Tag: Philosophy

Underdetermination in Science

Nazli Turan

– Do you agree with Duhem that there cannot be crucial experiments? Can you make an example?

  • I think there might be crucial experiments, but they do not guarantee the full description or explanation of a phenomenon. I want to give an example from my field of research (plasma catalysis). The catalytic reactions have been studied for years to increase the production rate of valuable products. Once we combine those reactions with some plasma applications, we observed an enhanced conversion of input gas flow (for example in the production of ammonia by nitrogen and hydrogen). Some thought plasma is affecting the catalytic materials, while the others believe the material is making some changes on plasma properties. Our group showed in the first experiment that there is no change in the macroscopic properties of plasma. Then, we designed an experiment with some expensive tools to see if there is any change on the catalytic material due to plasma. So, the second experiment seems so crucial to us to end the discussion on what is responsible for the enhancement. However, as I stated before, we didn’t probe the plasma in atomic level, it was a lumped study, which may cover the possible changes on plasma. In Duhem’s sense, there is no crucial experiments, but I believe an experiment might be still crucial, if its result will provide an answer to strengthen a possible explanation.

 

– In your opinion, what are the consequences for the rationality of science if we accept that theory choice does not work as an algorithm but it is influenced by values?

  • As Kuhn suggested, the choices scientists rely on are affected by objective -shared- criteria as well as subjective factors. The algorithm is the part of objective process, mostly, because it returns a result based on predefined rules. However, this algorithm also requires some input to start with, which makes ‘the scientific algorithm’ shaky. The input information may come from the previous theories or experiments, that those are possibly influenced by the tradition or even ‘the spirit of the time’, if we think of geocentric theory as an example. On the other hand, science is still reliable and rational due to its testability and fallibility (yes, I love Popper).  The geocentric theory was applicable to how stones fall, how water pumps function etc., but it required a stationary Earth. Many astronomers questioned this: “Ok, we observed other planets moving around, then why our lovely Earth is stationary?”. Because, they were not able to understand the role of gravity in a way that keeping the planets in their orbits and preventing people and atmosphere to fly away, till someone called Newton proved mathematically by inventing differential calculus. Is this theory testable, even though he just showed mystical mathematical expressions? Absolutely yes! Look around! You can easily see that ocean is moving back and forth at coasts due to tidal force between Earth and Moon, exactly how Newton describes. So, that is highly possible that theory choice is a combination of values and criteria, but once we accept that point of view, we’re also framing an unshakable stage for science itself and questioning its rationality is out of game, I guess.

Science and Pseudo-science

Nazli Turan

– How does falsificationism differ from logical empiricism’s criterion of demarcation?

  • The logical empiricism’s criterion of demarcation found its bases on verifiability or deducibility from observation statements.  All those observations should be inferred by natural science and the verified knowledge coincide with the meaningfulness. Popper’s falsification does not deal with meaning. The problem of meaning was a verbal problem, according to him. He was intended to draw a line between the scientific statements and pseudo-scientific/metaphysics characters. Also, relying just on observations encloses science in a narrow area, such that today’s quantum physics cannot find a place for itself, although astrology can be interpreted as science due to its observational basis, which is not even wrong.

– According to Laudan, which were the consequences of assuming a fallibilistic perspective in epistemology for the demarcation criterion?

  • The problem is starting here with the differentiation of knowledge from opinion. Aristotle described the demarcation criterion based on the idea of infallible science and fallible opinion. This view suggested that scientific knowledge should be derived from ‘first causes/principles’, which I don’t have any clue for which first principle is. (I have tendency to accept Carnap’s explanation on how the word ‘principle’ is meaningless without a context.) However, by the work of Galileo and Newton, they had limited or no knowledge of the causes of their observation, although they can put a valid set of theories, such as gravitational force. Laudan is asserting we can even put Newton in a non-scientific category because his claims are not fallible but lack of causes. However, I think it is a scaling problem (to apply a theory of macro to nano) and we don’t know, even today, the causes of gravitation, which is thought to be carried by a quantum particle, graviton -never observed-. The searching of first cause sounds much more metaphysics, to be honest. What first cause? God? Aliens? A force?

Science and Philosophy

Nazli Turan

Haha! You will hear my humble opinions on a variety of topics on philosophy and science. I will put my assignments here to track myself!

– What does it mean, according to Carnap, that philosophy should just be logic of science?

  • Carnap builds his point of view onto the intersection of logic and empiricism, primarily affected by Ernst Mach. He tries to define a system of logical language constructed with internal and external questions. With the rules of this language, metaphysics can be expelled from the realms of science. The metaphysical statements do not contain empirical criterion, deducibility, truth-conditions, and method of verification. Once we identify those statements and words, we can remove meaningless words and pseudo-statements and clarify the scientific concepts. What remains for philosophy is science through the method of logical analysis.

– Describe one example in Laplane et al’s article that shows how philosophy can have a productive impact on science

  • As a half-way scientist, I disagree with most of the conceptual examples introduced in the paper (ie. formulation of a novel theoretical framework, which should be a core part of science, in a sense that asking hypothetical questions, forming research statement/hypothesis etc.). However, I also found that the most intriguing and driving discussions on human cognition can be oriented by philosophy! Artificial intelligence (AI) is simply our future, believe it or not. Yet, the concepts of mind, intelligence, consciousness, and emotion are equally vague in terms of a computer-generated body of code with thousands of lines. I have an insight that if we can define ‘what human is’, we will make a huge step in AI. That’s why, we need philosophy right now! Immediately!

– Describe one instance of negative contribution of positivism to science according to Weinberg

  • Unfortunately, Kaufmann did not believe what he deduced from measurements (electric charge/mass) without ‘observing’ physically. However, it was an electron, which is still not observed alone since it is a quantum particle following Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. But, if we observe particles, expelled from a cathode ray with a certain velocity, are deflecting in magnetic field with the same radius, we can obtain a ratio (charge/mass) which points out a new particle: electron. Kaufmann hesitated to report this new particle due to his positivist views and maybe the common positivist atmosphere in scientific world of his time, and he missed the Nobel prize… This might seem as an individual failure, but also shows the adverse effect of being a conservative ‘believer’ of any idea/approach.