June 2024—Media outlets at home and abroad sensationalized a supposed “far-right victory” in the European Parliament as French and German right-wing populists made major gains in the recent election. Centrist parties raised the alarm, panicking at what they believed to be a rapid surge in disregard for liberal-democratic norms. As domestic elections loomed on the horizon, things seemed quite bleak for the liberal consensus.
Yet in the months since June, virtually nothing has materialized for European right-wing populism. On the contrary, centrist and left-wing coalitions have struck back in France and the United Kingdom. Seemingly everywhere, right-wing opposition proves to be domestically ineffective, plagued by scandal and infighting. Could it be that this “far-right victory” was nothing more than a mirage? Perhaps not everywhere.
Out of the big three European economies, only Germany has the potential for a right-wing surge. Political stalemate–as the center-right establishment (CDU) refuses to cooperate with the rising right-wing populist movement (AfD)–as well as Germany’s unique electoral system, have provided the AfD with a pathway to electoral gains in the near future.
On the eve of the European Parliamentary election, I was studying in Germany at the University of Heidelberg—a city historically known for voting for the climate-progressive Green party. Politically, the atmosphere was complacent. Anxieties about the AfD’s surge had subsided from the previous year, as scandal after scandal rocked the party.
But as marred as the AfD’s momentum was, the party managed to pick up four seats in the European Parliament, for a total of 15 out of Germany’s 96. Simultaneously, a new left-wing populist party, the Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), picked up six seats. The results left the ruling left-wing coalition facing disaster, with a hypothetical mandate from only 30% of voters.
To the alarm of many, Britain and France appeared to be heading in a similar direction. In France, the right-wing populist National Rally (RN) gained seven seats and garnered a commanding simple majority. At the same time, the ruling centrist coalition, Ensemble, led by President Emmanuel Macron, saw a devastating loss of 10 seats.
Outside of the EU, the United Kingdom witnessed Nigel Farage’s announcement that he was reentering politics to lead the Reform Party. Farage, infamous for his leadership of the Brexit movement, sought to take out the ruling Conservative party. With the Tories facing a collapsing mandate from voters, Farage took aim at “mass migration,” calling for a return to common-sense politics.
Europe’s three largest economies all seemed to be facing a similar story, as their collapsing establishment parties battled populist dissent from both the left and the right. But what happened next was far from predictable.
On May 31, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (Conservative Party) announced a snap election in which the Conservative Party was resoundingly defeated and the Labour Party took home its first victory in 14 years. Farage’s party made waves, winning the third-highest portion of the vote at 14.3%. Despite this, Reform won just five of Britain’s 650 seats. For reference, the Liberal Democrats won 72 seats with 12.2% of the vote.
The Reform party’s strength–its appeal with disaffected urban Brits–also became its biggest weakness. Because Britain’s “first past the post” system only requires a simple majority (>50%) to win each seat, populist right-wing parties like Reform–with widespread voter bases–lack the voter concentration necessary to win seats.
Just a few days later in France, Macron called a similar snap election after his party’s disastrous results in the EU Election. Unlike Sunak, Macron’s gambit paid off, as Ensemble joined with the left-wing (NFP) to shut out the right and secure a ruling coalition. Macron understood his voters; he knew that they were more likely to support the right-wing in the European Parliament, where consequences seemed remote, than they were to vote for a right-wing party domestically. By calling this bluff, Macron turned a complete disaster into an overwhelming victory.
Similar to the United Kingdom, France’s first-past-the-post system also acted to shut out parties without concentrated voter bases. Despite achieving 33.21% of the first-round vote, RN ended with 142 seats of the available 577, as opposed to Ensemble’s 21.28% and 159 respectively.
Breaking from the United Kingdom and France, Germany’s ruling coalition did not seek a snap election in the immediate aftermath. This decision could be chalked up to sheepishness about the ruling coalition’s odds of success, but, more likely, it resulted from a lack of viable alternatives. Only recently has Germany been forced into a snap election, as its left wing (SPD and Green) parties no longer tolerated the free market liberal party (FDP) in their coalition.
Like other countries, Germany’s parliamentary system includes elements of first-past-the-post. But unlike France and the United Kingdom, Germany only selects half of its candidates from individual district elections. The other half of its parliament apportioned according to the total percentage of the vote. As a result, the AfD controls a far greater portion of seats relative to its voter base when compared to right-wing parties in the big three.
To address this problem and to prevent the AfD from governing, the center-right CDU maintains a “firewall” against the AfD, swearing off any possibility of a joint coalition. But this policy has arguably become a double-edged sword for Germany’s largest party. The CDU cannot form a coalition alone, as it pulls in only around 30% of the electorate. While a joint CDU-AfD coalition would give the CDU a broad mandate to pursue its preferred policies, it would come at a heavy cost—the party’s legitimacy.
Without the AfD, the only possible coalition for Germany’s 2025 snap parliamentary election is a CDU-led alliance with the left-wing Social Democrats (SPD)–maybe even the Greens as well. Such a coalition would be radioactive to both the CDU’s agenda and image and come with little chance of political efficacy.
By blocking millions of AfD voters from its coalition, the CDU is ironically ensuring exactly the kind of “far-right surge” it hopes to prevent. Provided that the AfD can stay alive in the next few cycles, it will absorb a tidal wave of disillusioned CDU voters.
Despite the rise and fall of the “right-wing mirage,” most of Europe seems to have recovered a liberal status quo. But for Germany, the future remains far less certain. Germany’s center-right collapsing would leave the only remaining gatekeepers of right-wing populism on the left. In such a scenario, the right would be more legitimate than ever and surge to new heights.