Author: tsulli24

The Question Not Asked: American deterrence in Taiwan | By Liam Kelly

tsulli24

The past month has seen both a presidential debate between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump and a vice-presidential debate between JD Vance and Tim Walz. During both hour-and-a-half debates, the candidates answered questions on a wide range of issues — the economy, abortion, the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East; however, one topic was glaringly missing: the threat of China to Taiwan and how the United States will address it. 

This omission during the debates is symptomatic of a larger political obliviousness in the public conscience to the great danger which China poses to American hegemony. For the past two-and-a-half years, all eyes in America have been trained first on Ukraine and then on Israel. No mind is paid to the growing danger of China in Taiwan.

The same blindness has also struck the Washington establishment. Since Ukraine was invaded, the United States has sent $61.3 billion in military aid to the country. In the past year we have spent $17.9 billion on Israel’s defense. In April, the United States passed a foreign aid package providing just $3.9 billion in aid to Taiwan, far less than the $18 billion provided during the Trump administration.

All the while the threat from China grows. According to the Economist, the number of incursions by the People’s Liberation Army into Taiwanese airspace has increased from 36 in January to 193 in August of this year. The number of ships crossing into Taiwanese waters has almost doubled from 142 to 282 in the same time frame. Military exercises by China, including mock blockades, have become more common and more bold. China maintains its aspiration for unifying the island with the mainland and has not ruled out using force to do so. After Ukraine, the international community should dispel any notion that rhetoric is meaningless or that large scale military invasions by great powers are unthinkable. 

As the threat rises, Taiwan is woefully vulnerable. It has 169,000 active duty military to China’s 2,185,000. It has 76 principal surface combatant ships to China’s 209. It has 300 fighter jets to China’s 1,900. It has 4 submarines to China’s 59. A recent report from the Department of Defense predicts that China’s most favorable window to launch an invasion of Taiwan is between 2027 and 2030, thus making the security situation urgent.

With conflict raging throughout the globe we must ask ourselves where American money and energy is best spent. Russia, though a powerful nation, does not possess the economic or political influence to surpass the United States in power. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion has been heroic, but despite its recent incursion into Russian territory, its counter offensive has stalled and it is increasingly improbable that Ukraine will be able to completely expel Russia from its territory. The only way for Russia to be expelled from the country is if the United States enters the war as a belligerent — a move that would certainly lead to a dangerous escalation of the conflict. As Ukraine’s situation becomes more and more clear, America should reconsider the level of aid being sent to the country. Moreover, our European allies can do more to provide for their own continent’s defense. As the threat rises in the Pacific, they must take up the responsibility which we have borne for so many years. 

Some argue that we would be showing weakness by lessening our aid to Ukraine, but the United States has already shown its resolve by arming Ukraine. The worst outcome — a full Russian takeover of the country — has been averted. Bringing the war in Ukraine to a gradual end is not an act of surrender. It is a recognition of reality. The time to arm Ukraine was ten years ago when Russian intentions in the region became clear. Now we must arm Taiwan and deter an invasion there before it is too late. 

In the Middle East we can defend our strategic interests without becoming involved in any conflicts ourselves. We must find the balance between containing Iran and keeping Israel’s legitimate responses to acts of terror in proportion. Above all, we should know better than to become involved in land wars in the Middle East which have nebulous goals. By giving a limited amount of resources to Israel, supplying our allies with intelligence and fighting terrorists directly with precise strikes, we can achieve our goals and not become involved in a broader war. Above all we must have the clarity to recognize that Iran does not have the economic or military might to threaten the American-led world order.

Only China has that potential. Its GDP at $31.227 trillion is greater than the United States’ at $27.361 trillion. Its population of 1,416,043,270 dwarfs the United State’s population of 341,963,408. Its navy has more ships. Its military is larger and only has one region to focus on. 

A Chinese attack on Taiwan would be disastrous. War games show that the United States would likely win if it defended Taiwan, but not without losing dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands servicemen. Our ability to project power across the world would be crippled and the threat of escalation to a nuclear conflict is also possible. The economic effects of a Chinese attack would also be severe. Taiwan produces 60% of the world’s semiconductors and 90% of the world’s advanced semiconductors. Providing subsidies for semiconductor production in the United States is a prudent insurance policy for a possible invasion, but the destruction and possible Chinese control of this market would be economically disastrous. Indeed, in the event of war, the world economy is estimated to shrink by $10 trillion, or 10% of its GDP. 

The United States must make sure that China understands that war in Taiwan will be disastrous, and the best way to achieve this is through a strong deterrent. Only strength can face strength. We must arm Taiwan to the teeth and make the idea of a military invasion of Taiwan as unpalatable to China as possible. If we do not arm Taiwan, a Chinese invasion is more likely and we will likely still be drawn into the conflict if China attacks, while being unprepared for it. If we do arm Taiwan, China may be deterred from invasion and even if they do attack, we will be prepared for it.

But we cannot be everywhere at once. Last year’s National Defense Industrial Strategy stated that the U.S. defense industrial base “does not possess the capacity, capability, responsiveness, or resilience required to satisfy the full range of military production needs at speed and scale.” Within this reality of limited arms production, we must be intentional about where we send our weapons. Arming Taiwan means lessening our aid to other theaters of conflict, and politicians must be honest about this. Neither Harris or Trump has explicitly said that they will not defend Taiwan. If they plan not to, then the American public deserves to know. If they do want to defend the island, they must take this task more seriously and decide how they will practically carry it out. There may be some value in strategic ambiguity, but hard decisions about allocating funding require honesty about our geopolitical plans and priorities.

World hegemony does not last forever. Since World War II, America has dominated the world stage like no other power. We have ushered in an era of relative peace and stability and have thrived economically. But we must not make the mistake of believing that American dominance will last forever. As our population stagnates and as power shifts to the global south new challengers will rise and we must adapt. We must hand over responsibility to our allies and preserve our interests where we can. We must not be so naive as to think that America can project power equally in every part of the globe forever. We must be rational, evaluate where the greatest threat to our power lies and take sufficient steps to preserve our influence in the region. If not, we may find ourselves woefully unprepared for a Chinese attack that threatens to seriously damage America’s ability to exert its influence abroad. We would do well to ask ourselves if that is the kind of world we would like to live in.

Sources

https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/#:~:text=To%20date%2C%20we%20have%20provided,invasion%20of%20Ukraine%20in%202014.)

https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-us-military-spending-8e6e5033f7a1334bf6e35f86e7040e14)

https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/24/2003205865/-1/-1/1/07-AMONSON%20%26%20EGLI_FEATURE%20IWD.PDF

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden

https://foreignassistance.gov

https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2024/USspendingIsrael

https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iran/#economy

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/china/#people-and-society

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#economy

https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/10/03/china-is-using-an-anaconda-strategy-to-squeeze-taiwan

https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/26/us-foreign-aid-bill-package-details

https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/03/06/taiwans-dominance-of-the-chip-industry-makes-it-more-important?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=17210591673&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjwyL24BhCtARIsALo0fSDSlkfehqZtbjMF11GaJ2roU2dSRVWD3SM8vuRjn7eMEi9drILHqZAaAnfVEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/02/draft-pentagon-strategy-china-00129764

Distrusting the Food We Eat | By Catalina Scheider Galiñanes

tsulli24

“Each day in America, you can trust the foods you eat and the medicines you take, thanks to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.”1

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) claims to provide American citizens with security and safety regarding their food intake. After all, the FDA, formed in 1906 by the Pure Food and Drugs Act, was founded upon the Department of Agriculture’s 1860s mission to analyze the safety of chemicals in agricultural products.2 Food safety standards are a historical FDA priority. So how does the United States still lack a robust system for the post-market assessment of chemicals in food?

In September 2024, a paper, entitled “Evidence for widespread human exposure to food contact chemicals” published by the Journal of Exposure Science & Environmental Epidemiology made waves in mainstream media. The study found that over 3,600 chemicals that migrate to food from food contact articles (FCAs) used to store, process, package, and serve food end up in the human body, where they can cause serious harm. The researchers concluded there was an “urgent need to ban the most hazardous chemicals shown to migrate from food packaging and other types of FCAs (food contact articles) into foods to protect human health.”3

The recent discovery regarding the American consumer’s high risk presents the FDA’s serious dereliction of duty. Adequate governmental action is a central part of our republic, and the state has a duty to ensure food safety. Recent FDA failures further reveal how the bloated bureaucracy of a disunified Executive ultimately undermines the public interest.

Increasingly widespread concern over food chemicals prompted the FDA to conduct a public meeting on the development of an enhanced systematic process for FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food.4 The meeting, which featured opening remarks from Jim Jones, Deputy Commissioner for Human Foods at the FDA, revealed that, in his words, “the agency has not established a systematic process…until now we have taken an ad hoc approach” to post-market chemical review.5 The current FDA process is self-described by the agency as “situational” and possesses a “lack of dedicated resources” regarding additives and ingredients.6

Despite having over 18,000 employees, the FDA has neglected to create an effective system for reviewing post-market chemicals within food. This ought to shock every American citizen, and it raises the greater question: What exactly has the FDA been doing?

This is extremely difficult to answer. The project towards analyzing chemicals in food is part of a larger focus on food chemical safety.7 This Human Foods Program exists within the Office of Food Chemical Safety, Dietary Supplements & Innovation,8 which is a part of the Closer to Zero Initiative.9 The Office is further broken down into pre- and post-market assessments and the dietary supplements program, as well as including staff focused on innovative foods and those working in operations. These subdivisions are a part of the larger FDA structure, in which there are thirteen headquarter level offices and nine centers, each with hundreds to thousands of employees.10

On October 1, 2024, the FDA underwent its largest reorganization effort in recent history.11 The American food supply has been suffering under the crisis of bureaucratic complexity, prompting the FDA to launch a newly unified Human Foods Program, which impacted over 8,000 employees and “touched almost every facet of the agency.” Responding to independent reviews, as well as the FDA’s handling of the infant formula shortage of 2022, the agency claims it is newly focused on “inspections, investigations and imports as its core mission.”

Despite the overwhelming number of already-existing offices, projects, programs, and initiatives, the Discussion Paper accompanying the September public meeting states that the first part of the solution is that a “team of FDA experts will rank individual chemicals” before gathering feedback and performing risk-assessments for each chemical.12 Yet, it is doubtful that a new team of the same experts is likely to solve the deeper issue of a bloated and ineffective bureaucracy. The structure of the federal government was designed in order to maximize responsibility, and yet the current administrative state evades accountability due to its size and complexity.

This lack of unity and transparency sharply contrasts with the original vision of an efficient executive branch, as highlighted by the Founders’ writings on executive power. In the Federalist papers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, writing as Publius, collaborated to convince Americans, specifically the people of the state of New York, to ratify the Constitution. When considering the powers of the Executive branch, which were meant to rest upon the President of the United States, Hamilton remarks in Federalist 70, “A government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.”13 Ill execution can consist of poor policies, as well as irresponsibilities. A strict size-restraint on the Executive branch was meant to ensure energy and unity of action, as well as proper transparency and assignment of blame.

When faced with the suggestion of the dispersal of authority among a council of executive officers, Hamilton writes, “it often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall.”14 The branch has grown dramatically, even in recent years, thus further threatening valuable characteristics emphasized by Hamilton: “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”15

Over the ten fiscal years from 2007 to 2017, a study conducted by the United States Office of Personnel Management found a growth of nearly 215,000 employees between the Department of Defense Agencies, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Department of Health and Human Services, under which the FDA falls.16

Hamilton, by unifying the power of the Executive branch into the President and a limited Cabinet, sought to achieve effective law enforcement and incentivize individual responsibility. Although the FDA has failed to execute precautions against chemicals in diet, it has 50 technical and scientific advisory committees and panels and is charged with enforcing over 200 laws.17 

The organization of administrative agencies have resulted in an inability to focus on the common good, and the United States is suffering under disastrous regulatory confusion. Madison’s warnings in Federalist #62 highlight the importance of criminalization: “It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made of men of their own choice if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow.”18 As the FDA seeks to create a post-market review system, they must keep in mind their position as a part of the Executive branch, charged with enforcing legislation.

More than mere inconvenience, the FDA’s failures represent a subversion of the common good. With the expansion of the federal administrative state, individual states have turned over their traditional police powers. The American public is left without guidance regarding health, safety, and morals, traditionally understood as governmental priorities. As health crises worsen, governmental incompetence erodes public trust.

As famously presented in Aristotle’s politics, the ideal regime, with no name, or known simply as polity, consists of popular rule for the common interest. The American founders, with their careful restraints and meticulously designed offices, attempted to create a balanced republic, which both responded to democratic demands and protected “the people against themselves.”19

Chemicals in food and the proper role of the government are being discussed in the popular political arena, and citizens are searching for alternatives to the status quo.  Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who recently announced his support of candidate Donald Trump, vowed in a viral X post and video that, “Enough is enough. President Trump and I are going to stop the mass poisoning of American children.”20 

In the clip, he tells the story of Tartrazine, or Yellow Dye #5, which is included in everyday foods such as Doritos, Cheez-its, and Gatorade. He explains that it is produced from “the sludge that is left over when you turn coal into coke for blast furnaces.” After displaying the harmful effects of these food chemical additives, RFK tells his audience, “Together, we are going to make America healthy again.”

As federal regulators struggle to  provide clear guidance, creative entrepreneurs face the issue in the private sector. The YUKA app, featured by podcaster Shawn Ryan on the popular “Joe Rogan Experience,” is a prime example of citizens taking governmental obligations towards safety into their own hands.21 The mobile phone app, which boasts over 61 million downloads, claims to “deciphers product labels and analyzes the health impact of food products and cosmetics.”22 

At the show’s start, Ryan explains, “You basically scan anything, food related…it’ll tell you all the chemicals and what the chemicals do to you.” Rogan exclaims, “That’s what people need!” He went on to promote RFK’s past experience in “protecting people against corporations that are poisoning them.” 

Regardless of the FDA’s complicated organizational structure, or how it ought to be rectified, it is clear that the situation surrounding health and food safety in the United States is dire. In 2023, every single state in the Union had an obesity rate of over 20%.23 Food allergies are on the rise, with 48% of American adults with allergies reporting a new, recent allergy they did not have as children.24 Fertility rates are at a record low, with only 55 births per 1,000 women.25 American life expectancy has faced dramatic declines, and is lagging at 77.5 years, compared to comparable nations’ 82.2 average.26 

Americans are not just dying earlier–they are also suffering mental challenges at higher rates. In 2016, almost 1 in 4 (23%) American adults reported a mental health diagnosis, compared to fewer than 10% in Germany, France, or the Netherlands.27 Ties between food consumption and mental health are obvious and overwhelming; one study co-authored by researchers at Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health found that those in the top fifth of ultra processed food consumption had a 50% higher risk of developing depression than those in the bottom 20%.28

Mental health issues highlight the growth of psychiatric treatment in the United States. The 12% increase in mental health prescriptions from 2019 to 2022 far outpaces overall prescription growth of less than 1%.29 Shockingly, over 338 million antidepressant prescriptions were written in 2016, enough for one for every man, woman, and child in the nation.30 Yet, they have skyrocketed further–growing by 35% in 2022.31 Mental health is declining both rapidly and uniformly, or citizens are being widely overmedicated–both may be true. 

This is a systemic crisis. The typical American ingests toxic chemicals and is encouraged to turn to medication for physical and mental health issues. The normalization and proliferation of such treatments ignore that the common American diet and reliance on medication are actively harming the bodies and minds of millions, particularly children. Children raised on food dyes, dopamine enhancers, and screens may never know clarity, alertness, or their natural creativity and personalities.

America is facing a crisis of both physical and mental health, which appears to cut across all geographic, socioeconomic, or racial borders. There must be something in the water–or, actually, in the food supply. Prioritizing a safe and nutritious food supply is a necessary first step towards protecting future generations of Americans. 

  1. “About FDA.” FDA, 14 June 2024, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda. ↩︎
  2. “FDA History.” FDA, 29 Mar. 2021, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history. ↩︎
  3. Geueke, B., Parkinson, L.V., Groh, K.J. et al. “Evidence for widespread human exposure to food contact chemicals.” J Expo Sci Environ Epidemiol (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41370-024-00718-2 ↩︎
  4. “FDA to Hold Public Meeting on the Development of an Enhanced Systematic Process for FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food.” FDA, Sept. 2024. www.fda.gov, https://www.fda.gov/food/hfp-constituent-updates/fda-hold-public-meeting-development-enhanced-systematic-process-fdas-post-market-assessment. ↩︎
  5. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Public Meeting: The Development of an Enhanced Systematic Process for the FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food. FDA, 25 Sept. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/media/180941/download. ↩︎
  6. Current Approach to Post-Market Work. FDA, 25 Sept. 2024, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-wTJvt6eU9ZnEa74opKOsCeEX2Lv8kkt/view?usp=sharing. ↩︎
  7. “Food Chemical Safety.” FDA, 1 Oct. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/food/food-ingredients-packaging/food-chemical-safety. ↩︎
  8. “Office of Food Chemical Safety, Dietary Supplements & Innovation.” FDA, Oct. 2024. https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/human-foods-program/office-food-chemical-safety-dietary-supplements-innovation. ↩︎
  9. “Closer to Zero: Reducing Childhood Exposure to Contaminants from Foods.” FDA, Sept. 2024. https://www.fda.gov/food/environmental-contaminants-food/closer-zero-reducing-childhood-exposure-contaminants-foods. ↩︎
  10. “FDA Organization Charts.” FDA, 8 July 2024, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-organization/fda-organization-charts. ↩︎
  11.  “FDA Modernization Efforts for Establishing a Unified Human Foods Program, New Model for Field Operations and More.” FDA, 1 Oct. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-organization/fda-modernization-efforts-establishing-unified-human-foods-program-new-model-field-operations-and. ↩︎
  12. Discussion Paper Development of an Enhanced Systematic Process for the FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food. FDA, Aug. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/media/180942/download ↩︎
  13. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 422. ↩︎
  14. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 426. ↩︎
  15. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 423. ↩︎
  16. Sizing Up the Executive Branch. United States Office of Personnel Management, Feb. 2018, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/reports-publications/sizing-up-the-executive-branch-2016.pdf. ↩︎
  17. “Learn About FDA Advisory Committees.” FDA, Aug. 2024. www.fda.gov, https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-fda-advisory-committees;“Learn About FDA Advisory Committees.” FDA, Aug. 2024. www.fda.gov, https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-fda-advisory-committees ↩︎
  18. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 369. ↩︎
  19. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 383. ↩︎
  20. Kennedy, Robert, F. 25 Sept. 2024, https://x.com/RobertKennedyJr/status/1839012584957042973  ↩︎
  21. Kennedy, Robert, F. 25 Sept. 2024, https://x.com/RobertKennedyJr/status/1839012584957042973 ↩︎
  22.  “Yuka – The Mobile App That Scans Your Products.” Yuka, https://yuka.io/en/. ↩︎
  23. “Adult Obesity Prevalence Maps.” Obesity, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 19 Sept. 2024, https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/php/data-research/adult-obesity-prevalence-maps.html. ↩︎
  24. Why Are Food Allergies on the Rise? With Ruchi Gupta, MD, MPH. Northwestern University, 12 Feb. 2019, https://www.feinberg.northwestern.edu/research/podcast/food-allergies-on-the-rise.html. ↩︎
  25. U.S. Fertility Rate Drops to Another Historic Low. CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, 25 Apr. 2024, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/2024/20240525.htm. ↩︎
  26. Rakshit, Shameek, et al. “How Does U.S. Life Expectancy Compare to Other Countries?” Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker, Peterson-KFF, 30 Jan. 2024, https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/u-s-life-expectancy-compare-countries/. ↩︎
  27. Roosa Tikkanen et al., Mental Health Conditions and Substance Use: Comparing U.S. Needs and Treatment Capacity with Those in Other High-Income Countries (Commonwealth Fund, May 2020). https://doi.org/10.26099/09ht-rj07 ↩︎
  28. Samuthpongtorn C, Nguyen LH, Okereke OI, et al. Consumption of Ultraprocessed Food and Risk of Depression. JAMA Netw Open. 2023;6(9):e2334770. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.34770. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2809727#google_vignette ↩︎
  29. Garzella, Cecilia. “Mental Health Crisis Fuels the Post-Pandemic Rise in Medication Use.” USA TODAY, 3 Mar. 2024, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2024/02/29/mental-health-related-prescriptions-rise-post-covid/72310337007/.  ↩︎
  30.  “Top 25 Psychiatric Medications for 2016.” Psych Central, 12 Oct. 2017, https://psychcentral.com/blog/top-25-psychiatric-medications-for-2016. ↩︎
  31. Burns, Corrinne. “Antidepressant Prescribing Increases by 35% in Six Years.” The Pharmaceutical Journal, 8 July 2022, https://pharmaceutical-journal.com/article/news/antidepressant-prescribing-increases-by-35-in-six-years. ↩︎

Declaratory Policy and Nuclear Competition | By Marko Gural

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“Trinity Detonation” by U.S. Department of Energy is public domain

Is declaratory nuclear policy useful? The Soviet Union’s 1982 declaration of a no first use policy was met with inaction by Soviet military leaders who secretly maintained their ex-ante military doctrine. Declaratory policy is nothing without concurrent posture adaptations, suggesting that the United States and China are condemned to nuclear competition for the foreseeable future.

No First Use

China and India currently maintain no first use (NFU) pledges. They agree not to use nuclear weapons against another state unless in retaliation to a nuclear strike, claiming to deter without the option of a pre-emption.1 The United States has pondered an NFU and related declaratory policy changes. The Obama administration stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that the “fundamental role” of US nuclear weapons is to deter attack on the homeland and allies, and President Biden’s 2022 NPR maintained this.2 Both Obama and Biden, however, declined to adopt an NFU policy. The Trump administration maintained in 2018 that an NFU doctrine was not appropriate because it would not reflect the plethora of international threats that the United States faces. Similarly, although Biden, first as Vice President and later as presidential candidate, stated in 2017 and 2020, respectively, that the United States should adopt a “sole purpose” nuclear doctrine, his NPR hesitated to take the next step to its realization.3

The Soviet Union—and, after its dissolution, Russia—held an NFU posture from 1982 to 1993.4  Few analysts consider it when conversing about NFUs today. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko publicly announced the shift in Soviet doctrine at the United Nations, but it is widely known that the United States did not seriously believe that the Soviets would refrain from launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike in case of desperate emergency.

Understanding what an NFU would look like today depends, at least in part, on what NFUs looked like decades ago. The international climate has become more tense. In theory, an NFU declaration from major nuclear powers would significantly reduce the possibility of escalation because states would not be worried about nuclear threats or use against one another. As mentioned, China utilizes its long-standing NFU in diplomatic conversations today to portray itself as an actor opposed to escalation. Although the adoption of NFUs by countries like the United States and Russia may seem unlikely today,5 a greater understanding of what might bring about a serious pledge and how to maintain it can further the conversation on declaratory nuclear policy.

So, is declaratory policy useful for attenuating security competition? Unfortunately, the Soviet case suggests that political statements can be met with inaction by intransigent military brass. Concurrent changes in nuclear posture would ease this problem, but the United States and China’s nuclear postures are headed in a competitive, instead of conciliatory, direction.

The Soviet NFU

In 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev pledged that the Soviet Union would not launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike. In 1993, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the termination of the Soviet and Russian NFU.6 Over the course of that decade-plus, the United States intelligence community did not take the Soviet pledge seriously, and believed there was instead a possibility of a Soviet first strike. This is an old fear over NFU policies, however. More interestingly, archival documents indicate that Soviet military leadership did not shift its military doctrine to rule out a first strike possibility.   

The Soviet military and its civilian defense leaders resisted the political leadership’s NFU. Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov “believed in first strikes” even though they violated official Soviet policy and led the resistance against a doctrinal shift toward no first use.7 Institutional resistance followed. Documents from East German military archives demonstrate that the Soviet military “retained and exercised” the possibility for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against NATO, even during a contingency in which NATO only used conventional weapons.8 Furthermore, the Soviet NFU policy on its own seems to have turned few heads: US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated during the Reagan administration that recent Soviet SS-20 missile deployments with multiple nuclear warheads each dampened the credibility of the Soviet NFU.9

Contemporaneous CIA analysis of Soviet military doctrine reflected the military reality. A top secret 1983 memorandum stated that Soviet wartime plans for central Europe would include an attempt to pre-empt NATO’s use of nuclear weapons to preclude a large strike on Soviet conventional forces.10 A different 1989 CIA memorandum claimed that the Soviets were “well aware” of their poor economic standing vis-à-vis the West and supposed that the Kremlin may alter its military doctrine towards one which takes a defensive stance.11 The CIA’s implication in this statement that Soviet doctrine was not presently defensive led to the conclusion that the Soviets had not effectively developed a no first use policy.12 Additionally, while the memorandum claimed that Soviet military doctrine focused on the prevention of conventional and nuclear war,13 it analyzed the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance in depth, particularly as former President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative may have impacted stability.14 This may have reflected a distrustful belief about the Soviet NFU, or at least indicated that recent Soviet technological developments placed Moscow on a similar military footing as Washington.

Even a classified briefing of the Defense Policy Panel to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in 1988 stated that the Soviet NFU declaration represented the political presentation of its military doctrine instead of any military-technical or operational aspects. The concrete measures which the Soviet military took to prepare for and conduct warfighting did not change from before the NFU. The deployment of conventional and nuclear forces retained its “threatening posture.”15

Was the widespread distrust which met the Soviet NFU unique? Perhaps not. Chinese military officials, such as Major General Zhu Chenghu in July 2005, have claimed that Beijing’s NFU has only applied to non-nuclear weapon states.16 While the Chinese government distanced itself from Zhu’s statement, its NFU pledge has historically served propaganda purposes and was conditioned out of necessity and policy instead of peace-loving sentiment. China’s long-standing small nuclear arsenal has made it physically unable to launch a first strike against a nuclear weapon state without expecting complete annihilation, and its nuclear weapons were not created as part of a doctrine which extends past countervalue minimum deterrence.17 Indeed, although Beijing has undertaken significant restraining measures to convince states of its NFU, they are impossible to verify and the United States has continued to distrust China.18

“Minuteman 3 Launch” by U.S. Air Force is public domain

Declaratory Policy and Nuclear Competition

The United States historically has not found NFU pledges to be credible, but analysts overlook an NFU’s civil-military strife. While Soviet political leadership announced an NFU in 1983, military leaders personally stated their opposition and worked to maintain a first strike doctrine.

What does this experience tell the nuclear community about NFUs today? A novel no first use pledge by non-NFU states like Russia and the United States seems unlikely in the midst of today’s tense geopolitical competition, but analysts should also question the domestic viability of such a policy. The U.S. military strongly opposes an NFU and the possible changes in nuclear posture that would follow.19 A U.S. NFU would not necessarily cause a civil-military divide, especially considering civil-military transparency and communication in Washington. But the consequences of other great powers adopting an NFU must be considered. For those states with significant political-military divides, an NFU declaration by political leaders may be met with inaction by military authorities.

This conclusion supports the belief that declaratory policy has little value without a concurrent adaptation of posture by military personnel. Because statements can be empty, the most effective way to create a credible NFU would necessitate action. States could eliminate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from their nuclear arsenal (or at least take them off high alert) and instead prioritize the survivable sea-based leg of the triad. This would represent qualified self-deterrence against a first strike because states would be unable to rapidly launch a debilitating first strike and would preclude effective pre-emption. Additionally, given land-based weapons’ vulnerability, their elimination would decrease the benefits and likely success of a first strike. Unfortunately, recent great power policies run counter to these long-term posture commitments that may ease tensions.

The United States is modernizing its ground-based leg with the development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD, LGM-35 Sentinel), while China is significantly expanding its siloed ICBM force.20 Neither development benefits relations between Washington and Beijing, and in fact may lead American policymakers to doubt China’s NFU more. Given that China has considered the possibility of placing parts of its forces on a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture, Beijing’s strategic posture is changing, and debates about its NFU remain.21 Even though China has officially reiterated an “unqualified commitment” to its NFU, President Xi Jinping has called for the PLA to establish a “strong system of strategic deterrence,” pointing to a break in nuclear policy that may push American policymakers to question the continuity of the NFU.22 Although Chinese officials claim that LOW would be consistent with the NFU, Washington may link Beijing’s actions on one front of nuclear policy to another and sense a wholesale shift to a more aggressive nuclear doctrine. In a crisis bargaining scenario, uncertainty about an NFU may lead states to assume the worst case scenario.

Regardless of declaratory policy, the United States and China have adopted postures that risk quick escalation. The Chinese NFU declaration, for this reason, does not by itself preclude action-reaction spirals and American doubt about the validity of a no first use posture. The rivalry—for now—may be condemned to competition.

  1. It remains important to distinguish between China and India’s NFUs, however. While China has gone to great lengths to make its pledge credible, India caveats its NFU by retaining the option to use nuclear weapons in response to a major biological or chemical weapons attack against India or its forces. Additionally, India has eroded belief in its pledge over conventional attack and nuclear preemption as tensions with Pakistan have grown for decades. Cf. Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use: Nuclear Weapons and Declaratory Policy,” War on the Rocks, 22 February 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/sole-purpose-is-not-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-and-declaratory-policy/. ↩︎
  2. Ernest J. Moniz et al., “U.S. Nuclear Policies for a Safer World,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 2021, pp. 7-12; and Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn, “NTI Statement on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 28 October 2022, https://www.nti.org/news/nti-statement-on-the-2022-nuclear-posture-review/. ↩︎
  3. A “sole purpose” declaratory policy states that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the United States and its allies. Cf. Moniz, “U.S. Nuclear Policies for a Safer World.” ↩︎
  4. I refer to this primarily as the “Soviet NFU” because of its adoption during the Soviet years and the change in policy soon after the Russian Federation’s birth. ↩︎
  5. The United States is unlikely to adopt an NFU today because allies, especially those who benefit from extended nuclear deterrence in east Asia, will worry that Washington will not stand up for them. Russia is unlikely to adopt an NFU today, as seen by its consistent use of nuclear threats and forward deployment in Belarus. ↩︎
  6. Serge Schmemann, “Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of Atom Arms,” The New York Times, 4 November 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/04/world/russia-drops-pledge-of-no-first-use-of-atom-arms.html. Interestingly, Soviet generals clarified after terminating the NFU that it only applied to non-nuclear weapon states that signed the 1968 NPT, but still not those allied with nuclear weapon states. ↩︎
  7. Matthew R. Costlow, “A Net Assessment of ‘No First Use’ and ‘Sole Purpose’ Nuclear Policies,” Occasional Paper 1, no. 7 (National Institute Press, 2021), p. 78. ↩︎
  8. Costlow, “A Net Assessment,” p. 79; and Ankit Panda, “‘No First Use’ and Nuclear Weapons,” Council on Foreign Relations, 17 July 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons. ↩︎
  9. Costlow, “A Net Assessment,” p. 82. ↩︎
  10. “Soviet Planning for Front Nuclear Operations in Central Europe,” Central Intelligence Agency, June 1983, p. 11, archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-090-doc1.pdf. ↩︎
  11. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 1989, pp. 13-14, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000499601.pdf. ↩︎
  12. NFUs are defensive, instead of offensive, policies, because they are inherently responsive. They can still serve deterrent functions, because they warn against the response a state would face if they were to attack with nuclear weapons. But NFUs are not offensive because they eliminate the possibility of first use and preemption. ↩︎
  13. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” p. 21. ↩︎
  14. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” pp. 18-19. The SDI was intended to intercept ICBMs from space, which many argued would encourage another arms race and undermine established arms-control agreements. Earlier U.S.-Soviet treaties, like the ABM Treaty, were intended to reduce defensive anti-ballistic missile systems that would otherwise have pushed the powers to build more weapons for deterrence and undermined mutual vulnerability. ↩︎
  15. “General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Military: Assessing His Impact So Far and the Potential for Future Changes,” The Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 2 August 1988, p. 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100030010-1.pdf. ↩︎
  16. Stephanie Lieggi, “Going Beyond the Stir: The Strategic realities of China’s No-First-Use Policy,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 31 December 2005, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/realities-chinas-no-first-use-policy/. ↩︎
  17. It is unclear how China’s nuclear expansion and modernization will impact this, but its arsenal as of this writing is still unlikely to comprehensively destroy U.S. second-strike capability and maintains an assured retaliation capability. Cf. Henrik Stålhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel, and Magnus Langset Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China’s Changing Nuclear Posture,” International Security 47, no. 4 (2023): pp. 147-187. ↩︎
  18. Lieggi, “Going Beyond the Stir”; and Panda and Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use.” Panda and Narang further that China has implemented de-targeting agreements and has unilaterally separated warheads from ICBMS (a process known as de-mating), but because an NFU is a component of declaratory nuclear policy, there is no possible diplomatic arrangement that would verify or enforce a pledge. Furthermore, the pledge alone would not impact capabilities. For Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s distrust of China’s NFU, see Kumar Sundaram and M.V. Ramana, “India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 1 (February 2018): pp. 152-168. ↩︎
  19. Panda and Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use.” ↩︎
  20. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 148. Additionally, some scholars have written about the direct impact of new U.S. capabilities, such as ballistic missile defense and CPGS, on China’s ability to launch a retaliatory strike. China expanded its force structure in part to ensure survivability under assured retaliation, but it might be forced to abandon assured retaliation for a first-use posture. Chinese analysts also surmised during the Obama administration that Beijing would retaliate against a U.S. conventional attack on Chinese nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons, violating the NFU. These possibilities point to the unsure nature of declaratory policy. Cf. Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): pp. 8, 21. ↩︎
  21. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 150. Additionally, some Chinese officials believe that a LOW posture would violate China’s NFU, proving the volatility of declaratory policy. Without concrete actions that distinctly support declaratory policy, the latter is confusing domestically and internationally. Cf. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” pp. 170-171. ↩︎
  22. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 168. ↩︎

Asia’s Balancing and China’s Dilemma | By Marko Gural

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Royal Navy. “AUKUS Deal Delivers New Class of Submarines for UK and Australia.” Royal Navy, March 14, 2023. https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2023/march/14/20230314-aukus-deal-delivers-new-class-of-submarines-for-uk-and-australia.

Countries in the Indo-Pacific region are allying with the United States to contain China. But domestic defense initiatives have stalled, and allies continue to disagree with each other on critical issues, leading to the conclusion that China may be better off provoking conflict sooner (if at all) rather than later. The dilemma? China will be ready later rather than sooner.

China

Scholars disagree on the size of the Chinese threat.1 Some describe China as a regional behemoth that may attempt to break out of its unfavorable geographic limitations at any moment.2 Others claim that Beijing’s expansion is stalling, still short of U.S. power, constraining its ability to seriously threaten its neighbors.3 But no matter the specifics, many states in the Indo-Pacific are scared of China because no regional actor can individually stand up to Beijing from head to toe. Enter the United States and its balancing coalition.

States ally with each other against a powerful external threat to avoid military and economic dominance.4 The United States has led a policy of external balancing (consider the balancing scales of justice, but with adversarial countries creating a coalition to “balance” the other’s power) in the Indo-Pacific against a rising China. Since America’s superiority in the Western Hemisphere began in the late 19th century, Washington’s foreign policy has centered around ensuring that no country is strong enough to similarly dominate the economic and military activities of its own region.5

To halt the possibility that China’s power in the Indo-Pacific rivals America’s in the Western Hemisphere and around the world, the United States needs defense commitments from China’s neighbors. Many states that border China and its waters are happy to ally with Washington: China is larger, stronger, and wealthier than them, and they fear one-sided conflict or at least economic co-option. But have these balancing attempts been successful? And what do they tell us about the military and diplomatic balance in the Indo-Pacific, now and into the future?

Allying, or external balancing, is difficult because states understand that they primarily provide their own security.6 While the United States has led the charge in creating formal institutions to contain China, states have at times succumbed to infighting and shocking industrial setbacks. If China’s ambitions indeed exceed its current international standing, its window of aggression may remain open for a few years. But its own stagnant growth and ill-prepared military keep the balancers in an advantageous position.

The Good

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“Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Summit Meeting” by the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan is licensed under CC BY 4.0

The United States has laid the groundwork for an intricate web of alliances in the Indo-Pacific. Take the Quad. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue–consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India–was resuscitated in 2017 to ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”7 Grouping four states with little connection apart from their power in the region broadly defined, the Quad hopes to counter Chinese economic and military coercion and uphold democratic values.

Or consider AUKUS. The Australia-UK-US trilateral agreement of 2021 has since worked to exchange technology between the three countries, especially on developing Australia’s defense capability. The plan’s Pillar I includes Australia’s purchase of three US Virginia class conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines and the buildup of its sovereign submarine base. Pillar II of the alliance aims to develop joint capabilities through technology and information sharing, focusing on cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum, and undersea capabilities. AUKUS’s goal with submarine and technology sharing is specifically to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and bolster deterrence for allies in the region.8

And we shouldn’t forget Camp David. In August 2023, US President Biden, South Korean President Yoon, and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida gathered at Camp David to inaugurate a new trilateral centered around shared goals of containing China, denuclearizing North Korea, and maintaining American extended deterrence. The ROK-Japan rapprochement is significant in the face of long-standing nationalistic disputes, and at Camp David, the parties agreed to coordinate regional responses and policies.9

The Bad

Unfortunately, however, these alliances take time to get off the ground. As with NATO’s European parties, who have been slow to increase their defense spending and grow their industrial bases in the face of an obstreperous Russia,10 Asia’s balancing coalition has run into numerous domestic and industrial roadblocks that have produced mixed tangible results.

One example is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a grouping of US government controls on defense imports and exports. Simply put, ITAR is not structured for rapid technological innovation, trade, or international competition. Instead, it is a cautious ordinance better suited for American national security when the United States is not seriously competing against other great powers. 

The Biden administration and the legislatures of Australia and the UK are working to pass sweeping ITAR exemptions. But ITAR has already created problems for the alliance’s Pillar II in three ways. First, ITAR requires foreign states to prove that they protect sensitive technology to a standard comparable to the United States. Australia, in particular, has a significantly smaller defense industrial base than its allies, meaning that its export regime is historically not up to par. Second, the United States will work to make a release from ITAR sweeping; the exemption would apply to AUKUS nations generally and not to specific transactions by AUKUS countries. This comprehensive measure requires an equally extensive and time-consuming review. An exemption would lastly need to outline the mechanisms through which AUKUS countries can utilize the agreement, which follows from previous conversations about comparable standards and scope.11

Legislation is not the only complication confronting AUKUS. An internal US Navy investigation from April found that the United States is running two to three years behind schedule on its construction of the new nuclear-powered Virginia class submarine. Washington may not be able to deliver these submarines, which will undergird Australia’s involvement in the alliance and Indo-Pacific, by the planned 2032 date. Other construction projects are also running late: the star nuclear-powered ballistic missile Columbia class submarine will be 12 to 16 months late and the attack Block IV Virginia submarines are running three years behind schedule.12

Multilateral domestic quibbles also threaten to weaken the American-led alliance regime in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad, for one, is plagued by differing motivations and domestic situations. All four countries share economic interdependence with China (although the United States is following a decoupling strategy), making containment, in part, a self-defeating policy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has assaulted civil liberties and minority rights, pulling the country away from mature democracy, even though democracy and freedom are supposedly among the Quad’s bedrock values.13 Given these disagreements, the Quad remains a loose diplomatic alliance instead of a security commitment à la AUKUS or Camp David.

Although the United States-Japan-South Korea trilateral has settled on commitments in East Asia, Tokyo and Seoul continue to have their differences on critical points of policy. In particular, the two states have exhibited varying willingness to publicly support Taiwan, US military deployments to Taiwan from their own soil, and the prioritization of a Taiwan contingency over tensions on the Korean Peninsula.14

The Ugly

What do these nascent alliances mean for China’s future? Beijing faces a dilemma of enormous proportions.

On the one hand, these alliances are nascent. If China seeks to expand, whether for security or greed15–and that’s a very important if–then its window of aggression may extend for a few years. Aggression could take any number of forms, from an invasion or blockade of Taiwan to an occupation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 

On the other hand, these alliances are unlikely to be nascent for long. AUKUS nations will move past ITAR and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida recently visited Washington to extend alliance commitments. China has serious domestic blockades of its own that make Beijing ill-prepared to strike in the short term. The People’s Liberation Army has not fought a serious war for decades and China’s military will only be prepared to invade Taiwan come 2027.16 Xi Jinping has structural nonmilitary problems, too: Chinese overdevelopment has built dozens of ghost cities, its energy policies cause significant environmental damage, and local authorities have taken on staggering debt to grow the economy. China may be neither a peer competitor to the United States nor declining, but its situation is one that few countries must envy.

One caveat to conclude: the United States is stretched thin internationally, and escalation in conflicts around the world may bode poorly for America’s continued focus on its Indo-Pacific alliances. Russia continues to move forward in Ukraine, albeit slowly, and congressional debates on aid to Kyiv have stalled.17 Iran’s retaliation against Israel caused little damage and both sides can reasonably claim to de-escalate tensions, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may yet seek to respond against his weaker adversary in Tehran.

If the White House were to pull itself further into either conflict (and especially in the latter scenario, considering that American servicemen are stationed in the Mediterranean to help Israel), the United States may be less prepared against an Indo-Pacific contingency. Although China is widely considered to be Washington’s major threat, three wars at once may be too much to handle. American overextension would ease Beijing’s dilemma.

  1. And, importantly, on whether it represents a threat at all. ↩︎
  2. Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021). ↩︎
  3. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (New York: W.W. Norton, 2022). ↩︎
  4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). ↩︎
  5. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). ↩︎
  6. Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, “Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 52. ↩︎
  7. “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” The White House, 24 May 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/. ↩︎
  8. Joseph Clark, “AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities,” Department of Defense News, 10 April 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3737569/aukus-partners-focus-on-indo-pacific-security-in-shaping-joint-capabilities/. ↩︎
  9. “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” The White House, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/; and Jenny Town and Yuki Tatsumi, “Takeaways from the Camp David Summit,” Stimson Center, 25 August 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/takeaways-from-the-camp-david-summit/.  ↩︎
  10. Daniel Michaels, “Europe Is Boosting Military Spending. It’s Still Not Enough,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 February 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-is-boosting-military-spending-its-still-not-enough-020b432a. ↩︎
  11. Deborah Cheverton and John T. Watts, “AUKUS is hamstrung by outdated US export control rules. Here’s what Congress can do,” Atlantic Council, 15 November 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/aukus-is-hamstrung-by-outdated-us-export-control-rules-heres-what-congress-can-do/. ↩︎
  12. Matthew Cranston, “AUKUS subs construction delayed by years: US Navy,” Australian Financial Review, 4 April 2024, https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/aukus-subs-construction-delayed-by-years-us-navy-20240404-p5fh9a#:~:text=The%20assessment%20found%20the%20Virginia,submarines%20to%20Australia%20by%202032. ↩︎
  13. Debasish Roy Chosdhury, “Quad is Key to Biden’s Strategy in Asia, But the Four-Way Alliance Is Ambiguous and Contradictory,” TIME, 18 March 2021, https://time.com/5947674/quad-biden-china/. ↩︎
  14. Adam P. Liff, “How Japan and South Korea diverge on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait,” The Brookings Institution, 22 February 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-japan-and-south-korea-diverge-on-taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/. ↩︎
  15. Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171-201. ↩︎
  16. Roxana Tiron, “China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, US Says,” Bloomberg, 20 March 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-20/china-on-track-to-be-ready-for-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-says. ↩︎
  17. Nicole Wolkov et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 10, 2024,” The Institute for the Study of War, 10 April 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2024. ↩︎

Confused American Identity, Patriotism, and Immigration | By Catalina Scheider Galiñanes

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Considering what constitutes the United States of America

What constitutes the American nation? As border crossings surge1, with 2023 ending with a high of nearly 250,000 U.S. Border Patrol-Migrant encounters at the southern border in December of 2023, and political rhetoric heating up between Biden and Trump in anticipation of their impending presidential face-off, the question of how one ought to define a nation-state looms large in the minds of many Americans. While nearly all Americans2 identify the number of migrants seeking to enter the United States from the Mexico border as either a crisis (45%) or a major problem (32%), President Biden calls3 for foreign nationals to “immediately surge to the border” and states that the United States’ absorption of mass migrants and refugees is “who we are.” It is worthwhile to ask: who are we, as the American nation? And how could an unprecedented level of immigration change our answer? An America which refuses to acknowledge that she possesses specific historical and cultural components and struggles to address large-scale illegal immigration, reveals the pressing importance of the development of a shared self-understanding and local interconnectedness to the survival of the United States.

Ancient writers and accounts have much to offer on the topic of national borders and patriotic identity. Plutarch’s biography of Lycurgus, the great lawgiver and leader of Sparta, in The Parallel Lives reveals the centrality of united community and economic components of the state as intimately tied to its citizens’ habituation in virtue. In a radical and somewhat fictitious account of unity and clarity of intention, Lycurgus founds and rules the Spartan state with a defined idea of who his people ought to be. In this partially legendary account, Lycurgus abolishes all traditional currency, equally redistributes land, limits trade and immigration, and forms the Spartan citizenry into an elite fighting force. His policies, although extreme, and in tension with liberal notions of limitless self-determination, reveal a deeper goal of the state: to form its citizens as “integral parts of the whole community…almost beside themselves with enthusiasm and noble ambition, and to belong wholly to their country.”  It is not clear that the modern American would identify feeling “beside themselves with enthusiasm and noble ambition,” as a part of the current political ideal. As only 16% of Americans4 report being very attached to their local community, it becomes nearly impossible for citizens to experience a deep feeling of responsibility for their nation. 

In Plutarch’s account of the ancient Spartan state, the appeal of political harmony was so strong as to supersede inconveniences or the human push towards individuality. Patriotic ties towards one’s nation, call forward  “an indefinable and special emotion, which nothing modern can possibly arouse,” as Swiss political philosopher Benjamin Constant expressed in his famous 1816 essay, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns.”  Lycurgus outlawed international markets not due to a fear of invasion, but due to his understanding that, “For along with strange people, strange doctrines must also come in; and novel doctrines bring novel decisions, from which there must arise many feelings and resolutions which destroy the harmony of the existing political order.”  The notion of a protective orientation towards immigration is foreign to modern political rhetoric. The defense of the “harmony of the existing political order,” requires the acknowledgement that the maintenance of the political order is the central goal of the government.

Lycurgus’s reforms display that essential to any national identity is the willingness of the populace to sacrifice themselves out of a love of neighbor and country. In order for America to survive, one must first acknowledge that there is a particular definition of the American way of life and it is good. The very fact that the nation of the United States of America exists necessitates that there are some things which America is and some which it is not. American citizens must buy-in to a similar notion of values, history, laws, and interpersonal commitments. These objective standards must rest upon the country’s Judeo-Christian founding, traditions of personal rights, and the common good. The relativistic desire to identify America exclusively as a mixture of standards and values fundamentally confuses the American project of republican government into a post-modern, post-Christian project of contradictions. In order to begin to clarify American identity, citizens must assent to standards such as equality under the law and the fomentation of virtues which allow for the proper usage of liberty–not to the destructive rhetoric of identity conflict which holds that “America” does not means much of anything besides a system of oppression.

Interestingly, a traditional notion of national identity has recently been communicated by an unexpected source—Democratic Congresswoman Ilhan Omar of Minnesota. In a speech delivered in the Somali language in early February 2024, Congresswoman Omar spoke to her constituents about national identity and patriotism. The speech’s translation is disputed, with the conservative Heritage Foundation reporting5 on her as saying, “Somalia belongs to Somalis—it is unified, and we are all brothers” and the progressive Minnesota Reformer writing6 that her words were, “we are also people who can rely on each other. We are people who are siblings. We are people with courage. We are people who know that they are Somali and Muslim. We are people who support each other.” Either translation expresses a powerful patriotic sentiment, a call for Somali unity and support, and a clear definition of who Somalis are. And yet, Congresswoman Omar serves in the House of Representatives of the United States of America, not of Somalia. Her speech, widely criticized by Republicans and defended by Democrats as an example of intersectionality, is actually an exemplification of what it means to truly belong to a nation. 

In Omar’s case, her patriotic message focuses upon the Somali nation, which the naturalization oath had bound her to “absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity” to. That a member of the American congress would feel comfortable communicating such a message about another nation highlights the confusion surrounding American self-identity. This contradiction is the natural outcome of a culture which has condemned American cultural and social standards as oppressive. It is an interesting situation in which the desire to affirm that the United States’ only defining characteristic as its lack of objective values has allowed for other identities–racial, ethnic, or multinational–to secure prominent positions in American self-understanding. 

Regardless of questions raised surrounding Omar’s American identity, it remains obvious that many American citizens long to hear their leaders proclaim a similar sentiment: “America belongs to Americans–it is unified and we are all brothers.” This deep desire to belong within one’s home is an inherent part of human nature, and is not founded upon fear or hatred of the other. Instead of a xenophobic or hateful foundation, patriotism is traditionally understood as man’s desire to come home–as Odysseus longs to return to Ithaka or Aeneas searches for a homeland for his descendants–and as pride in the civilization to which each man and woman belongs. An understanding of home is particularly important in the nation which welcomes the “huddled masses” of Lazarus’s Great Colossus; therefore, attitudes toward mass immigration must be informed by the need for a unified American identity.

Beyond the first step in recognizing and embracing that being American means assenting to certain principles and rejecting others–immigration processes must ensure that these standards are communicated and accepted. This is simply impossible to ensure when the United States is facing such record high entries at the Southern border. In documents sent to Congress from Homeland Security, the federal government projects7 that the “non-detained docket,” or migrants without official legal status, is projected to have hit eight million by October 2023. The sheer volume of migrants is staggering–although President Biden had promised8 to effectively “absorb” asylum seekers during his 2020 campaign. This absorption has proved to be more difficult than anticipated, and it is impossible to thoroughly vet individuals when the Border Patrol is facing up to a quarter of a million encounters within a single month. The situation at the Southern border is distinct from any other migration to the United States, which has historically welcomed and been benefited by diverse immigration. Immigration undoubtedly plays an important role in the United States’ economic and social development. In order to address the immigration crisis, the government must recognize its role as the protector of political harmony, and acknowledge a responsibility to both migrants and citizens–lack of documentation leaves immigrants at risk of labor exploitation and trafficking9.

America is a nation founded upon an ambitious program of self-government, individual rights, and an orientation towards a national common good. Any meaningful notion of American identity rests upon her citizens’ ability to recognize foundational. American ideals as historic, objective, and central to their own understanding of themselves. Rhetoric which pushes a vision of the United States as a mere amalgamation of subjective multiculturalism, and welcomes mass illegal migration, welcomes dangerous ideological confusion: confusion in which an American Congresswoman extols the patriotism of another nation, confusion in which 8 million undocumented and vulnerable individuals are practically impossible to identify or contact, and confusion in which a record low10 Americans are proud of their nation. If Americans wish to preserve their nation, they must not fear defining both their ideological and geographical borders.

Notes

*Headline picture “American Flag Waving on a Flag Pole” is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.

  1.  Gramlich, John. “Migrant Encounters at the U.S.-Mexico Border Hit a Record High at the End of 2023.” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/02/15/migrant-encounters-at-the-us-mexico-border-hit-a-record-high-at-the-end-of-2023/. ↩︎
  2.  Center, Pew Research. “1. How Americans View the U.S.-Mexico Border Situation and the Government’s Handling of the Issue.” Pew Research Center – U.S. Politics & Policy, 15 Feb. 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/02/15/how-americans-view-the-u-s-mexico-border-situation-and-the-governments-handling-of-the-issue/. ↩︎
  3.  Speaker Kevin McCarthy. Candidate Biden Calls On Illegal Immigrants to Surge the Border. 2021. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYwLYMPLYbo. ↩︎
  4. Mitchell, Travis. “5. Americans’ Satisfaction with and Attachment to Their Communities.” Pew Research Center’s Social & Demographic Trends Project, 22 May 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/05/22/americans-satisfaction-with-and-attachment-to-their-communities/. ↩︎
  5. Gonzalez, Mike. “Ilhan Omar Brags About Advancing a Somalia First Agenda in Congress.” The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/commentary/ilhan-omar-brags-about-advancing-somalia-first-agenda-congress.  ↩︎
  6.  Nesterak, J. Patrick Coolican, Max. “Republicans Smeared Ilhan Omar over a Faulty Translation. Here’s What She Really Said. .” Minnesota Reformer, 1 Feb. 2024, https://minnesotareformer.com/2024/02/01/republicans-smeared-ilhan-omar-over-a-faulty-translation-heres-what-she-really-said/. * ↩︎
  7. Kight, Stef. “Scoop: Migrant Backlog to Hit 8 Million under Biden by October, Data Reveal.” Axious, 2 Mar. 2024, https://www.axios.com/2024/03/02/data-biden-border-crisis-immigration-8-million-detention.  ↩︎
  8. Steck, Andrew Kaczynski, Em. “Joe Biden Promised to ‘Absorb’ 2 Million Asylum Seekers ‘in a Heartbeat’ in 2019 – He Now Faces an Immigration Crisis.” CNN, 7 Mar. 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/07/politics/kfile-biden-2-million-migrants-asylum-seekers-immigration-crisis/index.html.  ↩︎
  9. Finckenauer, James, and Jennifer Schrock. Human Trafficking: A Growing Criminal Market in the U.S. . International Center of the National Institute of Justice , 2001, https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/human-trafficking-growing-criminal-market-us.  ↩︎
  10.  Megan, Brenan. “Record-Low 38% Extremely Proud to Be American.” Gallup, Inc., 29 June 2022, https://news.gallup.com/poll/394202/record-low-extremely-proud-american.aspx. ↩︎

An Epidemic of Disengagement: Gen Z and the 2024 election | By Anne Rehill

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I remember the excitement and pride I felt the first time I voted, just two months after turning 18. Those of us who are now seniors in college came of age during the 2020 presidential election, giving us the chance to be part of something that felt impactful and incredibly important at the time, regardless of what party we identified with. Yet, this optimism was short-lived as voters now prepare to confront the same two options in 2024 that we did in 2020. Acknowledging that the structure of the current two-party electoral system makes a third-party vote unlikely to have any meaningful impact on the outcome, many opted to choose the “lesser of two evils” in their view in 2020. From the left, electing Biden was seen by many as a necessary, if undesirable, effort to prevent Trump from re-election. From the right, many Republicans did favor Trump at the time, but his popularity also demonstrated a move towards extremism, which isolated many moderates. Ultimately, this choice was difficult for hundreds of thousands of Americans who felt they did not have a candidate who truly represented them.

Now, only 13% of voting-age Gen Z (individuals born from 1997 to 2013) answered that they have “A great deal” or “Quite a lot” of trust in the presidency, and that number is even lower if you narrow it down to only Gen Z independents of voting age: 7%.1 There is an epidemic in which young people of voting age in the U.S. lack trust in several critical political and social institutions including Congress, the news, and the Presidency. According to the Harvard Youth Poll, although Gen Z played an instrumental role in the election of Biden in 2020, fewer young Americans plan on voting in 2024, with most of this decline coming from young Republican and independent voters. Comparing this to the 2020 presidential election cycle, the number of young Americans between 18 and 29 years old who “definitely” plan on voting for president has decreased from 57% to 49%.2 If continued, Gen Z could have lower political participation rates in upcoming elections due to a sense of disillusionment with their effectiveness in influencing politics in a political system that reinforces a rigid binary. The fact that a significant portion of the voting population is frustrated with the status quo is a serious concern and should be taken as a serious warning about the health of American democracy.

Everyone has heard that America is the most polarized today that it has ever been. Republican representatives have tended to move more right on the ideological spectrum, Democratic representatives have tended to move more left, negative views of each other have reached record highs, and government structures like Congress that require bipartisan cooperation have become dysfunctional. However, despite still having political “leanings” and strong beliefs, Gen Z and Millenials are the least partisan generations, with a whopping 52% identifying themselves as Independent.3 

Pew Research Center, “Party Identification in the United States in 2022, By Generation,” chart, August 18, 2022, Statistia, https://www.statista.com/statistics/319068/party-identification-in-the-united-states-by-generation.

Some potential reasons why Gen Z may not want to identify with the Democratic Party or the Republican Party include recognition of the ineffectiveness of partisan uncooperativeness, distrust in the beholdenness of the parties to large donor organizations and individuals, and mismatches between voters and candidates in stances on topical issues such as Israel/Palestine and environmental initiatives. This leads to a dilemma as we are dissatisfied with the lack of third-party options. The First-Past-the-Post (also called “single-choice voting”) and Winner-Takes-All Voting systems presently in American Presidential elections discourage smaller parties from gaining a foothold because they may struggle to win electoral votes without widespread support across multiple states. Without the primaries producing any solid alternatives to Biden and Trump, other groups have attempted to offer third-party options.

According to No Labels–a group meant to unite conservatives, liberals, and everyone in between under the fundamental beliefs of Country over party and moderation over extremism–their “polling shows 63% of Americans would be open to supporting a moderate independent presidential candidate in 2024 if the alternatives are Donald Trump and Joe Biden.”4 However, No Labels faced high levels of criticism by those who believed it would “spoil” the election and cause Trump to be re-elected by taking votes away from those who would have otherwise voted for Biden. For this reason, they were not able to field a candidate, with Joe Manchin, Chris Christie, and Larry Hogan declining, and abandoned their ticket last week. Meanwhile, as of March 29, 2024 polls, third-party candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr. attracted 12.3% of votes.5 This 12.3%, which was mostly siphoned from potential Biden voters, could have a huge impact on the outcome if Kennedy were to remain in the race.

 “2024 General Election: Trump vs Biden vs Kennedy,” Real Clear Polling, accessed March 29, 2024, https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/president/general/2024/trump-vs-biden-vs-kennedy.

The only way to mitigate polarization, give proper representation to those outside of the Republican/Democrat dichotomy, and reverse declining political participation is to reform the electoral system. Restructuring campaign finance, the electoral college, and implementing Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) could make third-party options feasible. Others call for age restrictions, with 82% of Republicans and 76% of Democrats supporting a maximum age limit in place for elected federal officials.6 These reforms could be achieved either through amendments to the Constitution or through individual efforts by all states. The U.S. Constitution grants states significant autonomy to states in determining their election procedures, including methods for conducting elections and counting votes. RCV has already been implemented in several statewide and federal elections in Maine and Alaska, and this March, Representative Don Beyer re-introduced an updated Fair Representation Act to implement measures to elect U.S. House Representatives through ranked-choice voting in multi-member districts.7

American historian and activist Howard Zinn said, “You can’t be neutral on a moving train.” To not vote is to take a side by allowing a winning candidate to be elected without opposition. Gen Z is the most diverse, most well-educated, and most technologically adept generation in American history. This makes it not only essential to get Gen Z levels of participation up to 2020 levels this 2024 but also gives us a unique ability to advocate for change. As we head into November, it is important that we mobilize to get out and vote, as voting goes far beyond the Presidential race. Thirty-two states will have senator elections and and dozens of House seats are up for re-election. These representatives have the power to back legislation for electoral reform in Congress. Whether you sign a petition in support of election reforms, contact your representatives to let them know your support, or volunteer on campaigns, now is the time to take action.

Notes

*Headline image “I Voted Sticker” is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license.

  1. Zach Hrynowski and Stephanie Marken, “Gen Z Voices Lackluster Trust In Major U.S. Institutions,” Gallup, September 14, 2023, https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/510395/gen-voices-lackluster-trust-major-institutions.aspx. ↩︎
  2. “Harvard Youth Poll,” Harvard Kennedy School Institute of Politics, December 5, 2023, https://iop.harvard.edu/youth-poll/46th-edition-fall-2023 utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email#key-takeaway–id–1516  ↩︎
  3.  Pew Research Center, “Party Identification in the United States in 2022, By Generation,” chart, August 18, 2022, Statistia, https://www.statista.com/statistics/319068/party-identification-in-the-united-states-by-generation. ↩︎
  4.  “Unity Ticket 2024 FAQs,” No Labels, accessed April 3, 2024, https://www.nolabels.org/unity-ticket-faqs. ↩︎
  5.  “2024 General Election: Trump vs Biden vs Kennedy,” Real Clear Polling, accessed March 29, 2024, https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/president/general/2024/trump-vs-biden-vs-kennedy. ↩︎
  6.  John Gramlich, “Most Americans favor maximum age limits for federal elected officials, Supreme Court justices,” PEW Research, October 4, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/10/04/most-americans-favor-maximum-age-limits-for-federal-elected-officials-supreme-court-justices/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Constitution%20sets%20minimum,age%20for%20Supreme%20Court%20justices. ↩︎
  7. Congress, “Text – H.R.3863 – 117th Congress (2021-2022): Fair Representation Act,” November 1, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3863/text. ↩︎

The Unforeseen Consequences of Social Capital | By Kendall Manning

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Introduction
Robert Putnam is best known for his book Bowling Alone, in which he links a healthy democracy with strong levels of social capital. Putnam defines social capital as “connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.”1 Putnam illustrates the importance of creating bonds within a community to promote healthy democracy. However, these bonds are not always used for good, something he highlights in his discussion of how social capital can contribute to the formation and success of extremist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK).2 In recent years, modern extremist groups have become more mainstream.3 Robert Putnam’s theory argues that in the United States, we are currently experiencing a severe decrease in social capital – something that is seen through falling enrollment in clubs and organizations such as bowling leagues and rotary clubs. In this paper I will argue that this decline in social capital is what has created the space for the increased prominence and attractiveness of extremist groups. With nowhere else to turn, people find community wherever they can.

Modern Examples of Political Extremism
Modern examples of political extremism occur on both ends of the political spectrum. On the left, groups termed Anarchist Violent Extremists (AVEs) pose a moderate risk of engaging in acts of violence, actively opposing constructs such as capitalism and the government which they view as harmful to society.4 Books written about AVEs from the left often paint their actions as necessary to respond to “right-wing extremist groups’ increased violent activity.”5 This highlights the polarization between the two ends of the political spectrum, as one side may engage in a violent action to retaliate against the other side’s actions. Regardless of the AVE’s motivation, the cyclical nature of escalatory violence among extremist groups offers an explanation to their increased action, and henceforth increased popularity in recent years.

On the other end of the political spectrum, right-wing groups – such as the Proud Boys – have been similarly involved in violent actions. The January 6th attack on the capitol highlights that they “have emerged as a manifestation and driver for polarization and political violence in the United States since their inception in 2016.”6 Since 2016, the Proud Boys have become further incentivized to act violently to accomplish their political goals. Furthermore, the outside forces that plague the AVEs (such as a feeling of necessity to ‘retaliate’) similarly plague right-wing groups. Former President Donald Trump’s rhetoric inflamed the Proud Boys during a time that was already filled with heightened emotions following his loss in the 2020 presidential election. Some leaders of the Proud Boys, and their lawyers, have even gone so far as to claim that Trump caused the January 6th attack through this inflammation.7 Similar uses of rhetorical flourish and fear-mongering acts as an outside pressure for these political groups, motivating
increasingly extreme and violent actions.

The Fall of Social Capital
Putnam’s diagnosis of our social condition – as illustrated through falling registration in bowling leagues – is meant to encourage a revival in social behavior. At present, Putnam travels across the country showing screenings of his documentary Join or Die to remind people of the importance of connecting with one another.8 However, with the recent COVID-19 pandemic and the rise of social media, people are less connected than ever before. In his 20th anniversary edition of Bowling Alone, Putnam discusses the impact of social media on social capital – using Facebook as his focus. While social media has been used increasingly since the original publication of Bowling Alone, and people often use it to make connections, Putnam finds that it has not replaced the “in-person civic life that Bowling Alone showed was disappearing.”9 While people often tout their online connections, the utility of these ‘connections’ is not equivalent to the in-person social capital that was prominent in earlier decades. However, it is not just
Facebook and social media that weakens our social capital – online shopping sites have also harmed our ability to make connections: “Even before the coronavirus epidemic, e-commerce, including Amazon and Uber Eats, had been weakening ‘third places’ beyond home and work… that is, places where people traditionally encountered friends and acquaintances and thus created and maintained face-to-face social capital.”10 Online websites have removed the need to go into public and engage with civil society. The rise of e-commerce websites and social media seem, on balance, to have both further diminished our
social capital over the last two decades since Putnam first diagnosed the problem with American social capital in the 1990s.

This dramatic decrease in social capital partially explains the rise of political extremist groups. This case is in part illuminated by the political success of former President Donald Trump: “Trump’s support comes disproportionately from those with low social connectedness.”11 Low social connectedness is often associated with feelings of isolation and a decline of trust in others.12 These feelings of hopelessness directly contributed to Trump’s election, as he attempted to instill hope for the future in an isolated population.13 Trump’s message was successful – at least among the more socially alienated. In the 2016 Republican Primary, Trump won most districts with the lowest levels of social connectedness and lost most districts with the highest.14 For people with a low level of social connectivity, politically extreme messages – such as Donald Trump’s populism15 – have taken root.

Political Extremist Groups & The Rise of Social Capital
The idea of politically extreme messages taking root in socially isolated populations is similarly illustrated through the rise of political extremist groups. Both AVEs and right-wing groups illuminate Putnam’s concern about the dangers of social capital. With the continued decrease in social connectivity, alienated populations look for others they can relate to. With the rising appeal of populist and other political messages, as seen through Trump’s political success, it is often the case that they turn to these extremist groups: “Organizations like the Mob or the Klan can sometimes fulfill the need for social solidarity and community involvement as effectively as bowling clubs or the Rotary Club… community involvement is only as good as the community one is involved with.”16 Right-wing groups and AVEs can similarly fill the need for social connectedness among socially isolated individuals. The lack of opportunities for other forms of community involvement reiterates why individuals feel compelled to join political groups.

Additionally, the longevity of groups like the Proud Boys may be appealing: “The tempo of the group’s appearances after January 6 suggests that instead of instigating a standing down, the group may be positioning itself to serve as the violent tip of the post-Insurrection extreme far-right.”17 While the Proud
Boys underwent considerable scrutiny following the January 6th attack on the Capitol, it seems that this has not impacted the longevity of their organization. Individuals who choose to join politically extreme groups for the benefits of social capital can be assured in their resilience against outside pressures. More traditional groups – such as bowling leagues – have not proved similarly resilient against outside pressures, as decreased enrollment due to societal change18 often meant the end of the league itself.

Conclusion
Robert Putnam’s theory of social capital revolutionized the way political scientists think about social connectivity in democracies. He correctly details the decline in the United States’ social capital – as highlighted through dropping civic participation in community organizations. However, the rise of political extremist groups was an unforeseen consequence of decreased engagement. As seen through the patterns of Donald Trump’s political victories in the 2016 Republican Primaries and beyond, alienated individuals are more likely to buy into politically extreme messages such as Trump’s populism. These isolated individuals then seek out social capital in the only way they can – by joining politically extreme groups, whether left-wing or right-wing. These groups instill a sense of social connectivity with previously isolated individuals, which allows for them to flourish. Although it seems at present that the social connectivity of extremist groups is in contrast with the decline of other forms of social capital, their long-term viability remains to be seen. At present, the Proud Boys are reinforcing their organization, despite legal challenges following January 6.19 However, bowling leagues initially did as well, before they tapered off.20 Political extremist groups may similarly decline as a form of social capital, or they could contradict existing trends and remain on the upswing.

Notes

  1. Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone, (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2000), 19. ↩︎
  2. Putnam, 22. ↩︎
  3. For further reading, see Seth G. Jones “Who Are Antifa, and Are They a Threat?,” Kaitlyn Tiffany “The Right’s New Bogeyman,” and Jared Thomson “Examining Extremism: The Boogaloo Movement.” ↩︎
  4. “Anarchist/Left-Wing Violent Extremism,” (The George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2021), 6. ↩︎
  5. “Anarchist/Left-Wing Violent Extremism,” 9. ↩︎
  6. Matthew Kriner and Jon Lewis, “Pride & Prejudice: The Violent Evolution of the Proud Boys,” (CTC Sentinel, 2021), 26. ↩︎
  7. Kyle Cheney, “Proud Boys leaders: Trump caused Jan. 6th attack,” Politico, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/25/proud-boys-trial-trump-tarrio-00093678. ↩︎
  8. Clare Lyons, “Join or Die’: Harvard professor touts extracurriculars at Notre Dame Forum,” The Observer, Feb. 22, 2024, https://www.ndsmcobserver.com/article/2024/02/putnam-talks-social-capital-democracy-at-notre-dame-forum-keynote-event. ↩︎
  9. Putnam, 427. ↩︎
  10. Putnam, 435. ↩︎
  11. Michael Barone, “Does lack of social connectedness explain Trump’s appeal?”, The Washington Examiner, Mar. 27, 2016, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/2001105/does-lack-of-social-connectedness-explain-trumps-appeal/. ↩︎
  12. Isabel V. Sawhill, “Social Capital: Why We Need It and How We Can Create More of It,” (Brookings Institution, 2020), 1. ↩︎
  13. Sawhill, 6. ↩︎
  14. Sawhill. ↩︎
  15. Sawhill. ↩︎
  16. Joshua Keating, “Bowling Alone is Bad Unless Your Bowling Team Kills People,” Foreign Policy, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/15/bowling-alone-is-bad-unless-your-bowling-team-kills-people/. ↩︎
  17. Kriner and Lewis, 37. ↩︎
  18. Putnam, 17. ↩︎
  19. Kriner and Lewis, 37. ↩︎
  20. Putnam, 472. Bowling league enrollment rose steadily for almost 50 years – from 1920 to 1965 – before it dropped dramatically. ↩︎

Is This Another Munich? Analogies in International Relations | By Marko Gural

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International relations uses analogies of the past to describe situations today. The Munich analogy–appeasement–and the Pearl Harbor analogy–surprise attack–are two of the most common and well-known examples. Unfortunately, the overuse of these analogies often stems from a misunderstanding of their true history and subsequently distorts policy recommendations for the future.

In a conversation at the recent Yalta European Strategy Conference, Center for European Policy Analysis President Alina Polyakova declared that a Russian military collapse in Ukraine would be analogous to the breakup of the Soviet Union1. How does she know this? Is she a Kremlin insider, or does she enjoy unparalleled access to Russian federative politics? Today’s moment is different from the final years of the Cold War in many ways, not only because the Russian Federation is proportionately weaker than the Soviet Union was but also because the USSR did not disintegrate after battlefield collapse.

Analogies

“USS West Virginia” by U.S. Navy is public domain

Polyakova’s claim is one instance of international relations scholars using analogies of the past to advocate for positions in the present and future. Analogies are inferences based on the logic that if two events are similar in one respect, they may be similar in many other ways2. Two of the most commonly used analogies today are those of Munich and Pearl Harbor. At the Munich Conference of 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Nazi leader Adolf Hitler by granting him Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland. Chamberlain hoped that Hitler would be satisfied with the agreement but did not realize his hegemonic ambitions. Thus, Munich helped Hitler prepare for World War II, and scholars of history should know never to give an inch to a murderous dictator, as Chamberlain did in 1938. 

A second analogy concerns Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Ostensibly, the United States was unprepared for the surprise attack, leading to President Roosevelt’s “a date which will live in infamy” declaration and America’s subsequent involvement in the Second World War. Instead, policymakers and the military must always be ready for conflict.


Are these analogies accurate? They are not. Analogies often incorrectly promote ahistorical policies. Analysts misunderstand both the Munich Conference of 1938 and Japan’s decision to bomb Pearl Harbor in 1941. The common stories promote war-mongering, intense defense spending, and remaining on constant alert. Leaders are fearful of surprise attacks and their publics labeling them as appeasers or pacifists.

Unfortunately, this historical distortion is common. For example, Republican Senator Kevin Cramer of North Dakota claimed in 2022 that the Biden administration had failed to respond to Putin decisively, instead creating a “new international policy of appeasement to dictators and thugs, rather than a demonstration of strength.”3 Furthermore, former President Donald Trump has declared that Biden’s poorly executed 2021 withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan emboldened Putin.4 To be clear, this is a bipartisan analogy: Michael McFaul, Ambassador to Russia during the Obama administration, has repeated this same language.5 Republican Senator Pete Ricketts of Nebraska has applied this same rhetoric to China, arguing that Biden’s foreign policy is “all about appeasement.” He continued that appeasing dictators is a worthless endeavor because “you cannot make these people happy,” since China “wants to be the world dominating power by 2049.”6 

In the above cases, the implications are that the United States should have stayed in Afghanistan, even after more than two decades of fighting; the United States should have deterred Putin’s attack, although it is never clear how; and that the United States should incite an arms race against China. Indeed, many U.S. lawmakers today speak of a new “Axis of Evil” around the world to which America must respond.

The same is true for Pearl Harbor and its analogy to surprise attack. History remembers many wars as being started by one side’s surprise invasion: Stalin was supposedly unaware of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union with Operation Barbarossa, U.S. troops were caught off guard by the communist Tet Offensive in Vietnam, and the Israelis were ignorant of Arab preparations for the 1973 Yom Kippur War.7 Many witnessed Hamas’ invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023, through the same lens. Because such attacks can seemingly come at any time, the United States must remain prepared for battle. In fact, U.S. policymakers evoked memories of Pearl Harbor during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most tense nuclear standoff in history. Advisors to President Kennedy warned against a Soviet surprise attack and themselves argued against preemption.8

Reality

In reality, a close historical reading of the Munich and Pearl Harbor cases lend themself to vastly different lessons than those commonly promoted today.

The Munich story warns us about the dangers of disconnected military doctrine and diplomatic policy. After World War I, Great Britain promised to retrench from European commitments. She adopted the Ten-Year Rule, which “enjoined the services not to prepare for any major conflict” within a decade and limited military investment.9 Although the rise of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany’s rearmament caused considerable consternation in 10 Downing Street, the British Army was not prepared to maintain even a “rudimentary capability for combat” on the continent until 1939.10 When Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had to engage in diplomacy that reflected British capabilities. In fact, Chamberlain looked for a general settlement to “appease” the tense European situation–not towards Hitler in particular–because the post-World War I Versailles system had clearly failed.11 London’s allies were likely not strong enough to stand up to Berlin in September 1938: France’s military doctrine was defensive and unable to stand up to Germany, Stalin had purged most of the Red Army’s officer corps, and no other countries were strong enough to substantially impact a war against Hitler. 12

Thus, even had the British hoped to stand up to Hitler (and not “appease” him, although this use of the term is similarly ahistorical), war was risky. Chamberlain took the realistic route at the moment: ignorant of Hitler’s intentions but aware that another year of preparation would help the Allies in a possible war, he attempted to reach a settlement.

Pearl Harbor tells us that surprise attacks are often not truly surprises. Instead, they can be a careful and calculated step up the escalation ladder. Many Americans forget that Japan’s interwar economy was strongly tied to the United States, who supplied Japan with 80% of her energy requirements through crude oil.13 After Japan invaded northern Indochina in 1940, the U.S. strengthened economic sanctions, froze all Japanese assets in the United States, and introduced a total oil embargo. The Japanese, shocked by the abruptness of these actions, attempted to reach a modus vivendi for months. As Tokyo and Washington failed to come to an agreement, the Japanese continued to grow more desperate in the face of waning energy supplies. President Roosevelt and American units in the Pacific received information on December 6 that a Japanese attack was imminent, but the first offensive on the Philippines—and later on Pearl Harbor—was as overwhelming as if no warning had been sent out.14 

Pearl Harbor was an escalation, but one that the United States anticipated and quite a logical maneuver on the part of the Japanese. Indeed, although surprise attacks have started most major wars since World War II, Richard Betts finds that the “element of surprise…was unwarranted” because “substantial evidence” of attack was available before it happened.15 Intelligence failures, rather than a lack of constant vigilance, are often the causes of “surprises.”

Conclusions

“Парад в честь 70-летия Великой Победы (Parade in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Great Victory)” by the Kremlin is licensed under CC BY 4.0

Even if scholars and the public were to understand Munich and Pearl Harbor, among other important historical cases, analogies remain of limited use for discerning and predicting the unpredictable world of international politics. Analogies aim to broadly connect two events that have at least one similarity. This can be useful for casual observers growing interested in the world of international relations, but it is unthinkably dangerous for seasoned politicians and world leaders. 

The main danger that analysts face threatens the state’s existence and power. Appeasement and surprise attack analogies can lead to bloated defense spending and unnecessary constant alert. This, in turn, risks overextension. Overextension occurs when great powers commit themselves to areas, countries, or threats that they lack the capability to manage. The phenomenon can damage the home front and lead to a breakdown of international prestige. After the First World War, for example, Great Britain gained territories to grow her empire to its largest extent yet, but also faced a domestic economic crisis and skyrocketing unemployment. Although London won the Second World War, Britain failed to effectively defend her allies, and the Empire soon collapsed.

Washington’s insiders should rethink this approach, which would lead the United States into a dangerous period of international competition based on flawed historical understanding. No matter which analogies decision-makers grab onto, comparisons can promote nonsensical policies. America’s most important competitors today—and into the foreseeable future—are Russia and China. Although neither currently threatens the American homeland, miscalculation into confrontation has the power to take lives and soil. History can provide valuable lessons, but we cannot inflate its importance in singular cases. Politicians who scream bloody murder when they believe that a president is appeasing a dictator are ostentatiously advancing their foreign policy reputation. Unfortunately, in Washington, failure and exaggeration often breed promotion.16 The world is complicated—analogies won’t help.

Notes

*Headline image from “Münchener Abkommen (Munich Agreement)” by Bundesarchiv, licensed under CC-BY-SA 3.0.

  1. “Townhall: What is the Definition of Victory as of September 9, 2023?” YouTube, 10 September 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LIpLuvAjuZo. ↩︎
  2. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 6-7. ↩︎
  3. Shannon Pettypiece, Scott Wong and Peter Nicholas, “How Putin’s war could cost Biden with American voters,” NBC News, 16 February 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/putins-war-cost-biden-american-voters-rcna16383.  ↩︎
  4. Pettypiece, Wong and Nicholas, “How Putin’s war could cost Biden.” ↩︎
  5. Michael McFaul, “Calling for ‘Give Peace a Chance’ without a Strategy to Convince Putin To End His Invasion of Ukraine Is not Realism,” Substack, 18 August 2023, ↩︎
  6. “ICYMI: Ricketts on Biden’s Foreign Policy Following Xi Meeting: “It’s All About Appeasement,” Pete Ricketts, Senator for Nebraska, 16 November 2023, https://www.ricketts.senate.gov/press-releases/icymi-ricketts-on-bidens-foreign-policy-following-xi-meeting-its-all-about-appeasement/. ↩︎
  7. Richard K. Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning: Why Surprise Attacks Succeed,” Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 4 (1980-1981): 553-555. ↩︎
  8. Dominic Tierney, “Pearl Harbor in Reverse,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 3 (2007): 54. ↩︎
  9. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 163. ↩︎
  10. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 143. ↩︎
  11. Gerhard Weinberg, “Munich Conference: War Postponed,” in World War II: Roots and Causes, ed. Keith Eubank (Belmont: Wadsworth Learning, 1992), 154-166. ↩︎
  12. Weinberg, “Munich Conference,” 154-166. ↩︎
  13. Haruo Iguchi, “Japanese Foreign Policy and the Outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War: the Search for a Modus Vivendi in US-Japanese Relations after July 1941,” in The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective, ed. Frank McDonough (London: Continuum, 2011), 467. ↩︎
  14. Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning,” 554; and Iguchi, “Japanese Foreign Policy,” 474. ↩︎
  15. Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning,” 551. ↩︎
  16. Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York: Macmillan, 2018). ↩︎

High Voltage Diplomacy: Elon Musk’s Emergence as a National Security Threat | By Edward Nagler

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Elon Musk, America’s top entrepreneur, typically applauded for his leadership of Tesla, SpaceX, and OpenAI, has taken on a new role in our national security landscape. Musk’s industrial dominance over electric vehicles, satellite technology, and nascent artificial intelligence research positions him at the center of America’s relationship with its two most prominent adversaries – China and Russia. News of Musk’s decision to deactivate Ukraine’s access to Starlink as they prepared to engage Russian troops in Crimea and his flippant comparison between Taiwan and Hawaii has sent shockwaves through the foreign policy world. Musk’s influence over foreign affairs may even outrank John D. Rockefeller, who wielded unparalleled power through his Standard Oil Monopoly in the early 1900s. However, Musk’s unchecked rhetoric and unprecedented influence over foreign policy have undermined the Biden Administration’s  agenda and jeopardized U.S. interests overseas. While Musk’s entrepreneurship and unorthodoxy once warranted applause from American audiences, we must now consider whether his recent actions make him a grave national security threat. 

A Missed Opportunity? Defending Musk’s Initial Foreign Policy Actions

While Musk’s recent decisions to shut off Ukraine’s access to Starlink technology and declaration that Taiwan is an integral part of China endangers U.S. interests, his initial actions regarding China and Russia arguably served them. By providing Ukraine access to Starlink in February 2022, Musk bolstered their communication and surveillance capabilities, hindering a swift Russian victory and a potential challenge to NATO territory. Meanwhile, Musk’s meeting with Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang in May 2023 emphasized the benefits of continued American-Chinese economic cooperation, facilitating communication between the two nations during a time of frozen diplomatic channels. Musk’s initial actions demonstrate that private citizens can benefit U.S. national security under the proper circumstances.

Musk’s decision to activate Starlink at the onset of Russia’s invasion on February 26, 2022 demonstrates his willingness to use technology to promote U.S. national security. After being asked by Mykhalio Fedorov, Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister to activate Starlink on Twitter, Elon granted his request within hours.1 While Musk may appear to be conducting a publicity stunt, the government did not initially fund Starlink, implying that he independently chose to fund the Ukrainian effort.2 Starlink has contributed significantly to Ukraine’s communication and detection of Russian battlefield movements, contributing to the war effort and therefore promoting U.S. interests. However, Musk consistently expressed uneasiness towards the prospect of Starlink technology being used to mount an attack on Russian territory – including Crimea.3 Musk’s initial willingness to offer technology to support the Ukrainian cause was admirable, however the Biden Administration’s failure to interpret Musk’s war aims or harness his technological prowess positioned Musk to inevitably use Starlink against U.S. interests.

Meanwhile, Musk’s meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang inadvertently served U.S. National Security interests by highlighting the severe economic costs of a conflict with China. According to liberal conceptions of international relations, a key way for states to overcome an anarchic international order and facilitate cooperation is through economic interdependence.4 Accordingly, if states’ economies become deeply intertwined, the mutually devastating consequences of war would deter conflict.5 Musk’s visit strengthened interdependence between the two countries by defying both states’ strategy of economic decoupling. However, Musk’s intentions were not rooted in patriotism but instead out of personal gain. American-Chinese economic cooperation is in Tesla’s interest, considering that 30 to 50 percent of Tesla’s total production is based in Shanghai.6 Nevertheless, Musk’s business interests ultimately promoted U.S. national security through the benefits of economic interdependence, highlighting the possibility for business tycoons to serve U.S. interests while chasing their own profit. However, Musk may have gone too far in his efforts to appease the CCP by supporting their territorial claim over Taiwan. 

Things Go Astray: Elon’s Daunting Power Grab and Fanatical Rhetoric

Despite Musk’s initial contributions to U.S. national security, his recent decisions to curtail Ukraine’s access to Starlink technology and issue provocative statements regarding Taiwan has only endangered the United States. While private citizens like Musk can act in the national interest, their efforts at foreign policymaking can also have disastrous consequences that propel the United States into international conflict.

On September 7, 2023, days before Walter Issacson’s biography, Elon Musk, was released to the American public, Musk’s decision to sever Ukraine’s access to Starlink in Fall 2022 made national headlines. In the biography, Issacson provides a detailed account of Musk’s rationale for sabotaging Ukraine’s attempt to attack a Russian fleet off the coast of Crimea. According to the biography, Musk justified his decision by claiming that “Space X would be explicitly complicit in a major act of war and conflict escalation” if Starlink contributed to Ukraine’s attack.7 Moreover, Musk backed up his claim by asserting that he was merely trying to stop another “Pearl Harbor.”8 However, Musk’s defense that he would be “complicit in a major act of war” rings hollow given his prior willingness to provide Ukraine with ongoing Starlink access, which undoubtedly contributed to their war effort. Musk’s claim that he made the decision after consulting the Russian government9 also raises concerns that he acted on behalf of an American adversary. 

Elon Musk’s actions, despite the ongoing debate regarding U.S. economic and military support for Ukraine, are jeopardizing American national security interests. By thwarting Ukrainian war plans, Musk is prolonging the conflict, forcing Ukraine to ask the United States for more financial and military support. Moreover, Musk’s decision to consult Russia instead of the United States implies that he is defying the U.S. government’s wishes. What is most alarming  though is that news of this sneaky maneuver made public headlines a year after the incident. It remains to be seen whether any other moves to undermine Ukrainian objectives will arise in the months to come. 

Meanwhile, on September 13, 2023, Musk thrust himself into the debate over China’s claim on Taiwan in a virtual appearance at the All-In Summit while sitting comfortably on his luxurious private jet. In his appearance, Musk claimed that China’s perception of Taiwan is analogous to our relationship with Hawaii.10 While Musk’s statement demonstrates his desire to appease China and safeguard his business interests, his subsequent comments defied U.S. security objectives. Following his Hawaii analogy, Musk asserted that Taiwan is “like an integral part of China that is arbitrarily not part of China, mostly because the U.S. Pacific Fleet has stopped any sort of reunification by force.”11 This statement not only ignores Taiwan’s strong desire for independence, a significant factor hindering reunification efforts, but also places the blame for stalled reunification squarely on the United States. Furthermore, Musk’s claim that Taiwan’s separation from China is “arbitrary” suggests that it is somehow unnatural that reunification has not yet occurred. 

Musk’s commentary poses a severe threat to U.S.-China relations and actually undermines his business interests. By suggesting that American warships are responsible for the separation of China and Taiwan, Musk strengthens China’s claim on Taiwan and emboldens China to take action. Reunification of China and Taiwan undermines American objectives in the Pacific because a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could result in a direct military conflict between two major powers with a chance of nuclear escalation. Furthermore, if the United States were to withdraw support from Taiwan, a Chinese victory would allow China to project more military power in the Pacific from Taiwan and threaten key U.S. allies. Musk’s comments ironically undermine his interests because he is escalating U.S.-China tensions, compromising his efforts to promote economic cooperation between the two countries. In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, a military blockade of China or a trade embargo would inflict severe costs on Tesla’s profits. Musk’s fanatical rhetoric demonstrates why he is ill-suited to conduct diplomacy with our adversaries.

Where Can We Go From Here?

  Elon Musk’s recent political stunts with U.S. adversaries highlight his dangerous influence on U.S. national security. Moreover, Musk’s ability to thwart U.S. interests in the future is still growing. As a result, the U.S. government must take action to limit his ability to conduct foreign policy as a private citizen. 

A potential solution to handcuffing Musk’s control over Starlink is for the United States government to pay for it entirely. In Fall 2022, Musk hinted that he’d like the Pentagon to start funding Starlink, noting the high costs of his private contributions.12 The United States should fulfill Musk’s request on the condition that Musk forfeits his presidential-like power to independently control Ukraine’s access to it. If Musk continues to fund Starlink, even partially, he will maintain his claim to control its implementation. Luckily, Senators Warren, Shaheen and Duckworth recognize the need to curb Musk’s control over Starlink technology. On September 18, 2023, they drafted a letter to Lloyd Austin and the Department of Defense lamenting Musk’s unilateral control over the technology. In the letter, they asked Austin if there were other incidents where Musk unilaterally chose to shut off Starlink technology or if contract protections existed to block Musk from taking unilateral action.13 The U.S. government should also stop awarding contracts to SpaceX to punish Musk for undermining American interests. While Musk has the right to object to U.S. Foreign Policy, the government owes it to its citizens to refrain from purchasing military technologies from contractors who discreetly consult foreign adversaries.

Regarding Musk’s Taiwan rhetoric, there is little the United States can do to stop his reckless action. His ownership of X (formerly known as Twitter) allows him to control information regarding China’s claim on Taiwan, raising severe concerns over Musk’s capability to promote disinformation favoring China’s claims and suppress information supporting Taiwan’s claim for independence. Musk can also use these same powers to promote Russian propaganda and decrease U.S. support for the Ukrainian war effort. In fact, a September 2023 report from the European Union substantiated these concerns. The EU found Musk’s X Platform to have the largest number of posts containing disinformation and noted the high frequency of posts parroting Russian narratives.

Americans should fear Musk’s unprecedented ability to leverage his tech empire to influence U.S. foreign policy as an unelected official. While countless Americans pursue their dreams of shaping foreign policy through meritocratic channels, Musk uses his control over satellite technology, social media, and artificial intelligence to play his own game of great power diplomacy. Musk’s impact on our relationships with our adversaries sends a chilling message to future generations, suggesting that power and wealth, rather than knowledge and experience are the keys to influencing policy. As Musk cements his position as a volatile player in the national security ecosystem, Americans have a patriotic duty to scrutinize his ongoing communications with Russia, China, and other U.S. adversaries to safeguard the integrity of our foreign policy. 

Notes

  1. Christine H Fox and Emelia S. Probasco, “Big Tech Goes to War,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2023,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/big-tech-goes-war. ↩︎
  2. Christine H Fox and Emelia S. Probasco, “Big Tech Goes to War,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2023,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/big-tech-goes-war. ↩︎
  3. Christine H Fox and Emelia S. Probasco, “Big Tech Goes to War,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2023,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/big-tech-goes-war. ↩︎
  4. Daniel W Drezner, “The Dangers of Misunderstanding Economic Interdependence,” CATO Institute, September 12, 2023, https://www.cato.org/publications/dangers-misunderstanding-economic-interdependence. ↩︎
  5. Daniel W Drezner, “The Dangers of Misunderstanding Economic Interdependence,” CATO Institute, September 12, 2023, https://www.cato.org/publications/dangers-misunderstanding-economic-interdependence. ↩︎
  6. Roula Khalaf, “Elon Musk: ‘Aren’t You Entertained?,’” Financial Times, October 7, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/5ef14997-982e-4f03-8548-b5d67202623a. ↩︎
  7. Elon Musk Says He Denied Ukraine Satellite Request to Avoid Complicity in ‘Major Act of War’ vs. Russia,” CBS News, September 8, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elon-musk-ukraine-russia-war-starlink-satellite-denied-major-act-of-war/. ↩︎
  8. Marc Champion, “Analysis | Elon Musk Has Power in Ukraine. Does He Know How to Use It?,” The Washington Post, September 8, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/09/08/ukraine-war-it-doesn-t-matter-how-elon-musk-got-involved-he-s-in-it/83d1a4a8-4e51-11ee-bfca-04e0ac43f9e4_story.html. ↩︎
  9. Jack Detsch, “Musk’s Starlink Shutdown Raises Eyebrows,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/14/elon-musk-ukraine-russia-starlink-shutdown-crimea/. ↩︎
  10. Jack Detsch, “Musk’s Starlink Shutdown Raises Eyebrows,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/14/elon-musk-ukraine-russia-starlink-shutdown-crimea/. ↩︎
  11. Jack Detsch, “Musk’s Starlink Shutdown Raises Eyebrows,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/14/elon-musk-ukraine-russia-starlink-shutdown-crimea/. ↩︎
  12. Christine H Fox and Emelia S. Probasco, “Big Tech Goes to War,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2023,  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/big-tech-goes-war. ↩︎
  13. Shaheen, Jeanne, Elizabeth Warren, Tammy Duckworth, Tim Kaine and Gary Peters. “Shaheen, Warren, Duckworth, Kaine and Peters Send Letter to Secretary Austin Requesting Information about Defense Contracts with Commercial Providers Following the Reported Starlink Incident in Ukraine: U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire,” U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen, September 15, 2023, https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/shaheen-warren-and-duckworth-send-letter-to-secretary-austin-requesting-information-about-defense-contracts-with-commercial-providers-following-the-reported-starlink-incident-in-ukraine.
    ↩︎

Orientation to the Political World | By Michael Donelan

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The breadth of political philosophies is a bizarre thing. Each of us are intimate members of political life, yet our communal involvement scarcely results in homogenous conceptions of what “politics” is. In a way, this is itself a deeply political situation: we come together with our own perspectives; our own theories; our own concerns and epistemologies and histories. Somehow, without exactly agreeing on what a “community” is, or what counts as “functioning,” we have to intellectually bargain our way to a functioning community.

Like how policies are unintelligible without the context they are conceived in, my particular political arguments lean heavily on my broader view of the nature of politics; this inaugural piece consequently has the unique (and cumbersome) purpose of laying out ex nihilo the foundations of my political thought. Its successors will engage with more specific and widely familiar topics, but this initial baptism in what might be deeply foreign thought is the mandatory first step. However, as you will learn should you bore yourself with my editorial series, authoritarianism and I find each other something loathsome. It would be wrong for me, then, to impress on you my own political conception as patent truth. Take it instead as a footsoldier in the army of idiosyncratic imaginations indigenous to any free society.

I understand politics broadly, as the causal principles that govern reality. I even contend that this is hardly a heterodox theory; I see it only as a generalization of the mainstream definition of politics, “who gets what, and why.” The conventional conceptions revolve around this distributive theme, conferring the “political” label on anything deciding resource assignment. But that perspective zooms in too far, cutting out the reason why distribution is political. It is that question that my own understanding answers.

When you see politics as the causal principles of reality, it places our intraspecies contensions in their appropriate theoretical context. Rather than a peculiar, fundamentally human activity, we can recognize politics as the pattern and grammar of reality across a slew of areas usually condemned to the apolitical.

Think of it like this: when Party A is more popular than Party B, it wins elections; when it wins elections, it implements its policies. Politics—as we commonly recognize it—is the causal language dictating our policy reality. Now take it a step back: when Organism A is more fit for its environment than Organism B, it is selected for; when it is selected for, it becomes the dominant species. The distinctions between this and the former case are so superficial it would be obscene to focus on those petty differences rather than the deep, categorical likeness. The most important information about the former solution is likewise the most important information about the latter: what results, and why? The supposed “distinctions” that make the former case “political” tell you nothing meaningful. Who cares what the parties are, or what policies they endorse? The substance resides entirely in the logic of why one party wins and what the reality it causes looks like; and this template is prominently at work anywhere you look, regardless of the relevance of human activity. Politics is the creation of reality. It is the logic of two molecules binding; the reason behind the engine of natural selection; the rationale of a gunfight. Who lives, who dies: what happens, what does not. In my eyes, politics is the umbrella over this panoply of caused events, a term silly on its face, but profound when you recognize what a marvel it is to change the state of reality. Have you ever heard a professor sermonize on how philosophy is the foundation of the intellectual sphere? (I have). Well in precisely the same way, politics is the foundation of the practical sphere. An astrophysicist cannot know the sun will rise tomorrow without a philosophical justification for empirical belief, and the sun will not rise tomorrow without a politics allowing it to. Using the common denominator of logical cause and effect, politics binds together superficially irreconcilable phenomena, which we arrogantly divide in some self-aggrandizing project to claim “the political” exclusively for human affairs.

But what does this tell us? What does my conception give that conventional distribution narratives deprive?

A recognition of what matters. And once you have that, you have the interpretive key to understand politics beyond facades of unsure norms and fragile narratives.

Entertain an analogy. Consider something commonly considered to be in the “political” realm, like the personal demeanor or policy aspirations of political leaders. These superficial traits are like the variables of an equation: though important, they are useless without understanding their relations to each other. If you had to choose which to know—the variables, or their operators, exponents, and so on—you would much prefer knowledge of the latter elements. At least if you understand the logic connecting the variables, you can see how they will scale with each other, or determine the shape of their curve. If you have the variables, and no connective logic, you would be up a creek with no paddle. Politics is that logic. It is the causation into which variables fit. Whether those variables concern states, firms, galaxies or curling teams, they are all members in the same category: causative determination of reality.

But what does this tell us about human politics? (I will concede that, despite its failure to contextualize human politics in the grand pattern of reality-determination, the distributional definition is excellent at catering to our interests).

I think it tells us something quite important: the politics of our “politics.” That is, it focuses us, clearing out superficial distractions so we can recognize the meaningful logic driving our own world.

So, allow us to make sense of our authentic politics.

It begins by recognizing that political processes, as logical causal processes, are governed by sets of rules. These rules can be arranged in hierarchies, such that one countermands another. Federal law, for instance, is generally unrestrained by state law. Rules need not be literal regulations, though; for instance, an appellate court can overturn the ruling of a district court. Here, the appellate court, though an actor rather than a literal law, is the superior rule. As a final nuance, the hierarchy among rules may be incomplete, or even contradictory. Perhaps all rules are equal, and none can override another, or perhaps they are intransitive. But for our purposes, only one rule matters: the one at the top, called the ultima ratio, which we’ll nickname the U.R. for short. It stands always in superposition to its counterparts. There is no rule which can defy it.

Conveniently, there is a consensus over what the U.R. is in our politics. Call it force, violence, coercion, or another moniker, so long as you respect the essential fact: that there is no higher appeal than physical authority. The presence of an U.R. changes the structure of political rules. When there is an unexceptional rule, which overrides all others, then all political behavior becomes rooted in the eventual exercise of the U.R. In this sense, the U.R. is foundational; it is the bedrock upon which the entire regime of political rules is constructed. Importantly, the share of activity which inferior rules comprise should never be taken to imply a superiority to the U.R. Consider how one must define an origin to make a physics problem intelligible. Without a point of reference, distance and movement have no practical meaning. Thus, though the “important” parts of physics, the parts that dominate our work with it, are conducted in terms of velocity, acceleration, jerk, snap, crackle, and pop (those are the real fourth, fifth, and sixth time-derivatives of position; and physicists call us the fake scientists), they all exist only in their relation to the rarely-used position value. When a U.R. exists, it creates much the same ecosystem amongst the political rules. With an absolute law present, all inferior rules become defined in relation to their ultimate superior; they literally become derivatives of the highest rule. 

Politics is the logic of reality, and the logic of our reality—no matter how many proxies we build—is violence. This is the ecosystem within which my thought exists, and which these editorials will explore: a world where politics is always, everywhere, inevitably, cruelly, the exercise of irrational violence.