Day: November 20, 2025

American Cold War Fears Becoming a Reality | By Chase Ouellette


As inter-state rivalry with China continues to grow, it is important to remember that the US is no stranger to this type of conflict. Throughout the Cold War, US national security decision-makers navigated the United States through tense, complicated scenarios that tested American political and economic security.1 While observers might view the collapse of the Soviet Union as an inevitable result of internal dysfunction, stagnation, and sloppy attempts at reform, there were various geopolitical scenarios American leaders feared could jeopardize US Cold War aims and tilt the global balance of power in the Soviets’ favor. Among the most prevalent of these fears was the formation of a unified Communist bloc capable of challenging the economic and military might of the West.2

A unified Communist bloc, particularly close alignment and collaboration between the USSR and China, was a serious concern plaguing American policymakers in the first decades of the Cold War. The probability of intimate collusion between the PRC and USSR was highest in the first years of the new Chinese government’s existence. In February of 1950, both nations signed The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union – a charter obligating mutual defense in the event of an attack by Japan and its allies.3 The Sino-Soviet relationship remained strong for the next few years, with a 1954 US report stating: “In its most general features the Sino-Soviet Relationship may be compared to that between Great Britain and the US”.4 

Thankfully, ideological tensions, longstanding border disputes, Chinese resentment over Russian colonial treaties with China, and side effects of the Cultural Revolution provided the spark necessary to kick off the deadly Sino-Soviet border clashes that would mark the beginning of the 1969 border crisis and the conclusive Sino-Soviet split.5 American paranoia and concern regarding the preservation of the Sino-Soviet relationship can be seen by Nixon’s eagerness to open diplomatic relations with the nation in 1972.6 Such a definite reversal on decades-long US foreign policy displays how vital to US interests was the isolation of the USSR from the PRC, a belief that held until the collapse of the USSR. 

US fears regarding the formation of a unified Communist bloc are becoming a reality in today’s international arena. While the world left domino theory behind in 1991, if we substitute “Communist” for “Challenger”, we can see that there is an increasingly resolute axis of states in China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) who are striving to challenge the extent and depth of US influence across the world.7 China and Russia’s leading role in the foundation of BRICS demonstrate the desire of the ‘no limits’ partnership to construct international institutions that counter-balance traditionally western-dominated international institutions such as the G7, IMF, and WTO.8 China has also utilized its Belt and Road initiative to establish comprehensive infrastructure projects within both Iran and Russia, measures that further demonstrate China’s commitment to aiding its sanctions-stricken partners.910

The largest uptick in collusion between the states within CRINK has been seen during Russia’s war with Ukraine. China has forged an intimate military-technical partnership with Russia that has aided its sustained invasion of eastern Ukraine.11 China has accomplished this through the export of dual-use goods such as semiconductors, microchips, drones, lithium-ion batteries, and ATVs.12 These goods, while supposedly intended for civilian purposes, are easily converted into components that are vital for the production of Russian weapons systems. China has also helped Russia improve its satellite and space-based capabilities immensely. The identification and targeting of locations hundreds of miles away, a task necessary for Russia’s mass long-range drone strikes against Ukraine, has been greatly improved with Chinese technological transfers.13 China’s role in enhancing Iran’s defense capabilities rivals that of their involvement with Russia. Iran’s domestic surveillance systems, air defense network, and the solid fuel used to power its rockets are all sourced from China.14

While recent years have seen China supplying weapons technologies to Russia, Putin’s regime has long been a vital supplier of advanced military technology to China. Russia has supplied China with a wide array of technologies ranging from fighter jets and an aircraft carrier to advanced missile technologies and cutting-edge command and control systems.15 These arms transfers have played a prominent role in China’s stunning rise through the global military power food chain and are rooted in Russia’s desire to help China continue challenging American presence in the South China Sea.16

Russia has provided extensive assistance to North Korea’s armed forces. Recent North Korean military breakthroughs – the deployment of its first nuclear submarine, the new Hwasong-20 ICBM system, and the new Choe Hyon-class destroyers – have all been made possible through technological transfers from Moscow to Pyongyang.1718 These transactions have not exclusively benefitted North Korea. North Korean contributions to Russia’s war in Ukraine have been extensive. The DPRK has supplied millions of artillery shells to Russia over the course of the war, contributions that are essential to Russia’s war effort. North Korea has also contributed its own men to the fight, notably sending around 11,000 soldiers to the front in a mission to solidify ties between Russia and the DPRK and to provide North Korean soldiers with critical experience on a modern battlefield.19 

CRINK’s increasing levels of cooperation and collusion pose a potential challenge to the US-led international order that has defined the decades after the Cold War. While, short of war, it is impossible to plot and execute a grand strategy that breaks up this new axis of evil, there are a variety of measures the US could take to limit CRINK’s potential influence and power on the global stage. The first measure, which should be the most obvious to US leadership, is to hold on to the advantages we already have. 

One of the most impressive feats in world history has been the forging and maintenance of the modern US alliance system. Spanning across Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Pacific, the US has established intimate diplomatic relations with states of varying size, regime type, geography, and economic power. Looking to southeast Asia, China, the world’s fastest growing power who continually challenges US technological, economic, and military dominance, is boxed in by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines – all close US partners.20 Moving to Iran’s neighborhood, observers will find Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Bahrain, and Israel cooperating closely with the United States.21 Egypt, Oman, and Turkey – states with vested interests in the Middle East – have also cooperated extensively with US policymakers in recent years.22 Finally, when Putin looks West from his bedroom window in the Kremlin, he sees two institutions in the horizon that are married to the US: The most formidable military alliance in world history and the world’s second-largest economic unit.23

This point of this detour in geography is the highlight that the US possesses innate advantages over the CRINK axis that its member states could only dream of. What would China give to be a signatory of mutual defense pacts among seven of the world’s ten largest economies?24 What would Iran give to have intense diplomatic sway over the affairs of the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant? What would Russia give to trade its rotting CSTO for NATO, an organization containing 3.5 million military personnel across 32 member states? 

With these advantages in place, I wonder why US leadership is behaving in ways to undercut and diminish them. President Trump’s tariffs, trade wars, hesitant commitment to the transatlantic partnership, and troubling negotiations with Russia all significantly strain our alliances and give our partners valid reasons to question the benefits of US alliance leadership. Our escalatory trade war with Canada and our vague threats pointing to its annexation only serve to foster disdain for the US amongst Canadian leadership. Straining a relationship with a neighboring country is generally a bad path to choose. However, straining a relationship with a country you share an integrated air defense command with and who controls vast swaths of territory bordering the Arctic Ocean is an error.25

US apprehensiveness regarding China is often anchored in observations of the PRC’s rapid industrial and technological development. Chinese developments in AI, auto manufacturing, steel production, clean energy infrastructure, and shipbuilding far outpace current US trends.26 With the US locked into an innovation race with China, protectionism is illogical. South Korea, Japan, and the EU are all home to advanced manufacturing industries, economic sectors US firms would benefit greatly from if there were minimal trade barriers between our market economies. 

President Trump’s faltering commitment to our European partners only weakens our global influence and posture. While our European allies undoubtedly freeload off of US security guarantees and have underinvested in their militaries over the past twenty years, the benefits of further involvement in European security affairs outweigh the drawbacks of carrying Europe on our shoulders. European dependence on an American security blanket allows the US to have intense influence over the policy decisions of the European powers.27 Furthermore, having access to fifty military bases across Europe allows the US to have an incredibly strong military presence across a distant continent, project force right on Russia’s doorstep, and support intricate combat operations in a post-US nation-building  Middle East.28

CRINK’s strategic coordination to undercut the US’s global standing presents a challenge the US has not seen for decades. China, Russia, and Iran specifically have made various maneuvers that have placed US policymakers in awkward positions and forced them to make tough decisions. Despite the behavior of these contenders, the US has what CRINK can only dream of: an intricate alliance network allowing privileged economic and military access across the world’s largest economies and most strategically important states. This network is something CRINK can never replicate. Having been developed over the past eighty years, the US has cemented its influence over the world’s leading states, boxing CRINK out of important partnerships and economies. 

With this innate advantage over our rivals, the US, particularly the Trump Administration, needs to stop weakening our alliances and partnerships through its spastic protectionism and imflammatory rhetoric. Yes, European states have neutered their militaries due to assumptions of a permanent American interest in Europe. Yes, the US holds trade deficits in industrial sectors with other states. Yes, it is not at all in the US’ interest to confront Russia directly over Ukraine. However, these grievances are not worth blowing up our alliance system over. CRINK can continue to make their leaps and bounds in technology and interoperability. However, they cannot recruit other leading states to their axis as long as the US maintains its relationships with the world’s largest advanced economies and militaries. 

  1. https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/TrumanCIA_Timeline.pdf ↩︎
  2. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539142?seq=1 ↩︎
  3. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01443R000300050007-8.pdf ↩︎
  4. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d183?
    ↩︎
  5. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/ ↩︎
  6. https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/nixons-trip-china ↩︎
  7. https://theweek.com/politics/crink-the-new-autocractic-axis-of-evil ↩︎
  8. https://infobrics.org/ ↩︎
  9. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-25/ ↩︎
  10. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2025/4/25/iran-to-sign-4bn-oil-deal-with ↩︎
  11. https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-position-russias-invasion-ukraine#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20officials%20add%20that,to%20make%20propellants%20for%20weapons. ↩︎
  12. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/behind-the-scenes-chinas-increasing-role-in-russias-defense-industry?lang=en ↩︎
  13. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-provides-intelligence-russia-ukraine-targets-ukrainian-intelligence-says-2025-10-04/ ↩︎
  14. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/10/15/china_and_iran_after_the_12-day_war_1140963.html ↩︎
  15. https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/partnership-short-of-alliance-military-cooperation-between-russia-and-china/ ↩︎
  16. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-russia-helping-china-prepare-seize-taiwan ↩︎
  17. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251014006100315 ↩︎
  18. https://kyivindependent.com/russia-north-korea-warships-failed-launch-06-2025/ ↩︎
  19. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/brothers-arms-assessing-north-koreas-contribution-russias-war-ukraine ↩︎
  20. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/geostrategic-competition-and-overseas-basing-in-east-asia-and-the-first-island-chain/ ↩︎
  21. https://www.mei.edu/publications/us-policy-middle-east-third-quarter-2025-report-card ↩︎
  22. https://jstreet.org/securing-the-ceasefire-the-roles-of-egypt-qatar-and-turkey-as-guarantors/ ↩︎
  23. https://alcottglobal.com/infographic/gdp-shifts-for-japan-china-the-european-union-and-the-united-states-2000-vs-2025 ↩︎
  24. https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/ ↩︎
  25. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/rising-tensions-shifting-strategies-evolving-dynamics-us-grand-strategy-arctic/ ↩︎
  26. ​​https://itif.org/publications/2025/09/23/how-china-is-outperforming-the-united-states-in-critical-technologies/ ↩︎
  27. https://chairestrategique.pantheonsorbonne.fr/themes/2019/why-america-us-role-european-defense-and-european-mind ↩︎
  28. https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4240876/defense-agency-contributed-toward-operation-midnight-hammer-success/ ↩︎