Category: Uncategorized

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June 2024—Media outlets at home and abroad sensationalized a supposed “far-right victory” in the European Parliament as French and German right-wing populists made major gains in the recent election. Centrist parties raised the alarm, panicking at what they believed to be a rapid surge in disregard for liberal-democratic norms. As domestic elections loomed on the horizon, things seemed quite bleak for the liberal consensus.

Yet in the months since June, virtually nothing has materialized for European right-wing populism. On the contrary, centrist and left-wing coalitions have struck back in France and the United Kingdom. Seemingly everywhere, right-wing opposition proves to be domestically ineffective, plagued by scandal and infighting. Could it be that this “far-right victory” was nothing more than a mirage? Perhaps not everywhere.

Out of the big three European economies, only Germany has the potential for a right-wing surge. Political stalemate–as the center-right establishment (CDU) refuses to cooperate with the rising right-wing populist movement (AfD)–as well as Germany’s unique electoral system, have provided the AfD with a pathway to electoral gains in the near future.

On the eve of the European Parliamentary election, I was studying in Germany at the University of Heidelberg—a city historically known for voting for the climate-progressive Green party. Politically, the atmosphere was complacent. Anxieties about the AfD’s surge had subsided from the previous year, as scandal after scandal rocked the party.

But as marred as the AfD’s momentum was, the party managed to pick up four seats in the European Parliament, for a total of 15 out of Germany’s 96. Simultaneously, a new left-wing populist party, the Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), picked up six seats. The results left the ruling left-wing coalition facing disaster, with a hypothetical mandate from only 30% of voters.

To the alarm of many, Britain and France appeared to be heading in a similar direction. In France, the right-wing populist National Rally (RN) gained seven seats and garnered a commanding simple majority. At the same time, the ruling centrist coalition, Ensemble, led by President Emmanuel Macron, saw a devastating loss of 10 seats.

Outside of the EU, the United Kingdom witnessed Nigel Farage’s announcement that he was reentering politics to lead the Reform Party. Farage, infamous for his leadership of the Brexit movement, sought to take out the ruling Conservative party. With the Tories facing a collapsing mandate from voters, Farage took aim at “mass migration,” calling for a return to common-sense politics.

Europe’s three largest economies all seemed to be facing a similar story, as their collapsing establishment parties battled populist dissent from both the left and the right. But what happened next was far from predictable.

On May 31, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (Conservative Party) announced a snap election in which the Conservative Party was resoundingly defeated and the Labour Party took home its first victory in 14 years. Farage’s party made waves, winning the third-highest portion of the vote at 14.3%. Despite this, Reform won just five of Britain’s 650 seats. For reference, the Liberal Democrats won 72 seats with 12.2% of the vote.

The Reform party’s strength–its appeal with disaffected urban Brits–also became its biggest weakness. Because Britain’s “first past the post” system only requires a simple majority (>50%) to win each seat, populist right-wing parties like Reform–with widespread voter bases–lack the voter concentration necessary to win seats.

Just a few days later in France, Macron called a similar snap election after his party’s disastrous results in the EU Election. Unlike Sunak, Macron’s gambit paid off, as Ensemble joined with the left-wing (NFP) to shut out the right and secure a ruling coalition. Macron understood his voters; he knew that they were more likely to support the right-wing in the European Parliament, where consequences seemed remote, than they were to vote for a right-wing party domestically. By calling this bluff, Macron turned a complete disaster into an overwhelming victory.

Similar to the United Kingdom, France’s first-past-the-post system also acted to shut out parties without concentrated voter bases. Despite achieving 33.21% of the first-round vote, RN ended with 142 seats of the available 577, as opposed to Ensemble’s 21.28% and 159 respectively.

Breaking from the United Kingdom and France, Germany’s ruling coalition did not seek a snap election in the immediate aftermath. This decision could be chalked up to sheepishness about the ruling coalition’s odds of success, but, more likely, it resulted from a lack of viable alternatives. Only recently has Germany been forced into a snap election, as its left wing (SPD and Green) parties no longer tolerated the free market liberal party (FDP) in their coalition.

Like other countries, Germany’s parliamentary system includes elements of first-past-the-post. But unlike France and the United Kingdom, Germany only selects half of its candidates from individual district elections. The other half of its parliament apportioned according to the total percentage of the vote. As a result, the AfD controls a far greater portion of seats relative to its voter base when compared to right-wing parties in the big three.

To address this problem and to prevent the AfD from governing, the center-right CDU maintains a “firewall” against the AfD, swearing off any possibility of a joint coalition. But this policy has arguably become a double-edged sword for Germany’s largest party. The CDU cannot form a coalition alone, as it pulls in only around 30% of the electorate. While a joint CDU-AfD coalition would give the CDU a broad mandate to pursue its preferred policies, it would come at a heavy cost—the party’s legitimacy.

Without the AfD, the only possible coalition for Germany’s 2025 snap parliamentary election is a CDU-led alliance with the left-wing Social Democrats (SPD)–maybe even the Greens as well. Such a coalition would be radioactive to both the CDU’s agenda and image and come with little chance of political efficacy.

By blocking millions of AfD voters from its coalition, the CDU is ironically ensuring exactly the kind of “far-right surge” it hopes to prevent. Provided that the AfD can stay alive in the next few cycles, it will absorb a tidal wave of disillusioned CDU voters.

Despite the rise and fall of the “right-wing mirage,” most of Europe seems to have recovered a liberal status quo. But for Germany, the future remains far less certain. Germany’s center-right collapsing would leave the only remaining gatekeepers of right-wing populism on the left. In such a scenario, the right would be more legitimate than ever and surge to new heights.

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The past month has seen both a presidential debate between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump and a vice-presidential debate between JD Vance and Tim Walz. During both hour-and-a-half debates, the candidates answered questions on a wide range of issues — the economy, abortion, the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East; however, one topic was glaringly missing: the threat of China to Taiwan and how the United States will address it. 

This omission during the debates is symptomatic of a larger political obliviousness in the public conscience to the great danger which China poses to American hegemony. For the past two-and-a-half years, all eyes in America have been trained first on Ukraine and then on Israel. No mind is paid to the growing danger of China in Taiwan.

The same blindness has also struck the Washington establishment. Since Ukraine was invaded, the United States has sent $61.3 billion in military aid to the country. In the past year we have spent $17.9 billion on Israel’s defense. In April, the United States passed a foreign aid package providing just $3.9 billion in aid to Taiwan, far less than the $18 billion provided during the Trump administration.

All the while the threat from China grows. According to the Economist, the number of incursions by the People’s Liberation Army into Taiwanese airspace has increased from 36 in January to 193 in August of this year. The number of ships crossing into Taiwanese waters has almost doubled from 142 to 282 in the same time frame. Military exercises by China, including mock blockades, have become more common and more bold. China maintains its aspiration for unifying the island with the mainland and has not ruled out using force to do so. After Ukraine, the international community should dispel any notion that rhetoric is meaningless or that large scale military invasions by great powers are unthinkable. 

As the threat rises, Taiwan is woefully vulnerable. It has 169,000 active duty military to China’s 2,185,000. It has 76 principal surface combatant ships to China’s 209. It has 300 fighter jets to China’s 1,900. It has 4 submarines to China’s 59. A recent report from the Department of Defense predicts that China’s most favorable window to launch an invasion of Taiwan is between 2027 and 2030, thus making the security situation urgent.

With conflict raging throughout the globe we must ask ourselves where American money and energy is best spent. Russia, though a powerful nation, does not possess the economic or political influence to surpass the United States in power. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion has been heroic, but despite its recent incursion into Russian territory, its counter offensive has stalled and it is increasingly improbable that Ukraine will be able to completely expel Russia from its territory. The only way for Russia to be expelled from the country is if the United States enters the war as a belligerent — a move that would certainly lead to a dangerous escalation of the conflict. As Ukraine’s situation becomes more and more clear, America should reconsider the level of aid being sent to the country. Moreover, our European allies can do more to provide for their own continent’s defense. As the threat rises in the Pacific, they must take up the responsibility which we have borne for so many years. 

Some argue that we would be showing weakness by lessening our aid to Ukraine, but the United States has already shown its resolve by arming Ukraine. The worst outcome — a full Russian takeover of the country — has been averted. Bringing the war in Ukraine to a gradual end is not an act of surrender. It is a recognition of reality. The time to arm Ukraine was ten years ago when Russian intentions in the region became clear. Now we must arm Taiwan and deter an invasion there before it is too late. 

In the Middle East we can defend our strategic interests without becoming involved in any conflicts ourselves. We must find the balance between containing Iran and keeping Israel’s legitimate responses to acts of terror in proportion. Above all, we should know better than to become involved in land wars in the Middle East which have nebulous goals. By giving a limited amount of resources to Israel, supplying our allies with intelligence and fighting terrorists directly with precise strikes, we can achieve our goals and not become involved in a broader war. Above all we must have the clarity to recognize that Iran does not have the economic or military might to threaten the American-led world order.

Only China has that potential. Its GDP at $31.227 trillion is greater than the United States’ at $27.361 trillion. Its population of 1,416,043,270 dwarfs the United State’s population of 341,963,408. Its navy has more ships. Its military is larger and only has one region to focus on. 

A Chinese attack on Taiwan would be disastrous. War games show that the United States would likely win if it defended Taiwan, but not without losing dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands servicemen. Our ability to project power across the world would be crippled and the threat of escalation to a nuclear conflict is also possible. The economic effects of a Chinese attack would also be severe. Taiwan produces 60% of the world’s semiconductors and 90% of the world’s advanced semiconductors. Providing subsidies for semiconductor production in the United States is a prudent insurance policy for a possible invasion, but the destruction and possible Chinese control of this market would be economically disastrous. Indeed, in the event of war, the world economy is estimated to shrink by $10 trillion, or 10% of its GDP. 

The United States must make sure that China understands that war in Taiwan will be disastrous, and the best way to achieve this is through a strong deterrent. Only strength can face strength. We must arm Taiwan to the teeth and make the idea of a military invasion of Taiwan as unpalatable to China as possible. If we do not arm Taiwan, a Chinese invasion is more likely and we will likely still be drawn into the conflict if China attacks, while being unprepared for it. If we do arm Taiwan, China may be deterred from invasion and even if they do attack, we will be prepared for it.

But we cannot be everywhere at once. Last year’s National Defense Industrial Strategy stated that the U.S. defense industrial base “does not possess the capacity, capability, responsiveness, or resilience required to satisfy the full range of military production needs at speed and scale.” Within this reality of limited arms production, we must be intentional about where we send our weapons. Arming Taiwan means lessening our aid to other theaters of conflict, and politicians must be honest about this. Neither Harris or Trump has explicitly said that they will not defend Taiwan. If they plan not to, then the American public deserves to know. If they do want to defend the island, they must take this task more seriously and decide how they will practically carry it out. There may be some value in strategic ambiguity, but hard decisions about allocating funding require honesty about our geopolitical plans and priorities.

World hegemony does not last forever. Since World War II, America has dominated the world stage like no other power. We have ushered in an era of relative peace and stability and have thrived economically. But we must not make the mistake of believing that American dominance will last forever. As our population stagnates and as power shifts to the global south new challengers will rise and we must adapt. We must hand over responsibility to our allies and preserve our interests where we can. We must not be so naive as to think that America can project power equally in every part of the globe forever. We must be rational, evaluate where the greatest threat to our power lies and take sufficient steps to preserve our influence in the region. If not, we may find ourselves woefully unprepared for a Chinese attack that threatens to seriously damage America’s ability to exert its influence abroad. We would do well to ask ourselves if that is the kind of world we would like to live in.

Sources

https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/#:~:text=To%20date%2C%20we%20have%20provided,invasion%20of%20Ukraine%20in%202014.)

https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-us-military-spending-8e6e5033f7a1334bf6e35f86e7040e14)

https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/24/2003205865/-1/-1/1/07-AMONSON%20%26%20EGLI_FEATURE%20IWD.PDF

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden

https://foreignassistance.gov

https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2024/USspendingIsrael

https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iran/#economy

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/china/#people-and-society

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#economy

https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/10/03/china-is-using-an-anaconda-strategy-to-squeeze-taiwan

https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/26/us-foreign-aid-bill-package-details

https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/03/06/taiwans-dominance-of-the-chip-industry-makes-it-more-important?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=17210591673&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjwyL24BhCtARIsALo0fSDSlkfehqZtbjMF11GaJ2roU2dSRVWD3SM8vuRjn7eMEi9drILHqZAaAnfVEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/02/draft-pentagon-strategy-china-00129764

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“Each day in America, you can trust the foods you eat and the medicines you take, thanks to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.”¹

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) claims to provide American citizens with security and safety regarding their food intake. After all, the FDA, formed in 1906 by the Pure Food and Drugs Act, was founded upon the Department of Agriculture’s 1860s mission to analyze the safety of chemicals in agricultural products.² Food safety standards are a historical FDA priority. So how does the United States still lack a robust system for the post-market assessment of chemicals in food?

In September 2024, a paper, entitled “Evidence for widespread human exposure to food contact chemicals” published by the Journal of Exposure Science & Environmental Epidemiology made waves in mainstream media. The study found that over 3,600 chemicals that migrate to food from food contact articles (FCAs) used to store, process, package, and serve food end up in the human body, where they can cause serious harm. The researchers concluded there was an “urgent need to ban the most hazardous chemicals shown to migrate from food packaging and other types of FCAs (food contact articles) into foods to protect human health.”³

The recent discovery regarding the American consumer’s high risk presents the FDA’s serious dereliction of duty. Adequate governmental action is a central part of our republic, and the state has a duty to ensure food safety. Recent FDA failures further reveal how the bloated bureaucracy of a disunified Executive ultimately undermines the public interest.

Increasingly widespread concern over food chemicals prompted the FDA to conduct a public meeting on the development of an enhanced systematic process for FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food.⁴ The meeting, which featured opening remarks from Jim Jones, Deputy Commissioner for Human Foods at the FDA, revealed that, in his words, “the agency has not established a systematic process…until now we have taken an ad hoc approach” to post-market chemical review.⁵ The current FDA process is self-described by the agency as “situational” and possesses a “lack of dedicated resources” regarding additives and ingredients.⁶

Despite having over 18,000 employees, the FDA has neglected to create an effective system for reviewing post-market chemicals within food. This ought to shock every American citizen, and it raises the greater question: What exactly has the FDA been doing?

This is extremely difficult to answer. The project towards analyzing chemicals in food is part of a larger focus on food chemical safety.⁷ This Human Foods Program exists within the Office of Food Chemical Safety, Dietary Supplements & Innovation,⁸ which is a part of the Closer to Zero Initiative.⁹ The Office is further broken down into pre- and post-market assessments and the dietary supplements program, as well as including staff focused on innovative foods and those working in operations. These subdivisions are a part of the larger FDA structure, in which there are thirteen headquarter level offices and nine centers, each with hundreds to thousands of employees.¹⁰

On October 1, 2024, the FDA underwent its largest reorganization effort in recent history.¹¹ The American food supply has been suffering under the crisis of bureaucratic complexity, prompting the FDA to launch a newly unified Human Foods Program, which impacted over 8,000 employees and “touched almost every facet of the agency.” Responding to independent reviews, as well as the FDA’s handling of the infant formula shortage of 2022, the agency claims it is newly focused on “inspections, investigations and imports as its core mission.”

Despite the overwhelming number of already-existing offices, projects, programs, and initiatives, the Discussion Paper accompanying the September public meeting states that the first part of the solution is that a “team of FDA experts will rank individual chemicals” before gathering feedback and performing risk-assessments for each chemical.¹² Yet, it is doubtful that a new team of the same experts is likely to solve the deeper issue of a bloated and ineffective bureaucracy. The structure of the federal government was designed in order to maximize responsibility, and yet the current administrative state evades accountability due to its size and complexity.

This lack of unity and transparency sharply contrasts with the original vision of an efficient executive branch, as highlighted by the Founders’ writings on executive power. In the Federalist papers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, writing as Publius, collaborated to convince Americans, specifically the people of the state of New York, to ratify the Constitution. When considering the powers of the Executive branch, which were meant to rest upon the President of the United States, Hamilton remarks in Federalist 70, “A government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.”¹³ Ill execution can consist of poor policies, as well as irresponsibilities. A strict size-restraint on the Executive branch was meant to ensure energy and unity of action, as well as proper transparency and assignment of blame.

When faced with the suggestion of the dispersal of authority among a council of executive officers, Hamilton writes, “it often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall.”¹⁴ The branch has grown dramatically, even in recent years, thus further threatening valuable characteristics emphasized by Hamilton: “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”¹⁵

Over the ten fiscal years from 2007 to 2017, a study conducted by the United States Office of Personnel Management found a growth of nearly 215,000 employees between the Department of Defense Agencies, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Department of Health and Human Services, under which the FDA falls.¹⁶

Hamilton, by unifying the power of the Executive branch into the President and a limited Cabinet, sought to achieve effective law enforcement and incentivize individual responsibility. Although the FDA has failed to execute precautions against chemicals in diet, it has 50 technical and scientific advisory committees and panels and is charged with enforcing over 200 laws.¹⁷ 

The organization of administrative agencies have resulted in an inability to focus on the common good, and the United States is suffering under disastrous regulatory confusion. Madison’s warnings in Federalist #62 highlight the importance of criminalization: “It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made of men of their own choice if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow.”¹⁸ As the FDA seeks to create a post-market review system, they must keep in mind their position as a part of the Executive branch, charged with enforcing legislation.

More than mere inconvenience, the FDA’s failures represent a subversion of the common good. With the expansion of the federal administrative state, individual states have turned over their traditional police powers. The American public is left without guidance regarding health, safety, and morals, traditionally understood as governmental priorities. As health crises worsen, governmental incompetence erodes public trust.

As famously presented in Aristotle’s politics, the ideal regime, with no name, or known simply as polity, consists of popular rule for the common interest. The American founders, with their careful restraints and meticulously designed offices, attempted to create a balanced republic, which both responded to democratic demands and protected “the people against themselves.”¹⁹

Chemicals in food and the proper role of the government are being discussed in the popular political arena, and citizens are searching for alternatives to the status quo.  Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who recently announced his support of candidate Donald Trump, vowed in a viral X post and video that, “Enough is enough. President Trump and I are going to stop the mass poisoning of American children.”²⁰ 

In the clip, he tells the story of Tartrazine, or Yellow Dye #5, which is included in everyday foods such as Doritos, Cheez-its, and Gatorade. He explains that it is produced from “the sludge that is left over when you turn coal into coke for blast furnaces.” After displaying the harmful effects of these food chemical additives, RFK tells his audience, “Together, we are going to make America healthy again.”

As federal regulators struggle to  provide clear guidance, creative entrepreneurs face the issue in the private sector. The YUKA app, featured by podcaster Shawn Ryan on the popular “Joe Rogan Experience,” is a prime example of citizens taking governmental obligations towards safety into their own hands.²¹ The mobile phone app, which boasts over 61 million downloads, claims to “deciphers product labels and analyzes the health impact of food products and cosmetics.”²² 

At the show’s start, Ryan explains, “You basically scan anything, food related…it’ll tell you all the chemicals and what the chemicals do to you.” Rogan exclaims, “That’s what people need!” He went on to promote RFK’s past experience in “protecting people against corporations that are poisoning them.” 

Regardless of the FDA’s complicated organizational structure, or how it ought to be rectified, it is clear that the situation surrounding health and food safety in the United States is dire. In 2023, every single state in the Union had an obesity rate of over 20%.²³ Food allergies are on the rise, with 48% of American adults with allergies reporting a new, recent allergy they did not have as children.²⁴ Fertility rates are at a record low, with only 55 births per 1,000 women.²⁵ American life expectancy has faced dramatic declines, and is lagging at 77.5 years, compared to comparable nations’ 82.2 average.²⁶ 

Americans are not just dying earlier–they are also suffering mental challenges at higher rates. In 2016, almost 1 in 4 (23%) American adults reported a mental health diagnosis, compared to fewer than 10% in Germany, France, or the Netherlands.²⁷ Ties between food consumption and mental health are obvious and overwhelming; one study co-authored by researchers at Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health found that those in the top fifth of ultra processed food consumption had a 50% higher risk of developing depression than those in the bottom 20%.²⁸

Mental health issues highlight the growth of psychiatric treatment in the United States. The 12% increase in mental health prescriptions from 2019 to 2022 far outpaces overall prescription growth of less than 1%.²⁹ Shockingly, over 338 million antidepressant prescriptions were written in 2016, enough for one for every man, woman, and child in the nation.³⁰ Yet, they have skyrocketed further–growing by 35% in 2022.³¹ Mental health is declining both rapidly and uniformly, or citizens are being widely overmedicated–both may be true. 

This is a systemic crisis. The typical American ingests toxic chemicals and is encouraged to turn to medication for physical and mental health issues. The normalization and proliferation of such treatments ignore that the common American diet and reliance on medication are actively harming the bodies and minds of millions, particularly children. Children raised on food dyes, dopamine enhancers, and screens may never know clarity, alertness, or their natural creativity and personalities.

America is facing a crisis of both physical and mental health, which appears to cut across all geographic, socioeconomic, or racial borders. There must be something in the water–or, actually, in the food supply. Prioritizing a safe and nutritious food supply is a necessary first step towards protecting future generations of Americans. 

1. “About FDA.” FDA, 14 June 2024, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda. ↩︎
2. “FDA History.” FDA, 29 Mar. 2021, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history. ↩︎
3. Geueke, B., Parkinson, L.V., Groh, K.J. et al. “Evidence for widespread human exposure to food contact chemicals.” J Expo Sci Environ Epidemiol (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41370-024-00718-2 ↩︎
4. “FDA to Hold Public Meeting on the Development of an Enhanced Systematic Process for FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food.” FDA, Sept. 2024. www.fda.gov, https://www.fda.gov/food/hfp-constituent-updates/fda-hold-public-meeting-development-enhanced-systematic-process-fdas-post-market-assessment. ↩︎
5. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Public Meeting: The Development of an Enhanced Systematic Process for the FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food. FDA, 25 Sept. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/media/180941/download. ↩︎
6. Current Approach to Post-Market Work. FDA, 25 Sept. 2024, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-wTJvt6eU9ZnEa74opKOsCeEX2Lv8kkt/view?usp=sharing. ↩︎
7. “Food Chemical Safety.” FDA, 1 Oct. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/food/food-ingredients-packaging/food-chemical-safety. ↩︎
8. “Office of Food Chemical Safety, Dietary Supplements & Innovation.” FDA, Oct. 2024. https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/human-foods-program/office-food-chemical-safety-dietary-supplements-innovation. ↩︎
9. “Closer to Zero: Reducing Childhood Exposure to Contaminants from Foods.” FDA, Sept. 2024. https://www.fda.gov/food/environmental-contaminants-food/closer-zero-reducing-childhood-exposure-contaminants-foods. ↩︎
10. “FDA Organization Charts.” FDA, 8 July 2024, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-organization/fda-organization-charts. ↩︎
11.  “FDA Modernization Efforts for Establishing a Unified Human Foods Program, New Model for Field Operations and More.” FDA, 1 Oct. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-organization/fda-modernization-efforts-establishing-unified-human-foods-program-new-model-field-operations-and. ↩︎
12. Discussion Paper Development of an Enhanced Systematic Process for the FDA’s Post-Market Assessment of Chemicals in Food. FDA, Aug. 2024, https://www.fda.gov/media/180942/download ↩︎
13. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 422. ↩︎
14. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 426. ↩︎
15. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 423. ↩︎
16. Sizing Up the Executive Branch. United States Office of Personnel Management, Feb. 2018, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/reports-publications/sizing-up-the-executive-branch-2016.pdf. ↩︎
17. “Learn About FDA Advisory Committees.” FDA, Aug. 2024. www.fda.gov, https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-fda-advisory-committees;“Learn About FDA Advisory Committees.” FDA, Aug. 2024. www.fda.gov, https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-fda-advisory-committees ↩︎
18. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 369. ↩︎
19. Hamilton, Alexander, et al. The Federalist Papers. 1. Signet Classic pr, Signet Classic, 2003, 383. ↩︎
20. Kennedy, Robert, F. 25 Sept. 2024, https://x.com/RobertKennedyJr/status/1839012584957042973  ↩︎
21. Kennedy, Robert, F. 25 Sept. 2024, https://x.com/RobertKennedyJr/status/1839012584957042973 ↩︎
22.  “Yuka – The Mobile App That Scans Your Products.” Yuka, https://yuka.io/en/. ↩︎
23. “Adult Obesity Prevalence Maps.” Obesity, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 19 Sept. 2024, https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/php/data-research/adult-obesity-prevalence-maps.html. ↩︎
24. Why Are Food Allergies on the Rise? With Ruchi Gupta, MD, MPH. Northwestern University, 12 Feb. 2019, https://www.feinberg.northwestern.edu/research/podcast/food-allergies-on-the-rise.html. ↩︎
25. U.S. Fertility Rate Drops to Another Historic Low. CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, 25 Apr. 2024, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/2024/20240525.htm. ↩︎
26. Rakshit, Shameek, et al. “How Does U.S. Life Expectancy Compare to Other Countries?” Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker, Peterson-KFF, 30 Jan. 2024, https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/u-s-life-expectancy-compare-countries/. ↩︎
27. Roosa Tikkanen et al., Mental Health Conditions and Substance Use: Comparing U.S. Needs and Treatment Capacity with Those in Other High-Income Countries (Commonwealth Fund, May 2020). https://doi.org/10.26099/09ht-rj07 ↩︎
28. Samuthpongtorn C, Nguyen LH, Okereke OI, et al. Consumption of Ultraprocessed Food and Risk of Depression. JAMA Netw Open. 2023;6(9):e2334770. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.34770. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2809727#google_vignette ↩︎
29. Garzella, Cecilia. “Mental Health Crisis Fuels the Post-Pandemic Rise in Medication Use.” USA TODAY, 3 Mar. 2024, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2024/02/29/mental-health-related-prescriptions-rise-post-covid/72310337007/.  ↩︎
30.  “Top 25 Psychiatric Medications for 2016.” Psych Central, 12 Oct. 2017, https://psychcentral.com/blog/top-25-psychiatric-medications-for-2016. ↩︎
31. Burns, Corrinne. “Antidepressant Prescribing Increases by 35% in Six Years.” The Pharmaceutical Journal, 8 July 2022, https://pharmaceutical-journal.com/article/news/antidepressant-prescribing-increases-by-35-in-six-years. ↩︎

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Is declaratory nuclear policy useful? The Soviet Union’s 1982 declaration of a no first use policy was met with inaction by Soviet military leaders who secretly maintained their ex-ante military doctrine. Declaratory policy is nothing without concurrent posture adaptations, suggesting that the United States and China are condemned to nuclear competition for the foreseeable future.

No First Use

China and India currently maintain no first use (NFU) pledges. They agree not to use nuclear weapons against another state unless in retaliation to a nuclear strike, claiming to deter without the option of a pre-emption.¹ The United States has pondered an NFU and related declaratory policy changes. The Obama administration stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that the “fundamental role” of US nuclear weapons is to deter attack on the homeland and allies, and President Biden’s 2022 NPR maintained this.² Both Obama and Biden, however, declined to adopt an NFU policy. The Trump administration maintained in 2018 that an NFU doctrine was not appropriate because it would not reflect the plethora of international threats that the United States faces. Similarly, although Biden, first as Vice President and later as presidential candidate, stated in 2017 and 2020, respectively, that the United States should adopt a “sole purpose” nuclear doctrine, his NPR hesitated to take the next step to its realization.³

The Soviet Union—and, after its dissolution, Russia—held an NFU posture from 1982 to 1993.⁴  Few analysts consider it when conversing about NFUs today. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko publicly announced the shift in Soviet doctrine at the United Nations, but it is widely known that the United States did not seriously believe that the Soviets would refrain from launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike in case of desperate emergency.

Understanding what an NFU would look like today depends, at least in part, on what NFUs looked like decades ago. The international climate has become more tense. In theory, an NFU declaration from major nuclear powers would significantly reduce the possibility of escalation because states would not be worried about nuclear threats or use against one another. As mentioned, China utilizes its long-standing NFU in diplomatic conversations today to portray itself as an actor opposed to escalation. Although the adoption of NFUs by countries like the United States and Russia may seem unlikely today,⁵ a greater understanding of what might bring about a serious pledge and how to maintain it can further the conversation on declaratory nuclear policy.

So, is declaratory policy useful for attenuating security competition? Unfortunately, the Soviet case suggests that political statements can be met with inaction by intransigent military brass. Concurrent changes in nuclear posture would ease this problem, but the United States and China’s nuclear postures are headed in a competitive, instead of conciliatory, direction.

The Soviet NFU

In 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev pledged that the Soviet Union would not launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike. In 1993, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the termination of the Soviet and Russian NFU.⁶ Over the course of that decade-plus, the United States intelligence community did not take the Soviet pledge seriously, and believed there was instead a possibility of a Soviet first strike. This is an old fear over NFU policies, however. More interestingly, archival documents indicate that Soviet military leadership did not shift its military doctrine to rule out a first strike possibility.   

The Soviet military and its civilian defense leaders resisted the political leadership’s NFU. Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov “believed in first strikes” even though they violated official Soviet policy and led the resistance against a doctrinal shift toward no first use.⁷ Institutional resistance followed. Documents from East German military archives demonstrate that the Soviet military “retained and exercised” the possibility for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against NATO, even during a contingency in which NATO only used conventional weapons.⁸ Furthermore, the Soviet NFU policy on its own seems to have turned few heads: US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated during the Reagan administration that recent Soviet SS-20 missile deployments with multiple nuclear warheads each dampened the credibility of the Soviet NFU.⁹

Contemporaneous CIA analysis of Soviet military doctrine reflected the military reality. A top secret 1983 memorandum stated that Soviet wartime plans for central Europe would include an attempt to pre-empt NATO’s use of nuclear weapons to preclude a large strike on Soviet conventional forces.¹⁰ A different 1989 CIA memorandum claimed that the Soviets were “well aware” of their poor economic standing vis-à-vis the West and supposed that the Kremlin may alter its military doctrine towards one which takes a defensive stance.¹¹ The CIA’s implication in this statement that Soviet doctrine was not presently defensive led to the conclusion that the Soviets had not effectively developed a no first use policy.¹² Additionally, while the memorandum claimed that Soviet military doctrine focused on the prevention of conventional and nuclear war,¹³ it analyzed the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance in depth, particularly as former President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative may have impacted stability.¹⁴ This may have reflected a distrustful belief about the Soviet NFU, or at least indicated that recent Soviet technological developments placed Moscow on a similar military footing as Washington.

Even a classified briefing of the Defense Policy Panel to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in 1988 stated that the Soviet NFU declaration represented the political presentation of its military doctrine instead of any military-technical or operational aspects. The concrete measures which the Soviet military took to prepare for and conduct warfighting did not change from before the NFU. The deployment of conventional and nuclear forces retained its “threatening posture.”¹⁵

Was the widespread distrust which met the Soviet NFU unique? Perhaps not. Chinese military officials, such as Major General Zhu Chenghu in July 2005, have claimed that Beijing’s NFU has only applied to non-nuclear weapon states.¹⁶ While the Chinese government distanced itself from Zhu’s statement, its NFU pledge has historically served propaganda purposes and was conditioned out of necessity and policy instead of peace-loving sentiment. China’s long-standing small nuclear arsenal has made it physically unable to launch a first strike against a nuclear weapon state without expecting complete annihilation, and its nuclear weapons were not created as part of a doctrine which extends past countervalue minimum deterrence.¹⁷ Indeed, although Beijing has undertaken significant restraining measures to convince states of its NFU, they are impossible to verify and the United States has continued to distrust China.¹⁸

Declaratory Policy and Nuclear Competition

The United States historically has not found NFU pledges to be credible, but analysts overlook an NFU’s civil-military strife. While Soviet political leadership announced an NFU in 1983, military leaders personally stated their opposition and worked to maintain a first strike doctrine.

What does this experience tell the nuclear community about NFUs today? A novel no first use pledge by non-NFU states like Russia and the United States seems unlikely in the midst of today’s tense geopolitical competition, but analysts should also question the domestic viability of such a policy. The U.S. military strongly opposes an NFU and the possible changes in nuclear posture that would follow.¹⁹ A U.S. NFU would not necessarily cause a civil-military divide, especially considering civil-military transparency and communication in Washington. But the consequences of other great powers adopting an NFU must be considered. For those states with significant political-military divides, an NFU declaration by political leaders may be met with inaction by military authorities.

This conclusion supports the belief that declaratory policy has little value without a concurrent adaptation of posture by military personnel. Because statements can be empty, the most effective way to create a credible NFU would necessitate action. States could eliminate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from their nuclear arsenal (or at least take them off high alert) and instead prioritize the survivable sea-based leg of the triad. This would represent qualified self-deterrence against a first strike because states would be unable to rapidly launch a debilitating first strike and would preclude effective pre-emption. Additionally, given land-based weapons’ vulnerability, their elimination would decrease the benefits and likely success of a first strike. Unfortunately, recent great power policies run counter to these long-term posture commitments that may ease tensions.

The United States is modernizing its ground-based leg with the development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD, LGM-35 Sentinel), while China is significantly expanding its siloed ICBM force.²⁰ Neither development benefits relations between Washington and Beijing, and in fact may lead American policymakers to doubt China’s NFU more. Given that China has considered the possibility of placing parts of its forces on a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture, Beijing’s strategic posture is changing, and debates about its NFU remain.²¹ Even though China has officially reiterated an “unqualified commitment” to its NFU, President Xi Jinping has called for the PLA to establish a “strong system of strategic deterrence,” pointing to a break in nuclear policy that may push American policymakers to question the continuity of the NFU.²² Although Chinese officials claim that LOW would be consistent with the NFU, Washington may link Beijing’s actions on one front of nuclear policy to another and sense a wholesale shift to a more aggressive nuclear doctrine. In a crisis bargaining scenario, uncertainty about an NFU may lead states to assume the worst case scenario.

Regardless of declaratory policy, the United States and China have adopted postures that risk quick escalation. The Chinese NFU declaration, for this reason, does not by itself preclude action-reaction spirals and American doubt about the validity of a no first use posture. The rivalry—for now—may be condemned to competition.

1. It remains important to distinguish between China and India’s NFUs, however. While China has gone to great lengths to make its pledge credible, India caveats its NFU by retaining the option to use nuclear weapons in response to a major biological or chemical weapons attack against India or its forces. Additionally, India has eroded belief in its pledge over conventional attack and nuclear preemption as tensions with Pakistan have grown for decades. Cf. Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use: Nuclear Weapons and Declaratory Policy,” War on the Rocks, 22 February 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/sole-purpose-is-not-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-and-declaratory-policy/. ↩︎
2. Ernest J. Moniz et al., “U.S. Nuclear Policies for a Safer World,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 2021, pp. 7-12; and Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn, “NTI Statement on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 28 October 2022, https://www.nti.org/news/nti-statement-on-the-2022-nuclear-posture-review/. ↩︎
3. A “sole purpose” declaratory policy states that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the United States and its allies. Cf. Moniz, “U.S. Nuclear Policies for a Safer World.” ↩︎
4. I refer to this primarily as the “Soviet NFU” because of its adoption during the Soviet years and the change in policy soon after the Russian Federation’s birth. ↩︎
5. The United States is unlikely to adopt an NFU today because allies, especially those who benefit from extended nuclear deterrence in east Asia, will worry that Washington will not stand up for them. Russia is unlikely to adopt an NFU today, as seen by its consistent use of nuclear threats and forward deployment in Belarus. ↩︎
6. Serge Schmemann, “Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of Atom Arms,” The New York Times, 4 November 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/04/world/russia-drops-pledge-of-no-first-use-of-atom-arms.html. Interestingly, Soviet generals clarified after terminating the NFU that it only applied to non-nuclear weapon states that signed the 1968 NPT, but still not those allied with nuclear weapon states. ↩︎
7. Matthew R. Costlow, “A Net Assessment of ‘No First Use’ and ‘Sole Purpose’ Nuclear Policies,” Occasional Paper 1, no. 7 (National Institute Press, 2021), p. 78. ↩︎
8. Costlow, “A Net Assessment,” p. 79; and Ankit Panda, “‘No First Use’ and Nuclear Weapons,” Council on Foreign Relations, 17 July 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons. ↩︎
9. Costlow, “A Net Assessment,” p. 82. ↩︎
10. “Soviet Planning for Front Nuclear Operations in Central Europe,” Central Intelligence Agency, June 1983, p. 11, archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-090-doc1.pdf. ↩︎
11. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 1989, pp. 13-14, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000499601.pdf. ↩︎
12. NFUs are defensive, instead of offensive, policies, because they are inherently responsive. They can still serve deterrent functions, because they warn against the response a state would face if they were to attack with nuclear weapons. But NFUs are not offensive because they eliminate the possibility of first use and preemption. ↩︎
13. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” p. 21. ↩︎
14. “The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine,” pp. 18-19. The SDI was intended to intercept ICBMs from space, which many argued would encourage another arms race and undermine established arms-control agreements. Earlier U.S.-Soviet treaties, like the ABM Treaty, were intended to reduce defensive anti-ballistic missile systems that would otherwise have pushed the powers to build more weapons for deterrence and undermined mutual vulnerability. ↩︎
15. “General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Military: Assessing His Impact So Far and the Potential for Future Changes,” The Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 2 August 1988, p. 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100030010-1.pdf. ↩︎
16. Stephanie Lieggi, “Going Beyond the Stir: The Strategic realities of China’s No-First-Use Policy,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 31 December 2005, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/realities-chinas-no-first-use-policy/. ↩︎
17. It is unclear how China’s nuclear expansion and modernization will impact this, but its arsenal as of this writing is still unlikely to comprehensively destroy U.S. second-strike capability and maintains an assured retaliation capability. Cf. Henrik Stålhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel, and Magnus Langset Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China’s Changing Nuclear Posture,” International Security 47, no. 4 (2023): pp. 147-187. ↩︎
18. Lieggi, “Going Beyond the Stir”; and Panda and Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use.” Panda and Narang further that China has implemented de-targeting agreements and has unilaterally separated warheads from ICBMS (a process known as de-mating), but because an NFU is a component of declaratory nuclear policy, there is no possible diplomatic arrangement that would verify or enforce a pledge. Furthermore, the pledge alone would not impact capabilities. For Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s distrust of China’s NFU, see Kumar Sundaram and M.V. Ramana, “India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 1 (February 2018): pp. 152-168. ↩︎
19. Panda and Narang, “Sole Purpose is not No First Use.” ↩︎
20. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 148. Additionally, some scholars have written about the direct impact of new U.S. capabilities, such as ballistic missile defense and CPGS, on China’s ability to launch a retaliatory strike. China expanded its force structure in part to ensure survivability under assured retaliation, but it might be forced to abandon assured retaliation for a first-use posture. Chinese analysts also surmised during the Obama administration that Beijing would retaliate against a U.S. conventional attack on Chinese nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons, violating the NFU. These possibilities point to the unsure nature of declaratory policy. Cf. Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): pp. 8, 21. ↩︎
21. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 150. Additionally, some Chinese officials believe that a LOW posture would violate China’s NFU, proving the volatility of declaratory policy. Without concrete actions that distinctly support declaratory policy, the latter is confusing domestically and internationally. Cf. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” pp. 170-171. ↩︎
22. Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma,” p. 168. ↩︎

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Countries in the Indo-Pacific region are allying with the United States to contain China. But domestic defense initiatives have stalled, and allies continue to disagree with each other on critical issues, leading to the conclusion that China may be better off provoking conflict sooner (if at all) rather than later. The dilemma? China will be ready later rather than sooner.

China

Scholars disagree on the size of the Chinese threat.¹ Some describe China as a regional behemoth that may attempt to break out of its unfavorable geographic limitations at any moment.² Others claim that Beijing’s expansion is stalling, still short of U.S. power, constraining its ability to seriously threaten its neighbors.³ But no matter the specifics, many states in the Indo-Pacific are scared of China because no regional actor can individually stand up to Beijing from head to toe. Enter the United States and its balancing coalition.

States ally with each other against a powerful external threat to avoid military and economic dominance.⁴ The United States has led a policy of external balancing (consider the balancing scales of justice, but with adversarial countries creating a coalition to “balance” the other’s power) in the Indo-Pacific against a rising China. Since America’s superiority in the Western Hemisphere began in the late 19th century, Washington’s foreign policy has centered around ensuring that no country is strong enough to similarly dominate the economic and military activities of its own region.⁵

To halt the possibility that China’s power in the Indo-Pacific rivals America’s in the Western Hemisphere and around the world, the United States needs defense commitments from China’s neighbors. Many states that border China and its waters are happy to ally with Washington: China is larger, stronger, and wealthier than them, and they fear one-sided conflict or at least economic co-option. But have these balancing attempts been successful? And what do they tell us about the military and diplomatic balance in the Indo-Pacific, now and into the future?

Allying, or external balancing, is difficult because states understand that they primarily provide their own security.⁶ While the United States has led the charge in creating formal institutions to contain China, states have at times succumbed to infighting and shocking industrial setbacks. If China’s ambitions indeed exceed its current international standing, its window of aggression may remain open for a few years. But its own stagnant growth and ill-prepared military keep the balancers in an advantageous position.

The Good

The United States has laid the groundwork for an intricate web of alliances in the Indo-Pacific. Take the Quad. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue–consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India–was resuscitated in 2017 to ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”⁷ Grouping four states with little connection apart from their power in the region broadly defined, the Quad hopes to counter Chinese economic and military coercion and uphold democratic values.

Or consider AUKUS. The Australia-UK-US trilateral agreement of 2021 has since worked to exchange technology between the three countries, especially on developing Australia’s defense capability. The plan’s Pillar I includes Australia’s purchase of three US Virginia class conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines and the buildup of its sovereign submarine base. Pillar II of the alliance aims to develop joint capabilities through technology and information sharing, focusing on cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum, and undersea capabilities. AUKUS’s goal with submarine and technology sharing is specifically to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and bolster deterrence for allies in the region.⁸

And we shouldn’t forget Camp David. In August 2023, US President Biden, South Korean President Yoon, and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida gathered at Camp David to inaugurate a new trilateral centered around shared goals of containing China, denuclearizing North Korea, and maintaining American extended deterrence. The ROK-Japan rapprochement is significant in the face of long-standing nationalistic disputes, and at Camp David, the parties agreed to coordinate regional responses and policies.⁹

The Bad

Unfortunately, however, these alliances take time to get off the ground. As with NATO’s European parties, who have been slow to increase their defense spending and grow their industrial bases in the face of an obstreperous Russia,¹⁰ Asia’s balancing coalition has run into numerous domestic and industrial roadblocks that have produced mixed tangible results.

One example is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a grouping of US government controls on defense imports and exports. Simply put, ITAR is not structured for rapid technological innovation, trade, or international competition. Instead, it is a cautious ordinance better suited for American national security when the United States is not seriously competing against other great powers. 

The Biden administration and the legislatures of Australia and the UK are working to pass sweeping ITAR exemptions. But ITAR has already created problems for the alliance’s Pillar II in three ways. First, ITAR requires foreign states to prove that they protect sensitive technology to a standard comparable to the United States. Australia, in particular, has a significantly smaller defense industrial base than its allies, meaning that its export regime is historically not up to par. Second, the United States will work to make a release from ITAR sweeping; the exemption would apply to AUKUS nations generally and not to specific transactions by AUKUS countries. This comprehensive measure requires an equally extensive and time-consuming review. An exemption would lastly need to outline the mechanisms through which AUKUS countries can utilize the agreement, which follows from previous conversations about comparable standards and scope.¹¹

Legislation is not the only complication confronting AUKUS. An internal US Navy investigation from April found that the United States is running two to three years behind schedule on its construction of the new nuclear-powered Virginia class submarine. Washington may not be able to deliver these submarines, which will undergird Australia’s involvement in the alliance and Indo-Pacific, by the planned 2032 date. Other construction projects are also running late: the star nuclear-powered ballistic missile Columbia class submarine will be 12 to 16 months late and the attack Block IV Virginia submarines are running three years behind schedule.¹²

Multilateral domestic quibbles also threaten to weaken the American-led alliance regime in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad, for one, is plagued by differing motivations and domestic situations. All four countries share economic interdependence with China (although the United States is following a decoupling strategy), making containment, in part, a self-defeating policy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has assaulted civil liberties and minority rights, pulling the country away from mature democracy, even though democracy and freedom are supposedly among the Quad’s bedrock values.¹³ Given these disagreements, the Quad remains a loose diplomatic alliance instead of a security commitment à la AUKUS or Camp David.

Although the United States-Japan-South Korea trilateral has settled on commitments in East Asia, Tokyo and Seoul continue to have their differences on critical points of policy. In particular, the two states have exhibited varying willingness to publicly support Taiwan, US military deployments to Taiwan from their own soil, and the prioritization of a Taiwan contingency over tensions on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁴

The Ugly

What do these nascent alliances mean for China’s future? Beijing faces a dilemma of enormous proportions.

On the one hand, these alliances are nascent. If China seeks to expand, whether for security or greed¹⁵–and that’s a very important if–then its window of aggression may extend for a few years. Aggression could take any number of forms, from an invasion or blockade of Taiwan to an occupation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 

On the other hand, these alliances are unlikely to be nascent for long. AUKUS nations will move past ITAR and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida recently visited Washington to extend alliance commitments. China has serious domestic blockades of its own that make Beijing ill-prepared to strike in the short term. The People’s Liberation Army has not fought a serious war for decades and China’s military will only be prepared to invade Taiwan come 2027.¹⁶ Xi Jinping has structural nonmilitary problems, too: Chinese overdevelopment has built dozens of ghost cities, its energy policies cause significant environmental damage, and local authorities have taken on staggering debt to grow the economy. China may be neither a peer competitor to the United States nor declining, but its situation is one that few countries must envy.

One caveat to conclude: the United States is stretched thin internationally, and escalation in conflicts around the world may bode poorly for America’s continued focus on its Indo-Pacific alliances. Russia continues to move forward in Ukraine, albeit slowly, and congressional debates on aid to Kyiv have stalled.¹⁷ Iran’s retaliation against Israel caused little damage and both sides can reasonably claim to de-escalate tensions, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may yet seek to respond against his weaker adversary in Tehran.

If the White House were to pull itself further into either conflict (and especially in the latter scenario, considering that American servicemen are stationed in the Mediterranean to help Israel), the United States may be less prepared against an Indo-Pacific contingency. Although China is widely considered to be Washington’s major threat, three wars at once may be too much to handle. American overextension would ease Beijing’s dilemma.

1. And, importantly, on whether it represents a threat at all. ↩︎
2. Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021). ↩︎
3. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (New York: W.W. Norton, 2022). ↩︎
4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). ↩︎
5. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). ↩︎
6. Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, “Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 52. ↩︎
7. “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement,” The White House, 24 May 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/. ↩︎
8. Joseph Clark, “AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities,” Department of Defense News, 10 April 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3737569/aukus-partners-focus-on-indo-pacific-security-in-shaping-joint-capabilities/. ↩︎
9. “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” The White House, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/; and Jenny Town and Yuki Tatsumi, “Takeaways from the Camp David Summit,” Stimson Center, 25 August 2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/takeaways-from-the-camp-david-summit/.  ↩︎
10. Daniel Michaels, “Europe Is Boosting Military Spending. It’s Still Not Enough,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 February 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-is-boosting-military-spending-its-still-not-enough-020b432a. ↩︎
11. Deborah Cheverton and John T. Watts, “AUKUS is hamstrung by outdated US export control rules. Here’s what Congress can do,” Atlantic Council, 15 November 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/aukus-is-hamstrung-by-outdated-us-export-control-rules-heres-what-congress-can-do/. ↩︎
12. Matthew Cranston, “AUKUS subs construction delayed by years: US Navy,” Australian Financial Review, 4 April 2024, https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/aukus-subs-construction-delayed-by-years-us-navy-20240404-p5fh9a#:~:text=The%20assessment%20found%20the%20Virginia,submarines%20to%20Australia%20by%202032. ↩︎
13. Debasish Roy Chosdhury, “Quad is Key to Biden’s Strategy in Asia, But the Four-Way Alliance Is Ambiguous and Contradictory,” TIME, 18 March 2021, https://time.com/5947674/quad-biden-china/. ↩︎
14. Adam P. Liff, “How Japan and South Korea diverge on Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait,” The Brookings Institution, 22 February 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-japan-and-south-korea-diverge-on-taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/. ↩︎
15. Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 171-201. ↩︎
16. Roxana Tiron, “China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, US Says,” Bloomberg, 20 March 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-20/china-on-track-to-be-ready-for-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-says. ↩︎
17. Nicole Wolkov et al., “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 10, 2024,” The Institute for the Study of War, 10 April 2024, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2024. ↩︎