Takeaways from the Camp David Summit,” Stimson Center, 25 August 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/takeaways-from-the-camp-david-summit/.  ↩︎
10. Daniel Michaels, “Europe Is Boosting Military Spending. It’s Still Not Enough,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 February 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-is-boosting-military-spending-its-still-not-enough-020b432a. ↩︎
11. Deborah Cheverton and John T. Watts, “AUKUS is hamstrung by outdated US export control rules. Here’s what Congress can do,” Atlantic Council, 15 November 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/aukus-is-hamstrung-by-outdated-us-export-control-rules-heres-what-congress-can-do/. ↩︎
12. Matthew Cranston, “AUKUS subs construction delayed by years: US Navy,” Australian Financial Review, 4 April 2024, https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/aukus-subs-construction-delayed-by-years-us-navy-20240404-p5fh9a#:~:text=The%20assessment%20found%20the%20Virginia,submarines%20to%20Australia%20by%202032. ↩︎
13. Debasish Roy Chosdhury, “Quad is Key to Biden’s Strategy in Asia, But the Four-Way Alliance Is Ambiguous and Contradictory,” TIME, 18 March 2021, https://time.com/5947674/quad-biden-china/. ↩︎
14. Adam P. Liff, “How Japan and South Korea diverge on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait,” The Brookings Institution, 22 February 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-japan-and-south-korea-diverge-on-taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/. ↩︎
15. Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171-201. ↩︎
16. Roxana Tiron, “China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, US Says,” Bloomberg, 20 March 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-20/china-on-track-to-be-ready-for-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-says. ↩︎
17. Nicole Wolkov et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 10, 2024,” The Institute for the Study of War, 10 April 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2024. ↩︎