Considering what constitutes the United States of America

By Catalina Scheider Galiñanes

What constitutes the American nation? As border crossings surge¹, with 2023 ending with a high of nearly 250,000 U.S. Border Patrol-Migrant encounters at the southern border in December of 2023, and political rhetoric heating up between Biden and Trump in anticipation of their impending presidential face-off, the question of how one ought to define a nation-state looms large in the minds of many Americans. While nearly all Americans² identify the number of migrants seeking to enter the United States from the Mexico border as either a crisis (45%) or a major problem (32%), President Biden calls³ for foreign nationals to “immediately surge to the border” and states that the United States’ absorption of mass migrants and refugees is “who we are.” It is worthwhile to ask: who are we, as the American nation? And how could an unprecedented level of immigration change our answer? An America which refuses to acknowledge that she possesses specific historical and cultural components and struggles to address large-scale illegal immigration, reveals the pressing importance of the development of a shared self-understanding and local interconnectedness to the survival of the United States.

Ancient writers and accounts have much to offer on the topic of national borders and patriotic identity. Plutarch’s biography of Lycurgus, the great lawgiver and leader of Sparta, in The Parallel Lives reveals the centrality of united community and economic components of the state as intimately tied to its citizens’ habituation in virtue. In a radical and somewhat fictitious account of unity and clarity of intention, Lycurgus founds and rules the Spartan state with a defined idea of who his people ought to be. In this partially legendary account, Lycurgus abolishes all traditional currency, equally redistributes land, limits trade and immigration, and forms the Spartan citizenry into an elite fighting force. His policies, although extreme, and in tension with liberal notions of limitless self-determination, reveal a deeper goal of the state: to form its citizens as “integral parts of the whole community…almost beside themselves with enthusiasm and noble ambition, and to belong wholly to their country.”  It is not clear that the modern American would identify feeling “beside themselves with enthusiasm and noble ambition,” as a part of the current political ideal. As only 16% of Americans⁴ report being very attached to their local community, it becomes nearly impossible for citizens to experience a deep feeling of responsibility for their nation. 

In Plutarch’s account of the ancient Spartan state, the appeal of political harmony was so strong as to supersede inconveniences or the human push towards individuality. Patriotic ties towards one’s nation, call forward  “an indefinable and special emotion, which nothing modern can possibly arouse,” as Swiss political philosopher Benjamin Constant expressed in his famous 1816 essay, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns.”  Lycurgus outlawed international markets not due to a fear of invasion, but due to his understanding that, “For along with strange people, strange doctrines must also come in; and novel doctrines bring novel decisions, from which there must arise many feelings and resolutions which destroy the harmony of the existing political order.”  The notion of a protective orientation towards immigration is foreign to modern political rhetoric. The defense of the “harmony of the existing political order,” requires the acknowledgement that the maintenance of the political order is the central goal of the government.

Lycurgus’s reforms display that essential to any national identity is the willingness of the populace to sacrifice themselves out of a love of neighbor and country. In order for America to survive, one must first acknowledge that there is a particular definition of the American way of life and it is good. The very fact that the nation of the United States of America exists necessitates that there are some things which America is and some which it is not. American citizens must buy-in to a similar notion of values, history, laws, and interpersonal commitments. These objective standards must rest upon the country’s Judeo-Christian founding, traditions of personal rights, and the common good. The relativistic desire to identify America exclusively as a mixture of standards and values fundamentally confuses the American project of republican government into a post-modern, post-Christian project of contradictions. In order to begin to clarify American identity, citizens must assent to standards such as equality under the law and the fomentation of virtues which allow for the proper usage of liberty–not to the destructive rhetoric of identity conflict which holds that “America” does not means much of anything besides a system of oppression.

Interestingly, a traditional notion of national identity has recently been communicated by an unexpected source—Democratic Congresswoman Ilhan Omar of Minnesota. In a speech delivered in the Somali language in early February 2024, Congresswoman Omar spoke to her constituents about national identity and patriotism. The speech’s translation is disputed, with the conservative Heritage Foundation reporting⁵ on her as saying, “Somalia belongs to Somalis—it is unified, and we are all brothers” and the progressive Minnesota Reformer writing⁶ that her words were, “we are also people who can rely on each other. We are people who are siblings. We are people with courage. We are people who know that they are Somali and Muslim. We are people who support each other.” Either translation expresses a powerful patriotic sentiment, a call for Somali unity and support, and a clear definition of who Somalis are. And yet, Congresswoman Omar serves in the House of Representatives of the United States of America, not of Somalia. Her speech, widely criticized by Republicans and defended by Democrats as an example of intersectionality, is actually an exemplification of what it means to truly belong to a nation. 

In Omar’s case, her patriotic message focuses upon the Somali nation, which the naturalization oath had bound her to “absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity” to. That a member of the American congress would feel comfortable communicating such a message about another nation highlights the confusion surrounding American self-identity. This contradiction is the natural outcome of a culture which has condemned American cultural and social standards as oppressive. It is an interesting situation in which the desire to affirm that the United States’ only defining characteristic as its lack of objective values has allowed for other identities–racial, ethnic, or multinational–to secure prominent positions in American self-understanding. 

Regardless of questions raised surrounding Omar’s American identity, it remains obvious that many American citizens long to hear their leaders proclaim a similar sentiment: “America belongs to Americans–it is unified and we are all brothers.” This deep desire to belong within one’s home is an inherent part of human nature, and is not founded upon fear or hatred of the other. Instead of a xenophobic or hateful foundation, patriotism is traditionally understood as man’s desire to come home–as Odysseus longs to return to Ithaka or Aeneas searches for a homeland for his descendants–and as pride in the civilization to which each man and woman belongs. An understanding of home is particularly important in the nation which welcomes the “huddled masses” of Lazarus’s Great Colossus; therefore, attitudes toward mass immigration must be informed by the need for a unified American identity.

Beyond the first step in recognizing and embracing that being American means assenting to certain principles and rejecting others–immigration processes must ensure that these standards are communicated and accepted. This is simply impossible to ensure when the United States is facing such record high entries at the Southern border. In documents sent to Congress from Homeland Security, the federal government projects⁷ that the “non-detained docket,” or migrants without official legal status, is projected to have hit eight million by October 2023. The sheer volume of migrants is staggering–although President Biden had promised⁸ to effectively “absorb” asylum seekers during his 2020 campaign. This absorption has proved to be more difficult than anticipated, and it is impossible to thoroughly vet individuals when the Border Patrol is facing up to a quarter of a million encounters within a single month. The situation at the Southern border is distinct from any other migration to the United States, which has historically welcomed and been benefited by diverse immigration. Immigration undoubtedly plays an important role in the United States’ economic and social development. In order to address the immigration crisis, the government must recognize its role as the protector of political harmony, and acknowledge a responsibility to both migrants and citizens–lack of documentation leaves immigrants at risk of labor exploitation and trafficking⁹.

America is a nation founded upon an ambitious program of self-government, individual rights, and an orientation towards a national common good. Any meaningful notion of American identity rests upon her citizens’ ability to recognize foundational. American ideals as historic, objective, and central to their own understanding of themselves. Rhetoric which pushes a vision of the United States as a mere amalgamation of subjective multiculturalism, and welcomes mass illegal migration, welcomes dangerous ideological confusion: confusion in which an American Congresswoman extols the patriotism of another nation, confusion in which 8 million undocumented and vulnerable individuals are practically impossible to identify or contact, and confusion in which a record low¹⁰ Americans are proud of their nation. If Americans wish to preserve their nation, they must not fear defining both their ideological and geographical borders.

Notes

*Headline picture “American Flag Waving on a Flag Pole” is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.

1.  Gramlich, John. “Migrant Encounters at the U.S.-Mexico Border Hit a Record High at the End of 2023.” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/02/15/migrant-encounters-at-the-us-mexico-border-hit-a-record-high-at-the-end-of-2023/. ↩︎
2.  Center, Pew Research. “1. How Americans View the U.S.-Mexico Border Situation and the Government’s Handling of the Issue.” Pew Research Center – U.S. Politics & Policy, 15 Feb. 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/02/15/how-americans-view-the-u-s-mexico-border-situation-and-the-governments-handling-of-the-issue/. ↩︎
3.  Speaker Kevin McCarthy. Candidate Biden Calls On Illegal Immigrants to Surge the Border. 2021. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYwLYMPLYbo. ↩︎
4. Mitchell, Travis. “5. Americans’ Satisfaction with and Attachment to Their Communities.” Pew Research Center’s Social & Demographic Trends Project, 22 May 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/05/22/americans-satisfaction-with-and-attachment-to-their-communities/. ↩︎
5. Gonzalez, Mike. “Ilhan Omar Brags About Advancing a Somalia First Agenda in Congress.” The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/commentary/ilhan-omar-brags-about-advancing-somalia-first-agenda-congress.  ↩︎
6.  Nesterak, J. Patrick Coolican, Max. “Republicans Smeared Ilhan Omar over a Faulty Translation. Here’s What She Really Said. .” Minnesota Reformer, 1 Feb. 2024, https://minnesotareformer.com/2024/02/01/republicans-smeared-ilhan-omar-over-a-faulty-translation-heres-what-she-really-said/. ^* ↩︎
7. Kight, Stef. “Scoop: Migrant Backlog to Hit 8 Million under Biden by October, Data Reveal.” Axious, 2 Mar. 2024, https://www.axios.com/2024/03/02/data-biden-border-crisis-immigration-8-million-detention.  ↩︎
8. Steck, Andrew Kaczynski, Em. “Joe Biden Promised to ‘Absorb’ 2 Million Asylum Seekers ‘in a Heartbeat’ in 2019 – He Now Faces an Immigration Crisis.” CNN, 7 Mar. 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/07/politics/kfile-biden-2-million-migrants-asylum-seekers-immigration-crisis/index.html.  ↩︎
9. Finckenauer, James, and Jennifer Schrock. Human Trafficking: A Growing Criminal Market in the U.S. . International Center of the National Institute of Justice , 2001, https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/human-trafficking-growing-criminal-market-us.  ↩︎
10.  Megan, Brenan. “Record-Low 38% Extremely Proud to Be American.” Gallup, Inc., 29 June 2022, https://news.gallup.com/poll/394202/record-low-extremely-proud-american.aspx. ↩︎

By Anne Rehill

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I remember the excitement and pride I felt the first time I voted, just two months after turning 18. Those of us who are now seniors in college came of age during the 2020 presidential election, giving us the chance to be part of something that felt impactful and incredibly important at the time, regardless of what party we identified with. Yet, this optimism was short-lived as voters now prepare to confront the same two options in 2024 that we did in 2020. Acknowledging that the structure of the current two-party electoral system makes a third-party vote unlikely to have any meaningful impact on the outcome, many opted to choose the “lesser of two evils” in their view in 2020. From the left, electing Biden was seen by many as a necessary, if undesirable, effort to prevent Trump from re-election. From the right, many Republicans did favor Trump at the time, but his popularity also demonstrated a move towards extremism, which isolated many moderates. Ultimately, this choice was difficult for hundreds of thousands of Americans who felt they did not have a candidate who truly represented them.

Now, only 13% of voting-age Gen Z (individuals born from 1997 to 2013) answered that they have “A great deal” or “Quite a lot” of trust in the presidency, and that number is even lower if you narrow it down to only Gen Z independents of voting age: 7%.¹ There is an epidemic in which young people of voting age in the U.S. lack trust in several critical political and social institutions including Congress, the news, and the Presidency. According to the Harvard Youth Poll, although Gen Z played an instrumental role in the election of Biden in 2020, fewer young Americans plan on voting in 2024, with most of this decline coming from young Republican and independent voters. Comparing this to the 2020 presidential election cycle, the number of young Americans between 18 and 29 years old who “definitely” plan on voting for president has decreased from 57% to 49%.² If continued, Gen Z could have lower political participation rates in upcoming elections due to a sense of disillusionment with their effectiveness in influencing politics in a political system that reinforces a rigid binary. The fact that a significant portion of the voting population is frustrated with the status quo is a serious concern and should be taken as a serious warning about the health of American democracy.

Everyone has heard that America is the most polarized today that it has ever been. Republican representatives have tended to move more right on the ideological spectrum, Democratic representatives have tended to move more left, negative views of each other have reached record highs, and government structures like Congress that require bipartisan cooperation have become dysfunctional. However, despite still having political “leanings” and strong beliefs, Gen Z and Millenials are the least partisan generations, with a whopping 52% identifying themselves as Independent.³ 

Some potential reasons why Gen Z may not want to identify with the Democratic Party or the Republican Party include recognition of the ineffectiveness of partisan uncooperativeness, distrust in the beholdenness of the parties to large donor organizations and individuals, and mismatches between voters and candidates in stances on topical issues such as Israel/Palestine and environmental initiatives. This leads to a dilemma as we are dissatisfied with the lack of third-party options. The First-Past-the-Post (also called “single-choice voting”) and Winner-Takes-All Voting systems presently in American Presidential elections discourage smaller parties from gaining a foothold because they may struggle to win electoral votes without widespread support across multiple states. Without the primaries producing any solid alternatives to Biden and Trump, other groups have attempted to offer third-party options.

According to No Labels–a group meant to unite conservatives, liberals, and everyone in between under the fundamental beliefs of Country over party and moderation over extremism–their “polling shows 63% of Americans would be open to supporting a moderate independent presidential candidate in 2024 if the alternatives are Donald Trump and Joe Biden.”⁴ However, No Labels faced high levels of criticism by those who believed it would “spoil” the election and cause Trump to be re-elected by taking votes away from those who would have otherwise voted for Biden. For this reason, they were not able to field a candidate, with Joe Manchin, Chris Christie, and Larry Hogan declining, and abandoned their ticket last week. Meanwhile, as of March 29, 2024 polls, third-party candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr. attracted 12.3% of votes.⁵ This 12.3%, which was mostly siphoned from potential Biden voters, could have a huge impact on the outcome if Kennedy were to remain in the race.

The only way to mitigate polarization, give proper representation to those outside of the Republican/Democrat dichotomy, and reverse declining political participation is to reform the electoral system. Restructuring campaign finance, the electoral college, and implementing Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) could make third-party options feasible. Others call for age restrictions, with 82% of Republicans and 76% of Democrats supporting a maximum age limit in place for elected federal officials.⁶ These reforms could be achieved either through amendments to the Constitution or through individual efforts by all states. The U.S. Constitution grants states significant autonomy to states in determining their election procedures, including methods for conducting elections and counting votes. RCV has already been implemented in several statewide and federal elections in Maine and Alaska, and this March, Representative Don Beyer re-introduced an updated Fair Representation Act to implement measures to elect U.S. House Representatives through ranked-choice voting in multi-member districts.⁷

American historian and activist Howard Zinn said, “You can’t be neutral on a moving train.” To not vote is to take a side by allowing a winning candidate to be elected without opposition. Gen Z is the most diverse, most well-educated, and most technologically adept generation in American history. This makes it not only essential to get Gen Z levels of participation up to 2020 levels this 2024 but also gives us a unique ability to advocate for change. As we head into November, it is important that we mobilize to get out and vote, as voting goes far beyond the Presidential race. Thirty-two states will have senator elections and and dozens of House seats are up for re-election. These representatives have the power to back legislation for electoral reform in Congress. Whether you sign a petition in support of election reforms, contact your representatives to let them know your support, or volunteer on campaigns, now is the time to take action.

Notes

*Headline image “I Voted Sticker” is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license.

1. Zach Hrynowski and Stephanie Marken, “Gen Z Voices Lackluster Trust In Major U.S. Institutions,” Gallup, September 14, 2023, https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/510395/gen-voices-lackluster-trust-major-institutions.aspx. ↩︎
2. “Harvard Youth Poll,” Harvard Kennedy School Institute of Politics, December 5, 2023, https://iop.harvard.edu/youth-poll/46th-edition-fall-2023 utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email#key-takeaway–id–1516  ↩︎
3.  Pew Research Center, “Party Identification in the United States in 2022, By Generation,” chart, August 18, 2022, Statistia, https://www.statista.com/statistics/319068/party-identification-in-the-united-states-by-generation. ↩︎
4.  “Unity Ticket 2024 FAQs,” No Labels, accessed April 3, 2024, https://www.nolabels.org/unity-ticket-faqs. ↩︎
5.  “2024 General Election: Trump vs Biden vs Kennedy,” Real Clear Polling, accessed March 29, 2024, https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/president/general/2024/trump-vs-biden-vs-kennedy. ↩︎
6.  John Gramlich, “Most Americans favor maximum age limits for federal elected officials, Supreme Court justices,” PEW Research, October 4, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/10/04/most-americans-favor-maximum-age-limits-for-federal-elected-officials-supreme-court-justices/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Constitution%20sets%20minimum,age%20for%20Supreme%20Court%20justices. ↩︎
7. Congress, “Text – H.R.3863 – 117th Congress (2021-2022): Fair Representation Act,” November 1, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3863/text. ↩︎

By Kendall Manning

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By Marko Gural

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Polyakova’s claim is one instance of international relations scholars using analogies of the past to advocate for positions in the present and future. Analogies are inferences based on the logic that if two events are similar in one respect, they may be similar in many other ways². Two of the most commonly used analogies today are those of Munich and Pearl Harbor. At the Munich Conference of 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Nazi leader Adolf Hitler by granting him Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland. Chamberlain hoped that Hitler would be satisfied with the agreement but did not realize his hegemonic ambitions. Thus, Munich helped Hitler prepare for World War II, and scholars of history should know never to give an inch to a murderous dictator, as Chamberlain did in 1938. 

A second analogy concerns Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Ostensibly, the United States was unprepared for the surprise attack, leading to President Roosevelt’s “a date which will live in infamy” declaration and America’s subsequent involvement in the Second World War. Instead, policymakers and the military must always be ready for conflict.

Are these analogies accurate? They are not. Analogies often incorrectly promote ahistorical policies. Analysts misunderstand both the Munich Conference of 1938 and Japan’s decision to bomb Pearl Harbor in 1941. The common stories promote war-mongering, intense defense spending, and remaining on constant alert. Leaders are fearful of surprise attacks and their publics labeling them as appeasers or pacifists.

Unfortunately, this historical distortion is common. For example, Republican Senator Kevin Cramer of North Dakota claimed in 2022 that the Biden administration had failed to respond to Putin decisively, instead creating a “new international policy of appeasement to dictators and thugs, rather than a demonstration of strength.”³ Furthermore, former President Donald Trump has declared that Biden’s poorly executed 2021 withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan emboldened Putin.⁴ To be clear, this is a bipartisan analogy: Michael McFaul, Ambassador to Russia during the Obama administration, has repeated this same language.⁵ Republican Senator Pete Ricketts of Nebraska has applied this same rhetoric to China, arguing that Biden’s foreign policy is “all about appeasement.” He continued that appeasing dictators is a worthless endeavor because “you cannot make these people happy,” since China “wants to be the world dominating power by 2049.”⁶ 

In the above cases, the implications are that the United States should have stayed in Afghanistan, even after more than two decades of fighting; the United States should have deterred Putin’s attack, although it is never clear how; and that the United States should incite an arms race against China. Indeed, many U.S. lawmakers today speak of a new “Axis of Evil” around the world to which America must respond.

The same is true for Pearl Harbor and its analogy to surprise attack. History remembers many wars as being started by one side’s surprise invasion: Stalin was supposedly unaware of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa, U.S. troops were caught off guard by the communist Tet Offensive in Vietnam, and the Israelis were ignorant of Arab preparations for the 1973 Yom Kippur War.⁷ Many witnessed Hamas’ invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023, through the same lens. Because such attacks can seemingly come at any time, the United States must remain prepared for battle. In fact, U.S. policymakers evoked memories of Pearl Harbor during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most tense nuclear standoff in history. Advisors to President Kennedy warned against a Soviet surprise attack and themselves argued against preemption.⁸

Reality

In reality, a close historical reading of the Munich and Pearl Harbor cases lend themself to vastly different lessons than those commonly promoted today.

The Munich story warns us about the dangers of disconnected military doctrine and diplomatic policy. After World War I, Great Britain promised to retrench from European commitments. She adopted the Ten-Year Rule, which “enjoined the services not to prepare for any major conflict” within a decade and limited military investment.⁹ Although the rise of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany’s rearmament caused considerable consternation in 10 Downing Street, the British Army was not prepared to maintain even a “rudimentary capability for combat” on the continent until 1939.¹⁰ When Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had to engage in diplomacy that reflected British capabilities. In fact, Chamberlain looked for a general settlement to “appease” the tense European situation–not towards Hitler in particular–because the post-World War I Versailles system had clearly failed.¹¹ London’s allies were likely not strong enough to stand up to Berlin in September 1938: France’s military doctrine was defensive and unable to stand up to Germany, Stalin had purged most of the Red Army’s officer corps, and no other countries were strong enough to substantially impact a war against Hitler. ¹²

Thus, even had the British hoped to stand up to Hitler (and not “appease” him, although this use of the term is similarly ahistorical), war was risky. Chamberlain took the realistic route at the moment: ignorant of Hitler’s intentions but aware that another year of preparation would help the Allies in a possible war, he attempted to reach a settlement.

Pearl Harbor tells us that surprise attacks are often not truly surprises. Instead, they can be a careful and calculated step up the escalation ladder. Many Americans forget that Japan’s interwar economy was strongly tied to the United States, who supplied Japan with 80% of her energy requirements through crude oil.¹³ After Japan invaded northern Indochina in 1940, the U.S. strengthened economic sanctions, froze all Japanese assets in the United States, and introduced a total oil embargo. The Japanese, shocked by the abruptness of these actions, attempted to reach a modus vivendi for months. As Tokyo and Washington failed to come to an agreement, the Japanese continued to grow more desperate in the face of waning energy supplies. President Roosevelt and American units in the Pacific received information on December 6 that a Japanese attack was imminent, but the first offensive on the Philippines—and later on Pearl Harbor—was as overwhelming as if no warning had been sent out.¹⁴ 

Pearl Harbor was an escalation, but one that the United States anticipated and quite a logical maneuver on the part of the Japanese. Indeed, although surprise attacks have started most major wars since World War II, Richard Betts finds that the “element of surprise…was unwarranted” because “substantial evidence” of attack was available before it happened.¹⁵ Intelligence failures, rather than a lack of constant vigilance, are often the causes of “surprises.”

Conclusions

Even if scholars and the public were to understand Munich and Pearl Harbor, among other important historical cases, analogies remain of limited use for discerning and predicting the unpredictable world of international politics. Analogies aim to broadly connect two events that have at least one similarity. This can be useful for casual observers growing interested in the world of international relations, but it is unthinkably dangerous for seasoned politicians and world leaders. 

The main danger that analysts face threatens the state’s existence and power. Appeasement and surprise attack analogies can lead to bloated defense spending and unnecessary constant alert. This, in turn, risks overextension. Overextension occurs when great powers commit themselves to areas, countries, or threats that they lack the capability to manage. The phenomenon can damage the home front and lead to a breakdown of international prestige. After the First World War, for example, Great Britain gained territories to grow her empire to its largest extent yet, but also faced a domestic economic crisis and skyrocketing unemployment. Although London won the Second World War, Britain failed to effectively defend her allies, and the Empire soon collapsed.

Washington’s insiders should rethink this approach, which would lead the United States into a dangerous period of international competition based on flawed historical understanding. No matter which analogies decision-makers grab onto, comparisons can promote nonsensical policies. America’s most important competitors today—and into the foreseeable future—are Russia and China. Although neither currently threatens the American homeland, miscalculation into confrontation has the power to take lives and soil. History can provide valuable lessons, but we cannot inflate its importance in singular cases. Politicians who scream bloody murder when they believe that a president is appeasing a dictator are ostentatiously advancing their foreign policy reputation. Unfortunately, in Washington, failure and exaggeration often breed promotion.¹⁶ The world is complicated—analogies won’t help.

Notes

*Headline image from “Münchener Abkommen (Munich Agreement)” by Bundesarchiv, licensed under CC-BY-SA 3.0.

1. “Townhall: What is the Definition of Victory as of September 9, 2023?” YouTube, 10 September 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LIpLuvAjuZo. ↩︎
2. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 6-7. ↩︎
3. Shannon Pettypiece, Scott Wong and Peter Nicholas, “How Putin’s war could cost Biden with American voters,” NBC News, 16 February 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/putins-war-cost-biden-american-voters-rcna16383.  ↩︎
4. Pettypiece, Wong and Nicholas, “How Putin’s war could cost Biden.” ↩︎
5. Michael McFaul, “Calling for ‘Give Peace a Chance’ without a Strategy to Convince Putin To End His Invasion of Ukraine Is not Realism,” Substack, 18 August 2023, ↩︎
6. “ICYMI: Ricketts on Biden’s Foreign Policy Following Xi Meeting: “It’s All About Appeasement,” Pete Ricketts, Senator for Nebraska, 16 November 2023, https://www.ricketts.senate.gov/press-releases/icymi-ricketts-on-bidens-foreign-policy-following-xi-meeting-its-all-about-appeasement/. ↩︎
7. Richard K. Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning: Why Surprise Attacks Succeed,” Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 4 (1980-1981): 553-555. ↩︎
8. Dominic Tierney, “Pearl Harbor in Reverse,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 3 (2007): 54. ↩︎
9. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 163. ↩︎
10. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 143. ↩︎
11. Gerhard Weinberg, “Munich Conference: War Postponed,” in World War II: Roots and Causes, ed. Keith Eubank (Belmont: Wadsworth Learning, 1992), 154-166. ↩︎
12. Weinberg, “Munich Conference,” 154-166. ↩︎
13. Haruo Iguchi, “Japanese Foreign Policy and the Outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War: the Search for a Modus Vivendi in US-Japanese Relations after July 1941,” in The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective, ed. Frank McDonough (London: Continuum, 2011), 467. ↩︎
14. Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning,” 554; and Iguchi, “Japanese Foreign Policy,” 474. ↩︎
15. Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning,” 551. ↩︎
16. Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York: Macmillan, 2018). ↩︎

By Edward Nagler

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Elon Musk, America’s top entrepreneur, typically applauded for his leadership of Tesla, SpaceX, and OpenAI, has taken on a new role in our national security landscape. Musk’s industrial dominance over electric vehicles, satellite technology, and nascent artificial intelligence research positions him at the center of America’s relationship with its two most prominent adversaries – China and Russia. News of Musk’s decision to deactivate Ukraine’s access to Starlink as they prepared to engage Russian troops in Crimea and his flippant comparison between Taiwan and Hawaii has sent shockwaves through the foreign policy world. Musk’s influence over foreign affairs may even outrank John D. Rockefeller, who wielded unparalleled power through his Standard Oil Monopoly in the early 1900s. However, Musk’s unchecked rhetoric and unprecedented influence over foreign policy have undermined the Biden Administration’s  agenda and jeopardized U.S. interests overseas. While Musk’s entrepreneurship and unorthodoxy once warranted applause from American audiences, we must now consider whether his recent actions make him a grave national security threat. 

A Missed Opportunity? Defending Musk’s Initial Foreign Policy Actions

While Musk’s recent decisions to shut off Ukraine’s access to Starlink technology and declaration that Taiwan is an integral part of China endangers U.S. interests, his initial actions regarding China and Russia arguably served them. By providing Ukraine access to Starlink in February 2022, Musk bolstered their communication and surveillance capabilities, hindering a swift Russian victory and a potential challenge to NATO territory. Meanwhile, Musk’s meeting with Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang in May 2023 emphasized the benefits of continued American-Chinese economic cooperation, facilitating communication between the two nations during a time of frozen diplomatic channels. Musk’s initial actions demonstrate that private citizens can benefit U.S. national security under the proper circumstances.

Musk’s decision to activate Starlink at the onset of Russia’s invasion on February 26, 2022 demonstrates his willingness to use technology to promote U.S. national security. After being asked by Mykhalio Fedorov, Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister to activate Starlink on Twitter, Elon granted his request within hours.¹ While Musk may appear to be conducting a publicity stunt, the government did not initially fund Starlink, implying that he independently chose to fund the Ukrainian effort.² Starlink has contributed significantly to Ukraine’s communication and detection of Russian battlefield movements, contributing to the war effort and therefore promoting U.S. interests. However, Musk consistently expressed uneasiness towards the prospect of Starlink technology being used to mount an attack on Russian territory – including Crimea.³ Musk’s initial willingness to offer technology to support the Ukrainian cause was admirable, however the Biden Administration’s failure to interpret Musk’s war aims or harness his technological prowess positioned Musk to inevitably use Starlink against U.S. interests.

Meanwhile, Musk’s meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang inadvertently served U.S. National Security interests by highlighting the severe economic costs of a conflict with China. According to liberal conceptions of international relations, a key way for states to overcome an anarchic international order and facilitate cooperation is through economic interdependence.⁴ Accordingly, if states’ economies become deeply intertwined, the mutually devastating consequences of war would deter conflict.⁵ Musk’s visit strengthened interdependence between the two countries by defying both states’ strategy of economic decoupling. However, Musk’s intentions were not rooted in patriotism but instead out of personal gain. American-Chinese economic cooperation is in Tesla’s interest, considering that 30 to 50 percent of Tesla’s total production is based in Shanghai.⁶ Nevertheless, Musk’s business interests ultimately promoted U.S. national security through the benefits of economic interdependence, highlighting the possibility for business tycoons to serve U.S. interests while chasing their own profit. However, Musk may have gone too far in his efforts to appease the CCP by supporting their territorial claim over Taiwan. 

Things Go Astray: Elon’s Daunting Power Grab and Fanatical Rhetoric

Despite Musk’s initial contributions to U.S. national security, his recent decisions to curtail Ukraine’s access to Starlink technology and issue provocative statements regarding Taiwan has only endangered the United States. While private citizens like Musk can act in the national interest, their efforts at foreign policymaking can also have disastrous consequences that propel the United States into international conflict.

On September 7, 2023, days before Walter Issacson’s biography, Elon Musk, was released to the American public, Musk’s decision to sever Ukraine’s access to Starlink in Fall 2022 made national headlines. In the biography, Issacson provides a detailed account of Musk’s rationale for sabotaging Ukraine’s attempt to attack a Russian fleet off the coast of Crimea. According to the biography, Musk justified his decision by claiming that “Space X would be explicitly complicit in a major act of war and conflict escalation” if Starlink contributed to Ukraine’s attack.⁷ Moreover, Musk backed up his claim by asserting that he was merely trying to stop another “Pearl Harbor.”⁸ However, Musk’s defense that he would be “complicit in a major act of war” rings hollow given his prior willingness to provide Ukraine with ongoing Starlink access, which undoubtedly contributed to their war effort. Musk’s claim that he made the decision after consulting the Russian government⁹ also raises concerns that he acted on behalf of an American adversary. 

Elon Musk’s actions, despite the ongoing debate regarding U.S. economic and military support for Ukraine, are jeopardizing American national security interests. By thwarting Ukrainian war plans, Musk is prolonging the conflict, forcing Ukraine to ask the United States for more financial and military support. Moreover, Musk’s decision to consult Russia instead of the United States implies that he is defying the U.S. government’s wishes. What is most alarming  though is that news of this sneaky maneuver made public headlines a year after the incident. It remains to be seen whether any other moves to undermine Ukrainian objectives will arise in the months to come. 

Meanwhile, on September 13, 2023, Musk thrust himself into the debate over China’s claim on Taiwan in a virtual appearance at the All-In Summit while sitting comfortably on his luxurious private jet. In his appearance, Musk claimed that China’s perception of Taiwan is analogous to our relationship with Hawaii.¹⁰ While Musk’s statement demonstrates his desire to appease China and safeguard his business interests, his subsequent comments defied U.S. security objectives. Following his Hawaii analogy, Musk asserted that Taiwan is “like an integral part of China that is arbitrarily not part of China, mostly because the U.S. Pacific Fleet has stopped any sort of reunification by force.”¹¹ This statement not only ignores Taiwan’s strong desire for independence, a significant factor hindering reunification efforts, but also places the blame for stalled reunification squarely on the United States. Furthermore, Musk’s claim that Taiwan’s separation from China is “arbitrary” suggests that it is somehow unnatural that reunification has not yet occurred. 

Musk’s commentary poses a severe threat to U.S.-China relations and actually undermines his business interests. By suggesting that American warships are responsible for the separation of China and Taiwan, Musk strengthens China’s claim on Taiwan and emboldens China to take action. Reunification of China and Taiwan undermines American objectives in the Pacific because a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could result in a direct military conflict between two major powers with a chance of nuclear escalation. Furthermore, if the United States were to withdraw support from Taiwan, a Chinese victory would allow China to project more military power in the Pacific from Taiwan and threaten key U.S. allies. Musk’s comments ironically undermine his interests because he is escalating U.S.-China tensions, compromising his efforts to promote economic cooperation between the two countries. In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, a military blockade of China or a trade embargo would inflict severe costs on Tesla’s profits. Musk’s fanatical rhetoric demonstrates why he is ill-suited to conduct diplomacy with our adversaries.

Where Can We Go From Here?

  Elon Musk’s recent political stunts with U.S. adversaries highlight his dangerous influence on U.S. national security. Moreover, Musk’s ability to thwart U.S. interests in the future is still growing. As a result, the U.S. government must take action to limit his ability to conduct foreign policy as a private citizen. 

A potential solution to handcuffing Musk’s control over Starlink is for the United States government to pay for it entirely. In Fall 2022, Musk hinted that he’d like the Pentagon to start funding Starlink, noting the high costs of his private contributions.¹² The United States should fulfill Musk’s request on the condition that Musk forfeits his presidential-like power to independently control Ukraine’s access to it. If Musk continues to fund Starlink, even partially, he will maintain his claim to control its implementation. Luckily, Senators Warren, Shaheen and Duckworth recognize the need to curb Musk’s control over Starlink technology. On September 18, 2023, they drafted a letter to Lloyd Austin and the Department of Defense lamenting Musk’s unilateral control over the technology. In the letter, they asked Austin if there were other incidents where Musk unilaterally chose to shut off Starlink technology or if contract protections existed to block Musk from taking unilateral action.¹³ The U.S. government should also stop awarding contracts to SpaceX to punish Musk for undermining American interests. While Musk has the right to object to U.S. Foreign Policy, the government owes it to its citizens to refrain from purchasing military technologies from contractors who discreetly consult foreign adversaries.

Regarding Musk’s Taiwan rhetoric, there is little the United States can do to stop his reckless action. His ownership of X (formerly known as Twitter) allows him to control information regarding China’s claim on Taiwan, raising severe concerns over Musk’s capability to promote disinformation favoring China’s claims and suppress information supporting Taiwan’s claim for independence. Musk can also use these same powers to promote Russian propaganda and decrease U.S. support for the Ukrainian war effort. In fact, a September 2023 report from the European Union substantiated these concerns. The EU found Musk’s X Platform to have the largest number of posts containing disinformation and noted the high frequency of posts parroting Russian narratives.

Americans should fear Musk’s unprecedented ability to leverage his tech empire to influence U.S. foreign policy as an unelected official. While countless Americans pursue their dreams of shaping foreign policy through meritocratic channels, Musk uses his control over satellite technology, social media, and artificial intelligence to play his own game of great power diplomacy. Musk’s impact on our relationships with our adversaries sends a chilling message to future generations, suggesting that power and wealth, rather than knowledge and experience are the keys to influencing policy. As Musk cements his position as a volatile player in the national security ecosystem, Americans have a patriotic duty to scrutinize his ongoing communications with Russia, China, and other U.S. adversaries to safeguard the integrity of our foreign policy. 

Notes

1. Christine H Fox and Emelia S. Probasco, “Big Tech Goes to War,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2023,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/big-tech-goes-war. ↩︎
2. Christine H Fox and Emelia S. Probasco, “Big Tech Goes to War,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2023,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/big-tech-goes-war. ↩︎
3. Christine H Fox and Emelia S. Probasco, “Big Tech Goes to War,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2023,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/big-tech-goes-war. ↩︎
4. Daniel W Drezner, “The Dangers of Misunderstanding Economic Interdependence,” CATO Institute, September 12, 2023, https://www.cato.org/publications/dangers-misunderstanding-economic-interdependence. ↩︎
5. Daniel W Drezner, “The Dangers of Misunderstanding Economic Interdependence,” CATO Institute, September 12, 2023, https://www.cato.org/publications/dangers-misunderstanding-economic-interdependence. ↩︎
6. Roula Khalaf, “Elon Musk: ‘Aren’t You Entertained?,’” Financial Times, October 7, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/5ef14997-982e-4f03-8548-b5d67202623a. ↩︎
7. Elon Musk Says He Denied Ukraine Satellite Request to Avoid Complicity in ‘Major Act of War’ vs. Russia,” CBS News, September 8, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elon-musk-ukraine-russia-war-starlink-satellite-denied-major-act-of-war/. ↩︎
8. Marc Champion, “Analysis | Elon Musk Has Power in Ukraine. Does He Know How to Use It?,” The Washington Post, September 8, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/09/08/ukraine-war-it-doesn-t-matter-how-elon-musk-got-involved-he-s-in-it/83d1a4a8-4e51-11ee-bfca-04e0ac43f9e4_story.html. ↩︎
9. Jack Detsch, “Musk’s Starlink Shutdown Raises Eyebrows,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/14/elon-musk-ukraine-russia-starlink-shutdown-crimea/. ↩︎
10. Jack Detsch, “Musk’s Starlink Shutdown Raises Eyebrows,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/14/elon-musk-ukraine-russia-starlink-shutdown-crimea/. ↩︎
11. Jack Detsch, “Musk’s Starlink Shutdown Raises Eyebrows,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/14/elon-musk-ukraine-russia-starlink-shutdown-crimea/. ↩︎
12. Christine H Fox and Emelia S. Probasco, “Big Tech Goes to War,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2023,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/big-tech-goes-war. ↩︎
13. Shaheen, Jeanne, Elizabeth Warren, Tammy Duckworth, Tim Kaine and Gary Peters. “Shaheen, Warren, Duckworth, Kaine and Peters Send Letter to Secretary Austin Requesting Information about Defense Contracts with Commercial Providers Following the Reported Starlink Incident in Ukraine: U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire,” U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen, September 15, 2023, https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/shaheen-warren-and-duckworth-send-letter-to-secretary-austin-requesting-information-about-defense-contracts-with-commercial-providers-following-the-reported-starlink-incident-in-ukraine.
    ↩︎

By Michael Donelan

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The breadth of political philosophies is a bizarre thing. Each of us are intimate members of political life, yet our communal involvement scarcely results in homogenous conceptions of what “politics” is. In a way, this is itself a deeply political situation: we come together with our own perspectives; our own theories; our own concerns and epistemologies and histories. Somehow, without exactly agreeing on what a “community” is, or what counts as “functioning,” we have to intellectually bargain our way to a functioning community.

Like how policies are unintelligible without the context they are conceived in, my particular political arguments lean heavily on my broader view of the nature of politics; this inaugural piece consequently has the unique (and cumbersome) purpose of laying out ex nihilo the foundations of my political thought. Its successors will engage with more specific and widely familiar topics, but this initial baptism in what might be deeply foreign thought is the mandatory first step. However, as you will learn should you bore yourself with my editorial series, authoritarianism and I find each other something loathsome. It would be wrong for me, then, to impress on you my own political conception as patent truth. Take it instead as a footsoldier in the army of idiosyncratic imaginations indigenous to any free society.

I understand politics broadly, as the causal principles that govern reality. I even contend that this is hardly a heterodox theory; I see it only as a generalization of the mainstream definition of politics, “who gets what, and why.” The conventional conceptions revolve around this distributive theme, conferring the “political” label on anything deciding resource assignment. But that perspective zooms in too far, cutting out the reason why distribution is political. It is that question that my own understanding answers.

When you see politics as the causal principles of reality, it places our intraspecies contensions in their appropriate theoretical context. Rather than a peculiar, fundamentally human activity, we can recognize politics as the pattern and grammar of reality across a slew of areas usually condemned to the apolitical.

Think of it like this: when Party A is more popular than Party B, it wins elections; when it wins elections, it implements its policies. Politics—as we commonly recognize it—is the causal language dictating our policy reality. Now take it a step back: when Organism A is more fit for its environment than Organism B, it is selected for; when it is selected for, it becomes the dominant species. The distinctions between this and the former case are so superficial it would be obscene to focus on those petty differences rather than the deep, categorical likeness. The most important information about the former solution is likewise the most important information about the latter: what results, and why? The supposed “distinctions” that make the former case “political” tell you nothing meaningful. Who cares what the parties are, or what policies they endorse? The substance resides entirely in the logic of why one party wins and what the reality it causes looks like; and this template is prominently at work anywhere you look, regardless of the relevance of human activity. Politics is the creation of reality. It is the logic of two molecules binding; the reason behind the engine of natural selection; the rationale of a gunfight. Who lives, who dies: what happens, what does not. In my eyes, politics is the umbrella over this panoply of caused events, a term silly on its face, but profound when you recognize what a marvel it is to change the state of reality. Have you ever heard a professor sermonize on how philosophy is the foundation of the intellectual sphere? (I have). Well in precisely the same way, politics is the foundation of the practical sphere. An astrophysicist cannot know the sun will rise tomorrow without a philosophical justification for empirical belief, and the sun will not rise tomorrow without a politics allowing it to. Using the common denominator of logical cause and effect, politics binds together superficially irreconcilable phenomena, which we arrogantly divide in some self-aggrandizing project to claim “the political” exclusively for human affairs.

But what does this tell us? What does my conception give that conventional distribution narratives deprive?

A recognition of what matters. And once you have that, you have the interpretive key to understand politics beyond facades of unsure norms and fragile narratives.

Entertain an analogy. Consider something commonly considered to be in the “political” realm, like the personal demeanor or policy aspirations of political leaders. These superficial traits are like the variables of an equation: though important, they are useless without understanding their relations to each other. If you had to choose which to know—the variables, or their operators, exponents, and so on—you would much prefer knowledge of the latter elements. At least if you understand the logic connecting the variables, you can see how they will scale with each other, or determine the shape of their curve. If you have the variables, and no connective logic, you would be up a creek with no paddle. Politics is that logic. It is the causation into which variables fit. Whether those variables concern states, firms, galaxies or curling teams, they are all members in the same category: causative determination of reality.

But what does this tell us about human politics? (I will concede that, despite its failure to contextualize human politics in the grand pattern of reality-determination, the distributional definition is excellent at catering to our interests).

I think it tells us something quite important: the politics of our “politics.” That is, it focuses us, clearing out superficial distractions so we can recognize the meaningful logic driving our own world.

So, allow us to make sense of our authentic politics.

It begins by recognizing that political processes, as logical causal processes, are governed by sets of rules. These rules can be arranged in hierarchies, such that one countermands another. Federal law, for instance, is generally unrestrained by state law. Rules need not be literal regulations, though; for instance, an appellate court can overturn the ruling of a district court. Here, the appellate court, though an actor rather than a literal law, is the superior rule. As a final nuance, the hierarchy among rules may be incomplete, or even contradictory. Perhaps all rules are equal, and none can override another, or perhaps they are intransitive. But for our purposes, only one rule matters: the one at the top, called the ultima ratio, which we’ll nickname the U.R. for short. It stands always in superposition to its counterparts. There is no rule which can defy it.

Conveniently, there is a consensus over what the U.R. is in our politics. Call it force, violence, coercion, or another moniker, so long as you respect the essential fact: that there is no higher appeal than physical authority. The presence of an U.R. changes the structure of political rules. When there is an unexceptional rule, which overrides all others, then all political behavior becomes rooted in the eventual exercise of the U.R. In this sense, the U.R. is foundational; it is the bedrock upon which the entire regime of political rules is constructed. Importantly, the share of activity which inferior rules comprise should never be taken to imply a superiority to the U.R. Consider how one must define an origin to make a physics problem intelligible. Without a point of reference, distance and movement have no practical meaning. Thus, though the “important” parts of physics, the parts that dominate our work with it, are conducted in terms of velocity, acceleration, jerk, snap, crackle, and pop (those are the real fourth, fifth, and sixth time-derivatives of position; and physicists call us the fake scientists), they all exist only in their relation to the rarely-used position value. When a U.R. exists, it creates much the same ecosystem amongst the political rules. With an absolute law present, all inferior rules become defined in relation to their ultimate superior; they literally become derivatives of the highest rule. 

Politics is the logic of reality, and the logic of our reality—no matter how many proxies we build—is violence. This is the ecosystem within which my thought exists, and which these editorials will explore: a world where politics is always, everywhere, inevitably, cruelly, the exercise of irrational violence.

by Anne Rehill

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Cover Image via NASA

The idea of a “global commons” is a zone that exists outside the jurisdiction of any nation but upon which all nations depend for finite, non-excludable resources.¹ The governance framework of treaties and agreements for these commons, such as the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, including the High Seas, in 1982, was established in the wake of World War II to ensure that these zones should only be used for peaceful non-military purposes and all may enter, use, and navigate through them.² By the time of the Space Race in the 1960s, the Antarctic Treaty served as a major inspiration for the development of space law, establishing much of the same rules for the use of outer space as a commons in the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, the Registration Convention of 1976, and the Moon Treaty of 1979. Thus, space law sought to establish a “province of all mankind” premised on similar principles: that no state can claim sovereignty over the moon, that no nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction or military activities may take place on the moon, and that any activities must prevent the “harmful contamination” of space or Earth.³ Because of our positive “common heritage,” and the potential for negative externalities to affect all people, it is important to make sure governance of commons is responsible and sustainable.⁴

When the Space Race began, it was led by governmental agencies, such as NASA; however, recent shifts to the privatization of the aerospace sector have challenged this status quo, leading to concerns over the legality of increasing commercialization and militarization of space. Scientific technology has also changed drastically: launch vehicles and satellites are more powerful and numerous, probes and rovers have reached interstellar space and Mars, and information can be transmitted at much higher speeds and size capacities. For space to remain a peaceful global commons in the face of these more advanced capabilities and increased number of actors and motives, the new challenges must be addressed by intergovernmental organizations and incorporated into a more comprehensive body of binding space law.

Commercialization

The stipulation that no state can own any part of space in Article II of the OST was, up until recently, interpreted as meaning that no state could “own” space materials. While space resources have been collected for many years for scientific purposes, such as in the recent OSIRIS-Rex mission, space resources such as rare earth metals present in asteroids have created interest in commercial mining for a “lunar marketplace.”⁵ With these possibilities in sight, legislators from many countries have begun to think of space as a region ripe for exploitation by all who can, rather than a region that no state or actor should exploit. Only eighteen states have ratified the Moon Treaty, which sought to codify procedures for orderly mining, and none of these states are major spacefaring nations with independently owned launch vehicles.⁶ The states who did not ratify it, including the “Big Three” major spacefaring nations of the United States, Russia, and China, therefore implicitly claim that any non-military, including commercial, activity on the moon is legal as they never agreed otherwise.

The Trump Administration’s statement that “the United States does not view [space] as a global commons” further undermines the concept of shared responsibility and the need to cooperate in our shared orbits.⁷ NASA’s support for selling space resources in the Artemis Accords aligns with policies like Trump’s 2020 executive order “Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources” and the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. These policies declare that the U.S. may mine space resources as they deny that “the extraction of space resources […] inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.”⁸ Saudi Arabia even reversed its ratification of the Moon Treaty in 2023 to join the Artemis Accords as they sought to get on board with space mining. By challenging the interpretation of the OST national appropriation clause in favor of new non-binding expectations, spacefaring parties are taking advantage of ambiguity to benefit while they have an access advantage over most other nations. These policies may prove to be unsustainable as there are no bounds to the exploration, which could lead to a “tragedy of the commons,” in which a communal resource loses its value because it was overexploited in the absence of proper regulation. However, the fact that most states on Earth cannot easily go to space makes it difficult for smaller or less affluent states to challenge those who do not follow the rules.

Militarization

The core principle of using space for peaceful purposes in Article IV of the OST is also being tested as space increasingly becomes part of states’ military strategies. Though the OST prohibits the establishment of military bases, installations, and fortifications, “space forces” have begun to increase, creating a new security dilemma.⁹ The United States’ creation of a space force, backed by President Biden, has triggered Russia, France, and other states to build their space forces to increase their security in response to the perceived threat of the American one. These military forces constitute military activity in space, directly violating the Outer Space Treaty, and further demonstrating unconcern for international space law by major world players.

Additionally, the increasing capabilities of low-orbit satellites to provide information and internet connections can be appropriated for military uses. Although the use of satellites is not explicitly militant, they can be used to track where enemy troops are located, plan missions, and intercept communications. Recently, SpaceX’s Starlink satellites have played a prominent role in the War in Ukraine, providing internet and access to communication networks to the Ukrainian military after their systems were destroyed in the fighting.¹⁰ The Starlink satellites were intended for commercial rather than military purposes, aiming to provide high-speed internet connections worldwide. Yet, the Ukrainian military has used Starlink’s satellites to coordinate drone strikes, prompting Musk to shut off access to the Starlink networks. Musk stated: “If I had agreed to their request, then SpaceX would be explicitly complicit in a major act of war and conflict escalation,” which he objected to participating in.¹¹ As space becomes an increasingly private sphere, as opposed to the government-led efforts of the 1960s, the role of individual actors and their obligations towards governments, international peace, and social responsibility have not been clearly defined.

Conclusions

The governance of outer space–-the existence of which was never necessary before space travel became possible in the 1960s-–presents a complex and evolving challenge for the international community. The existing political and legal frameworks, rooted in the concept of space as a global commons, are under strain as states and private actors increasingly assert their rights to exploit space resources and engage in militarization. This creates tensions regarding what obligations different groups have in maintaining international peace and social responsibility, as well as what rights they are entitled to regarding space resources or even territory. Further ethical considerations include the inaccessibility of the sector to all but the ultra-wealthy, which violates Article I of the OST’s call for space to benefit all states, “irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development,” not just the states with spacefaring capabilities enabled by material resources.

International cooperation and clear regulations are therefore essential to balance state, private sector, and global interests in space. Crucial components for new space laws must include provisions on sustainability to avoid pollution or corruption of space resources, fair divisions of space so that all nations can benefit, clearly defined rules on how private companies can participate in space, regulations for space commerce, and restrictions on the capabilities of space forces. Thus, new legislation reinforcing the OST while accommodating the changing political, economic, and military landscape of space will ensure the equitable and sustainable exploration of the “final frontier” in years to come.

Notes

1. Benjamin Silverstein and Ankit Panda, “Space Is a Great Commons. It’s Time to Treat It as Such,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 9, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/09/space-is-great-
   commons.-it-s-time-to-treat-it-as-such-pub-84018. ↩︎
2. “Convention on the Law of the Sea,” opened for signature December 10, 1982, United Nations Treaty Series 1833, No. 31363: art. 88-90, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf; “The
   Antarctic Treaty,” opened for signature December 1, 1959, United Nations Treaty Series 402, No. 5778: Art. 1-3,
   https://documents.ats.aq/keydocs/vol_1/vol1_2_AT_Antarctic_Treaty_e.pdf. ↩︎
3. “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” opened for signature December 18, 1979, United Nations Treaty Series 610, No. 8843: Art. 1, https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_21_2222E.pdf. ↩︎
4. “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” opened for signature July 11, 1984, United Nations Treaty Series 1363, no. 23002: Art. 11, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/moon-agreement.html. ↩︎
5. Loren Grush, “NASA wants to buy Moon rocks from private companies,” The Verge, September 10, 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/10/21429850/nasa-moon-rocks-sampling-commercial-space-transaction-lunar-marketplace. ↩︎
6. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Status of International Agreements relating to activities in outer space,” January 1, 2023, https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2023/aac_105c_22023crp/aac_105c_22023crp_3_0_html/AC105_C2_2023_CRP03E.pdf. ↩︎
7. U.S. President, Executive Order, “Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, 2020, Executive Order 13914 of April 6, 2020,” Federal Register 85, No. 70 (April 10, 2020): 20381-20382, https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2020-07800. ↩︎
8. “The Artemis Accords Principles For Cooperation In The Civil Exploration And Use Of The Moon, Mars, Comets, And Asteroids For Peaceful Purposes,” October 13, 2020: Section 10, https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf. ↩︎
9. “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” Art. IV. ↩︎
10. Adam Satariano, “Elon Musk doesn’t want his satellites to run Ukraine’s drones,” The New York Times, February 9, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/09/world/europe/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-satellite-ukraine.html. ↩︎
11. Elon Musk, Twitter Post, September 7, 2023, 6:48 pm,
    https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1699917639043404146?s=46&t=bZcrLpl8DTxSpYLBntBfhQ. ↩︎

By Marko Gural

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The interpretation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is up for debate: some argue that NATO expansion forced Putin’s hand, while others assert that imperial Russian tendencies motivated Moscow. Both claims miss the point. The means by which NATO expanded–without firm commitments or deadlines–allowed careful Russian escalation.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is entering its twentieth month. Ukraine’s highly-awaited counteroffensive has neither culminated nor failed, but Ukraine is fighting for small settlements when many expected it to be capturing major cities and destroying Russian ground lines of communication. A lack of substantial victories makes the dim future of negotiations slightly more visible. Whispers of peace permeate the halls of Western security players: Gen. Mark Milley, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Stian Jenssen, Chief of Staff to the UN Secretary General; and Richard Haass, former Council on Foreign Relations President, have all hinted at possible Ukrainian concessions or diplomacy with Russia.¹

How did this war come about? Many have debated its roots. Realists claim that their theory of international politics foresaw Putin’s dark reaction to NATO’s provocatory march to his western border, with John Mearsheimer even stating in 2014 that “the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault.”² Others believe that Putin dreams of a return to imperial Russia, hoping to wipe Ukraine off the list of nations and continue his trek west.³

This piece is not about theory or ideology, but seeks to understand landmark moments in Russo-Ukrainian security and the many actors behind European security policy in the leadup to February 24, 2022. Was there a turning point in Russian-Ukrainian-NATO relations that made war more likely? In other words, could a different NATO policy have deterred Putin’s invasion? How does this understanding impact Ukraine’s postwar orientation? NATO’s Ukraine policy since its 2008 Bucharest memorandum was the long-term cause of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, allowing Moscow to slowly escalate in Ukraine, blame its actions on NATO, and never fear serious NATO commitment. Had NATO been more forceful, or never considered expansion in the first place, Russia may not have started the bloodiest war in Europe since 1945. Thus, Ukraine must walk out of this conflict either incredibly militarily fortified or neutral with inviolable international guarantees. To maintain peace, compromise will be necessary.

Bucharest 2008

Ukrainian-NATO relations began in the 1990s and strengthened in the 2000s, but Ukrainian leadership was most successful in pushing for NATO membership in 2008 in order to protect “national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”⁴ Putin quickly announced Russia’s opposition to Ukraine in NATO, stating that NATO missile systems on Ukrainian territory would represent a grave threat to the Kremlin. The United States was Ukraine’s biggest supporter. President George W. Bush and presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain all backed Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership. Conversely, France and Germany remained staunchly opposed to eastward expansion: French Prime Minister François Fillon stated that Georgia and Ukraine may tip Europe’s balance of power against Russia and German Chancellor Angela Merkel similarly feared friction with Moscow.⁵ So, the Western security order reached a compromise.

NATO did not extend a path to membership to Georgia and Ukraine, but its final communique stated that the two countries “will become members of NATO.”⁶ NATO provided neither a firm commitment to support Ukraine nor a deadline for its accession, placing Ukraine in a liminal state of maximum vulnerability as the Russians feared a military alliance on its border. Concurrently, NATO provided no firm guarantees for Ukrainian security. Thus, in NATO’s 2008 phrase lay a multitude of possibilities for Moscow and a dithering future for Ukraine. 

First, NATO’s flimsy commitment to Ukraine allowed Moscow’s slow escalation in former-Soviet territories, culminating in Putin’s 2022 invasion. Russia’s post-Bucharest interventions have followed a similar pattern, with military activity followed by gray zone conflict. Putin invaded Georgia in December 2008 before recognizing the independence of two Georgian regions. He annexed Crimea and supported Ukrainian separatists in 2014, before agreeing to self government and low-level conflict in two Ukrainian regions. This careful push for more territory culminated in late 2021 and early 2022, when Putin placed 190,000 troops on Ukraine’s border.⁷ Western allies refused to cooperate with Russian pleas for negotiations, whether genuine or not, and Russia invaded.

Second, NATO’s 2008 statement allowed Russian leaders to voice fears of an overwhelming military alliance on its doorstep. The Kremlin spoke against NATO expansion in 2008,⁸ 2014,⁹ 2015,¹⁰ 2016,¹¹ and 2018.¹² NATO has responded in-kind to hostilities, strengthening its security posture after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014.¹³ 

Realists cite Putin’s proximate cause of conflict as the Biden administration’s interest in Ukrainian membership in NATO.¹⁴ US Secretary of State Antony Blinken indeed stated in December 2021 that NATO’s doors “remain open” to Georgia and Ukraine, which represented no sudden or severe shift in policy.¹⁵ Yet, Putin was able to repeat talking points about NATO’s offensive threat, emphasizing that Russia “would be forced to act if NATO placed missiles in Ukraine.”¹⁶ Putin repeated NATO expansion as one reason for Russia’s invasion in his February 24, 2022 speech.¹⁷ NATO may have lit a fuse for escalation that it was not equipped to extinguish.

Third, Russia could be confident that NATO countries would not risk military confrontation in Ukraine. Russia’s relatively-small incursions into Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 met weak rhetorical responses from major NATO powers.¹⁸ In responding to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, US President Barack Obama only noted that the “international community” will not recognize actions that are internationally illegal.¹⁹ He refused to send Ukraine lethal aid. 

Therefore, NATO policy on Ukraine–officially beginning and unofficially culminating in April 2008–became Ukraine’s worst nightmare. This is NATO’s war, even if not from the limited perspective that any infringement on Russia’s “sphere” would have led to an invasion. Hindsight is 20/20, but other policies may have been more effective at avoiding war.

First, a more forceful NATO may have deterred Putin. A NATO policy of this sort would have reversed its two original sins: the lack of a firm commitment and a deadline. Rather than telling Ukraine and Georgia that the two countries “will” become NATO members, a NATO policy which took concrete immediate steps towards accession would have signaled commitment to Russia. Setting a deadline on membership would have pressured hesitant European states to genuinely work towards a security solution and deter non-NATO actors. Such a policy may have also benefited Russia in the long-term, as a Ukraine which failed to join NATO after an overdue deadline would clearly have no future in the organization and could not threaten Russia unilaterally.

Second, a NATO that never expanded eastward would never have threatened Russia and exposed Ukraine. This counterfactual does not guarantee that Putin would not invade Ukraine, as Putin is rather unkind to the Ukrainian nation from both a historical and current perspective.²⁰ The policy, however, likely would have dissolved the source of more than a decade of tension with the West. 

Peace

What do these conclusions mean for the future of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict? Ukrainian liminality realistically created a security threat for Moscow while providing no military assurances. NATO’s in-between has allowed Putin to march into Ukraine. A peace deal should thus begin by recognizing Russia’s complaints and Ukraine’s fears.

Although diplomats may consider territory, possible human rights violations, and other subjects, Ukraine’s security situation is foremost in placating Russia and assuring Ukraine. Territorial disputes are secondary to security because the war’s frontline has changed little in recent months. Additionally, although Moscow annexed four Ukrainian oblasts, it has not completely occupied any of them.²¹ On-the-ground realities will define borders. Human rights are similarly not the first point of discussion in peace negotiations. Putting Russian human rights violators on trial would necessitate an overwhelming Ukrainian victory and a complete Russian collapse. Neither seems likely today; instead, if Moscow and Kyiv prioritize their survival and safety, then a new security arrangement in Eastern Europe is necessary.

Fearing liminality, actors should aim to create either a strong, independent Ukraine, or a neutral and demilitarized Ukraine with hefty security guarantees. Such is the art of negotiation: each warring nation has waged a battle with successes and failures. Peace ought to reflect that.

One possibility is a strong, independent Ukraine, which would renounce future Western security commitments in exchange for Russian acceptance of high Ukrainian defense spending. This agreement would recognize Ukraine as a security actor, but would protect Moscow against a Western security alliance moving further east. Although this situation may resolve Russia’s fears of NATO expansion, Ukraine would remain a (relatively small) threat on its western border prepared to protect itself if necessary.

Alternatively, Russia may be able to force a pledge of Ukrainian neutrality if Ukraine gains rock-solid security guarantees from Western partners. Russia provided a deal of this sort in the lead-up to the full-scale invasion, which would have included NATO’s withdrawal to its 1997 position.²² Violations of Ukrainian security would have to be separately decided, but would likely incorporate any territorial incursions against newly-defined borders. Ukrainian neutrality would thus implicitly accept a Russian security sphere, but would not accede to Russian pull factors due to strong Ukrainian nationalism.

Focusing on Ukraine solves Russia’s security concerns. Kyiv would no longer have the unilateral or multilateral power to threaten Moscow. Concurrently, Ukraine’s fears are placated because it would either have sufficient military might to deter and stop an invasion or rock-solid defensive security guarantees that would commit Western allies in case of another untimely invasion.

Are these realistic concessions for Ukraine and Russia’s domestic audiences? Perhaps not for Ukrainians, who have witnessed Moscow illegally invade their country and murder their brethren in cold blood. But, peace is not always joyous. Seeing as Ukraine’s recent advances have hardly changed the frontline, a world of peace is imaginable. 

Consulted References:

Bender, Jeremy. “This is the simplest explanation of why Putin is so opposed to NATO.” Business Insider. February 12, 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/simplest-explanation-of-why-putin-hates-nato-2015-2 

“Bucharest Summit Declaration.” NATO. April 3, 2008. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm 

Caldwell, Leigh Ann and Theodoric Meyer. “Gen. Milley on Ukraine, Tuberville and ‘wokeness.’” Washington Post. August 18, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/08/18/gen-milley-ukraine-tuberville-wokeness/ 

Chatzitheodorou, Christina. “Security At The Polish-Lithuanian Border Kaliningrad, Suwalki Gap and Russia.” Finabel. February 2022. https://finabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/42.-security-at-the-polish-lithuanian-border.pdf 

Connolly, Kevin. “US has only tough talk for Russia.” BBC News. August 12, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7555806.stm 

Erlanger, Steven. “As Ukraine’s Fight Grinds On, Talk of Negotiations Becomes Nearly Taboo.” New York Times. September 1, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/01/world/europe/ukraine-fight-negotiations.html 

Farchy, Jack. “Putin names Nato among threats in new Russian security strategy.” Financial Times. January 2, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/6e8e787e-b15f-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51 

Fisher, Max. “Putin’s Case for War, Annotated.” New York Times. February 24, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/europe/putin-ukraine-speech.html 

“Foreign Secretary deplores continued fighting in Georgia.” Foreign & Commonwealth Office. August 8, 2008. https://web.archive.org/web/20080828024606/http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/press-release/2008/august/georgia-statement-080809 

“Full Blinken: The International System Is ‘At Stake’ With Russia.” YouTube. December 12, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJw8mVuYsVw&t=571s 

Hird, Karolina, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2023.” Institute for the Study of War. October 8, 2023. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2023 

Mearsheimer, John J. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 77-89. 

Mearsheimer, John J. and Sebastian Rosato. “The Russian invasion was a rational act.” UnHerd. September 14, 2023. https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/ 

Melander, Ingrid and David Brunnstrom. “West urges end to South Ossetia fighting.” Reuters. August 8, 2008. https://web.archive.org/web/20080828172817/https://www.reuters.com/article/europeCrisis/idUSL844042 

Melvin, Neal. “Nationalist and Imperial Thinking Define Putin’s Vision for Russia.” RUSI. March 2, 2022. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nationalist-and-imperial-thinking-define-putins-vision-russia 

Osborn, Andrew. “Putin warns NATO against closer ties with Ukraine and Georgia.” Reuters. July 19, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-putin/putin-warns-nato-against-closer-ties-with-ukraine-and-georgia-idUSKBN1K92KA 

Pamuk, Humeyra and Johan Ahlander. “U.S., NATO fully committed to Ukraine, says Blinken ahead of Lavrov talks.” Reuters. December 2, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/blinken-set-meet-russias-lavrov-ukraine-tensions-flare-2021-12-02/

Pifer, Steven. “Putin’s NATO Fears Are Groundless.” Brookings. July 2, 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/putins-nato-fears-are-groundless/ 

“Russia army vows steps if Georgia and Ukraine join NATO.” Reuters. April 11, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-steps-idUSL1143027920080411 

Slack, Megan. “President Obama Announces New Ukraine-Related Sanctions.” The White House: President Barack Obama. March 17, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/03/17/president-obama-announces-new-ukraine-related-sanctions 

Taylor, Adam. “That time Ukraine tried to join NATO – and NATO said no.” Washington Post. September 4, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/04/that-time-ukraine-tried-to-join-nato-and-nato-said-no/ 

Traynor, Ian. “Nato allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia.” The Guardian. December 1, 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia 

Troianovski, Anton. “Why Vladimir Putin Invokes Nazis to Justify His Invasion of Ukraine.” New York Times. March 17, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/17/world/europe/ukraine-putin-nazis.html 

“Ukrainian Leader Makes a Push to Join NATO.” ABC News. April 1, 2008. https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=4563808&page=1 

Wilkie, Christina. “Nearly all of Russia’s initial invasion forces now in Ukraine, Pentagon says.” CNBC. March 7, 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/07/pentagon-says-nearly-100percent-of-pre-set-russian-troops-are-now-in-ukraine.html 
Williams, Matthias and Natalia Zinets. “Biden assures Zelenskiy that NATO membership in Ukraine’s hands, Kyiv says.” Reuters. December 9, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-president-zelenskiy-holding-talks-with-biden-adviser-says-2021-12-09/

Notes

1. Caldwell, Leigh Ann and Theodoric Meyer. “Gen. Milley on Ukraine, Tuberville and ‘wokeness.’” Washington Post. August 18, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/08/18/gen-milley-ukraine-tuberville-wokeness/  ↩︎
2. Mearsheimer, John J. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 77-89.  ↩︎
3. Melvin, Neal. “Nationalist and Imperial Thinking Define Putin’s Vision for Russia.” RUSI. March 2, 2022. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nationalist-and-imperial-thinking-define-putins-vision-russia  ↩︎
4. “Ukrainian Leader Makes a Push to Join NATO.” ABC News. April 1, 2008. https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=4563808&page=1  ↩︎
5. Taylor, Adam. “That time Ukraine tried to join NATO – and NATO said no.” Washington Post. September 4, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/04/that-time-ukraine-tried-to-join-nato-and-nato-said-no/  ↩︎
6. “Bucharest Summit Declaration.” NATO. April 3, 2008. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm  ↩︎
7. Wilkie, Christina. “Nearly all of Russia’s initial invasion forces now in Ukraine, Pentagon says.” CNBC. March 7, 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/07/pentagon-says-nearly-100percent-of-pre-set-russian-troops-are-now-in-ukraine.html  ↩︎
8. “Russia army vows steps if Georgia and Ukraine join NATO.” Reuters. April 11, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-steps-idUSL1143027920080411  ↩︎
9. Pifer, Steven. “Putin’s NATO Fears Are Groundless.” Brookings. July 2, 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/putins-nato-fears-are-groundless/  ↩︎
10. Bender, Jeremy. “This is the simplest explanation of why Putin is so opposed to NATO.” Business Insider. February 12, 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/simplest-explanation-of-why-putin-hates-nato-2015-2  ↩︎
11. Farchy, Jack. “Putin names Nato among threats in new Russian security strategy.” Financial Times. January 2, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/6e8e787e-b15f-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51  ↩︎
12. Osborn, Andrew. “Putin warns NATO against closer ties with Ukraine and Georgia.” Reuters. July 19, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-putin/putin-warns-nato-against-closer-ties-with-ukraine-and-georgia-idUSKBN1K92KA  ↩︎
13. Chatzitheodorou, Christina. “Security At The Polish-Lithuanian Border Kaliningrad, Suwalki Gap and Russia.” Finabel. February 2022. https://finabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/42.-security-at-the-polish-lithuanian-border.pdf  ↩︎
14. Williams, Matthias and Natalia Zinets. “Biden assures Zelenskiy that NATO membership in Ukraine’s hands, Kyiv says.” Reuters. December 9, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-president-zelenskiy-holding-talks-with-biden-adviser-says-2021-12-09/ ↩︎
15. “Full Blinken: The International System Is ‘At Stake’ With Russia.” YouTube. December 12, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJw8mVuYsVw&t=571s  ↩︎
16. Pamuk, Humeyra and Johan Ahlander. “U.S., NATO fully committed to Ukraine, says Blinken ahead of Lavrov talks.” Reuters. December 2, 2021. ↩︎
17. Fisher, Max. “Putin’s Case for War, Annotated.” New York Times. February 24, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/europe/putin-ukraine-speech.html  ↩︎
18. “Foreign Secretary deplores continued fighting in Georgia.” Foreign & Commonwealth Office. August 8, 2008. https://web.archive.org/web/20080828024606/http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/press-release/2008/august/georgia-statement-080809  ↩︎
19. Slack, Megan. “President Obama Announces New Ukraine-Related Sanctions.” The White House: President Barack Obama.March 17, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/03/17/president-obama-announces-new-ukraine-related-sanctions ↩︎
20. Slack, Megan. “President Obama Announces New Ukraine-Related Sanctions.” The White House: President Barack Obama.March 17, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/03/17/president-obama-announces-new-ukraine-related-sanctions ↩︎
21. Hird, Karolina, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2023.” Institute for the Study of War. October 8, 2023. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2023 ↩︎
22. Mearsheimer, John J. and Sebastian Rosato. “The Russian invasion was a rational act.” UnHerd. September 14, 2023. https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/ ↩︎