Publications
Incentives and Performance with Optimal Money Management Contracts, Journal of Political Economy, 2023 [article][ssrn version][online appendix][supplemental material]
Working Papers
Borrowing from a Bigtech Platform, with Jian Li [paper]
A bigtech platform competes with banks to lend to merchants. In equilibrium, credit markets become partially segmented based on borrowers’ credit quality, and the platform benefits from advantageous screening at the expense of banks, lowering equilibrium welfare for merchants of intermediate credit quality.
Perceived Corporate Values, with Antonino Emanuele Rizzo and Rafael Zambrana [paper]
Using fund-holding data, we construct a time-varying firm-level measure of the sentiment of values-oriented investors, which reflects their perception of each firm’s corporate values. An increase in sentiment predicts lower returns and a lower risk of regulatory fines and civil lawsuits in the future.
Demand-Driven Bond Financing in the Euro Area, with Mattia Montagna [paper]
Revision requested
We show corporations changed the quantity and composition of their bond issues in response to the scarcity and risk channels activated by the European Central Bank’s corporate quantitative easing program. The risk channel was primarily responsible for an increase in total issuance and a change in long-term investments.
Previous versions of the paper circulated with the title “The Transmission Channels of Quantitative Easing: Evidence from the Cross-Section of Bond Prices and Issuance” [old version] and “Issuance and Valuation of Corporate Bonds with Quantitative Easing”
Risk Aversion with Nothing to Lose [paper][online appendix]
In a continuous-time model, I provide economically interpretable conditions under which a risk-neutral decision-maker becomes risk averse endogenously and minimizes volatility near termination, even if she faces myopic incentives to gamble for resurrection. I show these conditions are met in a wide range of apparently unrelated models.
This paper generalizes the results from an earlier paper titled “Financial Intermediation and Flights to Safety” [earlier paper]
Defuse the Bomb: Re-Wiring Interbank Networks, with Matteo Chinazzi and Giorgio Fagiolo [paper]
We show how contagion can propagate under different scenarios when the topology of the financial system, the characteristics of the financial institutions, and capital regulation vary. We also study how liquidity shocks (de)stabilize the system under different market conditions.