Author: tsulli24

Strengthening Governance for Sustainable Space Exploration | By Anne Rehill

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Cover Image via NASA

The idea of a “global commons” is a zone that exists outside the jurisdiction of any nation but upon which all nations depend for finite, non-excludable resources.1 The governance framework of treaties and agreements for these commons, such as the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, including the High Seas, in 1982, was established in the wake of World War II to ensure that these zones should only be used for peaceful non-military purposes and all may enter, use, and navigate through them.2 By the time of the Space Race in the 1960s, the Antarctic Treaty served as a major inspiration for the development of space law, establishing much of the same rules for the use of outer space as a commons in the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, the Registration Convention of 1976, and the Moon Treaty of 1979. Thus, space law sought to establish a “province of all mankind” premised on similar principles: that no state can claim sovereignty over the moon, that no nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction or military activities may take place on the moon, and that any activities must prevent the “harmful contamination” of space or Earth.3 Because of our positive “common heritage,” and the potential for negative externalities to affect all people, it is important to make sure governance of commons is responsible and sustainable.4

When the Space Race began, it was led by governmental agencies, such as NASA; however, recent shifts to the privatization of the aerospace sector have challenged this status quo, leading to concerns over the legality of increasing commercialization and militarization of space. Scientific technology has also changed drastically: launch vehicles and satellites are more powerful and numerous, probes and rovers have reached interstellar space and Mars, and information can be transmitted at much higher speeds and size capacities. For space to remain a peaceful global commons in the face of these more advanced capabilities and increased number of actors and motives, the new challenges must be addressed by intergovernmental organizations and incorporated into a more comprehensive body of binding space law.

The raising of the American flag upon the first lunar landing could have been interpreted as a violation of the Outer Space Treaty; however, the Congress asserted that it was a symbolic gesture of national pride in achievement and was not to be construed as a declaration of national appropriation by claim of sovereignty. | Image via NASA

Commercialization

The stipulation that no state can own any part of space in Article II of the OST was, up until recently, interpreted as meaning that no state could “own” space materials. While space resources have been collected for many years for scientific purposes, such as in the recent OSIRIS-Rex mission, space resources such as rare earth metals present in asteroids have created interest in commercial mining for a “lunar marketplace.”5 With these possibilities in sight, legislators from many countries have begun to think of space as a region ripe for exploitation by all who can, rather than a region that no state or actor should exploit. Only eighteen states have ratified the Moon Treaty, which sought to codify procedures for orderly mining, and none of these states are major spacefaring nations with independently owned launch vehicles.6 The states who did not ratify it, including the “Big Three” major spacefaring nations of the United States, Russia, and China, therefore implicitly claim that any non-military, including commercial, activity on the moon is legal as they never agreed otherwise.

The Trump Administration’s statement that “the United States does not view [space] as a global commons” further undermines the concept of shared responsibility and the need to cooperate in our shared orbits.7 NASA’s support for selling space resources in the Artemis Accords aligns with policies like Trump’s 2020 executive order “Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources” and the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. These policies declare that the U.S. may mine space resources as they deny that “the extraction of space resources […] inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.”8 Saudi Arabia even reversed its ratification of the Moon Treaty in 2023 to join the Artemis Accords as they sought to get on board with space mining. By challenging the interpretation of the OST national appropriation clause in favor of new non-binding expectations, spacefaring parties are taking advantage of ambiguity to benefit while they have an access advantage over most other nations. These policies may prove to be unsustainable as there are no bounds to the exploration, which could lead to a “tragedy of the commons,” in which a communal resource loses its value because it was overexploited in the absence of proper regulation. However, the fact that most states on Earth cannot easily go to space makes it difficult for smaller or less affluent states to challenge those who do not follow the rules.

Militarization

The core principle of using space for peaceful purposes in Article IV of the OST is also being tested as space increasingly becomes part of states’ military strategies. Though the OST prohibits the establishment of military bases, installations, and fortifications, “space forces” have begun to increase, creating a new security dilemma.9 The United States’ creation of a space force, backed by President Biden, has triggered Russia, France, and other states to build their space forces to increase their security in response to the perceived threat of the American one. These military forces constitute military activity in space, directly violating the Outer Space Treaty, and further demonstrating unconcern for international space law by major world players.

Additionally, the increasing capabilities of low-orbit satellites to provide information and internet connections can be appropriated for military uses. Although the use of satellites is not explicitly militant, they can be used to track where enemy troops are located, plan missions, and intercept communications. Recently, SpaceX’s Starlink satellites have played a prominent role in the War in Ukraine, providing internet and access to communication networks to the Ukrainian military after their systems were destroyed in the fighting.10 The Starlink satellites were intended for commercial rather than military purposes, aiming to provide high-speed internet connections worldwide. Yet, the Ukrainian military has used Starlink’s satellites to coordinate drone strikes, prompting Musk to shut off access to the Starlink networks. Musk stated: “If I had agreed to their request, then SpaceX would be explicitly complicit in a major act of war and conflict escalation,” which he objected to participating in.11 As space becomes an increasingly private sphere, as opposed to the government-led efforts of the 1960s, the role of individual actors and their obligations towards governments, international peace, and social responsibility have not been clearly defined.

Conclusions

The governance of outer space–-the existence of which was never necessary before space travel became possible in the 1960s-–presents a complex and evolving challenge for the international community. The existing political and legal frameworks, rooted in the concept of space as a global commons, are under strain as states and private actors increasingly assert their rights to exploit space resources and engage in militarization. This creates tensions regarding what obligations different groups have in maintaining international peace and social responsibility, as well as what rights they are entitled to regarding space resources or even territory. Further ethical considerations include the inaccessibility of the sector to all but the ultra-wealthy, which violates Article I of the OST’s call for space to benefit all states, “irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development,” not just the states with spacefaring capabilities enabled by material resources.

International cooperation and clear regulations are therefore essential to balance state, private sector, and global interests in space. Crucial components for new space laws must include provisions on sustainability to avoid pollution or corruption of space resources, fair divisions of space so that all nations can benefit, clearly defined rules on how private companies can participate in space, regulations for space commerce, and restrictions on the capabilities of space forces. Thus, new legislation reinforcing the OST while accommodating the changing political, economic, and military landscape of space will ensure the equitable and sustainable exploration of the “final frontier” in years to come.

Notes

  1. Benjamin Silverstein and Ankit Panda, “Space Is a Great Commons. It’s Time to Treat It as Such,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 9, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/09/space-is-great-
    commons.-it-s-time-to-treat-it-as-such-pub-84018    . ↩︎
  2. “Convention on the Law of the Sea,” opened for signature December 10, 1982, United Nations Treaty Series 1833, No. 31363: art. 88-90, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf; “The
    Antarctic Treaty,” opened for signature December 1, 1959, United Nations Treaty Series 402, No. 5778: Art. 1-3,
    https://documents.ats.aq/keydocs/vol_1/vol1_2_AT_Antarctic_Treaty_e.pdf. ↩︎
  3. “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” opened for signature December 18, 1979, United Nations Treaty Series 610, No. 8843: Art. 1, https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_21_2222E.pdf. ↩︎
  4. “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” opened for signature July 11, 1984, United Nations Treaty Series 1363, no. 23002: Art. 11, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/moon-agreement.html. ↩︎
  5. Loren Grush, “NASA wants to buy Moon rocks from private companies,” The Verge, September 10, 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/10/21429850/nasa-moon-rocks-sampling-commercial-space-transaction-lunar-marketplace. ↩︎
  6. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Status of International Agreements relating to activities in outer space,” January 1, 2023, https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2023/aac_105c_22023crp/aac_105c_22023crp_3_0_html/AC105_C2_2023_CRP03E.pdf. ↩︎
  7. U.S. President, Executive Order, “Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, 2020, Executive Order 13914 of April 6, 2020,” Federal Register 85, No. 70 (April 10, 2020): 20381-20382, https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2020-07800. ↩︎
  8. “The Artemis Accords Principles For Cooperation In The Civil Exploration And Use Of The Moon, Mars, Comets, And Asteroids For Peaceful Purposes,” October 13, 2020: Section 10, https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf. ↩︎
  9. “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” Art. IV. ↩︎
  10. Adam Satariano, “Elon Musk doesn’t want his satellites to run Ukraine’s drones,” The New York Times, February 9, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/09/world/europe/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-satellite-ukraine.html. ↩︎
  11. Elon Musk, Twitter Post, September 7, 2023, 6:48 pm,
    https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1699917639043404146?s=46&t=bZcrLpl8DTxSpYLBntBfhQ. ↩︎

Bucharest 2008: 15 Years of War | By Marko Gural

tsulli24

The interpretation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is up for debate: some argue that NATO expansion forced Putin’s hand, while others assert that imperial Russian tendencies motivated Moscow. Both claims miss the point. The means by which NATO expanded–without firm commitments or deadlines–allowed careful Russian escalation.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is entering its twentieth month. Ukraine’s highly-awaited counteroffensive has neither culminated nor failed, but Ukraine is fighting for small settlements when many expected it to be capturing major cities and destroying Russian ground lines of communication. A lack of substantial victories makes the dim future of negotiations slightly more visible. Whispers of peace permeate the halls of Western security players: Gen. Mark Milley, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Stian Jenssen, Chief of Staff to the UN Secretary General; and Richard Haass, former Council on Foreign Relations President, have all hinted at possible Ukrainian concessions or diplomacy with Russia.1

How did this war come about? Many have debated its roots. Realists claim that their theory of international politics foresaw Putin’s dark reaction to NATO’s provocatory march to his western border, with John Mearsheimer even stating in 2014 that “the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault.”2 Others believe that Putin dreams of a return to imperial Russia, hoping to wipe Ukraine off the list of nations and continue his trek west.3

This piece is not about theory or ideology, but seeks to understand landmark moments in Russo-Ukrainian security and the many actors behind European security policy in the leadup to February 24, 2022. Was there a turning point in Russian-Ukrainian-NATO relations that made war more likely? In other words, could a different NATO policy have deterred Putin’s invasion? How does this understanding impact Ukraine’s postwar orientation? NATO’s Ukraine policy since its 2008 Bucharest memorandum was the long-term cause of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, allowing Moscow to slowly escalate in Ukraine, blame its actions on NATO, and never fear serious NATO commitment. Had NATO been more forceful, or never considered expansion in the first place, Russia may not have started the bloodiest war in Europe since 1945. Thus, Ukraine must walk out of this conflict either incredibly militarily fortified or neutral with inviolable international guarantees. To maintain peace, compromise will be necessary.

Bucharest 2008

“Vladimir Putin 4 April 2008-9” by Presidential Press and Information Office is licensed under CC BY 4.0.

Ukrainian-NATO relations began in the 1990s and strengthened in the 2000s, but Ukrainian leadership was most successful in pushing for NATO membership in 2008 in order to protect “national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”4 Putin quickly announced Russia’s opposition to Ukraine in NATO, stating that NATO missile systems on Ukrainian territory would represent a grave threat to the Kremlin. The United States was Ukraine’s biggest supporter. President George W. Bush and presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain all backed Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership. Conversely, France and Germany remained staunchly opposed to eastward expansion: French Prime Minister François Fillon stated that Georgia and Ukraine may tip Europe’s balance of power against Russia and German Chancellor Angela Merkel similarly feared friction with Moscow.5 So, the Western security order reached a compromise.

NATO did not extend a path to membership to Georgia and Ukraine, but its final communique stated that the two countries “will become members of NATO.”6 NATO provided neither a firm commitment to support Ukraine nor a deadline for its accession, placing Ukraine in a liminal state of maximum vulnerability as the Russians feared a military alliance on its border. Concurrently, NATO provided no firm guarantees for Ukrainian security. Thus, in NATO’s 2008 phrase lay a multitude of possibilities for Moscow and a dithering future for Ukraine. 

First, NATO’s flimsy commitment to Ukraine allowed Moscow’s slow escalation in former-Soviet territories, culminating in Putin’s 2022 invasion. Russia’s post-Bucharest interventions have followed a similar pattern, with military activity followed by gray zone conflict. Putin invaded Georgia in December 2008 before recognizing the independence of two Georgian regions. He annexed Crimea and supported Ukrainian separatists in 2014, before agreeing to self government and low-level conflict in two Ukrainian regions. This careful push for more territory culminated in late 2021 and early 2022, when Putin placed 190,000 troops on Ukraine’s border.7 Western allies refused to cooperate with Russian pleas for negotiations, whether genuine or not, and Russia invaded.

Second, NATO’s 2008 statement allowed Russian leaders to voice fears of an overwhelming military alliance on its doorstep. The Kremlin spoke against NATO expansion in 2008,8 2014,9 2015,10 2016,11 and 2018.12 NATO has responded in-kind to hostilities, strengthening its security posture after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014.13 

Realists cite Putin’s proximate cause of conflict as the Biden administration’s interest in Ukrainian membership in NATO.14 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken indeed stated in December 2021 that NATO’s doors “remain open” to Georgia and Ukraine, which represented no sudden or severe shift in policy.15 Yet, Putin was able to repeat talking points about NATO’s offensive threat, emphasizing that Russia “would be forced to act if NATO placed missiles in Ukraine.”16 Putin repeated NATO expansion as one reason for Russia’s invasion in his February 24, 2022 speech.17 NATO may have lit a fuse for escalation that it was not equipped to extinguish.

Third, Russia could be confident that NATO countries would not risk military confrontation in Ukraine. Russia’s relatively-small incursions into Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 met weak rhetorical responses from major NATO powers.18 In responding to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, US President Barack Obama only noted that the “international community” will not recognize actions that are internationally illegal.19 He refused to send Ukraine lethal aid. 

Therefore, NATO policy on Ukraine–officially beginning and unofficially culminating in April 2008–became Ukraine’s worst nightmare. This is NATO’s war, even if not from the limited perspective that any infringement on Russia’s “sphere” would have led to an invasion. Hindsight is 20/20, but other policies may have been more effective at avoiding war.

First, a more forceful NATO may have deterred Putin. A NATO policy of this sort would have reversed its two original sins: the lack of a firm commitment and a deadline. Rather than telling Ukraine and Georgia that the two countries “will” become NATO members, a NATO policy which took concrete immediate steps towards accession would have signaled commitment to Russia. Setting a deadline on membership would have pressured hesitant European states to genuinely work towards a security solution and deter non-NATO actors. Such a policy may have also benefited Russia in the long-term, as a Ukraine which failed to join NATO after an overdue deadline would clearly have no future in the organization and could not threaten Russia unilaterally.

Second, a NATO that never expanded eastward would never have threatened Russia and exposed Ukraine. This counterfactual does not guarantee that Putin would not invade Ukraine, as Putin is rather unkind to the Ukrainian nation from both a historical and current perspective.20 The policy, however, likely would have dissolved the source of more than a decade of tension with the West. 

Peace

What do these conclusions mean for the future of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict? Ukrainian liminality realistically created a security threat for Moscow while providing no military assurances. NATO’s in-between has allowed Putin to march into Ukraine. A peace deal should thus begin by recognizing Russia’s complaints and Ukraine’s fears.

Although diplomats may consider territory, possible human rights violations, and other subjects, Ukraine’s security situation is foremost in placating Russia and assuring Ukraine. Territorial disputes are secondary to security because the war’s frontline has changed little in recent months. Additionally, although Moscow annexed four Ukrainian oblasts, it has not completely occupied any of them.21 On-the-ground realities will define borders. Human rights are similarly not the first point of discussion in peace negotiations. Putting Russian human rights violators on trial would necessitate an overwhelming Ukrainian victory and a complete Russian collapse. Neither seems likely today; instead, if Moscow and Kyiv prioritize their survival and safety, then a new security arrangement in Eastern Europe is necessary.

Fearing liminality, actors should aim to create either a strong, independent Ukraine, or a neutral and demilitarized Ukraine with hefty security guarantees. Such is the art of negotiation: each warring nation has waged a battle with successes and failures. Peace ought to reflect that.

One possibility is a strong, independent Ukraine, which would renounce future Western security commitments in exchange for Russian acceptance of high Ukrainian defense spending. This agreement would recognize Ukraine as a security actor, but would protect Moscow against a Western security alliance moving further east. Although this situation may resolve Russia’s fears of NATO expansion, Ukraine would remain a (relatively small) threat on its western border prepared to protect itself if necessary.

Alternatively, Russia may be able to force a pledge of Ukrainian neutrality if Ukraine gains rock-solid security guarantees from Western partners. Russia provided a deal of this sort in the lead-up to the full-scale invasion, which would have included NATO’s withdrawal to its 1997 position.22 Violations of Ukrainian security would have to be separately decided, but would likely incorporate any territorial incursions against newly-defined borders. Ukrainian neutrality would thus implicitly accept a Russian security sphere, but would not accede to Russian pull factors due to strong Ukrainian nationalism.

Focusing on Ukraine solves Russia’s security concerns. Kyiv would no longer have the unilateral or multilateral power to threaten Moscow. Concurrently, Ukraine’s fears are placated because it would either have sufficient military might to deter and stop an invasion or rock-solid defensive security guarantees that would commit Western allies in case of another untimely invasion.

Are these realistic concessions for Ukraine and Russia’s domestic audiences? Perhaps not for Ukrainians, who have witnessed Moscow illegally invade their country and murder their brethren in cold blood. But, peace is not always joyous. Seeing as Ukraine’s recent advances have hardly changed the frontline, a world of peace is imaginable. 

Consulted References:

Bender, Jeremy. “This is the simplest explanation of why Putin is so opposed to NATO.” Business Insider. February 12, 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/simplest-explanation-of-why-putin-hates-nato-2015-2 

“Bucharest Summit Declaration.” NATO. April 3, 2008. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm 

Caldwell, Leigh Ann and Theodoric Meyer. “Gen. Milley on Ukraine, Tuberville and ‘wokeness.’” Washington Post. August 18, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/08/18/gen-milley-ukraine-tuberville-wokeness/ 

Chatzitheodorou, Christina. “Security At The Polish-Lithuanian Border Kaliningrad, Suwalki Gap and Russia.” Finabel. February 2022. https://finabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/42.-security-at-the-polish-lithuanian-border.pdf 

Connolly, Kevin. “US has only tough talk for Russia.” BBC News. August 12, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7555806.stm 

Erlanger, Steven. “As Ukraine’s Fight Grinds On, Talk of Negotiations Becomes Nearly Taboo.” New York Times. September 1, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/01/world/europe/ukraine-fight-negotiations.html 

Farchy, Jack. “Putin names Nato among threats in new Russian security strategy.” Financial Times. January 2, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/6e8e787e-b15f-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51 

Fisher, Max. “Putin’s Case for War, Annotated.” New York Times. February 24, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/europe/putin-ukraine-speech.html 

“Foreign Secretary deplores continued fighting in Georgia.” Foreign & Commonwealth Office. August 8, 2008. https://web.archive.org/web/20080828024606/http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/press-release/2008/august/georgia-statement-080809 

“Full Blinken: The International System Is ‘At Stake’ With Russia.” YouTube. December 12, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJw8mVuYsVw&t=571s 

Hird, Karolina, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2023.” Institute for the Study of War. October 8, 2023. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2023 

Mearsheimer, John J. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 77-89. 

Mearsheimer, John J. and Sebastian Rosato. “The Russian invasion was a rational act.” UnHerd. September 14, 2023. https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/ 

Melander, Ingrid and David Brunnstrom. “West urges end to South Ossetia fighting.” Reuters. August 8, 2008. https://web.archive.org/web/20080828172817/https://www.reuters.com/article/europeCrisis/idUSL844042 

Melvin, Neal. “Nationalist and Imperial Thinking Define Putin’s Vision for Russia.” RUSI. March 2, 2022. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nationalist-and-imperial-thinking-define-putins-vision-russia 

Osborn, Andrew. “Putin warns NATO against closer ties with Ukraine and Georgia.” Reuters. July 19, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-putin/putin-warns-nato-against-closer-ties-with-ukraine-and-georgia-idUSKBN1K92KA 

Pamuk, Humeyra and Johan Ahlander. “U.S., NATO fully committed to Ukraine, says Blinken ahead of Lavrov talks.” Reuters. December 2, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/blinken-set-meet-russias-lavrov-ukraine-tensions-flare-2021-12-02/

Pifer, Steven. “Putin’s NATO Fears Are Groundless.” Brookings. July 2, 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/putins-nato-fears-are-groundless/ 

“Russia army vows steps if Georgia and Ukraine join NATO.” Reuters. April 11, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-steps-idUSL1143027920080411 

Slack, Megan. “President Obama Announces New Ukraine-Related Sanctions.” The White House: President Barack Obama. March 17, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/03/17/president-obama-announces-new-ukraine-related-sanctions 

Taylor, Adam. “That time Ukraine tried to join NATO – and NATO said no.” Washington Post. September 4, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/04/that-time-ukraine-tried-to-join-nato-and-nato-said-no/ 

Traynor, Ian. “Nato allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia.” The Guardian. December 1, 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia 

Troianovski, Anton. “Why Vladimir Putin Invokes Nazis to Justify His Invasion of Ukraine.” New York Times. March 17, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/17/world/europe/ukraine-putin-nazis.html 

“Ukrainian Leader Makes a Push to Join NATO.” ABC News. April 1, 2008. https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=4563808&page=1 

Wilkie, Christina. “Nearly all of Russia’s initial invasion forces now in Ukraine, Pentagon says.” CNBC. March 7, 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/07/pentagon-says-nearly-100percent-of-pre-set-russian-troops-are-now-in-ukraine.html 
Williams, Matthias and Natalia Zinets. “Biden assures Zelenskiy that NATO membership in Ukraine’s hands, Kyiv says.” Reuters. December 9, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-president-zelenskiy-holding-talks-with-biden-adviser-says-2021-12-09/

Notes

  1. Caldwell, Leigh Ann and Theodoric Meyer. “Gen. Milley on Ukraine, Tuberville and ‘wokeness.’” Washington Post. August 18, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/08/18/gen-milley-ukraine-tuberville-wokeness/  ↩︎
  2. Mearsheimer, John J. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 77-89.  ↩︎
  3. Melvin, Neal. “Nationalist and Imperial Thinking Define Putin’s Vision for Russia.” RUSI. March 2, 2022. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nationalist-and-imperial-thinking-define-putins-vision-russia  ↩︎
  4. “Ukrainian Leader Makes a Push to Join NATO.” ABC News. April 1, 2008. https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=4563808&page=1  ↩︎
  5. Taylor, Adam. “That time Ukraine tried to join NATO – and NATO said no.” Washington Post. September 4, 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/04/that-time-ukraine-tried-to-join-nato-and-nato-said-no/  ↩︎
  6. “Bucharest Summit Declaration.” NATO. April 3, 2008. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm  ↩︎
  7. Wilkie, Christina. “Nearly all of Russia’s initial invasion forces now in Ukraine, Pentagon says.” CNBC. March 7, 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/07/pentagon-says-nearly-100percent-of-pre-set-russian-troops-are-now-in-ukraine.html  ↩︎
  8. “Russia army vows steps if Georgia and Ukraine join NATO.” Reuters. April 11, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-steps-idUSL1143027920080411  ↩︎
  9. Pifer, Steven. “Putin’s NATO Fears Are Groundless.” Brookings. July 2, 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/putins-nato-fears-are-groundless/  ↩︎
  10. Bender, Jeremy. “This is the simplest explanation of why Putin is so opposed to NATO.” Business Insider. February 12, 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/simplest-explanation-of-why-putin-hates-nato-2015-2  ↩︎
  11. Farchy, Jack. “Putin names Nato among threats in new Russian security strategy.” Financial Times. January 2, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/6e8e787e-b15f-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51  ↩︎
  12. Osborn, Andrew. “Putin warns NATO against closer ties with Ukraine and Georgia.” Reuters. July 19, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-putin/putin-warns-nato-against-closer-ties-with-ukraine-and-georgia-idUSKBN1K92KA  ↩︎
  13. Chatzitheodorou, Christina. “Security At The Polish-Lithuanian Border Kaliningrad, Suwalki Gap and Russia.” Finabel. February 2022. https://finabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/42.-security-at-the-polish-lithuanian-border.pdf  ↩︎
  14. Williams, Matthias and Natalia Zinets. “Biden assures Zelenskiy that NATO membership in Ukraine’s hands, Kyiv says.” Reuters. December 9, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-president-zelenskiy-holding-talks-with-biden-adviser-says-2021-12-09/ ↩︎
  15. “Full Blinken: The International System Is ‘At Stake’ With Russia.” YouTube. December 12, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJw8mVuYsVw&t=571s  ↩︎
  16. Pamuk, Humeyra and Johan Ahlander. “U.S., NATO fully committed to Ukraine, says Blinken ahead of Lavrov talks.” Reuters. December 2, 2021. ↩︎
  17. Fisher, Max. “Putin’s Case for War, Annotated.” New York Times. February 24, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/europe/putin-ukraine-speech.html  ↩︎
  18. “Foreign Secretary deplores continued fighting in Georgia.” Foreign & Commonwealth Office. August 8, 2008. https://web.archive.org/web/20080828024606/http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/press-release/2008/august/georgia-statement-080809  ↩︎
  19. Slack, Megan. “President Obama Announces New Ukraine-Related Sanctions.” The White House: President Barack Obama.March 17, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/03/17/president-obama-announces-new-ukraine-related-sanctions ↩︎
  20. Slack, Megan. “President Obama Announces New Ukraine-Related Sanctions.” The White House: President Barack Obama.March 17, 2014. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/03/17/president-obama-announces-new-ukraine-related-sanctions ↩︎
  21. Hird, Karolina, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 8, 2023.” Institute for the Study of War. October 8, 2023. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2023 ↩︎
  22. Mearsheimer, John J. and Sebastian Rosato. “The Russian invasion was a rational act.” UnHerd. September 14, 2023. https://unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/ ↩︎