Asia’s Balancing and China’s Dilemma | By Marko Gural

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Countries in the Indo-Pacific region are allying with the United States to contain China. But domestic defense initiatives have stalled, and allies continue to disagree with each other on critical issues, leading to the conclusion that China may be better off provoking conflict sooner (if at all) rather than later. The dilemma? China will be ready later rather than sooner.

China

Scholars disagree on the size of the Chinese threat.¹ Some describe China as a regional behemoth that may attempt to break out of its unfavorable geographic limitations at any moment.² Others claim that Beijing’s expansion is stalling, still short of U.S. power, constraining its ability to seriously threaten its neighbors.³ But no matter the specifics, many states in the Indo-Pacific are scared of China because no regional actor can individually stand up to Beijing from head to toe. Enter the United States and its balancing coalition.

States ally with each other against a powerful external threat to avoid military and economic dominance.⁴ The United States has led a policy of external balancing (consider the balancing scales of justice, but with adversarial countries creating a coalition to “balance” the other’s power) in the Indo-Pacific against a rising China. Since America’s superiority in the Western Hemisphere began in the late 19th century, Washington’s foreign policy has centered around ensuring that no country is strong enough to similarly dominate the economic and military activities of its own region.⁵

To halt the possibility that China’s power in the Indo-Pacific rivals America’s in the Western Hemisphere and around the world, the United States needs defense commitments from China’s neighbors. Many states that border China and its waters are happy to ally with Washington: China is larger, stronger, and wealthier than them, and they fear one-sided conflict or at least economic co-option. But have these balancing attempts been successful? And what do they tell us about the military and diplomatic balance in the Indo-Pacific, now and into the future?

Allying, or external balancing, is difficult because states understand that they primarily provide their own security.⁶ While the United States has led the charge in creating formal institutions to contain China, states have at times succumbed to infighting and shocking industrial setbacks. If China’s ambitions indeed exceed its current international standing, its window of aggression may remain open for a few years. But its own stagnant growth and ill-prepared military keep the balancers in an advantageous position.

The Good

The United States has laid the groundwork for an intricate web of alliances in the Indo-Pacific. Take the Quad. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue–consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India–was resuscitated in 2017 to ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”⁷ Grouping four states with little connection apart from their power in the region broadly defined, the Quad hopes to counter Chinese economic and military coercion and uphold democratic values.

Or consider AUKUS. The Australia-UK-US trilateral agreement of 2021 has since worked to exchange technology between the three countries, especially on developing Australia’s defense capability. The plan’s Pillar I includes Australia’s purchase of three US Virginia class conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines and the buildup of its sovereign submarine base. Pillar II of the alliance aims to develop joint capabilities through technology and information sharing, focusing on cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum, and undersea capabilities. AUKUS’s goal with submarine and technology sharing is specifically to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and bolster deterrence for allies in the region.⁸

And we shouldn’t forget Camp David. In August 2023, US President Biden, South Korean President Yoon, and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida gathered at Camp David to inaugurate a new trilateral centered around shared goals of containing China, denuclearizing North Korea, and maintaining American extended deterrence. The ROK-Japan rapprochement is significant in the face of long-standing nationalistic disputes, and at Camp David, the parties agreed to coordinate regional responses and policies.⁹

The Bad

Unfortunately, however, these alliances take time to get off the ground. As with NATO’s European parties, who have been slow to increase their defense spending and grow their industrial bases in the face of an obstreperous Russia,¹⁰ Asia’s balancing coalition has run into numerous domestic and industrial roadblocks that have produced mixed tangible results.

One example is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a grouping of US government controls on defense imports and exports. Simply put, ITAR is not structured for rapid technological innovation, trade, or international competition. Instead, it is a cautious ordinance better suited for American national security when the United States is not seriously competing against other great powers. 

The Biden administration and the legislatures of Australia and the UK are working to pass sweeping ITAR exemptions. But ITAR has already created problems for the alliance’s Pillar II in three ways. First, ITAR requires foreign states to prove that they protect sensitive technology to a standard comparable to the United States. Australia, in particular, has a significantly smaller defense industrial base than its allies, meaning that its export regime is historically not up to par. Second, the United States will work to make a release from ITAR sweeping; the exemption would apply to AUKUS nations generally and not to specific transactions by AUKUS countries. This comprehensive measure requires an equally extensive and time-consuming review. An exemption would lastly need to outline the mechanisms through which AUKUS countries can utilize the agreement, which follows from previous conversations about comparable standards and scope.¹¹

Legislation is not the only complication confronting AUKUS. An internal US Navy investigation from April found that the United States is running two to three years behind schedule on its construction of the new nuclear-powered Virginia class submarine. Washington may not be able to deliver these submarines, which will undergird Australia’s involvement in the alliance and Indo-Pacific, by the planned 2032 date. Other construction projects are also running late: the star nuclear-powered ballistic missile Columbia class submarine will be 12 to 16 months late and the attack Block IV Virginia submarines are running three years behind schedule.¹²

Multilateral domestic quibbles also threaten to weaken the American-led alliance regime in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad, for one, is plagued by differing motivations and domestic situations. All four countries share economic interdependence with China (although the United States is following a decoupling strategy), making containment, in part, a self-defeating policy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has assaulted civil liberties and minority rights, pulling the country away from mature democracy, even though democracy and freedom are supposedly among the Quad’s bedrock values.¹³ Given these disagreements, the Quad remains a loose diplomatic alliance instead of a security commitment à la AUKUS or Camp David.

Although the United States-Japan-South Korea trilateral has settled on commitments in East Asia, Tokyo and Seoul continue to have their differences on critical points of policy. In particular, the two states have exhibited varying willingness to publicly support Taiwan, US military deployments to Taiwan from their own soil, and the prioritization of a Taiwan contingency over tensions on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁴

The Ugly

What do these nascent alliances mean for China’s future? Beijing faces a dilemma of enormous proportions.

On the one hand, these alliances are nascent. If China seeks to expand, whether for security or greed¹⁵–and that’s a very important if–then its window of aggression may extend for a few years. Aggression could take any number of forms, from an invasion or blockade of Taiwan to an occupation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 

On the other hand, these alliances are unlikely to be nascent for long. AUKUS nations will move past ITAR and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida recently visited Washington to extend alliance commitments. China has serious domestic blockades of its own that make Beijing ill-prepared to strike in the short term. The People’s Liberation Army has not fought a serious war for decades and China’s military will only be prepared to invade Taiwan come 2027.¹⁶ Xi Jinping has structural nonmilitary problems, too: Chinese overdevelopment has built dozens of ghost cities, its energy policies cause significant environmental damage, and local authorities have taken on staggering debt to grow the economy. China may be neither a peer competitor to the United States nor declining, but its situation is one that few countries must envy.

One caveat to conclude: the United States is stretched thin internationally, and escalation in conflicts around the world may bode poorly for America’s continued focus on its Indo-Pacific alliances. Russia continues to move forward in Ukraine, albeit slowly, and congressional debates on aid to Kyiv have stalled.¹⁷ Iran’s retaliation against Israel caused little damage and both sides can reasonably claim to de-escalate tensions, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may yet seek to respond against his weaker adversary in Tehran.

If the White House were to pull itself further into either conflict (and especially in the latter scenario, considering that American servicemen are stationed in the Mediterranean to help Israel), the United States may be less prepared against an Indo-Pacific contingency. Although China is widely considered to be Washington’s major threat, three wars at once may be too much to handle. American overextension would ease Beijing’s dilemma.

1. And, importantly, on whether it represents a threat at all. ↩︎
2. Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021). ↩︎
3. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (New York: W.W. Norton, 2022). ↩︎
4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). ↩︎
5. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). ↩︎
6. Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, “Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 52. ↩︎
7. “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” The White House, 24 May 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/. ↩︎
8. Joseph Clark, “AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities,” Department of Defense News, 10 April 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3737569/aukus-partners-focus-on-indo-pacific-security-in-shaping-joint-capabilities/. ↩︎
9. “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” The White House, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/; and Jenny Town and Yuki Tatsumi, “Takeaways from the Camp David Summit,” Stimson Center, 25 August 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/takeaways-from-the-camp-david-summit/.  ↩︎
10. Daniel Michaels, “Europe Is Boosting Military Spending. It’s Still Not Enough,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 February 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-is-boosting-military-spending-its-still-not-enough-020b432a. ↩︎
11. Deborah Cheverton and John T. Watts, “AUKUS is hamstrung by outdated US export control rules. Here’s what Congress can do,” Atlantic Council, 15 November 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/aukus-is-hamstrung-by-outdated-us-export-control-rules-heres-what-congress-can-do/. ↩︎
12. Matthew Cranston, “AUKUS subs construction delayed by years: US Navy,” Australian Financial Review, 4 April 2024, https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/aukus-subs-construction-delayed-by-years-us-navy-20240404-p5fh9a#:~:text=The%20assessment%20found%20the%20Virginia,submarines%20to%20Australia%20by%202032. ↩︎
13. Debasish Roy Chosdhury, “Quad is Key to Biden’s Strategy in Asia, But the Four-Way Alliance Is Ambiguous and Contradictory,” TIME, 18 March 2021, https://time.com/5947674/quad-biden-china/. ↩︎
14. Adam P. Liff, “How Japan and South Korea diverge on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait,” The Brookings Institution, 22 February 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-japan-and-south-korea-diverge-on-taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/. ↩︎
15. Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171-201. ↩︎
16. Roxana Tiron, “China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, US Says,” Bloomberg, 20 March 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-20/china-on-track-to-be-ready-for-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-says. ↩︎
17. Nicole Wolkov et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 10, 2024,” The Institute for the Study of War, 10 April 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2024. ↩︎