Author: tsulli24

Looking at screens,

listening to voices

in nonexistent distance,

seeing, hearing nothing

present, we pass into

the age of disembodiment

Wendell Berry, 2013, Poem XVII

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Children are losing fine motor skills, literacy rates are plummeting, and even students at elite colleges are increasingly unfamiliar with reading books in their entirety. 77% of teachers today report that their students in grades preK-3 have a much more challenging time using scissors crayons, pencils, and pens as compared to just five years ago. Children are swiping and tapping on iPads, not holding real items, playing with clay, drawing, or building Legos; instead, with toddler headphones blocking out conversation, they scroll through video clips.

Between AI, cell phones, iPads, laptops, computer desktops, “smart” boards, and television screens, it should come as little shock that the average American is thinking less critically than ever (and even dropping IQ points). The human mind is declining as we sedate ourselves with 30-second-video clips and ChatGPT generated summaries.

In 2007, Steve Jobs introduced the iPhone. He promised a “revolutionary product” and shared his hope to “get rid of all the buttons and just make a giant screen.” We have moved far beyond that first 3.5-inch display, but “giant screens” have become wholly integrated into modern life. Over less than twenty years, with no great revolution and even less resistance, humanity has become reliant on tiny touch-activated pixels. We have unconditionally surrendered to a totally recreated world.

Alarm bells are finally ringing across the United States. The new movement to ban cell phones across all education levels poses a promising return to human knowledge, but one must deeply consider the costs of our frenetic passion for convenience.

Wendell Berry, a 90-year-old Kentucky novelist, poet, and environmentalist warned of the push to purchase a computer in 1987, and his reflections are deeply applicable today. Empires rose and fell, wars were fought, great multinational corporations grew and declined, children learned, and authors wrote, not all that long ago, all without the help of personal screens, internet, and computers. In his essay “Why I Am not Going to Buy a Computer,” Berry offers a few good reasons for his resistance.

Berry has an environmental focus and identifies the usage of computers with support of the energy and computer industries. He decries their role in the “rape of nature,” and pledges to write in daytime, without the use of electricity. Shockingly, he is not from some by-gone, backwards era—his essay is less than forty years old. Beyond his conservationist concerns, Berry asks his readers to consider the deeper issues at hand when facing new technologies.

The social surrender to screens has had few opponents and even fewer critical analysts. We have embraced a new model of the world, but as Berry expresses, “Technological innovation always requires the discarding of the ‘old model.’” In Berry’s case, he considers the “old model” his careful editor–his wife–and her typewriting. It is worth considering what the “old model” was and what is being carried out as the “new model” in screens and education.

The purpose of any tool ought to be to serve the common goods of humanity—not to elude nature or subvert reality. Now we are inundated with messaging that our real world is outdated or even harmful. For  the sake of efficiency and ease, we seem to have accepted a total revolution of education and relationships. We must find “new ways to connect and share experiences” as Meta claims on their virtual reality and AI glasses advertisements. In the rush to modernize, we have failed to consider what sorts of “new connections” may result in irreversible damage. 

Are children who cannot read or write “connecting” since they can play on iPads? They cannot connect in real life, in the “old ways,” because nobody has taught them. Berry explains, “I do not see that computers are bringing us one step nearer to anything that does matter to me: peace, economic justice, ecological health, political honesty, family and community stability, good work.”

Wendell Berry’s essay provides an interesting entry point to the current-day education crisis. State legislatures around the nation are flailing as they begin to recognize the severity and urgency of technological dependence. Democratic Illinois governor JB Pritzker joins eight other states in issuing bans and restrictions on cellphone usage in schools. As of February 2025, California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia have all passed legislation on statewide restriction. Eleven other states have issued incentives and recommendations, and the effort is widely bipartisan across regions. It is clear that kindergarten to twelfth grade students are in a screen-induced crisis, with the Pew Research Center finding that 72% of high school teachers recognized cell phone distraction as a “major problem.”

The move to curb cell-phone usage is positive and valuable, but may be too little, too late. The problem is deeper than iPhones–it is the entire restructuring of education. I recently had a fascinating (and alarming) interaction with a professor. She questioned me about my printed readings and hand-written notes. I told her I learned better in class, listening, writing. She did not seem to understand and asked me if I was a kinesthetic learner. 

“No, not necessarily,” I said, “but I am a physical being. This is real. When I take notes in class, I am listening to what you are saying and writing it down. I am here, now.” 

She said she did not see a difference between me watching the lecture recording on my own time and then typing my notes. Really, we were debating the value of the physical world. The conversation ended with me saying I did not like the idea of being hooked up to the cloud. I was relieved to have another professor who mandated handwritten notes and purchased books.

I enjoyed a unique high school experience which did not allow cell-phones during the school day or laptops until senior year. Many of my Constitutional Studies classes at Notre Dame have had the same handwritten note expectation. These classes often result in more engaged, present students, and in lively discussion and focused attention. Even when courses are dry, by eliminating laptops, we eliminate the allure of so-called multitasking, which actually involves emails, texts, and projects wholly unrelated to the class. 

Rejecting screens is not nostalgic, or backwards–it is a choice to embrace reality. Screens for children, even those which are purportedly “educational,” detract from genuine education and create a false equivalence between that which is happening and that which is out of time, out of space, and “located” on the internet. 

A 2024 Newsweek article by Clare Morell from the Ethics and Public Policy Center pulls together the harms of screens in classrooms. She finds that despite increases in computer access, educational attainment has not followed. In fact, on exams, students who read text on computers still perform worse than reading on paper. Even MRI scans of 8-to-12-years-olds revealed deeper brain behavior on those who read paper books instead of screens. Literacy remains a concern. In 2023, less than half (43%) of American fourth graders read at or above a proficient level. The statistics broken down by race are even more frightening: only 17% of Black students and 21% of Latino students read proficiently by fourth grade.

Even in the pre-pandemic world, a 2019 article from the Hong Kong Journal of Occupational Therapy found that children who used tablets “showed significantly lower scores than those in the non-tablet group for visual discrimination, visual memory, spatial relationships, form constancy, visual figure ground, fine motor precision, fine motor integration, and manual dexterity.” These are all essential skills–not only for the educational and professional world, but for a fulfilled, human life.

Screens enact more than educational or professional harms. Although it is widely reported that younger generations engage in less risky behaviors, they simply participate in less risky in-person behaviors. I would speculate that youths are as risky as ever, especially considering lack of privacy on the internet and the wide-spread exposure to pornography at young ages. Nearly one-third of teens report having watched pornography throughout the school day, and 44% of those students viewed it on a school-issued device, according to Common Sense Media.

Reliance on technology designed to commodify us into advertisement consumers and purchasers or addicted social-media users causes irreparable harm. Even a former Facebook executive admits that their product is “fundamentally addictive for people, and it’s causing all kinds of mental health issues, and I think it’s eroding aspects of society.” 

Reading, writing, and complex thought must be achieved by reading, writing, and thinking. There is no short-cut to education. Students who reject AI-generated summaries are not at a disadvantage despite what their fear mongering, “efficiency” focused peers claim. Instead, those who are bold enough to advocate for comprehension in the “old way” will be at a huge advantage: the possession of knowledge. Berry understood that the revolutionizing computer must be carefully analyzed:

“My final and perhaps my best reason for not owning a computer is that I do not wish to fool myself. I disbelieve, and therefore strongly resent, the assertion that I or anybody else could write better or more easily with a computer than with a pencil. I do not see why I should not be as scientific about this as the next fellow: when somebody has used a computer to write work that is demonstrably better than Dante’s, and when this better is demonstrably attributable to the use of a computer, then I will speak of computers with a more respectful tone of voice, though I still will not buy one.”

One can replace his focus on computers with the more modern frenzy around AI or tablets. Far from making our lives “demonstrably better,” convenience-based technologies are slowing us down and resulting in the true loss of knowledge. State legislatures are taking notice, but ultimately, technology usage begins in the home. Laws and regulations can enforce standards, but formation must come from parental and familial choices.

A comprehensive Pew Research study on children and screens found that 80% of parents know that their child 11-years-old or younger is watching videos on YouTube, and 84% claiming that they allow children to use tablet or iPhone devices while riding in a vehicle and 29% while dining out at a restaurant. 

Why? Why can children not look out the window at the world, or engage with menus, waiters, and their siblings? If it is an argument of ease or efficiency, it is merely a defense of poor parenting. Artificial distraction cannot be a genuine aid. Parents across the nation feel overwhelming pressure and are totally resigned to the inevitability of screens for toddlers and social media for teens. It does not have to go on. Each family can choose to value real life and support educational experiences and schools  that emphasize knowledge.

Penmanship is one way parents can ensure their children are learning writing and motor skills. Humans have communicated with flowing script for centuries, and in just a few years, people have lost the ability to read and write cursive. The National Archives is searching for Citizen Archivists who can understand cursive script. 

Suzanne Isaacs, a community manager with the National Archives Catalog in Washington, D.C, called reading cursive “a superpower.” What a tragic loss of skill and beauty, sacrificed on the altar of the supposed-convenience of print and typing. The search for practicality has resulted in the incredible impracticality of not being able to understand historical texts.

Take after Wendell Berry and refuse to fool yourself. Reject screens, especially for kids, and especially in education. Remove your Airpods or headphones and listen to your surroundings. Stop surrendering to screens, discover the world you are living in, and regain your humanity.

Introduction 

The 21^st century has seen a major uptick in presidential campaigns by female politicians. This has marked a major change in the social attitude surrounding opportunities for women as they pursue a political role that, in the United States, has only ever been held by men. A central question, and a prominent point of debate, among these campaigns is if a woman is qualified to be the leader of the United States. The most notable campaigns by female candidates (in terms of success and popularity) have been those by Hillary Clinton, Nikki Haley, and Kamala Harris, all of whom ran against President Donald Trump. During their campaigns, each woman employed different strategies to control and strategically manipulate the narrative surrounding her womanhood and femininity.

In their campaigns, female candidates face the strategic question of how to present their womanhood – a set of characteristics that has historically been viewed as a hindrance in their run for political office. In an analysis of female political campaigns, the necessity of addressing gender is pertinent: “Female candidates do not ignore feminine traits, but strategically and conditionally use these qualities.” ^[1] However, it requires a balancing act, as overemphasizing their womanhood could also have negative repercussions in the public sphere.^[2] In her 2016 presidential campaign, Clinton placed her gender at the forefront of the campaign, and often returned to the historic nature of her campaign, in an attempt to draw a contrast between herself and President Trump. In her bid for the Republican nomination, Haley wielded her femininity as a weapon, striving to highlight the strengths of womanhood and how femininity can be presidential. In her 2024 presidential campaign, Harris attempted to deemphasize her womanhood, and avoid the double-bind of identity politics. The ways in which Clinton, Haley, and Harris chose to present their gender is not solely determined by political ideology, but rather was determined by political considerations in their races against President Trump. 

Hillary Clinton & The Glass Ceiling 

In her bid for presidency, Hillary Clinton boldly embraced her femininity and made it a major selling point of her campaign. As the first woman to secure a major party nomination, Clinton shaped the rhetoric of being a female presidential candidate. In her 2016 presidential campaign, Clinton often framed her bid for presidency in terms of its historic nature and spoke frequently of breaking the “glass ceiling.”^[3] By acknowledging the groundbreaking nature of her campaign, Clinton intentionally placed her gender at the forefront. This emphasis on her womanhood highlights Clinton’s view of her gender as an asset to her campaign. She strategically embraced her femininity as she thought it would elevate her campaign and make her more popular with the American people: “[Clinton’s] 2016 campaign did more to feature her female sex as an asset, and not a deficit, and she invoked a more feminist ideology on the campaign trail.” ^[4] This strategy attempted to control the narrative on Clinton’s womanhood. By painting her feminine traits as assets, the campaign minimized gendered criticisms of Clinton. 

However, even though Clinton viewed her womanhood as an asset, she had to strategically balance those traits with a conversation surrounding her experience and masculine traits:  “Evidence of trait-balancing emerged in the 2016 presidential campaign when Hillary Clinton talked about ‘being a woman’ but strategically balanced this message by emphasizing her work ethic and leadership experience.” ^[5] By highlighting her qualifications and more masculine traits, Clinton went beyond the idea of the female politician. Although Clinton was qualified and possessed prior political experience, by emphasizing her masculine traits as well, she showed that she was capable in the same way as any male politician. 

Clinton’s political opponent, Donald Trump, often made attacks against Clinton based on her sex. During his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump said that Clinton did not have a ‘presidential look’: “By invoking the ‘presidential look,’ Trump made salient stereotypical notions of presidential leadership, which typically favor men and not women.”^[6] As all presidents have been men, by drawing attention to Clinton’s physical appearance – and the ways in which it lacks – Trump turned her womanhood into a political weakness and a point to attack. This highlights the drawbacks to female politicians centering their womanhood. Although it can be an asset to their campaign, it also opens them up to another line of attack that men are not subjected to. 

Nikki Haley & Her High Heels 

During her presidential campaign, Nikki Haley embraced and even weaponized her feminine traits against her political opponents. However, her nuanced stances on women’s issues ultimately led to her womanhood being a detriment to her campaign. Throughout her bid for the Republican party nomination, Haley often drew attention to her womanhood. She did this through repeated mentions to her high heels: 

Ms. Haley, like the women candidates before her, must balance the qualities we expect of women (warmth, femininity) with what we expect of leaders (authority, strength). By taking the most feminine of objects — a heel — and turning it into a weapon is essentially her way of saying ‘I wear heels, but I’m tough.’^[7] 

Haley weaponized her heels and her femininity, an attempt to close herself off from having it weaponized against her. In doing so, Haley asserted that women – and high heels – can be powerful, and presidential. It was not necessary for Haley to sacrifice her fashion and femininity to be a successful politician. 

Haley also placed women’s issues to the center of her campaign. She highlighted the empowerment of women and the importance of protecting young girls.^[8] Through emphasizing women’s issues, Haley strategically utilized her gender as an asset. As a woman, she appeared more qualified to talk about the problems that women faced than her male opponents. However, Haley’s advantage may have been a double-edged sword, as she attempted to balance the politics of conservative voters with the politics of more moderate or liberal voters whose support she also sought in the primary election: “Jennifer Horn, the former chair of the New Hampshire Republican Party, said Haley faces a dilemma on abortion in a GOP primary. But she doesn’t believe Haley went far enough to champion women’s rights in a way that would win over the state’s women and centrist voters.” ^[9] As a conservative woman running on women’s issues, Haley was in a double-bind with the issue of abortion. Both a pro-life stance and a pro-choice stance would harm her popularity with different groups, whose support she needed in the Republican primary. Ultimately, Haley attempted to take a ‘middle ground’ and lost support on both fronts as this middle ground damaged her popularity with all voters. The dilemma that Haley faced during her presidential campaign was a uniquely female one. As a woman, it was necessary that she attempt to appeal to women and centrist voters – groups of voters that Donald Trump was historically less popular with. However, in doing so, she also risked her popularity with conservatives, and ultimately cost herself the presidential nomination. Nikki Haley shows that as a female politician, it is necessary to appeal to women, even when doing so goes against the party platform and may be detrimental to her political success. 

Kamala Harris & Childless Cat Ladies 

During her presidential campaign, Kamala Harris attempted to create distance between herself and her femininity. In ignoring the historic nature of her presidential campaign, Harris attempted to invalidate Trump’s attacks against her identity. Unlike Clinton, Harris did not make her womanhood a centerpiece of her campaign, requiring Trump to engage in more debates on the issues, and less debates on her identity.^[10] By decentralizing her femininity, Harris has also strategically steered clear of identity politics: “The history-making nature of Ms. Harris’s candidacy excites at least some in the party, but there are also middle-of-the-road voters who recoil from what they see as identity politics.”^[11] Harris strode to avoid the controversy of identity politics by not talking about her identity as a woman and person of color. In doing this, she attempted to increase her appeal among more centrist voters, whose support she was reliant upon in determining the outcome of the 2024 election. 

Harris’s womanhood has driven the large political divide among men and women, especially younger voters: “Ms. Harris has an advantage of 16 percentage points with likely female voters, while Mr. Trump has an 11-point advantage with likely male voters.”^[12] This split between male and female voters highlights how the presentation of femininity by female politicians can be a political issue. By supporting Harris, women voters are signaling approval of her presentation of femininity and what her presidency would mean as the potential first female president. 

Attacks based on gender are not limited to the presidential candidates, however, with JD Vance criticizing both Harris and her female supporters, calling them “childless cat ladies.” ^[13]

These gendered attacks demonstrate that Harris is not immune from criticism because of her femininity, even if she has been unwilling to center it in her campaign. In the days leading up to the election, Trump and his political allies repeatedly emphasized Harris’s womanhood and the issue of gender. ^[14] These comments and gendered attacks highlight the limitations to female politicians controlling the narrative on their gender. Harris can refuse to address her womanhood, but at the end of the day, the political environment may still allow for gendered attacks against her.  

Conclusion 

Hillary Clinton, Nikki Haley, and Kamala Harris each presented their femininity differently. These presentations of femininity were intentional political strategies to manipulate the public opinion of the candidates, and ultimately, attract more voters. Female politicians face additional barriers to election, as they are subjected to different expectations and gendered attacks. However, Clinton, Haley, and Harris each made history in their presidential campaigns, challenging societal expectations about the role of women. Through different presentations of their femininity, they showed that women can be strong, leaders, and even presidential. Ultimately, these historic campaigns are what is required to elevate the societal role of women and end the stigma around women in politics.

Works Cited

^[1] Bauer, N. M., & Santia, M. (2022). Going Feminine: Identifying How and When Female 

Candidates Emphasize Feminine and Masculine Traits on the Campaign Trail. Political Research Quarterly, 75(3), p 701. 

^[2] Conroy, Meredith, Danielle Joesten Martin, and Kim L. Nalder. (2020). Gender, Sex, and the 

Role of Stereotypes in Evaluations of Hillary Clinton and the 2016 Presidential Candidates. Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 41 (2), p. 195.

^[3] Browning, K. (2024). Harris Often Sidesteps Her History Making Potential. Walz Doesn’t.

The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/07/us/politics/harris-often-sidesteps-her-history-making-potential-walz-doesnt.html

^[4] Conroy, et al. (2020). Gender, Sex, and the Role of Stereotypes, p. 195 

^[5] Bauer, N. M., & Santia M. (2022). Going Feminine, p. 701. 

^[6] Conroy, et al. (2022). Gender, Sex, and the Role of Stereotypes, p 194. 

^[7]Bennett, Jessica. (2023). Maybe This is Why Donald Trump Is Afraid to Debate Nikki Haley. 

The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/13/opinion/nikki-haley-high-heels.html.

^[8] Vitali, A. & Allen, J. (2024). Nikki Haley plays up femininity, plays down feminism in her 2024 pitch. NBC News. 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/haley-plays-femininity-plays-feminism-2024-pitch-rcna133824.

^[9] Allison, N. (2024). Nikki Haley made strides for women in politics. 

^[10] Brockes, E. (2024). Kamala Harris is steering clear of Hillary Clinton’s feminist messaging 

– and it’s working. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/commentisfree/article/2024/sep/04/kamala-harris-hillary-clinton-feminist-messaging-democratic-donald-trump

^[11] Browning, K. (2024). Harris Often Sidesteps Her History Making Potential. Walz Doesn’t.

The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/07/us/politics/harris-often-sidesteps-her-history-making-potential-walz-doesnt.html

^[12] Lerer, L., & Glueck, K. (2024). Why Gender May Be the Defining Issue of the Election. The New 

York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/23/us/politics/harris-trump-election-gender.html

^[13] Lerer, L. & Glueck, K. (2024). Defining Issue of the Election.  

^[14] Bidgood, J. (2024). Trump Still Won’t Stop Talking About Women. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/01/us/politics/harris-trump-womens-health-election.html?searchResultPosition=7

Since it opened its doors in 1915, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been dedicated to its mission of protecting consumers and competition. The Federal Trade Commission Act, which established the FTC, gives it the power to “prevent unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The FTC achieves these ends by setting rules for what is unfair or deceptive, gathering information and conducting investigations into organizations, as well as numerous other powers.¹ Essentially, the FTC is the backbone of antitrust policy and consumer protection. However, in the years following the Reagan Administration the U.S. moved towards a more hands-off economic approach, resetting guidelines to mitigate the FTC’s regulatory influence and leaving it up to market forces to discipline companies.² As a result, corporate consolidation has increased in a range of markets over the past few decades, creating stronger companies bordering on monopolies with the power to raise prices, lower wages, and influence policymakers.³

Enter Lina Khan, nominated by President Biden in 2021 as the new chair of the FTC. At 32, she was the youngest chair ever named, but that did not stop her from revitalizing the FTC and creating a massive antitrust movement. Since the start of her tenure, Khan has worked to reestablish and utilize the full extent of the FTC’s legal and regulatory power to fight against harmful consolidation and monopolistic practices. From threatening and bringing lawsuits against major corporations, to sending warning letters to predatory patents, to major policy wins, Khan’s FTC has been a thorn in the side of anti-competitive business practices. Even when the FTC has lost lawsuits, the fact that they are challenging corporations instead of letting them act as they please creates a tangible impact on the way business is conducted, scaring off potential acquisitions.⁴

The FTC’s resurgent influence under Khan has proved divisive on both sides of the aisle. While progressive Democrats such as Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), and Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) have praised Khan’s work at the FTC and want her to remain in place, her leadership has faced significant criticism from major business-owning supporters and donors of the Democratic party, including LinkedIn’s Reid Hoffman and billionaire Mark Cuban, who have called for a change in FTC leadership.⁵ On the Republican side, while the incoming Trump administration and its business-owner heavy ties will undoubtedly replace Lina Khan, she has garnered support from an unlikely source: vice president-elect nominee J.D. Vance. Vance has praised Khan on multiple occasions for her efforts combatting major tech industry players, referring to her as “one of the few people in the Biden administration […] doing a pretty good job.”⁶ He is not alone in this opinion, as Josh Hawley (R-MO) and Matt Gaetz (R-FL) have supported Khan and her antitrust movement. However, numerous other Republicans have criticized Khan and accused her of overstepping her authority and abusing the FTC’s power. With strong dissenting views of Lina Khan and the FTC under the Biden administration within each party, it is worth a closer examination of what the FTC has accomplished over the last four years to determine for ourselves whether the Khan has revitalized the antitrust movement or overstepped her powers.

Resetting Guidelines

A formative impact of the Khan administration was the new guidelines for mergers which the FTC and Justice Department released in December 2023 with the goal of safeguarding competition and improving economic opportunities for all Americans.⁷ In many instances, these guidelines restore authority in the review and challenging of merger cases stripped away by previous administrations . For example, the FTC is now allowed to designate a merger as illegal if it holds an undue or highly concentrated market share. This rule was used during the 1980s and 1990s but fell out of use with the 2010 Merger Guidelines, so the 2023 guidelines are restoring this power. The new guidelines similarly revitalize past authority to more directly protect competitors to major corporations who could be bullied or bought out by larger counterparts.⁸ Where controversy ensues and these guidelines differ from the past are in the broader scope afforded to the FTC in enforcing and litigating merger cases, allowing them to pick and choose useful guidelines and rules to bolster their individual cases. The FTC can also presume an illegal merger if it would create a “dominant” or monopolistic market position. These new merger guidelines have been met with pushback, especially from people who believe mergers can be economically beneficial and improve economic efficiency. Additionally, there is valid criticism of the guidelines as a return to a “the government always wins” mentality, giving the FTC an unfair overarching power over all mergers.⁹ In response to these critiques, I would respond that while in some cases mergers can be economically beneficial, the degree of dominance and consolidation we see from already large corporations are not examples of economic efficiency. As for the problem of a “government always wins” system, there are still cases where the FTC has failed to break up large mergers, such as a court ruling against the FTC’s motion to block Microsoft’s $68.7 billion purchase of gaming company Activision Blizzard, showing larger mergers still occur.¹⁰

Quality-of-Life Improvements

Beyond the world of corporate merger regulation, the Khan administration has fought for and succeeded in attaining a number of quality-of-life improvements for consumers and promoting competition. The first of these is the FTC ruling on non-compete agreements. Non-compete agreements are clauses in contracts prevent an employee from working for a competitor of a previous employer for a designated period after leaving their job. Initially intended to protect trade secrets, businesses have used non-competes in a predatory manner, for example, against workers like hairstylists or florists who do not work with proprietary information, making it prohibitive for workers to find work upon leaving their current job. This action in turn lowers job mobility, allowing companies to suppress wages.¹¹ In response to this misuse, the FTC announced a rule to ban non-compete agreements nationwide, claiming that it will allow workers to change jobs, increase innovation, and foster new business formation, while also fighting wage suppression. During the comment period for the rule, 25,000 out of 26,000 comments were in support of the ruling to ban non-compete agreements, a ringing endorsement of the FTC’s action. While the ruling has been blocked by a district court in Texas, the FTC is in the midst of appeals and can still address non-compete disputes on a case-by-case basis. Regardless of its longevity, the ambition of the non-complete ban to empower the estimated 30 million workers affected by these agreements reflects a renewed commitment for worker protection from the FTC.¹²

Another quality of life issue the FTC has ruled on is a consumer’s “right to repair” their products without nullifying their product warranties. The FTC has sent letters to multiple companies whose warranty practices may be violating the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), which allows the FTC to govern and enforce product warranties. Some companies have made their product warranties contingent on the owner using specific parts or service providers during repair for the warranty to hold, which is prohibited under the MMWA.¹³ By enforcing the right to repair, the FTC has not only benefitted consumers by expanding options and lowering costs for repairs, but also opened new market availability for repair companies.¹⁴ Once again, these simple yet important actions by the FTC help the common consumer lower costs and improve quality-of-life. 

Finally, the FTC is benefitting consumer quality-of-life with its recent decision on a “click-to-cancel” rule for subscription services. This rule is aimed at making it easier for consumers to cancel unwanted descriptions by preventing businesses from making difficult or convoluted ways to unsubscribe. As part of this rule, negative option programs (subscriptions which renew if the consumer fails to take action to cancel the agreement¹⁵) will now be regulated by requiring sellers to have a consumer’s informed consent before using negative option programs, and sellers will be required to provide more information before receiving billing information. Most importantly, businesses will be mandated to have a simple way to cancel negative option programs. Lina Khan commented on this rule saying that it will save “Americans time and money,” and that “Nobody should be stuck paying for service they no longer want,” further emphasizing the FTC’s renewed focus on protecting consumers not just in words but in action.¹⁶ 

Combating the Pharmaceutical Industry

Along with general rule changes, the FTC under Lina Khan has targeted specific industries, with the pharmaceutical industry and its exorbitant drug pricing being a top priority. Their efforts include a lawsuit brought against the three largest prescription drug benefit managers (PBMs) for a harmful drug rebate system that has artificially raised insulin prices. In short, the FTC has charged these PBMs with excluding available lower priced insulin in favor of higher prices so that the PBMs can make more money as the middlemen between drug manufacturers and consumers. Furthermore, the FTC has threatened to go after drug manufacturers themselves, some of whom have increased the price of insulin by 1,200% over the last 25 years.¹⁷ Additionally, the FTC has combatted predatory medicine patent practices which are increasing costs for consumers, such as with asthma inhalers. An inhaler which costs $7 in France costs around $500 in the U.S. due to American companies’ patent rights for the inhaler device. In response, the FTC sent letters to four major inhaler makers, leading to three of them lowering the price to $35.¹⁸ These efforts extend to major individual contributors to the industry’s corruption such as Martin Shkreli, who was accused of using an anticompetitive scheme to increase the price of a life-saving drug from $17.50 to $750 per tablet. In 2022, Shkreli was banned from participating in the pharmaceutical industry and made liable for $64.6 million he made through his illegal means.¹⁹ While there are still many problems in the pharmaceutical industry, the contributions of the FTC have been an unquestionable win for consumer protection and healthy competition during the Khan administration.

Combating the Tech Industry

Outside of pharmaceuticals, the FTC has also gone after technology companies to protect consumers. One of the largest cases the FTC has taken up is a lawsuit against Amazon. Lina Khan had been a vocal critic of Amazon’s monopolistic power prior to her position at the FTC, and her opposition manifested in office as the FTC and 17 state attorneys general have sued the company for taking actions that prevent the growth of competitors and the emergence of future competitors to maintain multiple monopolies. The suit finds Amazon anticompetitive in two areas, the Amazon store itself and the marketplace services it sells to other companies. Tactics under scrutiny include Amazon reducing the visibility of online retailers with lower prices than Amazon within Amazone’s search results, making Amazon Prime eligibility conditional on sellers using Amazon services, search result prioritization for Amazon products over others of better quality, and exorbitant fees for sellers who rely on Amazon for business. Combined, these anticompetitive actions restrict competition and harm consumers by centralizing online marketplaces to one monopolistic provider. Thus, the lawsuit of Amazon is a major move by the FTC to uproot the monopolistic trend of online commerce.²⁰

The FTC has also been active in the emerging world of artificial intelligence. With the speed at which AI has been developing, government regulation is struggling to catch up, but the FTC is working hard to try to maintain a regulated market and clamp down on bad actors. The agency has taken actions against multiple schemes to hype-up or sell AI technology that could harm consumers. For example, they have restricted AI tools that create fake reviews, claim to have law services, and run deceptive online stores. Khan herself has stated “The FTC’s enforcement actions make clear that there is no AI exemption from the laws on the books. By cracking down on unfair or deceptive practices in these markets, FTC is ensuring that honest businesses and innovators can get a fair shot and consumers are being protected.”²¹ Overall, government regulation has always lagged behind the tech industry, and Khan and the FTC are attempting to remedy that issue.

Success or Overstepping?

Despite the criticism of the FTC delegating itself too much power, the successes of the FTC over the last four years make it hard to view the Khan administration as anything other than a success. Whether or not the FTC overstepped their bounds, the benefits it has gained for consumers and the competition it has inspired are undeniably good and contribute to the FTC’s foundational mandate. Resetting merger guidelines to prevent corporate consolidation and anticompetitive deals was an invaluable step towards preventing the massive companies who dominate the economy from increasing monopolistic power, pushing out small businesses, and reducing competition. The quality-of-life improvements of fighting non-compete contracts, establishing a right to repair, and supporting click-to-cancel services will save consumers money and provide more freedom for personal economic choices. Finally, culling the massive pharmaceutical and technology industries and holding them accountable for harmful and predatory actions not only helps consumers and competition now, but also disincentivizes companies from using shady tactics in the future. As for the criticism levied against the FTC for ‘abusing its power,’ the fact that many of the tools and rules the FTC is using are revivals of tools and rules it had in the past allows one to argue the FTC is not overstepping its boundaries, but returning to the more hands-on approach to antitrust policy it once had. If policies and guidelines during the Regan administration weakened the FTC, then it only makes sense that new policies and guidelines under Biden’s presidency and Khan’s leadership of the FTC can restore its power. As for newer policies, there are plenty of legal mechanisms the courts, Congress, or the President could use to restrict the FTC if they thought it was overstepping its boundaries, and in some cases they have. That we have not seen abundant restrictions of the FTC is a testament to the good the FTC’s actions have done in protecting consumers and competition.

Looking to the future and the incoming Trump administration, while it is unlikely that Lina Khan will remain as the chairperson of the FTC, due to the Democratic antitrust fever and the support the Khan administration has had from some Republicans, it remains to be seen the extent to which the expanded powers of the FTC will be rolled back. Even without Khan, recent popular support for antitrust conviction has the chance to keep the aggressive stance of the FTC going. Furthermore, regulating the ever-expanding technology industry is a goal for both sides of the aisle, and as Khan’s time at the FTC has shown, the agency is one of the best ways to deal with regulating new industries in a timely manner. Whether you agree with the actions of Lina Khan and the FTC or not, the last four years have changed the face of consumer and competition protection, the antitrust movement, and the FTC for the foreseeable future.

1. “Federal Trade Commission Act” Federal Trade Commission, www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act.  ↩︎
2.  Stofferahn, Justin. “Corporate Consolidation Is Hurting Americans. Now Is the Time to Rein It In.” Washington State Standard, 5 Sept. 2023, washingtonstatestandard.com/2023/09/05/corporate-consolidation-is-hurting-americans-now-is-the-time-to-rein-it-in/. ↩︎
3. “Americans Pay a Price for Corporate Consolidation.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 26 Aug. 2023, www.nytimes.com/2023/08/26/opinion/biden-lina-khan-ftc.html.  ↩︎
4.  Primack, Dan. “Harris Faces Fight over Lina Khan’s Future.” Axios, Axios Media, 18 Oct. 2024, www.axios.com/2024/10/18/kamala-harris-lina-khan-ftc. ↩︎
5. www.washingtonexaminer.com/magazine-washington-briefing/3198509/hed-kamala-harris-lina-khan-shaped-elephant-in-room-subhed-ftc-heads-aggressive-approach-left-many-corporations-feeling-like-every-move-being-watched-regulated/. ↩︎
6. Dodd, Ethan. “JD Vance Hints Elon Musk, FTC Chair Lina Khan Could Be in Trump Admin: ‘I Agree with Them Both on Some Issues.’” New York Post, NYP Holdings Inc., 16 Oct. 2024, nypost.com/2024/10/15/us-news/j-d-vance-hints-elon-musk-and-lina-khan-could-be-in-trump-admin-i-agree-with-them-both-on-some-issues/. ↩︎
7.  “Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department Release 2023 Merger Guidelines.” Federal Trade Commission, 18 Dec. 2023, www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/12/federal-trade-commission-justice-department-release-2023-merger-guidelines. ↩︎
8.  Bolema, Ted. “Decoding the 2023 FTC and DOJ Merger Guidelines: Insights into Shifting Antitrust Enforcement.” Mercatus Center, George Mason University, 15 Feb. 2024, ↩︎
9. Bolema, “Decoding the 2023 FTC and DOJ Merger Guidelines,” Mercatus Center. ↩︎
10.  Warren, Tom. “FTC v. Microsoft: All the News from the Big Xbox Courtroom Battle.” The Verge, Vox Media, 19 July 2024, www.theverge.com/23768244/ftc-microsoft-activision-blizzard-case-news-announcements/archives/2. ↩︎
11.  Ryan, Sean M. “Commentary: Noncompete Agreements Are Bad for Workers, Bad for Consumers, and Bad for the Economy.” The New York State Senate, 16 May 2023, www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/in-the-news/2023/sean-m-ryan/commentary-noncompete-agreements-are-bad-workers-bad. ↩︎
12.  “FTC Announces Rule Banning Noncompetes.” Federal Trade Commission, 23 Apr. 2024, www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/04/ftc-announces-rule-banning-noncompetes. ↩︎
13.  “FTC Warns Companies to Stop Warranty Practices That Harm Consumers’ Right to Repair.” Federal Trade Commission, 3 July 2024, www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/07/ftc-warns-companies-stop-warranty-practices-harm-consumers-right-repair. ↩︎
14.  “FTC Focus: Competition and the Right to Repair – Insights.” Proskauer, Proskauer Rose LLP, 28 June 2024, www.proskauer.com/pub/ftc-focus-competition-and-the-right-to-repair. ↩︎
15.  Goodrich, Brian J., et al. “The New Cancel Culture: The FTC’s ‘Click to Cancel’ Rule: Insights.” Holland & Knight, Holland & Knight LLP, 30 Oct. 2024, www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2024/10/the-new-cancel-culture-the-ftcs-click-to-cancel-rule. ↩︎
16.  “Federal Trade Commission Announces Final ‘Click-to-Cancel’ Rule Making It Easier for Consumers to End Recurring Subscriptions and Memberships.” Federal Trade Commission, 16 Oct. 2024, www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/10/federal-trade-commission-announces-final-click-cancel-rule-making-it-easier-consumers-end-recurring. ↩︎
17.  “FTC Sues Prescription Drug Middlemen for Artificially Inflating Insulin Drug Prices.” Federal Trade Commission, 23 Sept. 2024, www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/09/ftc-sues-prescription-drug-middlemen-artificially-inflating-insulin-drug-prices.  ↩︎
18.  Stahl, Lesley. “FTC Trustbuster Lina Khan: Feared in Boardrooms, Cheered on by Progressives – and Even Some Maga Republicans.” CBS News, CBS Interactive, 22 Sept. 2024, www.cbsnews.com/news/ftc-chair-lina-khan-60-minutes-transcript/. ↩︎
19.  “Statement on Second Circuit Order Upholding ‘Pharma Bro’ Martin Shkreli’s Lifetime Ban.” Federal Trade Commission, 23 Jan. 2024, www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/01/statement-second-circuit-order-upholding-pharma-bro-martin-shkrelis-lifetime-ban. ↩︎
20.  “FTC Sues Amazon for Illegally Maintaining Monopoly Power.” Federal Trade Commission, 26 Sept. 2023, www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/09/ftc-sues-amazon-illegally-maintaining-monopoly-power. ↩︎
21.  “FTC Announces Crackdown on Deceptive AI Claims and Schemes.” Federal Trade Commission, 25 Sept. 2024, www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/09/ftc-announces-crackdown-deceptive-ai-claims-schemes. ↩︎

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June 2024—Media outlets at home and abroad sensationalized a supposed “far-right victory” in the European Parliament as French and German right-wing populists made major gains in the recent election. Centrist parties raised the alarm, panicking at what they believed to be a rapid surge in disregard for liberal-democratic norms. As domestic elections loomed on the horizon, things seemed quite bleak for the liberal consensus.

Yet in the months since June, virtually nothing has materialized for European right-wing populism. On the contrary, centrist and left-wing coalitions have struck back in France and the United Kingdom. Seemingly everywhere, right-wing opposition proves to be domestically ineffective, plagued by scandal and infighting. Could it be that this “far-right victory” was nothing more than a mirage? Perhaps not everywhere.

Out of the big three European economies, only Germany has the potential for a right-wing surge. Political stalemate–as the center-right establishment (CDU) refuses to cooperate with the rising right-wing populist movement (AfD)–as well as Germany’s unique electoral system, have provided the AfD with a pathway to electoral gains in the near future.

On the eve of the European Parliamentary election, I was studying in Germany at the University of Heidelberg—a city historically known for voting for the climate-progressive Green party. Politically, the atmosphere was complacent. Anxieties about the AfD’s surge had subsided from the previous year, as scandal after scandal rocked the party.

But as marred as the AfD’s momentum was, the party managed to pick up four seats in the European Parliament, for a total of 15 out of Germany’s 96. Simultaneously, a new left-wing populist party, the Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), picked up six seats. The results left the ruling left-wing coalition facing disaster, with a hypothetical mandate from only 30% of voters.

To the alarm of many, Britain and France appeared to be heading in a similar direction. In France, the right-wing populist National Rally (RN) gained seven seats and garnered a commanding simple majority. At the same time, the ruling centrist coalition, Ensemble, led by President Emmanuel Macron, saw a devastating loss of 10 seats.

Outside of the EU, the United Kingdom witnessed Nigel Farage’s announcement that he was reentering politics to lead the Reform Party. Farage, infamous for his leadership of the Brexit movement, sought to take out the ruling Conservative party. With the Tories facing a collapsing mandate from voters, Farage took aim at “mass migration,” calling for a return to common-sense politics.

Europe’s three largest economies all seemed to be facing a similar story, as their collapsing establishment parties battled populist dissent from both the left and the right. But what happened next was far from predictable.

On May 31, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (Conservative Party) announced a snap election in which the Conservative Party was resoundingly defeated and the Labour Party took home its first victory in 14 years. Farage’s party made waves, winning the third-highest portion of the vote at 14.3%. Despite this, Reform won just five of Britain’s 650 seats. For reference, the Liberal Democrats won 72 seats with 12.2% of the vote.

The Reform party’s strength–its appeal with disaffected urban Brits–also became its biggest weakness. Because Britain’s “first past the post” system only requires a simple majority (>50%) to win each seat, populist right-wing parties like Reform–with widespread voter bases–lack the voter concentration necessary to win seats.

Just a few days later in France, Macron called a similar snap election after his party’s disastrous results in the EU Election. Unlike Sunak, Macron’s gambit paid off, as Ensemble joined with the left-wing (NFP) to shut out the right and secure a ruling coalition. Macron understood his voters; he knew that they were more likely to support the right-wing in the European Parliament, where consequences seemed remote, than they were to vote for a right-wing party domestically. By calling this bluff, Macron turned a complete disaster into an overwhelming victory.

Similar to the United Kingdom, France’s first-past-the-post system also acted to shut out parties without concentrated voter bases. Despite achieving 33.21% of the first-round vote, RN ended with 142 seats of the available 577, as opposed to Ensemble’s 21.28% and 159 respectively.

Breaking from the United Kingdom and France, Germany’s ruling coalition did not seek a snap election in the immediate aftermath. This decision could be chalked up to sheepishness about the ruling coalition’s odds of success, but, more likely, it resulted from a lack of viable alternatives. Only recently has Germany been forced into a snap election, as its left wing (SPD and Green) parties no longer tolerated the free market liberal party (FDP) in their coalition.

Like other countries, Germany’s parliamentary system includes elements of first-past-the-post. But unlike France and the United Kingdom, Germany only selects half of its candidates from individual district elections. The other half of its parliament apportioned according to the total percentage of the vote. As a result, the AfD controls a far greater portion of seats relative to its voter base when compared to right-wing parties in the big three.

To address this problem and to prevent the AfD from governing, the center-right CDU maintains a “firewall” against the AfD, swearing off any possibility of a joint coalition. But this policy has arguably become a double-edged sword for Germany’s largest party. The CDU cannot form a coalition alone, as it pulls in only around 30% of the electorate. While a joint CDU-AfD coalition would give the CDU a broad mandate to pursue its preferred policies, it would come at a heavy cost—the party’s legitimacy.

Without the AfD, the only possible coalition for Germany’s 2025 snap parliamentary election is a CDU-led alliance with the left-wing Social Democrats (SPD)–maybe even the Greens as well. Such a coalition would be radioactive to both the CDU’s agenda and image and come with little chance of political efficacy.

By blocking millions of AfD voters from its coalition, the CDU is ironically ensuring exactly the kind of “far-right surge” it hopes to prevent. Provided that the AfD can stay alive in the next few cycles, it will absorb a tidal wave of disillusioned CDU voters.

Despite the rise and fall of the “right-wing mirage,” most of Europe seems to have recovered a liberal status quo. But for Germany, the future remains far less certain. Germany’s center-right collapsing would leave the only remaining gatekeepers of right-wing populism on the left. In such a scenario, the right would be more legitimate than ever and surge to new heights.

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The past month has seen both a presidential debate between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump and a vice-presidential debate between JD Vance and Tim Walz. During both hour-and-a-half debates, the candidates answered questions on a wide range of issues — the economy, abortion, the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East; however, one topic was glaringly missing: the threat of China to Taiwan and how the United States will address it. 

This omission during the debates is symptomatic of a larger political obliviousness in the public conscience to the great danger which China poses to American hegemony. For the past two-and-a-half years, all eyes in America have been trained first on Ukraine and then on Israel. No mind is paid to the growing danger of China in Taiwan.

The same blindness has also struck the Washington establishment. Since Ukraine was invaded, the United States has sent $61.3 billion in military aid to the country. In the past year we have spent $17.9 billion on Israel’s defense. In April, the United States passed a foreign aid package providing just $3.9 billion in aid to Taiwan, far less than the $18 billion provided during the Trump administration.

All the while the threat from China grows. According to the Economist, the number of incursions by the People’s Liberation Army into Taiwanese airspace has increased from 36 in January to 193 in August of this year. The number of ships crossing into Taiwanese waters has almost doubled from 142 to 282 in the same time frame. Military exercises by China, including mock blockades, have become more common and more bold. China maintains its aspiration for unifying the island with the mainland and has not ruled out using force to do so. After Ukraine, the international community should dispel any notion that rhetoric is meaningless or that large scale military invasions by great powers are unthinkable. 

As the threat rises, Taiwan is woefully vulnerable. It has 169,000 active duty military to China’s 2,185,000. It has 76 principal surface combatant ships to China’s 209. It has 300 fighter jets to China’s 1,900. It has 4 submarines to China’s 59. A recent report from the Department of Defense predicts that China’s most favorable window to launch an invasion of Taiwan is between 2027 and 2030, thus making the security situation urgent.

With conflict raging throughout the globe we must ask ourselves where American money and energy is best spent. Russia, though a powerful nation, does not possess the economic or political influence to surpass the United States in power. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion has been heroic, but despite its recent incursion into Russian territory, its counter offensive has stalled and it is increasingly improbable that Ukraine will be able to completely expel Russia from its territory. The only way for Russia to be expelled from the country is if the United States enters the war as a belligerent — a move that would certainly lead to a dangerous escalation of the conflict. As Ukraine’s situation becomes more and more clear, America should reconsider the level of aid being sent to the country. Moreover, our European allies can do more to provide for their own continent’s defense. As the threat rises in the Pacific, they must take up the responsibility which we have borne for so many years. 

Some argue that we would be showing weakness by lessening our aid to Ukraine, but the United States has already shown its resolve by arming Ukraine. The worst outcome — a full Russian takeover of the country — has been averted. Bringing the war in Ukraine to a gradual end is not an act of surrender. It is a recognition of reality. The time to arm Ukraine was ten years ago when Russian intentions in the region became clear. Now we must arm Taiwan and deter an invasion there before it is too late. 

In the Middle East we can defend our strategic interests without becoming involved in any conflicts ourselves. We must find the balance between containing Iran and keeping Israel’s legitimate responses to acts of terror in proportion. Above all, we should know better than to become involved in land wars in the Middle East which have nebulous goals. By giving a limited amount of resources to Israel, supplying our allies with intelligence and fighting terrorists directly with precise strikes, we can achieve our goals and not become involved in a broader war. Above all we must have the clarity to recognize that Iran does not have the economic or military might to threaten the American-led world order.

Only China has that potential. Its GDP at $31.227 trillion is greater than the United States’ at $27.361 trillion. Its population of 1,416,043,270 dwarfs the United State’s population of 341,963,408. Its navy has more ships. Its military is larger and only has one region to focus on. 

A Chinese attack on Taiwan would be disastrous. War games show that the United States would likely win if it defended Taiwan, but not without losing dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands servicemen. Our ability to project power across the world would be crippled and the threat of escalation to a nuclear conflict is also possible. The economic effects of a Chinese attack would also be severe. Taiwan produces 60% of the world’s semiconductors and 90% of the world’s advanced semiconductors. Providing subsidies for semiconductor production in the United States is a prudent insurance policy for a possible invasion, but the destruction and possible Chinese control of this market would be economically disastrous. Indeed, in the event of war, the world economy is estimated to shrink by $10 trillion, or 10% of its GDP. 

The United States must make sure that China understands that war in Taiwan will be disastrous, and the best way to achieve this is through a strong deterrent. Only strength can face strength. We must arm Taiwan to the teeth and make the idea of a military invasion of Taiwan as unpalatable to China as possible. If we do not arm Taiwan, a Chinese invasion is more likely and we will likely still be drawn into the conflict if China attacks, while being unprepared for it. If we do arm Taiwan, China may be deterred from invasion and even if they do attack, we will be prepared for it.

But we cannot be everywhere at once. Last year’s National Defense Industrial Strategy stated that the U.S. defense industrial base “does not possess the capacity, capability, responsiveness, or resilience required to satisfy the full range of military production needs at speed and scale.” Within this reality of limited arms production, we must be intentional about where we send our weapons. Arming Taiwan means lessening our aid to other theaters of conflict, and politicians must be honest about this. Neither Harris or Trump has explicitly said that they will not defend Taiwan. If they plan not to, then the American public deserves to know. If they do want to defend the island, they must take this task more seriously and decide how they will practically carry it out. There may be some value in strategic ambiguity, but hard decisions about allocating funding require honesty about our geopolitical plans and priorities.

World hegemony does not last forever. Since World War II, America has dominated the world stage like no other power. We have ushered in an era of relative peace and stability and have thrived economically. But we must not make the mistake of believing that American dominance will last forever. As our population stagnates and as power shifts to the global south new challengers will rise and we must adapt. We must hand over responsibility to our allies and preserve our interests where we can. We must not be so naive as to think that America can project power equally in every part of the globe forever. We must be rational, evaluate where the greatest threat to our power lies and take sufficient steps to preserve our influence in the region. If not, we may find ourselves woefully unprepared for a Chinese attack that threatens to seriously damage America’s ability to exert its influence abroad. We would do well to ask ourselves if that is the kind of world we would like to live in.

Sources

https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/#:~:text=To%20date%2C%20we%20have%20provided,invasion%20of%20Ukraine%20in%202014.)

https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-us-military-spending-8e6e5033f7a1334bf6e35f86e7040e14)

https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/24/2003205865/-1/-1/1/07-AMONSON%20%26%20EGLI_FEATURE%20IWD.PDF

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden

https://foreignassistance.gov

https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2024/USspendingIsrael

https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iran/#economy

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/china/#people-and-society

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#economy

https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/10/03/china-is-using-an-anaconda-strategy-to-squeeze-taiwan

https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/26/us-foreign-aid-bill-package-details

https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/03/06/taiwans-dominance-of-the-chip-industry-makes-it-more-important?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=17210591673&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjwyL24BhCtARIsALo0fSDSlkfehqZtbjMF11GaJ2roU2dSRVWD3SM8vuRjn7eMEi9drILHqZAaAnfVEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/02/draft-pentagon-strategy-china-00129764

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“Each day in America, you can trust the foods you eat and the medicines you take, thanks to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.”¹

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) claims to provide American citizens with security and safety regarding their food intake. After all, the FDA, formed in 1906 by the Pure Food and Drugs Act, was founded upon the Department of Agriculture’s 1860s mission to analyze the safety of chemicals in agricultural products.² Food safety standards are a historical FDA priority. So how does the United States still lack a robust system for the post-market assessment of chemicals in food?

In September 2024, a paper, entitled “Evidence for widespread human exposure to food contact chemicals” published by the Journal of Exposure Science & Environmental Epidemiology made waves in mainstream media. The study found that over 3,600 chemicals that migrate to food from food contact articles (FCAs) used to store, process, package, and serve food end up in the human body, where they can cause serious harm. The researchers concluded there was an “urgent need to ban the most hazardous chemicals shown to migrate from food packaging and other types of FCAs (food contact articles) into foods to protect human health.”³

The recent discovery regarding the American consumer’s high risk presents the FDA’s serious dereliction of duty. Adequate governmental action is a central part of our republic, and the state has a duty to ensure food safety. Recent FDA failures further reveal how the bloated bureaucracy of a disunified Executive ultimately undermines the public interest.

Increasingly widespread concern over food chemicals prompted the FDA to conduct a public meeting on the development of an enhanced systematic process for FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food.⁴ The meeting, which featured opening remarks from Jim Jones, Deputy Commissioner for Human Foods at the FDA, revealed that, in his words, “the agency has not established a systematic process…until now we have taken an ad hoc approach” to post-market chemical review.⁵ The current FDA process is self-described by the agency as “situational” and possesses a “lack of dedicated resources” regarding additives and ingredients.⁶

Despite having over 18,000 employees, the FDA has neglected to create an effective system for reviewing post-market chemicals within food. This ought to shock every American citizen, and it raises the greater question: What exactly has the FDA been doing?

This is extremely difficult to answer. The project towards analyzing chemicals in food is part of a larger focus on food chemical safety.⁷ This Human Foods Program exists within the Office of Food Chemical Safety, Dietary Supplements & Innovation,⁸ which is a part of the Closer to Zero Initiative.⁹ The Office is further broken down into pre- and post-market assessments and the dietary supplements program, as well as including staff focused on innovative foods and those working in operations. These subdivisions are a part of the larger FDA structure, in which there are thirteen headquarter level offices and nine centers, each with hundreds to thousands of employees.¹⁰

On October 1, 2024, the FDA underwent its largest reorganization effort in recent history.¹¹ The American food supply has been suffering under the crisis of bureaucratic complexity, prompting the FDA to launch a newly unified Human Foods Program, which impacted over 8,000 employees and “touched almost every facet of the agency.” Responding to independent reviews, as well as the FDA’s handling of the infant formula shortage of 2022, the agency claims it is newly focused on “inspections, investigations and imports as its core mission.”

Despite the overwhelming number of already-existing offices, projects, programs, and initiatives, the Discussion Paper accompanying the September public meeting states that the first part of the solution is that a “team of FDA experts will rank individual chemicals” before gathering feedback and performing risk-assessments for each chemical.¹² Yet, it is doubtful that a new team of the same experts is likely to solve the deeper issue of a bloated and ineffective bureaucracy. The structure of the federal government was designed in order to maximize responsibility, and yet the current administrative state evades accountability due to its size and complexity.

This lack of unity and transparency sharply contrasts with the original vision of an efficient executive branch, as highlighted by the Founders’ writings on executive power. In the Federalist papers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, writing as Publius, collaborated to convince Americans, specifically the people of the state of New York, to ratify the Constitution. When considering the powers of the Executive branch, which were meant to rest upon the President of the United States, Hamilton remarks in Federalist 70, “A government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.”¹³ Ill execution can consist of poor policies, as well as irresponsibilities. A strict size-restraint on the Executive branch was meant to ensure energy and unity of action, as well as proper transparency and assignment of blame.

When faced with the suggestion of the dispersal of authority among a council of executive officers, Hamilton writes, “it often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall.”¹⁴ The branch has grown dramatically, even in recent years, thus further threatening valuable characteristics emphasized by Hamilton: “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”¹⁵

Over the ten fiscal years from 2007 to 2017, a study conducted by the United States Office of Personnel Management found a growth of nearly 215,000 employees between the Department of Defense Agencies, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Department of Health and Human Services, under which the FDA falls.¹⁶

Hamilton, by unifying the power of the Executive branch into the President and a limited Cabinet, sought to achieve effective law enforcement and incentivize individual responsibility. Although the FDA has failed to execute precautions against chemicals in diet, it has 50 technical and scientific advisory committees and panels and is charged with enforcing over 200 laws.¹⁷ 

The organization of administrative agencies have resulted in an inability to focus on the common good, and the United States is suffering under disastrous regulatory confusion. Madison’s warnings in Federalist #62 highlight the importance of criminalization: “It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made of men of their own choice if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow.”¹⁸ As the FDA seeks to create a post-market review system, they must keep in mind their position as a part of the Executive branch, charged with enforcing legislation.

More than mere inconvenience, the FDA’s failures represent a subversion of the common good. With the expansion of the federal administrative state, individual states have turned over their traditional police powers. The American public is left without guidance regarding health, safety, and morals, traditionally understood as governmental priorities. As health crises worsen, governmental incompetence erodes public trust.

As famously presented in Aristotle’s politics, the ideal regime, with no name, or known simply as polity, consists of popular rule for the common interest. The American founders, with their careful restraints and meticulously designed offices, attempted to create a balanced republic, which both responded to democratic demands and protected “the people against themselves.”¹⁹

Chemicals in food and the proper role of the government are being discussed in the popular political arena, and citizens are searching for alternatives to the status quo.  Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who recently announced his support of candidate Donald Trump, vowed in a viral X post and video that, “Enough is enough. President Trump and I are going to stop the mass poisoning of American children.”²⁰ 

In the clip, he tells the story of Tartrazine, or Yellow Dye #5, which is included in everyday foods such as Doritos, Cheez-its, and Gatorade. He explains that it is produced from “the sludge that is left over when you turn coal into coke for blast furnaces.” After displaying the harmful effects of these food chemical additives, RFK tells his audience, “Together, we are going to make America healthy again.”

As federal regulators struggle to  provide clear guidance, creative entrepreneurs face the issue in the private sector. The YUKA app, featured by podcaster Shawn Ryan on the popular “Joe Rogan Experience,” is a prime example of citizens taking governmental obligations towards safety into their own hands.²¹ The mobile phone app, which boasts over 61 million downloads, claims to “deciphers product labels and analyzes the health impact of food products and cosmetics.”²² 

At the show’s start, Ryan explains, “You basically scan anything, food related…it’ll tell you all the chemicals and what the chemicals do to you.” Rogan exclaims, “That’s what people need!” He went on to promote RFK’s past experience in “protecting people against corporations that are poisoning them.” 

Regardless of the FDA’s complicated organizational structure, or how it ought to be rectified, it is clear that the situation surrounding health and food safety in the United States is dire. In 2023, every single state in the Union had an obesity rate of over 20%.²³ Food allergies are on the rise, with 48% of American adults with allergies reporting a new, recent allergy they did not have as children.²⁴ Fertility rates are at a record low, with only 55 births per 1,000 women.²⁵ American life expectancy has faced dramatic declines, and is lagging at 77.5 years, compared to comparable nations’ 82.2 average.²⁶ 

Americans are not just dying earlier–they are also suffering mental challenges at higher rates. In 2016, almost 1 in 4 (23%) American adults reported a mental health diagnosis, compared to fewer than 10% in Germany, France, or the Netherlands.²⁷ Ties between food consumption and mental health are obvious and overwhelming; one study co-authored by researchers at Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health found that those in the top fifth of ultra processed food consumption had a 50% higher risk of developing depression than those in the bottom 20%.²⁸

Mental health issues highlight the growth of psychiatric treatment in the United States. The 12% increase in mental health prescriptions from 2019 to 2022 far outpaces overall prescription growth of less than 1%.²⁹ Shockingly, over 338 million antidepressant prescriptions were written in 2016, enough for one for every man, woman, and child in the nation.³⁰ Yet, they have skyrocketed further–growing by 35% in 2022.³¹ Mental health is declining both rapidly and uniformly, or citizens are being widely overmedicated–both may be true. 

This is a systemic crisis. The typical American ingests toxic chemicals and is encouraged to turn to medication for physical and mental health issues. The normalization and proliferation of such treatments ignore that the common American diet and reliance on medication are actively harming the bodies and minds of millions, particularly children. Children raised on food dyes, dopamine enhancers, and screens may never know clarity, alertness, or their natural creativity and personalities.

America is facing a crisis of both physical and mental health, which appears to cut across all geographic, socioeconomic, or racial borders. There must be something in the water–or, actually, in the food supply. Prioritizing a safe and nutritious food supply is a necessary first step towards protecting future generations of Americans. 

1. “About FDA.” FDA, 14 June 2024, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda. ↩︎
2. “FDA History.” FDA, 29 Mar. 2021, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history. ↩︎
3. Geueke, B., Parkinson, L.V., Groh, K.J. et al. “Evidence for widespread human exposure to food contact chemicals.” J Expo Sci Environ Epidemiol (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41370-024-00718-2 ↩︎
4. “FDA to Hold Public Meeting on the Development of an Enhanced Systematic Process for FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food.” FDA, Sept. 2024. www.fda.gov, https://www.fda.gov/food/hfp-constituent-updates/fda-hold-public-meeting-development-enhanced-systematic-process-fdas-post-market-assessment. ↩︎
5. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Public Meeting: The Development of an Enhanced Systematic Process for the FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food. FDA, 25 Sept. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/media/180941/download. ↩︎
6. Current Approach to Post-Market Work. FDA, 25 Sept. 2024, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-wTJvt6eU9ZnEa74opKOsCeEX2Lv8kkt/view?usp=sharing. ↩︎
7. “Food Chemical Safety.” FDA, 1 Oct. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/food/food-ingredients-packaging/food-chemical-safety. ↩︎
8. “Office of Food Chemical Safety, Dietary Supplements & Innovation.” FDA, Oct. 2024. https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/human-foods-program/office-food-chemical-safety-dietary-supplements-innovation. ↩︎
9. “Closer to Zero: Reducing Childhood Exposure to Contaminants from Foods.” FDA, Sept. 2024. https://www.fda.gov/food/environmental-contaminants-food/closer-zero-reducing-childhood-exposure-contaminants-foods. ↩︎
10. “FDA Organization Charts.” FDA, 8 July 2024, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-organization/fda-organization-charts. ↩︎
11.  “FDA Modernization Efforts for Establishing a Unified Human Foods Program, New Model for Field Operations and More.” FDA, 1 Oct. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-organization/fda-modernization-efforts-establishing-unified-human-foods-program-new-model-field-operations-and. ↩︎
12. Discussion Paper Development of an Enhanced Systematic Process for the FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food. FDA, Aug. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/media/180942/download ↩︎
13. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 422. ↩︎
14. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 426. ↩︎
15. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 423. ↩︎
16. Sizing Up the Executive Branch. United States Office of Personnel Management, Feb. 2018, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/reports-publications/sizing-up-the-executive-branch-2016.pdf. ↩︎
17. “Learn About FDA Advisory Committees.” FDA, Aug. 2024. www.fda.gov, https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-fda-advisory-committees;“Learn About FDA Advisory Committees.” FDA, Aug. 2024. www.fda.gov, https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-fda-advisory-committees ↩︎
18. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 369. ↩︎
19. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 383. ↩︎
20. Kennedy, Robert, F. 25 Sept. 2024, https://x.com/RobertKennedyJr/status/1839012584957042973  ↩︎
21. Kennedy, Robert, F. 25 Sept. 2024, https://x.com/RobertKennedyJr/status/1839012584957042973 ↩︎
22.  “Yuka – The Mobile App That Scans Your Products.” Yuka, https://yuka.io/en/. ↩︎
23. “Adult Obesity Prevalence Maps.” Obesity, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 19 Sept. 2024, https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/php/data-research/adult-obesity-prevalence-maps.html. ↩︎
24. Why Are Food Allergies on the Rise? With Ruchi Gupta, MD, MPH. Northwestern University, 12 Feb. 2019, https://www.feinberg.northwestern.edu/research/podcast/food-allergies-on-the-rise.html. ↩︎
25. U.S. Fertility Rate Drops to Another Historic Low. CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, 25 Apr. 2024, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/2024/20240525.htm. ↩︎
26. Rakshit, Shameek, et al. “How Does U.S. Life Expectancy Compare to Other Countries?” Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker, Peterson-KFF, 30 Jan. 2024, https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/u-s-life-expectancy-compare-countries/. ↩︎
27. Roosa Tikkanen et al., Mental Health Conditions and Substance Use: Comparing U.S. Needs and Treatment Capacity with Those in Other High-Income Countries (Commonwealth Fund, May 2020). https://doi.org/10.26099/09ht-rj07 ↩︎
28. Samuthpongtorn C, Nguyen LH, Okereke OI, et al. Consumption of Ultraprocessed Food and Risk of Depression. JAMA Netw Open. 2023;6(9):e2334770. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.34770. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2809727#google_vignette ↩︎
29. Garzella, Cecilia. “Mental Health Crisis Fuels the Post-Pandemic Rise in Medication Use.” USA TODAY, 3 Mar. 2024, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2024/02/29/mental-health-related-prescriptions-rise-post-covid/72310337007/.  ↩︎
30.  “Top 25 Psychiatric Medications for 2016.” Psych Central, 12 Oct. 2017, https://psychcentral.com/blog/top-25-psychiatric-medications-for-2016. ↩︎
31. Burns, Corrinne. “Antidepressant Prescribing Increases by 35% in Six Years.” The Pharmaceutical Journal, 8 July 2022, https://pharmaceutical-journal.com/article/news/antidepressant-prescribing-increases-by-35-in-six-years. ↩︎

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Is declaratory nuclear policy useful? The Soviet Union’s 1982 declaration of a no first use policy was met with inaction by Soviet military leaders who secretly maintained their ex-ante military doctrine. Declaratory policy is nothing without concurrent posture adaptations, suggesting that the United States and China are condemned to nuclear competition for the foreseeable future.

No First Use

China and India currently maintain no first use (NFU) pledges. They agree not to use nuclear weapons against another state unless in retaliation to a nuclear strike, claiming to deter without the option of a pre-emption.¹ The United States has pondered an NFU and related declaratory policy changes. The Obama administration stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that the “fundamental role” of US nuclear weapons is to deter attack on the homeland and allies, and President Biden’s 2022 NPR maintained this.² Both Obama and Biden, however, declined to adopt an NFU policy. The Trump administration maintained in 2018 that an NFU doctrine was not appropriate because it would not reflect the plethora of international threats that the United States faces. Similarly, although Biden, first as Vice President and later as presidential candidate, stated in 2017 and 2020, respectively, that the United States should adopt a “sole purpose” nuclear doctrine, his NPR hesitated to take the next step to its realization.³

The Soviet Union—and, after its dissolution, Russia—held an NFU posture from 1982 to 1993.⁴  Few analysts consider it when conversing about NFUs today. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko publicly announced the shift in Soviet doctrine at the United Nations, but it is widely known that the United States did not seriously believe that the Soviets would refrain from launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike in case of desperate emergency.

Understanding what an NFU would look like today depends, at least in part, on what NFUs looked like decades ago. The international climate has become more tense. In theory, an NFU declaration from major nuclear powers would significantly reduce the possibility of escalation because states would not be worried about nuclear threats or use against one another. As mentioned, China utilizes its long-standing NFU in diplomatic conversations today to portray itself as an actor opposed to escalation. Although the adoption of NFUs by countries like the United States and Russia may seem unlikely today,⁵ a greater understanding of what might bring about a serious pledge and how to maintain it can further the conversation on declaratory nuclear policy.

So, is declaratory policy useful for attenuating security competition? Unfortunately, the Soviet case suggests that political statements can be met with inaction by intransigent military brass. Concurrent changes in nuclear posture would ease this problem, but the United States and China’s nuclear postures are headed in a competitive, instead of conciliatory, direction.

The Soviet NFU

In 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev pledged that the Soviet Union would not launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike. In 1993, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the termination of the Soviet and Russian NFU.⁶ Over the course of that decade-plus, the United States intelligence community did not take the Soviet pledge seriously, and believed there was instead a possibility of a Soviet first strike. This is an old fear over NFU policies, however. More interestingly, archival documents indicate that Soviet military leadership did not shift its military doctrine to rule out a first strike possibility.   

The Soviet military and its civilian defense leaders resisted the political leadership’s NFU. Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov “believed in first strikes” even though they violated official Soviet policy and led the resistance against a doctrinal shift toward no first use.⁷ Institutional resistance followed. Documents from East German military archives demonstrate that the Soviet military “retained and exercised” the possibility for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against NATO, even during a contingency in which NATO only used conventional weapons.⁸ Furthermore, the Soviet NFU policy on its own seems to have turned few heads: US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated during the Reagan administration that recent Soviet SS-20 missile deployments with multiple nuclear warheads each dampened the credibility of the Soviet NFU.⁹

Contemporaneous CIA analysis of Soviet military doctrine reflected the military reality. A top secret 1983 memorandum stated that Soviet wartime plans for central Europe would include an attempt to pre-empt NATO’s use of nuclear weapons to preclude a large strike on Soviet conventional forces.¹⁰ A different 1989 CIA memorandum claimed that the Soviets were “well aware” of their poor economic standing vis-à-vis the West and supposed that the Kremlin may alter its military doctrine towards one which takes a defensive stance.¹¹ The CIA’s implication in this statement that Soviet doctrine was not presently defensive led to the conclusion that the Soviets had not effectively developed a no first use policy.¹² Additionally, while the memorandum claimed that Soviet military doctrine focused on the prevention of conventional and nuclear war,¹³ it analyzed the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance in depth, particularly as former President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative may have impacted stability.¹⁴ This may have reflected a distrustful belief about the Soviet NFU, or at least indicated that recent Soviet technological developments placed Moscow on a similar military footing as Washington.

Even a classified briefing of the Defense Policy Panel to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in 1988 stated that the Soviet NFU declaration represented the political presentation of its military doctrine instead of any military-technical or operational aspects. The concrete measures which the Soviet military took to prepare for and conduct warfighting did not change from before the NFU. The deployment of conventional and nuclear forces retained its “threatening posture.”¹⁵

Was the widespread distrust which met the Soviet NFU unique? Perhaps not. Chinese military officials, such as Major General Zhu Chenghu in July 2005, have claimed that Beijing’s NFU has only applied to non-nuclear weapon states.¹⁶ While the Chinese government distanced itself from Zhu’s statement, its NFU pledge has historically served propaganda purposes and was conditioned out of necessity and policy instead of peace-loving sentiment. China’s long-standing small nuclear arsenal has made it physically unable to launch a first strike against a nuclear weapon state without expecting complete annihilation, and its nuclear weapons were not created as part of a doctrine which extends past countervalue minimum deterrence.¹⁷ Indeed, although Beijing has undertaken significant restraining measures to convince states of its NFU, they are impossible to verify and the United States has continued to distrust China.¹⁸

Declaratory Policy and Nuclear Competition

The United States historically has not found NFU pledges to be credible, but analysts overlook an NFU’s civil-military strife. While Soviet political leadership announced an NFU in 1983, military leaders personally stated their opposition and worked to maintain a first strike doctrine.

What does this experience tell the nuclear community about NFUs today? A novel no first use pledge by non-NFU states like Russia and the United States seems unlikely in the midst of today’s tense geopolitical competition, but analysts should also question the domestic viability of such a policy. The U.S. military strongly opposes an NFU and the possible changes in nuclear posture that would follow.¹⁹ A U.S. NFU would not necessarily cause a civil-military divide, especially considering civil-military transparency and communication in Washington. But the consequences of other great powers adopting an NFU must be considered. For those states with significant political-military divides, an NFU declaration by political leaders may be met with inaction by military authorities.

This conclusion supports the belief that declaratory policy has little value without a concurrent adaptation of posture by military personnel. Because statements can be empty, the most effective way to create a credible NFU would necessitate action. States could eliminate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from their nuclear arsenal (or at least take them off high alert) and instead prioritize the survivable sea-based leg of the triad. This would represent qualified self-deterrence against a first strike because states would be unable to rapidly launch a debilitating first strike and would preclude effective pre-emption. Additionally, given land-based weapons’ vulnerability, their elimination would decrease the benefits and likely success of a first strike. Unfortunately, recent great power policies run counter to these long-term posture commitments that may ease tensions.

The United States is modernizing its ground-based leg with the development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD, LGM-35 Sentinel), while China is significantly expanding its siloed ICBM force.²⁰ Neither development benefits relations between Washington and Beijing, and in fact may lead American policymakers to doubt China’s NFU more. Given that China has considered the possibility of placing parts of its forces on a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture, Beijing’s strategic posture is changing, and debates about its NFU remain.²¹ Even though China has officially reiterated an “unqualified commitment” to its NFU, President Xi Jinping has called for the PLA to establish a “strong system of strategic deterrence,” pointing to a break in nuclear policy that may push American policymakers to question the continuity of the NFU.²² Although Chinese officials claim that LOW would be consistent with the NFU, Washington may link Beijing’s actions on one front of nuclear policy to another and sense a wholesale shift to a more aggressive nuclear doctrine. In a crisis bargaining scenario, uncertainty about an NFU may lead states to assume the worst case scenario.

Regardless of declaratory policy, the United States and China have adopted postures that risk quick escalation. The Chinese NFU declaration, for this reason, does not by itself preclude action-reaction spirals and American doubt about the validity of a no first use posture. The rivalry—for now—may be condemned to competition.

1. It remains important to distinguish between China and India’s NFUs, however. While China has gone to great lengths to make its pledge credible, India caveats its NFU by retaining the option to use nuclear weapons in response to a major biological or chemical weapons attack against India or its forces. Additionally, India has eroded belief in its pledge over conventional attack and nuclear preemption as tensions with Pakistan have grown for decades. Cf. Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use: Nuclear Weapons and Declaratory Policy,” War on the Rocks, 22 February 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/sole-purpose-is-not-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-and-declaratory-policy/. ↩︎
2. Ernest J. Moniz et al., “U.S. Nuclear Policies for a Safer World,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 2021, pp. 7-12; and Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn, “NTI Statement on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 28 October 2022, https://www.nti.org/news/nti-statement-on-the-2022-nuclear-posture-review/. ↩︎
3. A “sole purpose” declaratory policy states that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the United States and its allies. Cf. Moniz, “U.S. Nuclear Policies for a Safer World.” ↩︎
4. I refer to this primarily as the “Soviet NFU” because of its adoption during the Soviet years and the change in policy soon after the Russian Federation’s birth. ↩︎
5. The United States is unlikely to adopt an NFU today because allies, especially those who benefit from extended nuclear deterrence in east Asia, will worry that Washington will not stand up for them. Russia is unlikely to adopt an NFU today, as seen by its consistent use of nuclear threats and forward deployment in Belarus. ↩︎
6. Serge Schmemann, “Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of Atom Arms,” The New York Times, 4 November 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/04/world/russia-drops-pledge-of-no-first-use-of-atom-arms.html. Interestingly, Soviet generals clarified after terminating the NFU that it only applied to non-nuclear weapon states that signed the 1968 NPT, but still not those allied with nuclear weapon states. ↩︎
7. Matthew R. Costlow, “A Net Assessment of ‘No First Use’ and ‘Sole Purpose’ Nuclear Policies,” Occasional Paper 1, no. 7 (National Institute Press, 2021), p. 78. ↩︎
8. Costlow, “A Net Assessment,” p. 79; and Ankit Panda, “‘No First Use’ and Nuclear Weapons,” Council on Foreign Relations, 17 July 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons. ↩︎
9. Costlow, “A Net Assessment,” p. 82. ↩︎
10. “Soviet Planning for Front Nuclear Operations in Central Europe,” Central Intelligence Agency, June 1983, p. 11, archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-090-doc1.pdf. ↩︎
11. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 1989, pp. 13-14, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000499601.pdf. ↩︎
12. NFUs are defensive, instead of offensive, policies, because they are inherently responsive. They can still serve deterrent functions, because they warn against the response a state would face if they were to attack with nuclear weapons. But NFUs are not offensive because they eliminate the possibility of first use and preemption. ↩︎
13. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” p. 21. ↩︎
14. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” pp. 18-19. The SDI was intended to intercept ICBMs from space, which many argued would encourage another arms race and undermine established arms-control agreements. Earlier U.S.-Soviet treaties, like the ABM Treaty, were intended to reduce defensive anti-ballistic missile systems that would otherwise have pushed the powers to build more weapons for deterrence and undermined mutual vulnerability. ↩︎
15. “General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Military: Assessing His Impact So Far and the Potential for Future Changes,” The Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 2 August 1988, p. 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100030010-1.pdf. ↩︎
16. Stephanie Lieggi, “Going Beyond the Stir: The Strategic realities of China’s No-First-Use Policy,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 31 December 2005, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/realities-chinas-no-first-use-policy/. ↩︎
17. It is unclear how China’s nuclear expansion and modernization will impact this, but its arsenal as of this writing is still unlikely to comprehensively destroy U.S. second-strike capability and maintains an assured retaliation capability. Cf. Henrik Stålhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel, and Magnus Langset Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China’s Changing Nuclear Posture,” International Security 47, no. 4 (2023): pp. 147-187. ↩︎
18. Lieggi, “Going Beyond the Stir”; and Panda and Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use.” Panda and Narang further that China has implemented de-targeting agreements and has unilaterally separated warheads from ICBMS (a process known as de-mating), but because an NFU is a component of declaratory nuclear policy, there is no possible diplomatic arrangement that would verify or enforce a pledge. Furthermore, the pledge alone would not impact capabilities. For Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s distrust of China’s NFU, see Kumar Sundaram and M.V. Ramana, “India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 1 (February 2018): pp. 152-168. ↩︎
19. Panda and Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use.” ↩︎
20. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 148. Additionally, some scholars have written about the direct impact of new U.S. capabilities, such as ballistic missile defense and CPGS, on China’s ability to launch a retaliatory strike. China expanded its force structure in part to ensure survivability under assured retaliation, but it might be forced to abandon assured retaliation for a first-use posture. Chinese analysts also surmised during the Obama administration that Beijing would retaliate against a U.S. conventional attack on Chinese nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons, violating the NFU. These possibilities point to the unsure nature of declaratory policy. Cf. Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): pp. 8, 21. ↩︎
21. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 150. Additionally, some Chinese officials believe that a LOW posture would violate China’s NFU, proving the volatility of declaratory policy. Without concrete actions that distinctly support declaratory policy, the latter is confusing domestically and internationally. Cf. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” pp. 170-171. ↩︎
22. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 168. ↩︎

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Countries in the Indo-Pacific region are allying with the United States to contain China. But domestic defense initiatives have stalled, and allies continue to disagree with each other on critical issues, leading to the conclusion that China may be better off provoking conflict sooner (if at all) rather than later. The dilemma? China will be ready later rather than sooner.

China

Scholars disagree on the size of the Chinese threat.¹ Some describe China as a regional behemoth that may attempt to break out of its unfavorable geographic limitations at any moment.² Others claim that Beijing’s expansion is stalling, still short of U.S. power, constraining its ability to seriously threaten its neighbors.³ But no matter the specifics, many states in the Indo-Pacific are scared of China because no regional actor can individually stand up to Beijing from head to toe. Enter the United States and its balancing coalition.

States ally with each other against a powerful external threat to avoid military and economic dominance.⁴ The United States has led a policy of external balancing (consider the balancing scales of justice, but with adversarial countries creating a coalition to “balance” the other’s power) in the Indo-Pacific against a rising China. Since America’s superiority in the Western Hemisphere began in the late 19th century, Washington’s foreign policy has centered around ensuring that no country is strong enough to similarly dominate the economic and military activities of its own region.⁵

To halt the possibility that China’s power in the Indo-Pacific rivals America’s in the Western Hemisphere and around the world, the United States needs defense commitments from China’s neighbors. Many states that border China and its waters are happy to ally with Washington: China is larger, stronger, and wealthier than them, and they fear one-sided conflict or at least economic co-option. But have these balancing attempts been successful? And what do they tell us about the military and diplomatic balance in the Indo-Pacific, now and into the future?

Allying, or external balancing, is difficult because states understand that they primarily provide their own security.⁶ While the United States has led the charge in creating formal institutions to contain China, states have at times succumbed to infighting and shocking industrial setbacks. If China’s ambitions indeed exceed its current international standing, its window of aggression may remain open for a few years. But its own stagnant growth and ill-prepared military keep the balancers in an advantageous position.

The Good

The United States has laid the groundwork for an intricate web of alliances in the Indo-Pacific. Take the Quad. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue–consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India–was resuscitated in 2017 to ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”⁷ Grouping four states with little connection apart from their power in the region broadly defined, the Quad hopes to counter Chinese economic and military coercion and uphold democratic values.

Or consider AUKUS. The Australia-UK-US trilateral agreement of 2021 has since worked to exchange technology between the three countries, especially on developing Australia’s defense capability. The plan’s Pillar I includes Australia’s purchase of three US Virginia class conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines and the buildup of its sovereign submarine base. Pillar II of the alliance aims to develop joint capabilities through technology and information sharing, focusing on cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum, and undersea capabilities. AUKUS’s goal with submarine and technology sharing is specifically to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and bolster deterrence for allies in the region.⁸

And we shouldn’t forget Camp David. In August 2023, US President Biden, South Korean President Yoon, and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida gathered at Camp David to inaugurate a new trilateral centered around shared goals of containing China, denuclearizing North Korea, and maintaining American extended deterrence. The ROK-Japan rapprochement is significant in the face of long-standing nationalistic disputes, and at Camp David, the parties agreed to coordinate regional responses and policies.⁹

The Bad

Unfortunately, however, these alliances take time to get off the ground. As with NATO’s European parties, who have been slow to increase their defense spending and grow their industrial bases in the face of an obstreperous Russia,¹⁰ Asia’s balancing coalition has run into numerous domestic and industrial roadblocks that have produced mixed tangible results.

One example is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a grouping of US government controls on defense imports and exports. Simply put, ITAR is not structured for rapid technological innovation, trade, or international competition. Instead, it is a cautious ordinance better suited for American national security when the United States is not seriously competing against other great powers. 

The Biden administration and the legislatures of Australia and the UK are working to pass sweeping ITAR exemptions. But ITAR has already created problems for the alliance’s Pillar II in three ways. First, ITAR requires foreign states to prove that they protect sensitive technology to a standard comparable to the United States. Australia, in particular, has a significantly smaller defense industrial base than its allies, meaning that its export regime is historically not up to par. Second, the United States will work to make a release from ITAR sweeping; the exemption would apply to AUKUS nations generally and not to specific transactions by AUKUS countries. This comprehensive measure requires an equally extensive and time-consuming review. An exemption would lastly need to outline the mechanisms through which AUKUS countries can utilize the agreement, which follows from previous conversations about comparable standards and scope.¹¹

Legislation is not the only complication confronting AUKUS. An internal US Navy investigation from April found that the United States is running two to three years behind schedule on its construction of the new nuclear-powered Virginia class submarine. Washington may not be able to deliver these submarines, which will undergird Australia’s involvement in the alliance and Indo-Pacific, by the planned 2032 date. Other construction projects are also running late: the star nuclear-powered ballistic missile Columbia class submarine will be 12 to 16 months late and the attack Block IV Virginia submarines are running three years behind schedule.¹²

Multilateral domestic quibbles also threaten to weaken the American-led alliance regime in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad, for one, is plagued by differing motivations and domestic situations. All four countries share economic interdependence with China (although the United States is following a decoupling strategy), making containment, in part, a self-defeating policy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has assaulted civil liberties and minority rights, pulling the country away from mature democracy, even though democracy and freedom are supposedly among the Quad’s bedrock values.¹³ Given these disagreements, the Quad remains a loose diplomatic alliance instead of a security commitment à la AUKUS or Camp David.

Although the United States-Japan-South Korea trilateral has settled on commitments in East Asia, Tokyo and Seoul continue to have their differences on critical points of policy. In particular, the two states have exhibited varying willingness to publicly support Taiwan, US military deployments to Taiwan from their own soil, and the prioritization of a Taiwan contingency over tensions on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁴

The Ugly

What do these nascent alliances mean for China’s future? Beijing faces a dilemma of enormous proportions.

On the one hand, these alliances are nascent. If China seeks to expand, whether for security or greed¹⁵–and that’s a very important if–then its window of aggression may extend for a few years. Aggression could take any number of forms, from an invasion or blockade of Taiwan to an occupation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 

On the other hand, these alliances are unlikely to be nascent for long. AUKUS nations will move past ITAR and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida recently visited Washington to extend alliance commitments. China has serious domestic blockades of its own that make Beijing ill-prepared to strike in the short term. The People’s Liberation Army has not fought a serious war for decades and China’s military will only be prepared to invade Taiwan come 2027.¹⁶ Xi Jinping has structural nonmilitary problems, too: Chinese overdevelopment has built dozens of ghost cities, its energy policies cause significant environmental damage, and local authorities have taken on staggering debt to grow the economy. China may be neither a peer competitor to the United States nor declining, but its situation is one that few countries must envy.

One caveat to conclude: the United States is stretched thin internationally, and escalation in conflicts around the world may bode poorly for America’s continued focus on its Indo-Pacific alliances. Russia continues to move forward in Ukraine, albeit slowly, and congressional debates on aid to Kyiv have stalled.¹⁷ Iran’s retaliation against Israel caused little damage and both sides can reasonably claim to de-escalate tensions, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may yet seek to respond against his weaker adversary in Tehran.

If the White House were to pull itself further into either conflict (and especially in the latter scenario, considering that American servicemen are stationed in the Mediterranean to help Israel), the United States may be less prepared against an Indo-Pacific contingency. Although China is widely considered to be Washington’s major threat, three wars at once may be too much to handle. American overextension would ease Beijing’s dilemma.

1. And, importantly, on whether it represents a threat at all. ↩︎
2. Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021). ↩︎
3. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (New York: W.W. Norton, 2022). ↩︎
4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). ↩︎
5. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). ↩︎
6. Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, “Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 52. ↩︎
7. “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” The White House, 24 May 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/. ↩︎
8. Joseph Clark, “AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities,” Department of Defense News, 10 April 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3737569/aukus-partners-focus-on-indo-pacific-security-in-shaping-joint-capabilities/. ↩︎
9. “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” The White House, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/; and Jenny Town and Yuki Tatsumi, “Takeaways from the Camp David Summit,” Stimson Center, 25 August 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/takeaways-from-the-camp-david-summit/.  ↩︎
10. Daniel Michaels, “Europe Is Boosting Military Spending. It’s Still Not Enough,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 February 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-is-boosting-military-spending-its-still-not-enough-020b432a. ↩︎
11. Deborah Cheverton and John T. Watts, “AUKUS is hamstrung by outdated US export control rules. Here’s what Congress can do,” Atlantic Council, 15 November 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/aukus-is-hamstrung-by-outdated-us-export-control-rules-heres-what-congress-can-do/. ↩︎
12. Matthew Cranston, “AUKUS subs construction delayed by years: US Navy,” Australian Financial Review, 4 April 2024, https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/aukus-subs-construction-delayed-by-years-us-navy-20240404-p5fh9a#:~:text=The%20assessment%20found%20the%20Virginia,submarines%20to%20Australia%20by%202032. ↩︎
13. Debasish Roy Chosdhury, “Quad is Key to Biden’s Strategy in Asia, But the Four-Way Alliance Is Ambiguous and Contradictory,” TIME, 18 March 2021, https://time.com/5947674/quad-biden-china/. ↩︎
14. Adam P. Liff, “How Japan and South Korea diverge on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait,” The Brookings Institution, 22 February 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-japan-and-south-korea-diverge-on-taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/. ↩︎
15. Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171-201. ↩︎
16. Roxana Tiron, “China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, US Says,” Bloomberg, 20 March 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-20/china-on-track-to-be-ready-for-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-says. ↩︎
17. Nicole Wolkov et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 10, 2024,” The Institute for the Study of War, 10 April 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2024. ↩︎